IDEOLOGIES OF THE MEN'S MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I shall argue that a shift in state ideology has contributed to greater visibility for one ideological segment of the men's movement whom I call the "masculinists." The masculinists join with restrictive liberals to argue that feminism has gone too far and that radical feminists, in particular, are demanding too much. I contrast the masculinist men with pro-feminist and traditionalist men in their respective ideologies, their relation to state ideology and patriarchy, and their ability to attain public visibility.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I shall examine the U.S. men's movement in a broad social and historical context. I shall compare and contrast the ideologies of traditionalist, masculinist, and pro-feminist men's organizations in terms of their relation to changes in patriarchy and state ideology. I shall use this approach to measure the visibility of men's movement organizations.

The pro-feminist men's movement has its roots in a period of expansive liberalism when feminist women established significant political opportunities. Other segments of the men's movement associate with ideological traditions that challenge both expansive liberalism and feminism. The traditionalist men draw from conservative political theory and directly oppose feminist goals. The masculinist men, like the restrictive liberals in state policy, stress principles of individualism and freedom and suggest that feminism and expansive liberalism have gone too far in seeking equality.

The pro-feminist men's movement has thus far been unable to attain much visibility. In part this can be attributed to divisions within the major national organization. With both liberal pro-feminists and radical (or socialist) pro-feminists in the leadership of the organization, a cohesive agenda has not yet emerged. This division is reminiscent of the feminist women's movement with its split between theories of the feminine mystique and sexual politics.

The traditionalist men's movement has not received much public attention. In part, this has been due to a propensity of their organizations to rely upon their founders, who continue to be the central organizers and theorists for this strand of the movement. Furthermore, like the New Right, the traditionalist men's movement attempts to return to a form of gender relations that has been made outmoded by changes in the needs of capital

and in the state's emerging political ideology.

The masculinist men's movement has thus far been the most successful at presenting itself to the media and public. Although this strand of the movement is also still small, its focus has been relatively cohesive, and its ideology is consistent with a more restrictively liberal state. The ground, then, seems most fertile for this strand of the movement.

In the second chapter of this paper I shall focus on the historical and ideological context of different strands of the men's movement. The resurgence of feminism as a mass movement is an important historical event in gender relations and will help explain the posturing of these different strands of the emerging men's movement. To make the challenge presented by feminism clearer, I will also examine ideological shifts in the state and the ideas of the human potential movement that have contributed to the liberal countermovement. In the third chapter I will then focus more specifically on men's movement organizations and how they affect and are affected by the prevailing liberal ideology. A process will emerge that reflects the resiliency of liberalism. Liberals in the movement challenge the system during a period of *expansive liberalism*, but then establish an important liberal countermovement during a period of *restrictive liberalism.*

PROBLEM

An adequate framework has not yet been developed to assess the visibility and political opportunities of different ideological segments of the men's movement. Further, while several authors have addressed divisions within the men's movement, they have generally not related these differences to broader changes in patriarchal relations and state ideology. The most recent and most complete characterization of ideological differences within the men's movement is Kenneth Clatterbaugh's article on "Masculinist Perspectives" (Clatterbaugh 1988). Clatterbaugh defines "masculinism" as "any point of view that offers an analysis of the social reality of American men and offers an agenda for them"

(Clatterbaugh 1988: 4). He then divides the movement into six categories: conservative masculinism, anti-sexist masculinism, men's rights masculinism, new age masculinism, socialist masculinism, and group specific masculinisms.

My own categorization of the movement differs in two ways. Fistly, I use "masculinism" to refer only to the faction that Clatterbaugh calls "men's rights masculinism." I do so because this faction claims to represent a parallel to feminism. Whereas feminists seek women's rights and equality for women, masculinists seek men's rights and equality for men. In contrast, the conservatives (or traditionalists) don't seek gender equality at all and the anti-sexists (or pro-feminists) begin with their support for feminist goals. Given Clatterbaugh's definition of masculinism, we would expect feminism to include conservatives, such as Schlafly, who have an analysis of women's social position and an agenda for women. This clearly would be misleading.

Secondly, I combine some of the categories. Because the only national pro-feminist organization (The National Organization for Changing Men) includes socialists and proponents of New Age spirituality, I combine these categories with the liberal and radical anti-sexist men. I agree with Clatterbaugh that these positions are theoretically distinct and that New Age men differ considerably in their ideological focus. However, neither the socialists nor the New Age advocates have found a home in other national organizations and tend to associate themselves primarily with pro-feminist men.

Clatterbaugh's categories are a useful starting point because they do rely upon movement ideology as it relates to patriarchy. However, his argument is incomplete because it does not specifically address men's movement *organizations* or the context in which these organizations have emerged.

Ehrenreich (1983) develops the ideological roots of men's liberation and men's rights, which are primarily associated with the liberal masculinist men's movement. Her study attempts to derive the source of a "male revolt" against the breadwinner ethic and the

family wage. This so-called revolt is dubbed the "flight from commitment." She does reveal some of the contradictions in liberal thought that provide women with both inspiration and constraints. However, her study fails to distinguish between the ideological positions of the various organizations in the men's movement and thus provides little point of reference in assessing the relative visibility of the liberal masculinists as opposed to pro-feminist men or traditionalist men.

This present study will attempt to fill these gaps. My concern is how various strands of the men's movement may affect the goals of feminism, given historical changes in patriarchy and the state ideology. There has been a shift in patriarchy because as industry has employed greater numbers of women in the paid labor force, the authority of man as father and husband has been diminished. Meanwhile, women have become increasingly conscious of the gender stratification that exists in the paid labor market. This is, therefore, an important juncture in terms of the state's attempt to mystify gender relations and discourage sexual consciousness, which would promote radical democracy. If the masculinist men's movement gains in size and visibility, then, it could be used to legitimate social patriarchy and deny the demands of radical and socialist feminists.

REVIEW OF RELEVENT LITERATURE

The visibility of the pro-feminist, traditionalist and masculinist strands of the men's movement depend upon 1) the cohesiveness of their ideology and 2) how that ideology relates to changes in state ideology and patriarchal relations. Ehrenreich (1983) in *The Hearts of Men* looked primarily at the masculinist strand of the movement as a liberal challenge to feminism and tried to explain the roots of these liberal masculinist ideas.

Ehrenreich (1983) focussed on the 1950s to formulate a thesis of man's "flight from commitment." She argued that the "family wage" was initially undermined by "a *male revolt* -- though hardly organized and seldom conscious of its goals -- against the breadwinner ethic" (13). As a result, she argued, women "are increasingly dependent on

our own resources, but in a society and an economy that never intended to admit us as independent persons, much less as breadwinners for others" (Ehrenreich 1983: 175). The concepts of commitment and revolt, though, are misleading. In fact, Ehrenreich expresses her own reservations in the conclusion of her book:

> My own judgment, as the reader must know, is an ambivalent one. At times I have felt that the various trends and intellectual shifts examined here deserve to be called less a 'revolt' than an accomodation. What has been understood as masculinity ... was at odds with the more 'feminine' traits appropriate to a consumption-oriented society...
> (Ehrenreich 1983: 170).

Astrachan (1986) criticizes Ehrenreich's study, because she doesn't address the role of the women's movement "in changing the traditional family" (199). Astrachan attributes this oversight to Ehrenreich's interest in asserting "that feminism has not made war on the idea of marriage" (Astrachan 1983: 199). My own contention is that Ehrenreich (1983) writes herself into a corner by accepting a premise of conservative theorists. The thesis of a male revolt relies upon the premise that men have no incentive to marry, because the market has subsumed the wife's role of providing services. As a consequence, Ehrenreich opposes economic inequality but also bemoans the abandonment of the breadwinner ethic, which encouraged married women to stay out of the paid labor force. The increasingly service economy, while it may have displaced part of the housewife's traditional role by providing more services, has also employed more married women. And many men (according to Blumstein and Schwartz) would provide for their wives if they could.

Ehrenreich also misrepresents the significance of men's stated reluctance to marry. While men have for centuries bemoaned an obligation to marry, "the vitality of marriage has been quite stupendous. Men have cursed it, aimed barbed witticisms at it, denigrated it, bemoaned it -- and never ceased to want and need it or profit from it" (Bernard 1982: 16). And, in fact, the "gray flannel dissidents," the consumers of *Playboy*, and the Beats of whom Ehrenreich wrote found themselves incapable of successfully rebelling: "White-

collar men fretted about conformity or fantasized about 'cheating' with the smooth, pink lovelies in *Playboy*, but there was no real way out of the interlocking demands of job and marriage" (Ehrenreich 1983: 55). And "the Beats remained a miniscule minority," who had scant appeal to most grown men" (Ehrenreich 1983: 53).

Astrachan notes that most of the trends that Ehrenreich establishes "preceded ... and helped shape male responses" to the women's movement (Astrachan 1983: 199). The *organized* men's movement, however, did not emerge until after the resurgence of feminism and after the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966 (the exception is the conservative divorce reformers whom Ehrenreich doesn't mention). In fact the masculinists refer to early statements from Friedan and NOW when they condemn the breadwinner ethic as no longer beneficial to men. Rather than focusing on an unconscious and unorganized "male revolt" against the commitment to protect women, we should be concerned with men's responsibility for their privileged positon in society. This includes a social and political responsibility for the oppression of women. As Astrachan points out, men "have seldom initiated demands for independence or equality between the sexes." Instead, they "were usually tying to have it both ways, privilege but no burdens..." (Astrachan 1983: 199). What Ehrenreich does accomplish, however, is to raise the issue of the ideology of men's liberation, which (as we shall see) is how the masculinist men's movement fits into the state's attempt to solve the crisis of liberalism and remystify patriarchal relations.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

In order to establish the importance of the ideological legitimation of power, I shall begin with the prevailing liberal ideology, its inherent contradictions in explaining social oppression and its importance for both those privileged groups seeking to maintain the status quo and those social movements challenging the existing order. I will specifically consider how liberalism addresses gender and racial inequality. In both race and gender

relations the state tries to mediate power relations within the constraints of liberal theory and the demands of a capitalist economy. In trying to resolve contradictions between liberal values and the inequalities produced by capitalist, race and gender relations, the state attempts to modify the form of these inequalities and their ideological justification.

I shall also address shifts in patriarchal relations. While the patriarchal family has come under attack, social patriarchy remains strong. This shift in patriarchal relations favors the ideology of masculinist men, who attack the patriarchal family but generally accept social patriarchy.

Liberalism and Social Oppression

The liberal state attempts to maintain order while preserving the privilege of white males and the profits of capitalists. In the process, however, contradictions are sometimes revealed when citizens organize to place demands upon the system. As long as these demands remain focused upon an individual or group's right to participate within the existing system, the challenge is to expand the system. However, the system does not expand without pressure. In response to radical consciousness and radical demands that threaten existing relations, the state may either embrace liberal procedural reforms to demonstrate the system's ability to change (during a time of expansive liberalism) or it may discourage such demands by redefining liberalism to remystify power relations and to stress the limitations of reform (during a time of restrictive liberalism).

Privileged groups rely upon ideology to explain and thus to more easily maintain their dominance. As Blauner (1972) explains, social oppression is built upon "the creation and defense of group privileges" (21): "To generate privilege, certain people have to be exploited, and to be exploited they must be controlled -- directly or indirectly. The mechanisms of control ... are therefore central to an understanding of oppression" (22). Important mechanisms in "controlling" blacks in the U.S., for instance, have been

constraints "over the movements of the oppressed and restriction of their full participation in society" (37). These mechanisms may be enforced through law (such as vagrancy or pass laws) or direct repression (such as white supremacist violence), but "the most common and more stable mechanisms reside in cultural beliefs and psychological adaptations. Here the notion of *place* is central" (Blauner 1972: 37). This institutionalized sense of boundaries is also central to the oppression of women for whom one definition of their rightful place has been "in the home."

Social movements also rely upon ideology to explain and thus to strengthen their challenge to the dominant order. Both the system and the insurgents, then, draw upon a liberal tradition that is versatile enough to support contesting positions. Robert Blauner argues that universalism, "the central value of the liberal philosophy," has two faces. On the one hand it "has been one of the great progressive ideas, affirming the essential humanity of all people..." (Blauner 1972: 267). On the other hand, universalism "goes hand in hand with individualism, and in the area of race the two join in the ideal of 'color blindness'" (Blauner 1972: 267). Liberals define sexism and racism as prejudice rather than institutional oppression and exploitation. Opposition to affirmative action quotas, for instance, has become mainstream with the current concern over "reverse discrimination."

While resources are important to a movement, the emergence of insurgency depends upon support from indigenous resources (McAdam 1982). The elite do not support insurgency, which would threaten their status and power. However, liberal funders and policy planners may provide support and encouragement to *reformist* goals in the face of social revolutionary pressures, particularly when a mass movement is strong. During this period of expansive liberalism, state elites may seem supportive of the movement. However, while elite support may increase after the movement becomes more active (and experiences some success), their support will tend to encourage activists to moderate the goals of the movement. Liberals in the movement will be more likely to try working within the system. When radicals continue to press demands that cannot be

satisfied within the system, the movement risks becoming fragmented.

Radical demands, along with the growing expense of implemented reforms, hasten a phase of restrictive liberalism. Restrictive liberals attempt to contain the movement's goals by arguing that the reforms haven't worked, that government programs have just raised expectations, and that the electorate must be satisfied with less. Unlike the conservatives, the restrictive liberals accept many of the reforms (which they saw as necessary), but they also recognize the danger of radicals within the movement, who are "extreme" in their demands. The liberals recognize that containing the movement is more consistent with the stated principles of a liberal democracy than is direct repression (except in dire circumstances). Repression, after all, will reveal the contradictions that exist between elite rule and liberal ideals of equality and freedom.

Shift in Patriarchal Relations

According to Eisenstein, "The understanding of patriarchy cannot be limited to either a particular family form (father, husband) or a static notion of male biological power (strength, aggression)" (Eisenstein 1984: 90). Rather than being a static reality, then, patriarchy adopts new forms as the economic and social structure of society changes. Gerson and Peiss (1985) define patriarchy in terms of boundaries, which are "the complex structures -- physical, social, ideological, and psychological -- which establish the differences and commonalities ... shaping and constraining the behavior and attitudes of each gender group" (Gerson & Peiss 1985: 318).

To define patriarchy in terms of the demands of *sex roles* is inadequate, because this explanation fails to convey the problematic nature of patriarchy. And, as Bowles and Gintis (1987) have observed, "the perpetuation of any power structure is generally problematic" (94). In response to the inadequacy of sexual roles in defining patriarchy, Gerson and Peiss (1985) have established a definition based instead upon *gender relations*. From this perspective, they argue, "gender is not a reified analytic category

imposed on human experience but a fluid one whose meaning emerges in specific social contexts as it is created and recreated through human actions" (317).

The boundaries have changed, but the negotiated relationship of gender has continued to be characterized by male dominance. For instance, women have increasingly entered the "public sphere" in a way that shifts the boundaries between public and private life. This certainly threatens the stability of a particular reified form of patriarchy, but patriarchal relations may continue in another form with renewed legitimacy. As Bowser (1985) points out, racism also takes different forms as socioeconomic conditions change: "As each mode of discrimination is challenged, a new one can easily take its place because the central motivation is still intact and unchanged" (Bowser 1985: 319).

Although the participation of women in the workforce has never fallen to the pre-World War II level, women's "position in the work force" after World War II "dropped drastically" (Freeman 1975: 23). As McAdam argues some historical periods provide a more conducive environment for insurrection than do others. By the early 1960s, the political opportunities for women had increased considerably because of shifting boundaries that made contradictions between women's position and liberal promises more apparent.

> Here then is the contradiction: advanced capitalism, because of structural changes and inflation, has required married women to enter the labor force. Although the structure of the capitalist market is patriarchal, its ideology is definately liberal... Therein lies a major crisis for liberalism: the contradictory reality of patriarchal inequality in an ideology of (liberal) equality is being uncovered by the married wage-earning woman.
>
> (Eisenstein 1984: 52)

The issues around which both the women's and men's movements would mobilize became vital because of these shifting boundaries. As long as the patriarchal family remained relatively stable, the family could be defined as "protected from the relations of power in society" (Eisenstein 1983: 46). Women's relations to power could thus be

mystified by establishing that women (and particularly married women with children) worked in the home, which was a private (thus not a political) realm. With an increasingly service economy, though, "some of the relational and ideological needs of patriarchy have been undermined, and as a result *the system of familial patriarchy appears less able to sustain the system of social patriarchy*" [emphasis added] (Eisenstein 1983: 47). Given this instability, the state has attempted to mediate the needs of capitalism and the patriarchal family (Eisenstein 1984: 94). Inasmuch as the state provides support for social patriarchy, it discourages the political visibility of pro-feminist men. And given the weakening of the patriarchal family, traditionalist men are marginalized. The masculinists, though, represent the "new man," who can maintain male dominance while changing his defined role in the family. Because this is consistent with the dominant state ideology, masculinist men have received considerably more attention than the other factions.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTEXT OF THE MEN'S MOVEMENT

CONTEXT FOR PRO-FEMINIST MEN

The context in which the pro-feminist men's movement emerged was one of expansive liberalism. Public support for liberal feminist reforms was high, and the state was making some concessions. Most of the men who organized and joined the pro-feminist men's movement supported the goals of women's rights but may have felt some ambivalence toward radical feminism. Organizations that were formed and disbanded in the 1970s had such titles as Men Allied Nationally for the Equal Rights Amendment (M.A.N. for E.R.A.) and Men's Alliance for Liberation and Equality (M.A.L.E.) (see Farrell 1978 and Kleiman 1978).

As with feminist women, the ideology of pro-feminist men was divided from its inception. The larger number have pressed for legal reforms to protect women's rights and legally recognize women's equality. A smaller number have worked on such issues as male violence and pornography, arguing that inequality has its roots not just in law but also in cultural meaning and personal relations and that these roots must also be addressed politically.

In order to understand the ideological divisions within the pro-feminist men's movement and its present position relative to state ideology, I will examine the general concept of expansive liberalism and the re-emergence of feminism as a mass movement divided between liberals and radicals.

Expansive Liberalism

Again, it is important to note that the elite do not have an interest in supporting social movements until they present some challenge. James Geschwender (1977) explains

that when "the resistance is too strong to be crushed, then the exploiting group may be forced to *retreat* through a partial abandonment of the system of racial exploitation" (2). The same is true of gender exploitation. This is the response of expansive liberalism.

Because gender relations function within a political context, the state has an interest in maintaining the patriarchal privilege of men in our society. State policies, then, shift to provide new ways of resolving conflicts that surface between the needs of capital, gender relations, and the prevailing interpretation of liberal values. As the liberal center has shifted in the past twenty years, the reaction of the state to demands of the women's movement and the men's movement has changed accordingly.

In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration attempted to moderate the goals of feminists by providing support to limited legal reforms for women's rights. Feree and Hess suggest that John Kennedy "brought women's rights back into the political forum" during the 1960 campaign (Feree and Hess 1985: 20). Yet, Kennedy was no women's rights activist. A year after being elected, Kennedy was confronted at a news conference by May Craig of the Portland (ME) *Press-Herald.* The report appeared under the heading, "A Chivalrous Kennedy Backs Women's Rights":

> President Kennedy smiled his way out of a bristling question on women's rights at his news conference today.
>
> A woman questioner noted that the Democratic presidential platform had promised equal rights for women, including equal pay. She asked:
>
> "What have you done for the women according to the promises of the platform?"
>
> "Well," said Mr. Kennedy, "I am sure we have not done enough."
>
> He added when the laughter subsided, that he believed in equal pay for equal work and thought "we ought to do better than we are doing."
>
> "I am glad you reminded me of it," he concluded to more male laughter from the audience" (New York Times, 1961, N9, 14: 6).

Still, Kennedy did offer some impetus to the rights of professional women. In December of 1961, Kennedy established the President's Commission on the Status of Women "at the behest of Esther Peterson, then director of the Women's Bureau [footnote removed]" (Freeman 1975: 52). Evans (1979) has written that "the purpose, in fact, may

have been to quell a growing pressure for an Equal Rights Amendment, but unwittingly the government organized its own opposition" (16).

In 1963 Kennedy's commission issued its report, rejecting the ERA as unnecessary but recommending equal pay in federal employment. In response, Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act. If women were to be hired for professional jobs, they had to be paid equally. Freeman (1975) noted that such legislation had been previously suggested by protectionists to keep women from undercutting men's wages. And, in fact, both Peterson and honorary chair Eleanor Roosevelt had long supported equal pay as an alternative to the ERA. Freeman writes, however, that "equal pay was irrelevent without equal job opportunity" (Freeman 1975: 176).

Similarly, Doug McAdam (1982) notes that, in the early 1960s, the goals of black insurgency "centered more on the integration of blacks into various areas of American life rather than on any major restructuring of the dominant economic and political institutions of society" (McAdam 1982: 164). This liberal focus on legal rights found increasing support in the general public and was not adamently opposed by the state, except when illegal tactics were used. Unlike the conservatives, who favored continued repression, the expansive liberals recognized that because of public support for the movement's goals, "the cost of openly racist rhetoric or policies" in the early 1960s was "the disaffection of the white liberal community..." (McAdam 1982: 159).

For women of all races, then, the early 1960s was a time when expansive liberals agreed to some beneficial legal reforms. These reforms had the effect of removing some of the constraints to opportunity, though it didn't assure just results.

Liberal Feminism and Women's Rights

Changes in gender relations and the development of a notion of sexual politics must be understood within the broader socioeconomic context of the United States. After

women gained the vote in the United States, the women's suffrage coalition unraveled. Reportedly the movement "died" to be reborn in response to Kennedy's Commission on the Status of Women. In fact, a deep split emerged in the feminist movement that would not be mended until the late 1960s.

Excluding black women (of whom nearly half over the age of 16 worked) the vast majority (77%) of women in the paid labor force in the 1920s were "young and single, mostly from immigrant and poor families" (Feree and Hess 1985: 2). Most women who remained in the paid labor force during the Depression years of 1928-1939 were limited to low-paying occupations, and laws restricted married women from working because of a concern that they would take jobs from male breadwinners. These conditions tended to divide women on the basis of class, race, and marital status. Women's groups, then, were largely divided by class into professional clubs and labor unions.

The National Women's Party had emerged from the suffrage campaign with a dual focus of support for the Equal Rights Amendment (first introduced in Congress in 1923) and for women running for public office. Norma Krause Herzfeld (1960) wrote that the ERA had "split organized American womanhood right in two" (517). Among the groups supporting the ERA were the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs and the General Federation of Women's Clubs. Groups opposing the ERA included the National League of Women Voters, the National Association of University Women, the National Council of Catholic Women and "labor groups" (Herzfeld 1960: 518).

Feminists who opposed the ERA supported laws guaranteeing "equal pay for equal work" but thought the ERA would threaten legislation protecting working women. According to Frances Perkins (1927), "the trade union women" were "leaders in the movement for" protective legislation (23). Such legislation included a minimum wage for women and limits upon the number of hours women could work per day. Herzfeld (1960) suggested that under equal pay legislation professional women worked "on a kind of

'separate but equal' basis..." (518). Elizabeth Faulkner Baker (1927) noted, in fact, that protective legislation did not benefit women if they were "in the minority in the occupation or industry" to which the laws applied (12). In these occupations, she says, women "may well fear for the security of their positions" (Baker 1927: 26).

Supporters of the ERA, who were critical of "special legislative protection" argued that such protection should be provided to all workers regardless of gender. The question posed was whether women workers needed protection because they were women (as the courts and many male unions believed) or because they were workers. And if the latter, was it more effective to first end discrimination or to use special protection as "a stepping stone to the legal protection of all workers" (Baker 1927: 12).

Following World War II, the United States entered a period of prolonged economic expansion that was distinguished by a growing public sector and an increasingly service economy. The family wage was threatened (for those who had it) by inflation and "there was a high need for well-educated low-paid clerical and service workers" (Freeman 1975: 24). Married women began entering the workforce in greater numbers to fill positions in these new industries and to provide additional income for a growing consumer demand. The trend between 1940 and 1960 was of women re-entering the workforce in middle age after their children were raised. The state was characterized by *expansive liberalism.*

In spite of a cultural focus upon women's role in the home, "the percentage of wife-mothers in the labor force rose steadily in the 1950's in response to labor demand and the consumer economy, which benefitted from a supplemented family wage" (Feree and Hess 1985: 5). Among women whose husbands were present in the family, 14.7% were employed in 1940. Except for a brief decline after World War II, employment in this group has risen steadily to 51% in 1981. In comparison employment among single women increased from 48.1% to 62.3% and among widowed or divorced women from 32% to 41.9 percent.

There has also been a crisis in the marital union. What needs to be explained,

though, is not the breakdown of the family per se, but the erosion of a particular family form in which the husband and father had authority. With women earning money in the paid labor force, some men have questioned their own role as sole financial provider. In fact, "the historical evidence suggests that while both masculinity and femininity are socially constructed with [the] historical context of gender relations, definitions of masculinity are historically reactive to changing definitions of femininity" (Kimmel 1987: 123). Both feminism and restrictive liberal masculinism responded to structural changes that have made traditional relations vulnerable to attack. The "male revolt" and the "flight from commitment", then, are part of men's response to their diminishing role as protector of women. By arguing that men do not benefit from this role, Ehrenreich tends to undermine the theoretical notion of the patriarchal family. She conveniently dismisses offhand, for instance, Jessie Bernard's contention that men gain emotional security while maintaining economic power: "... contrary to all the charges leveled against it, the husband's marriage, whether they like it or not (and they do), is awfully good for them" (Bernard 1982: 16).

By the 1960s women were also better educated than they had ever been before (Freeman 1975: 29). The National Woman's Party was still pushing for passage of the ERA. During the presidential campaign of 1960, the National Woman's Party sent "deputations to all announced candidates for President in behalf of the long-pending equal-rights amendment" (New York Times 1960, Jan. 6, 19: 5). In 1963, Betty Friedan wrote *The Feminine Mystique*, which called upon women to get out of the home and do more with their lives. Between 1960 and 1980, moreover, more "mothers interrupted employment for increasingly shorter periods of child raising, or simply shifted to part-time work" (Feree and Hess 1985: 2).

In 1964 the provision of equal employment opportunity in the Civil Rights Act was amended to include "sex." In part this was attributed to a procedural maneuver by

legislators attempting to kill the Civil Rights Act. Consequently, the enforcement of equal employment opportunity for women was less than vigorously enforced. This became the focus of a renewed interest in feminism. In June 1966, at the third annual convention of the state commissions, a resolution to pressure the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce equal opportunity for women was squelched by conference officials. In response, Betty Friedan and two dozen conference delegates formed the National Organization for Women (NOW) to end employment discrimination against women (Freeman 1975: 55).

Freeman (1975) argues that, during its first year, NOW "reflected its limited origins more than its broad goals" (75). At its second conference in November 1967, NOW had increased its membership to 1,200 persons. Conflict erupted over proposals to support an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and women's reproductive rights. Some women who had wanted to maintain a narrow agenda formed the Women's Equity Action League in the fall of 1968. In addition, a couple of NOW lawyers formed the Human Rights for Women. Even with the issues of the ERA and reproductive freedom, though, NOW was basically a liberal organization: "NOW's intention never was to subvert male bastions of power, but to ... enable women to work alongside men in education, employment and politics" (Wickenden 1986: 20). In fact, Ehrenreich (1987) recently noted in an article for *Ms.* that most of the successes of the women's movement thus far have benefitted professional women more than working class and poor women.

The National Organization for Women rediscovered the issue of the Equal Rights Amendment as an avenue for ending sex discrimination. Still, the ERA, though apparently necessary, was a limited strategy for achieving women's equality. In fact, "the ERA campaign was in part an effort by the moderate women's movement to shake off the vague revolutionism of radical feminism," and "even many supporters of the ERA were skeptical about its potential for bringing a more egalitarian society" (Wickenden 1986: 20). While Burris has shown that working class families generally supported the ERA as a means of

helping working women, the emphasis on the ERA may have come at the expense of programs that could have been more helpful: "Pay equity may result at last in higher wages for women in underpaid jobs. But it will not necessarily ensure an equal distribution of labor" (Wickenden 1986: 24). Rather, it is necessary to address the demands of the institution of motherhood. These include legal and economic access to birth control, abortion and day care. It also includes exploring new family forms and organizing women's labor. As the women of NOW have focused on these other issues they have sharpened their critique of patriarchy.

The National Organization for Women was established as a national group without an agenda for grassroots organizing. Evans (1979) wrote that "in general, the professional women who created NOW accepted the division between the public and private spheres and chose to seek equality primarily in the public realm" (19). It was for this reason, suggests Evans, that NOW could not alone organize a mass movement at the grassroots.

As NOW grew in size, the organization became more decentralized and established regional and state structures to coordinate local activities with national goals. Following a demonstration for women's rights on August 26, 1970, the involvement grew quickly, and the composition of NOW changed (Freeman, p. 85). Increasingly radical women from the women's liberation groups became involved with NOW at the local level, and these groups (and their publications) served as "an ideological vanguard" in the transformation of NOW (Freeman 1975: 99).

In 1971 NOW passed a resolution recognizing lesbian sexuality as a legitimate option for women. This came after Friedan, in 1969 and 1970, had set out "to 'purge' NOW of what she called the 'lavendar menace'" (Freeman 1975: 99). Eisenstein (1981), recognizing this shift in NOW's agenda, commented that "NOW appears to be moving away from Friedan's mainstream politics of the 1960's" (192). She cautions, however, that NOW remains limited by its liberal origins and its failure to develop an explicitly

radical feminist identity to guide its more radical agenda. Reproductive freedom and lesbian rights are defined in terms of liberal law rather than as sexual politics. Thus, for instance, it has been difficult to mobilize for financial access to abortion services.

While the ERA is a limited goal and abortion has been defined in terms of liberal rights rather than as an issue of power, these have become campaigns on which liberal and radical feminists could work together, and NOW has tended to include more radical demands than when it began. In part this is due to difficulties in achieving equality through liberal means. Ending sex discrimination is not complete and has failed to create political and economic equality for women. Women's wages continue to be less than those of men. Most positions of institutional leadership (including the corporate boardrooms and the halls of Congress) continue to be occupied by men. "In 1980 two out of three adults who fit into the federal definition of poverty were women, and more than half the families defined as poor were maintained by single women" (Ehrenreich 1983: 172). This "feminization of poverty" was documented by Diana Pearce (1978). While divorced women with children tend to experience a loss of their standard of living, divorced men tend to enjoy an increase in their standard of living (see Weitzman 1985).

Radical Feminism and Women's Liberation

In an effort to explain the connections between their sexual degradation and male dominance in the so-called public sphere, feminist theorists began to challenge the limitations placed upon political theory and action. According to Evans (1979), a workshop at the 1965 conference of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) planted the seeds of the women's liberation movement that would come to fruition in 1967. Casey Hayden and Mary King composed a memo that criticized "a caste system that, at its worst, uses and exploits women" (Evans 1979: 235). The workshop also utilized many of the processes of consciousness-raising that would be central to the independent women's liberation movement. The Free Speech Movement and protests against the Vietnam War

had begun to transform the character of SDS, and "as the movement grew and changed, the question of women's roles had simultaneously begun to surface" (Evans 1979: 159).

While the movement constituency grew larger and students began focusing on their own position in the system, women in the movement found it "more alienating, more massive, competitive, and sexually exploitive" (Evans 1979: 170). The movement became more focused on the university setting, and the cultural protests were becoming more focused on young men resisting the draft.

The older women in the movement, who were often married and had much experience in SDS, raised the issue of women's position, but it was their younger sisters who frequently expressed greater anger (Evans 1979: 167). A statement that emerged from the December 1965 conference challenged the men of the movement to explore within themselves their inconsistency in relating to movement women. Some men eventually took such a challenge to heart and attended consciousness-raising groups that would be the beginning of a pro-feminist men's movement.

A "Women's Liberation Workshop" was organized at the SDS convention of June 1967. This workshop presented a set of demands, along with an analysis that compared women's status to that of Third World nations. Conflict ensued: "Most of the men who spoke accepted the notion of sexual caste system, but they argued strenuously against the third world analogy" (Evans 1979: 192). Women's demands were belittled and the *New Left Notes* included an unsympathetic graphic with its report of the events.

The radical women's movement consisted of small autonomous groups who organized dramatic actions and called themselves such names as Redstockings, Bread and Roses, or W.I.T.C.H. (Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy From Hell). Many women's liberation groups formed in late 1967 and into 1968. In 1968, twenty-two women from women's liberation groups met in Sandy Springs, Maryland. Many activist women wanted to maintain their ties to the New Left, and the only issue settled was to hold an open convention in Chicago on Thanksgiving. At that meeting 200 women attended and

were involved in much debate and dissension before returning to work in their local areas (Freeman 1975: 106-7). While many of the new women to join such groups focused only on "women's issues," those women with experience in the New Left continued to view women's concerns within a broader political context. The former preferred the term "women's liberation" while the latter preferred the term "radical women" (108). As we shall see, the pro-feminist men have also been divided over the terms used to define themselves.

The New York Radical Women organized a protest at the Miss America Pagaent on September 7, 1968. Two hundred women demonstrated against the pagaent with such activities "as the crowning of a live sheep as Miss America ... and a Freedom Trash Can into which demonstrators threw their steno pads, dish cloths, curlers, false eyelashes, girdles and bras" (McAllister 1988: 138). The media characterized the event as "bra burning," apparently to convey a similarity to other radical actions, such as flag or draft card burnings.

Violence against women has been a central facet of the sexual politics that concern radical women. Beauty pagaents were a target, explains McAllister (1988), because they "serve to sanction public scrutiny and ranking of female bodies and thus legitimize the objectification of women. This objectification, the protesters claim, feeds the climate of violence against women" (139). In addition to beauty pagaents, radical women have organized against pornography, marital violence, rape, sexual harassment, and so on.

By 1983, according to Feree and Hess, "the vital and influential liberation groups had either dissolved or lost focus..." (Feree and Hess 1985: 62). This supposedly coincided with a merging of radical women and liberal feminists. Yet many radical feminists continue to act autonomously of NOW and other liberal feminist organizations.

In 1974, for instance, women on the West Coast began an annual protest of the Miss California Pagaent. Among the activities have been women "in the streets outside the

auditorium" yelling chants and wearing "banners with the inscriptions 'MISS-INFORMED,' 'MI$$-USED,' 'MISS-FORTUNE,' 'MISS-OGYNE,' and 'MISS ANNA-REXIA'" (McAllister 1988: 139). Nikki Craft, whom McAllister (1988) calls "a guiding spirit at the protests" (139), has founded such organizations as the Preying Mantis Brigade, Citizens for Media Responsibility Without Law (a.k.a. Outlaws for Social Responsibility), Cross Your Heart Support Network, and Naturists Opposed to Pornographic Exploitation (N.O.P.E.).

Conflict in Feminist Ideology

One issue of great contention between feminist women is how to confront pornography. Andrea Dworkin, a radical feminist who helped draft ordinances in Minneapolis and Indianapolis, expresses and often represents this conflict:

> While many feminists disavow Miss Dworkin and her work, she, in turn, is critical of what she calls "organized feminism" for not taking a stronger stand against pornography. "The National Organization for Women is incredibly cowardly and timid on the issue," she said, "because they don't want to alienate their liberal supporters"
>
> (New York *Times*, Aug. 26, 1985, B7: 2).

Radical feminists like Dworkin recognize that the liberal notions of freedom and privacy (implying that the personal is not political) are frequently exploited by capitalists in the sex industry. Legal rights in a liberal society are an enigma. Our focus is usually upon the liberation of the citizenry from illegitimate repression. However, in our capitalist society corporations are also legally persons with personal rights (which is related to the concept of *free* enterprise). In such a society "free speech" has difficulty competing with "bought speech." Marcuse addressed this paradox of freedom in a repressive society when he wrote that "freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech) becomes an instrument for absolving servitude. And yet ... the existence and practice of these liberties remain a precondition for the restoration of their original oppostional function ..." (Marcuse 1965: 84).

While liberals risk being co-opted or exploited by free enterprise, the radical critique of male violence runs the risk of being co-opted by conservative theorists who want to repress sexuality. Many radical feminists who write about pornography or "distinctions between erotica and pornography" tend to use terms that make it "very difficult to think about the issue of sex in any other than protective terms" (Eisenstein 1984: 249). They do this by stressing the connections between the consumption of pornography and male violence against women. Writes Eisenstein (1984): "Most of the anti-pornography movement links sex and violence, heterosexual sex and rape" (250). Eisenstein adds that

> unless one wants to argue that all sexually active women are victims of false consciousness, one must deal with the contradictory mechanism by which, in spite of the patriarchal contours, heterosexual women desire sexual pleasure with men, women are aroused by pornography ... and so on.
> (Eisenstein 1984: 250)

Many radical and socialist feminists, though, resist pornography without appealing to the law for protection. The Outlaws for Social Responsibility, for instance, practice civil disobedience to empower women and to stress "corporate and individual responsibility" (Craft 1985: 7). The Outlaws for Social Responsibility promote sexual liberation while acting against exploitation. They express support for "nudity and sensuality," for "diverse consenting sexual experience," and for "explicit sexual materials" (Craft 1985: 7). At the same time, they also recognize that pornography is not an abstract issue removed from capital and sexual class relations. Rather, pornography represents the prevailing images of women and sexuality, which are part of the cultural legitimation of patriarchal relations, of the boundaries that restrict women and of the domination exercised by men as a sexual class. Furthermore, as in other businesses, the "sex industry" typically follows the model of men owning and profiting from women's labor.

The Outlaws for Social Responsibility believe that pornography and advertising use women's images to reflect and promote "body hatred and guilt concerning normal functions" (Craft 1985: 7). They object to the use of "women's bodies to sell products"

and violence against women sold "for entertainment and men's profit..." (Craft 1985: 7). Because they perceive pornography to be consistent with other cultural representations of women and with other exploitation of women's labor, they want to publicly confront pornography without censoring or banning its production or consumption. They believe that a ban would sweep the issue under the table and protect it from scrutiny. To be clear about what they are protesting, they state up front, "SEX IS NOT OBSCENE! The real obscenity is the marketing of women as products..." (Craft 1985: 7). Rather than focusing on contractual or legal rights, then, the Outlaws for Social Responsibility emphasize the class rights of women.

SHIFT IN STATE IDEOLOGY

The post-Vietnam period has been marked by a search for a new ideological center. Elite funders have become dissatisfied with the growth of the welfare sector and the liberal agenda that has supported it. Neoconservative or *restrictive liberal* policy planners have developed plans to slow liberal reforms and "correct" for the presumed excesses of liberalism (see, for example, Ferguson and Rogers 1986). The state has thus assumed an ideology of *restrictive liberalism.*

Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. economy has been increasingly plagued, and the Republican Party has maintained the presidency with the exception of the four years of the Carter Administration following the Watergate scandal. Liberal feminists and blacks have made significant gains, particularly in terms of legal protections and some new social services, but economic troubles combined with pressures from the civil rights, new left, and feminist movements fueled a reactionary movement from the new right. The new center is now being established by restrictive liberal policy planners. These restrictive liberals express the sentiment that liberalism has gone too far. In order to constrain the demands placed upon government, they attempt to limit the notion of equal opportunity to

its most narrow interpretation. Meanwhile, they attempt to avert the possibility that demands made on the basis of equal opportunity will expose the contradictions between the concept of equality and the continued existence of hierarchy and oppression (see Eisenstein 1981). These restrictive liberals may ally themselves with some conservatives and even borrow some of their rhetoric. Their goal, however, is not a conservative revolution, but a new liberal center.

CONTEXT FOR TRADITIONALIST MEN

Traditionalist men have organized in a spirit of resistance to changes that threaten the traditionally personal authority of men. Traditionalist men may concede that women are capable of performing some jobs in the paid labor force, and they may even accept some changes in women's role. They are clear, however, that men and women are different and that, even if they perform new roles, women shouldn't undermine male authority. For Gilder the risk is that men will lose their motivation. For activists in the traditionalist men's movement the risks are 1) that women will be given so much special treatment by the state and the courts that they won't need their husbands and 2) that children will either be soft or overly rebellious without male authority and discipline. The traditionalist men's movement, then, is connected with conservative theories and the goals of anti-feminists of the "pro-family" New Right.

Conservative Response to the Liberal Crisis

Conservatives have responded primarily to a crisis of authority and proposed a return of previous boundaries. Some conservative scholars have used sociobiology in an attempt to defend traditional values and respect for authority as natural. Philip Green (1981) argues that these conservative "arguments, taken together, ... implicitly ... repudiate the entire ethos of liberal democracy; *their appeal is designed for a time of crisis, not for the long run* [emphasis added]" (10). A brief glimpse at these conservatives will

demonstrate that the so called "neoconservatives" are, in fact, liberals.

Steven Goldberg, the author of *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*, reflects the interests of the true conservatives in his assertion "that by nature women can never be the equals of men in the quest for leadership" because men "are much more likely than women to exhibit a *drive to dominance*" (Green 1981: 127). Goldberg attributes this male aggression to hormones, which determine the needs of the male psyche. Men must, by their nature, dominate; otherwise they would not be men. George Gilder, "one of Goldberg's populizers" (Green 1981: 134), develops a self-consciously conservative political agenda. Recognizing that women can and do work in the paid labor force, Gilder relies on a variation of protecting the man's family wage. For the sake of their husbands, their marriages and their country, argues Gilder, women should not work even though they are capable of doing so. When women work, he explains, they undermine the man's sense of obligation to support *his* family. They also undermine the work ethic for the man, who is, by nature more inclined to reckless abandon and the unbridled pursuit of pleasure (male aggression gone wild). In short, women's role in the paid labor force has supposedly worked to undermine patriarchal authority and stability (Gilder 1973; see also Armstrong 1983 and Eisenstein 1984).

Gilder argues that marriage is necessary to control men's sexual drive because "sexual freedom is seen as destructive to the moral fabric of society..." (Eisenstein 1984: 55). This control is the wife's role. For the conservatives the corrolary to this is that women are more privileged than men. The conservatives argue that for women to protect their natural privilege and for the moral good of the nation, women should return to the home and men should resume their breadwinner role. The conservatives contend that this "commitment" as breadwinner is the mechanism of social control that prevents men from an unrestrained pursuit of pleasure. Gilder "argues for inequality between men and women in the economic realm in order to establish the importance and privilege of man as breadwinner, to counter the 'natural privilege of women'" (Eisenstein 1984: 54).

Anti-Feminist Women

Before founding the Eagle Forum, Phyllis Schlafly was an organizer within the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Klatch (1987) associates this wing of the Republicans with the John Birch Society: "While the John Birch Society epitomizes the radical right of the 1950s, ... the Society is a crucial link between the Old Right and the social conservatism of the New Right" (225).

The Eagle Forum's "pro-family" agenda stresses a need for authority in the family, which is presumed to be a traditional nuclear family. This demands also a cultural respect for authority: "The Eagle Forum, 'a national organization of women and men who believe in God, Home, and Country,' believes that it is the responsibility of society to honor the career of motherhood by recognizing the right of women to be a full-time wife and mother and to have laws that obligate her husband to provide the primary financial support and a home for her and their children [Eagle Forum flyer, Box 618, Alton, IL 62002]" (Eisenstein 1984: 177). It's clear that authority also carries a burden of responsibility, and women are considered to be in the enviable position of being protected by good masters. Likewise the citizens are protected by benevolent leaders in a hierarchy that is part of the natural order: "Antifeminists ... argue against sexual equality and for 'justice,' that is, difference and protection" (Eisenstein 1984: 169).

Deidre English (1983) has observed that these anti-feminists also claim "to stand for the best interests of all women" (477). These women have blamed feminism for the breakdown of the family. English (1983) characterizes the anti-feminist women's movement as expressing a "fear that feminism will free men first":

> If women hold jobs, no matter how poorly paid, men may more easily renounce any responsibility for the economic support of women and children. Thus woman's meager new economic independence, and her greater sexual freedom outside the bounds of marriage have allowed men to garner great new freedom. (481)

CONTEXT OF THE MASCULINIST MEN'S MOVEMENT

The masculinist men's movement is the one strand whose roots Ehrenreich (1983) addressed at length. From her argument I draw the importance of the human potential movement as a source of the individualism that's vital to men's liberation and men's rights. Because I am also concerned with the changing ideology of the state, though, I begin my examination of the roots of masculinism with a description of restrictive liberalism. Here I draw primarily from Steinfels' (1979) study of neoconservatives, while contending that the neoconservative is more appropriately deemed a restrictive liberal. I will then focus on the liberal countermovement to show how both the women's movement and men's movement have been affected by the shift in state ideology. As I stated earlier, when liberals within the movement attempt to work within the state while radicals press demands that cannot be satisfied within the system, the movement risks fragmentation. One fragment that emerges is the liberal countermovement, which continues to press for limited liberal reforms while also chastising the radicals and expansive liberals in the movement that demand too much or use extreme tactics.

Restrictive Liberalism

The stability of the U.S. polity relies upon a process of legitimating authority, and the ideology of liberal democracy allows stability without the overt use of force. We shift then from clear submission to a more murky form of acquiescence, which is defined as consensus. Intellectuals are important to this process because "as traffickers in society's symbols and values ... and ... as political theorists and shapers of general ideas intellectuals are legitimators" (Steinfels 1979: 6).

Steinfels (1979) traces the roots of "neoconservative" thought to the Cold War period. Functionalism was popular in the 1950s. During this time liberal intellectuals attacked mass politics as anti-intellectual and undemocratic. To do this, however, they used a particular definition of democracy that has become the modus operendi of restrictive

liberalism. Steinfels establishes five components of this definition, each of which are founded upon liberal theories of society: 1) pluralism, 2) consensus, 3) objectivity, 4) status politics, and 5) pragmatism. The overarching component is pluralism, which sets out to explain how our system functions to assure liberal values of equality and freedom. Social groups are said to compete in a fashion that will maintain balance, harmony and social order. Individuals are represented by these groups rather than participating themselves: "Citizen apathy is rationalized, and any degree of mass citizen participation is perceived as a threat and a precursor of totalitarian democracy" (Steinfels 1979: 34). The threat to democracy is presumed to be an idealistic belief that everyone can participate personally without representation. The elites and the inequality they represent, consequently, are not deemed threatening.

The concept of consensus relies upon the principles of objectivity and pragmatism. "The clash of groups" is supposed to have taken "place within a consensus about the rules of the game and the fundamental values that sustained these rules" (Steinfels 1979: 35). Anyone who contested the procedures of democracy or the markets were deemed to be ideologues. The terminology has been popular among political commentators in the 1980s. Aides to Reagan and now to Bush are divided into camps of ideologues (in this case right-wing) and pragmatists. By declaring an end to ideology, these intellectuals endorsed the liberal center without taking responsibility for this position. Anyone who contested the fundamental values of society were labeled "moralists." Of considerable significance for our discussion of changing boundaries, it was argued that "moralism dissolved the lines between public and private, between law and morality, that liberalism had established in hope of minimizing conflict over fundamental beliefs..." (Steinfels 1979: 36).

The final concept was meant to explain the occasional conflict that did arise. Status politics was characterized by status anxiety. Insurgents struggle, therefore, not against oppression but against modernism. The argument relied heavily upon psychological

characteristics, and "as a staple of political argument..., the 'new framework' ... turned out to be another, slightly more sophisticated, reductionism" (Steinfels 1979: 38).

With black insurgency, the New Left, and women's liberation, a respect for law and a reverence for experts was undermined by civil disobedience, rioting, and insurgency in general. Whereas the "neoconservative" intellectuals had once argued that moralism was "intolerant of accomodation and ambiguity" (Steinfels 1979: 36), they were now bemoaning the loss of "values." While these values were central to conservative thought, the restrictive liberals or "neoconservatives" were not abandoning their pragmatism. Instead, it seemed pragmatic to build a coalition with some of the conservatives to protect liberal society. As we shall see, these values did not challenge the objective or the pragmatic. Rather, those unspoken and supposedly consensual values were thought to be the underpinning of liberal stability.

Writes Steinfels: "Neoconservatives, *like most Americans*, disapprove of the unequal treatment suffered by racial minorities, women and the poor. But they ... are strongly opposed to minority separatism, disruption as a means of dramatizing conditions and forcing action, and civil disobedience except in very extreme circumstances" [emphasis added] (Steinfels 1979: 50). This is the classic dilemma of the liberal, who "quickly and self-consciously rejects two obvious alternatives which he [sic] defines as 'extremes'" (Ryan 1971: 27). During the Cold War, these liberals seemed to be alligned with the Left in their attack on McCarthyism, because the liberal "cannot side with an openly reactionary, repressive position," which is considered "repugnant" (Ryan 1971: 27). Then during the early 1970s, these liberals seemed to be aligned with conservatives, because the liberals abandon "the 'extreme' solution of radical social change, and ... cannot bring themselves to attack the system that has been so good to them" (Ryan 1971: 27).

In terms of race, Geschwender also notes that "retreat usually takes the form of retrenchment in a new system of racial exploitation which provides many of the advantages of the old system at lesser cost" (Geschwender 1977: 2). Restrictive liberals formulate the

terms of the retrenchment and, in the process, align themselves with some conservatives. By the mid to late 1960s, "the issue of an anachronistic regional caste system was replaced by fundamental questions concerning the equity of the prevailing distributions of wealth and power in America" (McAdam 1982: 206). Beginning in 1966 there was a "white backlash" reflected in a shifting political agenda. This was characterized by increasing white majorities for conservative political candidates and "the efforts of elected officials and political candidates to discredit the shifting patterns of black insurgency characteristic of this period" (McAdam 1982: 200). By the 1980s this white backlash had become part of the prevailing political ideology of restrictive liberalism.

Although racial prejudice has declined, efforts to improve the status of blacks has fallen upon disfavor. In part this can be attributed to the belief that liberal reforms have already created racial equality: "Polls reveal that an increasing number of white Americans are committed to the concept and the ideal of integration. Many of them believe that true equality of opportunity has been attained as a result of the passage of civil rights laws..." (Gill 1981: 189-190). As a result many U.S. citizens oppose "governmental and societal efforts that are thought to favor blacks [New York Times, December 3, 1979, p. 68]" (Gill 1981: 189-190).

In 1984 the Heritage Foundation prepared an agenda for President Reagan's second term and a summary of his administration's first four years. Prior to Reagan, according to this report, "judicial battles were being won by the argument that racial justice actually consists of race-consciousness -- and that the law must favor some races over others. This momentum, however, has been halted by the Reagan Administration's Justice Department. It has returned to the original vision of color-blind justice" (Butler 1984: 156). There continued to be contradictions within the state, as officials tried to maintain an image of liberal equality. Specifically, while the Justice Department opposed "quotas in any form," others in the White House reportedly "sought to woo minority businessmen [sic]" (Butler

1984: 156).

Steinfels concedes that "it has not been easy to settle upon a label" for those he calls "neoconservatives" (Steinfels 1979: 2). He also recognizes that "liberalism itself contains important conservative elements" and that it is this conservative aspect of liberalism that "neoconservatives reemphasize" (Steinfels 1979: 3). Steinfels rejects the use of liberalism, because he rightly believes that "neoconservatism" is somehow different from the expansive liberalism of the New Frontier and the Great Society. In doing so, however, he suggests that these views are new or are removed somehow from the liberal tradition rather than being rooted in a fundamental contradiction in our liberal society. They are still liberals but now in a restrictive phase.

Search for a New Center

The restrictive liberals hold open the possibility of equality but insist that government should not be expected to provide equal conditions. Rather, while restrictive liberals respect traditional values and reject the counterculture and radical politics, they favor equal opportunity. This opportunity, they believe, will be provided by the market "while preserving individual freedom" (Steinfels 1979: 51). According to the restrictive liberals, limits upon equality are not founded in the physiological or psychological dominance of man, nor upon the need to balance women's sexual power as Gilder argues. Instead, they posit a basic conflict between equality and liberty, a concept that was popular in the nineteenth century (Steinfels 1979: 231). Medcalf and Dolbeare (1985) suggest that "sometimes freedom and equality appear to be in direct conflict, so that one or the other must be given priority" (17). The restrictive liberals tend, then, to stress the freedom to compete, which is consistent with our capitalist system and tends to mystify both racial and gender domination. They express a concern that the call for equality will contribute to a "levelling" of society that will endanger the authority of experts and the role of meritocracy, which are, they believe, essential to the stability of liberal representative democracy.

While the restrictive liberals are not fundamentally opposed to the welfare/warfare state, they blame affirmative action quotas and the programs of the Great Society's war on poverty for the increasing demands and diminishing legitimacy of the state. Resources available for government programs are viewed as being in competition with industry's needs for economic expansion. Further, to restore confidence in traditional authority, greater emphasis is placed upon nationalism and national security. This emphasis can be used to stress that "we are all Americans" and that dramatic changes or extreme demands could be hazardous to our collective well-being. Military obligations and economic constraints can underscore the argument that government cannot solve all problems. "Furthermore, if impossible demands doom a high proportion of government programs to failure, the authority of government should be shielded by dispersing responsibility for this failure as much as possible" (Steinfels 1979: 64). This can be managed by shifting responsibility for many programs to state and local governments and stressing the role of the market in solving problems.

Ronald Reagan campaigned in 1980 as the flag bearer for the New Right. Eight years later it was clear that his administration had taken a decisive turn toward a restrictive liberal agenda. Faced with a Congress that has continued (with a six year lapse in the Senate) to be controlled by Democrats and with public opinion that was less than the mandate he claimed, Reagan was unable to achieve many New Right goals: a human life amendment, restoration of prayer in schools, elimination of the Department of Education, and so forth. This prompted some New Right activists to criticize Reagan (as they had Nixon before him) for not living up to his stated conservative ideals.

What Reagan did accomplish, in what might be called the Reagan Reformation, was to tighten restrictions on welfare and entitlement payments, reduce funding for many social programs, narrow the definition of affirmative action and other programs he personally opposed, and appoint a host of conservative judges throughout the country (including three Supreme Court justices and a new chief justice). By emphasizing the "private sector," self-

reliance, color blindness, and strict interpretations of the Constitution, Reagan had begun to again couch inequality as equal competition or "equal opportunity" defined in its most narrow terms.

In Reagan's chosen successor, George Bush, the legacy of restrictive liberalism is nearly complete. While speaking of a "kinder and gentler nation" and claiming to hear "the little people," Bush's militaristic policy plans did not deviate much from the course set by Reagan. Meanwhile, the Democratic campaign of 1988 set out to reclaim the so-called "Reagan Democrats," who were white and mostly male. The gender gap has two faces -- that of conservative white men who think the liberal programs have gone too far and that of blacks and women who are concerned for their future if there are not significant changes in the course of government. While Michael Dukakis chased the former and distanced himself from Jesse Jackson, Bush offerred a bit of soft rhetoric to cut his losses with the latter.

Bush seemed confident in the growing solidity of a restrictive liberal center and declared that Dukakis was "out of the mainstream." While stressing conventional themes of social control and military power, Bush advanced a restrictive liberal agenda marked by proposals to (1) limit abortions to cases of rape, incest and threats to the life of the mother and (2) offer tax credits to families that use day care. At one point, Bush went so far as to accuse Dukakis of being "sexist" for having suggested that women had been "forced" into the labor force.

The New Class

Restrictive liberals are also concerned about the "New Class" of professionals who occupy their time creating the reform strategies that have "overloaded" government. Michael Novak (1976) wrote of the "knowledge industry": "... federal and local government workers, researchers, lawyers, planners, consultants, educators, information systems operatives, journalists, social workers and others ... depend for their livelihood on

expanding and activist government expenditure (with its attendant corruptions)." One might imagine, then, that the rising expectations were caused by the overzealousness of this "new class" of professional problem solvers. If this new class, many of whom are women and minorities, could be disempowered, it might reduce the demands and the correspondent diminishment of authority (see Eisenstein 1984). "In particular, the neoconservatives [sic] have set themselves against two weapons, believed to be in the hands of the new class -- sentimental humanitarianism and guilt" (Steinfels 1979: 65).

Against sentimentalism the restrictive liberals argue that one cannot be certain of the results of a program. In fact, they demonstrated this uncertainty by claiming that the war on poverty had failed (or at least couldn't be proven to have succeeded). Against guilt they argued that the privileged must be protected from wallowing in the guilt associated with inequality and their privileged positions. Don't feel bad, we are told, because there's a limit to what we can do. "The attack on guilt ... is part of the wash of psychologizing that spread over social theory in the 1940s and 1950s. ... whatever responses the neoconservative [sic] critic judges to be self-abnegating or excessive are interpreted as 'guilt'" (Steinfels 1979: 66). As we shall see, a strikingly similar argument is used by the masculinist men's movement.

Restrictive Liberal Women

The restrictive liberal women occupy more prominent positions in the Republican Party mainstream. Klatch (1987) refers to these women as "laissez-faire conservatives" to convey their libertarian roots. "In the laissez-faire conservative world view," writes Klatch, "economic issues take precedence over social issues..." (Klatch 1987: 38). While restrictive liberal women support women's involvement in public life -- in politics and management -- they are not politically conscious as a gender class. Rather, these women tend to identify more with their economic class. They believe that their status will improve as the general economy improves, so that is their primary focus.

In terms of discrimination, they recognize that it exists and believe some action should be taken. However, individuals are responsible for solving such problems. These women don't want to get any special treatment that men in their fields don't get. They tend to support reproductive freedom but not government funded abortions. Their emphasis is on the individual and individual liberties. While they "are closer to feminists in their recognition of sexual discrimination, they do not recognize the institutional basis for sexual inequality nor do they call for collective responses or government action to remedy injustice" (Klatch 1987: 53). Klatch notes that an alliance has not yet been forged between restrictive liberal women and the feminists. With Friedan's "second stage" and the "post-feminist generation," though, some feminists are closer to the restrictive liberal women.

The Liberal Countermovement

Liberalism relies upon individualism. The youth culture (or counterculture) that was associated by many with the New Left attempted to interpret ideas of personal freedom in a political context and tended to disdain the conformity of the capitalist enterprise. It is significant, though, that the counter-culture seemed to assume "that hedonism was inevitably anti-capitalist." Although capitalism was, in terms of the work ethic, aptly associated with "puritanism and deferred gratifications,"

> where consumption was concerned, [capitalism] urged people to gratify their slightest wish. It exploited sex shamelessly to that end limited only by law and custom... Which was not to say that sexual and other freedoms were not good things in their own right. But there was no assurance that behavioral liberty would not grow at the expense of political freedom. It was one thing to say that sex promoted mental health, another to say it advanced social justice. (O'Neill 1975: 329)

The growing acceptance of humanistic psychology and the Human Potential Movement heralded potential liberation and growth. This emphasis on growth applied to both sexes, and provided a new form of individualism that was less rugged and better suited to new, more ambiguous gender boundaries. "Once the lid was off the life cycle, so

to speak, anything was possible for women as well as men, at least in principle" (Ehrenreich 1983: 97).

However, some women began to sense that it was they who were being consumed. While the sexual revolution had the effect of providing men and women with more sexual options, it also maintained male dominance and male standards. Evans noted, for instance, the sense that men had expected women to be sexually liberated in their terms: "Men believed that women would simply adopt their own more promiscuous standards" (Evans 1979: 153). Marge Piercy (1970) contrasts the styles of male supremacists and male liberals within the New Left. The sexism of the male supremacists was overt: "The male supremacist tends to exploit women new to the Movement or on its fringes. His concept of women is conventionally patriarchal: they are for bed, board, babies and, also, for doing his typing and running his office machines and doing his tedious research" (Piercy 1970: 434). The male liberals, on the other hand had a more subtle approach that invited acquiescence rather than demanding submission:

> *The male liberal* respects the pride of women. He has learned well the rhetoric of women's liberation and offers apparent partnership... He is just as career-oriented and just as exploitative as the male supremacist, but he gives back enough tidbits of flattery and attention to make the relationship appear reciprocal by contrast with what goes on with bullier males, and he *is by far the more efficient long-range co-opter* [emphasis added] (Piercy 1970: 435).

Clearly then, pursuing freedom is not sufficient to attain sexual justice. Kappeler makes this point by using Sade to explain the ideological shift from sexual conservatism to sexual liberalism -- labelled "liberation" (Kappeler 137). Yet, structural constraints remain with this new liberty.

As the structural boundaries shift, patriarchal privilege must be masked in new ways. Corresponding with a structural shift from an industrial based economy to an increasingly service economy, the ideology of management and of patriarchy also shifted. The model of paternalism, or blatant oppression, has given way to the model of team

management, of "repressive tolerance": Without equality "the conditions of tolerance are 'loaded': they are determined and defined by the institutionalized inequality (which is certainly compatible with constitutional equality), i.e., by the class structure of society" (Marcuse 1965: 85).

This shift in the ideological legitimation of patriarchy empowers the liberal countermovement that wants reform but criticizes radical demands as too extreme: "Thus, within a repressive society, even progressive movements threaten to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept the rules of the game" (Marcuse 1965: 83). This has been the position of Friedan's liberal feminism. It has also been the position of the masculinist men's movement, which promises men's rights and men's liberation in the guise of growth. Like the restrictive liberals, the masculinists attack radical theorists for succumbing to guilt.

Human Potential Movement

Existential philosophy was a precursor to the growing acceptance of humanistic psychology. But while the impulse of existentialism was political and tended toward revolutionary change, humanistic psychology has been more optimistic about personal change. Rowan (1976) notes that what became known as the T-group had its roots in research by social psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1946. Together with the client-centered therapy developed by Carl Rogers in the late 1940's and the research of self-actualizing growth by Abraham Maslow, Lewin's work was one of three strands of humanistic psychology that "converged in the early 1950's" (8).

Michael Murphy, along with fellow Stanford graduate Richard Price, founded the Esalen Institute in 1962 in Big Sur, California. The encounter group, the best-known human potential activity at Esalen, was designed to respond to the alienation of modern society. The encounter group had evolved from the T-group (a.k.a. sensitivity training

groups) that "had originated in the Northeastern United States and had existed primarily as a means of helping administrators and business executives become more sensitive to the interpersonal aspects of their jobs and organizations" (Shaffer 1978: 4-5).

According to Shaffer (1978) "two central emphases within humanistic theory" that deal with alienation are "man's [sic] essential wholeness and his [sic] unfulfilled potential" (7). The encounter group, then, "was expressly designed to allow individuals to encounter aspects of their being that they had become deadened to; this included encounters with their body feelings, with their fellow group participants, and with nature" (7).

Psychology had adjusted to changes in the work role of middle class men and developed the notion of growth as a positive aspect of masculinity. Throughout *The Hearts of Men*, Ehrenreich recognizes the social control function of what is officially prescribed as healthy and natural. Men were declared weak by *Today's Health* in 1957 when the medical profession began warning that men were disproportionately subject to heart disease (Ehrenreich 1983: 70). Yet, "psychology was not ready to condemn masculinity as a health hazard, and medicine was not about to indict the corporate system for generating toxic levels of occupational stress" (Ehrenreich 1983: 81). The result was a myriad of advice to wives about how to better nurture and pander to their "weak" husbands.

This did not, however, reflect the experiences of working and lower class men, including many men of color. Patriarchal styles, then, have varied according to race and economic class. The central characteristic of traditional masculinity is the perceived need to maintain control. Aggression and particularly competitiveness can be part of maintaining control, so at times (as the leaders of the T-groups recognized) could sensitivity and cooperation. Ehrenreich also notes a class interest involved in the concern that liberal men have with being more sensitive (Ehrenreich 1984). Brod argues, just as Piercy noted earlier, that the more comfortable liberal exploiter may be the more insidious:

> Thus men may appear more personally congenial farther up the economic ladder, even as they exercise the institutional power responsible for women's lower status. In contrast, men who have but their personal power are more conspicuous but actually less efficacious when exercising their power in patriarchy's service.
>
> (Brod 1987: 15)

Feminine Mystique

In 1963 Betty Friedan wrote *The Feminine Mystique*, which was a liberal feminist critique that stressed human potential. Both women and men were denied liberty, she argued, by the narrowness of their sex roles. Accordingly, women's potential had been restricted by a glorification of femininity. Friedan, then, frames the issue of women's status in terms of sex role socialization rather than sexual politics: "Friedan does not see women's liberation involving a struggle for power. According to her view men have nothing to lose and women have only to take the risk" (Eisenstein 1981: 185-186).

In developing her thesis of the feminine mystique, Friedan refers to humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow. She failed meanwhile to further the beginnings of a radical analysis to be found in the writings of Wollstonecraft and Stanton (see Eisenstein 1981). In short, "she tries to smooth over the tensions between the liberal state and feminists rather than uncover them" (Eisenstein 1981: 178). While feminism attributes women's unequal position to their sexual class (or caste), liberal indidualism attributes inequality to individual characteristics or the failure of a social group to compete in a supposedly pluralist polity. Because Friedan attempts to resolve a problem common to women without expounding a theory of sexual class, she is unable to develop a consistent feminist theory: "It would seem that Friedan should know that women are clearly overeducated for their jobs and for their work in the home. But she still offers individual solutions as a political one" (Eisenstein 1981: 188).

Friedan and NOW presented a challenge to the status quo in 1966 when they set out to provide greater economic opportunities for women. In the years since, though, NOW

has issued a more radical agenda (although still defined in liberal terms), and Friedan finds herself adopting a *relatively* more conservative argument. In fact, Friedan's position is in many ways nearer to the restrictive liberal ideology of the state, since the state has accepted some procedural aspects of equality for women that were the initial goals of NOW.

In 1981 Friedan wrote *The Second Stage*. Ehrenreich (1987) calls it "one of the early signs of lethargy" within the feminist movement (166). Stacey reflects that "Friedan is one of many disenchanted liberals who retain a progressivist faith in capitalist development and individual initiative despite their serious loss of confidence in the prospects for, or the efficacy of, federally sponsored social reforms" (Stacey 1983: 568). Eisenstein (1984) suggests that "Friedan and Schlafly have come to share the same enemy," namely radical feminism (193). And Daniel Bell says approvingly, "Although the NOW movement may have gone too far ..., they are pulling back. Betty Friedan represents this 'second-stage' pullback" (Bell 1987: 204).

Stacey (1983) has identified Friedan as part of "the new conservative feminism" of which the "central, definitive characteristic ... is a repudiation of sexual politics..." (561). Additional distinguishing marks of this new conservative feminism are (1) a renewed focus on the needs of the middle class nuclear family, (2) a glorification of feminine qualities that are neglected in the masculine public sphere, and (3) the belief that important political goals have been sacrificed due to distraction caused by a "struggle against male domination" (Stacey 1983: 561-562). One distraction according to Friedan's *The Second Stage* is work against pornography. Friedan clearly is concerned that feminism be more relevant to the needs of the dual career family and that women and men work *together* for change. Stacey (1983) concludes:

> *The Second Stage* represents a liberal's response to the failure of liberalism and a feminist's response to the setbacks of feminism... While maintaining sexual equality as a vague, futuristic goal, Friedan seeks to curtail explicitly feminist struggles to achieve it, and she collaborates with the neoconservative [sic] program to dismantle the welfare state. (564)

Masculine Mystique

If the identification with femininity had confined women to the role of housewife, then masculinity had confined men to the roles of protector and provider. The feminine and masculine mystiques, then were complementary problems with complementary solutions. Don Anderson wrote "Warren the Success Object" in which he reviews Warren Farrell's *The Liberated Man: Beyond Masculinity*. Says Anderson (1975):

> Warren Farrell is a contradiction who, like all media stars, both reaches farther and compromises more than others struggling with the same issues. ...his major thesis is that Women's Liberation is not threatening to men, and indeed that its main effect is to relieve men of many of the pressures they now experience (e.g. freedom from nagging wives).

Farrell had at one time been elected to the Board of Directors of the National Organization for Women and, in 1971, had formed the NOW Task Force of the Masculine Mystique . (Anderson 1975: 146). In 1975 Warren Farrell wrote *The Liberated Man*. Farrell concludes that liberated men attain "new freedoms -- freedom beyond proving oneself; beyond worrying about appearances..." (313). While women sought greater access to the paid labor force, men set out to get in touch with themselves, their partners, and their children. Men were encouraged to be more emotionally expressive, more affectionate, more sensitive, and more domestic. Liberated men should get "beyond condescension and contempt toward women, needing to be in control...; beyond specializing, needing to become the expert, being the sole breadwinner, the victim of bribes -- ultimately a security object" (313).

A year later Herb Goldberg (1976) wrote *The Hazards of Being Male*. Goldberg is a California psychotherapist who believes that men are challenged by the women's movement to recognize their own need for change. He is critical of men's liberation groups, however, for encouraging guilt and self-hating attitudes and for having "introjected the voices of their feminist accusers" and fostered a "competition to be the least competitive and most free of the stereotyped version of male chauvinism" (Goldberg 1976: 5).

At the same time, however, Goldberg stresses what men can gain from changing roles. Goldberg lists several impossible binds that seem to be related to one of two major conflicts: (1) How can men be devoted to work and to the work ethic and still be a caring and responsible person at home and at rest? and (2) How can men both maintain a position of power relative to women and still enjoy the benefits of sharing in an equal partnership? He summarizes his main argument as follows: "By what perverse logic can the male continue to imagine himself 'top dog?' Emotionally repressed, out of touch with his body, alienated and isolated from other men, terrorized by the fear of failure, afraid to ask for help, thrown out at a moment's notice on the occupational junkpile..." (Goldberg 1976: 181).

Astrachan writes that "When Goldberg speaks publicly, he states frankly that he says nothing about power in his books because 'I'm pretty naive in that area' or 'I'm politically stupid'" (305). Warren Farrell proved to be not much brighter on the subject of social power. In the mid-70's Farrell was considered to be a spokesman for feminist men, but he has since aligned himself with the masculinist wing of the men's movement, which grew out of Goldberg's ideas. Farrell's most recent book is *Why Men Are the Way They Are*. In the introduction he writes: "*The more deeply I understood women's experience of powerlessness, the more I assumed men had the power women did not have.* In fact, what I was understanding was the *female* experience of male power" (Farrell 1986: xvii). Actually, he seemed to have rediscovered the argument that Goldberg had made ten years earlier, i.e. men and women are equally oppressed. Male liberal feminism is difficult to maintain without directly facing the contradictions between liberalism and feminism, and Farrell seems unable to do so.

CHAPTER III

MEN'S MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

I have established a context for each strand of the men's movement, paying particular attention to two aspects of social movement emergence conveyed by McAdam (1982): 1) socioeconomic processes and 2) cognitive liberation. I will now describe the present organizations of the men's movement primarily in terms of their ideologies -- values, goals and tactics, as found in organizational literature and statements of purpose (see Gerlach and Hines 1970: xvii). It should be noted that such a study of organizational characteristics will not encompass the entire breadth of the movement. I am focusing on organizations in order to address the dynamic of social power. I will rely on such documents as newletters, statements of purpose, and periodicals to develop an image of organizational ideology. I will use broad strokes to paint my portrait of the different strands of the men's movement.

I initially identified many national organizations through the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (1987). In addition to the *Encyclopedia*, I found current references in "Resources for Change" (compiled by J. Kilbourne, 51 Church St., Boston, MA 02116), "A History of the Men's Movement" by T. Williamson (1985) and "Men: A Movement of Their Own" by A. Astrachan (1984). Some additional organizational names and addresses were derived from the original contacts. This includes some periodicals of the men's movement.

I am concerned with the general history of the organizations and of the movement. The study, as a cross-section of the movement, represents some limitations in terms of historical data. Still, much historical information can be derived from existing data. Kimmel, for instance, utilizes historical data to posit a consistent male response to crises in gender relations, consisting of 1) the antifeminist backlash, 2) the promale backlash and 3)

profeminist men (Kimmel 1987: 143-153). I refer to the modern men's movement as consisting of the traditionalists, the masculinists and the pro-feminists. Table 1 shows the organizations in each segment of the movement.

Table 1. Organizations according to ideological faction.

Pro-Feminist:	National Organization for Changing Men
Traditionalist:	Men's Rights Association
	National Organization for Men
Masculinist:	National Congress for Men
	The Coalition of Free Men
	Men's Rights Inc.

It could well be argued that most organizations in our society disproportionately advance the interests of men as a group. It is important, therefore, to note that while the men's movement may attempt to advance men's perceived best interests, this is not the movement's distinguishing characteristic. For differing reasons the members of the men's movement believe that the existing masculine role is itself not in the best interests of the male sex. This includes organizations with a primary focus on changing how men function in such contexts as divorce law, child custody, parenting, work behavior, interpersonal relations, and male violence. The different segments of the men's movement, then, are divided (and the pro-feminist group is subdivided) by the level of analysis and the kinds of issues addressed. Table 2 separates the segments according to this dimension.

Because the different strands of the men's movement are divided by ideology, their views of the world are different. With the exception of some traditionalists and masculinists working on divorce reform the factions rarely work together. Table 3 shows how different factions of the men's movement relate to state ideology and patriarchy, which were discussed in the first two chapters.

Table 2. Level of analysis and level of involvement in men's issues.

Personal
Liberal Pro-Feminists -- personal expression and alternative institutions
Masculinists -- personal expression and political rights for men

Structural
Radical Pro-Feminists -- resistance to oppressive institutions
Traditionalists -- resistance to loss of power

Table 3. Response of men's movement factions to state ideology and patriarchy

Faction	Favored State Ideology	Relation to Patriarchal Family	Relation to Social Patriarchy
Pro-Feminist	Expansive Liberalism	Opposition	Opposition
Traditionalist	Conservatism	Support	Support
Masculinist	Restrictive Liberalism	Opposition	Acceptance

PRO-FEMINIST MEN'S MOVEMENT

The pro-feminist men's movement has been dominated by supporters of liberal feminism. A smaller group of men espousing radical and socialist feminism have organized themselves within the only national pro-feminist men's organization, but they have met some resistance. In response to their proposal to eliminate the term "male positive" from the organization's statement of purpose, a lengthy letter in the newsletter suggested that they should "organize themselves as a men's auxiliary to NOW" (*brother*, December 1988). Futher, the letter's author queried, "Is the men's movement to be considered as full partners with the women's movement, or functionaries with someone else's agenda?" (*brother*, December 1988).

NOCM describes itself as "male-positive, pro-feminist and gay affirmitive." The statement of purpose elaborates each of these aspects and concludes, in part: "Many people are oppressed today because of their race, class, age and religion and physical condition. We believe that such injustices are vitally connected to sexism, with its fundamental premise of unequal distribution of power." This portion of the statement speaks to the

centrality of sexism in the nexus of power relations. However, the organization has been effectively divided between liberal pro-feminist men (who tend to focus more on culture) and radical and socialist pro-feminists (who are trying to make the organization more politically active). This division within the National Organization for Changing Men (NOCM) is similar to the division within the feminist women's movement. Clatterbaugh (1988) makes this same point by saying that pro-feminist men "get caught in the same sectarian battles that afflict feminism" (Clatterbaugh 1988: 5). From the beginning the organization has been limited in its effectiveness because of this division and because a strong faction of liberal reformers have preferred to focus on personal liberation at the expense of political action.

History of Pro-Feminist Men

The Men's Center in Berkeley was established in 1970 (Williamson 1985). Also in 1970 Jack Sawyer wrote an article, "On Male Liberation," in *Liberation* magazine (Astrachan 1986). There were certainly men's consciousness-raising (C-R) groups prior to this time however. Snodgrass (1977) refers to a C-R group that was formed in 1969 in New York. This group wrote a pamphlet (published in 1971) called *Unbecoming Men.* Snodgrass notes that this pamphlet contained "excellent illustrations of the feelings of self-degradation and hopelessness about personal change that men often experience" when they do C-R exercises to discover their sexism (110). He goes on to say that the men of this group "were all young, white, mostly middle class, heterosexual, movement activists. They drew together out of a sense of isolation accentuated by the new meaning that women found in the enthusiasm and affection of sisterhood" (110).

Snodgrass was himself introduced to feminism through a personal relationship with a feminist woman. Eventually, he says, he "began to accept the accuracy of the accusation that [he] was a male supremacist, but felt helpless to do anything about it" (7). He tried C-R groups with little satisfaction and eventually "helped form the Los Angeles Men's

Collective in October 1974" (8). This is probably typical of the early pro-feminist men's movement. Many of the early participants were undoubtedly political activists. Thiesen writes, for instance, that members of the National Organization for Changing Men "have tended to come from the feminist movement and the political left" (Thiesen 1988: 59). And probably most of the men in the early C-R groups had personal relationships with feminist women. According to Fred Small, "The bulk of men in NOCM came to the movement either through their relationships with women who were experiencing the feminist revolution or through their own role in the gay community" (Thiesen 1988: 123).

National Organization for Changing Men

The first national Men & Masculinity (M&M) Conference was organized in 1974 "by the Women's Studies Program at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville" (Interrante 1982: 5). Subsequent conferences were held at Penn State, Pennsylvania; Des Moines, IA; St. Louis, MO; Los Angeles, CA; and Milwaukee, WI. A national organization was launched in Boston, MA, at the seventh M&M Conference (*brother*, winter 1983). This organization, which was to become the National Organization for Changing Men (NOCM), is the only national organization of pro-feminist men in the U.S.

According to the newsletter, the National Council is "the most powerful body of the organization" (*brother*, winter 1983). The first National Council members were elected in the spring of 1982, and Bob Brannon was elected to be the National Council chair. When the nine council members convened their first meeting in San Francisco on August 12-14, 1982, the major result was an "agreement on an organizational structure proposed by Pleck, Brannon, Shapiro, and Morgan" (*brother*, winter 1983). Besides the council, the organization consists of action positions, task groups (and task group leaders), regional and local groups, and an annual national conference.

There was (and has continued to be) considerable frustration regarding the task of organizing pro-feminist men nationally. In the first issue of NOCM's newsletter, *brother*,

the first chair of the national council (Bob Brannon) reflected that pro-feminist men "have always had a compelling practical weakness... We were afraid to get organized, afraid to have a structure, afraid of leadership roles that might be abused." He went on to say that "seven years and countless meetings" after he first joined a C-R group "two intruders from New Zealand disrupted our first major attempt to start an organization. But other meetings that had no intruders produced the same result" (*brother*, winter 1983). Astrachan also notes that "the M&M Conference hesitated to move to national organizations ..., and they hesitated to court media publicity lest they be subjected to glamorized misunderstanding" (Astrachan 1986: 312).

NOCM is made up of volunteers who do most of the work. Their primary source of funds is membership dues. There were no paid staff members until the fall of 1988 when NOCM hired one person and set up an office in Pittsburgh. Prior to that time all administrative and liaison duties had been performed by holders of action positions, which was sometimes an inefficient system. NOCM has about 1000 members nationwide but has experienced a lot of turnover in membership. In part, this has been due to a failure to send renewal notices.

Many of the volunteers belong to one or more task groups, which focus on various issues and can promote "public statements and actions." Presently NOCM has eleven task groups and nineteen action positions. The first issue of *brother* described a task group as "having its own funds, projects, committees, etc. Task Groups will have considerable power and autonomy: all detailed policy statements, resolutions, political actions, and other organizational activities dealing with the issues in its jurisdiction shall originate only from the appropriate Task Group" (brother, winter 1983). Most of the task groups have their own newsletters to share information and strategies for action, but task groups vary in their effectiveness due to the frequently great distance between members.

NOCM now has two *regional* groups. The first is C.A.M.P. Caucus, which had

met in California for several year prior to the formation of NOCM. The second regional group is the Northeast Men's Emerging Network (NEMEN). The first *local* chapter was NOCM-LA, which was officially added on January 25, 1986. At that time the group had fifty members. Still, local organizing has also been slow and awkward.

In spite of Brannon's expectation that the organization would have a "profound positive effect on this society" in its first five years, problems continue to plague NOCM. In fact, five years later Jon Cohen, of the Activist Men's Caucus, wrote that "NOCM, as a structure and as a vehicle for any kind of social change, is still in its infancy. (It is just now getting ready to set up a national office)" (*The Activist Men's Journal*, March 1988).

Internal Conflict

When the first issue of its quarterly newsletter, *brother*, came out in the winter of 1983, the organization still did not have a name. In choosing an identity, the unresolved factions within the group clearly emerged. The first issue of *brother* reported that "words such as 'liberation', 'feminist', and 'gender' were felt to be problematic to at least some potential members" (*brother*, winter 1983). The membership was surveyed to choose one of the following three names: The National Organization for Men, Changing Men, and The National Organization for Changing Men. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of the members responding chose to call themselves The National Organization for Men. However, some were reportedly displeased with a name that "seemed to be 'bland' and neutral, and didn't convey anything about [their] values and politics" (*brother*, summer 1983).

A year later, because Sidney Siller had already incorporated his traditionalist men's group as the National Organization for Men in New York state, the pro-feminist group opted to change its name. Although only one-third of the membership (182 people) voted on the name change, there were 104 votes for the National Organization for Changing Men and 58 votes for the National Organization of Men Against Sexism. Joseph Pleck, writing in *brother*, noted that there was again controversy over the chosen identity. Pleck argued,

however, that the new name (NOCM) would seem "more accessible to 'mainstream' men" than would have the other option (*brother*, summer 1984). The liberal reformers, then, still had greater organizational strength at this juncture. Accordingly there was a concern not to turn away men who were ready for some personal change but weren't ready or interested in political action against sexism and male privilege. Stoltenberg (1977) has criticized this approach, writing "We need to be clear that we're not talking about a market strategy for the men's movement; we're not talking about how to package the men's movement so that we can run it up the flagpole and all the men in America will salute" (128).

Ironically, at about the same time a major pro-feminist publication, *M: Gentle Men for Gender Justice*, was having name problems of their own. It was reported that the publication had filed suit against Fairchild Publications, which began its own magazine called *M*. According to *brother*, "Fairchild's *M* is a lifestyle and advertising publication with an initial circulation of 58,400; its subscribers have a median income of $67,000" (*brother*, summer 1984). *M: Gentle Men for Gender Justice* subsequently changed its title to *Changing Men*. This name change was consistent with that of NOCM -- a focus on change without clarifying what men might become or why. With both the organization and the publication, moreover, groups representing traditional male privilege subsumed generic titles, leaving the pro-feminists to again define themselves. They still opted for liberal terms.

Pro-Male Culture

Liberal pro-feminists have tended to focus on a supportive culture for men who are in transition or who have assumed new role responsibilities. Such issues as fatherhood, men and mental health, spirituality, and homophobia fall into this rubric. Liberal feminists tend to focus on helping individuals adjust to structural changes rather than create them.

They support feminist demands for legal equality and oppose social patriarchy in principle, but they do so by helping men to be more sensitive and supportive of women's changes and demands. As we shall see this is in many ways similar to the emphasis of masculinist men, except that liberal pro-feminists accept a liberal feminist agenda.

Spirituality

Part of the rhetoric of liberal pro-feminists focuses on developing a positive male spirituality. Thiesen observes that this is "what some might think of as the 'human potential,' 'New Age' and 'touchy-feely' groups within the movement," and Shepard Bliss refers to this as the "mythopoetic part of the men's movement" (Thiesen 1988: 122). The work of Robert Bly has been central to New Age men who are seeking a more positive image of themselves. Bly senses a problem with the emphasis on gentleness to which many changing men subscribe, and he is concerned that young men have become too soft. He argues, for instance, that "young men for various reasons wanted harder women, and women began to desire softer men. It seems like a nice arrangement, but it isn't working out" (Thompson 1987: 167). Bly's solution is to focus on the myth of the Wildman. He intends for this to be a corrective for men who have become too gentle, "but for men who have never done the feminine bit at all, who are unreconstructed male chauvinists, the Wildman is simply an invitation to be even more aggressive" (Rowan 1987: 111).

He frames the issue as a denial of masculinity, wounding of the male, and alienation from the father. Radical pro-feminists might attribute the sense of loss that men experience in being "soft" and nurturing to passivity. Personal and political change, they might add, only occur through action, and the personal cannot be separated from its political constructs. As Stoltenberg notes, men can neither be satisfied with being more brotherly nor with passivity (under the pretense that a lack of action represents a lack of harm): "The pride to which we aspire is not in being *men* but in being *men who*... -- men who are living their lives in a way that will make a difference" (Stoltenberg 1987: 129).

Bly, however, is unable to frame the issue in the same way, because his version of power relations relies upon archetypes of traditional sex roles. This New Age philosophy "believes that there is a male and female essence" (Clatterbaugh 1988: 6). According to Bly, "the unbalanced pursuit of the Vietnam War," for instance, was caused by the expectations placed upon men in the 1950s that "lacked feminine space ... lacked some sense of flow ... lacked compassion..." (Thompson 1987: 166). And the hazard in becoming too soft or too feminine is, as he cites Jung, that a boy "will see his father through his mother's eyes" (Thompson 1987: 179). This is similar to the statement that Farrell made about the male mystique when he "realized" that men don't really have more power than do women: "In fact, what I was understanding was the *female* experience of male power" (Farrell 1986: xvii).

Clatterbaugh notes that "this perspective can harmonize with either liberationist or men's rights perspectives. Since women have their own inner self, they can neither describe nor fully understand the male inner self. ... in a more anti-feminist tone, women can be seen as actively preventing men from discovering their inner man" (Clatterbaugh 1988: 6). Also, as I've stated before, this focus on personal change and personality characteristics tends to detract from the more political goals of radical and socialist pro-feminist men.

Homophobia

The gay affirmative aspect of the changing men's movement is important for several reasons. Two of these are that 1) because gay men do not abide by the heterosexual norm of masculinity they are alienated from the dominant culture, and 2) men are reluctant to be physically and emotionally intimate with one another for fear of being labelled a sissy or a "homo." These are deemed heterosexism and homophobia respectively. Both of these concerns are related to attempts to transform men's identification with traditional masculine attitudes and behaviors. The liberal concerns of men's liberation and a corresponding gay

liberation, though, are limited in their challenge to patriarchal relations. John Stoltenberg (1977) wrote that "the dilemma of gay men... is how to get cultural confirmation of their masculinity, how to come out and be one of the guys, how to have full access to all the powers, prestige, prerogatives, and privileges that other men have over and against women" (78-79).

While the concern with homophobia, then, is important in changing how men can and do relate to one another, it does not usually address directly men's relationship to women in our society. One benefit for women that's usually expressed in having all-male groups, for instance, is that men will learn to not rely upon women for emotional support. By itself, though, this is paradoxical as it may reduce both women's emotional burden and intellectual influence on the group.

Limitations of Liberal Feminism

In the 1970s most of the media coverage of the men's movement referred to the New Man and focused on liberal pro-feminist men or the men's liberation movement. *Newsweek* published an article in 1970 on the "Gents Auxiliary" (*Newsweek* 1970). A *Ms.* article in 1978 asked if it was "the year of the man" (Tavris 1978). When Jon Snodgrass edited *For Men Against Sexism* in 1975, many of the authors expressed suspicions of the early men's liberation movement. Wrote Grimstad & Rennie (1975):

> Men liberationists ostensibly aim to free themselves from being oppressors. Women, however, see a very real danger in men grouping together because the focus of their bonding can so easily shift to dealing exclusively with the side-effects of being oppressors rather than with the disease itself. (152)

More recently most of the press coverage attained by the pro-feminist men's movement is about the men's studies task group members, such as Joseph Pleck and Harry Brod.

In 1985 Harry Brod wrote an article entitled "Feminism for Men: Beyond Liberalism." In this article he wrote that "many men in our movement take pride in their

moral stance in favor of liberal feminism" (*brother*, June 1985). He contends, however, that the only motivations for men to adopt liberal feminism are "altruistic." "Liberalism," Brod explains, "ends up supporting those institutions of power in our society which do the very damage to the male psyche we're trying to undo" (*brother*, June 1985). John Stoltenberg (1987) explains the process by which this occurs:

> ... an anti-sexist man's moral identity might respond to the feminist analysis of the sex-class system by wanting to be an exception to it... But then his sex-class identity rejects any critique of men as a class, reacts either as if he is the defender of his whole sex class or as if his spectacularly exemplary life redeems it and thus refutes the analysis (128).

By the time a pro-feminist organization was formed in 1983, other groups espousing men's liberation and men's rights had been launched with a masculinist agenda. The relationship between the restrictive liberal masculinists and the pro-feminists eventually helped to call attention to the division within NOCM.

On October 24, 1982, Michael Kimmel and Jim Creane attended a forum at the New York Center of Men in order to introduce the formation of the pro-feminist group. They were "met with 'insights' from a number of Free Men supporters who shouted 'It's women who oppress men!'" (brother, winter 1983). Five years later Robert Brannon wrote of the 12th Men and Masculinity Conference in Hartford, Connecticut:

> ...many of us were shocked to find that seven *Anti*-Feminist ("Men's Rights") males had been not only invited to the conference, but given prominent spots on our program. One of them (Hayward) was even given a 45 minute block of time at the annual Council meeting to discuss 'a coalition' and 'how we can work together'" (*brother*, December 1987).

Activist Men's Caucus

When the conflict over the presence of the masculinists ensued at the Hartford conference, a "progressive men's caucus" was formed. They began *The Activist Men's Journal* with 41 names and a common concern about NOCM's "lack of political action." The Activist Men's Caucus has now been in existence for more than a year, and six issues

of *The Activist Men's Journal* have been produced. Jon Cohen was chosen to represent the Caucus on the NOCM National Council. He first conceived of his role as a new liaison position but was offered a "full member" status instead. Six men from the Activist Caucus ran for election to the National Council in 1988. Of these two were elected. In addition, one member was re-elected.

Issues that have been brought up in the National Council include consensus decision making (which was rejected by a majority vote), a proposal to delete "male-positive" from the statement of purpose (rejected) or to change the order of principles so that "pro-feminist" would appear before "gay-affirmative" and "male-positive" (rejected), a proposal to make the liaison position to men's rights organizations inactive (rejected), and a proposal to require that workshops should only be led by persons who agree with NOCM principles (approved). These issues were introduced at the mid-winter meetings, which were held before the 1988 elections.

The Activist Men's Caucus functions both within and beyond NOCM although its most substantive contribution thus far has been in its identification of and communication between radical and socialist pro-feminist men. Recognizing that NOCM has been limited by a divided tradition that includes liberal roots and continues to be strongly influenced by reform liberals, the Activist Men's Caucus has pursued two paths. The first is an attempt to obtain greater influence in the NOCM National Council, to sever official ties with masculinist men's groups, and to strengthen the stated political and pro-feminist goals of the organization. The second is an attempt to work within certain NOCM task groups (particularly those on *pornography*, *men's violence* and the new group on *child custody*) and within other organizations working on peace or social justice concerns.

Sexual Politics

Pornography is a concern that divides feminists, and the pro-feminist men's

movement reflects this division: "Radicals would ban or restrict it, while liberals believe it is protected by the right of free expression" (Clatterbaugh 1988: 5).

The Activist Men's Caucus organized a protest at the 13th M & M Conference in Seattle. The demonstration that took place at the Champ Arcade was controversial among Conference attenders. In fact, the editor of *brother* commented that some conference attenders felt that the protesters "got what they deserved" when they were maced by a "passer-by" (*brother* 7, no. 1; December 1988). Even among members of the pornography task group there was a difference of strategy. Some participated in the demonstration as a way to get at a pressure point. Others felt more comfortable promoting such erotica as David Steinberg's book, *Erotic By Nature.*

The chair of the task group on pornography and one of the organizers of the Champ Arcade protest was John Stoltenberg. B. Charles Thiesen (1988), writing in *Connecticut Magazine*, referred to Stoltenberg (who has long worked with Andrea Dworkin) as "a well-known anti-pornography activist and a founder of Men Against Pornography." Thiesen notes also that Stoltenberg is "pro-censorship" (122). In fact, the demonstration used a flyer that emphasized that pornographers abuse and assault workers in the industry, and demonstrators chanted such slogans as "Shut it down!"

Thiesen argues that "there is no reason why a pro-eroticism group couldn't exist within NOCM, even a group with an anti-censorship position. Both these positions are certainly represented within NOCM membership" (122). Thiesen means this as an example of healthy diversity, but this kind of liberal tolerance and peaceful co-existence of diverging positions has also limited the political effectiveness of the organization. Different positions co-exist and do their own thing, but the tension is clearly still there.

The pro-censorship wing risks providing legitimacy to more powerful conservatives who might ban all representations of nudity and explicit sexuality as obscene. I addressed this dilemma earlier in my discussion of how pornography divides feminists. On the other hand, the pro-erotica wing risks letting the market determine what will be

consumed, which means that the erotica produced will have to compete with the larger producers of pornography. But the lack of dialogue created by separate workshops, separate actions and the distance between task group members discourages mutual confrontation on these issues. As a result the organization remains split without being able to produce a cohesive agenda. Such an agenda might address such structural issues as the business exploitation and cultural degradation of women in much pornography, while also recognizing personal issues by encouraging and depicting a healthy male sexuality.

"Domestic" Violence

The pro-feminist faction of the men's movement is the only one that focuses on ending men's violence toward women. Such affiliated organizations as Men Against Rape in Madison, Wisconsin, and RAVEN in St. Louis, Missouri, provide resources for activists throughout the country. These groups also work closely with feminist women and share a common political agenda.

In November 1977, at the 6th National Men & Masculinity Conference in St. Louis, a group of six men "organized to confront the issue of male violence against women" (Leaflet, "Who Is Raven?"). They established a study group that met periodically for eight months. In September 1978 they formed RAVEN (Rape and Violence End Now). Trained counselors and peer counselors volunteer their time and make decisions by consensus.

In 1986 RAVEN, along with NOCM's Ending Men's Violence Task Group, published the 1st edition of "The Ending Men's Violence National Referral Directory." This directory lists 145 groups across the country. Most of these groups have programs for men who batter. Other programs are offerred for men who rape or commit child sexual assault, for male victims of battering, rape or child sexual assault, and for male "significant others." In addition several groups only provide education, research or networking services.

Not all of these groups consider themselves to be part of the men's movement. David Adams, in response to a survey, stated that EMERGE is "a social action and social service organization concerned with men's violence against women," not part of the men's movement. EMERGE: A Men's Counseling Service on Domestic Violence was formed in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1977.

The RAVEN group asserts that violence in the home is not just a problem of isolated individuals, nor can it be explained entirely by a man's psychology:

> Violence against women is an institution among men, only to appear as an individually-motivated behavior... The expectation that our home lives must be a perfect refuge from the horrors of public life leads men to blame women and children for all of their fears and insecurities.
>
> (RAVEN leaflet)

EMERGE also contends that violence against women "is a societally condoned method of male dominance" (EMERGE newsletter, December 1986), and AMEND (Abusive Men Exploring New Directions) in Boulder, Colorado, suggests that one common characteristic of an "abusive partner" is a belief in "traditional male role models of the family; e.g. the man should dominate" (AMEND pamphlet).

Because of their belief in a societal explanation for patterns of male violence, these groups stress the need to work with battered women's shelters. RAVEN has a policy of not taking grant money that might otherwise go to the shelters. EMERGE notes in their newsletter that, through contact with abused partners and "follow-up evaluations", the woman's safety remains their "first priority." This is improtant to the feminist community, as indicated by a book advertised in the directory: *Safety for Women: Monitoring Batterers' Programs* (available from the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence).

These programs stress the need for men to accept responsibility for their behavior as a precondition for change. Among the "common characteristics of an abusive partner" listed by AMEND are an extreme fear of "losing partner", a low sense of self-esteem,

"great difficulty trusting anyone", a belief that "the world is a hostile place where aggression is necessary for survival", and a tendency to blame others for his actions. Such persons may have "witnessed abuse between parents" or been a "victim of abuse as a child." The abusive partner may feel insecure and jealous. Feelings of pain, fear, guilt and/or a sense of loss are experienced as anger, which is expressed through violence.

The pro-feminists, following early men's liberationists like Jon Sawyer, recognize that the power that men have in society can limit their ability to be in touch with their emotional and physical health and to express their emotions. Men may *feel* insecure and powerless in their individual lives, and they may feel unable to control their own lives and circumstances, but this does not mean that men do not disproportionately benefit from their gender. Furthermore, ending violence in the family requires an understanding of class and gender power relations as well as the cultural legitimation of violence.

Child Custody

The pro-feminist Activist Men's Caucus has just recently begun to focus on the problem of child custody and has formed a task group to address the issue. The concern with custody is, in part, a response to efforts by the masculinist men's movement (in conjunction with the Joint Custody Association) to enact legislation establishing mandatory joint custody.

John Stoltenberg (1987) argues that "voluntary joint custody is not the problem," but that mandatory joint custody would be (Activist Men's Journal v1 #3 Dec/Jan 1987-88). Stoltenberg cites studies indicating that fathers still do not assume as many child care responsibilities as do mothers, and he suggests that custody is more vigorously contested when boy children are involved. "Mandated joint custody," writes Stoltenberg, "intersects issues of sexual justice, sexual violence, and economic class." Mandated joint custody, he further asserts, "has also been used to guarantee that an abusive ex-husband/father

continues to have court-protected access to the woman and/or children he has abused" (*Activist Men's Journal* v1 #3 Dec/Jan 1987-88).

John Straton (1987), NOCM's co-liaison to feminist women's groups, confirms the dangers of mandatory joint custody while also recognizing the limitations of sole custody ("Resources on the Effects of Child Custody Laws" *Activist Men's Journal* v1 #3). Straton concludes that "loyalty to men cannot come at" the expense of "women and children." He thus recommends a policy based upon the "Primary Caretaker Parent Rule" of West Virginia (R. Neely, *Yale Law and Policy Review III*, 168 -- Fall 1984). "Such a rule," he writes, "reflects that a custody settlement cannot be expected to undo a father's lack of participation in parenting within the marriage while also validating claims to custody by fathers who were fully involved within the marriage" (*Activist Men's Journal*, v1 #3 Dec/Jan 1987/88).

Conclusions

Liberal pro-feminists don't generally conflict with the activists in what they *say* as much as in what they *don't say*. Radical pro-feminists, for instance, agree that homophobia and heterosexism are a problem; they agree that consciousness-raising and spiritual sustenance are necessary; and they also recognize that masculinity, as it has been traditionally defined, is confining. The radical pro-feminists insist though, that the pro-feminist men's movement must begin by stating its allegiance to feminism and its determination to struggle against sexism, male domination and male violence. Goode (1980) notes that men have never been as constrained by the cultural demands of masculinity as has been recently implied. Rather, one could assert that men have had relatively greater flexibility than have women to reject role demands without losing their privileged position. Here again the concept of gender roles is more limited than the more actively constructed gender relations. The liberals tend to focus upon one gender in isolation as if men could ignore their dominance. In fact, Goode suggests, in what could

be a cautionary note to pro-feminist role theorists, that men seem to react most defensively to not being as central as we once were.

TRADITIONALIST MEN'S MOVEMENT

While traditionalist men provide a direct challenge to feminist goals, their ideology is largely inconsistent with the political and economic structures that prevail in the U.S. today. Although President Reagan clearly used a good deal of rhetoric from the conservative "pro-family" perspective, little of his social agenda was actually adopted. In fact, even among his own advisors much of the conservative attack on the welfare state was only marginally supported and generally not considered realistic. Analysts in the press began distinguishing between ideologues and pragmatists in the Reagan administration, and by the end the pragmatists were clearly stronger. While in the short term a call for a return to traditional male authority may rally action, in the long term few people accept the entire conservative agenda. So, for instance, while the ERA was defeated amidst the perception that many women opposed feminism, a 1986 Gallup Poll found that only 4 percent of women in the U.S. identify themselves as "anti-feminist" (Ehrenreich 1987: 168). While the conservative position may provide a focus for debate and act as a vanguard against change, it isn't viable in terms of creating policy.

History of Divorce Reform

The traditionalist men's movement focuses primarily on the loss of patriarchal privilege associated with the breakdown of the nuclear family. Meanwhile, traditionalist men criticize liberal reformers for their acceptance of the diminishing role of the father and husband. Unlike the masculinist men, traditionalists don't talk about personal growth (though they may both talk about men's rights).

In the late 1950s an organization called the National Men's Legion "tried to link

feminism to communism and to a decline in American morals" (Williamson 1985: 315). It seems, though, that not much is known about the group. More recently the traditionalist men's movement has its roots in the "men's divorce reform movement," whose earliest group was the Divorce Racket Busters, founded in 1960 and later renamed the United States Divorce Reform (Williamson 1985: 316). In 1964 men from the U.S. Divorce Reform testified during the Assembly Judiciary Committee hearings on California divorce law. "Their contention was that the existing law strongly favored women and allowed them to 'take their husbands to the cleaners' via alimony and property awards [Kay 1977: 21]" (Weitzman 1985: 17). In 1966 the U.S. Divorce Reform "attempted to get an initiative for divorce reform on the November 1966 California ballot." The proposal failed but "would have abolished alimony and established Family Arbitration centers to deal with divorce [Kay 1977: 41]" (Weitzman 1985: 17). While these divorce reform organizations were founded prior to feminism's re-emergence as a mass movement, they clearly were responding to the same broad social and economic trends that seemed to be undermining the authority of the father and exploiting instability in the family. So these divorce reformers weren't initially a direct "backlash" against the modern movement for women's liberation and women's rights. They do suggest, though, that men were getting the raw end of the deal in divorce, and they joined a broad coalition with liberal reformers to support groundbreaking changes in California's divorce law.

Traditionalist Men's Organizations

Men's Rights Association

Two national organizations that can presently be identified as belonging to a traditionalist men's movement are the Men's Rights Association (MRA) and The National Organization for Men, Inc. (NOM). The Men's Rights Association (17854 Lyons, Forest Lake, MN 55025) was formed by Richard Doyle in 1973. Doyle remains the president of MRA and makes decisions autocratically. MRA claims to have *served* more than 6000

"members" over the past decade and relies upon $20 membership fees to support its work. Membership numbers seem to be loosely defined as providing some financial support and the primary activity seems to be disseminating information about divorce law and providing legal referrals. MRA works closely with MEN (Men's Equality Now) International, which is described as an international coalition. MEN International was also formed by Doyle in 1977.

National Organization for Men

The National Organization for Men (381 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016) was founded in 1983 by Sidney Siller, columnist for *Penthouse* magazine. NOM has a quarterly newletter called *The Quest.* NOM claims to have 3600 members nationally, including 175 in New Jersey. They report organizing chapters in Florida, California, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and the Chicago, Illinois area. While NOM has chapters and seemingly a more active membership, Siller remains the single central figure. Like Doyle, he seems to be a crusader. Maggie Gallagher of the *National Review* notes that "by his own account, Siller thought up the men's rights movement more than twenty years ago..." (Gallagher 1987: 39). In many ways Siller could be considered more liberal than the traditionalist view represented by Doyle. NOM, for instance, criticizes the failure to draft women, and Siller has associated himself with humanism and, of course, the availability of pornography. Still, NOM stresses the breakdown of the family as a fundamental problem, and neither NOM nor the masculinist groups mention working with each other. In fact, when I asked Francis Baumli (a prominent member of the Coalition of Free Men and editor of a book from a masculinist perspective) about *The Quest*, he wrote that he hadn't heard of it. One wonders too how much the membership is involved in decision making. When Gallagher went to one of NOM's monthly board meetings, it was in "a corporate conference room ... not far from Wall Street" (Gallagher 1987: 39).

Traditional Values

The basis of both Doyle's and Siller's organizations is primarily the defense of the patriarchal family. Although it seems that they also support male privilege in general, their main focus is on legal reforms in the area of divorce and child custody. Unlike masculinists, furthermore, they stress paternal custody rather than joint custody. In terms of legitimating patriarchal relations, they tend to be less effective than the liberal masculinists. The traditionalists, like theorists of the New Right, aren't comfortable with New Deal liberalism and the effects of government intervention in the family. And, unlike the masculinist, traditionalists aren't concerned with appeasing liberal feminists by opposing alimony because it's "sexist." Instead, the traditionalists bluntly assert that women are screwing them over and that the nation is becoming more chaotic without the clear expression of natural male authority.

Doyle, for instance, is described by Williamson as being "a disciple of Charles Metz" (Williamson 1985: 318). Metz was a member of the United States Divorce Reform, who in 1968 wrote a book entitled *Divorce and Custody for Men: A Guide and Primer Designed Exclusively to Help Men Win Just Settlements*. According to Williamson, "Metz believed that men were to blame for female domination of men. As he saw it, men, who were in positions of power, were using that power to oppress men via a perverse chivalry which tried to win the favors and approval of women" (Williamson 1985: 317). Doyle does, in fact, continue this line of thought.

Doyle claims in a letter to potential members that his organization is not reactionary or "anti-women." Rather, he claims that the efforts of male divorce reformers "predate the term 'women's lib'" and are aimed at achieving justice (a concept also used by anti-feminist women). While the divorce reform movement was organized prior to the current movement for women's liberation, both followed a general trend of increasing numbers of married women entering the workforce. Concurrent with this trend was a growing

instability in the institution of marriage and an increase in divorce (see Klein 1984). Justice, according to the traditionalist men is to be found in firstly making divorce less attractive to women (so as not to undermine the existing family unit) and secondly making divorce less costly to men (so as not to reward ex-wives). In fact, while they claim not to be anti-women, they are patently anti-feminist, and both Doyle's *The Men's Manifesto* and NOM's, *The Quest*, cite C.H. ("Max") Freedman's (1985) book, *Manhood Redux: Standing Up to Feminism.*

The traditionalists are opposed to most changes in the female role and threatened by feminism. A promotional flyer for NOM claims that "the feminists' growth of power is designed to denigrate men, exempt women from the draft and to encourage the disintegration of the family." Feminists, then, are believed to be causing the disintegration of the family, which is patriarchal. The traditionalists hope to preserve the patriarchal family.

Divorce and the Welfare State

The traditionalists are the only faction of the men's movement that attacks the welfare state. According to traditionalist men, the patriarchal family has been undermined because 1) the courts and the rest of government have been too chivalrous and 2) the government has replaced the husband and father as the protector and guardian for women and children. As Doyle expresses the process, women are filing for divorce and the courts view women as being in need of protection. The courts then give wives large portions of their husbands' property and custody of the children while requiring the husband to pay alimony and child support. This rewards women for seeking divorce.

In addition to being anti-feminist, Doyle is opposed to the welfare state's intervention into the privacy of the family. He writes that "the socialist philosophy holds that government ... replace 'the man of the family.' Consequently the role of the male is shrinking, as the roles of judges, police, and social services personnel increase" (Doyle

1987: 12). The state has attempted to mediate the conflict between patriarchy and capitalism. As the patriarchal family came under attack in some segments of society and its position was compromised, the state established policies that would strengthen social patriarchy. The state tried to dictate, for instance, that men should continue to financially support their ex-wives as a continuation of the family wage. Alimony payments and child support, however, were difficult to enforce. Failing that, the state would provide limited subsidies to female-headed households. This has effectively contributed to male privilege even though the patriarchal family has been weakened, especially in the middle class. The traditionalists, though, criticize liberal state policies. Doyle asserts that welfare undermines the family. As evidence he cites the findings of the Task Force on the Family, which was appointed by President Reagan.

Siller wrote in 1970 regarding alimony: "Women have sought and been granted equal rights in the ownership of property, voting and employment opportunities... therefore there is no longer any need for the ancient anachronism of alimony..." (Siller 1970: 21). Women are able to work in the paid labor force, so they shouldn't rely on their ex-husbands. This does not mean, however, that Siller opposes men supporting their wives financially while married. He points out that if a woman re-marries in some states, she "can be supported by two husbands, her ex and her present" (Siller 1970: 20). He suggests that this is unfair to the ex-husband. It's also unfair to the ex-husband, though, if he re-marries and still has to support his ex-wife. Siller writes of men who "had remarried and discovered that they couldn't adequately support their new family on the salary that remained after alimony payments" Siller 1970: 20). In fact, the National Organization for Men works with another Siller group called the National Committee for Second Wives.

Paternal Custody

> Your wife can accuse you of rape at any time during your marriage. That charge can lead to your arrest, prosecution, and incarceration in many of the fifty states. Your protection against this conjugal lie is absolutely nil. It's her word against yours... As the law now stands in some states, a rape charge can deprive a husband of child custody and be used against him in a divorce trial -- even if it turns out that the charge is false.
>
> Sidney Siller, *Penthouse*,
> "'Wife Rape' -- Who Really Gets Screwed"

While masculinist groups advocate joint custody, traditionalists promote paternal custody. The traditionalist men's groups typically refer to studies that stress the importance of a strong father figure. Doyle, for instance, laments the loss of paternal authority as the result of divorce and the threat of divorce. He claims that juvenile delinquency is greater among children in maternal custody. Writes Doyle, "What else can we expect from two generations of fatherless youths? Both men and women are pamperized in the process" (Doyle 1987: 2). Doyle claims that fathers should be given custody of their children. While he recognizes that child care is not traditionally the venue of men, he argues that divorce itself is neither traditional nor moral. Under the circumstances, then, if a child is to have only one parent it is better to have a father (Doyle 1987: 7).

Most of the work of traditionalist men's groups continues to be directed toward divorce reform and child custody. This includes providing referrals to attorneys and counselors. MRA sponsors an annual demonstration in New York's Times Square to commemorate Father's Day. Both NOM and MRA also try to promote research. NOM has established the Institute for the Study of Matrimony Laws as a "research and education foundation for the study of the nation's divorce, alimony, custody and visitation laws." NOM also plans to initiate 'the first Men's Library and Research Center and the first Men's Legal Defense Fund." MRA researches the causes and effects of divorce as well as various reform strategies. Doyle claims to have evidence that links juvenile delinquency and child abuse with maternal custody. Says Doyle, "Our research has uncovered sociological

studies in defense of masculinity," which reportedly reveal "the duplicity of many laws and judicial practices" (Doyle, Letter to Potential Members).

Unlike the masculinists, traditionalist men are skeptical of joint custody arrangements. Ken Pangborn, the president of MEN International (which was founded by traditionalist Richard Doyle), opposes joint custody as detracting fathers from seeking sole custody. Pangborn argues that the success of joint custody can be attributed to its voluntary adoption by the parents. It would work less well, however, if it were imposed by the courts:

> Joint custody has an appeal to the obvious sense of fairness in people. But ... it distorts perceptions of reality. Joint custody works well when there is cooperation of both parents, and the children. But it is horrendous when there exists that level of belligerance that makes such an agreement difficult (201).

Pangborn suggests that "desperate and *lazy* men" prefer joint custody to seeking sole custody (201). In another context, though, he writes of illusions that fathers may harbor about the ease of having custody. In this vein, he writes: "I have seen many men seeking a custody modification who really want their new wives or girlfriends to be baby-sitters or the 'parent,' and they are not motivated by a genuine desire to '*be*' a custodial parent themselves" (154).

"Domestic" Violence

Doyle discounts the significance of violence perpetrated by men against women. He claims that there is "evidence there is more battering of husbands than of wives (the foregoing refers to physical battering; men usually can't hold a candle to women in psychological battering)" (Doyle 1987: 13). The image seems to be one of a domineering wife and a henpecked husband. How this is resolved with the notion of paternal authority is not clear. In any case, Doyle argues that "men must cease accepting blame for the alleged subordination of women" (Doyle 1987: 15).

View of Male Traitors

The traditionalists view pro-feminist men as deviant, abnormal and weak. Pro-feminist men believe that women have been oppressed, that men have been imbued with social privilege, and that a more egalitarian society would be more just. These men are viewed as traitors by the traditionalists. In 1986 NOM gave its first *WIMP Award* to a judge in Illinois who refused to give a convicted rapist a new trial after the victim recanted. Siller claimed that the judge "was affected by the media attention and the power of the feminist press in this country, and refused to vacate because of the gender issues involved." Doyle refers to "nominal males (wimps) who have banded together to denounce their masculinity, cry a lot, grope at each other in 'consciousness raising' sessions, and celebrate the virtues of homosexuality. A masochistic tendency in their character is capable of seeing fault only in males and manhood" (Doyle 1987: 11).

Affirmative Action

Both NOM and MRA oppose affirmative action policies, which they believe are designed to promote undeserving women. Doyle writes: "Liberals and envious women ... have managed to implement far reaching anti-male prejudicial practices. Gender and quotas, rather than ability, are the criteria now largely used to hire and promote employees" (Doyle 1987). The ideology of equal opportunity is accepted as self-evident.

The traditionalist men seem unable to resolve themselves to married women's role in the paid labor force. Although Siller seems to recognize women as workers when he argues against alimony, he seems to be speaking only of single or divorced women. And, in particular, he is concerned that young women, who have not committed as much time or energy to their marriages or their husbands' careers, should be expected to support themselves after a divorce. When faced with the issue of women's lower wages relative to men's, Doyle argues that most women are simply not qualified for work traditionally performed by men. This contention, of course, ignores historical evidence to the contrary.

Responding to attempts to achieve wage parity for women, Doyle claims that men have greater work skills and do more difficult work (Doyle 1987: 8).

Conclusions

The traditionalist men's movement has lacked a broad-based grass-roots and has tended to rely upon founding fathers. More importantly, the traditionalist men have failed to come to terms with the role of married women in the paid labor force. Their frame of reference is the patriarchal nuclear family while more U.S. families now have dual income earners or have only a single parent. Furthermore single parent households are rarely headed by a man (see Pangborn 1985).

Traditionalist antagonism to the welfare state undermines the usefulness of traditional rhetoric in today's state policy agenda. Even Reagan implemented much less conservative policy than he advocated. As Eisenstein points out, the welfare state was initially conceived as a means of resolving conflicts between the need (1) to maintain social order and thus the general welfare and (2) to maintain male and white privilege and the ability of owners of capital to exploit labor. Neither the New Right, nor the more narrow traditionalist men's movement, can provide the means to mystify male privilege in a service economy that requires most women (single or married) to work in the paid labor force.

The traditionalist men have been unable to inspire a majority opinion. Ferguson and Rogers (1986) note that polls indicate a consistent support for liberal social positions. Although polls indicate that a significant minority of married men still subscribe to traditionalist views, most men are now more egalitarian or more ambivalent (see Blumstein & Schwartz and Cherlin & Walters 1981). Blumstein and Shwartz (1984) note that 34% of married men clearly disagree with the assertion that both spouses should work outside of the home (118). Although that number increases to 64% when small children are present (Blumstein & Schwartz 1984: 568), Astrachan suggests that the percentage of men in two-

income families who hold this position is probably less than that of men in traditional nuclear families (which are now a statistical minority in the U.S.) (Astrachan 1983: 202). Blumstein and Schwartz seem to confirm this in a footnote. Ninety-one percent of those husbands who believe both spouses should work are from two-income families. By comparison, 78 percent of husbands who have "neutral or mixed feelings" and 57 percent of husbands who believe that women should not work are from two-income families (Blumstein & Schwartz 1984: 565). As two-income families become more prevalent, then, attitudes will likely become less traditional.

Regardless of how men and women conceptualize the ideal family, there are real economic demands that require most women to work outside of the home. Says Astrachan, "Women go to work primarily because the economy no longer fits the myth of the male wage earner; a family needs more than one income to live on middle-class terms, and many need more than one just to survive" (198). There are two clear implications to this reality. The first is that while women are working, their male relatives are likely to oppose discrimination against them. In fact, Blumstein and Schwartz (1984) found that husbands tended to be happier with their marriages when their wives were successful at work (161). This was especially true for men who thought both partners should be working. Burris found in his study of support for the ERA, moreover, that "the more men depend upon a second income (i.e., the lower their personal income) and/or the greater the actual contribution of a second wage-earner (i.e., the higher their spouse's income) the greater their support for equal rights for women [footnote removed]" (Burris 1983: 313-314). The second implication is that because of structural changes and the demands of the women's movement (that have been widely accepted in their liberal form), the ideology of traditional gender roles tends to be unacceptable to policy planners. As Green (1981) suggested of the conservatives, traditionalist men provide a challenge for the short-term but cannot provide the basis for effective long-term social policy.

MASCULINIST MEN'S MOVEMENT

The masculinists, like the traditionalists, are concerned with men's rights and criticize the pro-feminists for blaming men for social oppression. Like the restrictive liberals, masculinist men warn against acting out of guilt. Instead, men must create their own agenda for action.

Unlike the traditionalists, though, masculinist men stress that men have much to gain by women's legal equality. Masculinists draw upon the liberal human potential movement and counter culture in abdicating the role of protecting and providing for women and instead assuming a new involvement in fathering. These concerns are similar to the cultural issues addressed by pro-feminist men.

While the masculinists combine the conservative men's rights issues and the liberal men's liberation, the emphasis is always upon an agenda for men with little concern about how it affects women. The feminists presumably will take care of themselves, and the masculinists don't want the interests of men to be subsumed by feminism. One prominent interest of masculinist men is the right to be active fathers.

History of Masculinism

The masculinist movement builds upon a pluralist theory of power to assert that men and women have, in the past, had spheres of power and different kinds of oppressive role constraints. Accordingly, they assert, men's power and women's oppression were not greater than -- only different from -- women's power and men's oppression. They now speak of equal rights and gender justice as they work for men's rights in an attempt to balance the activities of feminist groups. In 1970 Men's Liberation, Inc., a group of 16 men who had been trying to changing alimony laws, "broadened its goals" to "liberating ourselves from having to prove our masculinity 24 hours a day" (New York Times Oct. 23, 1970, 36: 1). They argued that "men, no less than women, are victims of a fixed set of rules, based generally on mores, rather than biology," that "relationships with women as

equals would be more rewarding..." and that "men would be freed from the total responsibility for the family's economic well-being" (New York Times Oct. 23, 1970, 36: 1).

Masculinist Organizations

National Congress for Men

The National Congress for Men (2231 15th St. SE, Washington, DC 20003) was formed in 1981 with James Cook as its president. John Rossler of the Fathers Rights Association, Inc. is the current president. The National Congress for Men (NCM) is a coalition that combines the Coalition of Free Men, Men's Rights, Inc. and more than a dozen fathers' rights groups. Its newsletter is called *NetWORK*. "As of July 10, 1987, NCM had 687 dues paying members" representing 47 of the 50 states (*NetWORK*). Cook estimated, though, that the combined membership of associated local groups was 7000 to 8000 (Astrachan 1986: 309). Astrachan notes that the National Congress for Men was not at all reluctant to seek press coverage:

> The National Congress decided as a matter of course at its first meeting to set up a national organization and won CBS, NBC, National Public Radio, New York *Times* and Washington *Post* coverage -- all steps toward getting a finger on the levers of power, that is, changing the divorce laws in as many states as possible. (The New York *Times* sent a style page reporter to the opening press conference of NOCM and then refused to run the story she wrote, on the pretext that the *Times* doesn't cover embryonic organizations; nobody thought of that when the Houston correspondent sent a news story on the first meeting of the National Congress for Men to the national desk in 1981.)
>
> (Astrachan 1986: 312-313).

The National Congress for Men (NCM) has one staff person who does many different tasks. NCM refers fathers who are going through divorce to local fathers groups. They maintain a directory of such groups across the country and claim to refer about 150 fathers per month. They also claim that "20% of the callers ... are women seeking help for their fathers, brothers, sons, uncles, husbands and lovers" (*NetWORK*).

At their first conference in 1981, Fredric Hayward said that "the objective of the National Congress for Men ... is not to fight feminism or roll back its gains, but to extend sexual equality to both sexes." The New York *Times* reported, however, that

> although both Mr. Hayward and the conference generally sought to dovetail its philosophy with that of feminists, the feminists nonetheless came in for some hard words. Feminism, Mr. Hayward asserted, is too often sexist itself. That is, he explained, it insists on a female perspective, is monopolized by female concerns, and perpetuates myths about males -- for example, that all men are privileged, all are rapists, all are dominant.
> (New York *Times* 1981, B9: 2)

The conference was attended primarily by divorced men. They argued that "men are sexually discriminated against in employment sometimes, and in military service almost all the time" and that "abortions, performed unilaterally by women, often trample on the legitimate rights of the father to be" (New York *Times* 1981, B9: 2). Among the workshops offered at the 1987 NCM Convention are several about courtroom strategies for divorce settlements and joint custody judgments, including such topics as "defending false allegations of sexual abuse," "defending parental abduction," and "the use of a private detective in domestic matters" (*NetWORK*).

The Coalition of Free Men

The Coalition of Free Men (PO Box 129, Manhasset, NY 11030) began in the fall of 1980 as the New York chapter of Free Men, Inc. Free Men, Inc. was formed in December 1976 by a group of men in Maryland. Free Men has since become inactive, but the Coalition of Free Men has gained national prominence. The president of The Coalition of Free Men is Tom Williamson and its bimonthly newsletter is *Transitions*.

The stationary of The Coalition of Free Men lists Herb Goldberg, Edward Asner, Dan Greenberg and Gregory Hines as members of the Board of Advisors. The organization is incorporated as a "nonprofit (501)(C3) educational organization that looks at the ways sex discrimination affects men" (Williamson, response to survey). The only

source of financial support are dues and voluntary contributions, and all of the workers are volunteers. The Board of Directors include the president, vice president, administrative vice-president, recording secretary, and treasurer.

According to Williamson, "day to day running of the organization is [the] responsibility of the president. Policy decisions are made by the Board of Directors." The directors are supposed to be elected as "delegates" from the chapters. Williamson notes, however, that "chapter formation comes and goes" and that they presently "have a self perpetuating Board" (Williamson, response to survey). There are "state representatives" in Massachusetts, Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Indiana, Oregon, California, Wisconsin, Texas, Arizona, and West Virginia. There are also committees on feminist ideology and on men's studies. CFM sponsors national conferences and public meetings, forms men's support groups, provides a speakers bureau, promotes public awareness, promotes men's studies courses and provides resources, provides a referral service for men who are getting a divorce, and does research to find data on men's issues.

Men's Rights, Inc.

In addition to Free Men, Inc., 1977 marked the beginning of Fred Hayward's Men's Rights, Inc. (PO Box 163180, Sacramento, CA 95816). Fred Hayward is the founder and director of Men's Rights, Inc. (MR, Inc.) Dr. Barry Sandrew has been appointed to direct East Coast Operations. MR, Inc. is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization that relies upon voluntary donations from individuals as its source of financial support. MR, Inc. has no chapters or local groups. Individuals can become members by donating a designated amount each year. According to Hayward, they do not solicit members and have no intention of becoming "a large, grass roots political organization" (Hayward, response to survey). When asked how decisions were made, Hayward responded that people are encouraged to do things and that if someone wants to do

something, they do it. MR, Inc. works closely with the Coalition of Free Men and the National Congress for Men as well as several local groups (Equal Rights for Fathers, VOCAL & Single Fathers' Support Group).

MR, Inc. helps organizations to form and network and was a founding member of the National Congress for Men. They provide referrals and speakers, help researchers, sponsor demonstrations and programs for the community. They produce some literature, attempt to generate publicity and take legal action. Four legal actions were cited: 1) Eliminating sex discrimination in automobile insurance in Massachusetts, 2) successfully getting "a Massachusetts regulation banning 'Ladies Nights' in bars," 3) providing a legal argument at the U.S. Supreme Court against "all-male military conscription," and 4) supporting a suit by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination against higher premiums for men receiving life insurance policies.

MR, Inc. created MR MEDIA WATCH in 1984 "to improve the image of men in the media." In 1986 the project began making awards for the best and worst in advertising. Other projects are MR ERA and MR PARENTAL LEAVE. "MR, Inc. is dedicated to ending sexism in a way that recognizes the social, psychological, physical, legal, and economic problems of men. It seeks to make available to men the wide range of options that are now available to women..." (Statement of Purpose).

Father's Rights

Joint Custody

> ... more and more divorced and separated fathers are being accused (often falsely) of sexually and physically abusing their children to the point where such allegations are being made in three out of ten divorces.
>
> Jane Young, *Transitions*
> speech at Father's Day Rally

Both the pro-feminist and traditionalist groups criticize the masculinist focus on joint custody. Pro-feminist radicals advocate a primary caretaker rule, and traditionalists

support paternal custody arrangements. When the National Congress for Men was formed in 1980, the masculinist groups forged an alliance with fathers' rights organizations. The National Congress for Men reportedly published a directory in 1985 that lists "more than one thousand ... men's organizations" (Williamson 1985: 320).

Father's rights and specifically child custody have become a central focus of the masculinist men's movement. Haddad explained that "the dominant issue of the women's movement has been employment, that sphere has always been man's domain. The corresponding domain for women has been child-rearing, and that is where men must and will muscle in on the action" (Haddad 1984: 50). They argue that, in the interests of fairness and equality, joint custody legislation should be adopted nationwide. This has contributed to a conflict with many feminists. The *Wall Street Journal* in 1986 wrote of "an increasingly bitter fight with women -- in the nation's courts and in the state legislatures -- over the issue of joint custody of children in divorce cases" (*Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 21, '86: 54).

Jane Young, a member of the Fathers Rights Association's steering committee, delivered a speech at a Father's Day Rally in which she used a pronouncement from the early NOW to support her position. In 1966 NOW said in its Statement of Purpose:

> We reject the current assumptions that a man must carry the sole burden of supporting himself, his wife, and family, and that a woman is automatically entitled to lifelong support by a man upon her marriage, or that marriage, home and family are primarily woman's world and responsibility -- hers to dominate -- his to support.
>
> (NOW SOP, Oct. 29, 1966)

For Young and others in the masculinist men's movement, NOW's more recent opposition to joint custody legislation has seemed to be in bad faith. Young claims that "a lot of women are scared" that "men want to horn in on women's traditional turf, their power base" (Young, Transitions v.7 #5, Sept/Oct. 1987). John Rossler (NCM's president) and Jane Young (NCM's Women's Issues Advisor) wrote a letter to 301 editors of newspapers

carrying *Parade Magazine*. They were responding to an article entitled "Should We Make It Harder for Men to Walk Out on Wives and Children?" In their letter they advocate no-fault divorce and joint custody: "Arrangements of shared parenting in the event of divorce are philosophically consistent with early equal rights theory because they free both men and women from strict adherence to stereotypical gender roles" (*NetWORK*, v.1, n. 3).

When toward the late 1970's NOW opposed joint custody legislation, argued Williamson, "the women's movement looked more and more like just another special interest group" (322). According to Williamson, Warren Farrell had viewed the early NOW "as a voice for human rights" and "expected from them more encouragement for males" (322).

Daniel Calvin has written an article on joint custody that Baumli (1985) refers to as a "classic within the men's movement" (325). He refers frequently to a book by Roman and Haddad (1978) called *The Disposable Parent*. Calvin (1985) argues that the current tradition of maternal custody following divorce is damaging to everyone involved: "... our current arrangements tend to make ex-parents of fathers, painfully deprived creatures of the children, and overburdened persons out of the mothers" (188). Calvin then argues that joint custody is the best alternative.

Along the way Calvin observes: "the vast majority of women ... work out of economic necessity" (186); "men have almost never agreed on any large scale to share responsibility for the home" (187); "divorce decisions are based upon the extension of assumptions and values that underlie and support the required structure and roles of the American nuclear family" (188); "until the beginning of the twentieth century, 'patriarchy' almost exclusively determined the legal status of children [footnote removed]" (191); "industrialization, which split the wage labor of men and the private labor of women, was behind the exaltation of motherhood and the maternal instinct" (192); and "when joint custody would not work (where the parents themselves say it will not work), no court in the land will make it happen" (195).

From just the above statements, one would believe that this is a clearly feminist argument. However, in spite of agreement about the sexist nature of assumptions of the nuclear family (upon which public policy is erected), clear conflicts do exist between masculinist and feminist proposals on child custody. Phyllis Chesler (1986) has written a book on the subject, entitled *Mothers on Trial: The Battle for Children and Custody.* According to the Wall Street Journal, Chesler "argues that all too often a father may seek joint custody ... as a way of 'retaining the marital home and other assets and as a way of monitoring, controlling and harassing his ex-wife'" (Wall Street *Journal*, Aug 21, '86: 54). It's important to note that joint custody "does not refer to the living arrangement of the children" (Salt 1986: 110). Rather, this custodial arrangement effects parental rights regarding the children.

In some divorces the parents agree upon custodial arrangements and do not contest this issue in court. In these circumstances maternal custody (which Calvin criticizes) would not be forced. Accordingly, Calvin is primarily concerned with court directed custody judgements. Calvin's argument is essentially that, when custody is contested, the court should give preference to joint custody rather than to maternal custody. In Calvin's words "joint custody ... needs to be the legislative presumption" (195).

Calvin goes on to recognize that this "presumption in favor of joint custody" may be seen as "coercive." Nevertheless, he asserts, "the current bias in favor of the mother is also coercive" (195). Provisions of joint custody include the following: the parents share legal custody, which precludes the notion of "visitation"; "responsibility and decision-making" are shared; and there is no requirement of "child support" (191).

Alimony and Child Support

Masculinist men, like the traditionalists, oppose alimony and child support requirements. On March 2, 1987, Jack Kammer, NCM Executive Director, testified before

the Senate subcommittee on Social Security & Family Policy chaired by restrictive liberal Patrick Moynihan. He told the subcommittee that alimony was an injustice and that men often do not pay alimony and child support because they no longer feel like part of the family. He explained that men are willing to sacrifice to earn a living for their families but only if they will reap the rewards of having that family to come home to. Referring to Weitzman's (1985) "claim that men's Standard of Living goes up after divorce, Kammer pointed out that 'men voluntarily lower their Standard of Living in order to achieve the love and affection, the feeling of purpose and connectedness that only a family can bring'" (*NetWORK*, v. 1, no. 2). Later that same month Kammer also testified in hearings on the Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987. Representative Harold Ford of Tennessee presided over these hearings (*NetWORK*, v. 1, no. 2).

Fredric Hayward, director of Men's Rights Inc., used a similar approach to the issue in his column on the so-called "deadbeat dad." Hayward explained that some of these men never wanted to be parents and that men should have the option of non-support if their partner refuses to have an abortion. Others, he said, changed their minds but, unlike the mother, didn't have the option of putting the child up for adoption. Others are denied custody or "resent their second-class status as parents." A final group simply can't afford to make the support payments. Hayward sums up the problem by saying that "once you rob someone of the rewards of parenthood -- the warmth of a family, the continued experience of a child's growth, the contribution of one's values -- you rob him of his sense of duty" (Los Angeles *Times* II, 5: 1).

Free Men

Women are free to pursue careers, so masculinist men are now pursuing their own liberation. As was discussed earlier, the masculine mystique consists of being limited to the roles of provider and protector. Now men are turning to a concern with their own individual growth. While they attack the patriarchal family for demanding that husbands

and fathers act as insensitive pocketbooks, masculinist men tend to accept social patriarchy. This follows from their view of power relations. Women, acting in their own interest, are pressing for greater equality in the paid labor force. Masculinist men, though, don't want their agenda to be set by the needs of women. Rather, these men are concerned to promote their interests as emotionally expressive individuals and active parents.

Goldberg had suggested that male privilege was a myth perpetuated by men's more active style. In other words, masculine aggressive behavior has a more apparent (but not more real) impact than does feminine passive aggression. Haddad (1984) builds upon this idea with a revised theory of male power based upon the myth of male privilege. According to Baumli (1985), "Richard Haddad, as one of the founding members of Free Men in Columbia, Maryland, and as publisher of *American Man*, the most important journal in the men's movement, has been spoken of as the messiah of men's liberation" (326).

While Haddad recognizes that most elite political and economic positions are occupied by men, he says that it "sounds too silly" to explicitly suggest "a conspiracy of some men to govern for the benefit of other men" (Haddad 1984: 14). He also recognizes that, while the majority of men do not occupy these elite positions, they do typically earn more than do women. However, Haddad argues, most men are economically disempowered because "the power of money is in the spending, not the earning" (Haddad 1984: 14). He seems to imply, then, that a man's earning power should be balanced against a wife's propensity to spend her husband's money. In regard to political power, Haddad points to "mandated alimony payments" and the social security system as primarily benefiting women. Furthermore, he says, "the same lawmakers who frowned on working women also frowned on vagrant men..." (Haddad 1984: 15).

Pro-feminist men might point out that lawmakers also represent the interests of capital, which is sometimes at odds with the interests of the male sexual class. Still, social patriarchy provides all men with privileges within society. An individual man may or may

not be a male supremacist, but he still enjoys social privilege from being part of the dominant sexual class (see Ehrlich 1977). Brod (1987) notes: "Capitalism increasingly creates a gap between institutional and personal power [footnote removed]. For men, this creates a disjunction between the facts of public male power and the feelings of men's private powerlessness" (13-14). Gerson and Peiss (1985) explain this process in terms of negotiated dominance:

> Domination describes the systems of male control and coercion while negotiation addresses the processes by which men and women bargain for privileges and resources. Each group has some assets which enable it to cooperate with or resist existing social arrangements, although clearly these resources and consequent power are unequal (318).

Liberalism typically masks social domination in a shroud of liberty while allowing an equal right to bargain.

But Haddad would likely find this explanation unacceptable: "We speak contemptuously of 'The System' as if it were something the government or industry or both have created and maintain primarily to exploit the citizen-worker. The government does not run the system. Neither does the corporation. The system runs both, and we -- men and women -- run the system" (Haddad 1985: 288). Haddad's concept of power, then, is patently pluralist. If men have occupied positions of political and economic decision-making, it's only because that has been their defined sphere of influence. Women, meanwhile, have traditionally occupied the domestic sphere and, according to Haddad, exercised power in that sphere. Because mothers have been responsible for child-rearing, they are central to the socialization process and to conveying values to children. Asks Haddad: "Exactly how important *are* men in society's scheme of things if it was not thought necessary for them to be around while we were growing up...?" (Haddad 1984: 16).

"Domestic" Violence

Unlike pro-feminist men, who focus on male violence against women, masculinist men stress the male victim. Baumli (1985) includes a section on "violence and the male victim," which is divided into material on battered and murdered husbands and mass media portrayals of men as legitimate victims. Masculinist men frame the issue of "domestic" violence in pluralist terms. Feminist women, they assert, have fostered a concern with violence against women. This, furthermore, detracts from services for men who are vitims of violence in the home. The traditionalists express a similar concern, although one would suspect that traditionalist men would attribute the phenomenon to the man's loss of authority. For masculinist men, as for the researchers they cite, the concern is to demonstrate that violence in the family is less an expression of man's patriarchal privilege than of a culture that encourages violent solutions to conflict. In pluralist politics, further, masculinist men represent the interests of men.

The masculinists' concern about family violence is expressed by an insert in the first 1988 issue of *Transitions*. This was an article from *Social Work* on battered husbands, a subject that has caused a furor in the social work profession. The article contends that husband battering is as frequent as wife battering and that wives frequently falsely accuse men of child abuse in order to gain custody. These are popular contentions among the masculinist men's groups. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, the Fathers' Rights Association of New York (a member group of the National Congress for Men) "sent a copy of the article to Gov. Mario Cuomo, along with a letter charging that the state, because of 'feminist misrepresentations,' discriminates against men in its domestic-violence policies" (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, 35E: 4).

Critics contend that "the researchers failed to consider whether women are striking their husbands merely in self-defense. 'If you look at a hit or an assault out of context, it doesn't tell you much of anything,' argues Barbara Hart, an attorney for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence." Feminists seem to be concerned that a focus on

violence against husbands will diminish concern about wife abuse. According to the article, Warren Farrell, who has recently become associated with the masculinist men's movement, also "fears that in the short run the controversial article will make men's groups self-righteous and both sexes more defensive" (Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, 35E: 4).

Sexual Politics

Haddad also denies that men have any advantage in sexual politics. He notes that men either have a greater sex drive or are at least burdened with greater expectations of sexual performance: "Does that not make the male more vulnerable in interpersonal relationships? Have you ever thought of the male sex drive in terms of the power it gives women?" (Haddad 1984: 16). Apparently this is the power of rejection -- the "power" to say no. Jerry Boggs wrote an article called "Women's Hidden Power" in which he discusses a study that asked women how they get their way and found that they often use emotional ploys (*Transitions*, v. 7 #5). D. McDonnell II, writing of "Sex Harassment on the Job," argues that "a woman can have 'fun' by dangling the carrot of willingness and watch the men trip over themselves... Yet women continue to clamor that they are powerless in the supposedly male dominated society" (*Transitions*, v 7 #5 Sept/Oct. 1987). Boggs and McDonnell II try, in this way, to distort the message of feminism. Most feminists recognize that women have some personal power, which they can use to work for change. This does not, however, dismiss the institutional power and privilege that men use to maintain their dominance over women as a sexual class (and often as individuals).

In another issue of *Transitions*, Mel Feit tries to establish "A New Definition of Rape." Writes Feit, "She decides if and when there is going to be a sexual encounter. He asks. She decides. She has the power." This, Feit concludes, should be considered rape because dating makes men "feel belittled, enraged, degraded, dehumanized, humiliated and powerless" (Transitions v. 8 #1 Jan/Feb 1988). Robert Tyler expands this notion as power

derived from sexual passivity:

> The first and quite basic power -- or perhaps more neutrally at this point, advantage -- of women over men is in the basic biological nature of our sexual jobs... Women have no necessary duties to perform in coition... Short of clinical vaginissmus, the woman can 'perform' quite adequately, even as she lies on her back and plans her next day's shopping list, or her Board of Directors agenda (Tyler 1984: 6).

These are the words of a man who proclaims, "I am a liberal, on the right side, a life-long supporter of feminism. ...I am puzzled by my general assent to feminist goals and ideology and by my complete failure to 'feel' its contents" (Tyler 1984: 4-5). This liberal author reduces human sexuality to coition and then dismisses any coition that is not performed in the missionary positon.

Finally, David Morrow reviewed a book that the editor of *Transitions* said had "considerable merit." The book is entitled *Shy Men, Sex and Castrating Women* (Balls 1985). It describes the "castrating woman" as being "callous and manipulative." She is portrayed as victimizing "shy men" and exhibiting such traits as "habitual lying, menstrual problems, claims of previous rape or incest, and ... aversion to breast play..." (*Transitions* v. 8 #1 Jan/Feb 1988). Although Morrow believes that "other, less violent alternatives are more practical and to be preferred," the book suggests that "such women can be handled with manipulation, emotional retaliation, at times a slap upside the head, and often best with forced sex" (*Transitions* v.8, #1 Jan/Feb 1988).

Men's Rights

Men's Rights activists agree with feminists that sexist language is a problem, but they are specifically concerned about disparaging remarks about men. Tom Williamson of the Coalition of Free Men, for instance, dislikes the terms *wimp* and *macho*: "I don't like the way wimp makes a judgment. And macho is just another way of saying 'male chauvinist pig.'" Warren Farrell rebuts arguments about the male pronoun associated with

God by noting that the Devil is also referred to as male, which is unfair to men (New York *Times*, January 13, 1986, B52). A special issue of *The University of Dayton Review* on men's studies is advertised as including topics such as "anti-male bias in English" and "institutionalized sexism against men" and is available from the chair of CFM's committee on men's studies (*Network*, v.1, n.2). In fact, "activists in men's rights organizations are entering the fray with talk show appearances and angry letters over language and innuendo in advertisements, movies, news broadcasts, women's magazines and television programming" (New York *Times*, January 13, 1986, B52).

Conclusions

Survey data indicates that general support for gender equality has increased since 1970. Ferguson and Rogers (1986) note, for instance, that feminism is among "the policy areas in which the public has shown the sharpest increase in liberalism since World War II. The rate of increase slowed during the post-1973 period, but at no time did the public actually become more conservative on these issues" (Ferguson & Rogers 1986: 16). Writes William J. Goode, "Through men's eyes, at least the *principle* of equality seems more acceptable than in the past. Their resistance is not set against that abstract idea" (Goode 1980: 189). And for that reason the masculinists can be more useful to policy planners than other wings of the men's movement. They do not oppose equality and, in fact, they complain about sexism against men and about women's continuing dependence. They do, however, often resist the "concrete application" of equality, as Goode calls it. The rhetoric of men's liberation and of men's rights fits in well with a restrictive liberal agenda that wants a color-blind, gender-blind approach to equal opportunity. It fits in well with claims of reverse discrimination.

The state has attempted to shore up patriarchal relations in several ways, including (1) state paternalism through family policy and welfare regulations and (2) a sex segregated labor force in which women earn less. Surveys indicate that men still have more leverage,

do less housework, and expect women to stay home with small children (see e.g. Blumstein & Schwartz 1983). While traditionalist statements supporting the patriarchal family are blatant and liable to inspire more support for radical feminist goals, opposition to welfare and affirmative action quotas are not.

Masculinists have suffered setbacks in their campaign to establish a presumption of joint custody in divorce laws (California recently reversed such a policy because of its presumed effect on children passed between conflicting parents). They have, however, gotten their issues on the public agenda. In the fall of 1983, a retired professor addressed the Rotary Club in St. Joseph, Michigan on the subject of "men -- an endangered species." He opened by saying that he would "provide some highly needed refutation to those wild-eyed Women's Libbers" (Hampton 1984: 335). And among his concluding remarks, he quotes Frederic Hayward (of Men's Rights, Inc.) as saying, in part, that men "only want to make it a fairer world for everyone. That includes us!" (Hampton 1984: 339).

In 1979 Longres and Bailey set out to find studies of men in the social work journals. They selected 52 articles to review. Of these only three dealt with "explicit conceptualizations of sexism" (Longres & Bailey 1979: 27). And one of these was by a radical pro-feminist activist, John Stoltenberg. They did find additional articles addressing male privilege, but "generally, when authors take note of sex-role issues they do so to point out how men may be oppressed by norms relating to sex roles" (Longres & Bailey 1979: 29). Whether these studies explicitly support the masculinist men's movement, they do provide fodder for their efforts. Further, they note, that only two of the fifty-two articles "explicitly support maintaining traditional norms of male behavior" (Longres & Bailey 1979: 29).

In 1986 the National Congress for Men celebrated a small measure of "congressional recognition" when NCM successfully lobbied the House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families to add "men's issues to the list of topics about which it

will compile and distribute information" (*NetWORK*, v. 1, no. 2).

The "New Man" may, in fact, have become associated with a rare, but popularized, breed -- the YUPPIE. Writes Ehrenreich, "In the insecure 1980's, class lines are being hastily drawn, and many features of the new manhood can best be understood as efforts to stay on the right side of the line separating ... upscale from merely middle class" (Ehrenreich 1984: 44) As an example of this upscale concern, Ehrenreich cites the concern with sensititivity, though she expresses a sense that "it may be largely a verbal accomplishment" (Ehrenreich 1984: 46). She explains:

> The vocabulary of sensitivity, at least, has become part of the new masculine politesse; certainly no new man would admit to being insensitive or willfully 'out of touch with his feelings.' Quite possibly, as sensitivity has spread, it has lost its moorings in the therapeutic experience and come to signify the heightened receptivity associated with consumerism...
>
> Ehrenreich 1984: 46

Although many pro-feminist men stress the need for greater sensitivity, they clearly are not as likely to be upscale or, to cite another of Ehrenreich's concerns, to advocate irresponsibility or lack of commitment. Astrachan (1988) notes the different backgrounds of men who attend conferences of pro-feminist and masculinist organizations. The masculinists tend to come from better paid professional trades. It is perhaps a touch of irony, then, that the pro-feminist magazine *Changing Men* lost rights to its prior name, *M.*, to an upscale journal for the fashion conscious man who is not just sensitive but sophisticated as well. Keep in mind, though, what Piercy said about liberal manipulators -- much more effective.

The masculinists are the most likely strand of the men's movement to provide the ideological basis for rejecting the claims of radical feminists (which are founded upon notions of sexual politics and a sexual class system rather than liberal legal reform). In terms of the ongoing struggle for more egalitarian institutions, the masculinists present a common sense approach that says men and women are now equal and both are oppressed. They agree, then, with restrictive liberal Daniel Bell when he says that "the 1960s helped

bring an end to patriarchy" and "although the NOW movement may have gone too far..., they are pulling back. Betty Friedan represents this 'second-stage' pullback'" (Bell 1987: 204). This justifies a renewed emphasis on the needs of men, which seems to come at the expense of feminism.

Because much of the pro-feminist men's movement (like the feminist women's movement) has been dominated by a liberal ideology, it has been unable to adequately meet the challenge represented by the restrictive liberals and the masculinist men.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Whereas Ehrenreich (1983) traced historical trends that created a setting conducive to the "new man," I have focused on the political climate and the challenges of the women's movement to suggest that some particular men's movement organizations have a greater opportunity to effectively shape public consciousness and perhaps policy. The distinctions between the ideologies of pro-feminist, traditionalist and masculinist men are clear. I have suggested, though, a connection that has been less clear in previous work, that is the ideological tradition of the state and the segment of the women's movement that help shape each strand of the men's movement.

Each ideological faction of the men's movement seems to have begun with a personal concern or set of personal concerns. Pro-feminist men generally derive an initial concern from their relationships with feminist women or the gay community. In supporting feminist women, they attempt to critique men's privileged position in society and the destructiveness of their dominance relative to women. The pro-feminist approach to power relations, then, tends to include some analysis and critique of patriarchy. For radical and socialist pro-feminists, power is exercised by an economic and sexual class. Liberal pro-feminists may be less concerned with class politics, but are critical of laws that discriminate against women.

The radical and socialist pro-feminists are politically astute, which is a valuable resource for movement organizing and action. The political tradition from which they draw (i.e. - democratic socialism), however, has not been generally accepted in the U.S. political system. As a result, their political opportunities are limited. Liberal pro-feminists draw from a tradition of expansive liberalism, which has a declining but established position. The political opportunities for liberal pro-feminists, then, is also limited in the present

political climate, though not as severely as that of the radical and socialist pro-feminists.

The traditionalists began with a concern about their marriages and divorces. They consider alimony and child support to be discriminatory toward them, while also undermining marriage, the family, and their traditional authority as husbands and fathers. From this personal interest they derive a conservative theory of gender relations and power. Conservatives, while respected, are swimming upstream in a liberal political system. Accordingly, the traditionalists have limited political opportunites because they reject some liberal principles that are central to the status quo.

Masculinist men also began with a concern for their roles in the family. They have been primarily concerned with gaining joint custody arrangements, being more active fathers, and being more emotionally expressive and sensitive persons. Their emphasis on sensitivity and fathering is similar to that of pro-feminist men, but they share with traditionalists a concern for men's rights. From this perspective they develop a pluralist view of power relations that is consistent with the ideology of restrictive liberals. As a result masculinist men have greater political opportunities than do other factions of the men's movement. If they do not realize their potential, it may be due to a lack of political experience and organizational resources.

My measures of movement effectiveness are not complete. Clearly the masculinist men's movement seems ideologically consistent with the modern phenomenon of restrictive liberalism and its concern with limiting the goals of radical feminists. While the traditionalist organizations claim a comparable membership size, their measure of membership includes all consumers of services, many of which are for father's rights and thus are conducive with the masculinists. The traditionalists, furthermore, are clearly outside of mainstream public opinion. Compared with the pro-feminist men, masculinists not only have a larger membership but have also been more ambitious and more effective in seeking coverage in the mass media. Table 4 shows the relative membership size of different men's movement factions.

Table 4. Rough estimation of membership in men's movement factions.

Faction	Approximate number of members
Pro-Feminist	1000
Traditionalist	9500
Masculinist	7500

In terms of specific policy changes, the story is not as clear. While the pro-feminist men do not seem particularly effective thus far, feminist women have clearly established a political presence. The masculinist men, then, are in the precarious position of speaking for the interests of men (which many have felt to be ignored recently) while public support for liberal feminism remains strong. A more thorough examination of lobbying activity, of media coverage, and of policy changes would be in order. This would include a more in depth observation of several local men's groups and activists. I cannot, as well as I would like, demonstrate the direct effects of the men's movement, but this study does suggest the importance of the movement and of the present conflict between masculinist men and feminist women.

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