TRACKS TO TEITO: THE TOKYO TRAIN NETWORK AND THE MEIJI QUEST FOR
DOMESTIC HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

by

TRISTAN R. GRUNOW

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Jeffrey E. Hanes, Chair of the Examining Committee

8/19/08

Date

Committee in Charge: Jeffrey E. Hanes, Chair
Andrew Goble
Alisa Freedman

Accepted by:

Dean of the Graduate School
An Abstract of the Thesis of
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From its inception in 1872, with the first line between Tokyo and Yokohama, the Tokyo railway network played a critical role in the domestic and international political aspirations of the new Meiji government. In a domestic form of “railway imperialism,” the Meiji government sought to use railways as a means of unifying the country and asserting its legitimacy by centering the network on Tokyo. Meanwhile, to craft Japan as a modern, “civilized” nation-state on a par with the West, Meiji leaders sought to re-create Tokyo as Teito, or the grand “imperial capital” of a unified Japan. These two forms of state-formation culminated in the construction of the monumental Tokyo Station in 1914. With the completion of Tokyo Station as the cornerstone of the national railway network and at the center of the Teito, the Japanese government asserted domestic hegemony and anticipated international recognition as a modern “first class power.”
CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Tristan Robert Grunow

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

DATE OF BIRTH: June 27, 1983

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Arts, History, 2008, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Japanese, 2007, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, International Studies in History, 2005, Oregon State University
Bachelor of Arts, History, 2005, Oregon State University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Modern Japanese History
Japanese Language and Literature

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2007-2008

GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:

FLAS Award for Korean, University of Oregon, 2008-2009
FLAS Award for Japanese, University of Oregon, 2006-2007
Outstanding Senior Award for Japanese Minor, Oregon State University, 2005
International Research Award, Oregon State University, 2005
AIEJ Scholarship for study abroad in Japan, Oregon State University, 2002-2003

PUBLICATIONS:

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As an exchange student at Waseda University during the 2002-2003 academic year, I made the one-hour morning commute everyday from my homestay family’s house in southwestern Tokyo to the university crammed aboard the train with seemingly half of the city. Pressed into the train car amidst Tokyo’s notorious rush hour crowds, I could not help but to divert my eyes to the train maps above the car doors to pass the time. This time spent studying the maps sparked my interest in the Tokyo train network as a whole, and I began to wonder what kind of motivational factors had influenced the placement and construction of the many lines. This thesis is thus a product of many miles – some thankfully less crowded than others – traveled aboard trains in Tokyo and throughout Japan over the intervening years.

As this project evolved through several generations, Jeffrey E. Hanes provided constant guidance and advice. Committee members Andrew Goble and Alisa Freedman provided invaluable suggestions and constructive criticisms that shaped my interest in the train network into a hopefully substantive thesis. Many professors, colleagues, and friends at the University of Oregon offered insights, opinions, and comments on several parts of the thesis over countless cups of coffee. Saori and Saiki Otsuka, and Kenta Tsutsui also provided comments on translations of more difficult Japanese texts. I am greatly indebted, as many of my colleagues are, to History Department Graduate Program Coordinator Rebecca Lynn. Finally, Saori Otuska and my parents, Tom and Karin Grunow, gave continuous love and support. Without all of these people, this thesis would have suffered greatly. All errors within are, of course, my own.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On a clear day too warm to be the middle of December, a crowd of roughly 1,500 thronged to the plaza in front of the south end of Tokyo Station and gazed up at the magnificent “Renaissance Style” building rising before them. Equally impressive was the line-up of officials and politicians on stage. Chief Engineer of the Railway Bureau Ishimaru Shigemi read a report on the construction, followed by a ceremonial address from Railway Agency President Sengoku Mitsugu. Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu then added a few words, as someone who had supported railways from the beginning. Finally, Tokyo Mayor Sakatani Yoshio gave a congratulatory address, and the crowd celebrated the opening of Tokyo Station, “The Gateway to the Imperial Capital,” as fireworks exploded in the early winter sky.¹

The crowd was exuberant. It was December 18, 1914, and World War I had broken out the previous summer. Japan stood poised to assert itself as a dominant world power, as Europe was overcome by internecine warfare. It had jumped at the opportunity to declare war on Germany and to expand its power into China by occupying German possessions in Shantung and in the Pacific. And now the general of the Shantung occupying force, Kamio

Mitsuomi, was returning to Tokyo to report to the Emperor. According to plan, Kamio arrived on the first train into Tokyo Station at exactly 10:30 AM, as the climax of the opening ceremony. Fireworks continued overhead as the crowd enthusiastically cheered the return of their “triumphant general” (gaisen shogun), by waving flags and shouting “Banzai!” Gen. Kamio made his way through the Japanese version of the Arc de Triomphe, the celebratory “Great Green Arch” (Dairokumon) and adjacent pair of “Green Pyramidal Towers” (Hōsui sōryokudō) specially erected in the station-front plaza, and was paraded to the Imperial Palace down the appropriately named “Triumphal Return Boulevard” (Gaisen Dōro). Such pomp and circumstance was befitting of a country that saw itself as, and was intent on being recognized as, a “first-class power” (ittō koku).²

It was no coincidence that such a celebration of Japan’s empire coincided with the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station. The Japanese nation-state and its domestic hegemony and international reputation were directly tied to the station, as it was the junction of two parallel tracks of Japanese state-formation: railway network construction and capital city planning.

From its inception in 1872 with the first line between Tokyo and Yokohama, the national railway network played a critical role in the domestic and international political aspirations of the new Meiji government. One on hand, connections between productive areas, such as large cities or industrial regions, and nearby ports, served an obvious economic purpose. Yet at the same time, in a domestic form of “railway imperialism,” the Meiji

² Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 59-61; Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi, 31; The most detailed description of the opening ceremony is Nakagawa Ichirō, Yamaguchi Fuminori and Matsuyama Iwao, Tōkyō-Eki Tanken (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1987), 96-103. Gaisen Dōro is now called Miyuki Dōri. The literal translation of ittō koku is “first-class country,” but used in this context, it refers to the group of top world powers.
government sought to use the railways as a means of unifying the country and asserting its legitimacy by centering the network on Tokyo.

When the Meiji government allowed the establishment of the Nippon Railway Company in 1881, it initiated an important new stage of railway development. Until the nationalization of the 17 top-performing railway companies in 1906-1907, Japanese railway development was dominated by private enterprise. Yet the private companies in the Kantô region inadvertently contributed to Meiji "railpolitik" by building their own lines centered on Tokyo for business reasons, and by conforming to government-imposed regulations on the expanding railway network.

In their definitive account of early Japanese railways, Harada Katsumasa and Aoki Eiichi identify two general motives of early railway investing. One was to reform the network of transportation for industrial products and raw materials, improving factory and mine transportation networks. Harada and Aoki call this the "industrial capitalist standpoint," and, in the early years of Japanese railways, it was widespread among the political-business elite, including zaibatsu industrial conglomerates such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Fujita, and Sumitomo. These conglomerates were major investors and stockholders in the early trunk lines. As Stephen Ericson explains, "the private railways that succeeded in the Meiji period almost invariably depended on extensive equity participation by big-city capitalists and the

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nascent zaibatsu. While they did profit from the management of railways, the main purpose of these companies was to facilitate domestic distribution of goods and increase exports. As railway developers began to realize there was more profit potential in passenger fares than in industrial conveyance, however, new lines were built from the second motive of railway investing, what Harada and Aoki call the “railway capitalist standpoint.” These developers pursued profits through railway management, and were seen most prominently in later stages of railway development. Because these new lines targeted passenger revenue, they were constructed through highly populated areas, to connect large cities to one other.

Despite divergent motivations in railway investing, developers from both standpoints constructed lines that converged on Tokyo. For industrialists developing the productive regions north and west of the city, the most efficient way to reach the port in Yokohama, and international markets beyond, was by connecting to the government’s line between Tokyo and Yokohama. Additionally, although Tokyo was still regaining population lost as a result of the loosening of the sankin kōtai requirements in 1862 and its abolition in 1868, it was still the largest city in eastern Japan. Having recovered to a population nearing one million by

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6 Harada and Aoki, *Nihon no Tetsudō*, 58.

7 Before 1862, “alternate attendance” requirements placed on daimyō by the Tokugawa regime prescribed that they live in Edo six months out of the year. In 1862, the requirements were relaxed to only 100 days every three years, initiating a sharp reduction in Edo population as retainers and artisans who served the daimyō moved out of the city, a downward spiral that was exacerbated in 1868 when the practice was abolished. Henry Smith points out that Edo lost half of its population of 1 million after 1862, with 300,000 residents leaving in 1868 alone. Tokyo did not surpass Edo’s peak population until the 1890s. See Henry D. Smith, II, “The Edo-Tokyo Transition: In Search of Common Ground,” in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, ed. *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji*
the main years of private railway speculation, the late 1880s, Tokyo provided industrialists with a large market of consumption and railway capitalists with a large supply of potential riders, resulting in the location of Tokyo at the center of the emerging Kantō region railway network.  

Although the central government yielded construction of railways to private companies, it utilized several measures to guide the development of the network in order to achieve its railpolitik. First, the government, through the Railway Bureau, personally constructed the lines for the new private companies. Second, the charters awarded to the initial private companies contained clauses that guaranteed the right of the government to purchase the companies after a designated period. Third, a succession of legislative initiatives, such as the 1887 Private Railway Ordinance, the 1892 Railway Construction Act, and the 1900 Private Railway Law and Railway Operation Law, ensured that the privately constructed lines would be compatible with the government lines. Together, the private lines and government lines formed an integrated national network centered on Tokyo that conveyed the authority of the central government to all corners of the Japanese archipelago.

Meanwhile, to craft Japan as a modern, civilized nation-state, Meiji leaders sought to re-create Tokyo as Teito, or the grand “imperial capital” of a unified Japan. Following the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo became a “showcase” for the government to not only proudly display Japan’s newfound modernity to foreigners and thus spur renegotiation of the unequal treaties, but also to demonstrate to the people of Japan the authority of the central


8 For the population of Tokyo during the late Edo and Meiji period, see the graph in Smith, “The Edo-Tokyo Transition,” 356-357.
Beginning with the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and continuing into the 1880s with the Yoshikawa Plan and the Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance, Tokyo was re-cast along lines similar to Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann's Paris, to become a symbolic imperial capital on a par with the grand capitals of the West.

Tokyo also showcased the domestic authority and legitimacy of the Meiji Government, as it was the focus of, and the force behind, several methods of what James C. Scott calls state projects of "legibility" and "simplification." Similarly, Jeffrey E. Hanes has argued that in the Meiji period "centralization was achieved through standardization." As the capital of the new Meiji government, Tokyo became the center and the standard for the rest of the nation. Tokyo was the focus of the national transportation and communication networks; the Tokyo dialect became the standard language; and local Tokyo solar time was made the standard measure of clock-time for the entire country. Along with expanding

9 Tokyo is often described as a "showcase" or "window." Although the term has since been used by many scholars, Henry Smith is most often credited with first describing Tokyo as "showcase" in English (Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 53).

10 Although Tokyo did not undergo the same level of creative destruction that took place in Paris under Baron Haussmann, the Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance contained many of the same urban planning elements – parks, sewers, railways, broad avenues – that were implemented in Paris.


12 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?", 488.

13 Shun'ichi J. Watanabe points out that railways and telegraphs connected Tokyo to the entire country, in "Tokyo: Forged by Market Forces and Not the Power of Planning," in David L.A. Gordon, ed. Planning Twentieth Century Capital Cities (London: Routledge, 2006), 102. Nanette Twine argues that shortly after the Meiji Restoration, the Tokyo language had "consolidated its position as Japan's lingua franca," (Nanette Twine, "Standardizing Written Japanese: A Factor in Modernization," Monumenta Nipponica 43:4 [Winter, 1988]: 439). The first standard time in Japan was set in reference to Tokyo solar time in 1879, which remained the standard until Imperial Edict (chokurei) number 51 in 1886 set the country on Greenwich Mean time at 135 degrees east longitude (Nakamura Naofumi,
bureaucratic control into the periphery, such efforts of centralization and standardization allowed the central government to integrate its population and control its territory, a process that David Nugent has called the “annihilation of regional space by state power.”

Referring to the similar role of Paris in French modernization and state formation, French historian Eugen Weber has described this centralized process of acculturation as akin to domestic “colonization.” Like Paris, Tokyo was the focus of state formation through centralization. Aprodicio A. Laquian’s description of the role of primary cities in colonialism sheds light on Tokyo’s role in Japanese state formation. As Laquian asserts: “Colonizers based in the primate cities subdued the rest of the country and created a unity that was imposed at first but later became the basis for stable government.” As the “colonial capital,” Tokyo was the metropole based on which the Meiji leaders enacted domestic colonization to integrate the periphery, and form a united nation.

Although it shares some common characteristics, this Meiji form of domestic colonization should not be confused with the concept of “internal colonialism,” which has


also been occasionally called "domestic colonialism." The main similarity between Meiji domestic colonization and internal colonialism is the uneven relationship between the center, either the metropole or the primate city, and the periphery. In both, the center shapes and assimilates the periphery to form the nation, yet the motivations of the center differ between the two methods. Whereas in internal colonization the center exploits the periphery for economic gain or for racial reasons, the purpose of Meiji domestic colonization was to centralize the nation on the monumental capital of Tokyo to assert domestic hegemony and international power.

As the colonial capital of a government uniting the country through domestic railway imperialism, it was expected that the construction of a monumental central train station would be predominant in plans for the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito. Like Victoria Terminal in

18 Evolving from its Leninist inception of the forceful removal and relocation of citizens to under-populated regions of the country, the concept of "internal colonialism" and its variants, such as "internal colonization," "primate city parasitism," and "domestic colonialism," came to describe the process in which the ruling elites of a country or the central government exploit domestic ethnic groups for the benefit of the power holders. In such contexts, the concept has been used to analyze the experiences of Native Americans and African-Americans in the United States, as well as the Scots, Welsh and Irish in Great Britain. For an informative discussion of the evolution of the concept of internal colonialism, as well as an argument for its use by historians, see Robert J. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:3 (July, 1984): 543-568. The related concept of primate city parasitism asserts that primate cities have a negative and degenerative effect on the national periphery, as they drain resources and population from rural areas. See, Bruce London, "Internal Colonialism in Thailand: Primate City Parasitism Reconsidered," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 14:4 (June, 1979): 485-513. Carter, et. al use the term "domestic colonialism" to describe the process otherwise called internal colonialism in the South African context in, Carter, et. al. *South Africa’s Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Michael Hechter pioneered the use of "internal colonialism" to describe the assimilation and exploitation of domestic ethnic groups in *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For internal colonialism and Native Americans, see Jace Weaver, *That the People Might Live: Native American Literatures and Native American Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.

19 The planning for the central station was the first instance in Tokyo where city planning incorporated layouts for rail lines. Previously, lines had been built outside of the city,
Bombay, India, the planned central train station would project the power and authority of the colonial builders, in this case the central government, to the people and the international community.\textsuperscript{20} When finally opened as the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” \textit{(Teito no Genkan)} in 1914, Tokyo Station had become the focal point of an imperial railway network that united the nation, and spread via rail-ferry all the way from Tokyo to Seoul, Harbin, and beyond to the grand capitals of Europe. Thus, with the completion of Tokyo Station at the center of the \textit{Teito} and as the cornerstone of the national railway network, the Japanese government asserted domestic hegemony and anticipated international recognition as a modern “first class power” \textit{(ittō koku)}.

\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of Victoria Terminal as a symbol of British imperialism, see Steven Parissien, \textit{Station to Station} (London: Phaidon, 1997), 70.
CHAPTER II
MEIJI DOMESTIC RAILWAY IMPERIALISM

In March of 1854, American Commodore Mathew Perry returned to Tokyo Bay after the initial visit of his "black ships" in 1853. On this second visit, Perry presented the officials of the Tokugawa Shogunate with numerous gifts, among them a quarter-size model railway. Although many of the Shogunal officials and Japanese people who watched the train circle the track laid down by the Americans behind the reception hall at Yokohama were impressed, the Japanese leaders did not immediately capitalize on the potential of railways.¹ At the time, they remained satisfied with the existing system of nationwide distribution, which relied on road traffic on the Tōkaidō and Nakasendō highways and river and coastline barges to ship rice from northern Tōhoku and Hokuriku to Edo and Osaka, or fishmeal fertilizers from Hokkaido to the Inland Sea region.²

In the years between Perry’s presentation of the miniature train in 1854 and the fall of the Shogunate in 1868, many foreigners continued to advocate the construction of trunk lines between ports and large cities for economical reasons. Most of these plans called for lines between Edo and Yokohama, or Kobe and Osaka.³ In addition to their economic potential, the Tokugawa government also began to recognize the ability of railways to assert state

authority. As the Satsuma and Chōshū domains became increasingly anti-Tokugawa, the Shogunate made plans in 1866 to construct a railway between Kyoto and Edo. A link between the imperial capital of Kyoto and the political capital of Edo, the Shogunate hoped, would not only promote trade, but also consolidate Tokugawa power throughout the country.4

In addition to the link between Edo and Kyoto, the moribund Shogunate also authorized a secretary in the American legation to build a railway between Edo and Yokohama in 1867, but the Tokugawa government collapsed soon thereafter.5 The Americans requested the renewal of the agreement with the new Meiji Government in 1869, but it was rejected on the advice of the British Minister to Japan, Harry Smith Parkes.6 In fact, Parkes himself had been encouraging the new Meiji Government to build railways in order to modernize Japan, and on December 7, 1869, met with the Meiji leaders to discuss the introduction of railways and telegraph into Japan. Among the leaders at the meeting were Vice Minister of Finance Ōkuma Shigenobu and Assistant Vice Minister of Finance Ito Hirobumi, both of whom subsequently became the leading advocates for railway building in Japan.7

This meeting produced plans for several railways lines that were similar to the earlier Shogunal plans. One line was planned between Japan’s largest city at the time, Osaka, and the nearby port of Kobe, with later extensions to Kyoto and Otsu. Another line was planned


between Tokyo and the port city of Yokohama, and another between Tokyo and Kyoto. As these plans show, the Meiji government recognized the economic and political benefits of railways. Like the Tokugawa before them, the Meiji leaders sought to use railways to assert and legitimize their authority, and consolidate the country into a modern, unified nation.

**Railways and State Formation in the European and Meiji Contexts**

The contribution of railways to the political unification of nation-states has long been acknowledged and discussed, especially in European history. Railways played a primary role in national communication and transportation networks that were so important in integrating distant regions into consolidated nations, as well as in developing national identities. In Italy, the national railway network was given credit for uniting independent states into the nation of Italy during the Risorgimento. As Eugen Weber has argued, in France, "There could be no national unity before there was national circulation...So roads, of stone or steel, welded the several parts into one." Mathew Truesdell adds:

Moreover, these new link between Paris and the provinces seemed to many to be uniting the country in a way that went beyond more rapid and efficient travel. France seemed to becoming an integrated unit rather than a miscellaneous collection of provinces. Railroad inaugurations took on a particular fascination because every new line seemed to mark another step in these important transformations.

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9 This argument was most prominent in the early decades after Italian unification, but has since been contested. See, Albert Sehram, *Railways and the Formation of the Italian Nation State in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.


Railways played a similar role in the integration of individual German states into a united Germany, as Abigail Green has argued:

Railways linked hitherto distant towns, regions, and countries; facilitated the mobility of goods, people and ideas; encouraged the development of regional, national, and international markets; transformed popular perceptions of time and space. More specifically, railways construction played a crucial role in what Hans-Ulrich Wehler has termed the "dual revolution" – the twin processes of industrialization and national unification that changed the face of Germany during the 1850s and 1860s.\footnote{Abigail Green, \textit{Fatherlands: State-building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany} (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 223.}

Juan Batista Alberdi, an Argentine statesman, echoed this consolidating effect of railways in the South American context when he argued that the railway:

\ldots will unify the Argentine republic better than any congress. A congress can declare a country one and indivisible; but without the iron road, which draws together a nation's far-flung extremes, the country will for ever remain divisible and divided in spite of all legislative mandates. Thus political unity must begin with territorial unity, and only the railroad can make a single area out of two places separated by 500 leagues.\footnote{Quoted in Nicholas Faith, \textit{The World the Railways Made} (New York: Carroll and Graff, 1990), 65.}

Although the role of railways in European state-formation is widely recognized, the Japanese case seems more applicable.\footnote{Yet there is no complementary literature on railways and Japanese state-formation. The majority of scholarship on Japanese nation-state formation focuses on the emperor system, education system and the Imperial Rescript on Education, the national army, or the establishment of a standard language and the literary canon. See, for example: Gluck, \textit{Japan's Modern Myths}; Joshua A. Fogel, ed. \textit{The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Tadao Umesao, Takashi Fujitani, and Eisei Kurimoto, ed. \textit{Japanese Civilization in the Modern World 16: Nation-State and Empire} (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000).} While state unification through...
railways assumes that network construction was a project of the central government, in European countries this was largely not the case. In fact, although heavily subsidized by the central government, the railway networks in Great Britain, France, Italy, were constructed by private companies who were interested primarily in profit. These networks were then later, and in some cases much later, nationalized by the central governments. Even in Germany, railways were built by private companies and then later nationalized by Prussia in order to unify the country.

In Japan, by contrast, railway construction was initiated by the central government and then only later turned over to private enterprise. Enacting a domestic form of railway imperialism, the Meiji government unilaterally undertook railway construction to assert and legitimate their authority, and consolidate the country into a modern, unified nation.

Railways are often described as the first method of extending imperial influence into foreign countries. The locomotive has even been called the “main engine of imperialism.” As Ronald E. Robinson notes: “steel rails had a capacity for transforming the societies through which they ran and for spreading imperial influence in their domestic affairs.”

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15 Despite some earlier state-held lines, the majority of French railways were nationalized in 1937; German lines mostly in the years after World War I; and British Rail created in 1948. The only country to nationalize its railways around the same time as Japan was Italy, in 1905.


Utilizing this role of railways, imperialistic European powers, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, "began to play out their rivalries and project their imperial strategies along railway tracks," giving rise to the concept of railway imperialism.\(^{20}\)

For the Meiji leaders, the locomotive also functioned as an engine of state-formation, as the state built railways around the country in order to centralize the nation and spread forth Meiji influence. In this sense, the state-centric efforts of the Meiji government to use railways to modernize the nation might be termed "domestic railway imperialism."\(^{21}\) Because of their speed, and their ability to "dissolv[e] previous barriers of space and time," railways allowed spatial and temporal connections between the core and periphery that were impossible before.\(^{22}\) As Eric J. Hobsbawm argued, the "agents" of the state, including postal workers, teachers, police and railway engineers, "increasingly reach[ed] down to the humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages."\(^{23}\) He adds, "revolutions in transport and communication typified by railway and telegraph tightened and routinized the links between central authority and its remotest outposts."\(^{24}\) Thus, with the advent of a national railway

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\(^{21}\) Ronald E. Robinson uses this term to describe similar state-centric efforts of using railways to unify the country and establish the authority of the central government in Siam by King Chulalongkorn. See, Ronald E. Robinson, "Conclusion: Railways and Informal Empire," in Davis and Wilburn, ed. Railway Imperialism, 190. For analysis of King Chulalongkorn and Siamese railway development, see David F. Holm, "Thailand’s Railways and Informal Imperialism," in Davis and Wilburn, ed. Railway Imperialism, 121-136.


\(^{24}\) Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 81.
network, even Japanese living in remote villages were only a short temporal distance from the capital. No longer were they far removed, spatially and temporally, from central authority.

Under strong state control, railways, along with the telegraph, provided the infrastructure necessary to accomplish Meiji policies of economic and industrial modernization (fukoku-kyōhei, shokusan-kōgyō), as well as political and ideological unification (haihan-chiken, bunmei-kaika).25 Connecting large cities to ports, and linking both to industrially productive regions, provided an economic and industrial basis for government legitimacy. Meanwhile, connecting the new capital of Tokyo to the traditional capital of Kyoto, and placing Tokyo at the center of the emerging national network, added a political and ideological foundation for government hegemony, as railways reached into periphery and spread government power and policies of modernization.

Yet the centering of Tokyo in the national railway network was not merely a result of state-centric efforts. Private railway companies in the Kantō region also inadvertently contributed to Meiji "railpolitik" of uniting the nation through railways centered on Tokyo. Building on a theory developed with John Gallagher, Ronald E. Robinson has argued that European imperialism during the nineteenth century was as much Euro-centric push as it was "excentric" pull.26 In other words, the creation of "informal empire" was in some cases a

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25 Baron Takaharu Mitsui points out that the modernization of Japanese traffic systems during the Meiji period was from the beginning placed under strong state control, with a few exceptions. See, Baron Takaharu Mitsui, "The System of Communications at the Time of the Meiji Restoration," Monumenta Nipponica 4:1 (Jan., 1941): 89.

result of local elites actively soliciting the assistance of European imperialist countries in modernizing their countries. Applying this theory to Meiji domestic railway imperialism, the integration of the Japanese nation-state and centralization on Tokyo was not only state-centric “push” but also excentric “pull.” By building their lines centered on Tokyo for business reasons and by conforming to government-imposed regulations on the expanding railway network, the private railway companies contributed to Meiji hegemony.

The Government Railways

In the early years of the Meiji period, the government faced an economic crisis that it attempted to remedy with railways. Large amounts of Japanese capital were flowing out of the country in exchange for foreign imports. Additionally, because Japan had relatively low gold values, foreigners could cheaply exchange silver for gold and make a large profit. The government sought to avert this situation through its “shokusan kōgyō” (increase production and promote industry) policies, of which railway played a large role by facilitating domestic distribution and transportation of exports goods. With this economic dilemma in mind, railway lines had been planned between Japan’s largest city at the time, Osaka, and the nearby port of Kobe, with later extensions to Kyoto and Otsu. Another line was planned between Tokyo and the port city of Yokohama.


Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 2,” 15-16; Tōbu, Tōbu Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi, 6.

The government set about construction of the Tokyo to Yokohama line first, as it had large economic and political implications. As Yokohama was one of the only international ports open at the time, along with Nagasaki and Hakodate, western trade in the port was increasingly rapidly. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposal explained that this growing trade necessitated a rail link between Tokyo and Yokohama:

There are some who contend that the construction of a railway is not required, as we are presently well accommodated with transport facilities over waters between Tokyo and Yokohama. Nevertheless, trade at Yokohama has been growing steadily day after day. Tokyo and Yokohama are located close to each other. So, it is essential to obtain trade news [in Tokyo] promptly. The construction of a railway will join Tokyo and Yokohama as if they were in the same district, and enable even women and children to travel easily. Then trade will surely be further increased.\footnote{Cited from \textit{Dai Nihon Gaiko Monjo} Vol. 2, part 3, pg 76, in Tanaka, \textit{“Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2,”} 760-761.}

Yet along with the rapid increase of foreign imports entering the port of Yokohama, the presence of foreign nationals was also becoming more noticeable. The small contingent of one hundred permanent residents in Yokohama in 1861 for example, had grown to almost 1,000 by 1870.\footnote{Michael R. Auslin, \textit{Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 178.} According to Michael R Auslin, there were 10,000 sailors visiting the port for varying amounts of time throughout the year, meaning that at any given time, there could be approximately 3,000 foreigners residing in Yokohama.\footnote{Auslin, \textit{Negotiating with Imperialism}, 178.} Referring to the large number of foreigners in both Tokyo and Yokohama at the time, Japanese urban historian Ishizuka Hiromichi has classified these two cities as “semi-colonial.”\footnote{Ishizuka, \textit{Nihon Kindai Toshiron}, 23-31. Ishizuka was the first to make the claim about Tokyo and Yokohama as “semi-colonial” from the large presence of western soldiers in the}
entry for diplomats heading to the new capital for treaty revision, building a railway between Yokohama and Tokyo also served the political purpose of demonstrating Japan's modernization to both the domestic and international audience.

After acquiring a loan on the London market, the government set about building the 29-kilometer line in 1870 under the jurisdiction of the specially created Ministry of Public Works (Kōbusho), with actual construction being carried out by the Railway Bureau and chief-director Inoue Masaru. Identical terminal stations, designed by obscure free-lance architect R. P. Bridgens, were placed on each end of the line at Shiodome in Tokyo, and at Noge Kaigan, in Yokohama. Both locations were chosen because they were close to the urban areas of the cities and to the foreign settlements, thus facilitating trade, yet far enough


34 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28; Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 1; Katsumasa Harada, “Railroads” section of Chapter 2, “Transportation in Transition (1868-1891)” in Technological Innovation and the Development of Transportation in Japan (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1993), 15, 17. Inoue was a close friend of Ito Hirobumi, as both were from Choshu and had been members of the so-called Choshu Five. The Choshu Five were a quintet of Choshu natives who, defying the Shogunate's enjoinder against travel outside of the country, traveled to England in 1863. While there, Inoue studied mining and civil engineering at University College in London, making him one of the very few Japanese qualified in railway construction upon his return to Japan in 1868. See, Inouye Masaru, "Japanese Communications: Railroads," in Okuma Shigenobu, ed, Fifty Years of New Japan, Reprint (1910; repr., New York: Kraus, 1970), 425 (This Inouye Masaru is the same as Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru. The difference in spelling is explained by changing conventions for Romanizing Japanese names); Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 2,” 19.

away from the city center to keep land prices cheaper.\textsuperscript{36} As a Ministry of Public Works recommendation on the terminal locations suggests: "Unless the transport facilities were established near the foreign concession and shopping center, it would not benefit trade activities any... Then it would become meaningless to build railways at all."\textsuperscript{37} The Ministry of Military Affairs also wanted the stations close to the foreign settlements so that the range of movement for foreigners would be limited, preventing any bloodshed if Westerners wandering too far into the city center came across any exclusionists.\textsuperscript{38}

British engineers using British equipment completed construction of the single-track line between the Yokohama terminus and Shinagawa Station, the southern "mouth" of Tokyo, in May 1872.\textsuperscript{39} Passenger service started the next month between Yokohama and Shinagawa, but was delayed to the Tokyo terminus at Shimbashi because the Army refused to allow tracks to be built on its coastal training ground and its property near the Hama Detached Palace (Hamarikyū). Instead, railway engineers had to construct a new embankment on which to lay the tracks, finally completing construction in September.\textsuperscript{40} The official opening ceremony was held in the presence of the Meiji Emperor on October 14,


\textsuperscript{37} Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 775.

\textsuperscript{38} Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 18.

\textsuperscript{39} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 1. One legacy of this British involvement in the development and construction of the network is that the line gauge was set at 3 feet 6 inches, which was suggested by a British advisor because of Japan’s mountainous terrain and subsequently adopted as the standard gauge for all Japanese railways. Hence the "Bullet Train" or Shinkansen ("New Trunk Line") has a gauge a whole foot wider allowing a more stable and thus faster ride.

\textsuperscript{40} Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 29; Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudō, 28.
1872, at the newly renamed Shimbashi Station, marking the commencement of both the Japanese national and Tokyo railway networks.\(^{41}\)

While this Tokyo-Yokohama line, called the Shimbashi Line, was the first railway constructed, it was considered only a branch line of the main trunk network that would traverse the Japanese archipelago and legitimize the new government. The construction of such trunk lines was important, as chief of the Railway Bureau Inoue Masaru explained, because the communication and transportation networks of Japan were inadequate for a modern nation. The mountainous terrain of the Japanese islands forced nation-wide land transportation networks to rely mainly on foot-power, making travel slow and difficult, and hampering rapid long-distance communication along the Shogunate-administered roads.\(^{42}\) To impede travel further, the Tokugawa required permits to travel, and barriers \((sekisho)\) were placed on major highways to regulate and control inter-domainal transit for defense purposes.\(^{43}\) The combination of these natural and artificial barriers encouraged feudalism and regionalism. During the Tokugawa period the modern word for nation, \(kuni\), for example, had referred not to the “nation,” but instead to individual domains, or \(han\).\(^{44}\) Moreover, when

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\(^{42}\) Inouye Masaru, “Japanese Communications: Railroads,” 427-479; Mitsui, “The System of Communications,” 90. More recently, Constantine Nomikos Vaporis has argued that the generalization of Tokugawa communications lagging as a result of a poor road network and lack of bridges is completely false. See, Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, *Breaking Barriers: Travel and the State in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 11-12. What is important in the context, however, is that the Meiji leaders perceived that the communications network was lacking, and therefore contributing to feudalism.


Daimyō issued laws and spoke of the kokka (states or countries), they meant their individual han, not the Japanese "nation-state" as a whole.

While Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa Shogunate in succession had perhaps centralized the country politically by pacifying individual daimyō, the Meiji leaders perceived a threatening retention of feudalism and a weak national consciousness on the part of the commoners. The destruction of this persisting feudalism and the formation of national consciousness were necessary to create a national government and to politically integrate the nation. The Meiji leaders used a myriad of cultural tools to "propagate this idea of a new national structure, and thereby to impress the people of its own raison d'être." Modern communications, such as the railway and the telegraph contributed


45 Hall, et al. "Introduction," 7. As Sakata and Hall caution, the term "feudalism" has been used perhaps too "liberally" in Restoration history (Yoshio Sakata and John Whitney Hall, "The Motivation of Political Leadership in the Meiji Period," The Journal of Asian Studies 16:1 (Nov. 1956): 33). Here, "feudalism" is used, as it was for early Meiji leaders such as Okuma Shigenobu, to describe the fief-centric regionalism that pervaded Japan during the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods.


47 Many scholars argue that Japan was already socially and politically integrated during, or even before, the Tokugawa period. See, for example: John Whitney Hall, et al., ed. Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500–1650 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), and Mary Elizabeth Berry, "Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?" Modern Asian Studies 31:3 (July, 1997): 547–581; for quote, see Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 751.
to national consciousness "by overcoming local isolation." Anthems, flags, and state rituals were invented; newspapers and radio networks were developed; a school system was created; state Shinto was crafted, all as a means to engender nationalism in the people. As Mary Elizabeth Berry acknowledges: "The work of nationalism, and the creation of its essentially new symbols, was the work of Meiji."

Railways were especially useful tools in the endeavor to eliminate feudalism and centralize the nation. While Carol Gluck writes that railways had emerged, along with the monarch, as a "symbol of 'civilization,'" she adds that both were "associated with progress" and contributed to the "national and social integration that characterized the modern state." Hara Takeshi builds on, and quotes Gluck's assertion, saying: "railroads and the monarch together as symbols of 'civilization' and 'progress,' fulfilled their important role of spreading forth from Tokyo to every corner of the Japanese archipelago to eliminate regional differences, integrating national and social, characteristically of the modern state."

Illustrating the Meiji government's view, railway proponent Okuma Shigenobu argued in 1902:

To consolidate the hearts and minds of all the people, it is imperative to first demolish such an inconvenient transportation and shipping system (unyu kōtsū). Furthermore, some project to cause a great stir among the people is vital to demolish feudal regionalist thought (hōkenteki kakkyō no shisō). Therefore, just as [I was] pondering whether or not there was any effective means to do this, [I] heard about this railway


51 Hara, "Minto" tai "Teito", 22-23.
debate. With such things as motivation, it was then decided that railways were the overall best option, and from then on plans were made to initiate railways.52

The government’s intention to use railways to consolidate Japan into one unified country is elucidated in the Meiji Emperor’s speech on the occasion of the opening of the Shimbashi Line in 1872. “At this time, we announce the completion our country’s initial railway,” the emperor read to the assembled crowd, “...furthermore, we earnestly pray (koinegau) that this enterprise [of railways] will expand, and this line will spread like a vine (manpu) across the whole country.”53

As trunk lines were put in across the country, perhaps the most important for centralizing the nation and securing the domestic hegemony of the government was the line connecting the traditional and cultural capital of Kyoto, and the new capital of Tokyo. As Harada Katsumasa has observed, the construction of such an “iron-rail connection between the old and new political centres [sic] would strengthen central authority.”54 Strengthening central authority required validating the moving of the seat of government in 1868, accomplished by this rail link between the “two capitals.”

Even before the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Meiji Restoration of 1868, many future leaders, especially Ōkubo Toshimichi, felt that it was necessary to remove the emperor from Kyoto after the change in government in order to limit the undue influence of court aristocrats on imperial decisions. Ōkubo initially considered the port city of Osaka a viable candidate and submitted a petition for the temporary transfer of the capital to Osaka in

52 Quoted in Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 8. Tanaka translates this quote more liberally in “Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2,” 752.


54 Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 2,” 16.
February 1868. Others in the government preferred moving the capital to Edo, which had several benefits: first, Edo was located strategically in the middle of the country where it could keep watch on the pro-Tokugawa forces in the northeast; second, much of the former Shogunate bureaucracy was still intact in Edo; and finally, Edo Castle could easily be reinvented as the Imperial Palace.

Still others favored the creation of a dual-capital system. Edo would become the “Eastern Capital,” or Tokyo, while a second “Western Capital,” or Saikyō, would be built in the Kyoto-Osaka area. Those who supported this proposal, such as Ōki Takato of Hizen domain and Etō Shimpei, argued that maintaining the Western Capital was vital to prevent a bifurcation of the country between East and West. Furthermore, it was imperative for the emperor to travel frequently between the two seats of government to ensure solidarity. As land travel between the two cities could take as long as two months, the construction of a railway link was necessary to allow the emperor to spend equal time in each capital.

In the end, an imperial decree entitled, “Decree Renaming Edo as Tokyo and Moving the Capital,” tentatively settled the issue when it was issued in September 1868. The decree had proclaimed, “Edo is the great bastion of the east country. Upon it converge the crowds, and from it one can personally oversee affairs of state. Accordingly the place known as Edo

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56 Iwata, Ōkubo Toshimichi, 118-119.


will henceforth be Tokyo.”\textsuperscript{59} According to the decree, the name change from Edo to Tokyo reflected that “all lands within the seas, east and west,” were equally important to the Emperor.\textsuperscript{60} Also, referring to the pro-Tokugawa forces in the northeastern regions of Japan, the decree stated that the renaming was to “comfort and console the masses” (okuchō wo suibu su).\textsuperscript{61} The official explanation attached to the decree emphasized the need of “bringing together the strength of the nation,” and added that to this end, the emperor wished to make “frequent progresses (junkō) between the East and West while listening to the multitudes.”\textsuperscript{62}

Although the dual-capital proposal was ultimately dismissed, many Meiji leaders continued to refer to the cities as the “two capitals,” and recognized the political importance of making it possible for the emperor to travel rapidly back and forth between the two cities. According to a letter written by British Minister Parkes, who himself had advised the government to build a line between Tokyo and Kyoto, influential Meiji leader Iwakura Tomomi was an advocate for connecting the Eastern and Western Capitals by railway.\textsuperscript{63} Iwakura also reportedly told Parkes that the Japanese government understood the importance of establishing closer contact between the two capitals, and that Kyoto could not be left to deteriorate while the emperor lived in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{64} Coming from a court noble family, and

\textsuperscript{59} Translated in Seidensticker, \textit{Low City, High City}, 26.

\textsuperscript{60} Donald Keene, \textit{Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912} (New York: Columbia University Press), 159.

\textsuperscript{61} Shibata \textit{Meiji Shōcho'u Zenshū}, Naichi 9.

\textsuperscript{62} Cited in Fujitani, \textit{Splendid Monarchy}, 46.

\textsuperscript{63} According to another letter he wrote, Parkes advised the Meiji government to build a line between the two capitals at a dinner party. See, Daniels, \textit{Sir Harry Parkes}, 108. For Parkes’ letter, see Tanaka, “Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 1,” 581.

\textsuperscript{64} Tanaka, “Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 1,” 581.
having been opposed to the move of the capital from Kyoto to Tokyo, Iwakura supported the rail link as a way to retain Kyoto's importance and quell rising anti-foreign sentiment in the city. In 1869, Iwakura urged the Gijo administrative and Sanyo advisory council members:

The very fact that the Eastern and Western Capitals are situated at a great distance offers a cause for spreading ungrounded rumors and false reports. It is hoped that an easy journey be made possible between those cities.  

The 1870 railway proposal submitted by the Ministries of Home Affairs and Finance to the Supreme Council also emphasized the need of connecting the two capitals:

The Eastern and Western Capitals, forming, so to speak, the important body region of this country, are the two bases, from which the government policies should be administered. Once swift communications are established between these two cities so as not to alienate the one from the other, there will be no fear of breeding such evils as estrangement, or different customs and habits, between them.  

The connection between the two capitals was so important to the new government that without this particular link, railways might not have been introduced to Japan at all. “Had the introduction of railways been recommended on the ground of trade expansion, industrial improvement, the advancement of knowledge or even the enlightenment of the people,” Tanaka Takahiko argues, “it would have been rejected by the conservative bureaucrats as a matter requiring no immediate execution. As it was, the conservative bureaucrats recognized its urgency in establishing better communications between the Eastern and Western

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Capitals...That was, so to speak, the major commitment upon which the two groups, progressive and conservative, could finally come to an agreement."\textsuperscript{67}

To construct the trunk line between Tokyo and Kyoto, the government considered two options, both following major Edo-Period trade routes linking the two cities. One was to extend the Shimbashi Line and follow the Tōkaidō Road along the coast to Kyoto. The second was to follow the mountainous Nakasendō through the interior of the country. The Tōkaidō and the Nakasendō were the two most important of the Tokugawa Gokaidō, or Five Highway system, likened to the "arms and legs of the realm."\textsuperscript{68} The system of nationalized highways under the direct jurisdiction of the Shogunate, with evenly spaced post-stations (shuku) and barriers (sekisho), had guaranteed Tokugawa control over land communications, and also asserted the hegemony of the Shogun.\textsuperscript{69}

Certainly, the Meiji decision to construct the new railway lines along either of the Tokugawa highways was more than one of convenience. In fact, railways eventually replaced all five of the Tokugawa Gokaidō highways.\textsuperscript{70} While the routes would have been well traveled and therefore potentially easier to construct rails on, undoubtedly the political significance of laying railways on top of the Tokugawa highways was not lost on the new central government. In the hands of the Meiji leaders, as railway lines spread the influence of

\textsuperscript{67} Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 774.

\textsuperscript{68} Vaporis, \textit{Breaking Barriers}, 17.


\textsuperscript{70} The Tōkaidō was replaced by the Tōkaidō Line, the Kōshū Kaidō was replaced by the Kōbu Line, the Nakasendō replaced by the Takasaki Line, the Ōshū Kaidō replaced by the Tōhoku Line, and the Nikkō Kaidō, which largely following the Ōshū Highway, was replaced from the city of Utsunomiya by the Nikkō Line.
the central government into the most isolated and remote villages of the land, railway stations replaced *sekisho* barriers as the symbolic points of Meiji authority.

Planning of the trunk line between Tokyo and Kyoto began in 1870, two years before the opening of the Shimbashi line. After an investigation of both routes by two Ministry of Public Works officials, a recommendation was made for building the Tokyo-Kyoto trunk line via the Nakasendō. As the officials explained in their report, “since there are many places [along that route] where transportation is inconvenient, if branch roads are added here and there, it will open the way to the conveyance of products and the civilization of mountainous districts (*yamaguni kaika*).” Indeed, the proposed line would have passed through the silk producing regions of the southern part of Kōzuke and northern part of Shinano, connecting the silk, rice, and tea producing interior of the nation to the coasts. The government ultimately decided to construct the line along the Nakasendō because the Army, and Home Minister General Yamagata Aritomo, strongly insisted that a coastal line would be in increased danger of capture in case of foreign invasion.

Even though plans were made for the building of the first leg of the Tokyo-Kyoto trunk line from Tokyo to Takasaki in Gumma Prefecture northwest of Tokyo, they were not immediately carried out because of several domestic problems that occupied the government.

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The new government was in the middle of carrying out land tax reforms, suppressing disgruntled samurai revolts and the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement (Jiyū Minken Undō), and calming calls for an invasion of Korea. In addition, the government had run out of money after building trunk lines between Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, with the Kyoto-Otsu line only being completed because of the strong advocacy of Railway Bureau chief Inoue Masaru. Inoue was not as fortunate with the Tokyo-Takasaki line, however, and had to cancel its construction.

After the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, however, the military became increasingly interested in a national railway network as a means of quickly moving troops across the nation. At the Army’s insistence, in 1883, the government authorized the building of a segment of the Nakasendō trunk line between Takasaki and Ogata using public bonds. Taking the advice of a foreign advisor, Richard Vicars Boyle, plans were made to begin construction at both ends of the proposed Tokyo-Kyoto route. The line opened in segments as construction was finished, the first in October 1885. But the steep grade of the route and the number of valleys and peaks the line crossed raised concerns about the difficulty of construction and its usefulness for transportation upon completion.

Anticipating these concerns, Bureau Chief Inoue initiated plans for constructing a trunk line following the Tōkaidō route. The results of this investigation found that the distance between Tokyo and Nagoya (where the two proposed routes intersected) was shorter along the less mountainous Tōkaidō route, and could be traveled more quickly. More importantly for the cash-strapped government, the route would cost less to build. Using this

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75 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudō, 35.

76 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudō, 30-31, 33.

77 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudō, 35-36.
evidence, Inoue convinced Prime Minister Itô Hirobumi to support the Tôkaidô route, and Itô in turn arranged for the government to change the route of the trunk line route on July 13, 1886. After the route change, construction proceeded relatively smoothly along the coastal lowlands. When opened on July 1, 1899, the railway largely paralleled the historical Tôkaidô highway.79

When the Tôkaidô Line opened in 1899, it connected eastern and western Japan by railway, as the historical Tôkaidô highway had done by road since the Heian period. Like the Gokaidô highways concentrated on Edo as the Shogun’s capital, the railway lines of the Meiji government converged on the emperor’s capital of Tokyo. Tokyo thus became the physical and conceptual center of the national railway network. In discussing the connection between railways and centralization, Hara Takeshi argues, “The development of railways centering on the ‘imperial capital’ Tokyo starting in the Meiji Period engendered more than just the economic dimension of the growth of Japanese capitalism, but was intimately linked to the ideological dimension of forming national consciousness.”80 Tokyo became the reference point for train direction, as “with Tokyo as the standard reference, all routes were differentiated as either ‘going towards Tokyo (Nobori)’ or ‘going away from Tokyo (Kudari),’ and the same laws and regulations were applied nationally.”81 Starting in 1879, local solar Tokyo time was set as the national standard, and the 1887 Railway Bureau

78 Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô, Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Hyakunen Shi 1, 156; Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudô, 36.
79 Traganou, The Tôkaidô Road, 21. The Tôkaidô Line diverted from the highway bypassed a few of the historical barriers and post-stations, such as Odawara, Hakone, and Mishima, and also redirecting to pass through Nagoya (Traganou, The Tôkaidô Road, 21).
“Service Regulations for Staff Engaged in Operating Railways” declared that “The standard time of each station shall be Tokyo time, and shall be transmitted to station by telegraph every day....”82 When opened in 1914, Tokyo Station, furthermore, became the “zero kilometer” point from where rail distances were measured for all national lines.83

This centering of the national railway network on Tokyo was an important factor in securing the domestic hegemony of the Meiji government. The government had initiated the construction of trunk lines across the country, all the while locating Tokyo at the center. Yet this centering of Tokyo was not only the result of state-centric efforts. When the government stepped aside to allow private railway enterprise, the private railway companies in the Kantō region built lines converging on Tokyo for their own business reasons. As private companies proliferated, the central government took steps to ensure that their railpolitik was maintained. In order to centralize the national network on Tokyo, it was necessary that first the lines in the Kantō region converged on the city, as these lines were later extended across the archipelago. The central government was therefore directly involved in the planning and actual construction of rail lines for the private companies. The government then issued guidelines and regulations on railway construction to ensure that the expanding network would remain compatible. By following the lead of the government and contributing to the centralization of the nation on Tokyo, the private railway companies inadvertently contributed to Meiji railpolitik. The companies thereby facilitated Meiji domestic hegemony.


83 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 28, shows pictures of the “zero kilometer posts” for the various lines within Tokyo Station. The historic marker for the Tōkaidō and Tōhoku Lines is located between the second and third platforms of the station.
The Private Lines

On May 21, 1881, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Iwakura Tomomi submitted to the Governor of Tokyo a petition signed by 460 other nobles requesting permission to found a private railway company. According to Harada Katsumasa and Aoki Eiichi, "the movement for founding private railway companies had just become realized." The company formed by this petition, the Nippon Railway Company, was largely responsible for constructing the Tokyo rail network as it was at the time of nationalization in 1906-1907. Of the other lines built or acquired by the other companies founded during the years prior to nationalization, the experience of Kôbu Railways is most illustrative of Meiji efforts to guide private railway construction to fulfill its railpolitik.

There were two factors that guaranteed that the expanding private railway network would converge on Tokyo. First, lines were placed so as to connect areas of high production to areas of high consumption. Many of the early Kantô region lines were therefore built linking the silk and textile-producing regions north of Tokyo to the city proper. Once a link between these northern lines and the government line to Yokohama was completed in 1885, export goods from these regions were able to reach trade vessels waiting in the port of Yokohama. Second, the government actively encouraged and persuaded the companies to construct lines to fulfill their plans of centering the network on Tokyo.

The person ultimately responsible for the creation of private railway companies was statesman Iwakura Tomomi, an advocate of private railway enterprise long before he submitted his petition for the Nippon Railway Company to the governor of Tokyo in 1881. As far back as 1874, only two years after the opening of the nation's first line, he had

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supported the Tokyo Railway Association, founded by a group of former daimyō and nobles with plans to build a line between Tokyo and Aomori in the northern part of Honshu. 86 Under pressure from the government, the association dropped its plans for building the Aomori line and instead made a deal to acquire the government’s Shimbashi Line in August 1876. 87 Although the Shimbashi Line deal eventually fell apart when the company disbanded in March 1878, the association’s plans sparked heated debate in the government over whether or not the state should maintain complete control over railway building or allow private companies to manage lines. 88

Another group of former samurai founded the Tōzan Company in May 1878 with plans to build a line between Tokyo and Takasaki. 89 However, the government refused the plans of this company as well, presumably because the Railway Bureau itself was at that time also considering building a line between Tokyo and Takasaki. 90 Sparked by the cancellation of these plans in November 1880, the Tōzan Company again sought to officially start a company and turned to Iwakura Tomomi for help.

Iwakura's role as official in charge of peerage affairs for the Imperial Household Department sheds light on his early support of private railways. 91 In this role, he was responsible for the former samurai and nobles who no longer received stipends as they had

86 Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle, 105.
87 Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle, 105-106.
under the Tokugawa government. Instead, these “peers” were issued public bonds, which quickly became worthless as inflation ran rampant after the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. In response, Iwakura arranged a loan from his 15th National Bank with the peers’ bonds as collateral, and submitted the aforementioned proposal to the Governor of Tokyo, creating the Nippon Railway Company.

The founding of the Nippon Railway was made possible by the financial difficulties facing the government at this time. In addition to the outflow of money that followed the importation of Western goods and technology, the government also triggered rapid inflation as it issued enormous amounts of paper money during the Satsuma Rebellion. In order to combat this inflation, Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi began a curtailment policy in 1880 and supported the foundation of private companies as a means of moving away from costly government management and control of industry. As a result of Matsukata’s policies, many government enterprises were sold to the private sector, initiating a boom in private investment, especially in railways. “By taking on the debts of some of the pioneering entrepreneurs at the start of industrialization,” Hiromi Masuda argues concerning Matsukata’s policies, “the government served to lay the foundation on which private enterprise of the next stage could be built.”

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92 Ike “The Pattern of Railway Development,” 222; Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
93 Harada, Technological Independence, 10; Tōbu, Tōbu Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi, 23.
Despite the financial difficulties facing the government, some of the Meiji leaders, and especially the military, had remained reluctant to allow private construction of railways. Public Works Minister, and Army General, Yamagata Aritomo, for example, had blocked Ito Hirobumi’s proposal in 1881 for the selling of special railway stocks so that the government could exit the railway business. Furthermore, abandoning the railway industry also seemed to suggest that the government would give up its ambition of integrating and centralizing the nation.

To ensure the continuance of the Meiji railpolitik, and temporarily placate the objections of the Public Works Ministry and Army, the Nippon Railway Company was allowed only under a special charter, ensuring that the government would still construct and control all railways. In addition to laying the tracks, the central government arranged for local governments to purchase the necessary land. The central government then protected the financial stability of Nippon Railways through partial payment of interest and even acted as a proxy in construction and operation of the lines. Nippon Railways itself was basically only responsible for providing funds and purchasing materials, further ensuring that the tracks, facilities, and rolling stock of the company would be compatible with those of the government lines.

From the beginning, the founders of Nippon Railway had intended to build lines in accordance with the government-envisioned national network. According to an early

97 Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 13.
98 Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 13.
99 Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
100 Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 13.
101 Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
proposal, the company planned to build the aborted government Tokyo-Takasaki line with a branch splitting off midway towards the northeastern town of Aomori, a line connecting the two capitals (Tokyo and Kyoto) extending from Takasaki via the Nakasendō, a line branching off from the Nakasendō towards Niigata on the Japan Sea coast, and a separate line in Kyūshū. One important feature of these plans, excluding the line in Kyūshū, is that they all radiated out from Tokyo.

The first line opened by the Nippon Railway Company was the Tokyo-Takasaki line originally planned by the government. A deal was made with the government where the actual construction would be done by the Railway Bureau, while Nippon Railway trained crews in preparation for a planned second line. Construction started in September 1882, but a decision was yet to be made as to where the Tokyo terminus would be located. The company had originally considered connecting the line to the government's Shimbashi Line at Shinagawa. However, the northern end of the line was progressing well, and constructing the connection from Kawaguchi to Shinagawa would have taken time because of the hilly terrain on the western side of the city. The company, therefore, proposed instead to build their Tokyo closer to the built-up area of the city. They located one potential site on a hill overlooking the city in an area called Ueno. The terrain between Kawaguchi and Ueno was relatively flat, allowing for quick construction and earlier commencement of service.

The company saw this as an opportunity to begin making profits sooner than would have been possible if the terminus had been located in Shinagawa. The Takasaki Line, as it

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102 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 417.
103 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 432.
104 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 435.
was called, opened completely in 1884.\textsuperscript{105} With the assistance of the military and the central government, the Takasaki Line was later extended to connect Tokyo to the rice and oil fields along the Japan Sea coast. When the line opened to the coastal city of Naoetsu in 1893, it cut the travel time to Tokyo from six days to less than twelve hours, creating trade markets for Niigata rice, Hokkaido coal, and oil.\textsuperscript{106}

The government, however, wanted a connection between the port of Yokohama and the productive regions in the center of the country, which had yet to be linked by rail to the coast. In fact, when the government restarted construction of its Tokyo-Kyoto line along the Nakasendō highway in those regions, it planned to connect with the Nippon Railway line in Takasaki.\textsuperscript{107} The government could not construct the line itself due to its financial struggles, but it could still exert pressure on Nippon Railway to do it for them. After finishing construction of the Takasaki Line, the Nippon Railway Company had put its plans to build the Kawaguchi-Shinagawa connection on hold, blaming a shortage of investment capital.\textsuperscript{108} The company had also wanted to focus on its plan to build a new line out of Ueno.\textsuperscript{109} In response, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue rejected the planned line and wrote a letter to the head of Nippon Railway, Yoshii Tomosane, urging that the Kawaguchi-Shinagawa line be built as

\textsuperscript{105} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 2, 435.


\textsuperscript{107} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 3.

\textsuperscript{108} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 1, 611.

\textsuperscript{109} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 2, 438.
quickly as possible. The stockholders of the company learned their lesson, and in a special meeting, voted to begin construction.

Construction was again carried out by the Railway Bureau and started in January 1884. The line opened March 1, 1885 as the Shinagawa Line, later to be called the Yamanote Line, and connected to the Takasaki Line north of the city. Because the line was originally intended to serve as a freight connection between the silk-producing regions of Gumma and the port of Yokohama, it intentionally circumvented the built up areas of the city to the west. In this way, trains could run unimpeded all the way from Maebashi to Yokohama to unload their silk goods onto the waiting foreign transport vessels. Silk cargo had traditionally been shipped by barge down the Tone River and then on to Yokohama, but the new rail link made the travel shorter, cheaper, and safer than river and coastal shipping. Shortly, all export goods from Gunma to Yokohama were shipped along this line. Such transport made the Yamanote Line one of Nippon Railways' most successful, and provided the company a dramatic increase in revenue.

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110 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 1, 611.
111 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 438.
112 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 433, 438.
115 Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 46.
116 Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 14. The original industrial and transport purpose of the line also explains the numerous pockets of land which resisted urbanization along the route that were originally used as marshaling yards, depots, and termini (Tiry, “Tokyo Yamanote Line,” 5).
Once the Shinagawa Line was complete, Nippon Railway set about fulfilling its intention of building a line to Aomori. In its original charter application, it had stated that the Aomori line would branch off somewhere in the middle of the Takasaki Line, but two years later in 1883, that junction had still not been determined. In May of that year, Nippon Railway requested a Railway Bureau survey to identify the best route for the first branch of the Aomori line to Utsunomiya in Tochigi Prefecture, northeast of Tokyo.\textsuperscript{117} Students from the Public Works College carried out the survey and in November of 1884, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue submitted a report to the company weighing the merits of locating the junction at either Kumagaya or Ōmiya, and ultimately suggesting Ōmiya.\textsuperscript{118} The Ōmiya-Utsunomiya branch of the so-called Tōhoku (Northeast) Line was completed and opened for service in 1885.\textsuperscript{119} When opened completely in 1891, the line stretched all the way from Tokyo to the far northeastern city of Aomori, spreading central authority to the realm of the Tokugawa’s last supporters.

With all of its originally planned lines completed, Nippon Railway turned back to the additional line out of Ueno that Railway Bureau Chief Inoue had rejected in 1883. The plan was for this line to head northeast out of Ueno to the Jōban coalfields of ibaraki and Fukushima Prefectures in northern Honshū. In order to facilitate conveyance, the line connected to the Takasaki Line, and was opened in 1896.\textsuperscript{120} Linking the town of Mito and

\textsuperscript{117} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 2, 439.

\textsuperscript{118} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 2, 439.

\textsuperscript{119} Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, \textit{Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi} 2, 433.

the coal producing areas around Iwanuma to the Nippon Railway’s terminal in Ueno, this Mito Line was used mainly to convey coal to Tokyo, earning Nippon Railways substantial profits.121

The majority of the Tokyo railway network was operated by Nippon Railways before it was nationalized in 1906. As a company primarily focused on industrial conveyance for profits, the company had built its lines to facilitate such transportation. As railway speculation began to increase, and the number of railway companies in the Tokyo area grew, the trunk lines of Nippon Railways served as a frame for the Tokyo network. Because the Yamanote Line was the most efficient route to the port of Yokohama, it played an increasingly important role in the city network. Subsequent railway companies sought to connect their lines to the existing Nippon Railway lines in order to reduce construction costs and provide faster shipping to Yokohama through the Yamanote Line.

Seeing the profits made by Nippon Railway after the Yamanote Line opened in 1885, many private entrepreneurs and investors sought to build their own railways.122 In fact, as many as fifteen charters had been awarded for new railway companies by 1891.123 Three companies, in particular, sought to emulate Nippon Railway’s success: the Ryōmō Railway Company, the Mito Railway Company, and Kōbu Railway Company. Both the Ryōmō and Mito Railway companies simultaneously built lines branching off of Nippon Railway’s trunk

121 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 110; JRR, JR Zensen Zeneki (Tokyo: Kosai Shuppansha, 1997), 178; Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 110. A cutoff was later added between Nippori and Mikawashima in 1905 giving the line its present route (JRR, JR Zensen Zeneki, 178).

122 Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 14.

123 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 2.
lines in order to exploit the productive regions north of Tokyo, while Kōbu Railway concentrated on the regions to the west of the city.

Because these private companies subsequently built lines that connected to existing Nippon Railway lines, all three were founded as "branch lines" of Nippon Railway. Moreover, President Narawara Shigeru of Nippon Railway served concurrently as president of Mito and Ryōmō Railways in 1890-1891, and had been elected president of Kōbu Railway in May 1888. Because of its close relationship with the Railway Bureau, Nippon Railways acted almost as an agent of the government. Just as the government attempted to maintain control over Nippon Railways with strict regulations and a close relationship, the government was now using Nippon Railways as its agent to engender the same control over the newer companies. Ryōmō and Mito Railways eventually merged with Nippon Railways because of financial difficulties, while the more financially stable Kōbu Railways managed to secure its complete independence from Nippon Railway in 1891.

Kōbu Railways was more financially stable than the Mito and Ryōmō companies largely because it focused on the less developed productive regions to the west of Tokyo. The city of Hachioji directly west of Tokyo, for example, had long been an important transportation center on the Kōshū Kaidō, one of the Tokugawa's important Gokaidō highways centering on Tokyo. This location made Hachioji a natural distribution center for agricultural products and silk and textile goods. Beginning in the early Meiji Period, investors began seeking new modes of transportation for these products and especially for the

124 Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle, 150; Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 506.

125 Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle, 150.

126 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 503. The Five Roads (Gokaidō) were the Tōkaidō, Nakasendō, Nikkō Kaidō, Kōshū Kaidō, and the Ōshū Kaidō.
limestone being mined in more distant parts of the Tama region of western Tokyo Prefecture. Yet these plans were mired down on several occasions due to changing technology, economic competition, and finally by government indecision concerning the private operation of railways.

As early as 1883, plans were presented to the government to build a horse-powered railway west from Shinjuku. At this time, Nippon Railway’s Shinagawa Line had not yet been built through Shinjuku, but it was still an important location on the western outskirts of the city as it was the branching point of the Kōshū and Ōme Roads. After the government rejected this plan, other investors, including former Kanagawa Prefecture Governor Iseki Moritome and Tokyo industrial capitalist Amenomiya Keijirō, proposed their own route, intending to concentrate on limestone mining in the Ōme Region. They were joined by investors from the western Tama region, who convinced them to first build a line between Tokyo and Hachiōji.

The investors decided on a terminal point at Shinjuku and applied for permission to found the Kōbu Horse-powered Railway Company in April 1884. Yet by the time that permission was granted to found the company in November 1886, steam-powered railways

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130 Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô, *Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Hyakunen Shi* 2, 503.

were replacing horse-powered railways as the preferred means of operation, and the company applied for permission to build change to a steam railway.\textsuperscript{132}

The founding of the company would be delayed again by competition from the Musashi Railway Company, which proposed building a line similar to that proposed by Kōbu Railway between Hachioji and Kawasaki in Kanagawa Prefecture. Although this plan was supported by the governor of Kanagawa, as it was the shortest distance between silk and textile products in Hachioji and the port in Yokohama, the proposed connection would undermine Meiji railpolitik. Rather than converging on Tokyo, a direct line between Hachioji and Yokohama would run well to the south of the city.

The importance of retaining Tokyo at the center of the national network was not lost on Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo. As an army general, Yamagata had recognized the strategic implications of railways and earlier recommended that the Tokyo-Kyoto line be built inland to prevent damage from foreign attacks. He had also blocked Ito Hirobumi’s proposal that the government should exit the railway business in 1881. Still Home Minister five years later. Yamagata now had the opportunity to ensure that the national rail network would focus on Tokyo, as he would choose which company would be given permission to build a line from Hachioji to Yokohama. In line with Meiji railpolitik, Aritomo thought it more important to directly connect the population centers of Tokyo and Hachioji. In addition, the connection of the line to Shinjuku would contribute to the importance of the Yamanote Line, as Shinjuku Station was located on the line. Hence, he recommended approval of the Kōbu Railway application and guaranteed that Tokyo would remain the center of the national network.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{132} Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô, \textit{Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Hyakunen Shi} 2, 504.

\textsuperscript{133} Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô, \textit{Nihon Kokuyû Tetsudô Hyakunen Shi} 2, 504-505.
Although the Kōbu Railway was given permission from the government for construction, a new obstacle presented itself when the government passed the Private Railway Ordinance in May 1887. Under the new ordinance, the company’s original authorization as a horse-powered railway would be considered temporary. Narawara Shigeru, acting as the representative for the Kōbu investors, then sent a letter to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi requesting the allowance of the Kōbu Railway Company as a branch line of Nippon Railway. The government authorized the founding of the company in March 1888. The investors, in turn, elected Narawara president of Kōbu Railway Company.134

A petition for the government to construct the line was subsequently signed jointly by Narawara, as president of Nippon Railway, and Sashida Shigejūrō, founding committee member of Kōbu Railway.135 As a branch of Nippon Railways, the construction of Kōbu Railways’ lines would be completed by the Railway Bureau, and the bureau would also be responsible for subsequent maintenance.136 Because of protests from citizens in the cities of Chōfu and Fuchū, who were concerned that the railways would reduce business in the area, the line was planned in a straight line from Shinjuku to Tachikawa instead of following the more circuitous Kōshū road.137 Construction was started in 1888, and the whole line to Hachioji opened later that same year.138

134 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 506.
135 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 507.
136 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 510.
137 Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle, 61; Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 1, 170.
138 Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō, Nihon Kokuyū Tetsudō Hyakunen Shi 2, 508.
Kôbu Railway’s concentration on Shinjuku illustrates the profit-oriented motivations of its investors as well as the Meiji government’s railpolitik. As the Kôbu line was built for the purpose of transporting limestone and silk products, a connection to the Yamanote Line allowed the most cost-effective and efficient conveyance to Yokohama. Meanwhile, the insistence of the government, in the person of Home Minister Yamagata, for the Kôbu line to detour to the Yamanote line at Shinjuku rather than heading directly to Yokohama reveals the government’s determination to construct a national railway network focused on Tokyo.

Regulation of the Private Railway Network and the Success of Meiji Railpolitik

As the private railway companies increased in number and the private railway network grew, the central government took extra steps to ensure that their railpolitik would not be compromised. Aside from being involved in route selection and construction of the private company lines, the government secured the right to nationalize private railway companies in the future. The government also issued a series of regulations to ensure that each line in the private railway network would be compatible with the government’s own lines. This compatibility facilitated the nationalization of the railways in 1906-1907, by which the Meiji government reclaimed control over the national network and asserted domestic hegemony.

The regulations placed on Nippon Railway upon its founding in 1881 elucidate the Meiji government’s efforts to continue its railpolitik even after it had allowed the formation of private railway companies. As part of the special charter awarded Nippon Railway, the government ensured “strict and comprehensive control” over all phases of railway business, “including construction, accounts, and rate-making.”\(^\text{139}\) The term of concession for the line and right-of-way was fixed at 99 years, and the government reserved the right to repurchase

\(^{139}\) Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 2.
the line after 50 years.\textsuperscript{140} The agreement also stipulated that work on the lines should be started no later than six months after the granting of the charter, with all lines completed within 7 years.\textsuperscript{141}

The military, in particular, urged increased regulation of the private lines. The army had been pleased with the speed of troop movements during the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, and in 1879 conducted a detailed survey of the transport capacity of the railway network.\textsuperscript{142} The military initially pressed for the railways to be upgraded to the international standard gauge for all railways. This would allow expedited troop movements, as trains would be able to travel faster on the wider tracks. Once this suggestion was deemed too expensive, the military increasingly pushed for nationalizing and unifying railways to improve military transport.\textsuperscript{143}

To appease the army’s demands for troop movement, the Nippon Railway charter also included an article stating: “In the event of an emergency or war, the company shall have the obligation to allow the government, if so ordered, freely to use its railways.”\textsuperscript{144} The army’s control over private railways was extended in 1884 by Cabinet directive. “Since construction or alteration of railways has bearing on military affairs,” read the new directive, “consultation should be made with the Ministry of War to discuss how it is to be executed.”\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{140} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 2.

\textsuperscript{141} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 2.

\textsuperscript{142} Harada, \textit{Technological Independence}, 11.

\textsuperscript{143} Aoki, et. al. \textit{A History of Japanese Railways}, 39.

\textsuperscript{144} Harada, \textit{Technological Independence}, 11.

\textsuperscript{145} Harada, \textit{Technological Independence}, 11.
The railway boom following the opening of the Yamanote Line in 1885 heightened the demand for standardization. The opening of the line and the profits Nippon Railway made shipping silk had led to a dramatic increase in the amount of private railway speculation. In 1889, tracks of the private lines stretched 840 kilometers, slightly less than the 881 kilometers of the government lines. By the next year, however, private lines surpassed the government’s, extending to 1,357 kilometers. Until the nationalization in 1906, “private railways rather constituted the mainstay of rail transport in Japan.”

This rapid speculation and increase of private railways around the country was problematic for several reasons. First, it contradicted government efforts to standardize the national railways, as the private companies imported technology from different sources. Kyōshū Railways, for example, imported materials and engineers from Germany, while Hokkaidō coal lines used American materials. Even the government began importing materials increasingly from Germany and the United States, instead of Great Britain. Secondly, many lines that companies proposed were not realized, and investors lost large amounts of money in the process. Finally, the private railway companies, ultimately interested in profit, tended to build lines only in populous regions and where construction costs would be relatively low. Entire regions of the country were left without rail access, further impeding the formation of a national network and the social and political integration of the state.

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149 Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47.
As early at 1887, the Meiji government took steps to ensure that future lines would be built to the same technical standards as the state railways, and even passed regulations to guarantee that Tokyo would be the center of the private railway network. These new efforts at regulation were championed by Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru. Following the abolition of the Public Works Ministry in 1885 and the placing of the Railway Bureau under direct cabinet control, Inoue saw a rise in his influence over government railway policy. With this newfound power, Inoue stepped in to combat rampant railway speculation and the problems it caused by making an effort to consolidate government control over railways.\textsuperscript{151}

With strong support from the military, special regulations were issued in the Private Railway Ordinance in May 1887 codifying the concessions made to companies “as a first step towards securing uniformity of operation under State control.”\textsuperscript{152} As Stephen Ericson observes, although the law was disguised as helping private railways gain legal recognition, “the regulations were actually meant to control more than to assist railway companies.”\textsuperscript{153} While this ordinance helped private railway companies in acquiring land, it also reduced the amount of financial aid given by the government and lowered the government repurchase option term to only 25 years.\textsuperscript{154} The regulations also allowed the government to closely observe construction and operation, and even order companies to make connections between lines.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{151} Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47.

\textsuperscript{152} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 3.

\textsuperscript{153} Ericson, \textit{The Sound of the Whistle}, 116.

\textsuperscript{154} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 3; Ericson, \textit{The Sound of the Whistle}, 116.

\textsuperscript{155} Ericson, \textit{The Sound of the Whistle}, 121.
Most importantly for maintaining Meiji railpolitik, the 1887 Private Railway Ordinance located Tokyo at the conceptual center of even the private railway network. Included in the ordinance was the “Service Regulations for Staff Engaged in Operating Railways,” made up of 463 articles. Article 21 delineated the method for setting the standard time for all private railways:

The standard time of each station shall be Tokyo time, and shall be transmitted to stations by telegraph every day according to the method that has been separately established to ensure the correct time.¹⁵⁶

With this article within the Private Railway Ordinance, the central government forced new private railway companies, and existing ones such as Nippon Railway, to submit to its temporal authority by adopting Tokyo time. “In sum, the state railway attempted to encourage the spread of this standard time among private railways by taking over the operation system, improving the time consciousness of staff, and reorganizing the system…” Nakamura Naofumi argues, “Through such efforts, the Railway Bureau sought to achieve unified control over the temporal as well as other dimensions of the nationwide system of traffic.”¹⁵⁷

When the country faced recession in 1890, many private railways closed or merged with more stable companies. Because of the troubles facing the private railways, calls for nationalization gained strength.¹⁵⁸ Seeing an opportunity to push the nationalization issue, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue presented his “Matters Concerning Railway Policy” to the

¹⁵⁸ Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47.
cabinet in July 1891.\textsuperscript{159} This proposal discussed the purchase of private railway and suggested that the government construct railways without concern for profit and loss.\textsuperscript{160} Inoue also recommend a law on railway construction and another for purchasing private railways.\textsuperscript{161}

After studying the report, the cabinet submitted two bills to the Imperial Diet, which had been established the previous year in 1890. As Inoue had recommended, one bill called for selling national bonds to fund the purchase of private railways, while the other bill was to allow the purchase of the lines.\textsuperscript{162} The private sector learned of these bills and, sensing the threat it presented to their industry, submitted an opposing bill to the Diet through sympathetic Diet members.\textsuperscript{163} The private railways convincingly argued that they could construct and operate railways more cheaply and efficiently than could the government, and the bills were rejected by the Diet in 1891.\textsuperscript{164}

Not to be dissuaded, the government reintroduced the same two bills the next year.\textsuperscript{165} After being greatly amended, the bills were put to a vote. Diet members had begun to realize the benefits of rail lines passing through their electoral districts, and were more supportive this time around. The bill for buying the private railways was rejected again, but the loan bill

\textsuperscript{159} Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 42; Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 14. Masuda calls this memorandum the “Proposal on Railway Policy.”

\textsuperscript{160} Masuda, “Policy, Ch. 2,” 14.

\textsuperscript{161} Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47.

\textsuperscript{162} Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 42.

\textsuperscript{163} Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47.

\textsuperscript{164} Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 42.

\textsuperscript{165} Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 42.
passed both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers and became the Railway Construction Law on June 21, 1892.\textsuperscript{166}

Although the bill allowing the purchase of the private lines had been rejected, the new Railway Construction Law continued Meiji railpolitik, as it contained a clause that allowed the government the right to purchase private lines judged necessary to complete the projected trunk network centered on Tokyo.\textsuperscript{167} The new act also gave the government the ability to determine where new private trunk lines would be constructed, and which lines would be built first. This right extended government control over private lines, in essence making all of the private line companies proxies for the government. The government's control was total: it set standards in line construction, such as line gauge, curve radii, and platform height, and permitted the building of private railways only if the government wanted them built.\textsuperscript{168}

The new regulations set forth in the Railway Construction Law came right in time, because the stock scare of 1890 did not last long. The economic prosperity following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 led to the "second railway boom" of 1895-1898.\textsuperscript{169} The new regulations ensured that even companies founded in this second railway boom would conform to government railway standards, facilitating future nationalization. Yet the economic prosperity, which led to the creation of new railway companies, also drove away calls for private railway nationalization. In this way, the ebb and flow of nationalization sentiment corresponded directly to the strength or weakness of the economy.

\textsuperscript{166} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 3; Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 47.

\textsuperscript{167} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 4.


When the second rail boom turned to bust as another recession hit in 1898-1899, calls for nationalization returned. This recession saw the dissolution of no fewer than 15 companies because of lack of funds. Mergers and absorption of competitors was common, and the number of private railway had reduced from 66 in 1897 to 39 by 1906. As expected, sentiment for nationalization again rose during the economic downturn. In 1899, the issue came before the Lower House of parliament, leading to a proposition for nationalization. An enquiry committee appointed by the government to investigate the topic recommended nationalization, and two bills for nationalization and state purchase were again put before the Diet in 1900. Again, both bills failed to pass. The government reacted by issuing more strict laws regarding private railway operation in the Private Railway Law and the Railway Operation Law, both of 1900. The two laws together replaced the outdated 1887 Private Railway Ordinance, and regulated private railways serving as trunk lines. As a result, the authority of the Railway Minister was greatly enhanced over both the government and the private railways. The minister could even control passenger and cargo fares.

Sentiment for nationalization once again grew during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. As a government report stated, two important factors in railway nationalization were “the national spirit of expansion engendered by the successful war with Russia, and the

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170 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 4-5.
need of the times for the speedy development of national industry." Indeed, by the time of the Russo-Japanese, the Japanese economy had turned towards heavy industry, causing an increase in domestic freight volumes. With this shift, even staunch capitalists began to favor nationalization, as it would strengthen distribution networks. Prominent businessman Shibusawa Eiichi, for example, had been heavily involved in private railways beginning with the Nippon Railway Company, and had argued against the calls for nationalization whenever there was an economic downturn. Yet he became a promoter of nationalization because improved distribution promised to help his business interests.

One of the most ardent supporters of nationalization after the Russo-Japanese War was the military. According to the military, the national railways had proved inadequate during the Russo-Japanese War. Minster of War Terauchi Masatake summarized the position of the military in a session of the Diet on March 3, 1906:

National defense is defensive and offensive, and systematically related railways are necessary not only to passive, but also to active protection. As concerns the first case, we have had a most unfortunate experience with the private roads; and in the other contingency, in which the cooperation of maritime interests is needed, the private roads have again proved themselves insufficient. It was further shown in the war with Russia that the operation of the private railways, constructed with poor materials, was absolutely deficient.

Despite War Minister Terauchi’s claims that the private lines had been inadequate during the war, Japanese railways were able to convey 1.3 million passengers, and 3.2 million

175 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 6.
177 Watarai, Nationalization of Railways in Japan, 55.
tons of freight. Although on the surface encouraging nationalization for the reason that the private lines were inadequate, the military had again recognized the pivotal role railways played in military campaigns. The army further realized that success in any future wars on the continent would require an even more efficient rail network. For this reason, the military was strongly in favor of consolidating the domestic, Manchuria, and Korean railways into one transportation system.

The government responded with a plan for incorporating the railways into one network. This policy had three aims: to smooth domestic transport, lower freight and passenger fares, and standardize and integrate the railways. Such changes, the government hoped, would reduce costs and liabilities, while increasing operation convenience. A second reason for nationalization was that it would prevent the railways from being taken over by foreign investors. The government had feared that foreigners would be able to purchase a controlling interest in the companies. Nationalization would prevent this from happening.

The government presented the Railway Nationalization Law to the Diet in March 1906. This law passed the Lower House unchanged, but received opposition in the Upper House. A committee was appointed to review the law, and as a result the number of companies to be purchased was reduced from 32 to 17. After being amended, the law was forced through at the end of the Diet session after all opposing lawmakers had walked out.

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178 Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 3,” 56.
179 Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 3,” 56.
181 Watarai, Nationalization of Railways in Japan, 56-57.
The law was passed on March 31, and became the Railway Nationalization Law.\textsuperscript{183} This law stipulated that the government would buy the 17 appointed private railways within 10 years, with all of the companies being nationalized before the end of 1907.\textsuperscript{184} The law also authorized the purchase of the Keifu Railway Company in Korea.\textsuperscript{185}

The purchased railways were chosen with the intent of finalizing the national trunk network centered on Tokyo. Companies that provided service primarily to a single region were therefore omitted. Of the seventeen lines nationalized, four were in the Tokyo region. Nippon Railway and Kōbu Railways were purchased in 1906, while Sōbu Railway and the Bōsō Railway, which converged on Tokyo from Chiba Prefecture to the east, were purchased the following year.\textsuperscript{186} As a result of the nationalization, government-owned lines, which had previously only accounted for 30\% of the national total, increased to almost 90\% of national trackage.\textsuperscript{187} The government’s portion of control would have been even higher had it been able to nationalize all 32 companies that it sought.

Nevertheless, tracks owned solely by the government after the nationalization stretched from northern Honshū all the way to Kyūshū, and were located on all four of the main islands of the archipelago.\textsuperscript{188} Moreover, the Meiji government had successfully fostered a network that fulfilled its railpolitik. Tokyo was located at the physical and conceptual center of a railway network that spread central authority to all corners of nation, to

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[183] Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 43.
\item[184] Imashiro, “Nationalisation of Railroads,” 43.
\item[185] Watarai, \textit{Nationalization of Railways in Japan}, 54.
\item[186] Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 8.
\item[188] Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 8.
\end{footnotesize}
even the humblest villager. With the purchase of Keifu Railways in Korea, government lines also extended beyond Japan-proper to its territory in Korea, marking the beginning Japan’s imperial railway network. By nationalizing the network and even beginning its own European style “railway imperialism” in Korea, the Meiji government took a big step towards cementing their domestic hegemony and gaining international recognition. Both would be accomplished with the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito, and the construction of the monumental Tokyo Station.
CHAPTER III
FROM TOKYO TO TEITO

On February 26, 1872, just four years after the Meiji Restoration, a great fire broke out in the Ginza district of Tokyo. Raging over 95 hectares of land in the center of the city, the fire destroyed roughly 3,000 buildings and displaced some 50,000 people. From the fire “emerged the new Ginza,” as Edward Seidensticker described the government’s response to the damage. Rather than allow the area to be rebuilt in a more traditional manner, Meiji leaders Ōkuma Shigenobu and Inoue Kaoru seized the opportunity to rebuild the area in a showcase of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment), as “an impressive and fire-resistance district suitable for the imperial capital.” The burnt area had provided the Meiji leaders with a blank canvas on which to paint the model of a modern national capital that would unite the nation and project the authority of the new central government to both the domestic and international audiences.

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2 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 58; Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 61.


4 For capitals as a means to unite the nation and project domestic and international authority, see, Gavin Shatkin, “Colonial Capital, Modernist Capital, Global Capital: The Changing Political Symbolism of Urban Space in Metro Manila, the Philippines,” Pacific Affairs 78 (Winter 2005-2006), 579.
During the age of imperialism, national capitals proliferated as one of the “logical outcome[s] of the nation-state.” Internationally, these monumental capital cities were the “physical representations of the power and wealth of the nation-states then competing with each other.” As Takashi Fujitani observes, “in that age of rising nation-states a sort of international rivalry in the display of national power and prestige through urban architecture and space swept through Paris, Madrid, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and Washington.” In France, for example, when Paris “had to have a physical magnificence worthy of its importance,” Baron Haussmann created a capital that would rival imperial Rome “and celebrate a new form of Empire.” Yet for a Meiji government that tied its domestic legitimacy and international reputation to modernity and teleological progress, the national capital, often used to “express a vision of an idealized future,” became a space that showcased the modernization and Westernization of Japan. As such, Tokyo became the symbol of the united, modernizing state and “an official sign of Japan’s progress and prosperity.”

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The most visually stunning and effective way for Japan to showcase its modernity and progress was through the use of Western architecture in the capital. The construction of Western-style buildings in the grand Western-style capital of Tokyo represented Japan's participation "in a worldwide competition to be enlightened and civilized," as "in the age of imperialism, capital cities were regarded as symbols of the progress of mankind and as the embodiment of modern civilization." As William Coaldrake argues, "Architecture was charged with a mission of the highest national significance: proclaiming loudly on every city block and street corner Japan's assurance and authority as a modern state."

Tokyo thus had two roles as national capital during the Meiji period, both of which contributed to the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito, or the "imperial capital." On the domestic stage, Tokyo was the focus and force of state formation and integration through centralization and standardization. In this role, the capital had become the metropole of Meiji domestic colonization. The government then used modernity and progress to ideologically integrate the people of Japan, and placed Tokyo at the conceptual nexus. Henry Smith has argued that Tokyo was a "showcase" of modernity, "on the one hand a sort of two-dimensional backdrop against which the latest fashions and inventions from the West were displayed, and on the other a proving-ground for institutional innovations." Similarly, Shun'ichi J. Watanabe

13 Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 53.
points out that "as a capital city at the centre of Japan’s efforts to modernize and Westernize, Tokyo represented the country’s most important site for exchange with foreign countries."14

Domestically, Western architecture displayed the authority of the central government and became the symbol of new Meiji government authority.15 Western buildings embodied the "authority of a central government that aimed to rule more directly than did the previous Tokugawa government."16 As Toshio Watanabe argues, "Large, imposing modern edifices would impress upon the Japanese people the power and stability of the new regime."17 Watanabe continues, articulating the symbolic value of Western architecture for the domestic audience:

Western styles were clearly different from anything Edo culture could offer and, above all, provided an image of modernity. The public could see for itself that the new government was progressive rather than retrogressive like the old one. By using Western styles the governmental patrons of such buildings could make their political intentions visible. Additionally, Western-style buildings looked grand and imposing, a rare quality in Edo-period architecture. Multistory stone or brick buildings gave the impression of solidity, permanence, and authority, all qualities the young Meiji government was striving for. The Western style fit the bill perfectly.18

In its international role, Tokyo was the monumental capital city that would project a "modern and civilized aspect to the outside word in order to persuade the Western powers

17 Watanabe, "Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan," 22.
18 Watanabe, "Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan," 23.
that Japan was a country to be treated with respect." One of the major challenges facing the Meiji leaders when they gained control of the country in 1868 had been projecting this modern and civilized image to the outside world in order to revise the so-called "un-equal treaties." This treaty revision process began when over half of the Meiji ruling elite, including Iwakura Tomomi, Kido Kōin, Itō Hirobumi, and Ōkubo Toshimichi, visited the United States and Europe from 1871 to 1873.

Although the official purpose of this Iwakura Mission was to secure treaty revision and study western political and administrative institutions, the Meiji leaders also learned firsthand how far behind Japan was in terms of architecture and city planning. As André Sorensen argues, the mission "served to persuade its members of the inadequacy of Japanese cities." The Japanese leaders had visited Paris, recently renovated by Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann, and as it did for people around the world, Paris thereafter became the urban model of modernity for the Japanese leaders. Ultimately, the mission convinced the Meiji leaders of the need for Japan's own monumental capital on a par with the great capitals of Europe. In order to construct their modern capital, the Meiji government implemented western architecture and city planning to show that Japan was a modern nation "worthy of being treated as a equal among other developed nations."


23 Watanabe, "Josiah Conder's Rokumeikan," 22.
The immediate domestic and international goals of creating Teito were, then, to assert the hegemony of the central government, prevent the encroachment of the Western powers, and renegotiate the unequal treaties. All the while, the ultimate goal in the mind of the Meiji leaders as Tokyo became Teito was to garner international recognition and acceptance as a modern nation.\(^{24}\) Although not a constant process, this re-creation of the capital started with the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and grew stronger in the 1880s with the competing “Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya” and “Yoshikawa Plan,” as the Meiji leaders saw the need for and the potential to create a capital to impress the international community. Finally, with the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914, Japan was able to anticipate acceptance as a first-class world power (ittō koku).

The “Door to Bunmei”

Immediately after the great fire in Ginza, the government announced plans to rebuild the area. The speed, and the scale, with which the Meiji leaders, led by Ōkuma and Inoue, seized the chance to rebuild the district from the ground up indicates the importance of the project’s political ramifications. Plans for the construction of nearly 1,000 buildings were announced only six days after the fire.\(^{25}\) At the hands of the Meiji government, the new Ginza rose from the smoldering ashes of the traditional Low City as the first step in transforming Tokyo into a beacon of modernity that would project the authority of the central government to both the international and the domestic audience.

The physical location of Ginza perfectly suited the goal of showcasing Japan’s civilization and enlightenment to the Westerners who had come to the country for treaty

\(^{24}\) Coardrake, *Architecture and Authority*, 208-209.

Henry Smith argues that Ginza’s location indicates that the Brick Quarter was intended to impress these foreign observers. The area was bordered by Marunouchi to the west, the foreign settlement at Tsukiji to the east, and the new Shimbashi railway station to the south. Therefore, any foreign visitor or dignitary making his way from Yokohama via railway would walk directly through Ginza on his way to renegotiate treaties at the ministry buildings, or to his hotel in the Tsukiji foreign settlement.

The Ginza Bricktown also had domestic implications. Gavin Shatkin has suggested that the first political function of capital cities is to “present an ‘argument’ for the legitimacy of [the national government’s] policies and programmes [sic] by presenting the capital as a symbol of progress that represents a template for the rest of the nation to follow.” In this vein, the Meiji leaders hoped that the Western-style Brick Quarter would act as a model of modernity and bunmei kaika for the rest of the city, and the nation beyond. Indeed, as Fujimori Terunobu writes, for the Japanese government, “the door to bunmei was in Ginza.” Urban historian Ishizuka Hiromichi has also suggested that the construction of the Ginza Bricktown, as the first step of re-creating Tokyo as Teito, was a means of political consolidation. As Ishizuka argues:

The new government, at the time the sole external representative of Japan, was in the process of also becoming the sole domestic unified ruler (tōitsu-teki shukensha). As such, the first undertaking in the project of establishing a Teito suitable for a centrally

26 Smith, “Tokyo as an idea,” 54.
ruled, unified nation (*chūō shūken-teki tōitsu kokka*) was the construction of the Ginza Bricktown.\(^{30}\)

Although only about a third of the planned 1,000 buildings were completed because of financial shortfalls, the Bricktown became the herald of civilization and enlightenment for all who saw it.\(^{31}\) One contemporary Japanese observer declared of the Ginza Bricktown, “Here one feels as if one were in a foreign country for a while.”\(^{32}\) Hattori Bushô, author of the *New Tales of Tokyo Prosperity* (*Tōkyō Shin Hanjōki*) published between 1874-1876, points to the Kyōbashi Brick District, of which Ginza was the main part, as one of the symbols of civilization and enlightenment in the city. “To lift the darkness and spread knowledge,” Hattori writes, “there is nothing like showing the actual scene with the real things.”\(^{33}\) To ensure that the district would be an effective model of progress by “showing the real things,” the Meiji leaders had hired English engineer Thomas Waters to design the building plans in a suitably modern and “civilized” style. The resulting district was thoroughly Western, at least on the street front – buildings off the main streets remained Japanese. The Western buildings were all made of red brick, giving the district its popular moniker, the Ginza Bricktown (*Ginza Rengagai*).\(^{34}\) Roads had been widened and had Japan’s first sidewalks, which had been planned even before the fire because of the large number of

\(^{30}\) Ishizuka, “Meiji-ki ni okeru Toshi-keikaku,” 486.


\(^{32}\) Meech-Pekarkik, *The World of the Meiji Print*, 92.


\(^{34}\) The name is also translated as Ginza Bricktown. Seidensticker, *Low City, High City*, 59; Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan*, 62.
foreign pedestrians in Ginza.\textsuperscript{35} The first gaslights in Tokyo were installed, and planted trees lined the brick-paved streets.

Yet the Ginza Bricktown was not successful as a model from which modernization would spread across the city and the nation. Although nearly 1,000 Western-style buildings were constructed in Kyōbashi Ward, which included Ginza, there were fewer than twenty in the rest of the city. One ward, Yotsuya Ward, even had no Western buildings at all.\textsuperscript{36} The reason that the buildings did not proliferate could be that while interesting for visitors to look at, they were not a very pleasant place in which to live. As Seidensticker explains: “They were found to be damp, stuffy, vulnerable to mildew, and otherwise ill adapted to the Japanese climate, and the solid walls ran wholly against the Japanese notion of a place to live in.”\textsuperscript{37}

While the Ginza Bricktown did not compel the visitors who strolled through the Ginza -- a custom called Ginbura, or as Seidensticker translates in, “Killing time in the Ginza”\textsuperscript{38} -- to rebuild their own homes in brick, it did contribute to the wave of popular interest in Western architecture. From the 1870s, knowledge of “authentic Western architecture” began entering Japan in the form of foreign books, returning students and officials, and best-selling books on the West.\textsuperscript{39} The government also began hiring western architects as foreign advisors (oyatoi gaikokujin) to train Japanese engineers. In 1870, the Meiji government had also established the Public Works Ministry (Kōbushō) in order to build

\textsuperscript{35} Suzuki and Yamaguchi, \textit{Shin Kenchikugaku}, 251.

\textsuperscript{36} Seidensticker, \textit{Low City, High City}, 59.

\textsuperscript{37} Seidensticker, \textit{Low City, High City}, 61.

\textsuperscript{38} Seidensticker, \textit{Low City, High City}, 61.

\textsuperscript{39} Finn, \textit{Meiji Revisited}, 17.
the railways, and also to train new Japanese engineers at the Engineering College (Kōbudaigakkō).40

The Ginza Bricktown was also successful in establishing brick as the preferred material for Western-style construction, itself becoming a symbol of bunmei kaika.41 Soon, brick buildings constructed in Western-styles began appearing all over Japan, including museums, banks, and banquet halls like the Rokumeikan. Along with the imperial family residences, the public half of the Emperor’s palace, where he would appear as a modern ruler, was even rebuilt in 1888 in the Western-style.42

Tracks to Teito

After the completion of the Ginza Bricktown in 1877, there was a several year hiatus before the next large project in the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito. This delay could have been a result of uncertainty on the part of government leaders concerning the role of Tokyo. While committed to moving the administrative center of the nation to Tokyo, some Meiji leaders insisted that the symbolic capital should remain in Kyoto. Arguably furthest from their mind was the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito. As Takashi Fujitani contends: “The idea of fashioning Tokyo into the imperial city (teito) par excellence – that is, into the nation’s symbolic and ritual center – did not become significant until the early 1880s. Few if any of the ruling elites had such visions for Tokyo in the years shortly after the overthrow of the ancien régime in 1868.”43

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40 Suzuki Jun, Kōbushō to Sonno Jidai, 3-4: Finn, Meiji Revisited, 17.


42 Suzuki and Yamaguchi, Shin Kenchikugaku Taikei, 230: Finn, Meiji Revisited, 93-94.

43 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 38.
Certainly there were pressing domestic matters such as rampant inflation and the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 that preoccupied the government and prevented large-scale urban projects. Yet another reason for the delay in re-creating Tokyo as *Teito* could be that until the 1880s the Meiji government was more concerned with using the capital to assert domestic hegemony and display Japan’s modernity than to pursue international power. In other words, until the 1880s, the intended audience for the reconstruction of Tokyo was domestic rather than international. The Ginza Bricktown, for example, had displayed Japan’s modernity in order to impress the foreigners inside the country for treaty revision, and to remind citizens of the regime change. Beginning in the 1880s, however, the government’s view towards Tokyo began to change as the Meiji leaders saw the need and potential for creating a monumental capital targeting an international audience.

Indicative of the government’s changing view of Tokyo was the treatment of the imperial palace. In 1868 the government had ordered the construction of a new palace on the site of the former Shogun’s castle, but no action was taken on the order. Then in May 1873, the emperor’s residence was destroyed by fire, forcing the imperial family to live in a so-called “Detached Palace” (*Rikyū*), which was actually an old daimyo estate. As Takashi Fujitani observes, “they remained there, in the structure newly renamed the Akasaka Temporary Palace for nearly sixteen years. In the meantime the heart of the city lay empty....”

Construction on a new palace did not begin until 1884. Repairs had been postponed by imperial order two weeks after the fire in 1873, and then again in 1877 ostensibly because of technical and financial difficulties. Fujitani speculates that there was another reason for the delays: “Rather, the extremely long delay in even beginning the building project,

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followed by a rush to build an extravagant palace and surrounding area can only be explained by a radical change in the governing elites’ perception of the palace.”45 This change in perception, Fujitani argues, was towards recognizing the imperial palace more than simply the residence of the emperor, but as a representation of imperial authority and national honor.46 Yet more than just a change in the perception of the palace, the Meiji government also experienced a change in how they viewed the capital city of Tokyo.

From the early 1880s, the government increasingly saw Tokyo more as a symbolic national capital than just the political center of the nation. While not yet envisioning an imperial capital, or Teito, on a par with the great capitals of the West, the government began attempting to re-create Tokyo in the model of the Western capitals, particularly Paris. This endeavor was initiated with the city’s first venture into large-scale city planning, the 1880 “Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues” (Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai). Presented by Tokyo Governor Matsuda Michiyuki, the plan had been initiated in 1876 in the Urban Improvement Committee established by then-governor of Tokyo Kusumoto Masatake.47

Sitting on this Urban Improvement Committee were two prominent Tokyo businessmen, Taguchi Ukichi and Shibusawa Eiichi. Taguchi was one of the most influential of the early advocates of modernization; he had even been an investor in the Ryōmō Railway Company north of Tokyo that ultimately merged into the Nippon Railway Company. Taguchi was also the founder of the Tokyo Journal of Economics (Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi) and a leader in the bunmei kaika movement with his influential treatise Short History of

45 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 67-68.

46 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 68.

47 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
Enlightenment in Japan (Nihon Kaika Shōshi). Taguchi was also interested in city planning, and in 1880 published his famous Theses on Tokyo (Tōkyōron), calling for the development of an international port that would make Tokyo a great world port.

The 1880 report submitted by Governor Matsuda proposed concentrating redevelopment efforts to create a high-density central business district. Modeled on Paris, the proposal included plans for public buildings, roads, canals, bridges, gas and water lines, a port for Tokyo, and fire prevention measures. Calling for great boulevards as in Paris, the report advanced what has been called the “Paris-ization of Tokyo” (Tōkyō no Pari-ka). Yet the similarities with Haussmann’s city did not go much further. The Tokyo plan emphasized the concentration of economic activity and port development, while disregarding Haussmann’s creation of grand infrastructure. While Haussmann had been the architect behind Napoleon III’s imperial capital of Paris, these early city proposals for Tokyo displayed what André Sorensen calls a “revealing lack of concern for the symbolic project of creating a great imperial capital.” Nonetheless, although it was never implemented, the Matsuda Plan indicates that city planners had begun to look towards the grand European capitals as a model for a national capital city, the first step towards creating Teito.

It was not until the mid-1880s that the project of creating a symbolic imperial capital became a priority. From this time, the government and especially the Foreign Ministry,

48 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
49 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
whose task it was to renegotiate the unequal treaties, began to see Tokyo as Teito.\textsuperscript{53} Two competing city plans, the “Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya” championed by the Foreign Ministry and Minister Inoue Kaoru, and the Home Ministry’s so-called “Yoshikawa Plan,” delineate this increasingly symbolic view of the national capital. Both proposals shared common characteristics that made the conversion from Tokyo to Teito possible. Both looked to the great capitals of the West, especially Paris, as models for city improvement, and most importantly both included plans for a central railway station.

The first plan to re-create Tokyo into a grand imperial capital was championed by Inoue Kaoru. As Foreign Minister, it was Inoue’s responsibility to negotiate for the revision of the treaties with the Western countries. Originally xenophobic, as were many Meiji leaders, Inoue had come to recognize the need to Westernize in order for Japan to be accepted as a modern nation, and was a leading proponent of the Ginza Bricktown.\textsuperscript{54} In 1883, Inoue spearheaded the construction of the Rokumeikan, a Western-style ceremonial hall complete with ballroom that became a symbol of Japanese attempts to Westernize.\textsuperscript{55} Inoue was preparing for a treaty renegotiation conference scheduled for May 1886, intended to be the final such conference, and therefore encouraged the creation of a grand Western-style capital, complemented by a National Diet, prisons, and various ministry buildings.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{56} Ishida, \textit{Mikan no Tôkyô}, 11; Ker, “Treaty Revision in Japan,” 2.
In February of the same year, Inoue assembled the Temporary Construction Bureau (Rinji Kenchiku-kyoku) under direct cabinet control, with himself as the chairman, and was steadily proceeding with preparations for construction. The only thing left was to find an architect who could actualize his ideas.\(^5^7\) Inoue initially turned to Josiah Conder, a British architect who taught at the Engineering College and then at Tokyo University and had designed Inoue’s Rokumeikan, but ultimately rejected the design Conder produced.\(^5^8\) Inoue then looked to Europe, and hired two German architects, Wilhelm Böckmann and Hermann Ende, in 1886.

Böckmann arrived in Japan before Ende, and began sketching designs for the government building complex. The first plan produced by Böckmann was called the “Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya” (Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku).\(^5^9\) As Inoue had hoped, this plan proposed the creation of an imperial capital that would impress foreigners and aid the treaty revision process.\(^6^0\) The plan featured a central railway station in the middle of a rail line linking the northern and southern city railway terminals and fronting a large triangular plaza. Flanking the central station were two broad ceremonial avenues, named Emperor Avenue and Empress Avenue, which converged in front of the station before becoming Japan Avenue and leading to the proposed National Diet Building. When presenting this plan to the government leaders in the Rokumeikan two months later in May, Böckmann tried to persuade the leaders by making comparisons to similar plans for Vienna.

\(^{57}\) Ishida, *Mikan no Tōkyō*, 11.

\(^{58}\) Ishida, *Mikan no Tōkyō*, 11.

\(^{59}\) Böckmann’s plan is reproduced in Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, Appendix diagram number 50.

and Budapest. Böckmann recorded in his diary that the plan had been accepted with some modifications, but the plan for the Diet building was well received. Böckmann then traveled back to Germany in July of 1886 to finalize the plans, but only after meeting the Emperor and receiving his thanks.

Meanwhile, the Temporary Construction Bureau enlisted the services of another German architect, James Hobrecht, the “father of Berlin.” When Hobrecht arrived in Japan in March 1887, he immediately advised that Böckmann’s road plans be scaled back. Most importantly, Hobrecht eliminated the proposed central railway station in Ginza, as it would require excessive demolition of existing structures, although he kept plans for the north-south railway connection. Ende arrived in Japan soon thereafter in May 1887 and also rejected Böckmann’s plan as being too expensive and requiring too much of a change to the city. Ende and Hobrecht then both designed plans to group all of the ministry buildings into square-shaped arrangements in Hibiya Park, surrounding a large plaza. Around this same time in 1887, however, Inoue’s treaty renegotiations failed, leading to calls for his dismissal. Inoue finally resigned in September of 1887, also effectively ending the “Plan for

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61 Ishida, Mikan no Tōkyō, 19.
63 Ishida, Mikan no Tōkyō, 19-21.
64 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 238-239.
65 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 239; Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshikeikaku, 47.
66 Ishida, Mikan no Tōkyō, 22.
67 Ishida, Mikan no Tōkyō, 23.
Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya. Only two buildings from Ende and Böckmann’s plans were eventually constructed, the Tokyo Court Building, and the Justice Bureau building.

On the same day that Inoue Kaoru resigned his post as Foreign Minister and chairman of the Temporary Construction Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimushō) Undersecretary Yoshikawa Akimasa stepped in to replace him as chairman of the bureau. Inoue’s failure and resignation must have provided Yoshikawa with quite a feeling of vindication. As governor of Tokyo in 1884, Yoshikawa had presented a revision of the failed 1880 Matsuda Tokyo Central District Demarcation proposal to Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo. Yoshikawa’s proposal, called the City Planning Statement, looked beyond the central area of the city and outlined a modernization of the entire intra-city transportation network by widening roads, digging canals, and most importantly, building railways. Like the Foreign Ministry plan, this Home Ministry plan had called for a railway connection between the northern Nippon Railway terminus in Ueno and the southern Government Railway terminus in Shimbashi. Whereas the Foreign Ministry placed the central station in Ginza, however, the Home Ministry proposed a “central station” (chūō no teishajō) located in the Kajibashi district.

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69 Fujimori, “Ende Bekkuman: Sono 3,” 141.

70 The official name of Mayor Yoshikawa’s proposal was *Shiku-kaisei no Gi ni tsuketaru Jōshin*, but is more commonly known as the *Yoshikawa An*.

71 Fujimori, *Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku*, 115. Kajibashi is the historic name for the area in which Tokyo Station is currently located.
In response to the Yoshikawa Plan, Homo Minister Yamagata established the Tokyo City Improvement Committee (Shiku-kaisei Shinsakai) within the Home Ministry with Yoshikawa as the chairman. The purpose of the committee was to investigate and enact Yoshikawa's proposals, but Inoue was able to push through his opulent Hibiya plans, shelving the Yoshikawa Plan for the time being. Only when the Foreign Ministry plan was finally abandoned, was the Home Ministry able to reinstate its Yoshikawa plan. In early 1888, the Tokyo City Improvement Committee presented its Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance (Tōkyō Shiku-kaisei Jōrei), based on the Yoshikawa Plan, to the Privy Council. Because of the strong objection of Itō Hirobumi, the Privy Council rejected the bill in June after three months of heated debate. Nevertheless, Home Minister Yamagata and Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi ignored the decision of the Privy Council and passed the bill in the Cabinet in August. The bill was then passed into law as an imperial edict that same month.

Although the Yoshikawa Plan was the brainchild of the Home Ministry, it was more attuned to the creation of the monumental Teito than was the competing Foreign Ministry plan. Certainly, Böckmann's magnificent Baroque-style design for the center of the city would have made the capital an impressive display of power, but with the amount of destruction and high costs necessary, the plans were never plausible. Perhaps the most salient limitation of the subsequent alterations made by Hobrecht and Ende was the elimination of the central railway station. Myopically focused on treaty revision, the Foreign Ministry had

72 Ishizuka, Nihon Kindai Toshiron, 44.

73 Sorensen, 67; Ishizuka and Ishida, "Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and Its Urban Development," 11.

lost sight of an important feature of grand capitals: that they display both domestic hegemony and international power. With the removal of the central railway station, the Foreign Ministry plan also lost its connection to Meiji domestic hegemony, integration through railways.

For the Home Ministry, unlike the Foreign Ministry, domestic issues were of primary importance. As it was their responsibility to maintain Meiji domestic hegemony, the Home Ministry understood the need to make Tokyo a political city worthy of being the imperial capital.75 To ensure that Tokyo would display both domestic and international power, the Yoshikawa Plan and the later Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance incorporated plans for a monumental central railway station in the middle of a rail link connecting the northern and southern railway terminals. This connection made Tokyo the physical center of the national railway network. As Fujimori Terunobu argues, “the one railway line laid from north to south in the Yoshikawa plan was a connection between the networks of national territory and cities.”76 Only with this connection between domestic hegemony and international power was Tokyo able to become Teito. Yet this was only possible because Meiji railpolitik had fostered a national railway network that developed with Tokyo at the center. Without railways, Teito was not possible.

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75 Ishizuka, *Nihon Kindai Toshiron*, 45.

CHAPTER IV
THE GATEWAY TO THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL

When Tokyo Station opened as the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” (*Teito no Genkan*) on December 18, 1914, it marked the completion of a long process of re-creating Tokyo as *Teito*, the grand national capital of Japan. Spanning two imperial reigns, Meiji and Taishō, the process had started with the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and escalated with the Yoshikawa Plan and Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance in the late 1880s. The shift from Tokyo to *Teito* was then accomplished with the creation of the monumental Tokyo Station in 1914. Only a railway station could combine the two elements necessary for creating the imperial capital. Tokyo Station was the junction between the national railway network that integrated the nation, and the center of plans to re-create Tokyo in the model of the capitals of the West, complete with opulent Western architecture. In this way, Tokyo Station was the manifestation of the domestic hegemony and international power of the central government.

Tokyo Station displayed the authority of the central government in two ways. In its practical role as the cornerstone of the Tokyo and national railway networks, Tokyo Station was the physical center of Meiji domestic railway imperialism. Symbolically, Tokyo Station was the conceptual nexus of projects to unite the nation through ideology. As a railway depot, Tokyo Station was a beacon of modernity and a representation of civilization and enlightenment; and since it was also the personal station of the emperor, it served in addition as the embodiment of the emperor system.
Yet Tokyo Station was more than just a mere rail depot. As the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital,” it was also the gateway to the empire. It was the measure by which the city, and by extension the nation, would be judged on the international stage. Railway stations with similar symbolic value were being constructed in imperial capitals around the world, and it was only fitting that Japan should boast a grand Western-style central station in Tokyo as a symbol of its own empire. Tokyo Station as the “gateway to the empire” took on an even more literal meaning as the Meiji government began enacting its own European-style railway imperialism in Korea and Manchuria. With Tokyo Station sitting at the center of a railway network that spanned the Japanese archipelago and connected Tokyo to the grand capitals of Europe via rail ferry, Japan was able to claim its place as a first-class world power.

**Constructing the Gateway**

Plans for constructing the station that would eventually become Tokyo Station were initiated by the German architects hired to design the Foreign Ministry’s “Project of Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya,” Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann. Although Ende and Böckmann had provided the first plan for the “central station” (chūō teishajō) in Tokyo, calling for it to be placed in Ginza, the plans were rejected as too grandiose and prohibitively expensive.1 Nevertheless, the government saw the benefit of a symbolic central railway station. Plans for such a station to replace Shimbashi Station as the “gateway to the capital” were ultimately included in the 1884 Yoshikawa Plan and the 1888 Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance.2 The next year, Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo ordered the Railway Bureau

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to begin a survey for the construction of both the station and the connector line. The government then hired another German architect, Franz Baltzer, to draw up plans for the elevated electric railway and the “central station” in 1898.

Baltzer’s plans situated the station directly opposite the imperial palace, an arrangement that would be kept in the final plans for the station. However, this was the only aspect of Baltzer’s plans that would be adopted. Basing his designs on extant Edo-period architecture, Baltzer designed a station that was, as William Coaldrake argues, “entirely in keeping with Japanese traditions of architecture and authority, but it was entirely out of step with the intention of the Meiji imperial state to represent its new authority as a modern, Westernised [sic] nation.”

The government rejected Baltzer’s plans as not modern enough, or too Japanese, and paradoxically sought a Japanese architect who could design a more suitably Western-style building. In 1903, the government turned to Tatsuno Kingo, a leading proponent of Western architecture in Japan. Tatsuno had designed the Western-style Bank of Japan in Osaka, along with its branch offices. He also had experience designing Western-style railway stations, as he had designed several, including one in Pusan, Korea and the important Manseibashi Station in Tokyo. Tatsuno was therefore a natural choice for Tokyo’s central station, and unlike Baltzer, his plans were completely Western from the beginning. Tatsuno also understood the symbolic importance of the station, and realized that it would be compared the stations of the great capitals of Europe. “All of the great cities of Europe,”

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3 Tokyo Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed. Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi, 25.
4 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 231: Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247.
5 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 232.
6 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 232-233; Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247.
Tatsuno writes in the first line of a report on the construction of Tokyo Station, “even London, even Berlin; they all have central stations.”7

Construction of the station was delayed, though, by financial difficulties and two wars, the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. But victory over Russia in 1905 revitalized the project, and an even more “heroic” station building was planned once construction resumed in 1907.8 The new and improved design of the station owed to two key factors: the nationalization of the railways in 1906-1907 and the presence of Gotô Shimpei. The former offered incentive to enlarge the station, while the latter inspired an increase in the station’s imperial symbolism9

Serving at the time as cabinet member and Railway Agency President, Gotô famously urged the building of “a station that befits a Japan that defeated the great power Russia; one that will shock the world.”10 With this connection between Tokyo Station and imperial identity in mind, in 1908, Gotô ordered the plans for the station to be expanded from two floors to three, more suitable for Japan’s central station.11 Perhaps also because of Gotô’s influence in the cabinet, the budget for the construction of the station was increased, and the chief engineer was sent to inspect major rail terminals in Europe and the United States.12

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8 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248; Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62.
9 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 234.
10 Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, Tôkyô-Eki Eki-shi, 27.
12 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248.
After nearly two decades of planning, Tokyo Station was finally opened on December 18, 1914 to great fanfare and celebration in the square in front of the station. With the enlargements ordered by Gotô, Tokyo Station took on a symbolic importance suitable for the center of the Teito, and a manifestation of the domestic hegemony and international power of the central government.

**Tokyo Station and Domestic Hegemony**

The practical and symbolic roles of Tokyo Station were integral to the domestic hegemony of the central government. In its practical role, Tokyo Station served as the cornerstone of the Tokyo and national railway networks. In this way, it was the physical center of efforts to integrate the nation through the railways, a process that influenced even the naming of the station. Secondly, in its symbolic role, Tokyo Station was the conceptual nexus of attempts to unite the nation ideologically. As a rail depot and the personal railway station of the emperor, Tokyo Station embodied both the emperor system and bunmei kaika.

From the inception of plans for Tokyo Station, it was recognized as the center of the city railway network. Indeed, both the aborted Foreign Ministry “Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya” and the Home Ministry’s Yoshikawa Plan had called the proposed replacement for Shimbashi station, which ultimately became Tokyo Station, the “central station.” When it was opened in 1914, Tokyo Station replaced the previous Tôkaidô Line Tokyo terminal station of Shimbashi. From that time forward, the government described Tokyo Station as the “converging point of all the State lines in the metropolis.” A notice from the Tokyo Railway Administration Bureau announced the beginning of passenger service to Tokyo Station effective December 20, 1914. As the announcement made clear,

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Tokyo Station was to be the main Tokyo terminus. The old terminus of Shimbashi was concurrently renamed Shiodome, and was relegated to a freight-only station. The announcement added that the station previously called Karasumori would thereafter be renamed Shimbashi.\(^{14}\) When the Yamanote loop was completed in 1925, Tokyo Station also replaced the northern terminus of Ueno Station, allowing a through-connection on the previously separate Keihin (Coastal) and Tōhoku (Northeastern) Lines. More importantly, the completion of the Yamanote loop marked the completion of one central rail line that extended from one end of the Japanese islands to the other, through Tokyo Station.

Although not completed until 1925, the rail connection between the northern and southern railway terminals, with Tokyo Station in the center, had been one of the earliest planned railways in Tokyo. Plans for a link between the government railway terminus at Shimbashi and the Nippon Railway terminus at Ueno were included in the Yoshikawa Plan in 1884, and the proposal for a central station as far back as 1886. These plans were made official when the 1888 Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance called for the completion of an elevated train line between the two terminals.\(^{15}\) Such a line was considered necessary as increased traffic on the Tōkaidō and Tōhoku Lines began to overwhelm the capacity of the Yamanote.\(^{16}\) Because the line would connect the terminals of both the government line and the Nippon Railway Company, the line south from the proposed station would be built by the government, with the line north to Ueno being built by Nippon Railway.\(^{17}\) Accordingly, the


\(^{15}\) Harada, *Nihon no Kokutetsu*, 62.

\(^{16}\) Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 134.

Railway Bureau began a survey the next year of its half of the line at the behest of the Home Minister. In 1893, Nippon Railways also conducted a survey for their portion.18

After being delayed by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, a plan for the elevated link between Shimbashi and Ueno was finally accepted by the National Diet in 1896. This elevated line was proposed by Prussian engineer Herman Rumshöttel, who had been hired by Nippon Railways to conduct a survey on their half of the proposed north-south link through Tokyo.19 As they had previously done for the new military and constitution, the Meiji government looked to Europe for an example of urban railways when they set about construction of this elevated line. The government examined London and Paris before finding an ideal model in Berlin’s Stadt und Ringbahn, or City and Circle Line, a system where a loop encircling the city was bisected by another cross-town line.20 The government leaders resolved to construct a similar system in Tokyo, and fittingly hired the German architect of the Berlin line, Franz Baltzer, in 1898, to draw up engineering plans and supervise the construction of Tokyo’s elevated line.21 Because the line would run through existing business and commercial districts, it had to be elevated, requiring extra costs.22 Along with plans for a central station, Baltzer drew up designs for the elevated lines.

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18 Tokyo Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed. Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi, 25.


Although he was dismissed in 1903, his designs were used for the massive reinforced-brick viaduct between Tokyo Station and Shimbashi.\textsuperscript{23} 

The purchase of land for the line, known as the Tokyo Elevated Railway, began in 1899, but proceeded slowly because of financial troubles.\textsuperscript{24} The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 further delayed construction, and it was not until after the railway nationalization in 1906-1907 that a new plan was established.\textsuperscript{25} The Tokyo Elevated extended northward from Shimbashi intermittently as finances allowed. After several stops and starts in construction, service to Karasumori began in 1909, then to Yūrakuchō in June 1910, and in September of that year finally to the temporary station of Gofukubashi adjacent to the future Tokyo Station.\textsuperscript{26}

Meanwhile, the private railway companies in the Tokyo area, the Nippon Railway, Kōbu Railway, and Sōbu Railway companies, had all been slowly advancing toward the center of the city from four different directions.\textsuperscript{27} While the two earliest lines, the Government and Nippon Railway lines, were able to build terminal stations near the core of the city on the southern and northern sides, the two later railways were blocked by densely populated areas or other complications. Kōbu Railways, for example, had been forced to

\textsuperscript{23} Finn, \textit{Meiji Revisited}, 247.

\textsuperscript{24} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 134.

\textsuperscript{25} Aoki, et. al. \textit{A History of Japanese Railways}, 81.

\textsuperscript{26} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, \textit{Railway Nationalization in Japan}, 134. Karasumori is currently Shimbashi station. It was renamed concurrently with the opening of Tokyo Station on December 18, 1914.

build a terminal on the western outskirts of the city at Shinjuku, while Sōbu was relegated to the eastern periphery at Honjo. As railways became a more popular form of passenger travel, the private railways, especially, sought to extend their lines closer to the center of the city. More specifically, these extensions all targeted the proposed location of the new central station.

Following the nationalization of the private railways into Government Railways in 1906-1907, the government set about completing the Tokyo city network. An integral part of completing this envisioned network was also a line that would cut through the middle of the loop, allowing a direct east-west connection across the city. The first step in achieving the completion of the Yamanote loop and of the east-west link, was the nationalization of the Kōbu and Sōbu Railway companies in 1906, and 1907, respectively.

As one of the most important railways in the Tokyo area, the Kōbu Railway Company was one of the first two lines nationalized by the government. The line was important for two reasons: first, it extended to the west of the city, the direction of the city’s rapid population growth; and second, it cut across the middle of the Yamanote Loop directly to the area of the proposed central station. Kōbu Railways had begun extending their tracks steadily eastward from their terminus at Shinjuku towards the proposed central station. The line was extended to Ushigome by October 1894, to Iidamachi by April 1895, and then to Ochanomizu in 1904. Upon its purchase in 1906, the name of the line was changed to the Chūō Line, and the government immediately began building a link to the planned central station. The


extended Chūō Line was completed to Manseibashi Station in April 1912, with construction on the next leg following the opening celebration of Tokyo Station in December 1914.20

When the Yamanote loop was finally completed in 1925, Tokyo Station “literally became the heart (chūshin) of the national network.”31 Yet this was only the final act in a long-practiced tradition of placing Tokyo at the center of the national network. Tokyo had long been the reference point for the network, as trains were referred to, regardless of final destination, as either going towards or away from Tokyo. Furthermore, Tokyo Station was the “zero kilometer” point from where rail distances were measured for the national lines.32 This tendency to put Tokyo at the center of the national network was solidified when 17 of the top private railway companies were nationalized in 1906-1907. From this point on, the entire country, from Aomori in the northeast, all the way to Kyūshū in the southwest, was literally connected by one line with Tokyo at the center.33 As Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu proclaimed in his celebratory address for the opening of Tokyo station:

“Furthermore, the heart (chūshin) of our country’s railways, in other words, is nothing other than this station opening here today.”34

Even the naming of the station was affected as part of the process of placing Tokyo Station at the center of the national railway network. In fact, the opening celebration on December 18, 1914 marked the first time that the station was officially called “Tokyo

32 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 28.
34 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 102.
Prior to this time, during planning and construction, the station had been called the “central station" (chūō teishajō). Originally, this name was supposed to remain even after the station was opened. While this nomenclature delineated the role that the proposed station was to play in the Tokyo city network, it did not reflect Tokyo’s position as the capital of the nation, and certainly not its role as the metropole of an entire empire. Accordingly, the government, proposed to give the station a name with more symbolic resonance.

Arguments made by Railway Agency Documentation Division Director Nakagawa are representative of the government’s proposal to change the name of the station to Tokyo Station. While people living inside Tokyo would easily understand “central station” as the station located at the physical center of Tokyo, argued Nakagawa, people from outside the city would not be able to make this distinction. The response from residents of Tokyo stressed that designating one station “Tokyo Station” would isolate other stations in the city:

Within Tokyo there are many stations, such as Shimbashi, Ueno, Shinagawa, and Shinjuku. Naming the central station “Tokyo Station” even with all these other stations, gives the impression that only Tokyo Station is in the city of Tokyo and the other stations, like Ueno and Shimbashi, are somewhere in the countryside and not in Tokyo. So [the name] is not appropriate. The name should be “Central Station,” not “Tokyo Station.”

Nakagawa’s response to this argument reveals the government’s emphasis on the role of Tokyo Station as a symbol of the integrated nation. “The Central Station is the station at the

35 Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62-63. The station is referred to both as “Tōkō Teishajō and Tōkyō-eki.”


37 Tōkyō Hyakunen-shi Henshū linkai, ed. Tōkyō Hyakunen-shi, 735.
heart of Japan’s railways,” argued Nakagawa matter-of-factly, “Therefore, it must have a
name that is easily understood by people all over Japan. No matter what, making it Tokyo
Station is appropriate.”38

Perhaps another reason that Nakagawa was so adamant in naming the new station
“Tokyo Station” is that it would serve a second purpose of reinforcing the domestic
hegemony of the central government by standardizing the name of the city. Ever since the
capital of the nation had been moved from Kyoto to Tokyo, and Edo renamed as Tokyo,
citizens of Tokyo were confused about the correct pronunciation of the new name of the city.
Based on the pronunciation of the characters used, it could have been either Tokyo or
Tōkei.39 Ogi Shinzou points out that even in Taguchi Ukichi’s 1885 treatise, Nihon Kaika no
Seishitsu, the characters for Tokyo were indicated as being pronounced “Tōkei.”40 The
characters for Tokyo were also occasionally drawn incorrectly.41 Again, Ogi provides
examples of woodblock prints, even one print depicting the original Shimbashi Station, in
which the characters for Tokyo are drawn incorrectly.42 Lacking any official legal procedure
for changing the name of Edo to Tokyo, other than the imperial decree announcing the name
change, the usage of “Tokyo” to the present day has been merely customary.43

38 Tōkyō Hyakunen-shi Henshū Linkai, ed. Tōkyō Hyakunen-shi, 736.
39 Jeffrey E. Hanes, “Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji
Japan,” in Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern, eds. New Directions in the Study of Meiji
Japan (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997), 489.
40 Ogi Shinzou, Tōkei Jidai: Edo to Tōkyō no Hazama de (Tokyo: Kōdansha Gakujutsu
bunko, 2006), 31.
41 Ôishi, Ekime de Yomu Edo Tokyo, 26.
42 Ogî, Tōkei Jidai, 33-34, 41.
43 Ôishi, Ekime de Yomu Edo Tokyo, 26.
The confusion in the pronunciation of the name of the city was a result of two factors: first, the complicated decree announcing the renaming of Edo and the moving of the capital to Tokyo; and second, the recalcitrance of the residents of Edo. As Edward Seidensticker has observed, “some scholars have argued that the name of the city was not changed at all. The argument seems extreme, but the complexities of the language make it possible.”44 Because of the archaic language of the decree, Seidensticker explains, “this could mean that Edo is still Edo, but that it is now also ‘the eastern capital,’ or, perhaps, ‘the eastern metropolitan center.’”45 The decree was followed by the Emperor’s visit to Tokyo, where he entered the Shogun’s castle on November 26, 1868, but it was not until the opening of Tokyo Station that the name “Tokyo” had a tangible, geographical location.46

The tendency of Tokyo residents to mispronounce Tokyo as “Tōkei” was not only a result of confusion about the name of the city, but also of contentment for the Meiji government and its far-reaching reforms.47 Until late in the Meiji period, many of the residents of Tokyo had still identified themselves as “Edokko,” or “children of Edo.” Many of the Edokko had lived in the city from before the Meiji Restoration, and did not react enthusiastically to the new programs of the Meiji government. Although they were not completely pro-Tokugawa, they were more opposed to the new Meiji leaders, who they saw as uncouth “country-bumpkin” samurai from the western provinces who spoke a rough-


46 Keene, *Emperor of Japan*, 163.

language.48 Demonstrating the opposition of Edokko towards the government’s reforms, Ogi Shinzou relates a joke that was popular at the time, which makes use of a pun derived from the multiple meanings and readings of Japanese characters. “Those bums from Kyoto (Kamigata Zeiroku-domo) came and made Edo into this ‘Tokyo,’” begins the joke, “From above, they talk about things like ‘Enlightened Rule’ (Meiji), but from below, we read it as ‘ungoverned by anybody’ (osamaru mei).”49

Naming the new station Tokyo Station thus reminded residents of the regime change from the Shogun to the central government. The strategic location of Tokyo Station, and its association as “The Emperor’s Station,” was an attempt to counteract this tendency to resist, and compel the Edokko to recognize the regime change. As Matsuyama Iwao articulates, “There was nothing more suitable to teach the Shogun-sympathetic (Shōgun-biiki) Edokko that the Shogun’s city of ‘Edo’ had become the emperor’s city of ‘Tokyo’ than constructing a large central train station in front of the imperial palace.”50

At the same time, in its symbolical role, Tokyo Station displayed the domestic hegemony of the central government as the conceptual nexus of efforts to use the emperor system and civilization and enlightenment to unite the nation. The combination of emperor and enlightenment was possible because Tokyo Station served as the emperor’s personal station. It was from this station that he embarked on state visits, accentuating the station’s role as the center of nation and state.51 The grand central entrance to the station was reserved


49 Ogi, Tōkei Shomin Seikatsu-Shi Kenkyū, 22; Steele, Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History, 80.

50 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 98.

51 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225.
for the imperial family, and the gate through which they passed to enter the station was adorned with a rising sun, symbolic of the emperor's descent from the sun goddess.\(^5^2\)

Befitting the imperial family, the central entrance rotunda was decorated exquisitely with a marble floor, stained glass ceilings, and murals on the walls. At the heart of the station were individual reception rooms for the members of the imperial family, each also lavishly decorated with parquet floors, hinoki cypress paneling, and Nishijin silk hangings. The Plum Room on the right was for the crown prince, while the Bamboo Room on the left was for the lesser royals, and the Pine Room in the back was for the emperor.\(^5^3\)

The design and architecture of the station, which "paid unequivocal homage to the authority of the imperial institution," emphasized its role as a symbol of the emperor system.\(^5^4\) One example of this unequivocal homage to the imperial institution is the station's orientation: it was sited directly opposite the imperial palace. Another more striking example was the extent to which efforts to place the emperor above the common people went. Besides being far more ornately decorated than the commoner rooms, the central entrance and special rooms reserved for the imperial family, were actually raised 3.5 feet.\(^5^5\)

The way the emperor was both symbolically and physically placed above the commoners in the design and architecture of Tokyo Station even led to criticism of the station.

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\(^5^2\) Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan: Ten Years Progress Under State Management, 1907-1908 to 1916-1917* (Tokyo: Tsukiji Type Foundry, 1917), 136-137; Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority*, 225. The central entrance and private rooms are today still only used by the emperor and state dignitaries, although the decorations were destroyed by fire in World War II. Pictures of both the current private rooms, and the “rising-sun gate” can be found in Nakagawa Ichirō, et al., *Tōkyō-Eki Tanka*, 16. This gate can still be seen at the station.


as a whole. As Tamura Akira points out, referring to the way the station “revered authorities and denigrated the people,” (kanson minpi): “There was a major problem with this station. The kanson minpi ideology of the time is clearly denoted in the station building. The station tenaciously (akumademo) faces the Imperial Palace, and there were entrances open only on the Marunouchi side.”56 Indeed, as the station faced the imperial palace to the west, it turned its back on the traditionally merchant-class “Low City” to the east. It was not until fifteen years later that a tiny, isolated entrance to the station was opened “apologetically” on this backside.57

The grandiose scale of the station also received widespread criticism, even before construction was completed. The most vehement denunciations came from the young architect Endō Arata, who would later collaborate with Frank Lloyd Wright on the new Imperial Hotel. Endō wrote a series of newspaper articles in 1915 deploring everything about the station. Its location was too far from the heart of Tokyo. The station’s design, he said, was too long and its domes were too high, and the station’s exaggerated dimensions made people uncomfortable.58 One more criticism Endō had of the design of the building was that the “north and south pavilions were out of proportion to the imperial center.”59 Endō was referring to Tokyo Station’s characteristic form: a central building flanked by two identical


57 Tamura *Edo Tōkyō Machizukuri Monogatari*, 242-243. It was not until after World War II, when the moat running behind the station was filled in, that a larger entrance was put in on the eastern (Yaesu) side of the station. Ironically, the Yaesu entrances now receive more traffic than do the original Marunouchi entrances.


buildings larger and taller than the center. To Endō, having the imperial entrance less splendid than those for commoners was tantamount to lèse majesté. Some newspapers at the time agreed. Referring to the height and width of these rotundas, they wrote that the rotundas were “almost palace-like” (sonagara kyūden no gotoshi). Certainly, the baroque-style entrance used by the emperor was far lower than the rotundas on either side used by commoners.

Tatsuno also apparently wavered on this unusual feature of the station. While incorporated in the first generation of his plans for the station, the low center of the station disappeared in the second. The central section of the station was enlarged in the second generation, evidently in an attempt to emphasize, and suit, its role as the imperial entrance. In a design that Endō might have approved of, the central section was given an arched pediment that towered over the two flanking buildings. This gave the station a form familiar to many Western-style buildings signifying central authority, where the center symbolically dominated the periphery. The central tower looked more like a lighthouse or an

60 Tatsuno’s early sketches of the station plans are reproduced in Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 234; Fujimori Terunobu, “Tōkyō-Eki Tanjō,” in Kanō Shobō, ed, Tōkyō-Eki no Sekai (Tokyo: Kanō Shobō, 1987), 54.

61 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 101.

62 There is some disagreement between scholars on the order of Tatsuno’s designs of the station. Fujimori Terunobu wrote in 1987 that what is called the second generation of plans here was actually the first (Fujimori “Tōkyō-Eki Tanjō,” 55). Fujimori is widely known as the preeminent scholar on Tokyo city planning, but later works disagree, such as Yoshikawa Seiichi and Mizuno Shintaro, ed. Tōkyō-Eki to Tatsuno Kingo: ekisha no naritachi to Tōkyō-Eki no dekiru made (Tokyo: Higashi Nihon Ryōkaku Tetsudō, 1990), William Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority in Japan, 1996, and Azuma Hideki, Tōkyō-Eki no Kenchikuka: Tatsuno Kingo Den (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002).

63 Fujimori Terunobu, “Tōkyō-Eki Tanjō,” 55.

64 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 234.
observatory than a train station entrance, and some within the government were concerned that such a high tower would “look down” on the imperial palace. Hence, the third design plan returned to the unique form the station would ultimately take.\(^6^5\)

While unusual, the design of the station in its original form was symbolically significant.\(^6^6\) Although Endō found the design almost treasonous, it seems that he was missing the point completely. Due to the characteristic form of the center section of the station being lower than the peripheral rotundas, the station almost appeared to be stooping. In the ultimate showcase of deference to the emperor, it was as if the station was not only facing the imperial palace, but also physically bowing to it.

This function of Tokyo Station as the emperor’s personal station combined two symbols of “civilization” in Meiji Japan. As Carol Gluck explains in *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, “two ubiquitous images gradually emerged as symbols of ‘civilization’: the monarch, and the locomotive.”\(^6^7\) By combining the emperor and the railway — it was the emperor’s personal station, after all — Tokyo Station was cast as the epitome of “civilization and enlightenment” (*bunmei kaika*). Just as the Meiji Emperor had been re-dressed in the new robes of modernity as an ideological symbol for the nation, Tokyo Station was also constructed as a symbol of modernity: simultaneously as a grand Western-style building and as a railway depot.


\(^6^6\) Original, here, is referring to the design of the station before American firebombing destroyed it on the night of May 25, 1945. Fires burned out the roofs, the domes, the third story, and the opulent interior decorations. Because of a lack of funds after the war, the third story was never repaired, and clumsy planar roofs were placed over the three pavilions (Finn, *Meiji Revisited*, 250).

In *Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan*, Dallas Finn argues that Western-style buildings, such as schools, police stations, clinics, and town halls, were “shining beacons of another government objective, *bunmei kaika*, or civilization and enlightenment, the catch phrase for westernization.”68 Certainly, the same can be said of railway stations. Built in the Western-style typical of Meiji-era construction projects, Tokyo Station was a vivid portrayal of *bunmei kaika*. The station was a mixture of Japanese and Western materials and designs: the steel infrastructure was imported from the United States and Great Britain, while the bricks and decorative façade tiles were produced domestically.69 Moreover, the Japanese architect, Tatsuno Kingo, designed the station in the Western “Renaissance Style” with arches, domed turrets, and circular towers.70

As with the earlier Ginza Bricktown, the government hoped that Western-style buildings, as beacons of modernity, would literally enlighten the people of Japan and make them “civilized.” The celebratory address given by Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu during the opening ceremony of the station reflected this expectation. Using the luminous rhetoric of the time, Ōkuma described the station as the sun, noting, “its rays would brighten every side of Japanese life.”71 “Just as the sun at the center emits rays in all directions,” Ōkuma proclaimed, “we must extend the traffic network in all directions as if railroads were also

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beams of light.”  

Okuma then declared that Tokyo Station “represented shakai bunmei—civilized life, itself.”

The second way in which Tokyo Station symbolized bunmei kaika was in its practical function as a rail depot. As the central point of both the Tokyo city and imperial railway networks, Tokyo Station was the product of Meiji railpolitik. From the outset of railway development in Japan, the Meiji leaders had seen the potential of railways, not only for industrial advancement, but also for facilitating bunmei kaika. For this reason, the earliest government routes had been planned to pass through areas highest in population, in order to promote “civilization and enlightenment.”

In describing the ideological impact of railways in the Meiji period, Carol Gluck writes that they were “engines of civilization.” Moreover, the locomotive had become a “symbol of 'civilization'” along with the emperor. Railways were a symbol for the two focal points of government authority: “civilization” and “progress.” One way that railways accelerated bunmei kaika was by forcing people to adopt a “clock time” standard of progress. In 1888, the Meiji government had placed Japan on world time, “coordinating railroads and telegraphic services nine hours ahead of Greenwich.” As Jeffrey E. Hanes has argued, clocks “standardized temporal measurement and, in the process, hegemonized temporal

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72 Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken, 101-102.
73 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 249.
74 Harada, “Railroads, Ch. 2,” 16.
75 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 261.
76 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 101.
77 Hara, “Minto” tai “Teito”, 23.
78 Hanes, “Contesting Centralization?,” 490.
experience.” For example, clock time was necessary for industry to prosper, as employees would “clock in” and “clock out” on a nationally shared time schedule. Railways, which by nature required precise time scheduling to run efficiently, compelled the people to understand and adopt clock time while encouraging punctuality. For this reason, railways, along with clocks, “were Meiji Japan’s supreme icons of ‘civilization and enlightenment.’”

There are many examples of the popular association between Tokyo Station and bunmei kaika in Taishō Period popular media. One 1918 lithograph by Amijima Kamekichi, entitled “Drawing of Tokyo Station” (Tōkyō teishajō no Zu), clearly shows the perception of Tokyo Station as a beacon of modernity surrounded by other symbols of progress. Male and female commuters stroll through the electric lamp-lit station-front plaza; the men clad in fancy western dress complete with top-hats, the women in a mixture of Japanese and western-influenced kimono. A foreign-looking couple with a child examines the fascinating scene with their Japanese hosts. Rickshaws and taxis line up in front of the station waiting for patrons. Large clocks on the front of each rotunda display the time for all to see. Finally, a dirigible balloon and two early-model biplanes soar in the sky above the station. This particular print was used as a postal stamp during the Taishō Period, suggesting how widespread such a perception of the station was at the time.

A similar scene is portrayed in several more prints: a 1917 lithograph entitled “Scene in Front of Tokyo Station” (Tōkyō Teishajō no Zenkei); a 1921 print entitled “The Grand

79 Hanes, “Contesting Centralization?,” 490.
80 Hanes, “Contesting Centralization?,” 490.
82 Hanes, “Contesting Centralization?,” 490-491.
83 The 1918 lithograph is located on the back leaf of Nakagawa, et. al., Tōkyō-Eki Tanken.
Spectacle of Tokyo Station” (Tōkyō-Eki no Seikan); and a 1938 print entitled “The Magnificent Sight of Marunouchi Tokyo Station in the Imperial Capital” (Teito Marunouchi Tōkyō-Eki no Ikan). All three prints show Tokyo Station amidst a scene of modern symbols. Again, the station-front plaza is crowded with western-dressed people and street-trolleys, and is illuminated by electric lamps. As if pulling the station along, a locomotive exits the station on the far left of the 1917 print, with electric street-trolleys running below. The 1921 print has a monoplane flying above the station, while the 1917 and 1938 prints have airplanes and dirigible balloons.

Also conspicuous in these prints is the increasing presence of military personnel and signs of militarism. The earliest print, from 1917, depicted no Japanese flags and only a few soldiers and policemen. The 1918 print also only portrays a small number of policemen and soldiers. In contrast, Japanese Hinomaru flags top the rotundas in the 1921 print, and the 1938 print is overflowing with military symbols. Published the year after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident led to all-out war with China, this latter print adds to the flags on top of the rotundas with more Hinomaru flags and Imperial Japanese Navy flags over all of the station entrances. Even the street-trolley in front of the station, and the dirigible balloon and biplanes flying above the station, has Hinomaru flags waving proudly in the wind. The figures of army and navy men have also replaced civilians in the station-front square.

As these lithographs depict, Tokyo Station was commonly portrayed in the context of modernity. The presence of imperial soldiers and symbols of emperor-centered militarism on and around the station in the lithographs reflect the dual identity of the station as a symbol of

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84 All three lithographs are reproduced in Hayashi Junshin, Tōkyō Shiden Meisho Zue: Sō Tennenshoku Ishibanga Ehagaki ni Miru Meiji Taishō Shōwa no Tōkyō (Tokyo: JTB Shuppan Jigyōkyoku, 2000), 102-103, 104, 105. The artist of all three prints is not clearly identified, but similarities with the 1917 print suggest that they might be the work of Amijima Kamekichi.
progress and of the emperor. It was through this combination of the railways, the physical link between the center and the periphery, and the basis for ideological unification of the people, bunmei kaika and the emperor, that Tokyo Station became the manifestation of the domestic hegemony of the central government.

Tokyo Station and International Recognition

As the monumental central railway station situated in the grand capital of a modern nation, Tokyo Station proudly displayed to the great powers of the Western world Japan’s expectation of international recognition. Throughout Europe and the United States in the age of imperialism, similar monumental central railway stations “became an opportunity for propaganda in fierce international competition.”85 Railway stations had assumed the role of the triumphal arch gateway to display the city’s magnificence.86 Stations such as Victoria Terminal in Bombay, Berlin Station, Amsterdam Central, and the Gare De’est in Paris were the symbols of their respective cities. Tokyo Station was built, then, “in the international context of railway and capital-city stations as the expression of national confidence and authority.”87 Indeed, the construction of the station was on the same grand scale as London’s St. Pancras Station and Washington D.C.’s Union Station, and coincided with Union Station and Grand Central Station in New York City.88 The grandeur of Tokyo Station was therefore an attempt to place Tokyo on par with the great capitals of the West.

85 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 227-229.
86 Etlin, Symbolic Space, 3-4.
87 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225.
88 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 224.
As central railway stations situated in the grand capitals of the world were commonly used to demonstrate international and imperialist power, it was no coincidence that a celebration of Japan’s empire would coincide with the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station. As William H. Coaldrake suggests in *Architecture and Authority in Japan*, Tokyo Station was “a temple to progress and a monument to empire.”

“The main building, with its grand scale and warm red-brick walls held together securely by steel framing,” writes Coaldrake, “became the visible and functioning focus of a growing empire of communication, capitalism and colonialism...” Certainly, by the time Tokyo Station opened, Japan’s rail empire had grown along with its military expansion into Korea and Manchuria. Tokyo Station thus came to possess a spot at the heart of the Great Japanese Empire (*Dai-Nippon Teikoku*), connected to the grand capitals of Western Europe by railways and rail ferry.

Perhaps most indicative of the link between railways and the re-creation of Tokyo as *Teito* was the doubling of the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station as a celebration of the Japanese empire. The connection between the opening of the station and the expansion of the empire was clear. On the suggestion of Tokyo Mayor Sakatani, the opening celebration had been moved forward several months to coincide with the return to Tokyo of Gen. Kamio, the commander of the Japanese force occupying the German possessions in China, causing workers to hurry construction. Railway officials wondered if the new electric trains, which

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91 The opening celebration of the station was originally planned for June 1914. A newspaper article from the Tōkyō Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, dated June 13, 1913, states: “Construction of the central stations is progressing exceedingly, the exterior of course, but the construction of the interior as well, is already 70% completed, and the station will most likely be open for business as planned by June of next year...” ("Tōkyō-Eki secchi de Nihombashi-ku no chika ga gobai ni," in Taishō Nyu-su Jiten Hensan linkai, ed. *Taishō Nyu-su Jiten 1: Taishō 1-nen – Taisho 3-nen*, (Tokyo: Mainichi Comyunike-shonzu Shuppan, 1986), 560.)
had hardly been tested, would even run; or if the train tickets, which had not even been printed yet, would arrive before the station opened. Because the decision was made to hold the opening ceremony and the “welcoming of the triumphant general” (gaisen kangei kai) concurrently, the plans for the celebration became all the more grandiose.  

Preparations continued up until the day before the ceremony. The station platforms were draped in red and blue lace braids, and flags of all the nations of the world, except Germany and Australia, hung from the ceiling. A “Great Green Arch” was erected in the station front plaza, with two 36-foot tall “Green Towers” on either side. More towers lined the avenue between the station and the imperial palace. Tremendous light towers were constructed to illuminate the station until the early hours of the morning. Finally, the Railway Agency had sent out 2,345 special invitations to the ceremony.

The account of the opening ceremony given the next day in the *Tokyo Asahi* Newspaper reveals the connection between Tokyo Station and the expanding Japanese empire:

> The grand spectacle of the opening, the brilliance of a triumphant return! On this day, the eighteenth [of December, 1914] Commanding Officer Kamio and his general staff, were joyously welcome back to the Imperial Capital after their grand and triumphant military expedition, and marked the first step in the opening for business of the grand Tokyo Station, the largest station in Asia.  

With the renaming of the station to Tokyo Station, and with the relation of the opening of the station to the expansion of the Japanese empire, Tokyo Station opened “with an appearance

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92 Nakagawa, et. al., *Tôkyô-Eki Tanken*, 96.

appropriate for the central station of the capital of a ‘first class power’ (ittō koku).

Indeed, the two “Green Towers” each had inscriptions that clearly depicted the station’s role as a symbol of the empire. “Celebrate the opening of the Station,” read one inscription, while the other proclaimed, “Welcome the Triumphant General.”

The final piece in the puzzle of re-creating Tokyo as Teito was the placement of Tokyo Station at the center of the imperial railway network. For Japan to claim a place among the exclusive group of first-class world powers, it too had to embark on European style railway imperialism. The Meiji government had integrated and united Japan using domestic railway imperialism, and upon completion of that process, was able to look outside its borders to create its own formal and informal empire. By the time Tokyo Station opened, railway lines extended in excess of Japan-proper to the limits of the Japanese empire and beyond as a result of this new railway imperialism.

A Japanese Government railway report from 1917 explains that the “overseas expansion of Japanese railways” was possible because of two factors: “the nationalization of railways and the Continental expansion of the Empire after the successful campaign with Russia.”

It was Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 that ensured its rail empire on the continent. As stipulated in Article Six of the treaty, Russia agreed to relinquish control of its Manchurian railway between Changchun and Port Arthur.

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95 The “Green Arches” along with their inscriptions are pictured in Nakagawa, et. al., *Tokyō-Eki Tanken*, 97.


97D6CF&scp=1&sq=Text+of+the+treaty+emperor+of+japan&st=p.
Immediately after the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty on September 5, 1905, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, Japan asserted control over its new rail empire. Service between Tokyo and Seoul making use of rail ferry between Shimonoseki and Pusan on the government’s Tōkaidō Line started just six days later on September 11, 1905. Japan also quickly forced the “Manchuria Remedial Treaty” (Manshū Zengo Jōyaku) on the Qing Government in December of the same year. With this treaty, the Qing Government recognized Japan’s control of the Manchurian railway south of the city of Changchun. In 1906, the South Manchurian Railway Company was created by Imperial Decree to operate this railway, and it soon began constructing and buying line extensions. Demonstrating the importance of South Manchurian Railways to the imperial government, the first president of the company, Gotō Shimpei, would later become the first director of the Railway Agency (Tetsudō-In) in 1908.

Coinciding with the Railway Nationalization Bill of March 31, 1906 were two additions to Government Railways that were essential in the forming of Japan’s imperial railway network. First, when the government nationalized the private lines, they also seized control of the rail-ferry systems operated by the former private lines. Second, another bill promulgated at the time of the Railway Nationalization Bill authorized the nationalization of


Keifu Railways (Seoul-Pusan) in Korea. Together, these two additions signified a symbolic shift from Tokyo as the center of the national network, to Tokyo as the center of the imperial network.

The nationalization of the private railways in 1906-1907 also effected the nationalization of each line's rail-ferry services. These rail-ferries facilitated the extension of Government Railways into Korea and the mainland of Asia. At the time of nationalization, the Shimonoseki-Pusan Ferry had two ships, each making only one run daily. By 1917, however, the number of ferries running between Shimonoseki and Pusan had increased to 5, with one cargo ferry also making the trip. Other ferries operated by Government Railways also expanded services during this period, but none as dramatically as the Korea route. After 1910, when Korea was formally annexed into the Japanese empire, the numbers for passengers carried, tons of cargo conveyed, and total number of yearly trips rose noticeably. A good portion of this ferry conveyance presumably served military purposes, especially as Korean resistance movements gained strength. Such an escalation in the Japanese military presence in Korea would account for the sharp upsurge in the total number of ferry trips and tons of cargo conveyed between 1910 and 1917. Ferry trips increased from 1,078 to 1,550

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103 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, *Railway Nationalization in Japan*, 78.

during this period, while tons of cargo conveyed over the same period escalated from 62,534 to 318,365.\textsuperscript{105}

This rail-ferry between Shimonoseki and Pusan was especially important because Keifu Railways had been nationalized in 1906. Japan had won control over Korea from Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and the government had begun integrating the Korean railways into Government Railways. With the extension of the Government Railways to the empire, it was necessary for their like to have a more appropriately regal moniker. Hence, from 1907, the government lines were called the “Imperial Government Railways.”\textsuperscript{106} Imperial Government Railways was then placed under the newly formed cabinet-level Railway Agency by Imperial Decree in 1908.\textsuperscript{107} Showing the importance of railways to the government, the Railway Agency was under the direct purview of the Prime Minister. In addition, the agency administered not only domestic railways, but also the government railways in Korea, which by this time had grown to include the Keigi and Bazanho railways in addition to the Keifu. The South Manchurian Railway also came under the control of the new agency.\textsuperscript{108}

A rail map from 1917, published in English by the Japanese Government, entitled “General Railway Map of Japan & Manchuria: Showing Lines Open and Under Construction

\textsuperscript{105} Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 79.


\textsuperscript{108} Eiichi Aoki, “Policy, Ch. 4” in Yamamoto Hirofumi, ed. Technological Innovation and the Development of Transportation in Japan (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1993), 73.
on March 31, 1917,” proudly displays this Imperial Government Railway network. The map shows lines extending from Tokyo, across the Tsushima Straits to Korea, and connecting to the South Manchuria Railway. The map also shows Japanese government railways in Taiwan and the Japanese-occupied half of Karafuto (Sakhalin).

One telling feature of the cartography of this government-issued railway map is that the ferry line to Korea, between Shimonoseki and the Korean city of Pusan, is rendered differently from the other ferry routes. The Shimonoseki-Pusan Ferry route is drawn with the same style line as are other Government Railways, only dotted to denote that it is a ferry; other ferry routes are indicated with thin dotted lines. This deliberate distinction in cartography signifies the publisher’s – that is, the Japanese Government’s – perception of the relationship between the Japanese mainland and Korea. After its annexation, Korea was seen as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. Indeed, this map Romanizes the name of the area as “Chosun,” the Japanese pronunciation of the historical name of Korea, “Chosun.”

Additionally, by far the majority of Korean cities are Romanized not with their Korean pronunciation, but with their Japanese readings. Seoul is marked on the map in English as

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110 The name “Chosun” dates back to the Yi Kingdom established in 1392. Accepted as a vassal state of the Ming Empire in China, the Yi Kingdom was given the name “Chosun,” meaning “Eastern Kingdom” by the Chinese Ming emperor. The name lasted until the late 1890s when the Russians encouraged the King of Korea to change his title to the Emperor of Taehan, or “Great Korea,” in 1897. The Taehan Empire lasted until 1910 when Japan restored them name of “Chosun,” or “Chosun” in Japanese, even though pro-Japanese Korean officials argued that “Hanguk” should be the name of the country. See, Bong-youn Choy, *Korea: A History* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1971), 88, 98, 104; and Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 74.
“Keijō,” with “Seoul” added in parentheses for readers already familiar with the Korean capital.111

Conceptually, the distinctive link between Japan and Korea on the map reflects the idea of a continual, singular line connecting the entire Japanese Empire through Tokyo. The Tokyo-Seoul route is a clear example of the continual line between the imperial capital and the empire. While this overseas route was made possible by rail ferry, the Japanese government made plans to actualize a singular, continual line between Tokyo and the empire. At the height of the Japanese empire in 1938, the government initiated plans for what would later become the Shinkansen, or Bullet Train. Included in these plans was a tunnel under the Tsushima Straits to Korea, connecting Japan, Korea, and Manchuria into one grand imperial network.112 Whether by rail-ferry or by undersea tunnel, once the line of imperial railways was on the continent, Tokyo was no longer just connected to the empire. Rather, Tokyo was also linked to all of the grand capitals of Western Europe. Such a connection, as the government proclaimed, had “raised [Japanese railways] from an insignificant insular position to one of international importance, as forming part of the main artery of the world’s communications.”113

Japan quickly realized the importance of a connection to the grand capitals of Europe. As a first step to reaching Western Europe, Japan had inserted rights to a rail link with Russia and the Trans-Siberian Railway among the peace terms in the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905. Article Eight of the treaty had prescribed: “The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia,

111 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, map in rear packet.


113 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 93.
with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will so soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.”

Negotiations were held between May and June of 1907, producing the so-called 1907 Convention. This agreement between Japan and Russia specified that the Japanese South Manchurian Railway Company and the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway Company would share junction stations and rail gauges in order to facilitate through-traffic between the two lines. Following up on the Convention, a conference was held in Petrograd in 1908, after which the first service for passengers was initiated between the South Manchuria and Chinese Eastern Railway. Subsequent conferences were held, gradually initiating passenger traffic between Tokyo and Western Europe. In 1910, service was arranged as far Russian-controlled North Manchuria, and in 1911, throughout Russia. An agreement was made between Japan, Russia, and Great Britain and Canada for the commencement of the “Around-the-World Tour via Siberia and Canada” at a conference in London in 1911. Finally, at the Berlin Conference in 1912, Japan was admitted into the Trans-Siberian Through Passenger Traffic Union, with service starting between Tokyo and

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116 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94.

the great capitals of Europe like London, Paris, and Berlin in 1913. The Japan Tourist Bureau then began selling tickets to London the same year.

As the 1917 government railway report states: "The conclusion of through traffic service with Russia was but a preliminary step towards realizing the ultimate object which the Railway Management had in view, and that was to bring Japan into direct rail communication with London, Paris, Berlin, and all other leading cities in Western Europe." When Tokyo Station was opened in 1914, connections to these other grand capitals of Western Europe, after which Tokyo and the Japanese empire had been modeled, were already completed. The government saw these connections to the West as not only links in communication, but as indicators of a long-awaited equality in modernity and power. In the minds of the government leaders, Tokyo, as the Teito that displayed both the domestic hegemony and international power of the central government, was on a par with the grand Western capitals. Japan could now declare itself a member of the elite group of first class world powers.

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118 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94.
119 Harada, Mantetsu, 68.
120 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: TRACKS TO TEIKOKU

When the Meiji leaders overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate and came to power with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, they initiated a project of state formation to make Japan a modern, unified nation. An interesting comparison can be made concerning this process in Japan and a similar exercise of modern state formation in Siam.

Starting in the 1870 and 1880s, Western imperialist countries had begun closing in on Siam. Great Britain had annexed neighboring Burma in 1885, and French troops began advancing from Vietnam in 1888 into the Siamese vassal states of Laos and Cambodia. In order to prevent the conquest of his country, Siamese King Chulalongkorn undertook a program of modernization. Foreign officers and advisers were brought in to Westernize the military, install a telegraph network, and modernize the law code and government finances. King Chulalongkorn also faced difficulties in integrating distant vassals and provincial governors under central rule; sending troops rapidly over long distances to contest the encroaching French; and implementing monetary tax collection in remote valleys. As David F. Holm writes of these challenges, “Railways seemed an obvious answer to these problems.”

The Meiji leaders confronted similar obstacles when they came to power in Japan two decades earlier. The new government had inherited a land united militarily under the rule of

1 Holm, “Thailand’s Railways and Informal Imperialism,” 124. This discussion of railway construction in Siam relies heavily on Holm’s work.
the Shoguns, but not politically or ideologically integrated into one nation. The mountainous terrain of the Japanese islands, combined with Tokugawa-imposed regulations such as travel permits and sekisho barriers, made inter-regional travel difficult. These obstacles to nationwide transportation and communication contributed to regionalism, as people were unable to travel freely around the archipelago. The Meiji leaders attribute this regionalism to the inefficient transportation system, and saw it as a threat to their authority and a hurdle to state formation. As Ōkuma Shigenobu explained, “Feudalism remains even after the downfall of the Shogunate, and stands in the way of national unification...” The Pro-Tokugawa domains in the northeast also actively resisted the new government, further threatening its legitimacy. Finally, on top of everything else, the new Meiji government had to abide by the unequal treaties made by the Tokugawa with the Western powers. As Siam would later do, the Meiji leaders looked to railways as one response to these complications and as a means to form Japan into a modern, integrated nation.

Although leaders in both nations relied on railways to modernize and unite their countries and secure domestic hegemony, they differed on how those railways should be built. In Siam, instead of building the lines themselves, King Chulalongkorn and the ruling elite attempted to manipulate the imperial rivalries of the European countries to convince these countries to construct the Siamese railways on their behalf. A German engineer, for example, served as the Director-General of the mostly German-controlled Siamese Royal Railways Department, and the construction contractor was British. An education system that provided Western learning only to the scions of the aristocracy ensured that there were only a small number of Siamese engineers. This increased the Royal Railway Department’s dependence on foreigners, and made it susceptible to intervention from the imperial powers.
when foreign engineers were dismissed. To prevent an educated Siamese working class from undermining their power, the ruling elite even repeatedly refused to send Siamese students abroad to study engineering or establish an engineering school in Bangkok, despite pleas to do so from the German directors of the Railway Department. In this way, rather than depending on the domestic modernization program to strengthen Siam against foreign encroachment, the ruling elite instead “play[ed] one imperial power against another and us[ed] foreigners to staff the country’s technical and professional positions.” Because the royal family and ruling elite collaborated with, and depended heavily on, the imperial powers to build railways and secure their authority within the country, Siam ultimately submitted to “informal empire.”

The Meiji government, on the other hand, took a much more unilateral approach to railway building. Certainly Japan, too, had initially relied on foreigners such as British ambassador Harry Smith Parkes to help them build and operate the Shimbashi railway, but the Meiji leaders never relinquished control of railways to foreigners. Indeed, as it began initial railway construction, the central government took out a loan on the London market to finance the work, and the foreign advisors and engineers who guided construction were dismissed once the government had fully exploited their expertise. The opening of the Osaka Engineer Training School in 1877 hastened the dismissal of foreigners, and by 1880, Japanese engineers had largely replaced their foreign counterparts.

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3 Holm, “Thailand’s Railways and Informal Imperialism,” 127.
4 Holm, “Thailand’s Railways and Informal Imperialism,” 126.
5 Holm, “Thailand’s Railways and Informal Imperialism,” 126-128.
6 Aoki Eiichi points out that the Meiji government hired nearly 300 mostly British foreign advisors, or oyatoi gaikokujin, in a variety of railway-related roles including teachers, engineers, and other skilled workers. The first were hired in 1870 and the highest number of
By undertaking railway construction unilaterally, the Meiji government was able to limit foreign business ownership and influence in Japan. During the 19th century, railways were the first tendrils of imperialism into target countries, and when the Siamese ruling elite collaborated with the European imperialists to construct railways, Siam unwittingly submitted to informal empire. Because the Meiji leaders undertook railway construction without relying on the Western powers, Japan avoided a similar fate. Unilateral construction of railways was thus one way the Meiji government transformed Japan into a united, modern nation-state.

Studies of state formation in Japan often focus on Meiji efforts to modernize the nation politically and industrially, and to unify the Japanese people ideologically. Replacement of the domains with prefectures, standardization of cadastral surveys, the emperor system, “civilization and enlightenment,” the education system, the Imperial Constitution, and the establishment of the Japanese literary canon and historical tradition have all been described as contributing to Japanese state formation. Two related factors that should not be overlooked, however, are the construction of railways and the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito. To spread the authority of the central government, the Meiji leaders built railways spanning the entire Japanese archipelago. Centralized on the metropole of Tokyo,

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this national railway network facilitated industrialization and, with the assistance of the private railway companies, conveyed the power of the Meiji government to even the smallest, remotest Japanese villages. In this way, the railway network integrated Japan into a unified nation centered on the national capital.

Railways also provided the infrastructure for ideological unification. With their ability to carry passengers, ideas, and government officials and other “agents of the state” quickly over long distances, railways shortened the temporal distance between the national center and periphery.9 Locomotives, as modern industrial machines, symbolized progress; and railways also embodied the emperor system, as they carried the Meiji emperor around the country on imperial progressions (junkō). Gluck writes that “the monarch, and the locomotive” became symbols of civilization and contributed to national and social integration.10 As the Imperial Train, or omeshi ressha, toured the nation, these two symbols of civilization were physically conjoined as commoners lining the tracks showed their respect to the emperor in the Imperial Carriage (Goryōsha).

Even when the central government allowed the formation of private railway companies to complete its envisioned national network, the private lines inadvertently contributed to Meiji railpolitik. To ensure profits, private railway entrepreneurs built lines that converged on Tokyo, as it was the largest city in eastern Japan and promised a large market of consumption and supply of potential riders. In doing so, the private railway companies reinforced the centralization of Tokyo in the national railway network. The Meiji government then maintained control over the network through legislation and by constructing lines itself to ensure that the private railways would be compatible with the government.

9 Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism, 80.
10 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 101.
railway network. The Railway Construction Law of 1892, for example, prescribed standards in line construction, such as line gauge, curve radii, and platform height, and gave the government the right to decide where private railways were built. Finally, nearly fifteen years later in 1906-1907, the 17 top performing private railway companies were nationalized, and the government reasserted total control over almost 90% of the entire national railway network.

As the national railway network developed with Tokyo at the center, the Meiji leaders attempted to re-form the city into a suitable national capital that would demonstrate the domestic authority and international power of the central government. Through a process of domestic colonization, Tokyo became the measure by which the rest of the nation was standardized, as Tokyo solar time was officially implemented nation-wide. As Nanette Twine observes, Tokyo dialect also began to replace the Kyoto dialect as the means of communication and as the “perceived standard language” after the relocation of the capital in 1868. The establishment of the national education system in 1872 further contributed to the ascendancy of the Tokyo dialect. Starting in the 1880s, when Tokyo was firmly implanted as the national capital at the center of the national transportation and communication networks, the Meiji leaders began to actively re-create Tokyo as Teito to project the international power of the nation. Modeled on the grand capitals of the West and constructed with Western-style architecture, Tokyo became an imperial capital suitably dressed in symbols of civilization and progress.

This re-creation of Tokyo as Teito was envisioned most significantly in the planning and construction of a central national railway station. Although not completed until 1914,

11 Harada, “Policy, Ch. 3,” 47; Kinzley, “Merging Lines,” 43.

two years after the death of the Meiji Emperor, Tokyo Station was the apex of Meiji-era Western-style architecture and of Japan's quest for domestic hegemony and international recognition. It was the work of a major Meiji architect, Tatsuno Kingo, and its planning and construction, which spanned two imperial reigns, took place largely during the Meiji period.13 Tokyo Station, as the junction between the integrated national railway network and monumental Tokyo city planning, projected the power and authority of the Meiji government. Not only did the construction of the railway network centered on Tokyo Station facilitate the transition from Tokyo to Teito, its railway tracks literally and figuratively led to Teito.

With the expansion of Government Railways to Korea, whereby initiated its own European style railway imperialism, Tokyo Station became the center of the imperial railway network. Indeed, the opening ceremony for the station in 1914 fittingly doubled as a celebration and a confirmation of the Japanese empire. Ethnologist Umesao Tadao has suggested that in Japan "the construction of a nation-state was indeed the building of an empire."14 In other words, the formation of the Japanese nation-state and the emergence of the Japanese empire were parallel events.15 Yamamuro Shin'ichi describes this as the "duality" of the Meiji state, "namely, that it held colonial possessions while in the process of becoming a nation-state and itself became a colonial empire."16 Umesao explains that this

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13 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 246.

14 Umesao Tadao, “Keynote Address: Comparative Studies of Civilization with regard to the Formation and Transformation of the Nation-State,” in Umesao et. al., eds. Nation-State and Empire, 5.

15 Kurimoto Eisei writes that the transformation of the national army into an overseas army "was parallel with the process of state building that resulted in modern Japan; while the Japanese were trying to build a nation-state, they began to construct an empire," (Kurimoto Eisei, "Nation-State, Empire, and Army: The Case of Meiji Japan," in Umesao, et. al., eds. Nation-State and Empire, 106).
duality was a result of Japan mistakenly following the imperialist lead of the Western countries on which it had modeled itself. "Japan faithfully observed the European mode in her process of nation building in modern times," Umesao argues, "thus pursuing the construction of a Japanese empire." 17

One way that the Japanese government followed the lead of the West in creating an empire was by following Western models of railway imperialism. After successfully integrating the nation, the Meiji leaders turned their attention towards Korea as a target of Western-style railway imperialism. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese army began seeking ways to secure power in Korea, and resolved to construct railways. By 1894, the Japanese had developed plans for the construction of four railways on the Korean peninsula. 18 One line was eventually built by the United States, but this was later sold to Japan. From that time, Japan controlled all railways in Korea. A proposal for Korean railway construction submitted by Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro in 1902 to Prime Minister Katsura Taro elucidates the Meiji government's railway imperialism:

If Japan constructs the Gyeongui (Seoul-Pyongyang) Line on our own and connects to the Gyeongbu (Seoul-Pusan) Line, all major railways will be in the hands of our empire, in effect keeping Korea under our influence. 19


17 Umesao, “Keynote Address,” 4


19 Quoted in Nakano Akira, “Railway Network was Key to Japanese Army’s Control of Korea,” The Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 28, 2007.
As Foreign Minister Komura suggests, the Japanese government employed railways not only to assert their domestic hegemony, but also to expand the empire. Thus railways were not only instrumental in the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital, or *Teito*, but also the formation of the empire, or *teikoku*. This connection between railways and the expansion of the empire would have disastrous consequences as Japan’s imperialistic ambitions brought it into direct conflict with another nation increasing its influence in the Pacific, the United States.

On May 25, 1945, towards the end of World War II, American B-29s dropped incendiary bombs on the station, igniting the roof, the domes, the entire third story, and the wooden interior. The elegant imperial rooms were razed, as were the opulent decorations in the rest of the station. The imperial symbolism of the station had been demolished along with the Japanese empire. As Tokyo Station was the center of the imperial network, perhaps this destruction was sadly fitting. The station was rebuilt, but, due to financial constraints after the war, the domes were replaced with unsightly planar “lids” of roughly equal height. The melted steel supports were left to hang under the temporary rafters “like strings of melted toffee,” and the third story remained unfinished. Tiles were stripped off the backside to replace those destroyed in the fire, and it was then painted a “strange, simian red.”

Yet this destruction and unimpressive reconstruction of the station did not completely destroy Tokyo Station’s potential to be a domestic and international symbol. After the war, it remained the heart of both the national and Tokyo city railway networks. In 1964, as the

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Tokyo Olympics approached, the opening of the Bullet Train, or *Shinkansen*, confirmed the central position of Tokyo Station in the national network. As the *Shinkansen* network was later expanded to include lines northwest to Niigata in 1982 and Nagano in 1997, and northeast to Aomori, Akita, and Yamagata starting in 1982, Tokyo Station remained the "zero kilometer" point for the network. Not only do all *Shinkansen* trains either terminate or originate at Tokyo Station, passengers traveling from northeast Japan to southwest Japan must disembark and then switch trains at the station.

Surpassed for many years by other urban Tokyo rail hubs such as Shinjuku and Ueno, Tokyo Station promises to benefit from a new rail plan designed to strengthen its place at the center of the Tokyo city railway network. Called the "Tōhoku Through-Line Plan" (*Tōhoku Jōkansen Keikaku*), this project proposes the construction of additional elevated tracks between Tokyo Station and the northern terminus of Ueno Station. Japan Rail train lines that originally terminated at Ueno, such as the Utsunomiya Line, Takasaki Line, and Jōban Line, will be extended to Tokyo Station, initiating through service with the Tōkaidō Line.24 With the completion of this plan in 2013, the majority of JR train lines within the 23 wards of Tokyo will pass through Tokyo Station, buttressing its position at the center of the Tokyo city railway network.25

While Tokyo Station has retained and reinforced its functional importance as the domestic hub of national rail travel, a new plan for the renovation of the station to its opening-day appearance in 1914 will attempt to restore its international significance.

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25 By my count of the March 15, 2008 train line designations, only four of the 17 JR lines within the 23 wards of Tokyo city, the Ōbu Local Line, the Sōkyō Line, the Tokyo Monorail, and the Shōnan-Shinjuku Line, will not pass through Tokyo Station.
According to plans for the restoration work, which started in March 2007, the third floor will be reconstructed, and the north and south domes will be restored to their original condition. Part of a larger project called “Tokyo Station City,” which includes two new skyscrapers flanking the station, the renovation is aimed at handing down the cultural legacy of the building “to future generations” and represents an effort to “contribute to the development of a stately urban space for Tokyo.” As the gateway to the Marunouchi financial district, where many of the world’s largest companies have offices, the newly renovated Tokyo Station will re-emerge as a befitting centerpiece for the global capital of an economic superpower. With the “Tokyo Station City” plans, Tokyo Station is still the junction of the national railway network and monumental city planning. Much as it did in the pre-World War II years for the Japanese colonial empire, the newly renovated Tokyo Station will evoke Japan’s claim as a first class world economic power.

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