ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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A DISSERTATION

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Approved:

G. Bentzon Johnson

Few have perceived that Durkheim entertained two distinct schemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic Suicide. I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions. Absence/presence, too little/too much--these are the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved.

Resting on his image of human nature (homo duplex) as inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-social ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema, which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism and drives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by sociologists.

In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both anomie and egoisme proceed from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression. Anomie is active; egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see
anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the "Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams"--and the collapse of the will and imagination in frustration and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, and intellectuals. This ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call the "Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition."

Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some of our highest aspirations are then linked with Weber's work in the sociology of religion and culture. As an "infinity of desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural tradition, anomie is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As an "infinity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant contemporary cultural tradition, egoisme is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest callings and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the "golden mean," lead us to recognize, then, that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become, ironically, our special vices.
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This dissertation is dedicated to the ladies in my life:

Agnes, my mother,
Marsha, my wife,
Amanda, my daughter.
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"Man is neither angel nor beast, and it is unfortunately the case that anyone trying to act the angel acts the beast."

(Pascal)
INTRODUCTION

Few have perceived that Durkheim entertained two distinct schemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic *Suicide*. I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions. Absence/presence, too little/too much--these are the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved.

Resting on his doctrine of human nature (*homo duplex*) as inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-social ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema, which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism and drives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by sociologists.

In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both anomie and egoisme proceed here from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression. Anomie is active; egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the "Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate in-
satiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme—the "infinity of dreams"—and the collapse of the will and imagination in frustration and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, and intellectuals. This ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call the "Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition."

Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some of our highest aspirations may then be linked with Weber's work in the sociology of religion and culture. As an "infinity of desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural tradition, anomie is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As an "infinity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant contemporary cultural tradition, egoisme is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest callings and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the "golden mean," lead us to recognize, then, that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become, ironically, our special vices.

I first heard of Emile Durkheim and anomie as an undergraduate sociology major. But it was not until graduate school that, among my readings into Marx, Weber, Durkheim and others, I first encountered Suicide. Having rejected the positivist scientific ethos, reading Durkheim was, at first, an unpleasant experience. As with many others, all I could see at first were pages and pages of statistics, strident positivist declarations, extreme sociologism, hypostatizing social realism, a conservative world-view, and so on; after all, to Durkheim wasn't society all and the individual nothing? Besides, the very presentation of the book itself repelled me; the cover was blood red, I was interested in neither despair nor suicide, Simpson's psychoanalytically-oriented
preface set me off, the table of contents was relegated to the back of the book, and so on! I was ready to believe the worst I had heard about Durkheim. Little did I then know that I would come to dwell in this book and this man's mind for the next seven years!

During several rereadings, an interesting shift in my perception of Suicide and Durkheim began to emerge. The statistics seemed to fade from view, and Durkheim's moral philosophy came into focus. It seemed as if, in 1969, I had discovered something different, almost a different Suicide than commonly reported, a book within a book. Especially compelling to me was Durkheim's anatomy of the "moral anarchy" of the modern world—the destructive "diseases of the infinite," ending in ecocide or suicide, which I saw all about me. Here, then, Durkheim offered profound insights in my search for the origin and ground of many of the negative aspects of the modern world. At the time, I hardly suspected that my search for a fundamental, non-Marxian or Freudian, critique of the modern world would lead me deep into Durkheim; nor did I anticipate that my attempts to tell others of the potential significance of my discovery would necessarily involve a long struggle to free myself and others of deeply rooted stereotypes of Durkheim, a struggle that would remake me in the process. And, although I had earlier liked Weber much more than Durkheim, the experience of coming to have two polestars stimulated effort to bring their work together, especially their profound and ironic anatomies of the modern world—Suicide and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

With these two classics as guides, in about 1971 I embarked upon an arduous journey on two parallel paths—intensive reading of Durkheim's other works, major and minor, on the one hand, and on the other intensive search through the secondary literature on Durkheim and anomie. I sought there several insights: a new way of conceptualizing Durkheim's notions of anomie and egoisme, indeed, of reconstructing his
whole typology of suicide, and more generally, to attempt to grasp the foundational or "nuclear structure" which informed all of Durkheim's life-work. In this task I was fortunate to begin my systematic reflection during a great renaissance of interest in Durkheim: almost weekly new books and articles poured forth from the presses. Durkheim was "in the air" everywhere it seemed; such convergence of interest was exhilarating for this scholarly apprentice.

And, while learning much from Parsons' and other standard accounts stemming from the first great revival of interest in Durkheim during the 1930's, I found, to my dismay, that many did not recognize what I thought to be a significant discovery; moreover, my own incorporation through "osmosis" of certain premises rooted in the secondary literature was actually leading me astray. For I was, like so many others, simply taking over unfounded images from the secondary literature at the same time as I was struggling to interpret Durkheim directly. Hence, reliance on questionable secondary accounts in my first faltering attempts to conceptualize Durkheim's schema of suicide faced me with the difficult task of learning to unlearn popular stereotypes.

In my struggle to free myself from two pervasive secondary accounts—Merton's version of anomie and Parsons' version of Durkheim—I found help in many places, especially in the works of two contemporary British sociologists, Anthony Giddens and Steven Lukes. With their assistance I began to move toward more faithful exegesis, and, thus, to begin to reconstruct not only Durkheim's suicide typology, but also the paradigmatic structure informing all his work. While my conceptual breakthrough in 1972 to the present formulation of Durkheim's two schemas of suicide was largely independent, I gratefully acknowledge that I learned invaluable lessons from these and other insightful observers.

However, I soon discovered that as I tried to relate my discovery to others, many sociologists held stubbornly to certain established stereotypes. For example, when I men-
tioned Durkheim, they thought of Parsons' famous account in *The Structure of Social Action*, and when I spoke of anomie, it was Merton's essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which seemed automatically to come to mind. While remaining valuable in a number of ways, these accounts had become like barnacles clinging to the past; they had become, unfortunately, obstacles to deeper insight and scientific progress. I had, therefore, to dislodge these and other obstacles from my path.

In truth, our dilemma went deeper. For I discovered that anomie had become a protean concept. As with so many other paradigmatic notions, like alienation or "The Protestant Ethos," anomie had come to mean so many different things to so many different people that it had lost specific meaning. Then I realized that the transformation of Durkheim's concepts into amorphous, protean notions capable of meaning almost anything was an instance of a wider, typical process. Somehow, as if by some iron law, we manage to forget (eg. Maine's *Ancient Law*), or distort (eg. Weber's *Protestant Ethic...* and Durkheim's *Suicide*) many of the very paradigms which constitute our basic intellectual capital (see also Glock and Hammond, 1973:409). Indeed, I fear that the profound works of our founding fathers—whose charisma we are so quick to cash in on—are more often cited than read, more often absorbed through secondary or even textbookish accounts than wrestled with in the original, more often read fragmentarily than in the context of the pioneer's life-work and life-context, and more often simply misconstrued, usurped, or selectively altered than understood or legitimately extended (see McCloskey, 1974). Indeed, in the series of interpretations which come to constitute any tradition, there is the same sort of drift and displacement of goals and meanings which characterize the typical life-history of any institution. Inevitably, a hidden law of cultural entropy seems at work, for later generations stray
from the full meaning and intention of the original breakthrough. Without undue irony, might we not call this sadly inevitable sociocultural process the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit"?

Hence, the necessity of periodic renewals or renaissances are built into this on-going process, which affects sociology as well as society-at-large. Specifically, I found that Durkheim's sociological charisma, stemming from *Suicide* and other works, had become routinized, distorted, emptied of meaning, on the one hand, and on the other his doctrine and anomie in particular were beset by conflicting interpretations. Thus, I came to find myself in the peculiar position of one who, having started by rejecting Durkheim and much of the sociological tradition, came to return to this tradition in order to recover lost meanings. And, of course, the reappropriation of meaning is a continuous process.

Faced with a paradigm in crisis, and the need to return to the source of the tradition, what specific strategy could I evolve for recovering lost meanings and reconciling conflicting interpretations? I was like a miner of a vein of gold who had been granted a share in a vast common land-claim. Here, one was faced with a welter of conflicting claims; further, some refined ore proved to be valuable, yet there was much dross and pilings to be cleared away. In this way I took up mining full-time, and this mining was systematic exegesis; like mining raw ore, it was the hardest work I've ever done.

I began to sink shafts both vertically and horizontally into some of the richest deposits. My strategy, then, was this: to perform, first, a systematic exegesis of the basic strata underlying all of Durkheim's work, and then perform a systematic exegeis of Durkheim's sociology of suicide. Exegesis, then, involved, first, an in-depth "stratigraphy," and then a systematic "topography." Accordingly, my strategy is to systematically compare and contrast
an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's foundational paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" informing all his work with a systematic exegesis of his special sociology of suicide. Hence, this dissertation will alternate between Durkheim's general sociology (the "nuclear structure" of his work, see Book One), and his specific sociology of suicide (see Book Two). Further, in the first part of Book Three, we shall review shifts in Durkheim's basic premises, and then bring these two movements of thought together in Part II of Book Three by reconstructing Durkheim's schema of suicide.

My intention here is to provide the systematic, detailed, comprehensive documentation needed to reach a clearer understanding of Durkheim's work, and to enable us to resolve conflicting claims about the significance of his work. My hope has been to write the definitive work on Durkheim's schemas of anomic and egoistic suicide. Patient, systematic exegesis, then, is the main reason for the extraordinary length and denseness of this dissertation; in a real sense, Durkheim himself directed this effort. Further, since dissertations, being self-financed, are free from the normal pressures of publishing, I realized that only in this format could I hope to provide full documentation for my claims. The demise of monographs and the tyranny of the ten-page article led me to seize upon this unique opportunity for painstaking scholarship.

At the same time, the length of this dissertation is also a function of the difficulty of the task facing us. For the real scholarly burden was bequeathed us by Durkheim himself—for it was he who left us vast tracts of material, some of which remain largely unexplored territory to this day, while other parts remain largely misunderstood. We do not yet know Durkheim well enough; far too often our claims on his work (eg. concerning anomie) are unjustified; moreover, we need a way of resolving conflicting claims and recovering lost meanings.
One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those who might wish to systematically review the evidence and enter the debate in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of science—the special method by which we rise above the divisiveness of partisan rhetoric and endemic conflict to the unities of dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigorous standards of logic and evidence can we hope to successfully resolve the cacophony of competing claims or refutations (eg. see Appendix). Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963), the growth of science is fundamentally structured in terms of claims and refutations, ascending through ever-more rigorous agreed-upon rules or canons for resolving conflict. Without such norms, the ascent of science is impossible. The very cumulative nature of science itself, in contrast to other cultural forms, lies precisely in these mutually agreed-upon norms—namely, that all parties to the debate agree on constantly "raising the ante" to ever-higher levels of precision and comprehensiveness of evidence and logical principle.

In this spirit, I suggest several cautions at the outset. The following conventional errors in interpreting Durkheim's typology of suicide simply will no longer do; they should be set aside once and for all. Anomie cannot simply be equated with "normlessness" (whatever that means, precisely), nor with structural-cultural "malintegration," nor with "strain in the relational system of society," nor with "alienation" or a feeling of lostness, generalized despair, or a host of other negative "states of mind." Anomie cannot be simply collapsed into such broad categories as "social disorganization," "lack of structural integration," or even "lack of social participation." (On all this, see Appendix).

In addition, egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered virtuous, ala Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot justifiably be collapsed into one category, nor can anomie and egoisme be
accurately located as two extremes on two continuums of integration—structural and normative. Nor can altruism and fatalism be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical referents.

Such partial accounts mislead because they slight both Durkheim's doctrine of human nature as homo duplex, and his image of historical development. In all these versions, Durkheim's image of man as homo duplex—portraying the source of insatiable and egoistic passions as the organic ego, and his critical assessment of the broad, world-historical processes transforming the basic relations between society, culture, and person—simply drop from view.

In short, no transforming historical process, and no egoism and insatiability, no anomie or egoisme!

General criteria for more adequate reinterpretation of Durkheim's underlying schema of suicide include the following:

(1) Specify the source of egoism and insatiability—what are the origins of these destructive forces? Further, Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex—presuming the inherent egoism and insatiability of the pre-social ego—should be critically reviewed;

(2) Durkheim's evolutionary framework—reconstructed typologies should be based upon his social evolutionary framework, not abstracted or formalistic schemas. Specifically, new typologies should contain comparisons of the dominant "ideal types" of morality, and the types of suicide associated with them, at the two ends of history.

(3) All four types—successful reconstructions should attempt to resolve the current impasse of "reductions" and "rescues" (see Part II, appendix) by simultaneously inter-relating the four types, yet maintaining their distinctness. In other words, a new typology should reveal both a fundamental unity and an empirical-historical diversity; in short, the four types must be distinct, yet related.

(4) Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust—new typologies should include Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust. Specifically, any adequate reconstruction should be rooted in his polemic against opposing cultural traditions dominant in the modern world.
When beset by disorder, negation, breakdown, loss, we seek enlightenment as to their source and meaning. Our fundamental explanations of how things come to fall apart—indeed, of how evil and suffering come to reign—once were called "theodicies," a term I wish to retrieve for this dissertation. What, then, was Durkheim's basic theodicy?

The problem of locating the source of egoism and insatiability—le mal l'infini—is central to Durkheim's schemas of suicide. In his first schema, Durkheim grounded egoistic individualism and insatiable desires in the pre-social half of human nature—the organic ego. Indeed, this doctrine of the dualism of human nature (homo duplex)—the generic opposition between ego and person, between sensual appetites and moral rules, between percepts and concepts—lies at the very heart of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology of religion and morality, and his sociology of knowledge.

However, I propose that Durkheim's early image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was a mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, historically, and culturally (see Part I, Book Three). Indeed, Durkheim himself later shifted away from the "anomic" ego to the "alogic" ego; thus, instead of assigning the presence of self-destructive desires to the generic ego, Durkheim came to merely impute to it the inherent absence of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts. Moreover, as we shall discover in Book Two, at various points Durkheim also suggested that egoism and insatiability derive as much from the presence of modern cultural sanctions as from the absence of traditional moral controls over the pre-social ego in the modern world. This reversal of the presence/absence polarity is crucial to reformulation of the first schema of suicide.

Which theodicy, then, shall we pursue? Shall we accept the notion, as I have done, that anchors our vices in deformed virtues? Or shall we, as Durkheim's first schema
does, anchor our vices primarily in the organic ego? In this case, shall we then implicitly accept the underlying release/control continuum (eg. see P. Rieff, 1966)? Shall we then also accept the telling of history as either the growth or recession of repressive moral controls over the ego? If so, shall we then take up our stand in terms of the resulting symbolic alignments—namely, advocating release of the natural harmonies of the ego means liberal, while control becomes conservative and archaic? As for myself, since I am inclined neither to demonize nor apotheosize the organic ego, I cannot stand on either the liberal or the conservative end of this traditional continuum.

Rather, I shall follow Durkheim's occasional insight that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue." I propose, therefore, that it is, fundamentally, not our lapse from rules—not our lowest animal instincts—which leads us into trouble; it is not the lowest in us but the highest in us which leads to our own undoing. Perhaps my own conscientiousness in following out all the twists and turns in Durkheim's changing schemas might serve as a case in point. The structure of my argument, then, like Weber's in The Protestant Ethic... is ironic. My essential theodicy is that our virtues, when pushed to extreme, metamorphose or invert themselves and become our leading vices. In one sense, then, this dissertation may be read as a systematic search through Durkheim's work for evidence of a largely unnoticed but powerful break away from the release/control tradition of thought to a fully socio-cultural position, and a profoundly dialectical, ironic, or dramatic insight into the structure of human action based on another, older tradition of the "golden mean."

For the ultimate key to anomie and egoisme lies not, as in the first schema, in the release of the inherently insatiable appetites of the organic ego in the modern transitional crisis. Rather, it is found, as Parsons, Bellah, and others have repeatedly observed, not in the recession
of medieval systems of moral control but rather in the internalization of new and different systems of moral authority in the Protestant Era. Hence, the modern crisis, represented by egoisme and anomie, is not so much the result of the release of the floods of passion inherent in the organic ego as the ironic or unanticipated consequences of the deformation of extreme systems of moral control.

Let me briefly explain the logical structure of the two schemas presented here.

Now, a systematic search through the vast literature on anomie (see Appendix) reveals many different ways of schematically arranging Durkheim's typology of suicide. However, each schema rests on reinterpretation of one of several of Durkheim's underlying premises. Since I shall systematically criticize each of the major reconstructed typologies (see Appendix), let me first indicate the underlying logical structure of the two schemas of suicide which anchor and inform this dissertation.

Perhaps the simplest articulation of Durkheim's first typology is the following schema:

Figure 1. Contemporary Crisis/Mechanical Solidarity

| Suicidal Type | egoisme / altruisme | anomie / fatalisme |

Although a heuristic point of departure for us as well as for Durkheim, such a schema is evidently incomplete. One wishes to know, for example, what are the mediating causes of suicide and of our crisis? Hence, one is forced to introduce several other analytical dimensions. I have not followed the usual procedure of distinguishing between integration and regulation, as I believe this distinction to be misleading by itself without the underlying image of man as homo duplex.

Now, I have arranged my schemas in a different format.
than commonly utilized; I feel no compulsion to utilize a simple four-fold table, for instance. Rather, I prefer to attempt to precisely distinguish the multiple mediations and sub-categories in several dimensions. Thus, the overall structure of the schemas is a series of descending polar axes which overlap, and through several mediations, generate the four suicidal types. In one sense, then, the hermeneutical task is, through systematic exegesis, to infer back from the four types to their underlying logical structure (a procedure which Durkheim himself said he used in *Suicide*). Hence, we shall outline a series of compounding polarities until we reach the four suicidal types.

For example, in Durkheim's first schema the first and most basic axis is Durkheim's doctrine of *homo duplex* paired with sociocultural evolution. Thus, as graphically presented in Figure 2, Axis Ia represents the generic desires of the organic ego on the vertical dimension coupled with sociocultural evolution on the horizontal dimension. In turn, the second Axis subdivides into two more sets of polar categories--namely, Axis IIa represents Control or Release of the generic desires of the organic ego, while Axis IIb splits into Mechanical Solidarity and the Contemporary Transitional Crisis as the two poles on the continuum of sociocultural evolution. At the same level, the Future represents a new kind of organic solidarity reached through the national enfranchisement of corporations (see Part II, Book Two), which results in harmony restored through the "golden mean;" it represents the cessation or overcoming of anomic and egoistic passions. A third, and final, mediating level is added under Control and Release--namely, active/passive orientations, which may be mirrored on the corresponding horizontal dimension by collective versus self, or outside versus inside, orientations.

To sum up, we arrive at *altruisme* when the generic desires of the organic ego in mechanical solidarity are controlled and redirected in an active, collective manner;
fatalisme in a passive, inward turning manner. Further, in the first schema, anomie occurs when the generic desires of the organic ego are released in the modern transitional crisis; egoisme is the same situation except that it is expressed in a passive, introverted manner. The other two possible categories are, of course, historically null.

In the same manner, in my reconstruction of Durkheim's second schema of suicide, the first and most basic axis combines the generic power of cultural sanctions with sociocultural evolution. On the second axis, IIa represents Mechanical Solidarity (traditional societies), while IIb represents the Modern Transitional Crisis (pre-Organic Solidarity). Axis IIb represents the common cultural content of Mechanical Solidarity—namely, Absolutizing Collectivism and the Traditional Social Schedule of Satisfaction, which, when expressed in active and passive forms, generates, finally, altruisme and fatalisme, respectively. Correspondingly, Axis IIb— the Modern Transitional Crisis—is followed by Axis IIIb where the common cultural content of the modern era—Absolutizing Individualism and Legitimized Insatiability—is mediated successively through different cultural traditions reaching different suicidal expressions in anomie and egoisme (see Figure 3.)
Figure 2. Durkheim's First Schema

Axis Ia. **Homo Duplex**
   (generic desires of organic ego)

Axis IIa.

Control  Release

Axis IIIa.
Active/Passive  Active/Passive

Axis IIb.
Mechanical  Altruisme/Fatalisme
Solidarity

Axis Iib.

Sociocultural
Evolution

Contemporary
Transitional
Crisis

The Future:
Organic
Solidarity
via
Corporations

"The Golden Mean"
Figure 3. Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions

**Axis I:** The Generic Power of Cultural Sanctions (a) in Sociocultural Evolution (b)

**Axis IIa:** Mechanical Solidarity (Traditional Societies)

**Axis IIIa:**
- a. Common Cultural Content
- b. Different Modes of Expression

**Axis IVa:** Dominant Suicidal Types

**Axis IIb:** The Modern Transitional Crisis

**Axis IIIb:**
- a. Common Cultural Content
- b. Different Cultural Traditions
- c. Different Modes of Expression

**Axis IVb:** Dominant Suicidal Types

**Axis IIc:** The Future: Organic Solidarity via Cultural Shifts

The "Golden Mean"
How shall we explain the origins of, and continuing sanctions for, anomie and egoisme in the modern world? It was this haunting question which first drove me to attempt to anchor these modern forms of suicide in these series of mediating contexts; for I was dissatisfied with other's schemas and my own first formulations. Indeed, my attempts to anchor anomie and egoisme in better explanatory contexts went through at least three distinct stages.

Once having recognized that anomie and egoisme were culturally sanctioned, and having seen absolute individualism and insatiability as keys to these types, I first began to try to anchor anomie and egoisme in the modern world conceived as a unitary period. This is a common procedure: to portray the structure of the modern world as radically different from preceding eras, and to couch these differences in terms of such basic shifts as those from community to society, the attenuation of the social bond, and the resulting atomism, pluralism, market capitalism, rationalistic science, destructive technology, and so forth.

However, while true to a certain extent, all of these revolutionary shifts failed to truly illuminate, for by anchoring change in a unitary period, it seemed all one need do was to locate the crucial shifts in time, and once one entered the door, all changed. Such an explanation was too global, it lacked specificity. Further, it was not really sociocultural, for it was hard to locate groups-in-process, to determine their shifting rhetorical claims and counter-claims. And, besides, it was too close to Durkheim's first schema, since these shifts were primarily viewed as negative devolutions.

A second approach which emerged out of my dissatisfaction with the period approach was to pursue specific themes over time. Thus, I came to pose the basic problem in terms of the sociocultural origins, development, and impact of: (a) Individualism, nominalism, atomism, etc., and (b) Ideas of progress, time, future orientations, etc., and
(c) Drives toward perfection, infinite striving toward the ideal, and so on. The notion here was to try to compare and contrast these ideas with the second schema of anomie and egoism, and then attempt to trace the historical genealogies connecting earlier notions to modern ideas and moral sanctions. I began to canvass Western history and, indeed, all of human history for similar notions of, and sanctions for, individualism and drives for progress and perfection. While it was fascinating reading many great thinkers, this tracing of different notions of the Self and the meaning of the Individual, and of time, infinity, drives for progress and perfection, and so on, soon confused rather than clarified the issue; the specific outlines of my own project began to fade. The limitation of all such thematic or history of ideas approaches then became evident—they simply lacked sufficient sociocultural anchors. While better than the simple unitary approach in that one pursued specific themes across time periods, nonetheless, this interpretive perspective suffered from a certain disembodied, abstracted character. Were these real traditions, for instance, or merely "stream"s of thought in which people independently assumed similar positions, without dialogue or reference? Were these traditions merely verbal constructions of the investigator? And, most importantly, were these ideas or streams of morality and thought related to the actual rhetorical contexts, the lived frames of reference, the actual "logics-in-use" of different groups at different times?

Thereafter, an interesting dialectic emerged. On the one hand, my drive to anchor anomie and egoism in their generative contexts led me to seek a new level of cultural and historical specificity—namely, cultural traditions. Because it combines the notion of culture as a symbolic meaning and directive system of a group and the notion of tradition and historical process, the synthetic interpretive perspective of cultural traditions reaches both the
necessary level of cultural-historical specificity and offers a new and generalizable perspective for the human sciences.

Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, development, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiabilities in the modern world, we look to the interface between religion and culture. Here we ask: what are the prime terms of translation between modern religions and contemporary culture and psyche, especially anomie and egoisme? Thus, we shall explore whether, and to what extent, various ethical sanctions coming from Protestantism have become sedimented at the heart of modern structures of conscience and consciousness?

Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One we shall link the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism with two contemporary cultural traditions. In Book Two, we shall explore the problematic relations between Protestantism and suicide. In Book Three we shall connect anomie and egoisme as absolutized forms of individualism and legitimized insatiabilities to two dominant modern cultural traditions. Thus, having argued that Durkheim's four types of suicide must be addressed in historical terms, we cannot leave the foundations of anomie and egoisme floating in historical space. How, then, did it come to be that anomie and egoisme were (are) culturally sanctioned? What are the moral, spiritual, and intellectual foundations of the Utilitarian Ethos and the Romantic Ethos?

Having linked anomie and egoisme in the second schema to modern cultural traditions, at the very end of this dissertation we shall briefly move to link modern cultural traditions, in turn, to religions--to two versions of the Protestant Ethos; that is, anomie to the secularization of Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheranism. In short, we shall finally propose the following essential cultural-historical linkages. As the active extern-
alization of absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability, anomie is connected with the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Calvinistic Ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original and continuing source. Further, as the "infinity of dreams" seen, for instance, in the modern artists' anguished "journey into the interior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition as its prime carrier, and, then, ultimately, with the Lutheran's and spiritual radicals' ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its original and continuing source.

Finally, it may be of interest to note the significance of one other shift which the modern cultural sanctioning of anomie and egoisme necessitates in Durkheim's processual image of breakdown and breakthrough. Now, clearly in the first schema (see Book Two), Durkheim conceived suicide as a process involving, first, the breakdown of traditional social control, and second, the breakthrough of the directionless and proportionless passions of the pre-social ego. Even here the structural factor which most sociologists have taken as the decisive element of a sociological explanation of suicide--namely, the breakdown of social integration or regulation--was not considered by Durkheim himself to be the critical factor. Rather, social breakdown acted merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of the insatiable and self-centered passions of the organic ego. Hence, in his first schema, Durkheim's central concern was not so much the breakdown of norms as with the breakthrough of an "infinity of dreams and desires." The weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acted here merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of this egocentric insatiability. In sum, in the first schema Durkheim posited a two-step process, in which the breakdown of moral control preceded a breakthrough or release of the insatiable desires of the organic ego.

However, in the second schema, the sequence of this
two-step process is reversed. Because "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," and, therefore, because of the cultural sanctioning of absolute individualism and the "longing for infinity" in the modern world, we shall posit, first, a breakthrough in the dominant systems of morality, and then a breakdown of those structures. For example, first we see appearing the Weberian notion of the "New Model Man," the "visible saints" of ascetic and mystical Protestantism breaking forth from the medieval cloister to master self, society, and world for God's greater glory. Indeed, it was this unprecedented, massive, and sustained breakthrough to "inner-light," "inner-worldly mysticisms and asceticisms" which produced the modern moral cosmos. Only after the secularization of these new moral sanctions do we encounter, as an unanticipated and extreme consequence, Durkheim's isolated and seemingly "amoral action" on a large scale in anomie and egoism. Hence, the theodicy underlying Durkheim's first schema is limited only to the latter, derivative process. Thus, the shift in the absence/presence polarity in locating egoism and insatiability implies, correspondingly, a reversal in the two-step process causing anomie and egoism. Specifically, since the moral positions underlying anomie and egoism are culturally sanctioned, in the second schema we posit, first, a moral breakthrough and then, second, a breakdown or deformation of this new system of moral direction. In sum, absence/presence, breakdown/breakthrough--it is Durkheim's double shift on these key rhetorical axes which constitutes the inner tension of this dissertation.
Before we begin, it is important to point out what lies beyond the scope of even this massive dissertation. Despite their evident interest, the reader will not find the following topics addressed here:

(a) an exploration of the roots, especially the Greek classical roots, of Durkheim's notion of anomie, nor of the classical-Christian notion of limits, of human finitude, of gradation and balance, or of the "golden mean" (but see for the latter H. Hadyn, 1950).

(b) a review of all of Durkheim's work, a summary of all his major books, for instance, or even an in-depth treatment of his whole methodological and substantive doctrine; it must be emphasized that even in Book One I shall treat only of those central parts of Durkheim's substantive doctrine that relate to the schemas of suicide;

(c) detailed tracing of all the intellectual or cultural influences on Durkheim's work or life; this is far too complex a problem to be addressed here (but see Lukes, 1973);

(d) detailed investigation of the phenomenon of suicide per se, nor background on suicide studies, nor concern with the tradition of moral statistics;

(e) systematic explorations of the psychodynamics of anomie and egoisme;

(f) systematic histories of the development of the modern cultural traditions sanctioning anomie and egoisme.

Further, the reader is alerted to the following distinctions. When I use the word egoism, I shall refer to the organic ego, but when it use the term egoisme I shall refer to Durkheim's suicidal type. Moreover, to recall their distinctive connotations, I have retained the French expressions to refer to Durkheim's four suicidal types—namely, altruisme and fatalisme, anomie and egoisme.

In addition, the reader is alerted to the following conventions adopted here. Asterisks at the end of a quote mean that I have added underlining to emphasize significant parts of a passage.
Moreover, to simplify citation, the following abbreviations of the titles of Durkheim's major works shall be adopted: S for *Suicide*, DL for *The Division of Labor in Society*, EF for *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, R for *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ME for *Moral Education*, PC for *Primitive Classification*, SP for *Sociology and Philosophy*, PECM for *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Soc for *Socialism*, PE for "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," and DHN for "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions." Other articles and notes by Durkheim are indicated by year of publication, and may be found entered in this format under the appropriate bibliography entry. Footnotes are recorded in terms of their sequence on each page (eg. #2, page 200), and will be found at the end of each book.

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New York
Eugene
Berkeley
Seattle, 1970-1978

David D. McCloskey
BOOK ONE

THE "NUCLEAR STRUCTURE" OF DURKHEIM'S WORK

"Si vous voulez mûrir votre pensée, attachez-vous à l'étude scrupuleuse d'un grand maître; démontez système dans ses rouages les plus secrets."

(Emile Durkheim)

Synopsis. We shall explore the foundational or "nuclear structure" informing all of Durkheim's substantive work in two phases. In the first section, we shall focus on his key generic premises, while in the second section we shall focus on his key genetic-evolutionary premises. Our exploration will be sequential in that each succeeding chapter will amplify the central thrust of the preceding one. Hence, we shall progressively develop the generic sociocultural foundation and the evolutionary trajectory informing all of Durkheim's work, especially as these relate to his schemas of suicide.

In Part I, we shall first briefly explore Durkheim's penchant for addressing problems in terms of polarities, and his attempts to overcome such dichotomies through the dialectical mediums of sociocultural process and evolutionary progress. In Chapter Two, we shall unfold the basic dichotomy informing Durkheim's sociologies of morality, knowledge and religion--namely, homo duplex. Here Durkheim opposed the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego to the moral rules and intellectual concepts coming from society. Thus, Durkheim identified the moral and logical with the social. However, not only shall we offer a few preliminary criticisms of Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex (amplified in Part I, Book Three), but we also note
that Durkheim later shifted from the anomic to the alogic ego. This shift opens the way for the move from schema number one to schema number two—that is, the ego can then no longer be considered the negative source of the destructive "infinity of dreams and desires" seen in anomie and egoisme.

In Chapter Three we shall explore the most important half of Durkheim's homo duplex dichotomy—the sociocultural construction of the person in terms of structures of conscience and consciousness. In Durkheim's basic sociocultural theory, the logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellectual judgment are always and everywhere intertwined.

Next, we shall explore in detail how Durkheim specifically anchored the emerging relations between structures of conscience and consciousness by linking them to the fundamental structure and process of collectivities. Thus, in Chapter Four, we shall explore Durkheim's causal model which always anchored social facts in social processes. Here Durkheim posited a two-story causal model in which superstructural collectively representational (symbolic) processes were intimately linked with substructural social morphological processes. The prime link between the "material lower-story" and the "ideal upper-story" was "moral or dynamic density."

Our attention here shall be directed primarily toward the collectively representational level, because in his later work Durkheim's thought moved increasingly toward symbolic processes and the autonomization of collective representations.

Some key sequential linkages by which collective symbols emerge out of social morphological process include:

(1) Social morphological implosions moralize organic egos in creating societies and persons;

(2) Cultural implosions thereby lift man above the confines of the organic ego; social energies lift us into the realm of freedom, of moral rules and intellectual concepts;

(3) Symbols act as visible, public collective representations of group self-consciousness. Due to the moral intensities which created them, some symbols be-
come "sacralized"—invested with obligatory respect and desirability;

(4) Because moral intensities inevitably fade and "sacred symbols" become depreciated, periodic renewals are necessary to reaffirm the social bond and to revitalize the structures of conscience and consciousness;

(5) The marked contrast between these two alternating phases of sociocultural life creates the opposition between the "sacred" and the "profane." These basic oppositions create tension in the sociocultural and phenomenological fields, and life becomes progressively energized and organized by these two poles;

(6) Inevitably the organizing tension between sacred and profane is extended to all spheres of reality and levels of experience. The world is cosmicized through a compounding series of symbolic equations. Phenomenological analogies serve as bridges transforming empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity;

(7) Tension is resolved, and the powers of imagination and will reorganized and released, through a crucial transformation of the oppositions into a new and higher synthetic unity. Thus, sociocultural process in its symbolic dimension has an inherently dialectical or dramatic structure.

In Part II, we shall explore four key facets of Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary theory. It is important, however, to first understand how it was that Durkheim's causal model led him to always return to the simplest case, the clearest example of necessary connection between the "material" and "ideal" halves of society. For in fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and development of human society and culture, Durkheim sought to discover a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, for a crucial experiment in which there would be a one-to-one correspondence between symbolic forms and social forms, between the social morphological substratum and the social physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collective symbols are deeply fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durkheim believed he had discovered the "monocellular" form of sociocultural life, the template, from which all complex sociocultural forms evolved. As Lukes observes,
Durkheim held it as axiomatic that there is an identity between sociocultural simplicity and evolutionary priority. Hence, only in terms of the most "elementary" forms did Durkheim believe that he could surely discover generic sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably fused with genetic-evolutionary processes.

In Chapter Five, then, we shall explore Durkheim's guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of social life. For all of his work was grounded in this genetic and evolutionary framework. The trunk of the tree corresponds to the invariant conditions of social and cultural life, while the branches represent different types of societies. Durkheim's metaphor thus combined both evolutionary continuity (the roots and the trunk) and discontinuity and diversity (the branches and fruits).

In Chapter Six we shall explore Durkheim's seminal notion that the primitive sacral complex served as the prime evolutionary womb of society and culture. Elementary cultural forms are: (a) socio-centric, and (b) governed by sacro-magical rationales and ritual etiquettes. Thus, the first foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority are grounded in the group and its religion; in the beginning, they are all fused together. The double historical significance of the primitive sacral complex is that it both served as the creative womb of human culture and as an obstacle to progressive cultural evolution. Thus, the transition from simple, sacral societies to complex, secular societies forms the mainline of Durkheim's evolutionary concerns.

In Chapter Seven, we shall explore Durkheim's neglected sociology of civilizational process. For as societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. The close parallel on the macro-evolutionary level between social morphological differentiation and symbolic differentiation implies the transition from concrete to abstract symbolism, from parochial or tribal to universal representations, from the fused embeddedness of symbols in the primitive sacral
complex to the differentiated autonomy of symbols, institutional spheres, and persons. The inner key to the progressive evolution of societies and their symbolic guidance systems is the link between widening structures of fraternization and rationalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse. In sum, civilizations emerge through the progressive extension of social bonds which, in turn, require universalizable symbolic forms.

Finally, in Chapter Eight we shall explore Durkheim's notion of the evolution of the person through history. Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social conditions at the two ends of history. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self is submerged in the group, and permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective conscience. Now, there are two different, yet complementary, lines Durkheim pursued to explain the emergence of the individual out of archaic "mechanical solidarity." Early in his career, Durkheim equated societal differentiation with individuation. Thus, he asserted that the division of labor progressively frees the individual from the constraints of the repressive conscience collective. Here Durkheim was centrally concerned with the de-collectivization of structures of moral and intellectual responsibility. However, at this early stage Durkheim neglected to distinguish between individuation and personalization.

By contrast, in his later work Durkheim took care to distinguish between these two processes, and emphasized the symbolic construction of the notion of the person. Hence, we discover here a double dialectic in the evolution of the person through history between individuation (de-collectivization and autonomization through separation) and phenomenological deepening and centering through more powerful cultural sanctions. Thus, for example, far from being embedded in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person is rather a critically significant sociocultural and historical construc-
Finally, the emergence of the person through history finds its culmination in Durkheim's own religion of la personne humain, and in the Anglo and Romantic traditions' moral subsidy of the autonomous ego. At the same time, however (and this forms the link to the shifting schemas of suicide), acknowledgment of the extraordinarily strong modern cultural sanctions for individualism leads us to recognize that, like all cults which absolutize their prime values, this one, too, may ironically culminate in self-destructive extremes.
CHAPTER ONE
DICHOTOMIES AND DIALECTICS

... Durkheim tried to avoid making a narrow doctrinaire choice between allegedly incompatible opposites. Rather, he strove to attain a new synthesis, a unity of opposites, a coincidentia oppositorum which would provide a new level of analytic insight (Robert Bellah, 1973:xxi).

Perhaps the most characteristic and revealing hallmark of Durkheim's doctrine is the series of "root dichotomies" permeating his thought. This compounding system of "binary oppositions" provided Durkheim with key analytical anchors as he progressively unfolded his thought. Correspondingly, they may serve us as interpretive keys in our attempt to systematically comprehend the substantive "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought.

Although various observers over the years have noted one or more aspects of these crucial underlying polarities, certainly Steven Lukes (1971, 1973) was the first to systematically present and analyze many of these dichotomies as key analytical series anchoring Durkheim's system of sociology. Some of the more significant pairs in Durkheim's compounding binary system include: society/individual, objective/subjective, sociology/psychology, universals/variables, normal/pathological, science/mysticism, necessary/contingent, person/ego, concepts/sensations, moral rules/sensual appetites, sacred/profane, and so on and so forth.

There is no need here to explore the details of this interrelated series of "root dichotomies," as Lukes calls them, for he has already fruitfully explored several of the more basic pairs. It is enough for our present purposes to simply acknowledge this ever-proliferating series of polarities.
Lukes also explores various ambiguities and shifts in many of the more central polarities. Further, it is important to note that the contents of these dichotomous sets are not perfectly parallel, since the phenomena addressed by each differs. However, in each case the dichotomizing logic remains the same; and once one perceives the root logic operative in Durkheim's theorizing, it can easily be recognized that many of these dichotomous pairs unfolded one out of the other.

However, it is not sufficient to merely explore the existence of various Durkheimian dichotomies, nor even to recognize the inner logic of his initial interpretive procedure. For the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought is inevitably distorted if portrayed simply as rhetorical or fatally dichotomizing, for it was inherently dialectical as well. Poggi remarks, for example, how Durkheim always wished to move beyond the very oppositions which he himself had constructed:

On close examination, these points seldom turn out to be tenable as dichotomies ... in the sense that the two elements do not lie on the same plane. Instead, one of them stands over the other and "envelops" it. ... In my view, these unacknowledged breakdowns of purportedly crucial dichotomies express the urgency of Durkheim's moral passion for unity... (1972:252).

While everyone has observed Durkheim's polemical points of departure, few have emphasized that Durkheim's penchant for root dichotomies served merely to heighten the dramatic contrasts between traditional antinomies which he then attempted to reconcile in terms of a higher (positivistic and sociologicist) synthesis. It is almost as if Durkheim drew such sharp distinctions primarily to heighten the drama of his equally characteristic attempt to dialectically resolve these traditional opposites.

Fortunately, the current renaissance of Durkheim studies has recovered a sense of his higher dialectical ambitions. In 1960, for instance, Hayward described the inner tensions in Durkheim's sociological thought in this way:

Durkheim's social philosophy ... has been described as "Kantianism reassessed and supplemented by Com-
tianism." Whilst ... it would be more accurate to characterize it as an attempt to conciliate the neo-positivism and sociologism of Comte's predecessor, Saint-Simon, with the neo-criticism and "juridism" of Kant's disciple, Renouvier, this affirmation is valuable in indicating the tension within Durkheim's doctrine between determinist and libertarian, holist and personalist, transcendental and immanentist tendencies which, throughout his work, he endeavored to resolve into a harmonious synthesis through the unrelenting application of "conscience," i.e. a combination of analytical reason and imperative ethic (1960:19).

Bellah (1973) also reveals a keen sense of the extent to which Durkheim strove constantly to transcend perennial polarities such as those between materialism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, the individual and society, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and so on. Wallwork especially has emphasized the dialectical character of Durkheim's thought.

A second characteristic of Durkheim's method is the dialectical manner in which he approaches virtually every major philosophical and theoretical issue. As Henri Peyre rightly observes, "Durkheim was a master of dialectics".... Durkheim invariably sets forth antithetical views that are brilliantly criticized and seemingly discarded until they are joined, in a modified form, in his own unique synthesis.... Durkheim's frequent use of the dialectical method has unfortunately passed unnoticed by most of his American interpreters (1972: 5-6).

Wallwork also offers the following examples of some of the dialectical tensions inherent in Durkheim's thought, and thus, its paradoxical character.

The paradoxical quality of Durkheim's social and political thought derives from these and other dialectical resolutions. Man is of infinite worth, but this value is not inherent within him; it is but a supreme fiction created by society. Man is totally dependent upon society for the qualities that make him human, yet society has increasingly freed him from group tyranny. Man has become an "autonomous center of activity," yet secondary group restrictions, by preventing anomie, actually increase his liberty. Patriotism is a fundamental duty, yet patriotism must be counterbalanced by humanistic ends. For the ambiguities, lacuna, and errors in some of these paradoxical formulations, Durkheim has been justly criticized, but it is no longer justifiable to attribute to him conservative doctrines unqualified by the liberal, and occasionally radical, elements in his thought (1972:119; see also 136).
Finally, LaCapra also noted Durkheim's dialectical passion for transcending traditional polarities.

The truly basic philosophical tension in the thought of Durkheim was related to his rationalism. It involved his partial failure to transcend classical rationalism. Durkheim's thought was caught up in a tension between the narrowly analytical and the dialectical heritages transmitted to him through Renouvier.... One might simplistically label the narrowly analytical tendency of his thought a Cartesianized and socialied neo-Kantianism. The most obvious influence of neo-Kantianism was in his passion for dualistic antinomies. The more profound influence, which led into his dialectical attempt to reconcile or at least relate antinomies, was his ultimate affirmation of a philosophy of finitude based upon a normative sense of limits (1972:8).

LaCapra also remarks that:

Durkheim's broader rationalist dream was to transcend partisan ideological struggles and to forge a dialectical reconciliation of conservative, radical, and liberal traditions of thought (1972:18).

Like Marx, Durkheim tried to integrate a critique of political economy, German speculative philosophy, and the French socialist tradition in a comprehensive theory of the genesis and functioning of modern society (1972:23).

In sum, Durkheim's mode of conceptualizing always proceeded in a two-phase process. First, he set up mutually exclusive dichotomies, seemingly a radical contrasting of opposing claims to primacy in human action. It is this image of Durkheim as always radically polarizing primacy and virtue to his own chosen side of his own dichotomy which so often offends readers enjoying their first taste of one of his great works. Inevitably, however, deeper exegesis reveals that Durkheim always attempted to resolve the inherent oppositions which he himself had so sharply posed. Durkheim always sought, in positivistic and sociologistic terms, to dialectically transcend traditional antinomies by generating a new over-arching synthesis which all parties to the debate could embrace. Recognition of this two-step process of radical dichotomization and polemics on multiple rhetorical fronts, and then resolution of these polarities in terms of an evolutionarily-won synthesis is a key to understanding
Durkheim's conceptual and methodological structure and, in turn, his prime dialectical ambitions.

Without this necessary perception of the entire process of the normal "logics-in-use" in Durkheim's thought, various elements can be lifted out of context, leaving each man to "quote Scriptures" to his own purpose. As Lukes (1973) notes, there are many different and even contradictory "Durkheims" floating around in sociological space. As with Weber, or indeed, with any great thinker, one may choose to emphasize one aspect of Durkheim's thought at the expense of another, and one may find on almost any page convincing refutation from Durkheim himself against any such simple or narrow portrait. Perhaps this multiplicity of simultaneous interests and perspectives can be seen to constitute one key to both great thinkers and the uncertain fate of their paradigms. In turn, the same multiplicity can help to explain the subsequent diffusion, separation, and "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974). For, often as not, by virtue of their ability to encompass ever-more diverse phenomena, paradigms almost necessarily become protean models, capable of eliciting myriad meanings. Might we not call this phase of the eternal dialectic of "merger and division" (Kenneth Burke, 1945) the "proteanization of paradigms"?
CHAPTER TWO

HOMO DUPLEX: DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF THE DUALISM OF HUMAN NATURE

The soul and the body, sensation and reason, egoistic appetites and moral will are opposed and, at the same time, mutually related, just as the sacred and the profane, which are forbidden to one another, nonetheless are forever intermingled (Durkheim, in Lukes, 1973:22).

Preface. Almost the entire range of Durkheim's underlying series of "root dichotomies"—especially polarities such as society/individual, person/ego, moral rules/sensual appetites, concepts/sensations, public/private, sacred/profane—are summed up in Durkheim's central image of the dualism of human nature. Steven Lukes rightly observes:

This central, but ... multiple, dichotomy between the social and the individual is, in a sense, the keystone of Durkheim's entire system of thought. In particular, it can be seen as crucial to his sociology of morality, his sociology of knowledge, and his sociology of religion, since it underlies the distinctions he drew between moral rules and sensual appetites, between concepts and sensations, and between the sacred and the profane (1973:22).

Indeed, it can hardly be overemphasized that the image of man as homo duplex lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociologies of morality, knowledge, and religion. As we shall discover, without this distinction between ego and person, and the characterization of the former as inherently egocentric, passionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim's theory of anomie and the need for constant moral discipline makes little sense. Since in Book Three we shall extensively criticize Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex, I merely wish here to document in outline the nature and development of this crucial doctrine.
As a modern positivist moral philosopher working sociologically, Durkheim embraced the old image of man as *homo duplex*, but with a fundamentally new twist. Traditional Western and especially Christian moral philosophy portrayed man in his generic essence as representing a unique union between the opposing realms of matter and spirit—humankind was the link between heaven and earth. In Durkheim's system of positivist symbolic equations, this relation became translated as: ego is to person as body was to soul. Thus, Durkheim fulfilled his commitments to both positivism and moral philosophy by insisting that while man was, indeed, "double," it is society as the prime source of discipline and goals, of legitimate moral authority, impersonal public concepts, universalizable rules, on the one hand, and the inherently egocentric and privatized passions of the amoral, presocial individual on the other, which constitute the two basic poles of human existence.

We need not wander far to discover the cultural source from which Durkheim drew this doctrine of the duality of human nature. For Durkheim's own deep positivist cultural commitments led him here to embrace and extend traditional Cartesian dualisms splitting into separate spheres self and world, mind and body, spirit and mechanism, and so on. Wallwork has noted of this origin of Durkheim's doctrine: "... the world of objective facts was set against the realm of ideas and ideals, and matter was contrasted with spirit. These conflicts were essentially continuations of Cartesian dualism" (1972:9). LaCapra also noted the Cartesian influence, adding that of Durkheim's neo-Kantian "passion for dualistic antinomies" (1972:8; see also 285).

The influence of Cartesianism was most obvious in Durkheim's reliance upon the antinomy between mind and matter. This antinomy was expressed in the idea of *homo duplex*—the dual nature of man—which was interpreted by Durkheim in terms of the opposition between the organic and the social (1972:9).

Lukes also emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of Cartesian and neo-Kantian thought in the late nineteenth century as it
influenced Durkheim's "passion for dichotomies."

Durkheim's conception of human nature as dual involved two parallel oppositions: between sensual appetites and moral rules, and between sensations and concepts. The Kantian nature of this conception is unmistakable and corresponded to the predominant philosophical ideas of the time, which he had absorbed, first through the major formative influence of Renouvier, and later from the more specifically epistemological thinking of Hamelin (1973:435).

Through the fusion of Cartesian and neo-Kantian philosophical currents in his day, Durkheim's penchant for "root dichotomies" was deepened and reinforced. Finally, in a curious way, Durkheim's original Cartesian dualism was reinforced by the oppositions between individual and society embraced by Utilitarians and Romantics (eg. from Rousseau on) alike. But as we shall discover, this negative polemical reinforcement of the split between individual and society embraced by his opponents led to the undoing of Durkheim's first schema of suicide (see Book Three).

It is rather strange that this absolutely critical anchor of Durkheim's theories has been so often slighted in secondary accounts over the years. Besides Wallwork and LaCapra, Peristiany (1953:viii), Giddens (1971b:221), Coser (1971:136), Douglas (1967:343-4), Lukes (1973:432-3), and Nisbet (1974:229) have recently begun to glimpse the centrality and significance of this doctrine in Durkheim's work. However, one secondary account, perhaps slighted because it is out of print, puts the image of man as *homo duplex* at the very heart of Durkheim's doctrine. I refer, of course, to Edward Tiryakian's useful summary of Durkheim's seminal article "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions," in the former's *Sociologism and Existentialism* (1962). In sum, even though Durkheim's aforementioned article was translated and published in Kurt Wolff's 1960 collection of articles on Durkheim, and Tiryakian usefully summarized Durkheim's thesis, it is still not generally perceived that the image of man as *homo duplex* is absolutely central to Durkheim's system. This blindness and discontinuity in terms of scientific development is most distressing.
If consideration of the ways in which various influences fused in Durkheim's central doctrine of the duality of human nature is complex, when these multiple origins are coupled with Durkheim's ever-proliferating series of parallel dichotomies, we must stand ready to acknowledge not only the deepening ramifications of his complex argument, but also various shifts in the grounds of his argument. Thus, one may legitimately begin, for instance, by asking: but why should the individual be necessarily considered amoral? And why should society be portrayed as the sole source of goodness, authority, and reason? One answer might be: because, in direct contrast to preceding metaphysical theories which endowed the individual with cosmic or divine "essential" qualities, Durkheim insisted that only "existential" or "positive" sources be admitted as relevant evidence. Further, in contrast to the dominant individualistic or nominalist theories of his day, Durkheim stripped the lone abstracted individual not only of existential priority, but also of corresponding qualities such as the "inner light" of Reason, moral authority, and so on. Given his own negative incorporation of the hypothetical isolated ego--circumscribed by its own private passions--it is no wonder that Durkheim felt justified in assigning all the positive (in both senses) qualities to human society and culture. Thus, to Durkheim, society is the only moral phenomenon in nature; the individual ego is basically amoral. Morality, conversely, is preeminently social; that is, not only is it a social construction, but it pertains primarily to social obligation.

In any case, while highly complex and synthetic arguments such as Durkheim's offer intrinsic fascination simply because of their rhetorical appeal, we should not be surprised that such a "brittle synthesis," as Giddens (1971b:222) terms it, by virtue of the inherently incompatible elements, represents a constant temptation to logical and empirical error (see Book Three). Despite his dialectical ingenuity, the binds Durkheim unwittingly placed himself in unfortunately led him too far for us to fully embrace his doctrine. Indeed, given his commitments,
and his aspiration to transcend all previous oppositions rooted in opposing cultural traditions, perhaps he had little choice. As for us, forewarned is forearmed.

Indeed, as we set out on this journey to recapture the full depths of Durkheim's doctrine of the duality of human nature, it is important to recognize that there is a crucial difference between the early and late installments of his views. While egocentricity represented a constant negative factor in both Durkheim's early and later notions of the duality of human nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or alogical factor differed in these versions. In his early formulation, Durkheim grounded insatiability—the very absence of determinate form and natural limit (the sine qua non of morality)—in the dark desires of the unsocialized ego. However, toward the end of his life Durkheim apparently grew more pessimistic, and attributed the source of the endemic incapacity of man to gain inner peace and satisfaction to the warring halves of human nature. In addition, in the early image, the insatiable and egocentric passions represent a darkly destructive, even chaotic, energetically expansive force, while in the later version the purely idiosyncratic ego represents an inward-turning, purely privatized existence, that can only be pulled from its localized orbit by the intense impersonal forces of society and culture. In the first installment of this crucial doctrine, the a-nomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contradiction of all morality" (DL:431); in other words, the nomos of society and culture was actively opposed by the anti-nomian forces erupting up from the biological and psychological levels. In the later formulation, the relatively passive a-nomie or a-logic of the pre-socialized ego was opposed not so much to nomos as to a universalizable logos. Although Durkheim's doctrine of "human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) and his philosophy of health and well-being as the "golden mean" are closely related themes, we shall consider them later in the second part of Book Three. Let us now turn to consider the first installment of Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature.
A. The Multiplicity of Meanings of the "Individual" in Durkheim's System of Sociology

Preface. At the outset, it is important to recognize some of the potential ambiguities emerging from the mounting resonances between Durkheim's root dichotomies and his seminal image of the dualism of human nature. These resonances are compounded because Durkheim's thought moved here on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary levels, and because he assigned both positive and negative features to each half of the dichotomy on each of these levels. Further, we shall discover critical shifts in the grounds of argument, especially in regard to the question of the source of the seemingly constitutional inability of mankind to attain inner peace and lasting satisfaction. While he originally grounded insatiability in the pre-socialized ego, Durkheim later argued that the suffering inherent in the human condition derives instead from the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying both halves of human nature. Whereas the earlier notion required over-coming the darkly destructive passions of the isolated ego, Durkheim's later doctrine grew increasingly pessimistic, viewing the warring halves of human nature as the endemic dis-ease of the human condition. Let us now attempt to briefly sort out some of these important distinctions between different Durkheimian meanings of that crucial term the "Individual."

1. Generic Versus Genetic-Evolutionary Meanings of the "Individual"

We might begin by recalling that the long-standing critique of Durkheim as a kind of Platonizing metaphysician of society--an extreme hypostatizing social realist--persists in the still popular rendering of Durkheim as stridently anti-individualist. However, as Anthony Giddens rightly insists in his excellent article "The Individual in the Writings of Emile Durkheim":

... most secondary interpreters of Durkheim have failed to connect his analytical discussion (and rejection) of individualism as a methodological approach to social
theory with his developmental conception of the emergence of individualism as a morality brought into being by the growth of the differentiated division of labor (1971b:210).

This is a very important distinction; indeed, the misleading, but still pervasive, image of Durkheim as anti-individualist must now give way to more subtly inflected distinctions drawn between the various meanings assigned by Durkheim to the term 'individual' on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary levels. Let us now briefly explore these different connotations.

Steven Lukes provides the following useful guide to untangling the multiplicity of meanings of "individual":

By the 'individual,' Durkheim meant sometimes the (pre-social) individual seen as a biologically given, organic unit, sometimes the (abstract) individual seen as possessing certain invariant properties (eg. Utilitarian or economic man), sometimes the (extra-social) individual isolated from human association, and sometimes the real, concrete individual person, living in society—not to mention a further sense in which the 'individual' refers to a socially-determined conception of the human person in general (as in the 'religion of the individual,' which is the 'product of society itself,' in which the 'individual' becomes a sacred object (1973:21-2).

In his valuable 1971(b) article, Giddens adds that Durkheim placed two different valuations on the "individual" on two different levels. On the abstract, generic, universal level, Durkheim regarded the pre-socialized individual (eg. the child) as the negative carrier of insatiable and egoistic passions, or, at the very least, as the locus of privatized passions. On the same level, he portrayed society, by contrast, as the source of moral discipline, legitimate authority, reason, concepts, universalizable rules, and so on. However, on the historical level, Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social conditions at the two ends of human history. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self is necessarily submerged in the group; it is permeated by the fused sacral-magical collective conscience. In evolutionary terms, therefore, what we witness is the progressive awakening of the structures of conscience and consciousness, of the emergence of the individual, or rather the person, through his-
tory. Individual autonomy progressively emerges through soci­ etal differentiation. Far from being embedded in generic hu­ man nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and in­ tellectually responsible person is a crucial historical and social construction. But how could the individual be at one and the same time considered basically amoral and the evolu­ tionary object and expression of a higher morality?

No real paradox arises, however, since Durkheim's phi­ losophical notion of the pre-socialized human ego was couch­ ed on the generic organic level, while, on the contrary, his notion of moral individualism as a sociocultural emergent was cast on the evolutionary level (see Chapter Eight of this Book). The first image represents a generic and destructive given, while the second concerns the construction of the au­ tonomous conscience and consciousness as the preeminent value of the modern world. In short, the difference is between the generic ego and the emergent person. Late in life, Durkheim insisted on the importance of this distinction:

We say our individuality, and not our personality. Although the two words are often used synonymously, they must be distinguished with the greatest possi­ ble care, for the personality is made up essentially of supra-individual elements (DHN:339-340).

Although Durkheim himself failed to adequately clarify this distinction early in his career (eg. in The Rules), in 1912 he took great care in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life to separate the two meanings.

... it is not at all true that we are more personal as we become more individualized. The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially individual; yet we are more personal the more we are freed from our senses and able to think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon all the social ele­ ments of the individual do not mean by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8).

Durkheim's discovery of the evolving dialectic between uni­ versalization in the grounds of moral and cognitive discourse
and the emergence of the autonomous person (see E. Leites, 1974) is of the greatest importance. Clearly, the distinction between ego and person is fundamental for the human sciences; yet the precise origin, nature, and significance of this root contrast remains to be articulated. Leaving analysis of Durkheim's theory of the emergence of the moralized person through history till the end of this Book, let us now explore further the many meanings of the "individual" on the generic level.

2. The Conflation of Meanings of the "Individual" on the Generic Level

As noted, Durkheim's philosophically derived image of human nature paralleled his growing series of root dichotomies, thus leading him to progressively "conflate," as Lukes terms it, at least the following contrasts:

1. Between the socially determined and the organically or biologically given;
2. Between factors specific to particular societies, and abstracted or postulated features of "human nature;"
3. Between factors that are general within a given society or group and those that are particular to one or several individuals;
4. Between the experience and behavior of associated individuals, as opposed to those of isolated individuals;
5. Between socially prescribed obligations and spontaneous desires and behavior;
6. Between factors coming from "outside" the individual and those generated within his consciousness;
7. Between thoughts and actions directed towards social or public objects and those which are purely personal and private;

Certainly, one of critical points here is the extent to which these and other similar properties can be legitimately considered parallel. In terms of the emergence of this ever-proliferating series of dichotomous distinctions, however, I tend to think that they both proceeded from Durkheim's primal opposi-
tion between the egoistic and socialized halves of human nature, and also later fed back and reinforced the potency of this prime opposition. Certainly, it is true that although Durkheim's doctrine of man as *homo duplex* served him as a potent symbolic anchor from early on, it was not until toward the end of his career that Durkheim attempted to sum up this basic antinomy in his important 1914 paper "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions."

Now, the dual or ambivalent nature of such protean terms as "individual" and "society" partially accounts for this proliferating series of more or less parallel dichotomies, for such terms combine increasing generality of meaning and specificity of application. Whenever we encounter such persistent efforts to progressively unfold parallel properties in ever-more diverse situations, we may detect the workings of a subterranean unifying metaphor. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding metaphor early in his career was that of order and chaos, or more exactly, the analogous set was society is to the individual as order is to chaos. As often happens, the very process of unfolding new applications of this guiding analogy leads, however, by the very nature of the diverse properties encountered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or metaphorical "load." Toward the end of his career, Durkheim's guiding root opposition seemed to shift slightly, but significantly, on its metaphorical axes from order versus chaos, to universality versus particularity; or in other words, from nomos versus anomos, to logos versus alogos.

Finally, we should note the significance of Durkheim's rhetorical inversion of the high valuation placed on the lone abstract individual posited by his polemical opponents, including Utilitarians, rationalists, and Romantic-Idealists alike. In one sense, this inversion must be considered a clever but ultimately misconceived rhetorical device, since he thereby admitted in the backdoor some of the very elements against which he had so resolutely taken up arms in the first place. Nonetheless, in a second and more powerful meaning, Durkheim's distinctions represented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens
provides an important clue to the deeper significance of Durkheim's distinctions between the generic ego and the socioculturally and historically constructed person, when he insists: "Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach "liberal individualism" regarded as a conception of the characteristics of the modern social order, from 'methodological individualism'" (1971b:210; see also Lukes 1968, 1969, 1973). The deeper intellectual and cultural ramifications of Durkheim's revolution in thought become clearer here if we recall that for centuries the progressive mainlines of European thought had tacitly presumed there to be necessary inner logical, ethical, and historical connections between so-called "methodological individualism" and atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism), and its supposed epistemological correlates of pragmatic or utilitarian empiricism, individual political freedom and liberal democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man."

Durkheim's insistence, however, on a negative image of the isolated ego, and his transference of the source of moral goodness to society, coupled with his corresponding postulate that moral individualism, far from being a generic human universal, is rather a sociocultural historical construction, snapped apart the tacit, but deeply rooted, prevailing presumption of certain necessary links between logical nominalism and moral and political autonomy. Durkheim thus severed the inner symbolic links between these doctrines in mediating between preceding cultural traditions by rejecting certain points and incorporating others in a revised form in a new and hopefully more compelling model. A bold and new powerful doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the still pervasive presumption of the necessity of the inner symbolic links which Durkheim dissolved, has still to be understood in its full significance. I repeat: Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of derivation of autonomous or moralized individualism from "realistic" or "socially organic" premises. As Parsons (1949) recognized, this was Durkheim's revolution in the epistemology and methodology of the social sciences.
However, it is imperative that we place Durkheim's dialectical achievement against the background of his rhetorical failure—I mean his unfortunate incorporation of crucial premises of his polemical opponents (see especially Part I, Book Three). Giddens summarizes these important trade-offs:

... although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from methodological individualism is much more subtle and profound than what has been assumed by many of his critics, what results is a brittle synthesis, and essentially an unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and the very serious deficiencies which run throughout his works, however, have to be understood in the light of this attempt. As so often happens with a writer whose works are strongly polemical in tone, ultimately he was unable to abandon certain of the very premises of which he was most critical in the writings of his opponents (1971b:222).

It shall be our task, in part, to explore the making and unmaking of Durkheim's "brittle synthesis."

B. Insatiability Versus Moral Discipline: Durkheim's Early Version of His Doctrine of the Dualism of Human Nature

Durkheim's early version of the dualism of human nature focussed on the presumption that the unsocialized ego—that organic bundle of drives energizing each organism—was inherently passionate and even insatiable. The need for moral discipline which could only be provided through sociocultural rules was a constant background reference throughout Durkheim's major early works such as The Division of Labor, Suicide, and the lectures later published as Moral Education. Since we shall consider his related, and very significant notions of "human finitude" and the "golden mean" later (see Book Three), let us move immediately to consider his early notions of man as homo duplex.

Perhaps one of the earliest expressions in Durkheim's work of the traditional formula that "man is double" appeared in Suicide. Typically, as a moral philosopher, Durkheim began by observing that human needs and desires must somehow be proportioned to what is objectively possible if happiness is to be attainable.
In the order of existence, no good is measureless. A biological quality can only fulfill the purposes it is meant to serve on condition that it does not transgress certain limits. So too it is with social phenomena (S:217).

No living thing can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means.... If his needs require more than can be granted... they will be under continual friction or can only function painfully. Movements incapable of production without pain tend not to be reproduced (S:246).

Durkheim then observed that the organic needs of animals are ecologically and physiologically limited—that is, such needs are constrained and formed both by the amount of resources available in any given environment, and by the inherent limitations in processing capacity and physiological magnitudes of any given organism.

In the animal ... this equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions. All the organism needs is that the vital supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement be equivalent to use. When the void in resources created by existence is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its physical nature (S:246).

Thus, Durkheim argued that animals live in a state of (more or less) automatic balance in terms of their own built-in limitations and in relation to the possible resources or "carrying capacity" of their supporting habitat.

But Durkheim argued that man is governed by no such simple, built-in internal limitations or ecological equilibrium. Why? Because, over and above the obvious biological continuities, the relations of human beings to their environment are socially and culturally defined, and thus, Durkheim supposed, without natural built-in limits. In other words, while biological needs in man are limited as with the lower forms, socioculturally generated desires—unique to man-as-man—enjoy no such natural restraints.

This is not the case with man, because most of his needs are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree.
... Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot pass. But how to determine the quantity of well-being, comfort, or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his physiological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at once point rather than another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginnings of history, receiving more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health (S:247).

Therefore, man must construct his own schedule of satisfaction for wants; thus, every society is constantly engaged in negotiating a variable ratio, in terms of available resources and the legitimacy of wants, between organically generated needs (eg. food) and socioculturally generated desires (eg. honor, or the demands of charisma).

Above all, how to establish their proper variations with different conditions of life, occupations, relative importance of services, etc.? In no society are they equally satisfied on the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet, human nature is substantially the same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss (S:247).

Given his notion of the pre-socialized human ego as not only egocentric but insatiable, Durkheim proceeded to establish the constant need for regulation of these generic egoistic and undisciplined passions. Thus, Durkheim's initial dichotomy presumed, on the one hand, the egocentric passions of unsocialized human nature, and on the other, the moral discipline provided only by society. Alone, or de-socialized--that is, demoralized--the individual ego reverts back to generic type, and, ultimately, destroys itself in the fruitless passions so often seen in human action.
But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition, and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits, and sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an undetermined state be any more reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? (S:247-8).

Having set up the specter of the undetermined and undisciplined pre-social human ego, Durkheim was clearly setting up his critically important derivation of morality from society. The first requirement of such socially constructed rules, then, is discipline of these potentially insatiable desires.

... Passions must first be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulatory force must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted the state of equilibrium of the animal's dormant existence; only conscience, therefore, can furnish the means to re-establish it (S:248).

In a later comment, Durkheim likened the innate insatiability of the presocialized ego to the energies expressed in the inherent expansiveness of gases. Energy, whether physical, organic, or sociocultural, Durkheim suggested, indefinitely expands its radius of movement.

Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body of gas, provided no other matter resists its expansion, fills the immensity of space, so all energy—whether physical or moral—tends to extend itself without limit so long as nothing intervenes to stop it. Hence the need for regulatory organs, which constrain the total complex of our vital forces within appropriate limits. The nervous system has this function for our physical being. This system actuates the organs and allocates whatever energy is required by each of them. But the moral life escapes the physical system. Neither our brain nor any ganglion can assign limits to our intellectual aspirations or to our wills. For mental life, especially in its more developed forms, transcends the organism.... Sensations and physical
appetites express only the conditions of the body, not ideas and complex sentiments. Only a power that is equally spiritual is able to exert influence upon spiritual forces. This spiritual power resides in the authority inherent in moral rules (ME:40-41).

Durkheim was building here, from first principles, the role of society as the necessary counter-balance to the incessant expansion of the energy of the pre-socialized ego. And like moral philosophers of old, Durkheim insisted on grounding his argument on the level of man's generic species essence; that is, man-as-man, in contrast to the lower biological forms, is characterized by the "awakened reflection" and growth of conscience and consciousness, the striving for ideals beyond mere survival, which marks the intense new sociocultural life of this new and powerful species. We shall soon explore in greater detail how Durkheim constructed his notion of the social bases of morality. For now, let us simply observe that by first theoretically grounding his argument on the level of society and culture as evolutionary emergents, Durkheim implied that these potentially insatiable desires are not to be understood merely in terms of psycho-biological needs. Rather, the "awakening of conscience" which defines man signifies that these new generic desires are now socioculturally generated. No other conclusion is logically possible, since man is, by evolutionary essence, the sociocultural animal. The implications of the fundamental principles of Durkheim's philosophical anthropology are numerous and profound, not only in altering his own theses but also many of our own today. For example, the unsocialized child cannot hereafter legitimately be considered just an animal like any other, for a new level of biological achievement—the sociocultural—has been achieved by man. By its generic species essence, the infant can only be considered a human animal. Certainly, it would be absurd to presume that even man's closest animal relation could, with provision of the most elaborate socialization procedures, ever become a human being among other human beings. What we sometimes forget
when we repeat the old formula that man's inheritance is dou-
ble, is the critical fact that the sociocultural level in man
feeds back down and alters his psychobiological make-up; in
short, higher levels do influence lower levels. Even in terms
of his biological constitution, man is not simply an organ-
ism like any other organism, for even his organic form and
process have been socioculturally altered. In sum, much of
man's biological inheritance has been socioculturally con-
structed. Indeed, the old formula that "man makes himself"
has deeper dimensions than suspected. Further, this theoret-
ically profound argument is reinforced by Durkheim's insis-
tence that these new desires represent "moral forces," and
thus, must consequently be opposed by moral forces. As Durk-
heim later insisted, even the features of our immorality are
the expression of our system of morality (eg. see PECM:119).
This same principle was the source of a number of Durkheim's
more stimulating propositions, including the normality of
crime; and we shall use it as a key guide which to later in-
troduce some surprises into Durkheim's own schemas.

Given these negative and positive poles, let us next
explore how Durkheim proposed that the original destructive
or anomic energies of the pre-social ego are contained and
redirected by society as the fount of moral discipline. Here
we see Durkheim suggesting almost a simple one-to-one cor-
respondence between the negative qualities of this pre-social
go, and the positive qualities of morality. Proceeding from
his initial metaphor of the indefinite expansion of the ra-
dius of the energy of the pre-socialized ego, in Moral Edu-
cation Durkheim first pictured morality as "like so many
moulds with limiting boundaries into which we must pour our
behavior" (ME:26). Since the energies of the organic ego
have no determinate form of their own, they can only attain
human form and shape through acceptance of definite and con-
stant rules of social conduct. "The function of morality is,
in the first place, to determine conduct, to fix it, to e-
liminate the element of individual arbitrariness ... moral-
ity is basically a constant thing" (ME:27). According to Durkheim, the first thing that the unsocialized child must be taught is that regularity of conduct required not only for survival, but for continued social interaction.

Insofar as our inclinations, instincts, and desires lack any counterbalance, insofar as our conduct hangs on the relative intensity of uncontrolled dispositions, these dispositions are gusts of wind, erratic stop-start affairs characteristic of children and primitives, which as they endlessly split the will against itself, dissipate it on the winds of caprice and preclude its gaining the unity and continuity that are the essential preconditions of personality. It is precisely in this development of self-mastery that we build up moral discipline (ME:46).

In contrast to the potentially infinite passions of the isolated organic ego, the very first defining characteristic of morality, as socially constructed, is regularity, stability, in a word, definition.

But Durkheim then emphasized that there is more to morality than simply the stability and regularity of life provided by social norms, by cultural rules and meanings. A related aspect of morality is focus on attainable goals.

Morality is basically a discipline. All discipline has a double objective: to promote a certain regularity in people's conduct, and to provide them with determinate goals that at the same time limit their horizons (ME:47).

As we shall discover later, and as Giddens (1971b:225-6) emphasizes, both aspects of assigning goals to the ego are crucial--goals need to be both clearly definable and attainable. But if the individual ego is unable to either regularize its own energies, or to rise above its own egocentricity to devote its own energies to the attainment of defined goals, whence derives these devotions? Why should we do violence to our own natures?

Surely power or constraint alone is not sufficient. In Weberian terms, the distinction Durkheim next draws is couched in terms of the source of legitimate moral authority. As always, underlying Durkheim's notion of legitimate authority is the notion of the sacred. Ultimately, the only force able to pull the ego out of its passionate self-centered
fane) orbit is the moral or spiritual power embodied in the respect for the sacred as the source of all legitimate moral authority. I repeat: when Durkheim spoke here of constraint, he meant it not in the sense of physical forces, but rather in terms of the respect due to the foundations of legitimate moral authority (Parsons missed this distinction).

By authority we must understand that influence which imposed upon us all the moral power that we acknowledge as superior to us (ME:29).

Morality is a system of commandments (ME:31).

Thus, regularity and deference to the inherent moral and conceptual superiority of collective processes constitute the first major characteristic of morality to Durkheim—namely, discipline.

At the root of the moral life there is, besides the preference for regularity, the notion of moral authority. Furthermore, these two aspects of morality are closely linked, their unity deriving from a more complex idea that embraces them both. This is the concept of discipline. Discipline regularizes conduct. It implies repetitive behavior under determinate conditions. But discipline does not emerge without authority—a regulating authority.... The fundamental element of morality is the spirit of discipline (ME:31).

There is an additional element constituting morality besides discipline and obligatory respect—namely, desirability. Durkheim later elaborated this element in his article "The Determination of Moral Facts." While Parsons (1949) tried to claim that this notion of desirability—of wishing to achieve the good—represented a key breakthrough in Durkheim's moral theory, we do not agree, since we now see that Durkheim's earlier notion of constraint did not refer primarily to a crudely positivistic notion of external physical constraint. In fact, this distinction first appeared in The Division of Labor in the material that was suppressed in later editions, but which can be found in the appendix to Simpson's translation. In contrast to Parsons, Durkheim assumed all along that internalized obligation referred to the sacredness of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Hence, being drawn toward sacredness—its inherent desirabil-
ity—follows just as much as obligation from its role as the source of legitimacy. Clearly, all these basic elements of morality—discipline, authority, obligation or duty, and desirability—are intimately bound up together in Durkheim's basic moral theory. We shall also briefly explore some additional factors, such as attachment to social groups and personal autonomy, which complete the basic outlines of Durkheim's theory of morality. However important a clearer presentation of Durkheim's moral theory may be, it is not here our present task. Rather, we must now return to further explore our original problem: why did Durkheim so emphasize discipline as the very key to morality?

Only if we begin to perceive the depths and magnitude of Durkheim's assignment of negative and even dangerous traits to the pre-socialized ego, can we hope to understand how he could insist: "Discipline derives its raison d'être from itself; it is good that man is disciplined" (ME: 32). Let us now follow Durkheim as he rhetorically asks: "What makes moral discipline good?" In clear contrast to the Utilitarian and Romantic moralists alike, Durkheim observed how his hard-line comments may be seen by some as an affront to "widespread human sentiment." Since such sentiments may still be "widespread," we shall now briefly explore Durkheim's rhetorical attack on competing counter-principles, an exercise that is valuable because it clearly reveals how his position differed not only from his opponents, but also from many reigning tacit presuppositions of our own day.

To limit, to restrain—this is to deny, to impede the process of living and thus partially to destroy; and all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it be good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits that it cannot overcome? If life is not good, what is there of worth in the world? To be is to act, to live, and any reduction of life is a diminution of being. Does not all constraint, by definition, do violence to the nature of things? It was just such reasoning that led Bentham to see in law an evil scarcely tolerable, which could only be reasonably justified when it was clearly indispensable (ME: 35-6).

Clearly, the Utilitarians' penchant for laissez faire and their unprecedented claim that unbridled egoism will inevitably lead,
by a natural identity of interests, to altruism, presumes the
investing of the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego with precisely all those virtues that Durkheim progressively stripped away. Against this investment, Durkheim rhetoricized:

Must one view discipline simply as an external palpable police force, whose single raison d'être is to prevent certain behaviors and which, beyond such preventive action, has no other function? Or, on the contrary, may it not be, as our analysis leads us to suppose, a means sui generis of moral education, having an intrinsic value which places its own special imprint upon moral character (ME:37)?

To buttress his own case that "discipline in itself is good," Durkheim proposed a series of positive functions played by moral disciplining of the pre-socialized organic ego. First, as Parsons later argued, social interaction cannot successfully proceed without shared mutual expectations; thus, regularized communal norms provide the basic substructure of social life.

At each point in time, it is necessary that the functioning of the familial, vocational, and civic life be assured; to this end, it is necessary that the person be free from an incessant search for appropriate conduct. Norms must be established which determine what proper relationships are, and to which people conform. Deference to established norms is the stuff of our daily duties (ME:37).

In contrast, however, to Parsons (and note the way functionalism is linked with Utilitarian attitudes), Durkheim insisted that "Such an analysis and justification of discipline is scarcely sufficient. For we cannot account for an institution simply by demonstrating its social utility" (ME:38).

Therefore, Durkheim next emphasized that the very nature of man--since he represents only a small part of the universe--can attain fulfillment only if this prior limitation is accepted. In opposition to traditional religionists who portrayed man's nature and "the flesh" as inherently evil, Durkheim argued that the preference for asceticism which he shares with these religions is thus "not good in and of itself." Rather, all beings can only realize their true nature through acceptance of their prior particularity.

If we believe that discipline is useful, indeed necessary for the individual, it is because it seems to us
demanded by nature itself. It is the way in which nature realizes itself normally, not a way of minimizing or destroying nature. Like everything else, man is a limited being: he is part of a whole. Physically, he is part of the universe; morally, he is part of society. Hence, he cannot, without violating his nature, try to supersede the limits imposed on him. Indeed, everything that is most basic in him partakes of this quality of partialness or particularity. To say that one is a person is to say that he is distinct from all others; this distinction implies limitation. If then, from our point of view, discipline is good, it is not that we regard the work of nature with a rebellious eye, or that we see here a diabolical scheme that must be foiled; but that man's nature cannot be itself except as it is disciplined. If we deem it essential that natural inclinations be held within certain bounds, it is not because that nature seems to us bad, or because we deny the right to gratification; on the contrary, it is because otherwise such natural inclinations could have no hope of the satisfaction they merit (ME: 50-1).

Now, clearly one of the factors distinguishing us from others, yet by which each of us completes our nature—is our own personality. Durkheim next argued that personality—an only develop if the ego accepts the limiting boundaries distinguishing it from the rest of the world and from others.

Discipline is thus useful, not only in the interests of society and as the indispensable means without which regular cooperation would be impossible, but for the welfare of the individual himself. By means of discipline we learn the control of desire without which man could not achieve happiness. Hence, it even contributes in large measure to the development of that which is of fundamental importance for each of us: our personality (ME:48).

In terms of socialization and education, especially the moralizing of the ego—the first prerequisite is that the child be taught self-discipline. To Durkheim, self-discipline was the key precondition for the successful construction of the personality structure, and the subsequent welfare of the individual.

The capacity for constraining our inclinations, for restraining ourselves—the ability that we acquire in the school of moral discipline—is the indispensable condition for the emergence of reflective, individual will. The rule, because it teaches us to restrain and master ourselves, is a means of emancipation and of freedom (ME:48).
It is important to emphasize that Durkheim did not attempt to justify mastering the inordinate desires of the "enemy within" in terms of the supposed evilness of man's nature. Nor did he consider the role of moral discipline in the educational process as simply a "police action," designed to prevent the depredations of one freedom against another.

Moral discipline not only buttresses the moral life... it performs an important function in forming character and personality in general. In fact, the most essential element of character is this capacity for restraint—as they say, of inhibition—which allows us to contain our passions, our desires, our habits, and subject them to law (ME:46).

Now, the subjection and transformation of pre-social anomie into a sociocultural nomos is not merely the means for creating character, but more importantly, the acceptance of rules, meanings, and determinate horizons constitutes the very preconditions of human happiness, freedom, and even individual health.

We should not see in the discipline to which we subject children a means of constraint necessary only when it seems indispensable for preventing culpable conduct. Discipline is in itself a factor sui generis of education. Through discipline and by means of it alone are we able to teach the child to rein in his desires, to set limits to his appetites of all kinds, to limit and, through limitation, to define the goals of his activity. This limitation is the condition of happiness and of moral health (ME:43-44).

But how can the repression of individual desires be considered the way to freedom? Today our moral subsidization of the autonomous spontaneity of the unencumbered ego is so great that we have trouble even perceiving the structure of Durkheim's argument. For isn't freedom itself defined as the release from all previous, especially irrational, constraints? On the contrary, in a seeming paradox Durkheim contended that freedom only emerges out of the school of self-discipline.

Imagine a being liberated from all external restraint, a despot still more absolute than those of which history tells us, a despot that no external power can restrain or influence. By definition, the desires of such a being are irresistible. Shall we say, then, that he is all powerful? Certainly not, since he himself cannot resist his desires. They are masters of him, as of every-
thing else. He submits to them; he does not dominate them. In a word, when the inclinations are totally liberated, when nothing sets bounds to them, they themselves become tyrannical, and their first slave is precisely the person who experiences them. What a sad picture this presents (ME:44).

Since we moderns have so often conceived of freedom and autonomy in wholly negative terms, as a progressive shedding or disengagement from traditional claims on us, Durkheim's ironic paradox grates on our sensibilities and moral fervor. But Durkheim continued extending the irony by insisting on the impotency and self-destructiveness of ego-based desires.

A despot is like a child; he has a child's weaknesses because he is not master of himself. Self-mastery is the first condition of all true power, of all liberty worthy of the name. One cannot be master of himself when he has within him forces that, by definition, cannot be mastered.... Since there is nothing to restrain them, they inevitably go to violent extremes, which are self-destroying (ME:45).

Certainly, Durkheim's insights here run forcefully against the modern ethos that liberation is to be primarily found in continuous release, instead of self-mastery.

Not only freedom but happiness itself, Durkheim argued, is attainable only if we learn to inhibit our inherent and potentially insatiable egoistic desires. The very act of scaling down these expansive energies enables them to gain the possibility of satisfaction.

The totality of moral regulations really forms about each person an imaginary wall, at the foot of which a multitude of human passions simply die without being able to go further. For the same reason—that they are contained—it becomes possible to satisfy them (ME:42).

The irony continues, for the very constriction of horizons that would inevitably bring forth a mixture of indignation and pathos from representatives of our contemporary liberating subcultures, instead brings relief to human nature, Durkheim contended. He thus counseled us in the seemingly paradoxical puzzles of a very different therapeutic—that is, human happiness can only be attained to the extent to which the inherent passions of the pre-socialized ego can be constrained or disciplined to embrace only regular, determinate, and achievable goals.
Rather than instilling the drive for individual ambition and fulfillment of our limitless human potential, the prime function of education, Durkheim argued, is to inculcate the spirit of restraint and realizable ambitions.

Education must help the child understand that there are limits based on the nature of things, that is to say, in the nature of each of us. This has nothing to do with insidiously inculcating a spirit of resignation in the child; or curbing his legitimate ambitions; or preventing him from seeing the conditions existing around him. Such proposals would contradict the very principles of our social system. But he must be made to understand that the way to be happy is to set proximate and realizable goals, corresponding to the nature of each person, and to attempt to reach objectives by straining neurotically and unhappily toward infinitely distant and consequently inaccessible goals.... We must make the child appreciate that he cannot rely for happiness upon unlimited power, knowledge, or wealth; but that it can be found in very diverse situations, that each of us has his sorrows as well as his joys, that the important thing is to discover a goal compatible with one’s abilities, one which allows him to realize his nature without seeking to surpass it in some manner, thrusting it violently and artificially beyond its natural limits*(ME:49-50).

Conversely, Durkheim argued that moral discipline is not only necessary for social functioning, to complete man's nature, to develop personality or character structure, for freedom and happiness, but moreover, discipline is essential for health (see also Book Three). Without constraint of the egocentric passions of one half of human nature, a constitutional human disease rages out of control.

We have observed that discipline is often viewed as a violation of man's natural constitution, since it impedes his unrestricted development. Is this contention sound? Quite to the contrary, an inability to restrict one's self within determinate limits is a sign of disease--with respect to all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for all kinds of biological behavior. With a certain amount of nourishment a normal man is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be satisfied (ME:38).

Indeed, Durkheim argued, again and again, here and especially in Suicide, that the release from the constraints of moral discipline--or anomie--and the release of the insatiable passions harbored in the human ego--can only result in suffering. The
inevitable consequence of the release of the affliction of "dis-eases of the infinite" is self-destruction.

A need, a desire, freed from all restraints, and all rules, no longer geared to some determinate objective and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it. What gratification indeed, can such a desire yield, since by definition it is incapable of being satisfied? An insatiable thirst cannot be slaked *(ME:39-40).*

Thus, the only true way for man to avoid the affliction of "insatiable thirst" and self-destruction--Durkheim's equivalent of the metaphysical notions of evil and sin--is for the will to become disciplined in the "school of duty"--that is, in social obligation.

In order to have a full sense of self-realization, man, far from needing to see limitless horizons unrolling before him, in reality finds nothing as unhappy as the indeterminate reach of such a prospect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career without any definite terminus, he can only be happy when involved in definite and specific tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however, that man must arrive at some fixed position where ultimately he finds tranquility. In intermittent steps one can pass from one special task to others equally specific, without drowning in the dissolving sense of limitlessness. The important thing is that behavior have a clear-cut objective, which may be grasped and which limits and determines it (ME:40).

Durkheim completed his outline of his philosophy of "human finitude" and the need for limitation by suggesting that man too must submit to the natural law that "all life is complex equilibrium."

In order to live, we have to confront the multiple requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital energy. The amount of energy that we can and should devote to achieving each particular goal is necessarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of the strength at our disposal and the relative significance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a complex equilibrium whose elements limit one another; this balance cannot be disrupted without producing unhappiness or illness. Moreover, those activities in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupted become a source of pain to the person--and for the same reason--the disproportionate development accorded to them (ME:39).
Thus, with his philosophy of "human finitude" Durkheim provides an explanation—a "theodicy" and a "therapeutic" if you will—of man's essential nature, the causes of the inevitable tensions renting his equilibrium, and causing human suffering, the way forward to happiness, and so on. Even as a positivist, Durkheim clearly stands in an honorable tradition of moral philosophy reaching all the way back to Aristotle and his Ethics.

C. A Preliminary Critique

It is not my purpose to engage here in a full-scale critique of Durkheim's sociological theory of moral reality. Further, I shall relegate many criticisms of Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature as they are relevant to our present concerns to Book Three. Instead, I wish now to merely note the following points which may prove relevant to our subsequent explorations. Hopefully, this brief examination of the basic outlines of Durkheim's early moral theory has revealed some of the many reasons why Durkheim considered discipline absolutely necessary to restrain the potentially insatiable and egocentric passions of the organic ego. However, I feel compelled to lodge some objections. My first critique is directed at the very topic which Durkheim chose here for his own—namely, the grounds of moral obligation.

Now, it is only by perceiving the role of the extremely negative, even chaotic, reality of the insatiable passions of the pre-socialized human ego in posing dangers to the moral life, that I can even begin to understand why Durkheim assigned discipline the pre-eminent role in the moral life. Certainly, by this disproportionate emphasis, Durkheim largely ignored another fundamental aspect which many moral theorists have postulated as the very foundation of morality—namely, equity or reciprocity. It was precisely at this point that the great Piaget objected to Durkheim's moral theory, for he noted that Durkheim's notion of morality was largely hierarchical, as if rules were unilaterally handed down from on high to the child.
Instead (for example, in *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, 1965), Piaget distinguished two different forms of the construction of morality—the hierarchical form, and the type of reciprocity negotiated between peers, especially among children playing games for example. Piaget, of course, was more interested in the second type, while Durkheim was more interested in the first. Yet, is any account of the genesis of morality complete without discussion of both obligation and reciprocity? Indeed, we would do well to remember Durkheim's own dual emphasis on society as both the source and the object of moral rules; morality regulates social relations.

This curious lapse in Durkheim's theoretical framework helps to explain why—even when working within Durkheim's own positivistic frame of reference—he gave so little attention to the varied rationales underlying specific types of social obligations. In Durkheim's system we scarcely find mention of the reasons for the many moral rules and prohibitions which guide our lives—namely, the concern with the potential harm (whether physical, moral, or spiritual) that we may do to others (whether by omission or commission) by our actions (whether they be consciously intended or merely emerge as unanticipated results).

Further, Durkheim's limitation of the object of morality to social groups slight the fact that moral rules and individual duties are directed not only to society and self but even to the world. Here Durkheim was led astray by his later insistence that the choice of physical objects with which to invest sacredness is largely arbitrary; on the contrary, I maintain that the choice of prime symbols is rarely arbitrary (eg. see Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols*, 1973, or Victor Turner, *The Forest of Symbols*, 1967). If there be techno-logic, there also has to be symbol logic; and here the particular characteristics of the symbolic object in a symbolic process are often crucial. Moreover, how could we, within the confines of Durkheim's sociological system, even begin to speak of an ecological conscience, of the pressing need for a "wilderness ethic" (eg. see Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac*, 1966, or Christo-
pher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 1974)?

Clearly, Durkheim's ascetic obsession with repressing the inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recognition of potentially significant wider moral horizons. However, even given the magnitude and significance of this obsession in his system, Durkheim was still often not clear about the precise source of this important insatiable drive. Earlier I suggested that, given the logic of his theoretical grounding of his argument in man's evolutionary status as the sociocultural animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and biology was hereafter subject to critical review by the fact that, by definition, man's sociocultural achievement had changed the very structure of his organic inheritance. In addition, it seemed clear that biological appetites were restrained naturally--either by physiological limitation or by the upper limits of carrying capacity of the supporting environment. Unfortunately, however, Durkheim didn't seem to perceive these fuller implications of his original evolutionary propositions; a pity for both him and for us. Had he done so, my task in elucidating the possible extensions of this logic in terms of the wider implications of his Suicide schemas would have been greatly eased. In other words, if the potential for insatiability is derived from man's generic essence as the sociocultural animal, then it follows that we must look to the specific configurations of cultural values in any historical society for the specific expressions--whether realized, repressed, or redirected--of this potential drive for infinity. For example, Durkheim unfortunately often speaks of the unsocialized child as almost an animal. And in much of Moral Education and Suicide the Durkheim seemed to revert back to the position which his own theoretical logics had seemed to confute--namely, that the source of this key insatiability (his positivist analogy with old notions of evil and sin)--was biological, that is, expressed primarily in terms of the sensual appetites.

Thus, by a sort of covert operation in the underground of thought, Durkheim's positivism led him here (however much he
may have consciously rejected the identification) toward linking in his system the source of human suffering to the "original sin" (our organic inheritance) embodied in the inordinate desires expressed through the sensual appetites (the "flesh"). The tension in human existence derives from the inherent conflict in the nature of man between these two separate lower and higher entities warring in each man's breast. However, Durkheim's early tragic vision did not include here the perhaps more critical sources of tension and suffering in the human condition. I refer to the wrenching, exhausting conflicts between competing value systems or moralities, especially when these compete for ascendancy within the same person. I believe social psychologists refer to this situation as "cognitive dissonance." Certainly, Max Weber, Durkheim's contemporary, knew from tragic personal experience (eg. see Mitzman, 1971) the tensions introduced by the warring demons holding the "very fibers of our lives." The later Durkheim moved closer to this position, as we shall soon see.

Now, one might attempt to rescue part of Durkheim's "brittle synthesis" by suggesting a distinction between his conflation of the human ego in terms of the concrete ego of the child, for instance, and the abstract generic essence of the nature of the human species. Nevertheless, Durkheim's logical troubles have only begun. For we have seen that Durkheim had insisted, when he came to theoretically ground man's nature in terms of his evolutionary achievement, that man is man not only because of those sociocultural achievements known as civilization" (eg. ME:325), but also because his generic species nature is based on a "newly awakened conscience," "spiritual forces," "moral and mental life," and so forth. How, then, can it be that this generic species essence (I use the term in the evolutionary, not the metaphysical, sense) of man-as-man—even if expressed in the concrete pre-socialized ego of the child—could simultaneously be the source of both the amorality of the non-social ego and the moral discipline of society? If man is, by nature, social and cultural, then from what derives his essential amorality? His passionate insatiability?
Given the thrust of Durkheim's evolutionary arguments, we have already ruled out of court man's animal nature (since our biological needs and processes are naturally disciplined). The only candidate left is the old standby--the pre-socialized ego; but how can we reconcile the social and moral origins of the human individual--even the ego, evolutionarily considered--with its supposed insatiability? How can Durkheim legitimately have sought to maintain his stark dichotomy between the individual and the social, when he himself had insisted that the very foundations of the human individual--as an 'awakened conscience' a new reflective center--emerges in evolutionary terms only from sociocultural origins? In other words, is the ego more important here as the source of insatiable drives, or as representing the absence of moral rules and rational concepts? I believe the latter is more acceptable, and, indeed, that is the direction in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop.

Now, Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways; and indeed, in other places the opposition is much simpler and less paradoxical when he speaks as if the basically amoral passions of the troublesome ego derived from the lower organic levels. In that case, the only logical conclusion is that the human ego is virtually identical with animal egos, with the biological ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself. There is, however, scant justification for pursuing such an abstracted argument very far beyond its obvious applications, and thus, evident limitations. Certainly this alternative is not a sociocultural explanation (see also Book Three). Therefore, we are left little choice but to conclude that Durkheim's thought on this absolutely crucial question of the source of insatiability--whether it be the pre-socialized organic ego or human society and culture itself--did, indeed, represent a "brittle synthesis." Surely much of the unsatisfactory "brittleness" of this first view is that it represented an unwarranted incorporation--even with the rhetorical inversion--of a foreign element into Durkheim's thought (see Book Three). Further, the first solution represented a way of metaphorically translating and anchoring in his positivistic system some of the tradi-
tional moral elements such as sin and evil which otherwise could not be accommodated.

Moreover, we need not really be surprised that, even as a pioneer sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts be explained socially, Durkheim's concurrent other role as a positivist moral philosopher constantly led him to surreptitiously contravene the basic methodological rules that he himself had laid down as the foundation of his school. Indeed, few have noticed how inconsistent Durkheim was in regularly assigning key dynamic elements of human action to the very abstraction—the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego—which he had so powerfully criticized in the "social contract" theorists. Here, Durkheim's logical flaw was that rather than portraying the child as a socially neutral entity, possessed of certain proclivities and potentialities awaiting cultural imprinting, on the contrary, he constantly pictured human nature as the powerful source of negative and destructive passions. Besides the rhetorical mistake of accepting a basic image from his polemical opponents, here reinforced by Cartesian metaphors rife in his own culture, Durkheim's dark doctrine of generic human nature gets him into the serious bind, as it does to all social thinkers who unwittingly insist on basing society and culture on psychological or biological premises, of proposing that some of the most dynamic, generative, and significant sources of human action are to be derived primarily from lower, non-human, non-sociocultural levels. Besides running directly counter to his own notion of society and culture as evolutionary emergents, and social facts as sui generis phenomena that cannot be reduced to lower levels, and against my definition of man as the sociocultural animal, and further, against Parsons' (1949) and others' important thesis that the advance of social science depends on the progressive over-coming of "naturalistic" (i.e. physical, biological, psychological, geographical, etc.) reductions by properly drawn sociocultural explanations, Durkheim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as darkly and destructively egoistic and insatiable implicitly reduces society and culture to the relatively passive role of
constraining or simply redirecting the really critical organic desires (see also Book Three for fuller development of these objections).

Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here—I mean extending a key Cartesian logic deeply embedded in his own cultural tradition, and rhetorically inverting the high valuation of the generic individual so insistently proclaimed by his polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of positivist moral science—barred complete and unconditional embrace of the fully sociocultural position. The sociological position more fully consistent with Durkheim's own stated methodological prescriptions is that society and culture should be considered, both in generic and evolutionary terms, as the crucially important generative and directive sources of the most significant aspects of human action. In sum, despite the evident cultural and polemical functions served by the early version of his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknowledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of interpretive root dichotomies originally anchored in this same image, nonetheless, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher intrudes too strongly here for us to follow him in his fundamental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as inherently insatiable.

D. Durkheim's Tragic Vision of the Human Condition: His Later Notion of the Duality of Human Nature

Preface. Although Durkheim's notion of the endemic antagonism between the individual ego and the socially constructed person represented a seminal dichotomy from early in his career, it was not until much later that Durkheim came to explicitly and systematically formulate this notion as a constitutive foundation of his doctrine. Those secondary observers who have missed the significance of this crucial split in man's nature running through his earlier works are not alone, for even Durkheim's critics in his own day failed to recognize this dichotomy as one of the driving forces behind his masterpiece The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life. Yet, Durkheim announced in the introduction his intention to reformulate this old staple of traditional moral philosophy.

According to the well-known formula, man is double. There are two beings in him: an individual being which has its foundation in the organism, and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation—I mean society. This duality of our nature has its consequence in the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral ideal to a utilitarian motive, and in the order of thought, the irreducibility of reason to individual experience. In so far as he belongs to society, the individual transcends himself, both when he thinks and when he acts (EF:29).

Again and again in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim utilized the old formula of homo duplex in highly innovative ways. For example, in terms of the awakening of conscience and consciousness, and thus the emergence of the person in collective ritual, Durkheim explicitly referred to the duality of human nature.

This is the objective foundation of the idea of the soul: those representations whose flow constitutes our interior life are of two different species which are irreducible one into another. Some concern themselves with the external and material world; others, with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral superiority over the first. So we are really made up of two beings facing in different and almost contrary directions, one of whom exercises a real preeminence over the other. Such is the profound meaning of the antithesis which all men have more or less clearly conceived between the body and the soul, the material and the spiritual beings who coexist within us. Moralists and preachers have often maintained that no one can deny the reality of duty and its sacred character without falling into materialism. And it is true that if we have no idea of moral and religious imperatives, our psychical life will all be reduced to one level, all our states of consciousness will be on the same plane, and all feeling of duality will vanish. To make this duality intelligible, it is, of course, in no way necessary to imagine a mysterious and unrepresentable substance, under the name of the soul, which is opposed to the body.... It remains true that our nature is double; there really is a particle of divinity in us because there is within us a particle of these great ideas which are the soul of the group (EF:298-9).
Two years after publication of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim expressed surprise and chagrin that these underlying root dichotomies had not been adequately understood as the crucial foundation of that masterwork. The basic opposition with which Durkheim filled in the old formula of homo duplex was the contrast between the privatized physical sensations and appetites, almost the autistic, inward-turning of the organic ego, on the one hand, and the publicly communicable collective representations expressed in terms of the increasingly universalizable moral rules and rational concepts emerging from the generic sociocultural process, and embedded in the core structures of conscience and consciousness constituting the person.

The general failure of others to understand his crucial series of interpretive symbolic equations underlying the analytical framework of The Elementary Forms led Durkheim to reemphasize and explicitly articulate them in two important later addresses. In 1913, Durkheim contributed to an important discussion, published in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie (see Lukes, 1973:585), on "Le Probleme religieux et la dualite de la nature humaine." And in 1914, Durkheim published his article "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions" (in Wolff, 1960). Since the latter paper is Durkheim's most explicit statement of this doctrine, we shall focus on it here.

As noted earlier, in the very process of extending his root interpretive dichotomies, Durkheim's model tended to shift slightly but significantly on its rhetorical axes. First, insatiability was no longer the simple product of the inherently inordinate desires of the human pre-socialized ego. Rather than acting as the demonic source of destructive desires, the organic ego came to be portrayed as merely privatized and circumscribed by its own inherent limitations. Thus, it is most significant for our present purposes that Durkheim's concern shifted from emphasizing the presence of destructive drives in the pre-socialized generic ego, to the generic absence of moral rules and universalizable concepts (see also Book Three).

The antagonism between the two halves of human nature was, of course, still present, and even intensified. For now,
rather than the insatiability of the non-social half of human nature being branded as the cause of man's endemic torment, it was instead the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the conflicting demands of both the physically privatized organic ego and the claims of society on the moralized and rationalized person. Truly, it seemed man was "double," for the two beings in him represented different universes of being and valuing, of knowing and doing. "Torn between two masters"--it was this old image of man's tormented lot which lay at the heart of Durkheim's deepening tragic vision. Now, every endemic conflict requires that we finally take our stand, and choose which side will prevail. In this light, Durkheim's later sociological work can be seen, in the last analysis, as that of a positivist moral philosopher issuing a "priestly" call for the necessary and prolonged sacrifice of the ego, so that logos -- universality in morality and rationality in thought--might ultimately come to prevail. Durkheim's call for a kind of modern stoic asceticism embodied the essence of his own sociological system and that of the Durkheimian school. In the face of the spreading aggressions and impending doom of World War I, Durkheim, as the "high priest" of positivist moral sociology, issued final calls for the sacrifice of the ego--or eros--and the enthronement of reason--or logos.

1. Ego is to Person as Body is to Soul

When he finally came to explicitly and systematically articulate his philosophical anthropology, Durkheim began by insisting that "the constitutional duality of human nature"--especially in terms of the root opposition between the body and the soul--is a universal phenomenon. The antagonism between physical and moral-rational principles is perennial, and always and everywhere these invidious dualisms between body and soul, between Geist and Welt, are inextricably bound up with the religious realms of the sacred and the profane. Inevitably, things connected with the sacred principle are invested with higher dignity, while things linked with the profane principle, by virtue of their diametrically opposed nature to the divine,
are reserved for general opprobrium.

As a positivist moral philosopher, Durkheim attempted to "save the phenomena" by translating these seemingly universal dualities of human nature into purely sociological form-
ulas. Durkheim insisted that any universal social or cultural phenomena cannot be illusory, that is, either mere ignorant superstition or misplaced metaphysics. The universal must be true--this was one of Durkheim's fundamental principles. There-
fore, since Durkheim presumed that symbols are real in their causes and effects, he proposed that the duality of human na-
ture, especially in terms of the ubiquitous opposition between the body and the soul, can be deciphered as merely a symbolic projection of a constitutive experiential reality. Again and again, Durkheim sounded the same refrain.

A belief that is as universal and permanent as this cannot be purely illusory. There must be something in man that gives rise to this feeling that his na-
ture is dual, a feeling that men in all known civi-
lizations have experienced (DHN:326).

Against competing monistic images of man, which dismiss this duality as illusory, Durkheim contended that, since this inner tension has been felt by all peoples in all times and places, it cannot thereby be legitimately dismissed simply as one of man's earlier aberrations.

It is still true that at all times man has been dis-
quieted and malcontent. He has always felt that he is pulled apart, divided against himself; and the belief and practices to which, in all societies and all civi-
lizations, he has always attached the greatest value, have as their object not to suppress these inevitable divisions but to attenuate their consequences, to give them meaning and purpose, to make them more bearable, and at the very least, to console man for their exist-
ence. We cannot admit that this universal and chronic state of malaise is the product of a simple aberration, that man has been the creator of his own suffering, and that he has stupidly persisted in it, although his na-
ture predisposed him to live harmoniously (DHN:330-1).

Durkheim's deep sense that this duality is irretriev-
ably embedded in the very nature of life can be seen in a re-
port of a doctoral examination in 1910. Lukes reports the fol-
lowing exchanges:
Durkheim: There is a sense in which "we" are subject to physical laws, and another in which "we" perform the moral law: we are double.

Pradines (the candidate): I wanted to put an end to this dualism.

Durkheim: You have not succeeded. Reason, you say, unifies the tendencies in the moral law just as in the physical law it unifies natural phenomena, but do you not see that this antagonism is in us, in ourselves? What difficulty is there here? How can you imagine that a dialectical trick will unify this dualism, which all thinkers before you have expressed, each in his own language, some tracing the social to the perceptible, others opposing the rational to the individual, but all seeing one characteristic, the most profound of all moral characteristics. You who claim to have so keen an apprehension of complexity, how is it that you have not felt that there is always in us something which is elevating, while another part of us draws us in an opposite direction?

Pradines: It has seemed to me that classical rationalism was wrong not to put an end to this undeniable dualism.

Durkheim: Such a solution is impossible. You have found in all systems an internal opposition. You have denounced this as a contradiction; you should have see that this contradiction is in life itself (Lukes, 1973:646).

This last phrase—"the contradiction is in life itself"—aptly sums up Durkheim's evolving tragic sense of the human condition.

Durkheim further suggested that "Psychological analysis has, in fact, confirmed the existence of this duality—-it finds it at the very heart of our inner life" (DHN:326). Durkheim found this psychological validation in the apparent constitutional opposition between the physically rooted sensations and appetites, on the one hand, and conceptual thought and moral rules on the other. Although we have noted these dichotomies before, it is important to recognize how these oppositions moved to the very center of Durkheim's later thought, while concern with the insatiability of the pre-socialized organic ego faded into the background. The physically rooted ego was no longer seen as insatiable, just fatally circumscribed in its own private orbit.

Our intelligence, like our activity, presents two very different forms: on the one hand, are sensations and sensory tendencies; on the other, conceptual thought and moral activity. Each of these two
parts of ourselves represents a separate pole of our being, and these two poles are not only distinct from one another, but are opposed to one another. Our sensory appetites are necessarily egoistic: they have our individuality and it alone as their object. When we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, and so on, without bringing any other tendency into play, it is ourselves and ourselves alone, that we satisfy. Conceptual thought and moral activity are, on the contrary, distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct to which they conform can be universalized. Therefore, by definition, they pursue impersonal ends. Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other than ourselves. A sensation of color or sound is closely dependent on my individual organism, and I cannot detach the sensation from my organism. In addition, it is impossible for me to make my awareness pass over into someone else.... Concepts, on the contrary, are always common to a plurality of men. They are constituted by means of words, and neither the vocabulary nor the grammar of a language is the work or product of one particular person. They are rather the results of a collective elaboration, and they express the anonymous collectivity that employs them.... Because they are held in common, concepts are the supreme instrument of all intellectual exchange. By means of them, minds communicate (DHN:327).

To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites are necessarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting particularity meant that they cannot, by definition, rise above their purely private sensational level. On the other hand, since concepts and moral rules are social both in their origin and object—that is, impersonal and collective—they tend to become universalized. Note that Durkheim here explicitly suggests that these lower level organic needs can be satisfied; yet, by virtue of their purely physical base, such need-satisfactions remain egocentric and thus inherently private.

Therefore, these two levels of our organism and our moral and intellectual life are opposed to one another as the individual ego is contrasted with the impersonal collective culture, and thus, as private is opposed to public. Since the two beings within us—ego and person (body and soul)—are simultaneously drawn in different directions, Durkheim maintained that man's inner life is irretrievably marked by a oscillation back and forth between these two opposing poles of our existence. Because our inner life has a "double center of gravity,"
the perennial problem of resolving the competing claims of these beings and maintaining an integrated, coherent personality structure is greatly intensified.

These two aspects of our psychic life are, therefore, opposed to each other as the personal and the impersonal. There is in us a being that represents everything in relation to itself and from its own point of view; in everything that it does, this being has no other object but itself. There is another being in us, however, which knows things sub specie aeternitatis, as if it were participating in some thought other than its own, and which, in its acts, tends to accomplish ends that surpass its own. The old formula homo duplex is therefore verified by the facts. Far from being simple, our inner life has something that is like a double center of gravity. On the one hand, is our individuality--and more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the other is everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves (DHN:327-8).

The outlines of Durkheim's later tragic vision of life thus emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to the earlier emphasis on insatiability, but now directed instead to the inevitable discord between the two warring halves of our nature. Rather than portraying the ego and the person, the physical and the moral, the private and the public, the concrete and the universal halves of our beings, as necessarily complementary, Durkheim contended that these opposing forces wage an eternal struggle for ascendancy over our inner lives. To Durkheim, human reality is fundamentally conflictual.

Not only are these two groups of states of consciousness different in their origins and their properties, but there is a true antagonism between them. They mutually contradict and deny each other. We cannot pursue moral ends without causing a split within ourselves, without offending the instincts and the penchants that are most deeply rooted in our bodies. There is no moral act that does not imply a sacrifice, for, as Kant has shown, the law of duty cannot be obeyed without humiliating our individual sensitivity (DHN:328).

Durkheim thus insisted that living up to the demands of moral and intellectual life requires constant sacrifice of egocentric, purely privatized organic desires. In effect, Durkheim argued that the life of man-in-society-and-culture is made possible only through constant repression of all that is implied in egocentricity.
As Durkheim deepened the tension in the inner life of man by insisting that the antinomy between the two halves of human nature is irreconcilable, he came round again to the problem of insatiability, though in a rather different way. Now, man's inner torment comes from his inability to simultaneously satisfy both the biological and cultural halves of his inheritance.

This antinomy is so deep and so radical that it can never be completely resolved. How can we belong entirely to ourselves, and entirely to others at one and the same time? The ego cannot be something completely other than itself, for if it were, it would vanish--this is what happens in ecstasy. In order to think we must be, we must have an individuality. On the other hand, however, the ego cannot be entirely and exclusively itself, for, if it were, it would be emptied of all content. If we must be in order to think, then we must have something to think about. To what would consciousness be reduced if it expressed nothing but the body and its states? We cannot live without representing to ourselves the world around us and the objects of every sort which fill it. And because we represent it to ourselves, it enters into us and becomes part of us. Consequently, we value the world and are attached to it just as we are to ourselves. Something else in us besides ourselves stimulates us to act (DHN:328).

In his own way, Durkheim began to approach the old metaphysical problem of the relations between unity and plurality. For, if "in order to think we must be" (the Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum"), we must have an individuality that is directed both to ourselves and the external world. At the same time, however, Durkheim contended that because of the physical limitations of individual experience, we cannot raise ourselves independently and spontaneously to the level of universal validity. Instead, the only path from the eros of the ego to the universalizable logos of the collectivity is to transcend our isolated and limited physical existence through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, culture, and history. As Durkheim had said earlier: "Only the universal is rational. The particular and the concrete baffle understanding."

We understand only when we think in concepts. But sensory reality is not made to enter the framework of our concepts spontaneously and by itself. It
resists, and, in order to make it conform, we have to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to sorts of laborious operations that alter it so that the mind can assimilate it. However, we never completely succeed in mastering our sensations and in translating them completely into intelligible terms. They take on a conceptual form only by losing that which is most concrete in them, that which causes them to speak to our sensory beings and to involve it in action; and in so doing, they become something fixed and dead. Therefore, we cannot understand things without partially renouncing a feeling for life, and we cannot feel that life without renouncing the understanding of it (DHN:329).

Shades of Simmel! We now discover that, according to Durkheim, the deeper dimensions of the tragic paradox of the duality of human nature come not merely from the need for higher human levels to repress lower, non-human levels, but from the almost fatal double-bind that man finds himself in, especially in terms of the mounting costs of this self-inflicted violence. Inevitably, as we embark upon the journey from our own concrete particularity to collective universality and rationality, the necessarily increasing abstraction means that the feeling for the vital flow of life itself is lost. As with Simmel's view of the "tragedy of culture" and the "autonomization of forms" (in Wolff, 1950), sensational life is in continuous motion and process; but the abstract representations that are extern-alized and lifted out of this continuous flow thereby become frozen, things "fixed and dead." The inner struggle between these two poles of being and becoming is couched here not so much in terms of the Romantic notion of the inevitably and paradoxical duality between life (Spirit) and death (mechan-ism), as in terms of the opposition between eros and logos. I repeat: the real source of Durkheim's tragic vision of the human condition lies in an inescapable paradox; it is not simply the collective and public side of man must do violence to the organic ego, but rather that in this necessary process the original feeling for the flow and ebb of the life-process itself is lost. Ultimately, both ego and person--or eros and logos--stand clearly for eternally valuable and necessary, though eternally opposed, poles in the "double-bind" that is
human existence.

To emphasize this feeling of the tragedy inherent in the human condition, Durkheim characteristically returned to one of its preeminent expressions in his own cultural traditions--namely, to Pascal's formula that man is both "angel and beast." Thus, Durkheim's original dualism takes on increasingly diverse and profound overtones. To Durkheim, human reality is fundamentally conflictual; man is caught, by his very constitution, in a tragic "double-bind." The duality in the inner life of man means that suffering is rooted in our very nature.

This inner contradiction is one of the characteristics of our nature. According to Pascal's formula, man is both "angel and beast," and not exclusively one or the other. The result is that we are never completely in accord with ourselves for we cannot follow one of our natures without causing the other to suffer. Our joys can never be pure; there is always some pain mixed with them; for we can never simultaneously satisfy the two beings that are within us (DHN:329).

It is important to emphasize that, by this point, the key problem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was now rooted in the eternal contradiction and inner division between the two halves of our nature, rather than in simply burdening one side--the organic--with the blame. The inability of man to attain inner peace and harmony is due to the fact that man is "double" and "divided against himself." Indeed, this image of reality as inherently conflictual--isn't this what is meant by a philosophy of dualism?

Granting that "we are double," that "we are the realization of an antinomy," that "man is divided against himself," that "man is a monster of contradictions" who "can never satisfy himself," Durkheim then asked rhetorically: "But where do this duality and antinomy come from?" Now, Durkheim's drive to reformulate moral philosophy and action in purely positivist and sociologistical terms is clearly evident here when he insisted that, contrary to most contemporary sociologists (especially those who consider themselves "positivists" and "pure social scientists"), it is the prime task of the science of man (or as Durkheim once called it anthroposociologie), to
account for this wrenching dualism of human nature, the prime mover in human action. Durkheim first set aside both the opposing monistic versions of the two dominant modern cultural traditions as eliminating the problem rather than meeting its complexities. Further, he dismissed the ontological argument, dating at least from Plato, which was the source of the notion of homo duplex—namely, that two opposed worlds of being meet in man—spirit and matter, heaven and earth. To Durkheim, the old ontological metaphor recognized but did not explain the root origins of this opposition. Of course, it was just this type of metaphysical argument, embedded especially in the Catholic Cultural Tradition, which served as the source of much of the very moral philosophy which tacitly nourished Durkheim, and which also helped fuel the positivists' centuries-long revolt. As he set aside the last major contender—the neo-Kantian position which simply assigned these two opposing activities to opposing human faculties—Durkheim made the following crucial point. Contrary to all these contending positions, the "human spirit," far from being a generic given, must be considered a key sociocultural historical construction (see also the last chapter in this Book).

We have generally thought of man's mental nature as a sort of ultimate given which needs not to be accounted for. Thus we tend to believe that all has been said and done when we attach such and such a fact, whose causes we are seeking, to a human faculty. But why should the human spirit, which is—briefly—only a system of phenomena, be outside and above explanation? We know that our organism is the product of a genesis; why should it be otherwise with our psychic constitution (DHN:334)?

We see enunciated here a critical substantive principle of Durkheim's sociology (which we shall explore), one that would be developed later on by Marcel Mauss in his profound lecture "Une Categorie de l'esprit humain: la notion de personne, celle de 'moi'" (translated by L. Krader, 1968). Sociocultural analysis generally, and even philosophical discourse, would greatly improve if this critical principle were more widely understood.
After setting aside competing explanations, Durkheim moved to anchor the origins of ego and person in the universal opposition between the sacred and the profane.

The duality of our nature is thus only a particular case of that division of all things into the sacred and the profane that is the foundation of all religions, and it must be explained on the basis of the same principles (DHN:335).

Just as the profane can only be defined by contrast with the sacred, so too the organic ego is defined in opposition to a category of the human spirit--the socioculturally constructed person. As religion is double, so also the two poles of moral and intellectual existence echo within each of us.

It is not without reason, therefore, that man feels himself to be double: he actually is double. There are in him two classes of states of consciousness that differ from each other in origin and nature, and in the ends toward which they aim. One class merely expresses our organisms and the objects to which they are most directly related. Strictly individual, the states of consciousness of this class connect us only with ourselves, and we can no more detach them from us than we can detach ourselves from our bodies. The states of consciousness of the other class, on the contrary, come to us from society; they transfer society into us and connect us with something that surpasses us. Being collective, they are impersonal; they turn us toward ends that we hold in common with other men; it is through them and them alone that we can communicate with others. It is, therefore, quite true that we are made up of two parts, and are like two beings, which, although they are closely associated, are composed of very different elements and orient us in opposite directions.... In brief, this duality corresponds to the double existence that we lead concurrently: the one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the other social and nothing but an extension of society.

The origin of the antagonism that we have described is evident from the very nature of the elements involved in it. The conflicts ... are between the sensations and the sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the intellectual and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that passions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity--whether theoretical or practical--is dependent on social causes (DHN: 337-38).

Finally, Durkheim returned to the theme of the suffering inherent in the duality of the human condition. Pain and pro-
longed inner anguish are the lot of mankind, split as we are between the forever conflicting claims of our physical and moral selves. Durkheim's "social reality principle" insisted on an inevitable clash of social forces with the unencumbered ego. As with all split loyalties, the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying both halves of human nature is the cause of perpetual tension and man's endemic inner torment.

The painful character of the dualism of human nature is explained by this hypothesis. There is no doubt that if society were only the natural and spontaneous development of the individual, these two parts of ourselves would harmonize and adjust to each other without clashing and without friction: the first part, since it is only the extension and, in a way, the complement of the second, would encounter no resistance from the latter. In fact, however, society has its own nature, and consequently, its requirements are quite different from those of our nature as individuals: the interests of the whole are not necessarily those of the part. Therefore, society cannot be formed or maintained without our being required to make perpetual and costly sacrifice. Because society surpasses us, it obliges us to surpass ourselves; and to surpass itself, a being must, to some degree, depart from its nature—a departure that does not take place without causing more or less painful tensions (DHN:338).

Moreover, as society and culture grow increasingly complex and differentiated, and thus, the need for rationality and universality in thought and action grows correspondingly, man's "double-bind" deepens, and inner tensions increase.

Human malaise continues to increase. The great religions of modern man are those which insist the most on the existence of the contradictions in the midst of which we struggle. These continue to depict us as tormented and suffering, while only the crude cults of inferior societies breathe forth and inspire a joyful confidence. For what religions express is the experience through which humanity has lived, and it would be very surprising if our nature became unified and harmonious when we feel that our discords are increasing (DHN:331-32).

In many ways, Durkheim's tragic vision of life was close to Weber's, for both, in their most prophetic, pessimistic, and profound moments, saw that each of us must finally choose among the "inner demons holding the very fibers of our lives" which to devote our life-energies. The choice, never easy, always painful, must be made in full awareness both of the violence
we do to the lesser, though more vital, half of our nature, and the growing historical necessity of such asceticism. Both Durkheim and Weber demanded that ego and eros give way to logos and the morally disciplined person if western civilization was to survive.

We must do violence to certain of our strongest inclinations. Therefore, since the role of the social being in our single selves will grow ever-more important as history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there will ever be an era in which man is require to resist himself to a lesser degree, an era in which we can live a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization (DHN:339).

A stark vision indeed--the inner anguish of the constitutional duality of human nature deepened by historical necessity. In the face of this "theodicy," it was precisely the steadfast refusal to endorse any of the myriad and competing "therapuetics" abroad in their own days which counseled "transcendence" and diverse modes of "jumping out of your skin" which marks both Durkheim and Weber as moral realists, and ultimately as tragic figures. In one of those hidden ironies of history, wherein the gods take revenge on those titans who challenge them, both Durkheim and Weber, from opposing sides of the first European catastrophe of the twentieth century, felt compelled, each in his own way, to issue calls for the values of logos—universality and rationality—and to stand steadfastly by their fates, and simply "meet the demands of the day." Weber died within a year or so after the end of World War I; Durkheim died in 1917, it has been said, of a broken heart.
CHAPTER THREE

CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

It is not at all true that between science on the one hand, and morals and religion on the other, there exists that sort of antinomy which has so frequently been admitted, for the two forms of human activity really come from one and same source (EF:494).

The French word conscience is ambiguous, embracing the meanings of the two English words "conscience" and "consciousness." Thus, the "beliefs and sentiments" comprising the conscience collective are, on one hand, moral and religious, and, on the other, cognitive (Lukes, 1973:4).

The intimate relations between rationales of conscience and the structures of consciousness constitute one of the most fundamental, and least recognized, of Durkheim's postulates. The very terms employed by Durkheim here reveal his deepest intentions, for the French word conscience, as with the Latin conscientia, conveys both the meanings of moral decision and intellectual understanding. This fruitful ambiguity is retained today in the two meanings of "right and wrong" in the cognitive and moral senses. Thus, although the terms conscience and consciousness are separated in English, in Durkheim's basic sociocultural theory the logics of moral decision and the logics of intellectual understanding are always and everywhere intertwined.

As we approach the significance of this fruitful ambiguity, we would do well to remember that Durkheim declared that society is itself a moral phenomena, or more precisely, society is the only moral phenomenon. Correspondingly, morality is preeminently social. Moreover, these reciprocal relations between morality and society are evolutionarily grounded. With these commitments in mind, we can begin to perceive the centrality in Durkheim's system of the crucial relation between social
forms and the forms of conscience and consciousness. Indeed, the notions of conscience and consciousness as a closely interrelated pair constitute key links in Durkheim's system between different historical societies and different phenomenologies of the person, on the one hand, and Durkheim's corresponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of morality, religion, and knowledge on the other.

If we continue to translate away the fruitful ambiguity of Durkheim's usage of that seminal French word *conscience*—I mean its dual meanings of morality and cognition—we shall also continue to forfeit the key to unlocking the seemingly paradoxical relations which Durkheim posited between his sociology of religion, knowledge, and morality. Far too often we approach *Primitive Classification* or *The Elementary Forms*, for example, in terms of a rather simple equation between social structure and the basic forms of thought and religion. Whether or not they agree, most observers seem to grasp Durkheim's notion that the source of key collective representations embodied in religious ritual and the categories of logical thought are to be found originally in the social morphological structure of the human group. However, what perennially mystifies is this: even granting their common origins, why should Durkheim so insistently intertwine his sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge? Once one begins, however, to perceive the intimate interrelations between cognition and morality suggested by the connotations of the French term employed by Durkheim here, the paradox begins to evaporate. Alpert reminds us: "The Elementary Forms, it should not be forgotten, was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of Thought and of Religious Life" (1939:55). Wallwork has also noted that "... Durkheim associates epistemological and phenomenological connotations with the collective conscience, which enables him to employ this concept in explaining moral obligation" (1972:37). In sum, in Durkheim's sociological system, conscience—in terms of the moralities of thought—and consciousness—in terms of the logics of action—often follow
one from the other, while both, in turn, are linked with the underlying social morphological substratum of the human group.

Indeed, Durkheim's central insight that the rationales of conscience and the structures of consciousness are always and everywhere intertwined constitutes, in my opinion, a highly illuminating and significant tool for sociocultural analysis. Even more, when seen in comparative and historical terms, Durkheim's rule suggests the following hermeneutical canon: in general, fundamental changes in the grounds of conscience often precede fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness. In short, tracing basic shifts in the grounds and structures of legitimate moral authority and intellectual decision move to the center stage of in-depth sociocultural inquiry.

Strangely, none of those prominent sociologists who read Durkheim in the original French, and then published noteworthy accounts of his thought in English, were apparently able to successfully shake loose from the translators perennial difficulty. Neither Parsons (who chose to leave conscience untranslated), nor Alpert, nor Foskett, nor Bellah, nor Nisbet, nor LaCapra, nor Poggi, nor Wallwork, nor Giddens, nor Lukes, capitalized on the crucial ambiguity of Durkheim's intertwined notions of conscience and consciousness to illuminate his system, and especially his closely interrelated sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge. Even so perspicacious an observer as Steven Lukes, the foremost contemporary intellectual biographer of Durkheim, has apparently not yet perceived the crucial significance of Durkheim's usage of this ambiguity. Lukes, as with many others, unfortunately treats this double meaning as simply yet another difficulty encountered in translation.

There is the further difficulty of translation from French to English. Sometimes what is perfectly intelligible in French cannot be directly translated into seemingly equivalent English words (such as conscience and "conscience").... The French words map out a different conceptual structure from the English; they make different discriminations, and carry different presuppositions and connotations *(1973:3).

Perhaps because of the long-standing opposition between science
and religion, or the investment in the fact-value distinction, or perhaps because of the drive to establish sociology as an autonomous science, free from lingering ethical or philosophical entanglements, or for whatever reasons, none of these mainline sociologists successfully brought our attention to the potential significance of Durkheim's thesis of the intimate linkages between structures of conscience and consciousness. Rather, from the point of view of their own special preoccupations, it has been a medieval historian turned sociologist, a famous psychologist of child development, and a cultural anthropologist, who, having turned to Durkheim for illumination, discovered there these crucial insights. Let us now briefly explore this curious turn of events.

I first learned the significance of the intimately intertwined Durkheimian notions of conscience and consciousness from a former medieval historian turned sociologist—namely, Benjamin Nelson. Nelson has specialized in precisely these areas of unraveling the tangled relations between structures of conscience and consciousness, and, in turn, the significance of fundamental shifts in these structures as anchors of cultural complexes and civilizations, all seen in comparative and historical perspective. Nelson, who was sensitized to the significance of these double connotations by his knowledge of their linkage in medieval culture, was led to Durkheim's insights through the medium of Jean Piaget.

Following a maxim of Piaget based on Durkheim, I have called the schemas the "moralities of thought" and the "logics of action." Since the Middle Ages, both of these structures have regularly rested upon a single hinge, namely, the notion of conscientia which had the combined sense in Latin and other languages of "conscience" and "consciousness" (1972:105).

In another, earlier work, Nelson also acknowledged:

I owe the phrase (the "moralities of thought and the logics of action") to Jean Piaget (1948) who derived it by extending a notion of Durkheim's "Logic is the morality of thought, morality is the logic of action" (1968:161).

Indeed, Piaget's very turn of phrase here suggests the potency of Durkheim's insights, for normally we associate morality with action, and logic with thought. However, under Durkheim's
influence, Piaget profoundly inverted these terms and spoke instead of the central "moralities of thought and logics of action" which lie at the very bases of society, culture, and personality.

The anthropologist, Paul Bohannan, has rightly emphasized the theoretical potency of Durkheim's ambiguous language. From his anthropological perspective, Bohannan illuminates the several meanings of Durkheim's key term conscience in relation to the notions of culture and generic sociocultural process. Of Durkheim, Bohannan remarks:

... Perhaps no social scientist ever used ambiguity with better effect.... It is plain that Durkheim meant at least three things by conscience, and it was this very triunity that allowed him to think with the concept. The first ambiguity is inherent in the French language. English requires two words--"conscience" and "consciousness"--to translate conscience. That these two form a single concept in French means that, for all French sociologists, internalized sanctions are amalgamated ... with awareness of the social milieu. This factor is not unique with Durkheim.... Rather, attention must be paid to a more subtle ambiguity, one that cannot be untangled with reference to a dictionary. Conscience was used by Durkheim to mean the instrument of awareness, a meaning which is more or less equivalent to the English "consciousness." But the third and more important meaning of conscience is "that of which someone is (or many persons are) aware" and the only suitable English term for this notion is the anthropologists' term "culture." Thus, the French term conscience means three things: internalized sanctions, awareness, and perceived culture (1960: 78-79).

Bohannan then proceeds to make the crucial observation that Durkheim's simultaneously resonating conscience also implied both the noun and verb-like aspects of culture. This linkage between the notions of conscience and consciousness and cultural process in terms of collective representations as both object and process is, I agree with Bohannan, a crucial perspective that must be recaptured by the human sciences.

To read Durkheim's concepts of representation and conscience as interaction of a subject and an object is to misunderstand them. Their vital characteristic is a blending of subject and object into a single unit. In Durkheim's theory, something which
we view as an interaction between two processes is analyzed as a single process.... Durkheim focussed his attention on the verbal connection between them: the "knowing" or, as he called it, the process of representation.... This ambiguous assimilation of the knowing instrument and the known thing--of consciousness and culture--into a single concept was vital to Durkheim's thought.... American and English interpretations of Durkheim ... have separated the two substantive elements which Durkheim intended to leave conjoined. In the separation, the processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared (1960:79-80).

Bohannan's insights into the processual aspects of Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process are critical to understanding how the latter related social morphological intensities to the emergence of collective representations as crystallizations both of group self-awareness and normative discipline.

... the collective representation is both a thing perceived and a perceiving agent; one can say that it is a "perceiving." Seen in this way, the mass of collective representations--of "perceivings"--becomes the collective conscience (1960:82).

Bohannan's argument that Durkheim's seemingly simple notions of conscience and representation imply both verb and noun-like dimensions is reinforced by Steven Lukes. Lukes notes two related ambiguities built into Durkheim's concept of representation collective which have great interpretive significance.

In the first place, the concept representation refers both to the mode of thinking, conceiving, or perceiving, and to that which is thought, conceived, or perceived. And second, the representation is collective both in its origin, determining its mode or form, and in its reference or object (it is also, of course, collective in being common to the members of a society or group). Thus, Durkheim wanted to say both that representations collectives are socially generated and that they refer to, and are in some sense "about" society. (This duality is clearest in his sociology of religion and in his sociology of morality) (1973:6-7).

Thus, Durkheim's fundamental sociocultural theory presents us with a series of fruitful ambiguities in relation to the seminal terms--conscience, representation, and collective. Truly a profound ambiguity, and a profound contribution to the building of the human sciences!
How difficult this process of recapturing the simultaneously intertwined meanings implied in Durkheim's usage of his paradigmatic terms can be gauged by the long odyssey of Durkheim's foremost American interpreter--Talcott Parsons. While Parsons wisely avoided the imputation of the "group mind" specter to Durkheim's term collective conscience (1949:309) by leaving it untranslated, nevertheless, he also tended to split the two meanings of conscience and assigned them to separate phases in Durkheim's intellectual development (eg. see 1949:309). After the great series of intellectual breakthroughs which Parsons imputes to Durkheim's development, conscience was said to take on a very different meaning.

It involves a radical shift of emphasis from the original definition and context of use of the collective conscience. The latter concept originally referred to a body of beliefs and sentiments held in common; the collectiveness of it consisted in the "in commonness." Now the collectiveness consists in the nature of the reality exterior to the individual to which the individual's "representations" refer. It is not a subjective community of beliefs and sentiments which is the source of solidarity, but rational orientation to the same set of phenomena in the environment of action, an "objective" source of uniformities (1949:360).

So intent was Parsons on forcing Durkheim into the mold of "Social System" thinking that it took over thirty years for him to begin to revise his notion of the split between the moral and cognitive meanings of Durkheim's seminal term conscience. In his 1973 article "Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Revisited," Parsons acknowledges, in contrast, to his earlier position, that the "cognitive and moral elements" implied in Durkheim's usage of the term conscience belonged together from the very beginning. "The essential thing is the inclusion of both (cognitive and moral) references in the same formula, not the shift in interest from the cognitive to the moral" (1973:164). Although still not directly perceiving the simple but fruitful ambiguity in the French meanings of conscience, which suggested Durkheim's fundamental insight that structures of conscience and consciousness are always and everywhere intimately intertwined, Parsons acknowledged his earlier ambivalence
toward Durkheim's insistent linkage of his sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge.

I had not been fully aware of the extent to which the progression from the Cartesian conception of the facticity of the milieu social to the idea of constraint by moral authority was not simply progress from a more to a less elementary theoretical perspective, but was the framework within which both conceptions came to be combined in a unique manner. The realization that this is the case has, I think, been basically dependent on the conception that much of Durkheim's thought was couched at the level of the general theory of action and not only of the social system (1973:163).

It is revealing, however, that even as Parsons plods closer to this important insight, he still insists on placing it within his own very special framework. Parsons implies that this last great breakthrough in understanding Durkheim's doctrine could only have come through his own convoluted theory of generic human action. But, as we have just discovered, several theorists before Parsons clearly recognized the great significance of Durkheim's multiple meanings of his crucial terms conscience, representation, and collective. Perhaps they made this important discovery because they simply attended to the multiple meanings of the words in themselves, instead of allowing themselves to be sidetracked by Parsons' great (and greatly misleading) intellectual drama.

Indeed, this episode serves as an object lesson in the history of science--namely, how the profundity of a great thinkers' paradigms can be distorted by the powerfully wrought, and widely pervasive, intellectual drama of an influentially situated theorist (and intellectual broker) like Talcott Parsons. This irony is compounded here because the famous secondary interpreter entertained the best of intentions as a would-be rescuer of the original founding fathers' much-maligned theories. Further, it demonstrates how even ardent followers of the pioneer could not perceive the full depths of the original doctrine, except through the colored-glasses of a prime secondary interpreter (see much of Lukes, 1973, for instance). Finally, it reveals how only a small handful of relative "outsiders," with little investment in the dominant perspective, boldly returned
to the original source itself, and discovered there meanings which had long been slighted.

The ironies of history are such that it may not be possible, at this time (see McCloskey, 1976b) to fully judge the significance of the ways in which Parsons retarded or advanced the understanding of Durkheim's contributions to the human sciences. In any case, the preceding case-study reveals a typical sociocultural process—in any renaissance, new energies are generated and new paths blazed by those bold enough to return to the full dimensions of the original sources themselves. And, in this case, Durkheim's intentions and potential significance are clearly indicated by the double meanings conveyed by the key terms conscience, representation, and collective.
DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL:

SUBSTRUCTURAL SOCIAL MORPHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SUPERSTRUCTURAL COLLECTIVELY REPRESENTATIONAL PROCESSES

Besides the social ways of being, there are the social ways of doing; besides the morphological phenomena, there are the functional or physiological phenomena (1960:362).

Structure itself is encountered in becoming (1960:362).

In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the elementary group which gave rise to ever-more compound groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with one another, have formed the progressively more complex phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution (1960:374).

One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying social phenomena ... we take care not to leave them in the air, but always to relate them to a definite substratum ... a human group occupying a determinate portion of geographically representable space (1971:809).

The progress of the division of labor is in direct ratio to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL:257).

If we specialize, it is not to produce more, but it is to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that have been made for us (DL:275).

With animals, the organism assimilates social facts to it, and, stripping them of their special nature, transforms them into biological facts. Social life is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and particularly in higher societies, social causes substitute themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized (DL:346-7).

Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from being antagonistic to social action, it results from it. ... it is a conquest of society over nature. [Liberty] can realize itself progressively insofar as man raises himself above things and makes law for them, thus depriving them of their fortuitous, absurd, amoral character; that is, insofar as he becomes a social being. For man can escape nature only by creating another world where he dominates nature. That world is society (DL:386-7).
Society is also of nature and yet dominates it. Not only do all the forces of the universe converge in society, but they also form a new synthesis which surpasses in richness, complexity, and power of action all that went into it. In a word, society is nature arrived at a higher point in its development, concentrating all its energies to surpass, as it were, itself (SP:97).

Society ... is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs, and sentiments of all sorts which realize themselves through individuals .... Society is the field of an intense intellectual and moral life with a wide range of influence. From the actions and reactions between its individuals arises an entirely new mental life which lifts our minds into a world of which we could not have the faintest idea had we lived in isolation (SP:59).

If left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states (EF:262).

Collective representations ... presuppose that minds act and react upon one another .... They are the product of these actions and reactions (EF:263).

Human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collectively (EF:440).

A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal (EF:470).

The principal social phenomena, religion, morality, law, economics and aesthetics, are nothing more than systems of values and hence of ideals. Sociology moves from the beginning in the field of the ideal (SP:96).

For a society to become conscious of itself, and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself (EF:470).

... collective representations ... presuppose that minds act and react upon one another; they are the products of these actions and reactions which are themselves possible only through material intermediaries. These latter do not confine themselves to revealing the mental state with which they are associated; they aid in creating it without symbols, social sentiments could have only a precarious existence .... Social life, in all its aspects and in every period of its history, is made possible only through a vast symbolism (EF:263-4).

The rite serves ... to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it, the group periodically renews the sentiments which it has of itself and of its unity (EF:420).
The ideas and sentiments that are elaborated by a collectivity ... are invested, by reason of their origin, with an ascendancy, and an authority that cause the particular individuals who think and believe in them to represent them in the form of moral forces that dominate and sustain them (DHN:335).

The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and unknown, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects. When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity ... the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion (EF:56).

All known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world (EF:165).

... the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically (EF:175).

Religions are the primitive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history. They are in the social order what sensation is in the individual (PECM:160).

In the present day just as much as in the past, we see society creating sacred things out of ordinary ones (EF:244).

There is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its personality (EF:274-5).

Collective thought transforms everything it touches. It fuses natural orders and combines contraries; it reverses ... the natural hierarchy of being, it eliminates differences and differentiates between what is similar. In a word, it substitutes for the world revealed to us by the senses, a quite different world which is nothing other than the projection of the ideal it constructs (SP:94).
Preface. Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as a hypostatizing or Platonizing "social realist," the central rule of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analysis of social facts in a social substratum. Indeed, Durkheim's dualistic passion extended to his causal model, for he always linked superstructural collectively representational (symbolic) processes with substructural social morphological processes. The prime link between the "material" lower-story and the "ideal" upper-story, "moral" or "dynamic density." When a "critical mass" was reached, there occurred a social implosion, cultural energies were generated and released, and egos became moralized and transformed into persons. Conscience and consciousness are awakened, and society, culture, and persons are born. Collective representations symbolize group self-awareness. Such theses form the core of Durkheim's central causal model. Now, while Durkheim's explanatory framework was processual through and through, since much of this section shall necessarily focus on The Elementary Forms, we shall here be concerned mainly with micro-interactional processes, leaving Durkheim's very important macro-evolutionary concerns for succeeding chapters.

Now, it has not been sufficiently emphasized that Durkheim's key explanatory model combined, in a rather unique way, the two central divisions of sociology—I mean "social morphology" and "social physiology." Consciously utilizing organic metaphors, Durkheim described these two basic divisions in the following terms:

Besides the social ways of being, there are the social ways of doing; besides the morphological phenomena, there are the functional or physiological phenomena (1960:362).

The composition of society consists in certain combinations of people and things which by necessity are connected in space. The explanatory analysis of this substratum, however, should not be confused with that of the social life which builds on it. The way in which society emerges fully formed is one thing; the manner in which it acts is another. These are realities of two kinds, so different that they cannot be treated by the same procedures but require separate investigations. Consequently, the study of the first forms a
special, though fundamental, branch of sociology. We have here a distinction that is analogous to that which can be observed in all the sciences of nature. Chemistry, the study of the manner in which bodies are formed, stands besides physics, the study of the phenomena that are enacted by various bodies. Next to physiology, which seeks the laws of life, stands anatomy or morphology, which investigates the structure of living things, the manner of their formation, and the conditions controlling it (1960:360).

In regard to each basic division of the sociological field, Durkheim attempted to specify rules for understanding both the peculiar constitution of each sphere of social life, and the relations of one to the other.

In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the elementary group which gave rise to ever-more compound groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with one another, have formed the progressively more complex phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution (1960:374).

Against Comte's (and perhaps Saint-Simon's) somewhat similar designation of the main branches of sociological inquiry into "social statics" and "dynamics," Durkheim counterposed his own processual approach to the morphological and physiological aspects of society.

This branch of sociology [social morphology] is ... not purely a science of statics. Consequently, we do not think it proper to use this word: "static" poorly describes the view of society which is considered here. It is not a question of looking at society arrested at a given moment by abstraction (as has sometimes been said), but of analyzing its formation and accounting for it. Undoubtedly, the phenomena that have to do with structure have something more stable about them than have functional phenomena, but there are only differences of degree between these two orders of fact. Structure itself is encountered in becoming, and one cannot illustrate it except by pursuing this process of becoming. It forms and dissolves continually; it is life arrived at a certain measure of consolidation; to disconnect it from the life which it derives or from that which it determines is equivalent to dissociating things that are inseparable* (1960:362).

Since I shall later emphasize the importance of Durkheim's processual view of social morphology, I now merely note that, just
as Bohannan noted the processual aspect of Durkheim's key terms conscience and representation, so too I must emphasize that it is misleading to attempt (eg. Bellah, 1973: xiv-xv) to summarize Durkheim's two analytical modes in terms of so-called "structural" and "functional" approaches, since we have Durkheim's own word that even "structure is itself encountered in becoming." Of course, Durkheim's well-known designation for all the sub-fields of social physiology—including religious, juridical, economic, linguistic, and esthetic sociology (eg. see Alpert, 1939:51)—was based on the notion of "collective representations" as cultural symbolic forms.

Now, this same explanatory model—the anchoring of social physiological or sociocultural symbolic processes in their underlying social morphological substratum—marks all of Durkheim's work and that of his school. Yet, for some reason, his essential logic here remains relatively obscure to the present day. Some prestigious interpreters (eg. Parsons, 1949; Nisbet, 1965) have, by splitting Durkheim's model in two and assigning social morphology to Durkheim's early "positivistic" phase and his concern with "collective representations" to his later "idealistic" phase, proposed thereby a radical discontinuity in Durkheim's life-work. Contrary to these and other fateful misconceptions of Durkheim's central causal model, I propose that, as a general rule, Durkheim always and everywhere approached social morphological processes as the causal "material" substructure, and "collective representations" as the social physiological or sociocultural process in the reflected or projected "ideal" superstructure. Almost alone among contemporary secondary observers, Lukes (1973) and Giddens have begun to recognize the importance of this dualistic explanatory framework. It must be noted, however, that Durkheim's central focus was always on the second factor, especially moral and juridical and religious "collective representations" (see also Book Three). Let us now turn to explore in greater detail Durkheim's central causal model as it informs his first and last great works.
A. Social Morphological Processes

The first great subdivision of Durkheim's sociological system was "social morphology." "We propose to call the science that has for its object the study of the material forms of society 'social morphology'" (1960:362). The fundamental rule of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analyses of social facts in their generating material substratum. For instance, late in his career, Durkheim, with the assistance of Mauss, summed up their basic interpretive rule this way:

One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we take care not to leave them in the air but always to relate them to a definite substratum, that is to say, a human group occupying a determinate portion of geographically representable space (1971:809).

In applying his positivistic version of the scientific method to society, Durkheim always sought to anchor his analyses of the type of social facts which instinctively drew his attention—moral phenomena—in an empirically verifiable material "social body." Durkheim's positivistic search for empirically determinable entities led him, in direct contrast to those who insisted that Durkheim hypostatized social facts, to embrace social morphological forms and processes as a key constitutive ground of society and history.

Social life has various manifestations ... all of them, however, have this in common: they emanate from a group, simple or complex; the group is their substratum.... It is the object most immediately accessible to the sociologist because it takes on material forms that we can perceive with the senses (1960:360).

Those who do not perceive the seemingly paradoxical connections between positivist science and French moral philosophy, will probably not understand why Durkheim, although centrally concerned with the facts of the moral life, should have, none-theless, taken great care to ground his analyses of these moral facts in existentially—empirically verifiable—"material social bodies."

As Durkheim launched L'Annee sociologique, he took some care to articulate these various subdivisions of sociological
inquiry. For instance, I have quoted above from an important programmatic statement "Sociology and Its Scientific Field" first published in 1900 in Italian, and only recently translated by Kurt Wolff (1960). And in 1898 in L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim wrote a "Note sur la morphologie sociale." There he argued that the content of the new synthetic sociological base-line science of social morphology was to be drawn, in part, from a series of existing and overlapping disciplines. Unfortunately, these special sciences pursue their own isolated tasks today just as they did in Durkheim's day.

The works that treat of these questions actually come from different disciplines. Geography studies the territorial forms of states, history traces the evolution of rural or urban groups, demography reviews all that concerning the distribution of population, etc. There is, we believe, an interest in pulling these fragmentary sciences from their isolation, and putting them in contact and reuniting them under the same title; they would thus take on the sentiments of their unity (1898:520-21). 1

And, of course, one of the prime intentions of the Annee circle was precisely to "pull fragmentary sciences from their isolation," "to give them a greater sentiment of their unity." To this day, L'Annee sociologique stands out as one of the landmarks in the unity of the social sciences. But in attempting to generate this new field of social morphology, Durkheim, as always is true, had to contend against existing disciplinary boundaries.

... because different disciplines exist in separation from each other, and almost without being aware of each other, the way in which they have divided up the social world is not always consistent with the nature of things. Thus, for example, geography and demography (or the science of population) until recently remained separate from one another, and are only beginning to become interrelated. However, both study the same subject matter, in order to understand the material substratum of society; for what is it which forms the main substance of society, if it is not social space plus the population which occupies this space? (in Giddens, 1972a:83).

Against geography's "tribal mentality," for instance, Durkheim argued that the new inclusive science of social morphology should:
... study not the forms of the earth, but the forms which affect societies and establish them on the earth; that is very different. Without doubt, the courses of water, mountains, and so forth, enter as elements into the constitution of the social substrata; but they are neither the only ones nor the most essential (1898:521).

In contrast to geography, which assumes that the physical and topographical shapes of the earth's surface constitute the basic "template" to which societies rather passively adapt, Durkheim's view of social morphology looked to the ways in which societies shape their own habitats. In short, the roles were reversed in the two disciplines, for man and society were now considered to be active, independent forces in not only shaping their own habitats but in changing the face of the earth itself. Elsewhere, Durkheim argued:

... as nations increasingly involve the land in their life and transform it for their own use, it becomes, to the same degree, increasingly difficult to separate them from it. The only thing is, that if in this case there is indeed still a relation of dependence, it is almost the converse of that which is found originally. If now society is linked to the land, this is not because it has come under its influence, but, on the contrary, because it has incorporated it within itself. Far from it being the case that society models itself upon the land, it is the land which bears the imprint of society. Thus it is not the land which explains man, it is man which explains the land; and if it remains important for sociology to be aware of the geographical factorm this is not because it sheds new light on sociology, but because the former can only be understood in terms of the latter *(in Giddens, 1972a:88).

Specifically, Durkheim's new sociological science of social morphology, rooted in this key perception of society's active impact on the constitution of the earth's surface and the way it is variously used, would consider the external forms and internal contents of society in its spatial aspects, including the structures of the "built environment," and the movements and interactions of inhabitants of various regions. In short, Durkheim assigned a special program to this new sub-discipline:

The social substratum must, above all, be determined in its external form. This external form is chiefly defined by: (1) the size of the territory; (2) the space
which the society occupies, that is, its peripheral or central position in regard to other "continents" and the way it is enclosed by other societies, and so on; (3) the form of its frontiers.... In addition to the external form, there is the content, which is, first of all, the total mass of the population in its numerical size and density. Furthermore, there are within society secondary groupings which have a material basis, such as villages, cities, districts, and provinces of varying importance. In respect to each of them, there arise various questions which need to be studied in respect to the given collectivity: extension of habitations, size of cities, and villages, water courses, external enclosures, size and density of populations, and so on.

Finally, every group, as a whole or in part, makes use, according to its needs, of the soil or that part of it that it occupies. Nations surround themselves with fortresses or fortified cities, and roads for communication are constructed. The disposition of streets and squares, the architecture of the houses, and the structure of things made vary from village to town and from the large city to the small one, and so on. Man modifies the social substratum in a thousand ways, and the resultant differences have great sociological significance because of both the causes on which they depend, and the effects that they produce (1960:30-61).

But as happened with so much else of Durkheim's system of sociology, even though he proposed the nascent sub-discipline of social morphology as an essential foundation for sociology, and even assigned it a special program subsequently developed by such an eminent member of his school as Maurice Halbwachs, nonetheless, social morphology is almost forgotten today (however, see the exemplary article by L. Schnore 1958). This crucial aspect of Durkheim's sociology has been either consistently ignored, so that several critics persist in branding him as a Platonic theorizer leaving his hypostatized "collective conscience" dangling in sociological space (see Book Three), or else leading theorists (eg. Parsons, 1949; Merton, 1934a) mistakenly treat social morphology as a largely "biological factor" which Durkheim later overcame. Again, this sad story represents a salutary lesson in the history of any science precariously based on highly selective exegesis.
B. **Durkheim's Key Link Between Social Morphology and Social Physiology: "Moral Density," Intensity, and Social Energy**

The key link between substructural social morphological processes and superstructural "social physiological" (symbolic) processes was Durkheim's notion of "moral or dynamic density." The very fact that Durkheim would consider "moral" and "dynamic" as almost synonymous reveals a central clue to his linkages of social morphological processes with social physiological or representational processes. Once again, Durkheim's dynamic or processual focus moves to center stage ("structure itself is encountered in becoming"). For Durkheim was not merely concerned with the size of the society's territory, the number of its inhabitants, the forms of its frontiers, the dominant internal "built" forms, and so forth, but more importantly, how the degree of population concentration leads to increased rates of social interaction ("dynamic or moral density"), social intensity, and new rates of social energy, and thus, finally, social change.

It is clear that social phenomena vary not only with the nature of the component elements of society but also with their mode of composition; they will especially be very different according to whether each of the subgroups keeps its local life or is drawn into the general life--in other words, according to their degree of concentration (R:85).

Now, besides Schnore (1958), and to a certain extent Lukes and Giddens, Gianfranco Poggi (1972) stands almost alone among contemporary social scientists in understanding the importance in Durkheim's system of the intimate inner links between social morphology, social institutions, collective representations, and types of personality structure. To better grasp these inner links, especially between population concentration and social energy, we should follow Poggi's observation that the key to physical density, and thus, increased "moral" or "dynamic" social intensities, is the population/territory ratio (1972:187). The degree of population concentration is only partially a matter of physical density (itself a resultant of the population/territory ratio), and is also partially due to
the existence of key infrastructural transportation and communications networks binding groups together through time and space. Again, the key to the linkage in Durkheimian sociology between social morphological processes and collectively representational processes is not simply the volume of people, but rather the rates of sustained social interaction, as Alpert saw many years ago (1939: 90). Population density is important here only insofar as it leads to increased "moral or dynamic density," or in other words, increased social intensity and social energy. By "dynamic density," Durkheim argued,

... (it) must not be understood the purely physical concentration of the aggregate, which can have no effect if ... groups of individuals remain separated by a social distance. By it is understood the social concentration, of which the size is only the auxiliary and, generally speaking, the consequence. The dynamic density may be defined, the volume being equal, as the function of the number of individuals who are having not only commercial but also social relations, i.e. who not only exchange services or compete with one another, but also live a common life (R:113-14).

Thus, in Durkheim's system, "moral or dynamic density" leads to increased social intensities and energies, and the emergence of a common sociocultural life among previously separated individuals or groups. This proposed causal sequence constitutes one key anchor to almost all the rest of Durkheim's work. Indeed, this notion of greater "moral" densities leading to greater social intensities forms the key link between the material social morphological substratum and the emergence of the crystallized symbolic forms which come to represent this collective effervescence. Long term social morphological changes leading to greater population densities and social intensities also constitute a key causal sequence linking the progressive division of labor, societal evolution, historical change, and the emergence of the notion of the person throughout history, and so on and so forth. In sum, this generic micro sociocultural process of increasing social intensities leads, on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad, constitutive, historical processes of the evolution of societies, persons, and moralities, which formed a central preoccupation
in Durkheim's sociological system. Finally, it is very impor-
tant to recognize that these intimate linkages between micro
and macro-societal processes represent a relatively constant
series of sequential equations running throughout all of Durk-
heim's life-work, from The Division of Labor to The Elementary
Forms. Let us now briefly explore some of the more important
sequential linkages underlying these basic process in all of
Durkheim's major works.

In The Rules, for instance, Durkheim suggested that
heightened degrees of sustained social interaction are neces-
sary to the breakdown of segmental societies, and thus, are
a prior condition of the progressive division of labor.

Social life can be affected only by the number of those
who participate effectively in it. That is why the dy-
namic density of a people is best expressed by the de-
gree of fusion of the social segments. For, if each par-
tial aggregate forms a whole, i.e. a distinct indivi-
duality separated by barriers from the others, the ac-
tion of the members, in general, remains localized within
it. If, on the contrary, these partial societies ...
tend to be all intermingled within the total society,
to that extent is the radius of social life extended
(R:114).

Further, Durkheim proposed that, with the continuous extension
of the "radius of social life," the division of labor proceeds
apace with the progressive effacement of "segmental" types of
societies.

... all growth in the volume and dynamic density of
societies modifies profoundly the fundamental condi-
tions of collective existence by rendering social life
more intense, by extending the horizon and thought of
each individual (R:115).

... the progress of the division of labor is in direct
ratio to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL:
257).

While space does not allow us here to review all the
details of his argument, it is important to note that Durk-
heim's thought moved simultaneously on two different levels--
the intra-societal and the inter-societal levels. In terms
of external relations between formerly distinct societies,
Durkheim saw the breakdown of this isolation occurring through
the extension of the "radius of social life," and thus the
entering into of sustained and ever-more diverse social relationships to be a necessary prerequisite for the progressive emergence of new types of societal complexity.

The growth of the division of labor is thus brought about by the social segments losing their individuality, the divisions becoming more permeable. In short, a coalescence takes place which makes the combinations possible in the social substance (DL:256).

The "progressive effacement of the segmental type of society" and thus, the evolution of ever-more complex social morphological structures on the inter-societal level, depends, in turn, on corresponding shifts on the level of the intra-societal division of labor. There is an additional variable intervening between increasing moral density as the primary causal factor and the resulting division of labor. This crucial intervening variable underlying the progressive division of labor is competition.

If work becomes divided more as societies become more voluminous and denser, it is not because external circumstances are more varied, but because the struggle for existence is more acute (DL:266).

Following Darwin and other naturalists, Durkheim observed that the competition between members of the same species, or by analogy, between members of the same society, is more intense than inter-specific or inter-societal competition because the more similar the members, the more intense the competition for similar resources. The result of ever-more intense intra-societal competition is increasing specialization and diversification.

... in proportion to the segmental character of the social constitution, each segment has its own organs, protected and kept apart from like organs by divisions separating the different segments. But as these divisions are swept away, inevitably like organs are put into contact, battling and trying to supplant one another. But, no matter how this substitution is made, it cannot fail to produce advances in the course of specialization (DL:269).

Against the classical economists who deduced the cause of the division of labor from the innate tendency of human nature to produce more in order to become happier, Durkheim insisted that
increasing competition is the key cause behind the progressive specialization. "If we specialize, it is not to produce more, but it is to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that have been made for us" (DL:275).

Thus, Durkheim attempted to specify a whole series of sequential equations intervening between moral density and the progressive division of labor. This series of generic sociocultural sequences ran something like this: greater population density within a given geographic area (the population/territory ratio), held together by increasingly comprehensive and efficient infrastructural transportation and communications networks, leads to greater degrees of "dynamic density" or sustained increases in "quantity, intensity, and diversity of social relationships." This increased moral density or social intensity leads, in turn, to greater competition for resources between members of the same society, while this increased intrasocietal competition leads to greater specialization and occupational differentiation. These typical socioeconomic responses to long term changes in supply and demand lead almost inevitably, as generally agreed, to greater efficiency which leads to greater total productivity, which thus accelerates the progressive division of labor by increasing the potential for population growth, and the extension of key technologies such as the transportation and communications systems. This progressive extension of "the radius of social life" inevitably leads, in turn, to greater social energies and socioeconomic and cultural change, which leads onward and upward, on the general evolutionary level, in a progressive self-stimulating feedback cycle. Certainly, Durkheim posited a most complex process which his readers ignore at their own peril!

When discussing subsequent phenomena which he anchored in the progressive division of labor, it is important, therefore, to remember that this factor is really only a secondary one, derived from the primary source of social energy—moral or dynamic density—and the resulting social intensity.
If society, in concentrating, determines the development of the division of labor, the latter, in its turn, increases the concentration of society.... The division of labor remains the derived fact, and, consequently, the advances which it has made are due to parallel advances of social density.... That is all we wish to prove (DL: 260).

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly more dense and generally more voluminous (DL: 262).

This fundamental social morphological theme of greater densities and social or moral intensities underlies all the secondary historical processes concerning the evolution of society, religion, law, science, morality, the person, and so on. It runs as a constant refrain and explanatory model throughout all of Durkheim's works. Indeed, it became the very paradigm of Durkheim's sociology; one of its most succinct expressions was the Annee essay by Marcel Mauss and Henri Beuchat in 1906 on seasonal variations in the life of the Eskimos, which was specifically subtitled "Etude de morphologie sociale."

While it is clearly misleading to proclaim a radical discontinuity in Durkheim's career by dividing into positivistic and idealistic phases as Parsons (1949) did, it is true, nonetheless, that Durkheim did increasingly turn his attention toward establishing the linkages between social morphological processes and the emergence and elaboration of collective representations. Even Parsons himself, as Pope (1975a) emphasized, now acknowledges that he "... may have overdone the periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual development" (1975a: 106), and now agrees instead with Bellah (1973) that there is "an impressive" continuity in Durkheim's work. (See especially Giddens, 1970, for convincing refutation of Parsons early thesis of the split between the young and old Durkheim).

However, Parsons clearly saw (along with Alpert, 1939, and Foskett, 1939), that Durkheim shifted the main focus of his attention as his career progressed; this remains the valid anchor of Parsons' "stage" thesis. Even though he was mistaken

It is especially important to note Durkheim's continuing concern with elaborating key links between these material and symbolic processes, not only because of the misleading "idealization" of the "later Durkheim," but also because there is simply no other way of fathoming Durkheim's identification of the moral and the logical with the social. In *The Elementary Forms*, for example, Durkheim anchored his theory of the social origins, character, and meaning of religion in the alternating slack and intense periods of social interaction among the Australian natives.

The life of the Australian societies passes alternately through two distinct phases. Sometimes the population is broken up into little groups who wander about independently of one another, in their various occupations; each family lives by itself, hunting and fishing ... trying to procure its indispensable food by all the means in its power. Sometimes, on the contrary, the population concentrates and gathers at determined points for a length of time varying from several days to several months. This concentration takes place when a clan or a part of the tribe is summoned to the gathering, and on this occasion they celebrate a religious ceremony.... These two phases are contrasted with each other in the sharpest way. In the first, economic activity is the preponderating one, and it is generally of a mediocre intensity. Gathering the grains of herbs that are necessary for food, or hunting and fishing are not occupations to awaken very lively passions. The dispersed condition in which the society finds itself results in making its life uniform, languishing, and dull. But when a corroboree, a religious celebration takes place, everything changes (EF:245-6).

Clearly, to Durkheim, the "very fact of concentration" itself "acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant." Social life, in its elementary forms, is portrayed here as constantly alternating between isolated, dispersed, "profane," subsistence activities, on the one hand, and concentrated, col-
lective, intense, effervescent "sacred" activities.

When they are at once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each re-echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance*(EF:247).

So it is in the midst of these effervescent social environments and of this effervescence itself, that the religious ideas seems to be born (EF:250).

And again:

For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself (EF:470).

Indeed, it was these very linkages between the empirically observable material social morphological substratum and collectively symbolic ideal representations, that underlies Durkheim's bold and brilliant attempt to build a positivist scioiology of morality, religion, and knowledge over against the most persistent nemesis of his cultural tradition--namely, the metaphysical and clerical claims of the Catholic Metaphysical-Hierocratic Cultural Tradition.

The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science, it depends upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. Now, this concentration brings about an exaltation of the mental life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions where is portrayed the new life thus awakened. ... A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal (EF: 470).

In short, in Durkheim's developing view, collective effervescence of "social electricity" resulting from imploding "moral densities" and increased social intensities generates those religious, moral, and logical collective representations as externalized symbols of the inward social bond by which society first attains self-consciousness of its existence as a group.
C. "Social Physiology" and "Collective Representations":
Durkheim's Theory of Generic SocioCultural Process

Preface. Given Durkheim's notion of the radical egocentricity of the unsocialized organic ego, how is it possible that society and culture ever come to be born? What forces breakthrough the isolation of the organic cage and create the moralized, self-disciplined person? And once born, how is it possible that society and culture should survive beyond the moment? In effect, we are asking: what, precisely, was Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process? And what is the role of symbolism in this fundamental sociocultural process?

In exploring the first part of Durkheim's central explanatory model concerned with the social morphological substratum of society, we discovered that Durkheim's perspective was always processual. Social morphology referred not merely to the spatial demography of the group, but more importantly, to certain key constitutive processes; especially important here were those leading to greater moral densities and social intensities, and the production and release of social energies. It is precisely these social energies released at such collectively intense times that gives rise to the questions now posed: namely, how are groups born? How do groups come to conceive of themselves as a group? What role do collective representations play in this generic sociocultural process? And, how are these cultural symbols to be related to their continuing structural bases? While Lukes (1973: chapter 10) has given a very useful account of Durkheim's changing estimates of the relation between sub and superstructure (see also Book Three), let us now explore some of these questions in terms of a frontal analysis of Durkheim's causal model.

To continue the initial analogy, collective representations act, in Durkheim's causal schema, as the "ideal" or superstructural expression through externalized symbols of a groups' awakening self-consciousness. As noted earlier (see also Lukes, 1973: introduction), these crystallized sym-
bolts are collective and representations in two senses: first, they are collectively generated and carried; second, they are the externalized, shared vehicles by which the group first attains, and then reaffirms, their own distinctive existence as a group. Now, while almost everyone recognizes the importance of several of these notions in Durkheim's sociological system, few have clearly brought into focus the role of these critical inner connections linking social morphological processes with the corresponding sociocultural processes in Durkheim's fundamental explanatory model.

Doubtless, much of the difficulty in perceiving the full outlines of Durkheim's causal model come from his characteristic convergence of generic and genetic-evolutionary analyses. Now, Durkheim's own genetic and evolutionary claims for the significance of his pilgrimage to the "elementary forms" have often annoyed (eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, or W.H. Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973) or puzzled (eg. Bellah, 1973:xliii) many of his leading secondary interpreters. The British anthropologists and American functionalists' search for the generic or universal structures of human society led them to persistently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; in short, their generic emphasis swamped out Durkheim's genetic emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent tendency of "... secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's functional and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign to Durkheim's thought" (1971a:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's Elementary Forms, for example, has to be read genetically. Although Giddens appears willing to grant that this same work can also be read functionally, I cannot so easily agree. For I have discovered that, even as Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary emphasis has been persistently slighted, so too his generic focus on sociocultural process has been faultily reported. Saving discussion of Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary framework for subsequent chapters, let us now move to more closely define Durkheim's concern with generic sociocultural process.
It must be acknowledged again and again that much of the confusion and neglect was unintentionally assisted by Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches to sociocultural analysis. Now, Tiryakian (1962:19) reminds us that the French word *élémentaire* as used by Durkheim "signifies not only 'elementary' as in a scale of complexity, but also 'fundamental' or 'basic.'" It is precisely in these terms that Durkheim's British anthropological critics have charged him with confusing "earliest" and "simplest" (e.g. see Lukes, 1973:456). But the logic underlying Durkheim's conflation of his search for the universal or generic essence of human society and culture is still not widely perceived. For, in fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and development of human society and culture, Durkheim sought to find a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, for a "crucial experiment" in which there would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were, between symbolic forms and social forms, between the social morphological substratum and the social physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collectively symbolic representations are deeply inter-fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durkheim felt that he had discovered the "monocellular" (e.g. see Bellah, 1959:456-7) form of sociocultural life, the template, as it were, from which all complex sociocultural forms evolved. Thus, the generic links between religion, society, and culture which Durkheim thought he had discovered in Australian aboriginal religion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connections. It is absolutely critical to realize that Durkheim's causal model—substructural social morphological processes and superstructural collectively representational processes—led him to return, again and again, to the simplest case, the clearest connection between these two halves of human society. Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified his own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic analyses by likening them to Descartes' "first ring of certainty"
(EF:16). For Durkheim's conflation derived, in large part, from the influence of his cultural tradition—he was the sociological equivalent of the Cartesian method of systematic doubt, and return to indubitable first principles as the only sure road to objective certainty and inner certitude. "He (Durkheim) simply took it as axiomatic that there is an identity (structural and cultural) between simplicity and evolutionary priority" (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his conflation of generic and genetic in this perspective, we should no longer wonder that only in terms of the most "elementary" forms—in both senses—did Durkheim believe that he could surely discover generic sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably inter-fused with genetic-evolutionary ones. "Primitive classifications, then, offer privileged cases, because they are simpler ones" (EF:18). And again, "In the primitive religions, the religious fact still visibly carries the mark of its origins" (EF: 20). Those who persist in reading Durkheim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional propositions must continue to neglect Durkheim's own logic and method, and his insistence that the intimate relations between society, culture, and the person are evolutionarily constructed. As Giddens has rightly noted: "There is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is contingent upon the level of advancement of society" (1972a:27).

Let us briefly outline these two intimately related, but analytically separable, aspects of Durkheim's notion of the dual generic and genetic-evolutionary significance of the "elementary forms." In terms of Durkheim's elaboration of links between material and symbolic process, there is no way of fathoming Durkheim's virtual identification of the moral and the logical with the social without recognition of two previous types of crucial ambiguities concerning the paradigmatic Durkheimian terms—namely, "conscience" and "representation." As I have emphasized before, we continue to forfeit
the key to unlocking the connections between Durkheim's sociology of religion, his sociology of morality, and his sociology of knowledge. For in Durkheim's system, structures of consciousness are intimately related to, and evolve out of, structures of conscience, while both, in turn, derive from the underlying social morphological process. Alpert reminded us over three and a half decades ago: "Les Formes Elémentaires, it should not be forgotten, was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of Thought and of Religious Life" (1939:55; see also W.H, Stanner, 1967:227). Similarly, as noted earlier, "collective representation" contains both a verb-like and noun-like dimension. But as Bohannan points out: "American and English interpretations of Durkheim ... have separated the two substantive elements which Durkheim intended to leave conjoined. In the separation, the processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared" (1960: 79-80). As Bohannan rightly notes, the fruitful ambiguities of Durkheim's key terms conscience and representation led him to a fundamentally different, and perhaps more profound, perception of cultural and phenomenological process than the perspective today which splits apart the cultural object, the generating group, the constitutive symbolizing process, and the phenomenological experience.

In terms of Durkheim's own biological metaphors, social morphology was to take as its prime task the study of the spatial and material forms and physical-moral energies of societies, while social physiology was to focus primarily on the study of key collective representations as constitutive symbolic processes. Clearly, just as in the organism morphological structures are closely intertwined with physiological-psychological processes, so too Durkheim postulated similar intimacies between social morphological forms and processes and social physiological forms and processes. As noted earlier, Durkheim always sought to ground sociological analysis in an empirically verifiable material "social body." For example, against the Marxist Labriola in 1897, Durkheim refuted his later critics in these terms: "Either the conscience collective floats
in a void ... or else it is connected with the rest of the world by a substratum, upon which, consequently, it is dependent" (in Giddens, 1972a:159). Bellah suggests:

The analysis of society, personality, and symbolism and their interpretation in The Elementary Forms remains a fundamental reference point for present understanding. 

... In his theory of ritual Durkheim attempts to show how a new level of consciousness comes about and supercedes the isolated, fragmented, individual consciousnesses which operate in the dispersed conditions of everyday life. The new consciousness could be called a social consciousness or even a symbolic consciousness ... for it cannot occur without symbolism ... but it penetrates into the interior of the personality and even strongly affects physiology (1973:xlviii).

Now, Durkheim's dynamic or processual focus moves to center stage in The Elementary Forms. In the "crucial experiment" in which he purposely conflated generic and genetic-evolutionary analyses, Durkheim's concern with both was processual through and through. Durkheim took great care here to specify the links between social morphological and collectively representational processes, with central focus on the social morphological "critical mass" needed for the emergence of religious phenomena. Further, these social intensities also are the preconditions for the constitution of moral, religious, and logical categories and symbols. Let us briefly explore some of the following key sequential linkages by which collectively symbolic representations emerge out of social morphological intensities.

(1) Social morphological implosions moralize organic egos in creating societies and persons.

(2) The moralization of organic egos by cultural implosions releases man from the confines of the organic cage. Social energies lift persons into the realm of freedom, of moral rules and intellectual concepts. Liberty is the product of reglementation. Man is the sociocultural animal. The evolution of man and the evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic culture is the prime genetic medium of human society and human personality.

(3) Symbols act as visible, public collective representations of group self-consciousness. These collective representations both represent and constitute
symbolic bonds of the group. Due to the moral intensities which created them, certain collective symbols become "sacralized"—that is, invested with obligatory respect and desirability.

(4) Inevitably, however, moral intensities fade in the face of the demands of everyday life. "Sacralized" collective symbols face similar moral depreciation. Therefore, periodic renewals help to remoralize or recreate the sacred intensity of collective symbols representing the group, and thus to reaffirm the social bond, and to revitalize the structures of conscience and consciousness.

(5) The marked contrast between these two alternating phases of sociocultural life—dispersed and ordinary versus gathered together in extraordinary excitement—gives rise to dichotomous oppositions between the "sacred" and the "profane." This fundamental set of symbolic oppositions creates tension in the sociocultural and phenomenological fields, and life becomes progressively energized by, and organized around, these two poles.

(6) In the very nature of the alternating rhythms of sociocultural process, the "sacred" significance originally attached to the moral implosion of the group gradually becomes transferred to the image of the group. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective representations become detached from their processual origins, and crystallized into permanent symbolic forms. Symbolism always tends to grow more autonomous.

(7) The "contagiousness" of "sacral energies," plus the dependence of sociocultural process upon symbolism, means inevitably that the organizing tension between "sacred" and "profane" becomes extended to all spheres of reality and levels of experience. The world is cosmicized through a compounding series of symbolic equations. The greater the degree of lamination, or multiple linkage of meanings on several levels, the greater the symbolic load, and thus, the greater the potency and significance. Phenomenological analogy and metaphor serve as symbolic tools for the construction of classificatory systems in their early stages. These constitutive symbolic equations serve as crucial bridges transforming empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. Elementary classificatory systems are simultaneously sociocentric and sacro-magical, for the prime symbolic forms are linked to the structure of the group and its magical protocols. The legitimacy of structures of conscience and consciousness are bound both to the group and its religion.
Since symbols serve as time-binders holding groups together through time and space, as collectivities grow, so too must their representational symbols. Some viable, yet highly crystallized, symbols and transformational equations may become deeply sedimented as axial or paradigmatic collective representations on the level of cultural traditions. As societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. Although first born in the clan and its totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connection with the restrictive structures of both group and religion. Symbols blessed with a high degree of universalizability may help generate supra-societal or civilizational bonds. The extension of the social bond in terms of widening structures of fraternization, and universalization and rationalization of the legitimate structures of moral and intellectual authority proceed together on the world-historical level (we shall pursue these latter points especially in Chapters Six and Seven).

(8) Since the structure of human symbolic action is inherently dramatic (or rhetorical and dialectical), here we add the third and final, culminating phase to the first phase (tension-creating polarities) and the second phase (symbolic equations which extend the polarities)—namely, reunification through symbolic transformations. Specifically, the two basic religious modes of asceticism (separation) and mysticism (unification) sum up these phases of sociocultural process. Hence, tension is resolved, and the powers of the imagination and will released, through a crucial series of transformations of these mounting oppositions into a new and higher synthesis or unity.

Now, if Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process is still to be considered a brilliant "just-so-story," as even so insightful and sympathetic critic as Evans-Pritchard (1965) insists, then so be it! As Ken Kesey said in the introduction to his classic American novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, "It's the truth even if it didn't happen" (1962:13).
1. **Social Morphological Implosions, the Emergence of Society, and Transformation of Egos into Moralized Persons**

Given Durkheim's initial image of the isolated unsocialized organic ego, one way of viewing *The Elementary Forms* is as a detailed description, on the micro social interactional level, of "that singularly creative and fertile psychic operation ... by which a plurality of individual consciousnesses enter into communion and are fused into a common consciousness" (DHN:335). Through this communion process, egos are transformed into persons. Through this fusion or consubstantiality, a new reality is born—society.

Now, no entity as self-centered and closed as the pre-socialized individual willingly foregoes its own nature. Only an extraordinary force—a suprahuman (as it were) source of energy—can transform isolated egos into moralized persons with meaningful goals. Durkheim discovered this source of "sacred energy" in "collective effervescence."

... if collective life awakens religious thought upon reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are over-excited, passions are more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him (EF:469).

The social psychological process which Durkheim postulated here can be likened to centrifugal and divisive energies imploding into a fused, centripetal source of energy; Chardin (1961) described these as "tangential" and "radial" organizing energies, respectively. In effect, the self-seeking ego is blasted out of its own self-centered private orbit into a new and more powerful "energy state"; or to shift the analogy slightly, there is a passage from the "out of step" diffused energy of normal white light to the fused and coherent energy of a "laser beam."

Now, these moral implosions generate extra-ordinary energies that transform the isolated and privatized ego into a
socially constructed person. The center of his isolated exis-
tence then revolves not around private passions but around
public prescriptions.

One can readily conceive how, when arrived at this
state of exaltation, a man does not recognize him-
self any longer. Feeling himself dominated and car-
ried away by some sort of external power which makes
him think and act differently than in normal times,
he naturally has the impression of being himself no
longer. It seems to him that he has become a new be-
ing: the decorations he puts on and the masks that
cover his face figure materially in this interior
transformation, and they aid in determining its na-
ture (EF:249-50).

Such interior transformations mean that, in a very real sense,
the pre-socialized ego becomes a new being; now moralized and
socialized, it is now under the sphere of influence of the po-
werful energies of human society. Analogies with nuclear phys-
ics and other high energy phenomena in attempting to describe
this crucial generic transformation of egos into persons are
useful (though, of course, limited). For what Durkheim sought
to describe here is essentially the evolutionary emergence of
a totally new phenomena, breaking through the old restrictive
organic envelope. The organic cage is left behind. It takes
high-energy forms to overcome other strong energy patterns,
and this is precisely what Durkheim postulated as going on in
an "ideal typical" way in the "white heat" of Australian ritual.

According to Durkheim, as traditional American social
psychology also maintains (see, eg. Nisbet, 1974), "society
and person are twin-born." Society becomes the center of moral
and conceptual life, having its phenomenological anchor in the
newly moralized person's conscience and consciousness. For
ever more, man shall be homo duplex, "two souls in one body
twain." Ego and body, person and society, these Durkheimian
symbolic equations are now the twin anchors of the irretrieva-
ably ambivalent human condition.

When individual minds are not isolated but enter into
close relation with and work upon each other, from their
synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life. It is clear-
ly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that
led by the solitary individual. Sentiments born and
developed in the group have greater energy than purely individual sentiments. A man who experiences such sentiments feels himself dominated by outside forces that lead him and pervade his milieu. He feels himself in a world quite distinct from that of his private existence. This is a world not only more intense but also qualitatively different. Following the collectivity, the individual forgets himself for the common end and his conduct is oriented in terms of a standard outside himself.... This activity is qualitatively different from the everyday life of the individual, as is the superior from the inferior, the ideal from the real (SP:91).

Thus, in Durkheim's view, when a new level of intensity and collective effervescence reaches a white heat, and consubstantiality is thereby consummated, social energies implode. Society and culture are born as entirely new levels of world-activity. Through this evolutionary breakthrough, society and culture are energized, thereafter to dominate biological and psychological levels. Through this communion process, the duality of human nature is constructed, and the person—as opposed to the ego—emerges. Society and person are thus mutual co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the genetic medium.

If it is important to emphasize that society depends for its continued existence upon persons—"the clan, like every other sort of society, can live only in and through the individual consciousnesses that compose it" (EF:253)—the converse is equally true. Collective ritual and myth—the genetic symbolic medium of co-creation—provide, as Durkheim poetically said, a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature." If moralized persons are not to lapse back into the scattered egoisms or deepening autism of pre-social human nature, they can sustain themselves only by dipping again and again into the very fount of their existence—namely, collectively effervescent, symbolically energizing, human society.

The sentiments which society has for him raise the sentiments which he has for himself. Because he is in moral harmony with his comrades, he has more confidence, courage, and boldness in action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of god turned graciously toward him. It thus produces, as it were, a perpetual sustenance of our moral nature (EF:242).
Collective action, especially when extra-ordinary in nature, raises man above his egoistic half, and replenishes his moral nature. Collective ceremonial publicly revalidates his civic sense of self as a socially constructed and valuable person. Men do not deceive themselves when they feel at this time that there is something outside of them which is born again, that there are forces which are reanimated and a life which reawakens. This renewal is in no way imaginary, and the individuals themselves profit from it. For the spark of a social being which each bears within him necessarily participates in this collective renovation. The individual soul is regenerated too, by being dipped again in the source from which its life comes; consequently, it feels itself stronger, more fully master of itself, less dependent upon physical necessities (EF:391).

Consciousness and society, conscience, culture, and person, all imply one another in Durkheimian sociology. As Bohannan points out, it was precisely one of Durkheim's main virtues, in contrast to the heirs of both the idealists and the materialists, that he didn't bifurcate sociocultural process from phenomenological process. To Durkheim, cultural (that is, impersonal) process must become internalized in the person's conscience and consciousness if either are to live. There is no paradox here, really, for Durkheim himself observed:

Just as there is no society without individuals, so those impersonal forces which are disengaged from the group cannot establish themselves without incarnating themselves in the individual consciousness where they individualize themselves (EF:302).

Impersonal and personal, universal and particular, thing and process, culture and individual, these and other conventional dichotomies are seen simply as complementary phases of the same overall human process in Durkheim's sociological philosophy. Surely this is necessary prerequisite for the foundations of the human sciences of the future.

Now, according to Durkheim, the contrast between ego-centric and undisciplined, random action, on the one hand, and highly focussed, socialized and moralized human action, on the other, creates a basic tension within the heart of man. It is as though we have conflicting voices competing for ascendency within our inner lives. Freud, for example, at about
the same time as Durkheim, mythologized this inner conflict in terms of id, ego, and superego. While human reality is thus basically conflictual to Durkheim, it is also fundamentally creative. There was no oppressive feeling of primal guilt in Durkheim, however, as there was in Freud's work; no Durkheimian would call man "a disease of history" (N.O. Brown, 1959). Rather, if society makes men, so too do men make societies, and in the process each irretrievably alters the other. Society and person thus stand as mutual co-creations, and henceforth must perennially cope with their double burden. This was Durkheim's fundamental dialectic of human action. Forever more, man is double. His interior life has a "double-center of gravity"—for on the one hand, we see the self-centered and proportionless passions; on the other, we witness that cosmos of obligations, ideals, archetypal symbols and dynamic energies called culture. By virtue of the latter's contrast with the former, they are set apart or "sacralized."

When the Australian goes away from a religious ceremony, the representations which this communal life has aroused or rearoused within him are not obliterated in a second. The figures of the great ancestors, the heroic exploits whose memory those rites perpetuate, the great deeds of every sort, in which he too has participated through the cult, in a word, all these numerous ideals which he elaborated with the cooperation of his fellows, continue to live in his consciousness and, through the emotions which are attached to them and the ascendancy which they hold over his entire being, they are sharply distinguished from the vulgar impressions arising from his daily relations with external things. Moral ideals have the same character. It is society which forces them upon us; as the respect inspired by it is naturally extended to all that comes from it, its imperative rules of conduct are invested, by reason of their origin, with an authority and a dignity which is shared by none of our internal states; therefore, we assign them a place apart in our psychical life (EF:298).

With the evolutionary emergence of human society, and therefore also cultural and phenomenological process, a painful but creative dualism is enshrined in the very heart of man. "Our nature is double: there really is a particle of di-
vinity in us because there is within us a particle of these great ideas which are the soul of the group" (EF:299). As always, Durkheim perceived the key nexus between our inner and outer lives to be structures of conscience. And granting that conscience and consciousness are always intimately intertwined, nonetheless, in general, questions of conscience take precedence over questions of consciousness.

Although our moral conscience is a part of our consciousness, we do not feel ourselves on an equality with it. In this voice which makes itself heard only to give us orders and establish prohibitions, we cannot recognize our own voices; the very tone in which it speaks to us warns us that it expresses something within us that is not of ourselves. This is the objective foundation of the idea of the soul: those representations whose flow constitutes our interior life are of two different species which are irreducible one into another. Some concern themselves with the external and material world; others with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral superiority over the first. So we are really made up of two beings facing in different and almost contrary directions, one of whom exercises a real preeminence over the other. Such is the profound meaning of the antithesis which all men have more or less clearly conceived between the body and the soul, the material and the spiritual beings who coexist within us (EF:298).

The progressive transformation of the organic ego into a personality structured by conscience and consciousness generates the dualism of human nature. As with the old Christian image of man as homo duplex, the two parts of man are opposed to one another as body is to soul.

It is perfectly true that we are made up of two distinct parts, which are opposed to one another as the sacred to the profane, and we may say that, in a certain sense, there is divinity in us. For society, this unique source of all that is sacred, does not limit itself to moving us from without and affecting us for the moment; it establishes itself within us in a durable manner. It arouses within us a whole world of ideas and sentiments which express it but which, at the same time, form an integral and permanent part of ourselves (EF:297-8).

In sum, the human condition is both unprecedently powerful and irretrievably ambiguous.
2. The Break From the Organic Cage: Man's Ascent From the Kingdom of Necessity to the Kingdom of Freedom

Evans-Pritchard observed of Durkheim's theses, borrowing a phrase from Engels, that through the genetic medium of religious symbolism "Man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (1965:61). I believe that this telling phrase succinctly summarizes Durkheim's general framework of thought. Since the textual evidence presented here comes largely from The Elementary Forms, it should be noted that from his first great book on, Durkheim never tired of repeating that society is the source of moral rules and intellectual concepts, that society constructs the person, that culture releases man from the fixed bonds of the organic cage, that human liberty comes through sociocultural reglementation, and so on and so forth. Let us, then, further explore Durkheim's early formulation of his philosophical anthropology.

In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim correctly argued that cultural evolution replaced biological heredity as the prime mode of human adaptation. "The more elevated the species, the more discretionary instinct becomes" (DL: 322).

... the hereditary contribution diminishes, not only in relative value, but in absolute value. Heredity becomes a lesser factor in human development, not only because there is an ever greater multitude of new acquisitions it cannot transmit, but also because those it transmits disturbs individual variations less.... Indeed, it is very remarkable that instinctive life is weakened as one mounts in the animal scale (DL:321).

Thus, Durkheim posited a progressive release from the cramped confines of the organic cage--from the kingdom of necessity. With all his repeated arguments on "creative synthesis" (see especially Rules, and "Individual and Collective Representations" in Sociology and Philosophy), Durkheim pushed back the liberating principle of the human condition to society and culture in themselves.

To say that the influence of heredity is more general, more vague, less imperious is to say that it is smaller. It no longer imprisons the activity of the animal in a rigid form, but leaves him with freer activity.
When from animals one passes to man, this regression is still more marked.... Even where instinct survives, it has less force, and the will can more easily subdue it (DL:322).

And again:

... heredity always leaves more room for new combinations. Not only is there a growing number of things over which it has no power, but the properties whose continuity it assures become more plastic. The individual is, thus, strongly chained to his past; it is easier for him to adapt himself to new circumstances which are produced, and the progress of the division of labor thus becomes easier and more rapid (DL:328).

Agreeing with the old adage that "the progress of conscience is in inverse ratio to that of instinct" (DL:346), Durkheim further argued that the very notion of the person progressively emerges through societal differentiation and the multiplication of individual possibilities.

... individual differences steadily multiply ... the constitutive elements of the average type are more diversified.... The average man assumes a physiognomy less and less precise and recognizable, and more and more schematic. He is an abstraction more and more difficult to fix and delimit. Further, the more elevated the species to which societies belong, the more rapidly they evolve, since tradition becomes more supple.... The average type changes, then, from one generation to the next (DL:327).

The increasing suppleness of cultural traditions, as opposed to the rigidity of molecular inheritance, depends, in turn, on societal differentiation. Thus, there emerges a more intense and continuous collective symbolic life.

... as the social horizon extends, as collective life, instead of being dispersed in a multitude of small centers where it can only be weak, is concentrated in a more limited number of places, it becomes at the same time more intense and more continuous (PE:297).

The increasing intensity and continuity of long-term collective cultural activity forces man himself to change in turn.

... as societies become more vast and, particularly, more condensed, a psychic life of a new sort appears. Individual diversities, at first lost and confused amidst the mass of social likenesses, become disengaged, become conspicuous, and multiply. A multitude of things which used to remain outside consciences because they did not affect the collective being become objects of
representations. Whereas individuals used to act only by involving others ... each of them becomes a source of spontaneous activity. Particular personalities become constituted, take consciousness of themselves. ...(the psychic life of society) becomes freer, more extensive, and, as it has, after all, no other bases than individual consciences, these extend, become complex, and thus more flexible.

...Hence, the cause which called forth these differences separating man from the animals is also that which has forced him to elevate himself above himself (DL:347-8).

Indeed, as Durkheim repeated again and again, this diversification itself forces man to grow increasingly autonomous and rational. Thus, both morality and knowledge move toward greater universality and freedom. In Moral Education, for example, Durkheim contended that:

... the more societies become complex, the more difficult for morality to operate as a purely automatic mechanism. Circumstances are never quite the same, and as a result the rules of morality require intelligence in their application. Society is continually evolving; morality itself must be sufficiently flexible to change gradually as proves necessary (ME:52).

The distinguishing characteristic of man from animals is "... the greater development of his psychic life, (which) comes from his greater sociability" (DL:347). Indeed, Durkheim transforms the old definitions of man as the reasoning animal, or homo religiosus, into homo sociale et symbolizans.¹

Given this evolutionary grounding of man's liberation from genetic chains to the past in emergent human interaction and cultural relationship, Durkheim enunciated the following principle: "With societies, individuals are transformed in accordance with the changes produced in the number of social units and their relationships" (DL:345). For man's evolutionary identity as the sociocultural animal means that man's dependence upon society is a liberating dependence.

They (individuals) are made more and more free of the yoke of the organism. An animal is almost completely under the influence of his physical environment; its biological constitution predetermines its existence. Man, on the contrary, is dependent upon social causes (DL:345).
Man is the cultural animal. Man is the creature who dwells within his own images. "Man is the animal," said C. Geertz, "who is suspended in webs of meaning that he himself has spun." Man is the "time-binder" as Korzybski suggested. Man is the only creature who makes himself through the medium of his own symbolic forms. The evolution of man and the evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic culture is the prime genetic medium of human societies and persons. Culture is an autonomous, emergent phenomenon, irreducible to biology and psychology; indeed, cultural processes feedback down and alter biological structures (eg. the brain of *homo sapiens*) and individual psychological processes. Culture is the prime symbolic meaning and directive system of a group. This is part of Durkheim's profound, and basically optimistic, philosophical anthropology.

Further, if energy and information are considered basic categories of life processes, then culture may be likened to "social DNA," for it lays the foundation of human informational processes. Both socialization (social reproduction and the simultaneous construction of the person) and lifecycle development are in-formed by the great collective symbolic forms. "Mutations" or revolutions in the more adaptable (efficient and universalizable) symbolic forms stand on the mainline of sociocultural evolution. Human culture is negentropic, for instead of randomizing its potency, symbolic evolution shows a clear and definite tendency toward increasing complexity and adaptive power (eg. see Weber's concept of "rationalization"). I believe that Talcott Parsons deserves credit for having been one of the first, as far as I know, to explore the analogy between religious culture in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms* and genetic processes, information theory, and general systems theory (eg. see Parsons, 1973). I believe he might agree that culture acts as social DNA, for that is the secret to human evolution.

With animals, the organism assimilates social facts to it, and, stripping them of their special nature, transforms them into biological facts. Social life
is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and particularly in higher societies, social causes substitute themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized (DL:346).

This "hyper-spiritualization" is the very source of the reorganization of organic nature as social and cultural life implode into ever-more powerful and universal structures of conscience and consciousness; this is the foundation of human freedom. As we discovered earlier, Durkheim argued that liberty comes through reglementation.

Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from being antagonistic to social action, it results from social action. It is far from being an inherent property of the state of nature. On the contrary, it is a conquest of society over nature....

Liberty is the subordination of external forces to social forces, for it is only in this condition that the latter can freely develop themselves. But this subordination is rather the reverse of the natural order. It can, then, realize itself progressively only insofar as man raises himself above things and makes law for them, thus depriving them of their fortuitous, absurd, amoral character; that is, insofar as he becomes a social being. For he can escape nature only by creating another world where he dominates nature. That world is society (DL:386-7).

It is only because we moderns habitually think of freedom in negative terms, as the release of the individual from constraining traditional claims, that we have difficulty with Durkheim's notion that, at root, human freedom is positive—it emerges only through relationship. As Lynch (1966) observes, it is only mutuality that is ultimately liberating.

The individual submits to society and this submissiveness is the condition of his liberation. For man freedom consists in deliverance from blind, unthinking physical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them the great and intelligent force which is society, under whose protection he shelters. By putting himself under the wing of society, he makes himself, also to a certain extent, dependent upon it. But this is a liberating dependence. There is no paradox here (SP:72).

 Truly, then, "Man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" through collective symbolic forms.
3. Collective Representations as Symbols of Group Self-Consciousness

"For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself" (EF:470). In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed that human society is itself first created through the genetic medium of religious ritual. This symbolic genetic medium concentrates and intensely focusses social energies, as a solar mirror collects the rays of the sun, and thereby generates the first form of group self-consciousness. Durkheim's image of primitive religion, as Lukes aptly suggests, as a kind of "mythologized sociology" was not a late development. For as early as 1897, in Suicide (see also Durkheim 1886, R.A. Jones, 1974b), Durkheim succinctly summarized this essential notion in this way: "Religion is--in a word--the system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic way of thinking of collective existence" (S:312). Indeed, physical concentration becomes moralized through ritual sacrifice, for through such symbolisms men actually feel themselves becoming consubstantial. And the generative medium of this creative metamorphosis is collectively representational symbolism.

As always, in his exploration of the nature and origins of the elementary forms of sociocultural life, Durkheim fused his generic and genetic investigations. Therefore, he sought the generic nature of sociocultural process in terms of the genetic origins of human society. This necessarily involved central focus on what I shall call the "primitive sacral complex" (see succeeding chapters) as the womb of society, culture, and person. I believe, along with Giddens (eq. 1971a:106, 110, 114), that Durkheim's theses here should be genetically as well as generically. In critical terms, this means that Parsons' attempt to treat, for example, Durkheim's theory of the generic role of religion (translate to "ultimate value system based on non-empirical referents") in maintaining normative concensus, and thus, social order, in all societies is largely
misconceived. Rather, Durkheim here demonstrated genetically, in terms of the most elementary forms he could discover, the self-creativeness of generic sociocultural process. Or, as Giddens puts it, "Religion is the expression of the self-creation, the autonomous development, of human society" (1971a:110). And, of course, the emergence and crystallization of collective symbolic representations as the cultural vehicle of group self-consciousness depends upon sustained social morphological intensities and imploding energies. Surely this recognition should greatly change the widely pervasive image of The Elementary Forms supposed "idealization" of religion as the generic basis of The Central Value System, as well as the older misleading of Durkheim as a Platonic social realist.

Now, the very key to this collective process of group and self-transformation (for the person is created along with the group) is the creative effect of cultural symbols. Indeed, as my formula that culture acts as "social DNA" suggests, Durkheim proposed that "Social life in all its aspects, and in every period of its history, is made possible only through a vast symbolism" (EF:264). (Parsons, among others, mistook this as Durkheim's turn toward idealism). Now, the symbolic basis of the socioreligious bonds of the Australian aboriginees on which Durkheim lavished his attention was, of course, the totemic emblem. Over and above the ties of "blood and soil," Durkheim insisted that the clan was first and foremost a community of common belief, of shared symbols, a community of memories.

For the members of a single clan are not united to each other either (solely) by a common habitat or by common blood, as they are not necessarily consanguineous and are frequently scattered over different parts of the tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from their having the same name and the same emblem, their believing that they have the same relations with the same categories of things, their practising the same rites, or, in a word, from their participating in the same totemic cult (EF:194).

In the final analysis, Durkheim made the symbolic community prior to the geographical or even the biological community.
Indeed, kinship here is seen first and foremost as a socio-religious bond.

In essence, Durkheim proposed that public process is symbolic process. Symbolism serves as the visible vehicle of communication by which communion is consummated; it acts as the external cultural medium through which society attains consciousness of itself as a group.

... if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs individuals that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity (EF:262).

External signs and symbols, as prime modes of social communication, thus serve as the womb of society. Man makes himself through the genetic medium of cultural symbols.

Durkheim further proposed that material things as signs and gestures serve as externalized symbols which represent internal feelings. Especially important here is the creative role of religious and ritual symbolism in the awakening of conscience and consciousness, the key phenomenological embodiments of sociocultural process. For what was closed and private becomes open, public and creative. Thus, paradoxically, in the beginning, moral processes depend upon the utilization of material objects or physical gestures which, while devoid of "value" in themselves, yet become moralized or "sacralized" through group action.

... collective representations originate only when they are embodied in material objects, things, or beings of every sort--figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on--that symbolize them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are by nature closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison. The things that embody the collective representations arouse the same feelings as do the mental states they represent, and,
in a manner of speaking, materialize. They too are respected, feared, and sought after as helping powers. Consequently, they are not placed on the same plane as the vulgar things that interest only our physical individualities but are set apart from them. Therefore, we assign them a completely different place in the complex of reality and separate them; and it is this radical separation that constitutes the essence of their sacred character (DHN:335).

Now, the specific empirical focus of these sacred symbolisms is the totem. As noted earlier, Durkheim proposed that the community of ideals and memories symbolized by the totem underlay the communities of "blood and soil." The rite is thus the religious occasion when "Men who feel themselves united, partially by bonds of blood, but still more by a community of interest and tradition, assemble and become conscious of their moral unity" (EF:432). Here, Durkheim suggested, men are led to symbolically project their sense of moral community onto some external object which they portray as the constitutive principle of their consubstantiality.

This symbol embodying their essential mutuality is the totem. "They are led to represent this unity in the form of a very special kind of consubstantiality: they think of themselves as all participating in the nature of some determined animal" (EF:432; on consubstantiality, see also Kenneth Burke, 1969).

The men who assemble on the occasions of these rites believe that they are really animals or plants of the species whose name they bear. They feel within them an animal or vegetable nature, and in their eyes, this is what constitutes whatever is most essential and the most excellent in them. So when they assemble, their first movement ought to be to show each other this quality which they attribute to themselves and by which they are defined. The totem is their rallying sign, for this reason ... they design it upon their bodies, but it is no less natural that they should seek to resemble it in their gestures, their cries, their attitude.... By this means, they mutually show one another that they are all members of the same moral community and they become conscious of the kinship uniting them. The rite does not limit itself to expressing this kinship; it makes it or remakes it. For it exists only insofar as it is believed in, and the effect of all these collective demonstrations is to support the beliefs upon which they are founded * (EF:400).
Thus, in short, Durkheim regarded the totem as the first prime constitutive symbol: "It is the flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything which is a part of the clan ... men, beasts, or things" (EF: 236).

I wish to emphasize now, as Robert N. Bellah (1973) has rightly pointed out, that these symbolic systems serve not merely a neutral representative function, but more importantly, they are creative, or "constitutive" as Bellah suggests. They are "constitutive symbolism," the genetic cultural medium, vital to the very construction of the group in the first place.

That an emblem is useful as a rallying center for any sort of group is superfluous to point out. By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this more obvious to all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread quickly.... But more than that, this idea should spontaneously arise out of the conditions of common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiment society has of itself: it also serves to create this sentiment; it is one of its constituent elements (EF:262).

I believe that Durkheim here proposed a profound phenomenology of generic sociocultural process: cultural symbols are the genetic medium leading to the co-creation of the person and society. Such key symbols act not merely as neutral devices of objective representation but also enter into the self-creation of the group itself. Acting as the collectively representational symbols of group self-consciousness, gradually they become the very foundations of impersonal thought and group action. These dual functions of symbolism—representative and constitutive or creative—must be emphasized as twin keys as important to Durkheim's thought as the intimate relations between structures of conscience and consciousness.

Collective representations ... presuppose that minds act and react upon one another; they are the product of these actions and reactions which are themselves possible only through material intermediaries. These
latter do not confine themselves to revealing the mental state with which they are associated; they aid in creating it. Individual minds cannot come in contact and communicate with each other except by coming out of themselves; but they cannot do this except by movements. So it is the homogeneity of these movements that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist. When this homogeneity is once established and these movements have once taken a stereotyped form, they serve to symbolize them only because they have aided in forming them*(EF:263).

4. Alternating Phases of SocioCultural Life and Periodic Renewals

Preface. By their very nature, however, such moral intensities are extra-ordinary. "Ecstasy" (in the root sense, see EF:259) cannot last forever. High energy particles fall into lower orbits; newly fused egos caught up in the momentary intensities of moralized implosions, face the problem of the "morning after." Inevitably, the extraordinary concentration of human energies disperses and fades back into the interstices of everyday life. In short, "ecstasy," while self-fulfilling, is also self-exhausting. Further, the demands of everyday life--of eating, working, babies crying, fires burning, storms coming, enemies approaching, and so on--rudely intrude upon the sacred inviolability of the communal sacralizing moment. "Charisma," to use Weber's roughly parallel term, is like a high mountain peak surrounded by undulating valleys. At some point, we must come down from the heights and return to the mundane tasks of everyday life.

The tension between everyday routine (Weber's alltag) and the charismatic moment is two-fold. First, these sacred symbols and energies flow back out to socialize, energize, and sacralize us and the world as we strive to "meet the demands of the day." Correspondingly, even though we are newly energized, the farther we get from the generating source of power, the more these symbolic energies are usurped and dissipated in everyday life. As Durkheim once poetically said, they are subject to the "slow usury of time." In sum, al-
though these tensions between alltag and "charisma" allow sacred energies to flow, it also means that the energy reserves, as it were, shall be constantly depleted.

Even though we must forego the vulgar summary that the function of regular ritual and periodic celebration is to help men "recharge their batteries," as it were, nonetheless, analogies with electricity and other types of energy flows are stimulating. Both Durkheim and Weber compared the "sacred" and "charisma" with electricity, in terms of its power to energize, and its tendency to flow or its contagiousness. Thus, charismatic forces are like sacred electricity, for they energize as they flow. Now, because "ecstasy" is self-exhausting, and because the force of "charisma" is inevitably dissipated in the routine of everyday life, men must gather again and again to renew or recreate these sacred energies. "The essential constituent of the cult is the cycle of feasts which return regularly at determined epochs" (EF: 391). In turn, if society is to continue, that is, if the "collective conscience" is to perdure, it must constantly reassemble itself. "... Before all, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically" (EF: 432). Thus, rite and ceremonial are the prime public means of society's self-creation and recreation. Through religious ritual, society rekindles social energies and moral intensities, and thereby strengthens both persons and its own consciousness of itself as a group. "The rite serves ... to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it the group periodically renews the sentiments which it has of itself, and of its unity" (EF: 420).

Just as moral intensities inevitably fade, so too the energy of the sacralized collectively representational symbols face the same dissipation or moral depreciation. Because they no longer circulate at the same speed, they are no longer current, they lose their worth as "currency." Charismatic moment and charismatic symbol equally tend to fade from consciousness and conscience. Society then tends to
lapse back into that whirl of isolated and privatized ego-
isms from which it had only just escaped.

Of course, social sentiments could never be totally
absent. We remain in relations with others, the ha-
bits, ideas, and tendencies which education has im-
pressed upon us and which ordinarily preside over
our relations with others, continue to make their
action felt. But they are constantly combatted and
held in check by the antagonistic tendencies arou-
sed and supported by the necessities of the daily
struggle. They resist more or less successfully, ac-
cording to their intrinsic energy: but this energy
is not renewed. They live upon their past, and con-
sequently, they would be used up in the course of
time, if nothing returned to them a little of the
force that they lose through these incessant con-
flicts and frictions (EF:390).

In addition, the only way the twin attributes of human
personhood--conscience and consciousness--can be in-formed
and re-formed is through symbolic processes. "Since society
cannot exist but in and through individual consciousnesses,
this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within
us; it becomes an integral part of our being anu by that
very fact this is elevated and magnified" (EF:391). In turn,
social institutions and cultural forms also fundamentally de-
pend upon viable energizing symbols. Thus, as the power of
symbols fade, society, culture, and the person also begin
to fade in the same degree. In short, beyond the desire for
charismatic communitas (see Victor Turner, 1969), and
periodic recharismatization of the profane, the continuing
life of society and of symbolic culture require more or less
regular moments of renewal and recreation.

Steven Lukes provides the following lucid and concise
summary of some of Durkheim's basic theses here:

...symbolism was 'necessary if society is to become
conscious of itself', and is 'no less indispensable
for assuring the continuation of this consciousness.'
Indeed, 'social life, in all its aspects and in every
period of history, is made possible only by a vast
symbolism.' The role of the emblem was to perpetuate
and recreate the 'social sentiments' aroused by the
rites; moreover, the rites themselves enabled
social communication to 'become a real communion,
that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments
into one common sentiment,' and they not only expressed but served to 'support the beliefs upon which they are founded.' Hence, the cult in general was both a 'system of signs by which the faith is outwardly translated' and a 'collection of the means by which this is created and recreated periodically' (1973:472).

Let us now explore the course of Durkheim's argument in this regard. Remember, first, that the life of the Australian aborigenees, which Durkheim chose for his "crucial experiment," passed through alternating phases (as, apparently, all energy forms must). Using Durkheim's own dichotomies, one might term these the "economic" or "egoistic" phase (see, however, Book Three), on the one hand, and the "social" phase on the other. In the first, the population is scattered, hunting for food. In the second, the group gathers and moral intensities rise, and sociocultural energies are generated and released (see also, for example, EF:246-7).

The religious life of the Australian passes through successive phases of complete lull and of superexcitation, and social life oscillates in the same rhythm. This puts clearly into evidence the bond uniting them to one another, but among the peoples called civilized, the relative continuity of the two blurs their relations. It might even be asked whether the violence of this contrast was not necessary to discharge the feelings of sacredness in its first form. By concentrating itself almost entirely in certain determined moments, the collective life has been able to attain its greatest intensity and efficacy, and consequently to give men a more active sentiment of the double existence they lead, and of the double nature in which they participate (EF:250-1).

Now, as we have noted, "ecstasy" is self-consuming. In terms of the ultimate consummation or release of charismatic energies in the second or sacral phase, Durkheim noted:

This effervescence often reaches such a point that it causes unheard of actions. The passions released are of such impetuosity that they can be restrained by nothing. They are so far removed from their extraordinary conditions of life, and they are so thoroughly conscious of it, that they feel that they must set themselves outside of and above their ordinary morals.... They produce such a violent super-excitation of the whole physical and mental life that it cannot be be supported very long; the actor taking the principal part finally falls exhausted to the ground (EF:247-8).
Inevitably, the ebb and flow of everyday life returns. Durkheim observed that collective effervescence can never sustain itself for long: "... the exaltation cannot maintain itself at such a pitch; it is too exhausting. Once the critical moment has passed, the social life relaxes, intellectual and emotional intercourse is subdued, and individuals fall back into their ordinary level" (SP:92). Since Durkheim's social psychology here inevitably suggests sexual analogies, especially when these charismatic moments or communitas are considered as orgiastic activities, it should be noted that the evident value of the analogy between moral and physical intercourse is, apart from the mutual excitation, the communion that is ultimately consummated. These analogies are not unusual, for one of the favorite images of mystics, for example, over the centuries has been the intimate and all-encompassing union with their divine being or world-principle as bride or bridegroom.

Inevitably, the demands of everyday life intrude upon communitas, upon the special world set apart. It is simply a rule of existence that men, having once attained the heights, must return to the lowlands, to the secure and supportive routine of everyday life. Indeed, there is a hidden dialectic in the alternating rhythms of "charismatic communitas" and the alltag or routine "profane" existence, for it is precisely the continuing contrast between the two different forms of creativity unique to each that enables us to appreciate the distinctive virtues of the other. As always, diversity is generative; it is their very opposition which creates their processual unity. Durkheim observed that:

Society is able to revivify the sentiments it has of itself only by assembling. But it cannot be assembled all the time. The exigencies of life do not allow it to remain in congregation indefinitely; so it scatters, to assemble anew when it feels again the need of this. It is to these necessary alternations that the regular alternations of sacred and profane times correspond (EF: 391).

Moral passions are thus dissipated in the routine of "meeting the demands of the day" (Weber, after Goethe). Al-
though energized by collective moralization, such sacred forces face inevitable depreciation. So too do the collectively representational symbols, which serve as the genetic medium and prime cultural vehicle of these moralizing forces. Society thus threatens to constantly lapse back into an amorphous collocation of warring egoisms.

Without symbols, social sentiments could have only a precarious existence. Though very strong as long as men are together and influence each other reciprocally, they exist only in the form of recollections after the assembly has ended, and when left to themselves, these become feebler and feebler; for since the group is now no longer present and active, individual temperaments easily regain the upper hand. The violent passions—which have been released in the heart of a crowd fall away, and are extinguished when this is dissolved, and men ask themselves with astonishment how they could ever have been so carried away from their normal character (EF:263).

Due to these alternating phases of communitas and alltag, or in Durkheim's terminology, the "sacred" and the "profane," sociocultural life rises and falls in an oscillating rhythm. And thus, the moralized person's commitment to his newly found obligations and goals also ebbs and flows with the rise and decline of sociocultural symbolism. The continued viability of significant prime symbols, as a genetic and cultural medium, is vital to the continued viability of both society and the moralized person.

Sacred beings exist only when they are represented as such in the mind. When we cease to believe in them, it is as though they did not exist. Even those which have material form and are given by sensible experience, depend upon the thought of worshippers who adore them; for the sacred character which makes them objects of the cult is not given by their natural constitution; it is added to them by belief.... If these sacred beings when once conceived, are to have no need of men to continue, it would be necessary that the representations expressing them always remain the same. But this stability is impossible. In fact, it is in the communal life that they are formed, and this communal life is essentially intermittent. So they necessarily partake of this same intermittency. They attain their greatest intensity at the moment when the men are assembled together and are in immediate relations with one another, when they all partake
of the same idea and the same sentiment. But when the assembly has broken up and each man has returned to his own peculiar life, they progressively lose their own original energy. Being covered over little by little by the rising flood of daily experiences, they would soon fall back into the unconscious, if we did not find some means of calling them back to consciousness and revivify them. If we think of them less forcefully, they amount to less for us and we count less upon them; they exist to a lesser degree (EF:386-7).

As always, Durkheim considered evolutionary differences between these alternating rhythms according to social type.

This rhythm is capable of varying in different societies. Where the period of dispersion is long, and the dispersion itself is extreme, the period of congregation, in its turn, is very prolonged, and produces veritable debauches of collective and religious life. Feasts succeed one another for weeks and even for months, while the ritual life sometimes attains to a sort of frenzy. Elsewhere, these two phases of the social life succeed one another after shorter intervals, and then the contrast between them is less marked. The more societies develop, the less they seem to allow of too great intermittencies (EF:391-2).

Therefore, Durkheim proposed an evolutionary rule: in general, the intensity of collective rites varies inversely with their society's continuity and complexity.

Further, the periodic renewal of self and society through ritual concelebration becomes reinforced, in a sort of psychosociocultural feedback process, as the prime creative cultural medium. Thus, religious culture, which by its nature seeks to establish definite and obligatory relationships between the macrocosm and the human microcosm, acts as a sort of "social DNA" in a number of ways. First, it both socializes and resocializes men (that is, acts as the medium of social reproduction), and second, it directs the growth of society and the person as they develop. In social psychological terms, Durkheim suggests that the person realizes his continued dependence on collective symbolic process, and thus "he holds with all the strength of his soul to these practices in which he periodically recreates himself; he could not deny their principle without causing an upheaval of his own being,
which he resists" (EF:403). Durkheim further observed that "the real reason for the cults" is to be found "in the internal and moral regeneration which they bring about" (EF: 388).

The only way of renewing the collective representations which relate to sacred beings is to retemper them in the very source of the religious life, that is to say, in the assembled groups.... The common faith becomes reanimated quite naturally in the heart of this reconstituted group, it is born again because it again finds those very conditions in which it was born in the first place. After it had been restored, it easily triumphs over all the private doubts which have have arisen in individual minds. The image of the sacred things regains power enough to resist the internal or external causes which tend to weaken it. In spite of their apparent failure, men can no longer believe that their gods will die, because they feel them living in their own hearts.... Men are more confident because they feel themselves stronger; and they really are stronger, because forces which were languishing are now reawakened in their consciousness (EF:387).

However, the mere fact of physical congregation alone is not, of course, sufficient to generate adequate moral intensities and thus social communion. Rather, symbolic processes enter, as necessary elements, into the very creation of society and self. The specific form of the first constitutive cultural symbols was ritual sacrifice, joined with mythic commemorations. Through sacred commensality all are made "as one," again and again.

... the object of this communion is manifest. Every member of a totemic clan constitutes a mystic substance within which is the pre-eminent part of his being, for his soul is made out of it. From it came whatever powers he has and his social position, for it is this which makes him a person. So he has a vital interest in maintaining it intact and in keeping it, as far as possible, in a state of perpetual youth. Unfortunately, all forces, even the most spiritual, are used up in the course of time if nothing comes to return to them the energy they lose through the normal workings of things; there is a necessity of the first importance here which ... is the real reason for the positive cult. Therefore, the men of a totem cannot retain their position unless they periodically revivify the totemic principle which is in them; and as
they represent this principle in the form of a vegetable or an animal, it is to the corresponding animal or vegetable species that they go to demand the supplementary forces needed to renew this and rejuvenate it. A man of the Kangaroo clan believes himself and feels himself a kangaroo; it is by this quality that he defines himself; it is this which marks his place in the society. In order to keep it, he takes a little of the flesh of this same animal into his own body from time to time. A small bit is enough, owing to the rule: the part is equal to the whole (EF: 378-9).

Even more, Durkheim observed that there are special moments and special things which are favored as commensal sacrifices due to their special potencies, and thus, their special symbolic significance. Contrary to his repeated assertions strewn throughout The Elementary Forms, Durkheim here acknowledged that the choice and content of religious symbols is not wholly arbitrary (see also Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, 1973). Especially important here were the first fruits of the harvest.

If this operation is to produce all the desired effects, it may not take place at no matter what moment. The most appropriate time is when the new generation has just reached its complete development, for this is also the moment when the forces animating the totemic species attain their maximum intensity. They have just been drawn with great difficulty from those rich reservoirs of life, the sacred trees and rocks. Moreover, all sorts of means have been employed to increase their intensity still more .... Also, by their very aspect, the first fruits of the harvest manifest the energy which they contain: here the totemic gods acclaims himself in all the glory of his youth. This is why the first fruits have always been regarded as a very sacred fruit, reserved for very holy beings. So it is natural that the Australian uses it to regenerate himself spiritually. Thus, both the date and the circumstances of the ceremonies are explained (EF:379).

Often, the manifest purpose of totemic ritual communion is to insure the reproduction of the totemic species. "When the close union of the animal has once been admitted, men feel acutely the necessity of assuring the regular reproduction of the principal object of the cult" (EF:432-3). Indeed, as Durkheim noted, "it is owing to this state of dependency
upon the thought of men, in which the gods find themselves, that the former are able to believe in the efficacy of their assistance" (EF:387).

Of course, men would be unable to live without gods, but on the other hand, the gods would die if their cult were not rendered. This does not have the sole object of making the profane beings communicate with sacred beings, but it also keeps these latter alive and is perpetually remaking and regenerating them (EF:388).

In addition, the totemic commensal sacrifice often takes on the added meaning of a mythic commemoration. The heroic memories of the ancestors, who first received the totem from the spirits or from the world-directive principle, are thus simultaneously called to life. Belief and act, conscience and consciousness, are forever joined in fundamental sociocultural process. Imagination and symbol serve as the key mediating terms. The function or rather the effect of commemorative rites, Durkheim observed, consists "... in recollecting the past and, in a way, making it present by means of a veritable dramatic representation" (EF:416). "We have here a whole group of ceremonies whose sole purpose is to awaken certain ideas and sentiments, to attach the present to the past or the individual to the collectivity" (EF:423).

Nothing is in representations whose only object can be to render the mythical part of the clan present to the mind. But the mythology of a group is the system of beliefs common to this group. The traditions whose memory it perpetuates express the way in which the society represents man and the world; it is a moral system and a cosmology as well as a history. So the rite serves and can serve only to sustain the vitality of these beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from memory, and in sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social natures. The glorious souvenirs which are made to live again before their eyes, and with which they feel they have a kinship, give them a feeling of strength and confidence: a man is surer of his faith when he sees to how distant a past it goes back and what great things it has inspired (EF:419-20).
In the last, Durkheimian, analysis, society perdures only, as Weber also once observed, as a "community of memories." It is these shared memories of the heroic ancestors, coupled with the memory of the "charismatic communitas" that lingers on. These not only constitute phenomenological foundations of society, but also continue to energize and direct people by their august greatness or awful sanctity. Thus, Durkheim postulated another key dialectic to human symbolic action--the ideal becomes a reality, yet inevitably they diverge, only to fuse again, and in the process, each pole irretrievably alters the other.

All that was said, done, and thought during this period of fecund upheaval survives only as memory, a memory no doubt as glorious as the reality it recalls, but which is no longer at one. It exists as an idea or rather as a composition of ideas. Between what is felt and perceived and what is thought of in the form of ideals there is now a clear distinction. Nevertheless, these ideals could not survive if they were not periodically renewed. This revivification is the function of religious or secular feasts and ceremonies, all public addresses in churches and schools, plays and exhibitions, in a word, whatever draws men together into an intellectual and moral communion. These movements are, as it were, minor variations of the great creative movements. But these means have only a temporary effect. For a short time the ideal comes to life and approaches reality, but it soon becomes differentiated from it (SP:92).

Indeed, Durkheim universalized the necessity of regular renewals of the charismatic energy of all groups:

... This is why all parties, political, economic, or confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions where their members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common. To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with one another (EF:240-1).

By virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual commensality, and the commemorative dramatic representations or mimetic re-enactments of the ancestors heroic deeds, and the ensuing "community of memories," the sacred symbols become historicized. Sacral symbols thereby become attached to durable social sentiments and memories. Thus, the dialectic of
symbol and sociocultural process deepens, for these "... systems of totemic emblems, which are necessary if society is to become conscious of itself, are no less indispensable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness" (EF:263). If society and person are to endure, they must become rooted in symbolic forms. If symbols are to survive, sentiments must become durable; in short, they must become historicized. If sentiments are to attain historical durability, they must be symbolically sedimented deep within the sociocultural process. In other words, they must become prime constitutive symbols.

... if the movements by which these sentiments are expressed are connected with something that endures, the sentiments themselves must become more durable. These other things are constantly bringing them to mind and arousing them; it is as though the causes which excited them in the first place continued to act. Thus these systems of emblems, which are necessary if society is to become conscious of itself, are no less indispensable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness (EF:263).

Besides the more or less regular periodic commemorations or concelebrations of ritual commensality, Durkheim observed that there are other periods of history which are, as it were, permeated by charisma. During these extraordinary times, the ideal is formed and lived, and becomes thereby a model for generations to come. These are the crucial turning points of societies, the charismatic times when a people is really born, or made anew, or reformed, or when they embark upon entirely new directions and aspirations. Such extraordinary periods, since they strike so deeply into the axial structures of conscience and consciousness, come to constitute the cultural historical capital off of which societies and persons live for generations after. Here, Durkheim observed:

Besides these passing and intermittent states, there are other more durable ones, where this strengthening influence of society makes itself felt with greater consequence and frequently even with greater brilliance. There are periods in history when under the influence of some great collective shock, social interactions have become much more frequent and active. That general effervescence results which is character-
istic of revolutionary or creative epochs. Now this
greater activity results in a general stimulation of
individual forces. Men see more and differently now
than in normal times. Changes are not merely shades
and degrees; men become different. The passion moving
them are of such intensity that they cannot be satis-
fied except by violent or unrestrained actions, act-
ions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism.
This is what explains the Crusades, for example, or
many of the scenes, either sublime or savage, of the
French Revolution (EF:241).

As Robert N. Bellah (1973:xlix) notes, Durkheim thus
distinguished between two basic phases of sociocultural pro-
cess: the creative and the re-creative or commemorative. Ri-
tual repeats archetypal symbolic events, while those "great
historic outbursts of collective effervescence" create new
prime guidance symbols. Thus, charismatic movements come to
represent foundation periods in the life of all societies.

... at such moments of collective ferment are born
the great ideals upon which civilizations rest. The
periods of creation or renewal occur when men for var-
ious reasons are led into a closer relationship with
each other, when reunions and assemblies are most fre-
quent, relationships better maintained, and the ex-
change of ideas most active. Such was the great crisis
of Christendom, the movement of collective enthusiasms
which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bring-
ing together in Paris the scholars of Europe, gave
birth to Scholasticism. Such were the Reformation and
Renaissance, the revolutionary epochs and the Social-
ist upheavals of the nineteenth century. At such mo-
mants, this higher form of life is lived with such in-
tensity and exclusiveness that it monopolizes all minds
to the more or less complete exclusion of egoism and
the commonplace. At such times the ideal tends to be-
come one with the real, and for this reason men have
the impression that the time is close when the ideal
will in fact be realized and the Kingdom of God estab-
lished on earth (SP:91-2).

Finally, we should reflect briefly on the "eternal"
significance of these generic dialectical processes which
Durkheim here postulated, such as those between symbol and
sentiment, self and society, charismatic and ordinary moment,
communitas and history, and so on and so forth. Many inter-
preters of Durkheim's Elementary Forms have taken his famous
concluding remark that "there is something eternal in reli-
igion" (EF:474) in a rather narrow functional sense. Believers, for instance, have seized upon this passage as evidence that religion, in the traditional metaphysical sense, should be considered an eternal generic phenomenon (eg. see G. Baum, 1973:14). Others have concluded that Durkheim spoke in formal generic terms of the universal functional contributions of religion to social solidarity, psychological strength, and so on. Yet, neither position adequately grasps Durkheim's full meaning or larger intention, for neither takes into account the genetic and evolutionary and metaphorical meanings of Durkheim's famous statement. Setting aside until a succeeding chapter discussion of the "primitive sacral-magical complex," we should not forget that Durkheim here interpreted religion in a metaphorical sense as the prime symbolic form by which a group attained consciousness of itself as a group. Further, in Durkheim's doctrine, ritual process was seen mainly as signifying the self-creativeness of sociocultural process; Durkheim secularized its meanings. Giddens (1971a, 1972a) is one of the few analysts who has begun to stress this aspect of Durkheim's sociology of religion. Indeed, if one puts this famous quotation back in the context of his total statement, one can clearly discern Durkheim's real underlying intention.

There is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to each other, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come the ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly at Christmas celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the Exodus from Egypt, or the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life (EF:474-5)?
5. **The Sacred and the Profane: Fundamental Tensions in Sociocultural Life**

Preface. The marked contrast between these two alternating phases of sociocultural life gives rise, in Durkheim's model, to dichotomous notions contrasting the sacred with the profane. This conflict between dispersed and autistic egos and communalized and moralized persons is creative in that the tension works to energize and organize all of human life. Tension between the sacred and the profane is the driving force in the symbolic field of society, and within the person. As is true of all levels of reality, without this tension between incompatible elements or positions, no energy would flow. Difference energizes; diversity is generative. Energy flows created by this tension between the sacred and the profane serves, in short, to organize and energize and guide the decision matrices of societies and persons.

Now, if human experience were merely neutral or homogeneous, we would find ourselves devoid of reason for choice, and, therefore, action. If human reality lacked elementary invidious distinctions—such as those between good and evil, order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher and the lower, the positive and the negative, the beautiful and the monstrous, the creative and the destructive, the way forward and the way back, and so on—we would lack the basic organizing tension that energizes and directs human action. Every society and person makes some series of distinctions between fundamental polarities, for without these compounding oppositions, we stand paralyzed. Given a primal undifferentiated unity, in Durkheim's case the communion of aboriginal collectively effervescent ritual, our next need is to begin to differentiate within this unity certain separable parts. Such fundamental cleavages between "higher" and "lower" (e.g., Genesis, see also K. Burke, 1970) serve as the vehicle for differentiating reality and allowing us to deal with its specific forms. Primal unity, and then progressive differentiation, coupled with periodic re-unification; these are the funda-
mental phases in Durkheim's dialectic of generic sociocultural process.

Now, always and everywhere, positive and negative aspects of these basic polarities are expressed in terms of conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral right and wrong are always intimately intertwined with questions of consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality rather than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and persons lay themselves under positive obligations to affirm as true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable those series of phenomena judged as "sacred" to the group. Sacred means values constitutive to the group. These positive injunctions generate goals and values which are carried through the imagination, and internalized in the personality structure, and established in the institutions of the group. Conversely, all societies and persons find themselves negatively obligated to avoid falsity, evil, destructiveness, and regions of unreality. Those who follow the positive normative prescriptions gain in self-esteem, and their sense of self-worth and contributions to moral order are often publicly validated. Those who violate, or congenitally follow negative proscriptions, lose in status and self-esteem. They may be branded or "labelled" as failures, and at the most, as dangerously destructive deviants. As Robert K. Merton once observed, every society has its own peculiar set of "moral alchemies," especially for the assignment of guilt and negative status. Anxiety, fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate defilement are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate (see, for example, P. Ricoeur, 1969). Thus, by its very nature, deviance is linked with the profane, and the profane is also dependent, in turn, upon the prior definition of the sacred. As Mary Douglas (1966) notes, "purity and danger" are relational.

Just as human nature is irretrievably rent by conflict between the dictates of ego and person, body and soul, so too society and culture are inevitably polarized in terms of the
active opposition between the sacred and the profane, between the pure and the impure. Indeed, one of the virtues of Durkheim's perspective here is that he clearly perceived the intimate links between the resonating tensions between all that is sacred, true, good, orderly, pure, powerful, and all that is profane, false, evil, chaotic, dangerous, in symbolic terms on both the phenomenological and sociocultural levels. In short, public and private phenomenologies are to be seen as inextricably intertwined phases of the same generic human process.

a. The Transformation of the Ego, Alternating Phases of Social Life, and the Emergence of the Sacred and the Profane

Through collective effervescence, Durkheim postulated, and the resulting fusion into a common consciousness, egos are transformed into persons. Through this consubstantiality, a new reality is born—society. In the very nature of this transformation "... the contents of their consciousness is changed" (EF:389). The very core of this change from ego to person is the emerging contrast between the sacred and the profane.

In his own set of positivist symbolic equations, Durkheim associated the ego, commonness, and utilitarian life activities with the profane, while the person, the extra-ordinary, and things worthy of obligatory respect were linked with the sacred. Hence, from the first, it is the alternation of phases of sociocultural life which gives rise to these very different psychological and cultural modes of life. Durkheim observed, for instance, that when an individual participates in the collective effervescence:

... it is just as though he really were transported into a special world, entirely different from the one where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him and metamorphose him. How could such experiences as these, fail to leave in him the conviction that there really exist two heterogeneous and mutually incomparable worlds? One is that where daily life drags wear-
ily along; but he cannot penetrate into the other without at once entering into relations with extra-
ordinary powers that excite him to the point of fren-
zy. The first is the profane world, the second that
of sacred things (EF:250).

Thus, Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different worlds of human experience: ordinary days spent by dispersed egos in utilitarian tasks, versus extraordinary feast days spent by moralized persons in concentrated collective ceremonial.

On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual a-
vocations which take the greater part of the attention. Everyone attends to his own personal business; for most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the exigencies of material life, and the principal incentive to economic activity has always been private interest. On feast days, on the contrary, these preoccupations are necessarily eclipsed; being essentially profane, they are excluded from these sacred periods. At this time, their thoughts are centered upon their common beliefs, their common traditions, the memory of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of which they are the incarnation; in a word, upon social things (EF:399-90).

Now, due to his own polemical situation and cultural commit-
ments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with the so-
cial and the moralized person, and the profane with disper-
sed egos engaged in common and utilitarian activity. I be-
lieve, however, that the validity of Durkheim's insight into the universality of sacred and profane cultural symboliza-
tions can be considered quite apart from the peculiar contents of referents which he utilized. I believe that Durk-
heim appeared to have made a basic mistake by seemingly ban-
ishing common and practical activity, especially in the eco-
nomic sphere, from the all-important realm of the social and the moral (see also Book Three). Unfortunately, his polem-
ics led him here to extreme statements contrary to other parts of his own doctrine, such as the following sociologically in-
advisable thesis: "The principal incentive to economic act-
ivity has always been private interest." This is only true if economic action is to be regarded solely from the biologi-
cal or utilitarian point of view. However, I believe that one
could mount a properly sociological view of economic action, drawing in part from Durkheim himself (see also Book Three):

Even the material interests which these great religious ceremonies are designed to satisfy the public order and are therefore social. Society as a whole is interested that the harvest be abundant, that the rain fall at the right time and not excessively, that the animals reproduce regularly. So it is society that is in the forefront of every consciousness; it dominates and directs all conduct; that is equivalent to saying that it is more living and active, and consequently, more real, than in profane times (EF:390).

b. The Positive Pole of Sociocultural Life: Attributes of the Sacred

According to Durkheim, key distinguishing characteristics of "sacredness" include: hierarchical value, the moral authority and obligatory respect due to high position, its opposition to, or ability to repel, the profane, and its "contagiousness." Such attributes are, of course, linked together. It is important to remember at the outset, however, that the sacred and the profane are relationally defined—that is, their dichotomous existence is inter-dependent. Their contrast is necessary to their very mutual existence; much like the contrast between figure and field is necessary to perception. Second, following the same metaphor, just as localized figures depend for their separate perceptual existence upon contrast with the prior existence of a more generalized background field, so too does the profane depend upon the prior existence of the more fundamental category of the sacred. Or, in other words, as Poggi (1972) observes, even the profane itself is a religious creation! For the sacred defines not only itself, but its opposite as well. Thus, the anchor of the symbolic system of society and the person is the sacred; it is the ground of human existence. While the negative pole of the profane is a necessary element, only the sacred is sufficient. Let us now explore some of these more or less paradoxical conceptions of Durkheim in his magisterial Elementary Forms.

First, it is well to remember that Durkheim directed
our attention toward religion as the primal evolutionary matrix of society, culture, and the person; I call this his seminal thesis of the "primitive sacral complex" (see a succeeding chapter in this Book). This meant that in generic terms Durkheim defined religion's role in social, cultural, and phenomenological process in relational terms. That is, religion referred to the energizing and guiding oppositions between sacred and profane, on the one hand, and the micro and macrocosm on the other. In etymological terms, this meaning of religion was as re-ligare that which binds or ties everything together, and orients experience, and guides us toward a common goal.

This is one reason why Durkheim constantly repeated his contention that sacredness is superimposed upon objects, places, and things by society—"anything can be sacred." Now, while I have criticized this position that symbols are utterly arbitrary and conventional, I believe that Durkheim's central thrust here was correct in emphasizing that symbolic sets and series of equations are socioculturally generated. They are not natural "givens." Indeed, using Levi-Strauss's fundamental binary opposition between nature and culture, these symbolic sets of equations are the interface between "conditions" and "intentions." Symbols are our own creations, the means by which we make and remake ourselves. Therefore, the first key to understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal significance of the opposition between the sacred and the profane is to be sought in terms of the symbolic sets of equations by which society, culture, and person are progressively constructed.

Early in The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim defined religion, as the symbolic interface between nature and culture, society and person, in terms of the compounding series of oppositions between the collectively defined sacredness and profaneness.

All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal ... into
two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by ... the words profane and sacred. This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought. The beliefs, myths, dogmas, and legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with profane things. But by sacred things one must not understand simply those personal beings which are called gods or spirits: a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word, anything can be sacred (EF:52).

In his drive to emphasize the social creation of sacredness, Durkheim argued that this positive pole of sociocultural life is not based upon the inherent qualities of objects.

The sacred character assumed by an object is not implied in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added to them. The world of religious things is not one particular aspect of empirical nature; it is superimposed upon it (EF:261). Durkheim resisted, therefore, all efforts to narrowly circumscribe the parameters of religious symbolism; indeed, he had to do so if he was to successfully maintain his tacit contention that religious action is the constitutive foundation of human life. Thus, definitions of religion cannot be limited solely to consideration of spirits, gods, rites, etc.; rather, any definition must refer to the massive and sustained social, cultural, and phenomenological impacts of religious action.

The circle of sacred objects cannot be determined, then, once and for all. Its extent varies infinitely, according to the different religions. That is how Buddhism is a religion: in default of gods, it admits the existence of sacred things, namely, the four noble truths and the practices derived from them. (Footnote: not to mention the sage and the saint who practice these truths and who for that reason are sacred (EF: 52).

Now, the particular ceremonial occasions whereby the oppositions between the sacred and the profane are symbolically orchestrated, and human energies mobilized, are called rites. Religious rites serve to concentrate collective attentions and intentions; as a solar mirror collects the rays of the
sun, ceremonial and ritual act as the focal point by which the refractory rays of life are gathered up together and fused into the most potent instrument of society. The rite, the magic circle, is thus the point of origin, and continuing creative center of sociocultural life (see, for example, Josef Pieper, 1953).

A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite does not exist which does not have it to a certain degree. There are words, expressions, and formula which can be pronounced only by the mouths of consecrated persons; there are gestures and movements which everybody can perform. If the Vedic sacrifice has had such an efficacy that, according to mythology, it was the creator of the gods ... it is because it possessed a virtue comparable to that of the most sacred beings (EF:52).

Now, the creative character of these socioculturally generated symbols is clearly manifest in the sacred objects of the Australian aboriginees. The churinga, Durkheim observed, not only "... keeps the profane at a distance," but it also has:

... all sorts of marvellous properties: by contact it heals wounds ... it has the same power over sickness; it is useful for making the beard grow; it confers important powers over the totemic species, whose normal reproduction it ensures; it gives new force, courage, and perseverance, while, on the other hand, it depresses and weakens their enemies. This latter belief is so firmly rooted that when two combatants stand pitted against one another, if one sees that the other has brought the churinga against him, he loses confidence and his defeat is certain (EF:142-3).

Clearly, this passage reveals the centrality of symbols of prime potency within aboriginal culture. Following Durkheim, Pieper, and Evans-Pritchard, we may now discover why through religious ritual man "ascends to the kingdom of freedom." First, because religion in the sense of re-ligare places man in direct and mutually obligatory relationships with the generative and directive sources of the macrocosm. Second, because freedom is thus defined relationally--it is not merely a negative category, a state from which we escape from constraint, from negative being. Rather, human freedom is seen here as a voluntary and consistent relationship with the generative and directive sources of the cosmos.
Next, Durkheim asked: how is the sacred to be distinguished from the profane? His first answer was: reflective judgments made about reality always distinguish gradations or hierarchy of value. Human reality is neither simple nor homogeneous; rather, rankings and invidious status distinctions of higher and lower, are perennially made. Clearly, greater dignity and honor—in short, value—are accorded to those things which come as if "from on high."

One might be tempted, first of all, to define them by the place they are generally assigned in the hierarchy of things. They are naturally considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, and particularly to man, when he is only a man and has nothing sacred about him. One thinks of himself as occupying an inferior and dependent position in relation to them; and surely this conception is not without some truth (EF:52-3).

Then, Durkheim noted that the respect we accord sacred objects, places, and times differs greatly from the practical attitude by which we regard common, everyday things.

The sentiments which they inspire in us differ from those we have for simple visible objects. As long as these latter are reduced to their empirical characteristics as shown in ordinary experience, and as long as the religious imagination has not metamorphosed them, we entertain for them no feeling which resembles respect, and they contain within them nothing that is able to raise us outside ourselves. Therefore, the representations which express them appear to us to be very different from those aroused in us by collective influences. The two form two distinct and separate mental states in our consciousness, just as do the two forms of life to which they correspond. Consequently, we get the impression that we are in relations with two distinct sorts of reality and that a sharply drawn line of demarcation separates them from each other: on the one hand is the world of profane things, on the other, that of sacred things (EF:243).

Further, Durkheim argued that this unique capacity of society to construct anchors of our existence, to demarcate our lives and attitudes into two organized and opposing camps, is not limited to aboriginal societies. Rather, the ability to define some things as worthy of respect and others as deserving of "damnation," is a generic capacity of all societies in all times and places.
In the present day just as much as in the past, we see society constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones. If it happens to fall in love with a man and if it thinks it has found in him the principal aspirations that move it, as well as the means of satisfying them, this man will be raised above the others, and, as it were, deified. Opinion will invest him with a majesty exactly analogous to that protecting the gods.... In addition to men, society also consecrates things, especially ideas. If a belief is unanimously shared by a people, then ... it is forbidden to touch it ... to deny it or contest it. Now, the prohibition of criticism is an interdiction like the other and proves the presence of something sacred. Even today, howsoever great may be the liberty which we accord to others, a man who should totally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which modern societies are attached would produce the effect of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which those most devoted to free examination of everything tend to place above discussion and to regard as untouchable ... as sacred: this is the very principle of free examination (EF:243-4).

However, Durkheim reflected, hierarchical gradation and high moral authority, while necessary elements, are insufficient by themselves to distinguish sacredness. It is important to note that when Durkheim suggested that hierarchical scales rank phenomena in terms of more or less value, he acknowledged here an underlying gradation by degree. That is, there is a continuum here ranging from extremely sacred to neutral to extremely profane. Indeed, Durkheim admitted: "It must not be lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and that there are some in relation to which a man feels himself relatively at his ease" (EF:53). Thus, I believe that Evans-Pritchard's (1965) and W. H. Stanner's (1967) objections to Durkheim's seemingly rigid dichotomy between sacred and profane are lessened.

In summarizing the two extremes of the sociocultural hierarchy of valuation, Durkheim next argued that an additional key criterion distinguishing sacredness from profaneness is their radical polar opposition to one another. Durkheim appeared to argue here in rather static and categorical terms that the opposition between these two poles is absolute. Such a statement, however, as numerous critics of this aspect of Durk-
heim's sociology of religion have pointed out, is both theoretically and empirically untenable. I believe that taking Durkheim's statements here too literally, simply at face value, is both unjustified and misleading.

But if a purely hierarchical distinction is a criterion at once too general and too imprecise, there is nothing left with which to characterize the sacred in its relation to the profane except their heterogeneity. However, this heterogeneity is sufficient to characterize this classification of things and to distinguish it from all others, because it is very particular: it is absolute (EF:53).

However, again Durkheim's rhetorical animus was responsible here for this seeming over-statement. The most viable meaning of Durkheim's notion of the absoluteness of the opposition between the sacred and the profane is that their polar relationship is an absolute societal universal. In other words, while their opposition is relational—not rigid and absolute, nonetheless, it is true that their polar opposition is a cultural universal.

However, my attempted rescue of Durkheim from his polemical indiscretions is partially restricted by his penchant for rhetorical excess. Had he not (I believe mistakenly) identified the ego and utilitarian activity with the profane, Durkheim would not have made the following revealing statement:

In the history of human thought there exists no other example of two categories of things so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one another. The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing beside this; for the good and the bad are only two opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just as sickness and health are two different aspects of the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common (EF:53-4).

Had Durkheim set his anti-utilitarian polemics aside and rested content with the universal opposition between good and evil, truth and error, the pure and the impure, order and chaos, and so forth, he would have spared himself much undeserved opprobrium and us much confusion. While his rhetorical excess led him astray, his underlying purpose comes through clearly enough
in the following passage:

We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal beings to whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves and our own interests at the same time; we cannot devote ourselves entirely to the group and entirely to our own egoism at once (EF:356).

When Durkheim set his programmatic statements aside and returned to description rather than polemic, his real intentions and empirical concerns prevailed. For instance, I find little that is objectionable in the following quote:

The forces which play in one area are not simply those which are met with in the other, but a little stronger; they are of a different sort. In different religions, this opposition has been conceived in different ways. Here, to separate these two sorts of things, it has seemed sufficient to localize them in different parts of the physical universe; there, the first have been put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the material world is left in full possession of the others. But howsoever much the forms of contrast may vary, the fact of the contrast is universal (EF:54).

In short, as I earlier argued, although the symbolic contents of this opposition may vary, the "fact of the contrast" between the sacred and the profane is a cultural universal. This universal attribute gives rise to Durkheim's definition of religious phenomena.

The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and knowable, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects. When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but which is not comprised within any other system of the same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion (EF:56).
c. The Contagiousness of the Sacred

Earlier analogies likening the sacred with various energy forms and flows suggest what Durkheim meant when he referred to the "contagiousness of sacred forces," as another of their distinguishing qualities. Like a sort of "sacred electricity," those phenomena endowed with "charismatic energy" reveal great elusiveness and fluidity. "A sacred character is to a high degree contagious" (EF:254). The sacred is first and foremost to be regarded as an energizing force; its very intensity "incites it to spreading" (EF:363).

This extraordinary intensity and diffuseness of "sacred electricity" has at least two important consequences. First, it requires that the profane be isolated from the sacred, thus giving rise to myriad boundary-making efforts; second, as the sacred energy flows and spreads, it tends to organize the whole life of the group into a symbolically aligned microcosm of the universe. We shall discuss the first aspect now, and come back to the "global" nature of sacred-profane symbolic cosmization shortly.

It is important to note, moreover, that the constant effort directed toward isolating and prohibiting contact between these opposing forces is largely intended to protect the sacred from confusion with the profane. The energetic contagiousness of the sacred requires that it be bottled up, as it were, and held in its most potent and pure state. If the sacred refers to the sum total of all the aspects of the virtuous side of the universal dichotomy, then, as the focal or gathering point of these sacred energies, it is necessary to maintain its clarity and undiluted potency. Indeed, this is precisely what is referred to in the etymological meaning of profane—pro-fanum—that which is outside the temple.

Durkheim's analysis of totemism rests on this underlying notion of a primal undifferentiated "sacred electricity." Of the American Indians, Durkheim commented: "Now the common principle of life is the wakan. The totem is the means by which an individual is put into relations with this source of
energy; if the totem has any powers, it is because it incarnates the wakan" (EF:224). Indeed, the wakan or charismatic force is:

... the original matter out of which have been constructed those beings of every sort which the religions of all times have consecrated and adored. The spirits, demons, genii, and gods of every sort are only the concrete forms taken by this energy, or "potentiality" in individualizing itself, in fixing itself upon a certain determined object or point in space, or in centering itself around an ideal and legendary being (EF:228).

It should be noted, in passing, that Durkheim's description of the "essential consubstantiality of all sacred things" and the "fluidity" of sacred energies converges closely with Weber's description of charisma and the evolution of the gods in his magisterial The Sociology of Religion (1963, 1968). Durkheim's proposition that "... the wakan ... comes and goes through the world, and sacred things are the points upon which it alights" (EF:228-9) could have been written by Weber, or perhaps it was the other way around, as Mauss once insisted (see R. Aron, 1967: 271; E. Tiryakian, 1966:332, #7).

Durkheim's evolutionism was so strong that he discerned this primal, undifferentiated flow of sacred energy as lying back of all the more crystallized spirits and gods. Instead of gods at the origin of religious life, Durkheim discovered "indefinite, anonymous forces," and it is for this reason that he refused to define religion solely in terms of gods.

We are now in a better condition to understand why it has been impossible to define religion by the idea of mythical personalities, gods, or spirits; it is because this way of representing religious things is in no way inherent in their nature. What we find at the origin and basis of religious thought are not determined and distinct objects and beings possessing a sacred character of themselves; they are indefinite powers, anonymous forces, more or less numerous in different societies, and sometimes even reduced to a unity, and whose impersonality is strictly comparable to that of the physical forces whose manifestations the sciences of nature study. As for particular sacred things, they are only individualized forms of this essential principle.... Even the most elementary mythological constructions are secondary products which cover a system of be-
liefs, at once simpler and more obscure, vaguer, and more essential, which form the solid foundations upon which the religious systems are built. It is this primitive foundation which our analysis of totemism has enabled us to reach (EF:229, 232).

Additionally, Durkheim noted that the sacred and the profane are not simply defined by the obligatory respect due to the former. Rather, their active antagonism implies that the universality of the rigorous systems of interdictions serve to "close one sphere to another," for "between them there is an abyss" (EF:357). The particular reason for this "exceptional isolation and mutual exclusion" which Durkheim found in the "contagious" nature of sacred phenomena, and thus the corresponding need to keep these anchors of socio-cultural life from being irretrievably confounded one in the other. Thus, there are two forces at work here: the contagiousness of the "sacred electricity," and the sort of randomizing entropy characterizing all energy flows.

... by a sort of contradiction, the sacred world is inclined, as it were, to spread itself into this same profane world which it excludes elsewhere; at the same time that it repels it, it tends to flow into it as soon as it approaches. This is why it is necessary to keep them at a distance from one another and to create a sort of vacuum between them. What makes these precautions necessary is the extraordinary contagiousness of a sacred character. Far from being attached to the things which are marked with it, it is endowed with a sort of elusiveness. Even the most superficial or roundabout contact is sufficient to enable it to spread from one object to another. Religious forces are represented in the mind in such a way that they always seem to escape from the points where they reside and to enter everything passing within their range.... It is also upon this principle of the contagiousness of sacredness that all the rites of consecration repose. The sanctity of the churinga is so great that its action is even felt at a distance (EF:358).

Because of the contagiousness of this charismatic energy, Durkheim next explored the whole system of interdictions which spread out like reversed magnets from the ritual core throughout the whole fabric of social life. The pure is like a distilled precipitate that only retains its unique qualities and potencies when isolated and concentrated. Since, if
left to themselves the sacred and profane would confound themselves in the generic flow of life and existence, social interdictions or taboos become necessary to maintain their separate identities. Like survey markers continuously erased by time and circumstance, the boundary lines between the pure and the impure, between order and chaos, must be constantly maintained and periodically realigned. Dirt, weeds, noise, chance, ugliness, and so on, these and other phenomena which constantly threaten the clear outlines and meaningful patterns of our axial organizing coordinates must be controlled and interdicted.

Since, in virtue of this extraordinary power of expansion, the slightest contact, the least proximity, either material or simply moral, suffices to draw religious forces out of their domain, and since, on the other hand, they cannot leave it without contradicting their nature, a whole system of measures is indispensable for maintaining the two worlds at a respectful distance from one another. This is why it is forbidden to the profane, not only to touch, but even to see or hear that which is sacred, and why these two sorts of life cannot be mixed in their consciousnesses. Precautions are necessary to keep them apart because, though opposing one another, they tend to confuse themselves into one another (EF:359-60).

Finally, I must insist that this passage clarifies some of the intellectual controversies which have swirled around these points. First, contrary to Durkheim's earlier extreme "absolutistic" statements, and contrary to Stanner's and Evans-Pritchard's acceptance of these rhetorical excesses at their face value, in his more empirically descriptive work Durkheim never radically dichotomized these polarities nor rigidly absolutized their universal opposition. For if there can really be no contact between the sacred and the profane, what need have we then of interdicting their possible confusion? Further, what need would we have of rites that transform one category into another? Indeed, as we shall see, religious life is only possible and even necessary if there is at least the possibility of continuous contact and threats of confounding the sacred with the profane. Much tension in sociocultural life depends upon just this risk of confusion and pollution;
the irony of the human condition depends on it. Second, it is clear that the meaning of their interdicted separation is to maintain the axial boundaries, the survey markers on the base map of culture. Third, these cultural maps are not solely cognitive, but also simultaneously moral, emotional, and imaginative as well.

d. Pollution and Walling Off the Profane: The Negative or Ascetic Rites

Beyond the contagiousness of the sacred, and the need to keep it potent in its concentrated, pure form, there is also need to keep profaneness segregated from the sacred. Not only must these elements not be allowed to mix and confound themselves in the homogeneity of life, but they must also be walled off, as it were, from each other if the order of the microcosm is to maintained. This is the function (or consequence) of the negative or ascetic rites. If harmony in the cosmos is to be maintained, the relationships between the sacred and the profane, in terms of the alignment of the microcosm with the macrocosm, must be continuously regulated and reaffirmed. Through these ascetic or regulatory rites, we establish and reinforce boundaries separating the profane from the sacred. Naturally, these interdictions spread to the whole of socio-cultural life. Time, space, objects, events, people, and so forth, in short, all aspects of life, become classified, separated, and re-articulated in terms of the fundamental anchor of oppositions between sacred and profane. The whole world becomes valorized, that is, society progressively imposes positive, negative (and neutral) valences on all details of existence.

In genetic-evolutionary terms, it is important to note how primitive societies thus tend to become hedged in by ritual prescriptions and proscriptions. Sacral and magical taboos come to permeate tribal life. Questions of right and wrong, of truth and error, become inextricably bound up with the cosmic consciousness reflected in the mirror of the micro-
cosmic conscience. Sin, guilt, and pollution come from violating the boundaries between sacred and profane. Disturbances of the harmonious relations between macro and microcosm in bringing illness, attack, bad weather, etc., threaten the entire society. Thus, the first major forms of deviance are those of the "religious criminal" whose violation of the norms laid down by the collective conscience must be strongly repressed. As noted, profaneness and deviance are intimately intertwined. Moreover, the interdiction or prohibition of contact itself becomes sacrosanct, so that the rule instead of the actual violation becomes gradually sanctioned. Thus, the image rather than the event gradually takes over, giving rise to all those more or less "irrational" restrictive practices surviving long after their original reason for being has been lost forever to memory.

Now, the contact between sacred and profane is both inevitable and even necessary. In view of their opposition and prescribed separation, this prohibited mixing might seem paradoxical. Yet, we should always remember that these are relational polarities; if there were absolutely no contact possible between them, we would have no way of contrasting them, and thus, even of identifying them as universal contraries. It is only because, prior to conscious and systematic reflection, they are simply bound up with the mix and flow of everyday life. Paradoxically, it is only by profanations and defilements that we are able to separate out the sacred from the non-sacred in the first place. Second, however, beyond the inevitable pollutions of the pure and creative sources of life, points of communion must be possible if we are to regularly experience re-creation by the energizing powers of "sacred electricity" in our daily lives. There must be regularly scheduled passages from the profane to the sacred world, and back again. If these "doors" do not open, the crucial links binding the micro to the macrocosm would be fatally snapped.

Even while it tends to permeate life because of its
fluidity and contagiousness, the sacred or positive pole of sociocultural life is also separated and protected. Sacred things are, by definition, a "world apart."

By definition, sacred beings are separated beings. That which characterizes them is that there is a break in continuity between them and the profane beings.... A whole group of rites has the object of realizing this state of separation which is essential. Since their function is to prevent undue mixings and to keep one of these two domains from encroaching upon the other, they are only able to impose abstentions or negative acts ... taboos ... interdictions (EF:337-8).

Thus, things worthy of respect must be protected from contamination with things of little or negative value. In short, the fundamental classificatory principle is that things of unequal value must be separated. This principle is especially important because of the tendency of the sacred to spread by virtue of its own energy, and thus to confound itself in lesser states of being.

All that is sacred is the object of respect, and every sentiment of respect is translated in him who feels it, by movements of inhibition. In fact, a respected being is always expressed in the consciousness by a representation which, owing to the emotion which it inspires, is charged with a high mental energy; consequently, it is armed in such a way as to reject to a distance every other representation which denies it in whole or in part. Now, the sacred world and the profane world are antagonistic to each other. They correspond to two forms of life which mutually exclude each other, or which at least cannot be lived at the same time with the same intensity. We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal to whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves and our own interests at the same time; we cannot devote ourselves entirely to the group and entirely to our own egoism at once (EF:356-7).

Now, the critical factor is not the separation of sacred and profane beings or things in the external world, for life itself combines both poles of existence inextricably in its onward flow. Indeed, since the origin of these separations which we project outward and imprint upon the world is really culture and mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred and profane lies within man himself. The interdiction is, first
and foremost, a phenomenological injunction that man directs toward his own conscience and consciousness, towards his own imagination and will.

Here there are two systems of conscious states which are directed and which direct our conduct toward opposite poles. So the one having the greater power of action should tend to exclude the other from the consciousness. When we think of holy things, the idea of a profane object cannot enter the mind without encountering grave resistance; something within us opposes itself to its installation. This is because the representation of a sacred thing does not tolerate neighbors. But this psychic antagonism and this mutual exclusion of ideas should naturally result in the exclusion of the corresponding things. If the ideas are not to coexist, the things must not touch each other or have any sort of relations. This is the very principle of the interdict (EF:357).

Both thought and action must be different in the presence of sacred things. Sacred places, sacred times, impose their own norms and appropriate behaviors. One need not be told how to act in a sacred place, for instance; it issues its own requirements; indeed, a fully socialized adult would not think of profaning a church, temple, courtroom, hospital, historical site, etc., regardless of whether or not others are there at the same time to sanction potential deviance.

Since it (the sacred) is opposed to the profane world ... it must be treated in its own peculiar way; it would be a misunderstanding of its nature and a confusion of it with something that it is not, to make use of the gestures, language, and attitudes which we employ in our relations with ordinary things.... We may handle the former freely; we speak freely to vulgar beings; so we do not touch the sacred beings, or we touch them only with reserve; we do not speak in their presence, or we do not speak the common language there. All that is used in our commerce with the one must be excluded from our commerce with the other (EF:357).

Now, there are various kinds of taboos meant to separate the sacred from the non-sacred. For not even the sacred is a homogeneous category. First, we must distinguish between various degrees and types of sacredness; for example, greater and lesser forms of charismatic power, and their differentiation by task.
... there are interdictions of different sorts which it is important to distinguish.... These interdictions are intended to prevent all communication between the purely sacred and the impurely sacred, between the sacredly auspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All these interdictions ... come from the fact that there are inequalities and incompatibilities between sacred things (EF:338, 340).

Especially important here are the oppositions between magical and religious taboos. Durkheim distinguished between magical and religious interdictions in terms of the differing reasons for their respective sanctions.

First of all, beside those coming from religion, there are others which are due to magic. The two have this in common, that they declare certain things incompatible, and prescribe the separation of the things whose incompatibility is thus proclaimed. But there are also very grave differences between them. In the first place, the sanctions are not the same in the two cases (EF:338).

According to Durkheim, magical sanctions revenge violation of taboo in an automatic fashion, as if it were a mechanical fact. Religious sanctions, over and above the seemingly mechanical retribution forthcoming to all violations, adds a real socio-cultural and psychological punishment. There is no "sin" in magic, and therefore no need for re-definition of self and internalization of guilt.

... the violation of the religious interdicts is frequently believed ... to bring about material disorders mechanically, from which the guilty man will suffer, and which are regarded as a judgement on his own act. But even if these really came about this spontaneous and automatic judgement is not the only one; it is always completed by another one, supposing human intervention. A real punishment is added to this, if it does not anticipate it, and this one is deliberately inflicted by men; or at least there is a blame and reprobation. Even when the sacrilege has been punished, as it were, by the sickness or natural death of its author, it is also defamed; it offends opinion which reacts against it; it puts the man who did it in fault. On the contrary, the magical interdiction is judged only by the material consequences which the forbidden act is believed to produce, with a sort of physical necessity. In disobeying, a man runs risks similar to those which an invalid exposes himself in not following the advice of his physician; but in this case disobedience is not a fault; it creates no indignation. There is no sin in magic (EF:338-9).
Continuing the contrast, Durkheim proposed that magic is basically asocial, and therefore nonnormative; it relates mainly to the factual or behavioral order. Religious interdictions, by contrast, are primarily concerned with the sociocultural and phenomenological order of "sacredness." Magical proscriptions, on the other hand, are concerned mainly with the technical impropriety of linking inappropriate profane utilities. In sum, religious interdictions are ethical "categorical imperatives," while magical interdictions are "technical" recipes.

This difference in sanction is due to profound difference in the nature of the interdictions. The religious interdiction necessarily implies the notion of sacredness; it comes from the respect inspired by the sacred object, and its purpose is to keep this respect from failing. On the other hand, the interdictions of magic suppose only a wholly lay notion of property. The things which the magician recommends be kept separate are those which, by reason of their characteristic properties, cannot be brought together and confused without danger.... Magic lives on profanations ... and reasons of temporal utility. In a word, religious interdictions are categorical imperatives; others are useful maxims, the first form of hygienic and medical interdictions. We cannot study two orders of facts as different as these simultaneously, or even under the same name, without confusion. We are only concerned with religious interdictions here (EF:339).

However, even with these basic distinctions, Durkheim acknowledged that magical and sacral interdictions are continuous in other respects. For Durkheim made magical taboos a derivative subset of sacral-social ones.

This is not saying that there is a radical break in continuity between the religious and the magical interdictions: on the contrary, it is one whose true nature is not decided.... Magical interdicts cannot be understood except as a function of the religious ones (EF:339, #5).

This kinship is true regardless of whether the technical prohibition came first and then was subsequently secularized, or whether it was first sacral and then only later became desacralized, yet was still customarily observed. In short, magical taboos are directed primarily toward cognitive norms of consciousness, while sacral taboos are directed mainly toward
ethical norms of conscience. As always, questions of conscience and right action tend to override questions of consciousness and right thinking.

Having thus set aside magical taboo from prime consideration, Durkheim next briefly distinguished between types of sacramal interdictions. Recognizing that there are degrees of sacredness, Durkheim noted that "... the more sacred repels the less sacred" (EF:341). Thus, all the interdictions "... arrange themselves into two classes: the interdictions between the sacred and the profane, and the purely or the impurely sacred" (EF:341).

... the most important interdictions ... are intended to prevent all communication between the purely sacred and the impurely sacred, between the sacredly inauspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All these interdictions have one common characteristic; they come not from the fact that some things are sacred while others are not, but from the fact that there are inequalities and incompatibilities between sacred things (EF:340).

But Durkheim also set aside these various types of interdictions, as not really touching "what is essential in the idea of sacredness." Such observances could not lead to Durkheim's central sociological interest, namely, the cult or moral community and its collectively representational rites. All his statements concerning the radical abyss separating the sacred and the profane aside, we must remember that Durkheim here insisted: "Before all, a cult is made by regular relations between the profane and the sacred" (EF:340).

Durkheim next turned our attention to the center of his interest: those interdicts prohibiting contact between the sacred and the profane. Again, it is important to note that the setting of these crucial boundaries is a one-directional process, for it is the sacred which defines both its boundaries, and also walls off the profane. The profane may threaten the sacred and the order of the microcosm, but only sacramal symbolism and action is sufficient to organize the world and maintain the all-important harmonious relations between microcosm and macrocosm.
... there is another system of religious interdictions which is much more extended and important; this is the one which separates, not different species of sacred things, but all that is sacred from all that is profane. So it is derived immediately from the notion of sacredness itself, and it limits itself to expressing and realizing this. Thus, it furnishes the material for a veritable cult, and even of a cult which is at the basis of all the others; for the attitude which it prescribes is one which the worshipper must never depart from in all his relations with the sacred. It is what we call the negative cult. We may say that its interdicts are the religious interdicts par excellence (EF: 340).

e. Types of Sacral Interdictions

Sacral interdictions which seek to separate and restrict the profane from the sacred are the focus of religious cults. The ritual is the means by which the cult implements these interdictions. Durkheim called this the negative or ascetic cult. These interdictions can take multiple forms. The preeminent taboos are those concerned with restricting contact between these two constructed anchors of sociocultural life.

Before all are the interdictions of contact: these are the original taboos, of which the others are scarcely more than particular varieties. They rest upon the principle that the profane should never touch the sacred (EF: 341).

Under certain circumstances, contact with blood, hair, corpses, and so on, is forbidden, as the contact is unholy.

Clearly perilous to violation are alimentary interdictions, especially those concerning the consumption of totemic life.

An exceptionally intimate contact is the one resulting from the absorption of food. Hence comes the interdict against the sacred animals or vegetables, and especially against those serving as totems. Such an act appears so sacrilegious that the prohibition covers even adults ... only the old men attain a sufficient religious dignity to escape this interdict sometimes (341-2).

Now, this prohibition works both ways—sacred foods are forbidden to the profane, and profane foods are forbidden to those considered sacred. Moreover, we see emerging here a kind of cosmization of food and human diet. Those who take up
full-time religious status, or as Weber said "take a lease on charisma," as professional ascetics or religious virtuosos, inevitably make a systematic, symbolically aligned, and restricted diet part of their methodical regimen.

... if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, certain others, on the contrary, are forbidden to persons of a sacred character, because they are profane. Thus, it frequently happens that certain animals are especially designated as the food of women; for this reason they believe that they partake of a feminine nature and they are consequently profane. On the other hand, the young initiate is submitted to a series of rites of particular severity; to give him the virtues which will enable him to enter into the world of sacred things, from which he had up until then been excluded, they center an exceptionally powerful group of religious forces upon him. Thus, he enters into a state of sanctity which keeps all that is profane at a distance. Then he is not allowed to eat the game which is regarded as the special food of women (EF:342).

The old aphorism "you are what you eat" reminds us that diet, in both meanings of the term, has often become a prime spiritual technology. As an ascetic regimen, the dieter purposely restricts his nutritional intake to some predetermined minimum; as a means of building himself and his disposition, the dieter attempts to align the type of character he wishes to embrace with the type of foods symbolically associated with those specific attributes. This serves as an excellent example of sociocultural norms organizing and directing lower biophysiological levels; or in Levi-Strauss's terms, of culture organizing nature.

Certainly, other types of contact are forbidden also. Visual recognition, for example:

One comes into relations with a thing merely by regarding it: a look is a means of contact. This is why the sight of a sacred thing is forbidden to the profane in certain cases. A woman should never see the instruments of the cult (EF:342).

The contagiousness of the sacred, and the potential defilement of it by the profane, means that even verbal contact may be dangerous.

The word is another way of entering into relations with persons or things. The breath establishes a communic-
tion; this is the part of us which spreads outwards. Thus it is forbidden to the profane to address the sacred beings or simply to speak in their presence.... Besides the sacred things, there are words and sounds which have the same character; they should not pass the lips of the profane nor enter their ears. There are ritual songs which women must not hear under pain of death. They may hear the noise of the bull-roarers, but only from a distance. Every proper name is considered an essential element of the person who bears it; being closely associated in the mind to the idea of this person, it participates in the sentiments which the latter inspires. So if the one is sacred, the other is too. Therefore, it may not be pronounced in the course of the profane life (EF:343-4).

Moreover, in religious ritual, men often acquire another name, a special designation that not only signifies their new or reborn status, but also replaces their ordinary or profane names for sacral purposes.

In addition to their public and everyday names, all men have another which is kept a secret: the women and children do not know it; it is never used in the ordinary life. ... There are ceremonies during which it is necessary to speak a special language which must not be used for profane purposes. It is the beginning of a sacred language (EF:344).

In addition, the common profane appearance must often be set aside—men shave, are forced to strip naked, or put on special ritual costumes which signify their change of being. When approaching the sacred, men must put aside their common, ordinary selves, and thus the things signifying this profane style of life must also be set aside.

Not only are the sacred things separated from the profane, but also nothing which either directly or indirectly concerns the profane life should be confused with the religious life. Complete nudity is frequently demanded of the native as a prerequisite to being admitted to participation in the rites; he is required to strip himself of all his habitual ornaments.... If he is obliged to decorate himself to play his part in ritual, this decoration has to made especially for the occasion; it is forbidden to use them in profane affairs; when the ceremony is finished, they are buried or burnt (EF:344-5).

Not only must the outward appearance of the self be changed when approaching the sacred, but moreover, common and
ordinary everyday activities must also be suspended. Thus, society constructs not merely personality structures, but also time and spatial structure. The temporal rhythms of everyday life revolve around these alternating phases of sacred high intensity rites and everyday practical dispersal. In general, all acts characteristic of the ordinary life are forbidden while those of the religious life are taking place. The act of eating is, of itself, profane; for it takes place every day, it satisfies essentially utilitarian and material needs, and it is a part of our ordinary existence. This is why it is prohibited in religious times (EF:345).

Thus, time is punctuated by the extraordinary effervescence of the collective rites. As Halbwachs later showed, even the frameworks of memory and anticipation have a social and cultural character. In later societies, of course, it was the religiously sanctioned day of celebration, recollection, and recreation that came to anchor the weekly work cycle.

... all temporal occupations are suspended while the great religious solemnities are taking place.... The life of the Australian is divided into two very distinct parts: the one is devoted to hunting, fishing, and warfare; the other is consecrated to the cult and these two forms of activity mutually exclude and repel one another. It is on this principle that the universal institution of religious days of rest reposes. The distinctive character of the feast days in all known religions is the cessation of work and the suspension of public and private life, insofar as it does not a religious objective (EF:345).

Once again, however, we see that in counterposing religious and economic activity, Durkheim got himself in the bind of presuming that the former is social and normatively controlled and the latter is not. If work is indeed the preeminent form of profane activity, then should we not be interested in the ways in which it becomes sacralized? And, in turn, the way in which the workaday rhythms tend to "secularize" the sacred?

... work is an eminent form of profane activity: it has no other apparent end than to provide for the temporal necessities of life; it puts us in relations with ordinary things only. On feast days, on the contrary, the religious life attains an excep-
tional degree of intensity. So the contrast between the two forms of existence is especially marked at this moment; consequently, they cannot remain near each other. A man cannot approach his god intimately while he still bears on him marks of his profane life; inversely, he cannot return to his usual occupations when a rite has just sanctified him. So the ritual day of rest is only one particular case of the general incompatibility separating the sacred from the profane; it is the result of an interdiction (EF:346).

The need for separation takes another form--spatial. For example, certain places are inevitably set aside as special residences of the sacred. Sanctuaries and cultic ground tend to become "churches" and "temples" in the sense of holy places and facilities.

The sacred character of the churinga is so great that it communicates itself to the locality where they are stored: the women and the uninitiated cannot approach it. The religious nature radiates to a distance and communicates itself to all the surroundings: everything near by participates in this same nature and is therefore withdrawn from profane touch. Is one man pursued by another? If he succeeds in reaching the (sanctuary) he is saved; he cannot be seized there. Even a wounded animal which takes refuge there must be respected. Quarrels are forbidden there. It is a place of peace ... a sanctuary of the totemic group, a veritable place of asylum (EF:142).

The critical factor here to note is how these interdictions become basic temporal, spatial, and cultural anchors of everyday life. Nature is moralized by culture; in turn, society and culture are cosmicized by nature. Therefore, the very frameworks of sociocultural life are constructed out of the more or less systematic application of these ramifying sacred/profane oppositions. Durkheim noted that even granting the complexity of these myriad interdictions, they finally rest upon "two fundamental interdictions, which summarize and dominate" (EF:346), sociocultural life.

In the first place, the religious life and the profane life cannot coexist in the same place. If the former is to develop, a special spot must be placed at its disposition, from which the second is excluded. Hence comes the founding of temples and sanctuaries; these are the spots awarded to sacred beings and things and serve them as residences, for they cannot establish themselves in any place
except on the condition of entirely appropriating to themselves all within a certain distance. Such arrangements are so indispensable to all religious life that even the most inferior religions cannot do without them. The spot where the churinga are deposited is a veritable sanctuary. So the unintiated are not allowed to approach it. It is even forbidden to carry on any profane occupation whatsoever there.... Likewise the religious time and the profane time cannot coexist in the same unit of time. It is necessary to assign determined days or periods to the first, from which all profane occupations are excluded. Thus feast days are born. There is no religion and, consequently, no society which has not known and practiced this division of time into two distinct parts, alternating with one another according to a law varying with peoples and civilizations (EF:346-7).

We shall soon return to the progressive extension of the sacred/profane oppositions throughout the whole of sociocultural life. Let us now briefly turn our attention to the passage from fluid to crystallized symbolism, and the autonomization of these sacral symbolic forms.
6. Crystallization and Autonomization of Symbolism

"The images of totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves" (EF:156). Almost inevitably, due to the alternating rhythms of sociocultural process, and the contagiousness of sacred symbols, the significance originally attached to the newly moralized group gradually becomes transferred to the image of the group. Since such symbols represent the collectivity to itself, they become the basis of the cultural bond. Social interaction is always symbolic, as every introductory student learns. By attaining a certain stability, these sacral collective representations enable the group to perdure. Since consciences and consciousnesses are constructed through the medium of symbolic process, persons ground themselves in these group symbols as the anchor of their existence. In this long and complex process, the collectively projected image becomes more sacred than the group event which it first symbolized. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective representations become detached from their processual origins, and crystallize into relatively permanent symbolic forms. In short, symbolism always tends to become autonomous. The irony of this necessary generic process of displacement, substitution, and autonomization should, however, not be overlooked (eg. see Simmel, 1950).

Given the inevitable alternating rhythms of sociocultural process, our next task then is to briefly explore some ways in which newly generated symbols gradually become detached from their processual origins. In effect, Durkheim asked: what happens to collective symbols when the moral implosion is over? Once generated, does symbolism fade without a continuing underlying collective effervescence? On the contrary, since symbolism is essential to group life, instead of fading, symbols take on increasing significance. Indeed, symbols serve as prime "time-binders" holding groups together through time and space. Let us now turn to explore Durkheim's outline of the fundamental constitutive sociocultural process whereby cultural sym-
bols, once detached from their original generating matrices, come to take on a life of their own; how, in short, the image comes to take precedence over the underlying represented reality. Let us first consider Durkheim's earlier distinction between fluid and crystallized symbolism.

a. The Passage From Fluid to Crystallized Symbolism

True to his processual view of society and culture, Durkheim had earlier distinguished (eg. in The Rules and Suicide) between fluid and crystallized symbolic representations. Durkheim postulated a continuum here, ranging from new and highly fluid sociocultural "currents" (eg. opinion, fad and fashions, movements, etc.) on the one hand, and highly crystallized or stably institutionalized cultural forms such as religious and moral systems, science, law, and on, on the other hand. As Lukes (1973:10) observed, Durkheim suggested that:

There is a whole series of degrees without a break in continuity between the facts of the most articulated structure and those free currents of social life which not yet definitely molded. The differences between them are, therefore, only differences in the degree of consolidation they present. Both are simply life, more or less crystallized (R:12).

Close to the beginning of The Rules of Sociological Method, for instance, Durkheim emphasized that it is important not to overlook these fluid "social currents." For those looking only to the highly crystallized major cultural systems will presume that symbolic forms must be rooted in some continuing social organizational base. Durkheim, of course, agreed, but his overarching concern with sociocultural process on all levels of complexity led him to insist that we should attempt to anchor analysis of symbolic forms not so much in terms of a "material social body" as in a sociocultural process. Thus, if in their early stages sociocultural forms are still shifting and uncertain, then we ought to expect that the symbols which reflect and guide these substructural processes would also be more or less fluid.
Since the examples we have just cited (legal and moral regulations, religious faiths, financial systems, etc.) all consist of established beliefs and practices, one might be led to believe that social facts exist only where there is some social organization. But there are other facts without such crystallized form, which have the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the individual. These are called "social currents." Thus, the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one of the particular individual consciousnesses (R:4).

Inevitably, however, some of these "fluid" "social currents" become habitualized patterns of social interaction, and thus become institutionalized. Correspondingly, the symbolic forms which represent these social patterns also become stabilized in more stable systems, and thus institutionalized (eg. see Berger and Luckmann, 1966). As often noted, the institutionalization of these sociocultural facts implies that they have become generally shared, continuously transmitted over generations, and obligatorily observed. Durkheim remarked:

... certain of these social manners of acting and thinking acquire, by reason of their repetition, a certain rigidity which on its own account crystallizes them, so to speak, and isolates them from the particular events which reflect them. They thus acquire a body, a tangible form, and constitute a reality in their own right, quite distinct from the individual facts which produce it. Collective habits are inherent not only in the successive acts which they determine but, by a privilege of which we find no example in the biological realm, they are given permanent expression in a formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and fixed even in writing (R:7).

Searching as he was for a definitive index of exterior signs by which to recognize and objectively analyze "social facts," in this early attempt in The Rules Durkheim rightly directed attention primarily to institutions and highly crystallized major cultural forms. However, as his approach to positivism shifted from grounding analysis of "moral facts" in "material bodies" and "mechanical" process to grounding analysis in sociocultural, and especially symbolic process (this evolution culminating in The Elementary Forms), Durkheim correspondingly came to focus attention on the passage from fluid to crystallized forms, instead of just the latter pole.
social life consists, then, of free currents perpetually in the process of transformation and incapable of being mentally fixed by the observer, and the scholar cannot approach the study of social reality from this angle. But we know that it possesses the power of crystallization without ceasing to be itself. Thus, apart from the individual acts to which they give rise, collective habits find expression in definite forms: legal rules, moral regulations, popular proverbs, social conventions, etc. As these forms have a permanent existence and do not change with the diverse applications made of them, they constitute a fixed object, a constant standard within the observers reach, exclusive of subjective impressions and purely personal observations (R:45).

Now, in Suicide, Durkheim's cultural realism led him along the same lines when he insisted that "collective tendencies have an existence of their own." "Social life is made up of representations" (S:312). Let us reverse his order, and consider fluid "collective representations" first.

... not all social consciousness achieves such externalization and materialization. Not all the esthetic spirit of a nation is embodied in the works in inspires; not all morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater part is diffused. There is a large collective life which is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate everywhere, cross and mingle in a thousand different ways, and just because they are constantly mobile are never crystallized in an objective form.... all these eddies, all these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single modification of the main legal and moral precepts, immobilized in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these very precepts merely express a whole subjacent life of which they partake; they spring from it but do not supplant it. Beneath all these maxims are actual, living sentiments, summed up by these formula but only in a superficial envelope. The formula would awake no echo if they did not correspond to definite emotions and impressions scattered throughout society (S:315).

A little earlier Durkheim had noted that society externalizes its attitudes and sentiments in material objects. Thus, for example, a certain style of architecture can be said to "materialize" a certain cultural sentiment.

... society ... also includes material things, which play an essential role in the common life. The social fact is sometimes so far materialized as to become an element of the external world. For instance, a definite type of architecture is a social phenomenon; but it is partially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once constructed, become autonomous realities, independent of
individuals. It is the same with the avenues of communication and transportation, with instruments used in industry or private life which expresses the state of technology at any moment in history, of written language, etc. Social life which is thus crystallized, as it were, and fixed on material supports, is by just so much externalized, and acts upon us from without (S:313-14).

And as we shall discover from his analysis of the Australian materials, as symbolic currents crystallize into systems they tend to take on their own inner nature and form; in short, they grow increasingly autonomous. And, the more these symbolic systems are permeated with religious rationales and magical protocols, the more rigid they become. Some symbolic forms, on the other hand, reveal a special suppleness; these lend themselves to further development and universalization, as we shall discover in Chapter Seven. Durkheim refers to:

... the definite formula into which the dogmas of faith are precipitated, or legal precepts when they become fixed externally in a consecrated form... They have a manner of action of their own. Juridical relations are widely different depending on whether or not the law is written. Where there is a constituted code, jurisprudence is more regular but less flexible, legislation more uniform but also more rigid. Legislation adopts itself less readily to a variety of individual cases, and resists innovations more strongly. The material forms it assumes are thus not merely ineffective verbal combinations but active realities, since they produce effects which would not occur without their existence. They are not merely external to individual consciousnesses, but this very externality establishes their specific qualities. Because these forms are less at the disposal of individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to circumstances, and this very situation makes them more resistant to change (S:314-15).

Now, closely related to institutionalization of social patterns and crystallization and legitimation of cultural symbolic forms is the process of "sedimentation" or the layering down of multiple levels of symbolic meaning through time. Since society and culture are inter-generational, sentiments which gain a certain durability over time may be sedimented both in terms of sequence and depth of significance. Some lower levels may even be rediscovered or reappropriated and thence brought up to the level of conscious reflection.
Now, it is precisely this complex layering down of cultural elements from various sources and times, and their synergetic fusion, which constitutes the inner secret of that human socio-cultural historical complex known as civilization. In the relevant sections of The Elementary Forms, for instance, we see Durkheim observing:

In addition to these free forces which are constantly coming to renew our own, there are others which are fixed in the methods and traditions which we employ. We speak a language that we did not make; we use instruments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted to each generation that it did not gather itself, etc. It is to society that we owe these varied benefits of civilization... Now it is these things that give man his own place among things; a man is a man only because he is civilized (EF:242-3).

We shall further explore Durkheim's theory of the evolution of cultural symbolic forms in the following sections: in this Book, the chapters immediately succeeding on "The Tree of Evolutionary Life," "The Primitive Sacral Complex," "Durkheim's Notion of Civilizations," and the sections in Book Three, Part I, on the autonomization of collective representations in Durkheim's causal model, and his various transitions to sociocultural realism.

b. The Autonomization of Symbolic Forms

Well before The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim had already noted the tendency of collective symbolic systems, once institutionalized as the representative ground of legitimate moral authority and intellectual decision, to grow increasingly autonomous. Autonomous here means the tendency to become self-ordering, with its own laws, and developmental processes. As Weber once similarly remarked, "We are inserted into separate spheres of existence, each with its own laws." Whereas in Part I of Book Three I shall explore Durkheim's notion of the autonomization of symbolic forms from the methodological level, especially from the point of view of his argument from "relational realism" and "emergence," here I shall
approach this generic sociocultural process substantively in terms of primitive religion and ritual.

It should be noted that as early as The Division of Labor, Durkheim had remarked on the tendency toward autonomization of the collectively symbolic superstructure.

... wherever a directive power is established, its primary and principal function is to create respect for the beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that is, defend the common conscience against all enemies within and without. It thus becomes its symbol, its living expression in the eyes of all. Thus, the life which is in the collective conscience is communicated to the directive organ as the affinities of ideas are communicated to the words which represent them, and that is how it assumes a character which puts it above all the others .... It is the collective type incarnate. It participates in the authority which the latter exercises over consciences, and it is from these that it draws its force. Once constituted, however, without freeing itself from the source when it flows and whence it continues to draw its sustenance, it nevertheless becomes an autonomous factor in social life, capable of spontaneously producing its own movements without equal impulsion, precisely because of the supremacy which it has acquired (DL:84).

Now, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to indicate how the progressive detachment of symbols from the groups which they had come to symbolize occurred. First, the "hyper-spiritual" or moral forces, if they are to truly communicate, must gain some external, visible form of expression. The symbolic vehicle for moral and cognitive communion thus inevitably becomes lodged in an external material form or repeatable gesture. These visible, external, public signs are taken to manifest inward states. There is an eternal dialectic here between cultural forms and natural forms, for the former are dependent on the latter for their existence, even the one exists only to rise above the other. Moral processes depend upon natural vehicles to externalize the inner processes of moral communion which may lead to a linkage, exchange, or even confounding of their separable natures. We might recall that Durkheim had already explored the need for the clan to generate the totem as its prime "collective representation."
Now, by its very nature, the ideal forces must be externalized to become communicated. The vehicle for this moral-logical communion inevitably becomes lodged in a specific material form or gesture. Conversely, the natural symbolic potencies inherent in specific material mediums also feed back and structure the possible symbolic arrangements (e.g., see Levi-Strauss, 1963, Victor Turner, 1967, Mary Douglas, 1973). As I have insisted, it is simply mistaken to assert, as Durkheim did along with many others, that symbols are utterly arbitrary and conventional. The only adequate way to conceptualize these two poles of culture and nature is as analogical, that is, as a resonating series of more or less parallel matrices of events. It is metaphor and analogy which allow us to pass from one to the other in a more or less coherent fashion.

Since the clan cannot exist without a name and an emblem, and since this emblem is always before the eyes of men, it is upon this and the objects whose image it is, that the sentiments which society arouses in its members are fixed. Men are thus compelled to represent the collective force, whose action they feel, in the form of the thing serving as flag to the group. Therefore, in the idea of this force were mixed up the most different kingdoms; in one sense, it was essentially human, since it was made up of human ideas and sentiments; but at the same time, it could not fail to appear as closely related to the animate or inanimate beings who gave it its outward form.... There is no society where it is not active. In a general way, a collective sentiment can become conscious of itself only by becoming fixed upon some material object; but by this very fact, it participates in the nature of this object, and reciprocally, the object participates in its nature (EF:269).

Second, this inevitable linkage (or confounding) or moral and material is accelerated by the contagiousness of the sacred images which naturally spread as if propelled by some "sacred electricity" from thing to thing, from event to event. What Durkheim saw as contagiousness also rests, in part, of course, upon the verbal and symbolic mechanisms of metonymy and synecdoche (see especially the works of K. Burke), by which one thing comes to represent or "stand for another" in the extension of specific phenomenological linkages between a moral event and a natural sign, and thus the facilitation of trans-
ference of symbolic loads. Asking: "How does it happen that these externalized moral forces come to be thought of in the form of totems?"—that is, specific plants or animals, Durkheim replied:

It is because this animal or plant has given its name to the clan and serves it as an emblem. In fact, it is a well-known law that the sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the symbol which represents them. For us, black is a sign of mourning; it also suggests sad impressions and ideas. This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely united in our minds; the result is that the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously to the other. But this contagion, which takes place in every case to some degree, is much more complete and more marked when the symbol is something simple, definite, and easily representable, while the thing itself, owing to its dimension, the number of its parts, and the complexity of their arrangements, is difficult to hold in the mind. For we are unable to consider an abstract entity, which we represent only laboriously and confusedly the source of the strong sentiments which we feel. We cannot explain them to ourselves except by connecting them to some concrete object of whose reality we are vividly aware. Then if the thing itself does not fulfill this condition, it cannot serve as the accepted basis of the sentiments felt, even though it may be what really aroused them. Then some sign takes its place; it is to this that we connect the emotions it excites. It is this which is loved, feared, and respected; it is to this that we are grateful; it is for this that we sacrifice ourselves. The soldier who dies for his flag, dies for his country; but as a matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is the flag that has the first place. It sometimes happens that this even directly determines action. Whether one isolated standard remains in the hands of the enemy or not does not determine the fate of the country; yet the soldier allows himself to be killed to regain it. He loses sight of the fact that the flag is only a sign and that it has no value in itself, but only brings to mind the reality that it represents; it is treated as if it were this reality itself (EF:251-2).

Third, there is another sense of "contagion" here which is important to the continual attempts to separate out sacral from profane phenomena. For "contagion" also means "dangerous," and because, as Mary Douglas (1966) suggests, "the unclear is the unclean," the very mixture of sacred and profane symbolism in the onward flow of everyday life means that these boundaries
must be constantly reaffirmed in ever-new ways. The keeping of the sacra, the esoteric sacred mysteries, becomes a special responsibility of the magicians and priests, those religious virtuosos who "take a lease on charisma," as Weber once said. Mixture is dangerous because it threatens the newly constructed symbolic coordinates of the collectivity itself. If the group depends upon these symbolic coordinates, then their erasure means the collapse of the group itself.

The churinga are preserved in a sort of temple upon whose threshold all noises from the profane life must cease; it is the domain of sacred things. On the contrary, the totemic animals and plants live in the profane world and are mixed up with the common everyday life. Since the number and importance of the interdictions which isolate sacred things, and keep it apart, correspond to the degree of sacredness with which it is invested, we arrive at the remarkable conclusion that the images of totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves (EF:155-6).

Durkheim thus avoided the crude error of some other early anthropological analysts who presumed that the natives actually worshipped their totemic animals or even their totem poles! "In reality, it is not to the animal as such that the (totemic) cult is addressed, but to the emblem and the image of the totem" (EF:198). Specifically, Durkheim observed:

The Arunta dance around the nurtunja, and assemble before the image of their totem to adore it, but a similar demonstration is never made before the totemic being itself. If this latter were the primarily sacred object, it would be with it, the sacred animal or plant, that the young initiate would communicate when he is introduced into the religious life; but we have seen that, on the contrary, the most solemn moment of the initiation is the one when the novice enters into the sanctuary of the churinga. It is with them and the nurtunja that he communicates. The representations of the totem are therefore more actively powerful than the totem itself* (EF:156).

Now, it is evident that the clan is too complex a reality, with all its multiple spheres and levels of relationships and mutual obligations, to be represented clearly and fully by a single image.

The totem is the flag of the clan. It is therefore natural that the impressions aroused by the clan in indivi-
dual minds—impressions of dependence and of increased vitality—should fix themselves to the idea of totem rather than that of the clan: for the clan is too complex a reality to be represented clearly in all its complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences. More than that, the primitive does not even see that these impressions come to him from the group. He does not know that the coming together of a number of men associated in the same life results in disengaging new energies, which transforms each of them. All that he knows is that he is raised above himself and that he sees a different life from the one he ordinarily leads. However, he must connect these sensations to some external object as their cause. Now what does he see about him? On every side those things which appeal to his senses and strike his imagination are the numerous images of the totem. They are the churinga and bull-roarer, upon which are generally carved combinations of lines having the same significance. They are the decorations covering the different parts of his body, which are totemic marks. How could this image, repeated everywhere and in all sorts of forms, fail to stand out with exceptional relief in his mind? Placed thus in the center of the scene, it becomes representative. The sentiments experienced fix themselves upon it, for it is the only concrete object upon which they can fix themselves. It continues to bring them to mind and to evoke them after the assembly has dissolved, for it survives the assembly, being carved upon the instruments of the cult, upon the sides of rocks, upon bucklers, etc. By it, the emotions experienced are perpetually sustained and revived. Everything happens just as if they inspired them directly. It is still more natural to attribute them to it for, since they are common to the group, they can be associated only with something that is equally common to all. Now the totemic emblem is the only thing satisfying this condition. By definition, it is common to all. During the ceremony, it is the center of all regards. While generations change, it remains the same; it is the permanent element of the social life. So it is from it that those mysterious forces seem to emanate with which men feel that they are related, and thus they have been led to represent these forces under the form of the animate or inanimate beings whose name the clan bears (EF:252-3).

Given his sociocultural framework, Durkheim interpreted the totem as an external emblematical expression of the inward social bond. The totem signified an inner unifying principle which was expressed in terms of an obligatory sacral symbol. The totem is the source of the moral life of the clan. All the beings partaking of the same totemic principle consider that owing to this very fact, they are moral-
ly bound to one another; they have definite duties of assistance, vendetta, etc. towards each other, and it is these duties which constitute kinship. So while the totemic principle is a totemic force, it is also a moral power (EF:219).

It was this constitutive ground of legitimate moral and intellectual authority of the collective bond and individual conscience that the natives revered, argued Durkheim. Lukes aptly summarizes Durkheim's thought in this regard:

The role of the emblems was to perpetuate and recreate the social sentiments aroused by the rites; moreover, the rites themselves enabled social communication to 'become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment,' and they not only expressed but served to 'support the beliefs upon which they are founded.' Hence, the cult in general was both 'a system of signs by which the faith is outwardly translated,' and 'a collection of the means by which this is created and recreated periodically'.... Durkheim saw totemism as essentially constitutive of aboriginal social organization: the totem identified the clan, whose members were bound by specific ties of kinship, so that the 'collective totem is part of the civil status of each individual.' Indeed, a 'clan is essentially a group of individuals who bear the same name and rally around the same sign. Take away the name and the sign which materializes it, and the clan is no longer representable. Since the group is possible only on this condition, both the institution of the emblem and the part it plays in the life of the group are thus explained' (1973:472).

Stating that "we are now in a position to understand all that is essential in the totemic beliefs," Durkheim observed:

Since religious force is nothing other than the collective and anonymous forces of the clan, and since this can be represented in the mind only in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the god. Therefore, it is from it that those kindly and dreadful actions seem to emanate, which the cult seeks to provoke or prevent; consequently, it is to it that the cult is addressed. This is the explanation of why it holds the first place in the series of sacred things (EF:253).

Finally, while it is not my present problem to review Durkheim's positivist alchemies, we should note that Durkheim positioned here a whole series of inner transformations invisible to the participants themselves. Like the present day structuralists who often claim his mantle (eg. Levi-Strauss), Durk-
hein presumed that:

Social action follows ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes. As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men know well that they are acted upon, but they do not know by whom. So they must invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way in which they were led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought (EF:239-40).

Having thus traced Durkheim's notion of the crystallization and autonomization of symbolism, let us next turn our attention to the progressive extension of these increasingly autonomous sets through symbolic equations. For it is only by extending such fundamental polarities that men are able to build up more complex classificatory systems which may then gradually become detached from both their original sacral and collective basis. Only by striving to view this long sequence as a whole process with many phases and transformations can we ever hope to understand how our modern rational and universally valid cognitive classificatory systems came to emerge.

Preface. Since sociocultural process depends upon symbols (which grow increasingly autonomous), inevitably the organizing tension between "sacral" and "profane" collective representations becomes extended to all spheres of reality and levels of experience. "All known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world" (EF: 165). The so-called "contagiousness" of "sacral" symbolism leads to a universal classificatory system covering the "... whole world in the fashion of a gnosis or cabbala" (PC:70). Rooted first in varying degrees of phenomenological or concrete resemblance to the "sacral" and "profane" oppositions which anchor all emerging systems of morality and knowledge, through compounding series of analogies these symbolic equations progressively link together diverse experiences, places, times, and levels of existence. As the prime vehicles for the extension and synthesis of knowledge, analogy and metaphor are crucial for the construction of these systems guiding conscience and consciousness, especially in the early stages. "In China, in all the Far East, and in modern India, as well as in ancient Greece and Rome, ideas about sympathetic actions, symbolic correspondences, and astrological influences not only were or are very widespread, but exhausted or stillexhaust collective knowledge" (PC:5). Thus, the progressive extension and elaboration of resonating levels of phenomenologically based symbolic equations and proportions serves to progressively align all aspects of experience into more or less coherent structures of conscience and consciousness. "The men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically" (EF:175). These constitutive systems of symbolic equations and sequences act as bridges transforming empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. "This organ-
ization, which at first may appear to us as purely logical, is at the same time moral" (EF:175). Thus simultaneously moral and cognitive, these rudimentary systems of classification come to serve as the central directive paradigms of their cultures. World, self, and society become progressively organized around these compounding series of symbolic equations. For example, of the highly ramified Chinese Taoist system of classification, and also of moral and intellectual direction, Durkheim and Mauss observed: "It governs all details of life among the most immense population that humanity has ever known" (PC:67). In sum, first through polarities which create tension in the symbolic field, and then through ramifying series of symbolic equations based on the primal tensions, the whole world becomes cosmicized; the small scale human world becomes valorized.

In this regard, two essential principles have begun to emerge from our systematic in-depth reconstruction of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's substantive work so far. Let us first recall that Durkheim presumed that structures of conscience and consciousness are socioculturally and historically constructed, and thus remain for a long time linked and even confounded with specific groups. Moreover, as we have seen already, and will explore further in the succeeding section on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture the systems of morality and knowledge which so often become dominant first emerge in their most systematic way out of magical ritual and religious myth. In short, the two inner constitutive principles of the construction of over-arching systems of moral and intellectual classification are that these are, to a great extent, sociocentric and sacral-magical. As Durkheim and Mauss noted: "Among the Zuni, the idea which society has of itself, and its worldview, are so interlaced and merged that their organization, has perfectly been described as 'mytho-sociologic' " (PC:42).

Now, the linkage of the form of symbolic systems to the structure of the group, and the linkage of their content to
the sacral outlooks and magical protocols, are two principles of utmost importance for the human sciences. Both Weber and Durkheim, for instance, were very sensitive to this inner linkage of the legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness to the structure of the group and to its religion. Although first born in the clan and the totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connection with the restrictive structures of both group and religion. For, as we have proposed, as societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. And as Benjamin Nelson (see especially 1973a) has proposed, following both Weber and Durkheim, we should expect that the extension of the social bond—that is, shifts in the structures of social fraternization—and universalization and rationalization of the legitimate structures of moral and intellectual authority proceed together on the world-historical level. Indeed, as Nelson, Weber, and Durkheim emphasize, the failure to break with either sacral-magical praxis (ritual protocols, stereotyping, etc.) and classificatory systems rooted primarily in the collectivity, constitute prime obstacles to modernization.

Now since Primitive Classification preceeded The Elementary Forms, and since, as we have seen, Durkheim originally intended to entitle the latter "The Elementary Forms of Thought and of Religious Life" (Alpert, 1939:55), let us first turn to recall the general problems and theses which Durkheim proposed to address. Then we shall consider the more fully elaborated answers which Durkheim offered in 1912.

a. Durkheim's Socio-Logic: The Links Between Symbols & Groups

As a prelude to the project which culminated in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim wrote On Some Primitive Forms of Classification with Mauss to reveal the inner sociocultural "prehistory" of the categories of moral rules and intellectual concepts. As always, Durkheim's socio-logic—his insistence that symbols and logics be linked first to the group—had to
contend with a powerful and pervasive counter logic. And, in our own time, as in Durkheim's, that psycho-philosophical abstraction of the modern Western world—the generic ego floating in space endowed with a self-guiding rationality shining by virtue of its own inviolable "inner light"—still reigns. But Durkheim argued: "We have no justification for supposing that our mind bears within it at birth, completely formed, the prototype of this elementary framework of all classification" (PC:8). Indeed, I believe that the general thrust of Durkheim's thought here was correct, for the modern notion of the generic ego as the repository of an innate moral sense and a calculus of rationality depended upon the negation of tradition and the delegitimation and stripping away of the authority of the collectivity. What is most misleading here, of course, was the implicit symbolic equation between rationality, individualism, and freedom, the latter conceived largely in the negative sense as the absence of traditional social and cultural constraints. As Lukes (1968), among others, has observed, one of Durkheim's lasting accomplishments is to have demonstrated that there is no necessary inner connection between logical nominalism and its modern secular equivalents, and individual freedom and political democracy. Indeed, closer attention to the birth pangs of the modern world would have revealed, as both the Puritans in the English Civil War and Hobbes showed, that such positions may just as easily be linked with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes—with the Leviathans of the modern world. In sum, what Durkheim rightly insisted upon was that our modern notions here have themselves a distinct rhetorical structure. Against this highly dynamic position, Durkheim and Mauss declared in the opening pages of their essay:

The faculties of definition, deduction, and induction are generally considered as immediately given in the constitution of the individual understanding. Admittedly, it has been known for a long time that, in the course of history, men learned to use these functions better and better. But it is thought that in their essential features they have been fully formed as long as mankind
has existed. It has not even been imagined that they might have been, by a painful combination of elements, borrowed from extremely different sources, quite foreign to logic and laboriously organized. And this conception of the matter was not at all surprising so long as the development of logical faculties was thought to belong simply to individual psychology, so long as no one had the idea of seeing in these methods of scientific thought veritable social institutions whose origin sociology alone can retrace and explain (PC:3).

Yes, that is the key: scientific rationality, especially of the Utilitarian or positivist varieties, even the rationality of the pre-social individual which are so often symbolically associated, are themselves modern social institutions! And, as with so many other useful fictions of the Enlightenment, such as the "noble savage," "Robinson Crusoe," or the self-equilibrating market mechanism of market capitalism, these are merely images which we mistakenly project back into history, and onto other societies and cultures. Now, Durkheim clearly saw that, instead of being primarily anchored as fixed faculties inherent in the generic ego, modern universalistic and rationalistic classificatory systems had undergone a long evolution which they could not adequately explain in terms of their own premises. Durkheim's insights here are crucial, for as societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems, and if our modern system emerged from the past, there must be some way of specifying the inner link between two systems so different. The key to this inner evolution, Durkheim posited, was a link or parallel between the extension of the social bond and the rationalization and universalization of classificatory systems and, thus, of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. These were Durkheim's root "socio-logics," which so few seem to have understood then and even today.

It is interesting to note that few readers of Primitive Classification have recognized that the very structure of the essay is evolutionary. The more or less static preoccupations of the two schools (American structuralism-functionalism and British social anthropology) which still lay claim to the le-
gitimating mantle of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit" work against this crucial recognition. This is especially true of the latter school whose penchant for small-scale ethnographic analyses and anti-evolutionary biases have led them, although basically sympathetic, to mount what appears to be a devastating series of charges against the logical and evidential structure of Durkheim and Mauss's essay. For instance, Rodney Needham, the English translator of *Primitive Classification*, has raised a whole series of seemingly fatal criticisms against this essay (but see Alpert, 1965:665). Needham charges that there is good reason to believe that "Durkheim and Mauss's entire venture was misconceived" (1963:xxvi). Needham insists that "... there is no logical necessity to postulate a causal connection between society and symbolic classification" (1963:xxiv). "In no single case is there any compulsion to believe that society is the cause or even the model of the classification" (1963:xxv). "Now society is alleged to be the model on which classification is based, yet in society after society examined no formal correspondence can be shown to exist. Different forms of classification are found with identical types of social organization, and similar forms with different types of society" (1963:xvi). Needham adds that the most serious methodological failing was that "... Durkheim and Mauss did not subject their thesis to test by concomitant variation" (1963:xvi). Finally, in terms of the logical sequence underlying Durkheim's argument, Needham makes the oft-repeated charge that:

If the mind is taken to be a system of cognitive faculties, it is absurd to say that the categories originate in social organization.... The social model must itself be perceived to possess the characteristics which make it useful in classifying other things, but this cannot be done without the very categories which Durkheim and Mauss derived from the model (1963:xxvii).

Needham concludes with what must be one of the weakest recommendations for the theoretical and historical value of translating and reading a classic essay ever given: "Whatever its faults, its prime theoretical contribution has been to isolate
classification as an aspect of culture to which sociological inquiry should be directed" (1963:x1). Damning with faint praise! William Runciman (1969:190) felt the same way, branding Durkheim's sociology of religion as "fundamentally misconceived," and summed up his disdain by referring to Durkheim's sociology of knowledge as resting on a "logical howler."

Now, although Steven Lukes follows many of Evans-Pritchard's and Needham's criticisms (eg. "in the first place, the very relations established must always presuppose the prior existence of these very abilities", 1973:447), nonetheless, he offers a more subtly inflected critical review. Lukes even finds some aspects of Durkheim's thesis valuable. Although Lukes hardly more than Needham has clearly recognized the "nuclear structure" underlying Durkheim's work as we have explored it here, his judgements in this regard are generally more reliable. Although resolutely criticizing Durkheim's evolutionary claims, Lukes, apparently influenced by the lone voice of Robin Horton (1967, 1973), does acknowledge that "... the hypothesis that primitive and traditional religions contain the germs of scientific thinking is, in many ways, both challenging and plausible" (1973:449). (We shall soon pursue this notion in the following section on the primitive sacral complex). And Lukes especially praises Durkheim's claims that:

... belief systems, including primitive religions, should be treated as cosmologies. This claim has proved immensely fruitful... Perhaps their most theoretically significant aspect derives from the implications of his (other) claim that there are structural correspondences between symbolic classification and social organization, and quite generally between different orders of social facts (1973:449).

Now, doubtless as many critics have charged, if the human mind were totally devoid of any inherent classificatory ability, as Durkheim's rather extreme statements in *Primitive Classification* so often seem to suggest, then *we* would simply lack the rudimentary ability to construct ordered societies in the first place. Once again, Durkheim's "besetting scholarly vice" of *petitio principii* was at work. However, it should
not be overlooked that Durkheim himself explicitly acknowledged this logical necessity in The Elementary Forms.

... it is not our intention to deny that the individual intellect has of itself the power of perceiving resemblances between the different objects of which it is conscious. Quite on the contrary, it is clear that even the most primitive and simple classifications presuppose this faculty (EF:170).

Doubtless, Durkheim's bald sociologism ("The first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men", PC:82) was overstated. Once again, his rhetorical animus toward psychologism led him to excess:

Far from classifying spontaneously and by a sort of natural necessity, humanity in the beginning lacks the most indispensable conditions for the classificatory function. Further, it is enough to examine the very idea of classification to understand that men could not have found its essential elements in himself (PC:7).

Consequently, I am not interested here in pursuing what appears to many (eg. Needham) as Durkheim's main proposition—namely, that social forms were the sole and primary source of logical categories. Rather, like Lukes and Benjamin Nelson (1973a), I am more interested in what we might term the "weaker" and less explored version of Durkheim's theses—namely, that cognitive and moral classifications have been throughout history inextricably bound up with the structure and culture of collectivities. Now, while certainly the English anthropologists have done some of the finest work on symbolism and ritual using Durkheim's leads, I am convinced that the perspective which is emerging here has been generally slighted by them and most others. I believe that if we focus on the evolutionary structure of Durkheim's thought, and constantly relate it to Weber's sometimes parallel and sometimes complementary work, we shall help pioneer a new and crucial foundation for the emerging human sciences.

Now, it was this "socio-logic" which linked symbols to groups rather than to individual minds (see especially Evans-Pritchard, 1965), which led Durkheim and Mauss to explore these relationships, while it was his rhetorical stance and
dialectical ambitions which led the former to excess. In the beginning of *Primitive Classification*, Durkheim and Mauss posed their problem in this manner.

A class is a group of things; and things do not present themselves to observation grouped in such a way. We may well perceive more or less vaguely their resemblances. But the single fact of these resemblances is not enough to explain how we are led to group things which thus resemble one another; to bring them together in a sort of ideal sphere enclosed by definite limits, which we call a class, a species, etc.... To classify is not only to form groups; it means arranging these groups according to particular relations. We imagine them as coordinated or subordinate one to the other, we say that some (the species) are included in others (the genera), that the former are subsumed under the latter.... Every classification implies a hierarchical order for which neither the tangible world nor our mind gives us the model. We therefore have reason to ask where it was found (PC:7-8).

To buttress their case which, as we shall see, so often rests upon an ingenious use of analogy between social forms and logical forms, Durkheim and Mauss note the curious lineage of the very terms of classifications themselves:

The very terms which we use in order to characterize it allow us to presume that all these logical notions have an extra-logical origin. We say that species of the same genera are connected by relations of kinship; we call certain classes "families;" did not the very word genus (genre) itself originally describe a group of relatives (PC:8)?

Thus, Durkheim and Mauss proposed their socio-logical program of inquiry into the elementary forms of classification.

Far from being able to say that men classify quite naturally, by a sort of necessity of their individual understanding, we must on the contrary ask ourselves what could have led them to arrange their ideas in this way, and where they could have found the plan of this remarkable disposition. We cannot even dream of tackling this question in all of its ramifications (PC:9).

But after a decades more work, Durkheim felt ready to address these problems which he first broached with Mauss in 1903. Now, as I have had occasion to remark before, because many secondary observers have failed to understand both Durkheim's linkage of conscience and consciousness and his evolutionary framework, many have also failed to understand why
he returned again and again primarily (some would say almost exclusively) to consideration of such problems in terms of their paradigmatic "elementary forms." But if, indeed, Durkheim was inspired in proposing that our modern forms of classification have a prehistory, then how else are we to empirically illuminate this hidden shroud if not by recourse to what appear as the elementary forms? Thus, in the first substantive chapter of Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss focused on Australian totemism, to which the former devoted his full attention, of course, in The Elementary Forms. In this light, Primitive Classification can be seen as a wider evolutionary prolegomena to one of the two main threads of Durkheim's story which was later to unfold in his masterpiece of 1912. Therefore, the thrust of Needham's and many others' criticisms of Durkheim's logical base is attenuated by our shift from concern with the generic categories to the evolution of systems of classification, and the criticisms of the evidential base are lessened by the detailed and systematic presentation found in the classic of 1912.

Before we turn to consider how Durkheim charted in 1912 the manner in which classificatory systems are built up through a progressive extension of a series of resonating symbolic equations, let us briefly review Durkheim's setting of this specific problem in 1903. Doubtless his 1903 preliminary effort was less adequate than his later full blown analysis, for in the former we see that Durkheim and Mauss posited, ala Levy-Bruhl's law of "mystical participation" (see also Lukes, 1973:438, #17), a primitive state of undifferentiated confusion of categories. Now, in seeking to investigate the prehistory of modern universally valid, internally consistent, and rational "scientific" classifications, Durkheim was right in generally contrasting the fluidness of the former to the fixity of the latter. Indeed, however much religious thought and hermetic alchemical traditions may have contributed to the development of western thought, science as we know it today is simply not possible until the various orders of being are view-
ed as closed to one another, until phenomenal spheres are regarded as stable, and until there is the widespread feeling of certitude that invariant laws describing these closed and stable relationships can be discovered because there is a "sufficient reason" for this particular world-order. Durkheim noted this important difference between modern and primitive thought patterns:

For us to classify things is to arrange them in groups which are distinct each from the other, and are separated by clearly determined lines of demarcation. At the bottom of our conception of class there is the idea of a circumscription with fixed and definite outlines. Now one could almost say that this conception of classification does not go back before Aristotle. Aristotle was the first to proclaim the existence and the reality of specific differences, to show that the means was cause, and that there was no direct passage from one genus to another (PC:4-5).

Now, Durkheim's achievement in deriving the Aristotelian categories from social and cultural process (what has been called his "social Kantianism") was to attempt to illuminate both the generic and especially the genetic-evolutionary processes by which primitive symbolic systems gradually became transformed into modern scientific classifications. In so doing, he began with the original totemic situation in which transformations from one classificatory set to another apparently proceeded at random and without a fixed logic.

If we descend to the least evolved societies known ... we shall find a ... general mental confusion. Here, the individual loses his personality. There is a complete lack of distinction between him and his exterior soul or his totem. He and his "fellow animal" together compose a single personality. The identification is such that the man assumes the characteristics of the thing or animal with which he is thus united. ... There is a complete indifferentiation between sign and thing, name and person, places and inhabitants. ... For the primitive the principle generatio aequipvoca is proved. ... Animals, people, and inanimate objects were originally almost always conceived of as standing in relations of the most perfect identity to each other (PC:6-7).

Durkheim and Mauss even went so far as to liken this to the development of the individual (PC:7), as in the principle of "ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny." Finally, Durkheim and
Mauss noted the survival of this primitive mode of thinking even today, beneath many of our sophisticated forms. Observing that "It would be impossible to exaggerate the state of indistinction from which the human mind developed," Durkheim and Mauss noted:

Even today a considerable part of our popular literature, our myths and our religion is based on a fundamental confusion of all images and ideas. They are not separated from each other, as it were, with any clarity. Metamorphoses, the transmission of qualities, the substitution of persons, souls and bodies, beliefs about the materialization of spirits and the spiritualization of material objects, are the elements of religious thought or of folklore. Now the very idea of such transformations could not arise if things were represented by delimited and classified concepts (PC:5).

Now, granting that the postulate of a primitive state of indistinction and confusion to which rationality, as a counter principle, gradually gave order is an inadequate formulation of the problem, let us turn our attention to The Elementary Forms in which Durkheim greatly elaborated his earlier analysis of Australian totemism. We shall return at the end of this section to Durkheim's summary statements of his earlier theses in the conclusion to Primitive Classification. But, first, since Durkheim thought that the "contagiousness" of "sacral" symbolism offered the key to understanding the origin of both classificatory systems as such, and the nature of mythological transformations from one set of phenomena to another, let us first turn to further analyze this essential process. Now, even though Durkheim's later statement was far better than his first tentative version, he still put far too much emphasis on "contagion", while leaving its inner symbolic mechanisms too little explored. Since the extension of symbolic equations holds the key to the construction of systems of morality and cognitive classification, let us precede these other analyses with a quick look at some perspectives which try to illuminate the basic equational and transformational structures of symbolic process.
b. **Analogy and Metaphor: The Structure of Symbolic Equations**

It is crucial for those wishing to build the foundations of the human sciences to recognize the critical importance of analogy and metaphor as constitutive processes in building the human cosmos called culture. For the use of analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for the extension of experience and the synthesis of knowledge. As such, they allow us to link together separate things and events into a meaningful relationship. Recognition of phenomenological similarity or difference, and the construction of inner or essential comparisons and contrasts, is the basic way of constituting relationships. Besides controlled experiment, one of the few tried and tested ways of extending knowledge from the known to the unknown is through analogy and metaphor. Indeed, the human cosmos called culture depends on these processes of symbolic equations as one of its key inner constitutive processes.

All cultural expressions thus take on meaning through such equational structures. Language, for example, is built up by extending a series of root metaphors from one situation to another, by translating and retranslating basic guiding images into their various manifestations. The more seminal the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with potential meaning will the word root become. In this spinning out process, a whole web of related meanings is gradually constructed, and the whole language can be seen to "hang together" on a surprisingly small number of key pegs. Indeed, images come before words; an extended search through a good dictionary should convince almost anyone of the centrality of these root images, and the equational structure in which whole rafts of words and phrases are interdefined. Literary meaning, too, is built up out of a compounding series of symbolic equations. Indeed, the heart of the task of the literary critic is precisely to unfold and systematically elucidate these basic associational clusters, as Kenneth Burke calls them, or "what goes with what."
All other forms of knowledge and expression also have their own special equational structures and sequences. Noting this universality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking devices, Northrop Frye has remarked upon the "... similarity of form between the units of literature and of mathematics, the metaphor and the equation," which led him to wonder if:

... it is true that the verbal structures of psychology, anthropology, theology, history, law, and everything else built out of words have been informed or constructed by the same kind of myths and metaphors that we find, in their original hypothetical form, in literature (1957: 352)?

Now, there are good reasons for this to be so. For all knowing, indeed, all mental processes, ultimately rest upon perception, imagination, and cognition. The first supplies images, the second projects images, while the third compares and contrasts these images and reconstructs them into a meaningful interpretive schema. Thus, for example, the perceptual and cognitive training of young children centers largely around the increasingly systematic comparison (discernment of similarity, likeness) and contrast (difference) between these images, and their classification into sets, and abstraction of their shared qualities into generalizable attributes. Thus, the two key elements of symbolic process—polarities which create tension, and symbolic equations which link diverse events into series of meaningfully associated clusters, can be easily seen in terms of the verbal games which adults often play with children for intellectual entertainment. For example, given a series of rudimentary polarities such as hot/cold, black/white, up/down, left/right, etc., it is a simple matter for most school age children, once they grasp the underlying logic, to begin to generate their own series of oppositions. Indeed, knowledge always begins with such first order experiential gestalts. A further stage is reached when these perceptual dichotomies are given an analogical structure, such as hot is to summer as cold is to winter, and so on. Indeed, when this capability of constructing their own equational structures is ac-
quired, the comparing and contrasting reaches a new level of sophistication, and the child grows into higher order processes. The continued importance of these operations is attested to by the use of the Miller's Analogies Test for entrance into graduate school.

Now, we should not be surprised to discover that almost all higher level cognitive and judgemental process, including science itself, also rest upon equational structures which contain an irreducible phenomenological or first order base. Although the positivists' program for the philosophy of science banished all symbolic overtones from scientific language, and insisted that science consists exclusively of the systematic linkage of evidentially validated propositions, nevertheless, other contemporary philosophers of science have revealed the continuing importance of images, analogies, models, and paradigms in the growth of science. For instance, Norman R. Campbell, one of the pioneers of this recognition, maintained that the truly valuable element in scientific theories derives from a more or less fruitful embedded analogy which enables us to imaginatively extend our understanding of laws from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Indeed, Campbell argued that this is the very structure of hypotheses and theories, and their prime value, as contrasted with the inertness of law-like statements. Focussing on the process of discovery, Campbell, against the positivists, contended that the embedded analogy "... is essential to and inseparable from the theory and is not merely an aid to its formulation" (1920:119; see also 129-30). Significantly, Northrop Frye, from a rather different perspective, makes a similar observation "... whatever is constructive in any verbal structure seems to me invariably some kind of metaphor" (1957:353). Decades later, Mary Hesse (eg. Models and Analogies in Science, 1963) continued the same argument against the positivists' denuding of the structure of scientific theory. Further, it is interesting to note that other contemporary philosophers of science contend that scientific discovery and revolutions in science come about through "gestalt switches"
and paradigm changes (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958, T.S. Kuhn, 1962). Kuhn's notion of a paradigm as a model, an exemplar to be emulated by the scientific community, is almost Durkheimian. Indeed, a sociologist might be indulged the speculation that had philosophers of science been more familiar with fundamental sociocultural theory, they would have reached these conclusions in far clearer fashion long ago. In short, I submit that science too, instead of moving exclusively in analytical fashion from proposition to proposition, also grows and changes by moving from image to image. This is the irreducible phenomenological and metaphorical structure of all cultural processes.

Researchers in the human sciences too would do well to attempt to search out the fundamental equational and transformational structures underlying their specific materials. For instance, the philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) has convincingly analyzed several "root metaphors" of world-scope. For example, the informing "billiard ball" analogy which N.C. Campbell discovered underlying the Gay-Lussac law of gases in chemistry is a specific illustration of the workings of atomistic and mechanistic metaphors which have been so closely identified with the very structure of modern science. It is important to recognize, therefore, that these "root metaphors" of atomism and mechanism constitute interpretive logics which tend to cut across modern physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, economics, political theory, sociology, jurisprudence, ethics, religion; in short, almost all modern disciplines in the Anglo Cultural Tradition. Indeed, analysis of such cross-cutting interpretive logics of cultural traditions means that the historical thrust in the human sciences would be to proceed both analogically and homologically. Analogical analysis means looking at the in-depth symbolic linkages between one sphere and another (eg. religious ethics and economic norms). The task here would be to unravel the series of inner symbolic equations generating horizontally congruent spheres of action and meaning through the progressive extension of prime analogues from one set of experiences to another.
Homological analysis means looking at the historical connections between analogous elements in different spheres of development. Here the main task becomes to unravel the key sets of transformational equations linking diverse cultural phenomena with their common historical origins.

c. **Levi-Strauss's Notion of Totemism as a Primitive Equational Structure**

If we take this perspective and return to Durkheim's study of the primitive kind of systems in which phenomenological analogy serves as the chief classificatory principle, it is striking to note that one who calls himself "an inconstant disciple" of Durkheim should have developed a theory of totemism precisely around such notions of deeply embedded equational structures. Indeed, the "structuralist" program centers on elucidating the basic equational and transformational operations which constitute cultural process. Levi-Strauss views totemism as "... a classificatory scheme which allows the natural and social universe to be grasped as an organized whole" (1966:135). It is precisely these equational and transformational structures (which Levi-Strauss further explores in the several volumes of his *Mythologiques*), which mark totemism as a primitive, melded, phenomenologically based system of metaphors and condensation symbolism in which different spheres and levels of experience are pulled together and seen as convertible one into the other.

The mythical system and the modes of representations it employs serve to establish homologies [analogies?] between natural and social conditions, or more accurately, it makes it possible to equate significant contrasts found on different planes: the geographical, meteorological, zoological, botanical, technical, economic, social, ritual, religious, and philosophical (1966:93).

Arguing that "... the totemic representation amounts to a code which makes it possible to pass from one system to another regardless of whether it is formulated in natural or cultural terms," Levi-Strauss also notes that this totemic classification is more than just a system of knowledge, for "It is also
the basis of an ethic which prescribes or prohibits modes of behavior" (1965:97).

The isomorphism between social status and relations and symbolic cultural categories acts as the core, the framework, or template--the metaphorical translating column--of public and private phenomenological process. Arguing that the function of totemism as a phenomenological code "... is to guarantee the convertibility of ideas between different levels of social reality," Levi-Strauss suggests that this is what Durkheim meant to get at: "As Durkheim seems sometimes to have realized, the basis of sociology is what may be called 'sociologic' " (1966:76).

... ideas and beliefs of the totemic type particularly merit attention because they constitute codes making it possible to ensure, in the form of conceptual systems, the convertibility of messages appertaining to each level.... This mediation between nature and culture is one of the distinctive functions of the totemic operator (1966:90-1).

... totemism postulates a logical equivalency between a society of natural species and a world of social groups (1966:104).

Thus, instead of adopting a Utilitarian or pragmatic approach to food interdictions, for instance, Levi-Strauss views them as a symbolic way to emphasize a crucial link or opposition between culture and nature: "Eating prohibitions and obligations thus seem to be theoretically equivalent means of denoting significance in a logical system some or all of whose elements are edible species" (1966:103).

Now, while utilizing such fundamental generative oppositions as culture/nature, general/particular, generic logic/change and history, Levi-Strauss, searching for the panhuman logic operating in the elementary structures of the human mind, feels as if he can explain all the diversity in symbolism and human action through abstract models of differentiation and integration. In so far as he overstates his case, his work can be viewed as a kind of applied metaphysics. Yet, still his problem is akin to Durkheim's original one: how does differentiation generate integration? Perhaps LaCapra (1972) is
more sensitive than most secondary observers to the significance of Levi-Strauss's development of Durkheim's seminal insights. Let us conclude with a fine summary statement of Levi-Strauss's insights into totemism as a symbolic coding system:

What is significant is not so much the presence or absence of this or that level of classification as the existence of a classification with, as it were, an adjustable thread which gives the group adopting it the means of "focussing" on all planes, from the most abstract to the most concrete, the most cultural to the most natural, without changing its intellectual instrument (1966:136).

Thus totemism can be viewed as an ingenious primitive way of converting phenomenological diversity into moral and conceptual unity, of transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Indeed, this "science of the concrete" is adequate for its context, and as Durkheim observed, served as the foundation for the emergence of later rational and universal classificatory systems.

d. Sacral "Contagion" as A Primitive Metaphorical Link

Now, if Durkheim viewed the "contagion" of sacral forces as the prime unifying link in primitive classificatory systems, this was because this process contained a number of crucial metaphorical principles, especially "the part is equal to the whole," and "like produces like." Late in The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim summed up these metaphorical principles in this way:

Since all the forces of the universe have been conceived on the model of the sacred forces, the contagiousness inherent in the second was extended to the first, and men have believed that all the properties of a body could be transmitted contagiously. Likewise, when the principle according to which like produces like had been established in order to satisfy certain religious needs, it detached itself from its ritual origins to become, through a sort of spontaneous generalization, a law of nature (EF:404). Indeed, to Durkheim the contagion of sacral symbolism served as a way of translating through synecdoche and metaphor these constitutive principles into simpler form. Let us briefly explore these primitive analogical classificatory operations.
Once again, religion serves as the prime symbolic vehicle by which the sociocultural microcosm is first constructed. Due to the contagiousness of sacred energies, mounting oppositions between it and all that is profane spread to things that appear to resemble the totemic incarnation in some way or another. It is these binary oppositions which serve as the first principle of classification.

When a classification is reduced to two classes, these are almost necessarily conceived as antitheses; they are used primarily as a means of clearly separating things between which there is a very marked contrast (EF:170).

As Levi-Strauss notes, such binary oppositions serve as the organizing womb of culture. Thus, the very basis of the symbolic alignments of the microcosm with the macrocosm is the series of radical antitheses between the sacred and the profane.

Now, the symbolic contagion of sacral energies is the linking force to the extension of these binary oppositions.

A sacred character is to a high degree contagious: it therefore spreads out from the totemic being to everything that is closely or remotely connected with it. The religious sentiments inspired by the animal are communicated to the substances upon which it is nourished and which serves to make or remake its flesh and blood, to the things that resemble it, and to the different beings with which it has constant relations. Thus, little by little, sub-totems are attached to the totems, and form the cosmological systems expressed by the primitive classifications. At last, the whole world is divided up among the totemic principles of each tribe (EF:254).

Now, one of the marks of primitive thought in this regard is its phenomenological or concrete imagistic bases, for the ways in which experiences may be judged relevant to one or another set of symbolic references depend more upon the concrete details of specific situations, prevailing group definitions, and the individuals involved, than upon any universal or rational criterion. The point of departure here is the "natural attitude," which is shared by primitive and modern man in his everyday mode alike. Experience is linked to exper-
ience, image to image, instead of to abstract governing principles. The key anchor of this progressive cosmization is thus analogy. Based upon degrees of resemblance to the totemic incarnation, analogies drawn in a concrete way from immediate experience are progressively extended to other more or less related sets of experiences. Things similar to the sacred image are believed to be driven by the same essential energizing principles.

The Australian does not place things in the same clan or in different clans at random. For him as for us, similar images attract one another, while opposed ones repel one another, and it is on the basis of these feelings of affinity or of repulsion that he classified the corresponding things in one place or another (EF:170).

Later in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim spoke of the "law of contagion" as containing two sub-principles of so-called "sympathetic magic." The first principle was that "the part is equal to the whole," which means that "Anything touching an object also touches everything which has any relations of proximity or unity whatsoever with this object. Whatever affects the part also affects the whole" (EF:398).

... when a sacred thing is subdivided, each of its parts remains equal to the thing itself. Insofar as religious thought is concerned, the part is equal to the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy. The debris of a relic has the same virtue as a relic in good condition. The smallest drop of blood contains the same active principle as the whole thing.... This conception would be inexplicable if the sacredness of something were due to the constituent properties of the thing itself, for, in that case, it should vary with that thing, increasing and decreasing with it. But if the virtues it is believed to possess are not intrinsic to it, and if they come from certain sentiments which it brings to mind and symbolizes, though these originate outside it, then, since it has no need of determined dimensions to play this role of reminder, it will have the same value whether it is entire or not. Since the part makes us think of the whole, it evokes the same sentiment as the whole (EF:261-2).

The second principle is that like attracts like. The representation of a being or condition reproduces this being or condition. Durkheim compared these two principles in terms of the differences between sympathetic magic and the effica-
The charm is, to a large extent, a simple phenomenon of transfer. The idea of the image is associated in the mind with that of the model; consequently, the effects of an action performed upon a statue are transmitted contagiously to the person whose traits it reproduces. The function of the image is for its original what that of a part is for the whole: it is an agent of transmission. Therefore, men think that they can obtain the same result by burning the hair of the person whom they wish to injure: the only difference between these two sorts of operations is that in one, the communication is made through similarity, while in the other is by means of contiguity.

It is different with the rites which concern us. They suppose not only the displacement of a given condition or quality, which passed from one object into the other, but also the creation of something entirely new. The mere act of representing the animal gives birth to this animal and creates it; by imitating the sound of wind or falling water, they cause clouds to form, rain to fall, etc. Of course, resemblance plays an important part in each case, but not all the same one. In a charm, it only gives a special direction to the action exercised; it directs in a certain way an action not originating in it. In the rites of which we have just been describing, it acts by itself and is directly efficacious. So, in contradiction to the usual definitions, the real difference between the two principles of so-called sympathetic magic and the corresponding practices is not that contiguity acts in one case and resemblance in the other, but that in the former there is simple contagious communication, while there is production and creation in the latter (EF:398-9).

And Durkheim added this footnote: "We say nothing of what has been called the law of opposition, for as Hubert and Mauss (in their "General Theory of Magic") have shown, a contrary produces its opposite only through the intermediary of a similar" (EF:399). Thus, like attracts or produces like; analogy is the mediating principle, the crucial third term between empirical diversity and the all-embracing moral unity of the cosmos.

What ultimately results from these cross-mixings is often a very complex classificatory system, what Levi-Strauss has called a "bricolage," based upon the phenomenological
"science of the concrete." In short, there is a special logic to the elementary forms of human classification, whether these be elaborated by primitive peoples or moderns. The primitive classificatory process, though seemingly idiosyncratic, really does not proceed at random. Nor is it alogical or pre-logical; it is phenomeno-logical. What must be respected here especially is the extraordinary difficulty of building up systems of moral and intellectual classification from scratch. Given their meager cultural resources, the wonder is that primitive societies should have ever been able to construct classificatory systems of such sophistication and general usefulness. Whatever their inadequacies, and these are manifold, one of their undeniable virtues is, as Durkheim emphasized, that they laid the first foundations of our modern epochal achievements in science.

We have seen the facility with which the primitive confuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see one of the causes which has contributed the most to facilitating these confusions. Since religious forces are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening that the same principle animates very different objects equally; it passes from some into others as the result of either a simple material proximity or even of a superficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals, plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men because they bear the name of an animal; the animals because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks because they mark the place where the ceremonies are celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore considered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one single religious principle ought to pass as having the same essence, and as differing from one another only in secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite natural to arrange them in a single category, and to regard them as mere varieties of the same class, transmutable into one another.

When this relation has been established, it makes the phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings in spite of their natural differences? But we have seen that these confusions and participation have played a role of the highest utility in logic; they have served
to bind together things which sensation leaves apart from one another. So it is far from true that contagion, the source of these connections and confusions, is marked with that fundamental irrationality that one is inclined to attribute to it at first. It has opened the way for the scientific explanations of the future (EF: 364-5).

Indeed, Durkheim went so far as to identify the origin of the so-called "law of causality" (force and sequence) with these primitive notions. (We shall later pursue the significance of Durkheim's general assertions here in the following section on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture). It is important to repeat that even though to modern "rationalized" observers these primitive systems of resonating symbolic equations might seem wholly unreasonable and indeed devoid of everything we think of as logic, a veritable superstitious "bricolage," nonetheless, part of Durkheim's lasting achievement here was to emphasize the inner logic of their construction and their evolutionary significance. Elementary classificatory systems are a series of phenomenological projections constructed through the principle of extension of knowledge through analogy. To a certain extent, these systems are "mytho-sociological," as Durkheim said, since collective representations have sacralized the entire field of human experience.
e. **Symbolic Equations and The Legitimate Foundations of Moral and Intellectual Authority of Collectivities**

The construction of systems of moral and intellectual classification through the progressive extension of symbolic equations originally rooted in the sacral/profane opposition of collectivities is well illustrated by Durkheim and Mauss's seminal monograph on *Primitive Classification*. For example, of the phenomenological extension of concrete analogy among the American Zuni Indians, Durkheim and Mauss noted:

> What we find among the Zuni is a veritable arrangement of the universe. All beings and facts in nature, 'the sun, moon, and stars, the sky, earth, and sea, in all their phenomena and elements; and all inanimate objects, as well as plants, animals, and men,' are classed, labeled and assigned to fixed places in a unique and integrated system in which all the parts are coordinated and subordinated one to another by 'degrees of resemblance' (PC:43).

Through progressive extension of analogies, these compounding systems of classification are interwoven more and more tightly; cross-indexed as a librarian might say. Indeed, the degree of complexity, "cross-indexing," and internal consistency might serve as some basic criteria for judging the comparative degree of cultural complexity as represented in the central classificatory system.

In the form in which we now find it, the principle of this system is a division of space into seven regions: north, south, west, east, zenith, nadir, and the center. Everything is assigned to one or another of these seven regions. To mention only the seasons and the elements, the wind, breeze, or air, and the winter season are attributed to the north; water, the spring, and its damp breezes to the west; fire and the summer, to the south; the earth, seeds, the frosts which bring the seeds to maturity and end the year, to the east. The pelican, crane, grouse, sagecock, the evergreenoak, etc. are things of the west. With the east are classed the deer, antelope, turkey, etc. (PC:43-4).

Now, these more or less systematic phenomenological linkages continue to ramify: flora and fauna are linked with specific regions of the sky and seasons of the year, colors are added, as are human virtues and social classes. Indeed,
redundancy serves an important function, as in all systems of communication, for it almost seems as if primitive cultures constantly rotated the symbolic matrix, each time tying in yet another thread in the emerging cosmological fabric. This rotation and redundancy increases "inter-convertibility," as Levi-Strauss observes.

A particular color is attributed to each region and characterizes it. The north is yellow, because, it is said, the light is yellow when the sun rises and sets; the west is blue because of the blue light seen at sunset. The south is red because it is the region of summer and fire, which is red. The east is white because it is the color of the day. The upper regions are streaked with colors like the play of light among the clouds; the lower regions are black like the depths of the earth. As for the center, the navel of the world, representative of all regions, it is all the colors simultaneously (PC: 44).

In addition, men and things form integral parts of the same cosmological system. The emerging symbolic economy thus includes not only the creation of value but also the allocation of symbolic value to all the resources of the world. Natural elements are assigned social functions.

Not only things, but social functions are distributed in this way. The north is the region of force and destruction, thus war and destruction belong to it; to the west, peace and hunting; to the south, the region of heat, agriculture, and medicine; to the east, the region of the sun, magic, and religion; to the upper world and the lower world are assigned diverse combinations of these functions (PC:44).

Noting that "... this division of the world is exactly the same as that of the clans within the pueblo" (PC:44), Durkheim and Mauss argued:

... not only do the divisions of things by regions and the division of society by clans correspond, but they are inextricably interwoven and merged. One may equally well say that things are classified either with the north, south, etc. or with the clans of the north, south, etc. (PC:47).

Contending that we may discover the evolutionary links between the type of classification by clans, seen in Australian totemism, and more complicated systems of classification by quarters, as seen for example in some of the American tribes,
Durkheim and Mauss claimed:

Things were first of all localized by clans and totems. But this strict localization of clans ... necessarily brought with it a corresponding localization of the things attributed to the clans. From the moment that the wolf people, for example, belong to a particular quarter of the camp, the same necessarily applies to the things of all sorts which are classified under this same totem. Consequently, the camp has only to be oriented in a fixed way and all its parts are immediately oriented together with everything, things and people, that they comprise. In other words, all things in nature are henceforth thought of as standing in fixed relationships to equally fixed regions in space (PC:65).

Durkheim and Mauss further observe that this represents that stage of cosmological classificatory system which portrays the "...tribe as a microcosm of the universe," an imago mundi.

Certainly, it is only tribal space which is divided and shared in this way. But just as for the primitive the tribe constitutes all humanity, and as the founding ancestor of the tribe is the father and creator of men, so also the idea of the camp is identified with that of the whole world. The camp is the center of the universe, and the whole universe is concentrated within it. Cosmic space and tribal space are thus only very imperfectly distinguished, and the mind passes from one to the other without difficulty, almost without being aware of doing so. And in this way things are connected with particular quarters (PC:65).

Now, this notion of the camp as the center of the world is a particularly good illustration of what Durkheim and Mauss called the "sociocentrism" of primitive and archaic classificatory systems or cosmologies.

It has quite often been said that man began to conceive things by relating them to himself. The above allows us to see more precisely what this anthropocentrism, which might better be called sociocentrism, consists of. The center of the first schemas of nature is not the individual; it is society. It is this that is objectified, not man. Nothing shows this more clearly than the way in which the Sioux retain the whole universe, in a way, within the limits of tribal space; and we have seen how universal space itself is nothing else than the site occupied by the tribe, only indefinitely extended beyond its real limits. It is by virtue of the same mental disposition that so many peoples have placed the center of the world, "the navel of the earth," in their own political or religious capital, ie. at the place which is
the center of their moral life (PC:86-7).

Now, these insistent symbolic linkages imply consubstantiality—that the same sacred principle inheres in all linked things. They are made of the same "cosmic" substance, and energized by the same basic principle. The problem becomes to orchestrate a harmonious alignment between the two parallel orders. We witness here a most important equational process—the moralization of nature, and the naturalization of man. In this crucial reciprocal interpenetration, as Levi-Strauss observes, world, self, and society grow together in a "solid system all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically."

Men regard the things in their clan as their relatives or associates; they call them their friends and think that they are made out of the same flesh as themselves. Therefore, between the two are elective affinities and quite special relations of agreement. Things and people have a common name, and in a certain way they naturally understand each other and harmonize with one another....

Just as a man who belongs to the Crow clan has within him something of this animal, so the rain, since it is of the same clan and belongs to the same totem, is also necessarily considered as being 'the same thing as a crow'; for the same reason, the moon is a black cockatoo, every blacknut tree a pelican, etc. All the beings arranged in a single clan, whether men, animals, plants or inanimate objects are merely forms of the totemic being....

All are really of the same flesh in the sense that all partake of the nature of the totemic animal (EF:174-5).

These consubstantial linkages continue to ramify as the societies grow more complex, until, as Durkheim and Mauss said of the Chinese Taoist system, "... the whole world is covered like a gnosis or a cabbala." Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss imply here that one of the hidden keys to understanding the growth of cultural complexity comes from the suppleness or differential ease to which the central classificatory matrices of cultures can be progressively applied to encompass the incredible diversity of empirical facts. This differential ability to generalize, to progressively extend, in short, to universalize prime symbolic oppositions, shall prove a critical factor in later sociocultural evolution. Of the complex Taoist
classificatory system, for instance, Durkheim and Mauss noted:

In order to adapt the basic principles of the system to the facts, the divisions and subdivisions of regions and things were ceaselessly multiplied and complicated. The fact is that this classification was intended above all to regulate the conduct of men; and it was able to do so, avoiding the contradictions of experience, thanks to this very complexity (PC:70-1).

Now, it is important to emphasize that such classificatory systems serve not merely cognitive but moral functions as well. This dual aspect of phenomenological process means that such "... classifications (are) intended above all to regulate the conduct of men," or as Levi-Strauss says, "these classifications also carry ethics." We have emphasized throughout this book that structures of conscience and consciousness are always intimately interwoven, but had we drawn the conclusion that the more elementary these systems become, the more the representations also function as reglementations? Thus, as Weber (1963,1968) also saw, primitive magical rites, which are the counterpart of myths, serve eminently practical functions--to ensure long life, reproduction of game or to make crops grow, to cure sickness, repel enemies, etc. It is hardly surprising then that such systems of conscience and consciousness should come to "... govern all details of life."

... a divinatory rite is not generally isolated; it is part of an organized whole. The science of the diviners, therefore, does not form isolated groups of things, but binds these groups to each other. At the basis of a system of divination, there is thus, at least implicitly, a system of classification (PC:77).

For instance, of the rather sophisticated divinatory rites of the Chinese Taoists, Durkheim and Mauss remarked:

This classification of regions, seasons, things, and animal species dominates the whole of Chinese life. It is the very principle of the famous doctrine of feng-shui, and through this it determines the orientation of buildings, the foundations of towns and houses, the siting of tombs and cemeteries; if certain tasks are undertaken here and others there, if certain affairs are conducted at such and such a time, this is due to reasons based on this traditional systematization. And these reasons are not taken only from geomancy; they are also derived from considerations concerning hours, days, months, and years: a certain di-
rection which is favorable at one time becomes unfavorable at another. Forces agree or discord according to season. Thus not only is everything heterogeneous in time, as in space, but the heterogeneous parts of which these two settings are composed correspond, or are opposed, and are arranged, in one system. And all these infinitely numerous elements are combined to determine the genus and the species of things in nature, the direction of movement of forces, and acts which must be performed, thus giving the impression of a philosophy which is at once subtle and naive, rudimentary and refined. Here we have, then, a highly typical case in which collective thought has worked in a reflective and learned way on themes which are clearly primitive (PC:73).

The intimate linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies, therefore, that structures of morality and knowledge will line up in parallel fashion. There is no escaping this attempt at harmonious alignment, for the structures of responsibility are preeminently collective, as Durkheim noted with altruistic and fatalistic suicide. No, change comes here through greater alignment or severing of relations between the microcosm and macrocosm, or between systems of morality and knowledge. Noting that "There is nothing more natural, moreover, than the relation thus expressed between divination and the classification of things," (PC:77), Durkheim and Mauss compared the Chinese system to the Greek:

... the Chinese classification was essentially an instrument of divination. Now the divinatory methods of Greece are remarkably similar to the Chinese, and the similarities denote procedures of the same nature in the way fundamental ideas are classified. The assignment of elements and metals to the planets is a Greek, perhaps Chaldean, fact, as much as a Chinese. Mars is fire, Saturn is water, etc. The relations between certain sorts of events and certain planets, the simultaneous apprehension of space and time, the particular correspondence of a certain kind of undertaking, are found equally in both these different societies.

A still more curious coincidence is that which allows a relationship to be established between Chinese and Greek astrology and physiognomy, and perhaps with the Egyptian. The Greek theory of zodiacal and planetary melothesia, which is thought to be of Egyptian origin, is intended to establish strict correspondence between
certain parts of the body and certain positions of the stars, certain orientations, and certain events. Now in China also there exists a famous doctrine based on the same principle. Each element is related to a cardinal point, a constellation and a particular color, and these different groups of things are thought to correspond, in turn, to diverse kinds of organs, inhabited by souls, to emotions, and to different parts whose reunion forms the 'natural character.' Thus, yang, the male principle of light and sky, has the liver in the viscera, the bladder as mansion, and the ears and sphincters among the orifices. This theory, the generality of which is apparent, is not of mere curiosity value; it implies a certain way of conceiving things. By it, the universe is in fact referred to the individual; things are expressed by it, in a sense, as functions of the living organism; this is really a theory of the microcosm (PC:76-77).

Although some have criticized him for ignoring the body (eg. Victor Turner, 1967; P. Worsley, 1956) or the natural environment, Durkheim did acknowledge, it seems, that primitive and archaic societies did feel compelled to construct parallel alignments between society, the body, and the natural environment, especially the heavens in Mid-Eastern empires. Thus, world, self, and society are all cosmized.

Now, the systems of classification which we call primitive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding together moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a more or less coherent system. Such cosmological classifications are, at one and the same time, moral, intellectual and emotional, for the body, society, and the environment are also used analogically as resonating microcosms of the other. Thus, the analytical dimensions cross-cut knowledge, belief, and action.

The ties which unite things of the same group or different groups to each other are themselves conceived as social ties .... The expressions by which we refer to these relations still have a moral significance; but whereas for us they are hardly more than metaphors, originally they meant what they said. Things of the same class were really considered as relatives of the individuals of the same social group, and consequently of each other. They are of the 'same flesh,' the same family. Logical relations are thus, in a sense, domestic relations (PC:84).

And since domestic relations are rooted primarily in sentiment, it is not surprising that these other (ana)logical relations too should become suffused with social sentiment. In Moral Ed-
ucation, for instance, Durkheim explicitly noted that cognitive representations must not only be moral reglementations, but affect the sentiments as well. The existential is grounded in the essential which then converts the obligatory into the desirable. Such representations must:

... warm the heart and set the will in motion. The point here is not to enrich the mind with some theoretical notion ... but to give it a principle of action, which we must make as effective as necessary and possible. In other words, the representation must have something emotional; it must have the character of sentiment more than a conception. Since, in the long run, one only learns by doing, we must multiply the opportunities in which the sentiments thus communicated to the child can manifest themselves in action. To learn the love of collective life we must live in it, not only in our minds and imaginations, but in reality (ME:229).

Although in *Primitive Classification* Durkheim was tempted to identify the apparent inability of primitive man to form fixed logical concepts with the fused emotion ladenness of these moral-cognitive representations and reglementations, on the same page Durkheim and Mauss also link these sentiments to the authority of the sacral-magical complex. Indeed, it is the obligatoriness, the collectivization of responsibility for disharmonies between the microcosm and the macrocosm, which tends to make such representations and reglementations sacred. And because inviolable, immune to rational criticism and change.

... emotion is naturally refractory to analysis, or at least lends itself uneasily to it, because it is too complex. Above all, when it has a collective origin it defies critical and rational examination. The pressure exerted by the group on each of its members does not permit individuals to judge freely the notions which society itself has elaborated and in which it has placed something of its personality. Such constructs are sacred for individuals (PC:88).

Indeed, it is this infusion of religious or sacred sentiment into the central classificatory paradigms which characterizes the distinctiveness of the archaic cosmological system.

... it is possible to classify other things than concepts, and otherwise than in accordance with the laws of pure understanding. For in order for it to be possible for ideas to be systematically arranged for rea-
sons of sentiment, it is necessary that they should not
be pure ideas, but that they should themselves be pro-
ducts of sentiment.... For those who are called primi-
tives, a species of things is not a simple object of
knowledge, but corresponds above all to a certain senti-
mental attitude. All kinds of affective elements combine
in the representation of it. Religious emotions ... not
only give it a special tinge, but attribute to it the
most essential properties of which it is constituted.
Things are above all sacred or profane, pure or impure,
friends or enemies, favorable or unfavorable; ie. their
most fundamental characteristics are only expressions of
the way in which they affect social sensibilities. The
differences in which they are grouped are more affective
than intellectual (PC:85-6).

Indeed, it is precisely this on-going dialectic between senti-
ment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination and mo-
rality, macrocosm and microcosm, culture and nature, which
marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory systems.

Now, even granting the more or less direct line of con-
tinuity connecting our own day with these elementary forms,
the great gulf remaining between the two is revealed by the
religious affectivity of regions of space in primitive systems.
In contrast to the uniformly neutral, geometric homogeneity
of physical space in modern western thought, primitive cul-
tures have a highly emotionally charged, heterogeneous con-
ception of space.

For us, space is formed of similar parts, which are sub-
stitutable one for the other. We have seen, however,
that for many peoples it is profoundly differentiated
according to regions. This is because each region has
its own affective value. Under the influence of diverse
sentiments, it is connected with a special religious
principle, and consequently it is endowed with virtues
sui generis which distinguishes it from all the others.
And it is this emotional value of notions which plays
the preponderant part in the manner in which ideas are
connected or separated. It is the dominant characteristic
in classification (PC:86).

We see here the stark contrast between the world-views of the
"enchanted garden" and the "world-as-machine."

How did there come to be this great contrast if, indeed,
as Durkheim repeatedly insisted, "there is no gulf between
these stages of mankind"? Since such primitive cosmological
systems are largely built on phenomenological analogies, the
fusion of cognitive, moral and affective categories, socio-centrism, and sacral-magical protocols, modern systems will emerge only where classifications become progressively rooted in abstract "essential" principles which are true by their very nature, in which structures of conscience and consciousness become separated and the latter granted some legitimate institutionalized autonomy, where these categories become detached from their prime or original group status referents, and in which questions of truth and fidelity are resolved primarily by recourse to rational logical and evidential canons rather than by collective recourse to traditional magical praxis. In regard to one of these dimensions, Durkheim and Mauss observed:

... the history of scientific classification is, in the last analysis, the history of the stages by which this element of social affectivity has progressively weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflective thought of individuals (PC:8).

It is important to recognize, moreover, that this evolution does not come about simply through the antagonism of one mode of classification to the other, and the replacement of the former by the latter. Rather, as Benjamin Nelson (1973a) and Edmund Leites (1974) have realized, the passage to modernity comes about through the expansion of structures of fraternization, of universalization, of rationalization, within specific religiously based cultural traditions. Indeed, as they emphasize, conflict over the legitimacy of alternate anchors of moral and intellectual legitimacy, and structures of responsibility, are central to this critical evolutionary passage from "sacral-magical" to "faith" to "rational" structures of conscience and consciousness.

Certainly, one of the most valuable case-studies, all the more profound because it combines Durkheimian and Weberian interpretive perspectives, of a classificatory system in which categories are primarily related to specific group statuses and to the ritual praxis associated with them is Louis Dumont's study of the sacral foundations of Indian social organization in Homo Hierarchicus (1970). In contrast to the...
western notion of social stratification as rooted primarily in economic criteria, Dumont shows how the religious opposition between the pure and the impure serves as the key organizing principle for cultural and structural legitimacy in the Indian caste organization. Following both Nelson and Dumont, Jerome Gittleman offers these valuable observations:

Their description of the persistent authority of sacro-magical structures in the social institution of 'caste' illustrates the immense difficulty of the historical passage from 'sacro-magical' to 'faith' structures of consciousness.

In his essay 'For a Sociology of India,' Louis Dumont points out that Indian culture has the appearance of a sort of 'history museum' in which new culture traits are pulled up, juxtaposed, or sedimented upon the old traits, but do not replace them. Dumont argues that this is due to the hierarchical nature of Indian society which places a premium upon the prestige of status attaching to all things, and not upon their intrinsic functions. In another essay, 'A Structural Definition of a Folk Deity,' Dumont refers to the 'familiar impossibility of universal judgements in India,' which he explains by reference to the prescriptive structures of caste hierarchy: 'In the caste society nothing is true by nature and everything by situation, there are no essences but only relations.' By 'relations' Dumont is referring (in Nelson's language) to the sacro-magical definition of 'situation' prescribed ritualistically for each caste status—a particularistic, rigid, collective praxis which defines the sociocultural spaces allocated to things, cognitions, and acts in terms of a sacro-magical whole. The term 'essences' refers to those cultural universals which would make it possible to describe things in terms of the category 'true by nature' if the sacro-magical rites of collective praxis had not preempted the logical space 'true' (1974:83).

Thus, the failure to break with the sociocentric referent—the lack of cross-cutting social bonds of widening fraternization—and the sacro-magical traditional collective protocols constituted, in Weber's terms, an almost "ineradicable obstacle" to modernization.

Durkheim and Mauss were sensitive to the mechanics of these crucially significant world-historical processes. They well knew both the positive and negative results of the permeation of society and culture by sacral and magical rationales. Evoking echoes of Weber's image of archaic culture as
an "enchanted garden," Durkheim observed in 1912:

The field of religious things extends well beyond the limits within which it seemed to be confined at first. It embraces not only the totemic animals and the human members of the clan, but since no known thing exists that is not classified in a clan and under a totem, there is likewise nothing which does not receive to some degree something of a religious character. When, in the religions which later came into being, the gods properly so-called appear, this one over the sea, that one over the air, another over the harvest or over the fruits, etc., and each of these provinces of nature will be believed to draw what life there is in it from the god upon whom it depends. This division of nature among these different divinities constitutes the conception which these religions give us of the universe. Far from being limited to one or two categories of beings, the domain of totemic religion extends to the final limits of the known universe. Just like the Greek religion, it puts the divine everywhere; the celebrated formula "everything is full of the gods" might equally well serve it as a motto (EF:179-80).

And like Weber, Durkheim noted an important parallel between the evolution of the gods, ethical obligations, structures of conscience and consciousness especially in terms of individuation of responsibility, and the evolution of societies. In sum, as societies develop, so too do their symbolic and prime classificatory systems, especially their notions of gods as symbols of prime potency. But this last is a theme which we must save for the chapter after this on the genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and the person. Having explored in relative detail Durkheim's view of the building of classificatory systems, both moral and cognitive, through the extension of a series of symbolic equations, rooted in religion, which serves to cosmicize the human world and valorize human experience, let us now turn our attention to the final phase of symbolic process. I mean the overcoming of invidious dualisms which have thus been endlessly generated through symbolic transformations. Tension-creating polarities, symbolic equations which extend the polarities, and then unity through symbolic transformations thus constitute the three main phases of symbolic process.
8. Symbolic Transformations: The Positive Communion Rites

Preface. W.H. Stanner (1967) has suggested that the most viable aspect of Durkheim's sociology of religion is his dynamic theory of symbolic process which focussed essentially on cultural operations and transactions concerning value. I generally agree with Stanner, and even Parsons (1973:175) has complimented the former's quasi-Durkheinian efforts in this direction.

Now, as Kenneth Burke has rightly emphasized over the years, the structure of symbolic action is inherently dramatic (or rhetorical and dialectical). As we have discovered using Durkheim's materials, the temporal structure of generic symbolic action reveals at least three basic phases. First, binary polarities introduce a basic tension into human experience; dilemmas energize Everyman. Second, through metaphor and analogy, a whole series of symbolic equations, radiating out from the original opposition, serve to bind together different experiences in a resonating system charged with multiple levels of meaning. The greater the degree of lamination, or multiple linkage of meanings on several levels, the greater the symbolic load, and thus the greater the potency and significance. Third, tension is resolved, and the powers of imagination and will released, through a crucial transformation of the mounting oppositions into a new and higher unity. All human symbolic action thus has an inherently dramatic design. Van Gennep also saw these crucial phases with his three stages of "rites of passage"—separation, transition, and incorporation (or preliminal, liminal, and post-liminal, 1960: eg. 11). In this section we shall investigate the importance of positive communion rites which serve to effect a creative symbolic transformation from the profane to the sacred.

As we proceed, we should recall, for instance, Burke's counsel that "... in the structural analysis of the symbolic act, not only the matter of "what equals what", but also the matter of "from what to what" (1973:38) is important. Burke
offers some basic hermeneutical rules here:

The first step ... requires us to get our equations inductively, by tracing down the interrelationships as revealed by the objective structure of the book itself.... Along with the distinction between opposing principles, we should note the development of from what to what (1973:70-71).

Thus, like Levi-Strauss (eg. in the first volume of his Mythologiques, The Raw and the Cooked, 1969), Burke goes so far as to suggest a notation for these inner relationships: "The two main symbols for charting structural relationships would be the sign for equals (=) and some such sign as the arrow (from \[\rightarrow\] to)" (1973:74). Even though Burke developed his theories separately from Durkheim's influence, Parsons (1973:176) credits the former with great insight into the "... fully mature Durkheimian position developed in The Elementary Forms." While Levi-Strauss's structuralism is rather different from Burke's, clearly both structuralist and dramatistic analysis converge in their common concern with the inner form of symbolic process as a series of self-equilibrating equations and transformations (see also Jean Piaget, Structuralism, 1971). Both perspectives are concerned with the deep constitutive and transformative processes making up the human symbolic economy.

Finally, we would do well to remember here that Durkheim chose to analyze religious phenomena in depth because they represent the most systematic and sophisticated translation of generic symbolic processes into explicit symbolic forms. Religious processes were analytically important, in short, for the light they helped shed on generic symbolic processes. Certainly, as a non-believer, Durkheim did not accredit the truth claims of religions as such; nor do we need to do so here in our review of his epochal discovery and elaboration of the inner structure of generic human symbolic process. Rather, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970) translates theological relationships and terms into their "logological" equivalents, so too we are primarily concerned here with retranslating back religious symbols into their original and constitutive sociocultural equivalents. Thus, we may be jus-
ified, to a certain extent, in considering the two prime religious modes of asceticism and mysticism as serving to transfigure two basic phases of sociocultural process. Just as all religions embody, to a greater or lesser extent, ascetic and mystical modes (see especially Max Weber, 1963, 1968), so too does the generic human symbolic process which religion translates into sacral terms also contain both negative (ascetic) and positive (mystical) phases. Separation and reunification are thus the rhetorical and dialectical phases of all human symbolic processes.

a. Symbolic Metamorphoses: The Sacred and the Profane Are Not Closed to Each Other

While I do not wish to defend Durkheim's hyperbole in regard to the so-called "absoluteness" of the opposition between sacred and profane, I have tried to demonstrate that his rhetorical excesses derived in large part from Durkheim's own symbolic equation of the profane with egoistic and utilitarian economic activity. But contrary to many of Durkheim's critics who were misled by the strident tone of some of his programmatic declarations, Durkheim himself did not treat the contrast between the sacred and the profane as absolute in practice. Therefore, before we explore some of the materials concerning communion rites, we would do well to note that Durkheim observed, in the first section of The Elementary Forms, that symbolic metamorphoses from one category of being to another can and do, indeed must, take place. The sacred and the profane are thus not hermetically sealed boxes from which whole categories of existence can never escape.

This is not equivalent to saying that a being can never pass from one of these worlds into another; but the manner in which this passage is effected, when it takes place, puts into relief the essential duality of the two kingdoms. In fact, it implies a veritable metamorphosis (EF:54).

Now, close exegesis reveals that Durkheim did not treat this basic dichotomy as rigidly or statically as his critics, especially Evans-Pritchard (1965) or Stanner (1967), contend.
As always, Durkheim merely sharpened their opposition in order to heighten the drama of their inevitable resolution, and thus, their inner transformation and reunification. For instance, after emphasizing the universality of the sacred/profane opposition early in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim acknowledged:

This interdiction cannot go so far as to make all communication between the two worlds impossible, for if the profane could in no way enter into relations with the sacred, this latter would be good for nothing (EF:55).

Further, did not Durkheim remark that "... every consecration by means of anointing or washing consists in transferring into a profane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF: 362)? Now, if one looks to the latter phases of Durkheim's treatment of generic symbolic process in his 1912 masterwork, you shall discover that Durkheim did indeed explore the symbolic transformations from one state of being to another. Indeed, Durkheim acknowledged that sacred beings:

... would serve for nothing and have no reason whatsoever for their existence if they could not come in contact with ... worshippers.... There is no positive rite which does not constitute a veritable sacrilege, for a man cannot hold commerce with sacred beings without crossing a barrier which should ordinarily keep them separate (EF:379-80).

For what, indeed, would be the point of separating all that is sacred from all that is profane if there were not some regularly scheduled means of passing from the latter to the former, if there were no way for harmony between micro and macro-cosm to be restored?

It would have been almost impossible for Durkheim to leave that "absolute" and irreconcilable opposition floating in the air, forever incapable of resolution. For the "absoluteness" of this opposition implies an exclusively rhetorical structure to human action. But not only is this unlikely in the nature of symbolic processes, it also ignores the fact that Durkheim, as a master dialectician, always recognized the ever-present desire for reconciliation of tension-filled opposites in a new and creative unity. As Burke constantly reminds us, to separate implies a joining. Diversity implies
unity, "extremes meet" as Coleridge said. No, in the end, there must always be some path which men can take to restore themselves and their troubled worlds to wholeness, to health and well-being. Rites are these mediums of symbolic metamorphoses; rites are collective moral therapeutics.

In addition, Evans-Pritchard (eg. 1965:65) charges Durkheim's basic dichotomy with "situational inflexibility." But, once again, if we set aside Durkheim's rhetorically inspired programmatic declarations, we discover that, in practice, Durkheim did indeed recognize what Van Gennep called the "pivoting of the sacred" around a few central symbolic axes. In the first part of The Elementary Forms did not Durkheim acknowledge that "... it must not be lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and there are some in relation to which a man feels himself relatively at ease" (EF:53)?

It should, first of all, be remembered that at the heart of the sacramental world-view is the implicit declaration that the orders of being are not necessarily closed to one another, and that the exercise of this faith depends especially upon special situational dispensations to ritually ingest a tiny part of the sacred totem.

The profane function of vegetables and even of animals is ordinarily to serve as food; then the sacred character of the totemic animal or plant is shown by the fact that it is forbidden to eat them. It is true that since they are sacred things, they can enter into the composition of certain mystical repasts, and ... sometimes serve as veritable sacraments; yet normally they cannot be used for everyday consumption (EF:150-1).

In addition, it should be recalled that whether or not a sacramalization of the profane or a profanation of the sacred occurs depends upon the proper approach to any communion ritual. Sacrilege occurs when the taboos surrounding the sacred objects are violated; yet there is no sacrilege when the appropriate preparatory steps have been taken. Indeed, even:

... when it is permitted to eat the plant or animal that serves as totem, it is not possible to do so freely; only a little bit may be taken at a time. To go beyond this amount is a ritual fault that has grave consequences (EF:151).
Further, the definition of sacralization and sacrilege are differentiated by degree for different types of people. That is, different roles are granted differential dispensations to approach the sacred objects; this is, of course, the beginning of specialization and differentiation of religious roles.

The old men and those who have attained a high religious dignity are freed from the restrictions under which ordinary men are placed. They can eat the sacred thing because they are sacred themselves; this rule is in no way peculiar to totemism, but it is found in the most diverse religions (EF:152; see also 346, #47).

Now, as there are always exceptions to the rule, Durkheim observed that there are also exceptions to the strict totemic food interdictions. Although Evans-Pritchard charged that Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy was "situationally inflexible," Durkheim did in fact note that practical necessity changed the definition of the sacral situation.

... here also there are exceptions and tolerations ... especially in the case of necessity, when the totem is a dangerous animal, for example, or when the man has nothing to eat. There are certain tribes where men are forbidden to hunt the animals whose name they bear, on their own accounts, but where they may kill them for others. But the way in which this act is generally accomplished clearly indicates that it is something illicit. One excuses himself as though for a fault, and bears witness to the chagrin which he suffers, and the repugnance which he feels, while precautions are taken that the animal may suffer as little as possible (EF:154).

As with the case of King David and his men eating the temple showbreads in time of famine, Durkheim recognized (to borrow a term from Van Gennep) the "pivoting of the sacred" along several symbolic axes. Let us conclude this brief excursus with Van Gennep's unjustifiably overlooked formulation of this important problem.

Characteristically, the presence of the sacred (and the performance of appropriate rites) is variable. Sacredness as an attribute is not absolute; it is brought into play by the nature of particular situations.... The "magic circles" pivot, shifting as a person moves from one place in society to another. The categories and concepts which embody them operate in such a way that whoever passes through the various positions of a lifetime one day sees the sacred where
before he has seen the profane, or vice versa. Such changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society and of the individual, and it is the function of the rites of passage to reduce their normal effects (1960:12-13).

b. The Transition From Negative to Positive Rites

Observing that "The absolute and universal nature of the contrast between the sacred and the profane does not mean that things or beings cannot or do not pass from one sphere to another" (1974:174), Robert Nisbet also rightly notes that the negative or ascetic rites serve merely as a preparatory stage to the passage to the sacred pole of sociocultural life. "Purification rites, as in initiation or eucharistic ceremonies, are the means through which a person or thing passes from the profane state to the sacred" (1974:174). Negative or ascetic rites, as we have seen, serve to demarcate the boundaries between the sacred and the profane, and thus to progressively separate all that which is aligned with the latter from the former.

By definition sacred beings are separated beings. That which characterizes them is that there is a break in continuity between them and the profane beings.... A whole group of rites has the object of realizing this state of separation which is essential. Since their function is to prevent undue mixings and to keep these two domains from encroaching upon the other, they are only able to impose abstentions or negative acts ... taboos or interdictions (EF:337-8).

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's description of the transition from the negative, ascetic rites, to the positive communion rites.

Durkheim himself observed that the whole system of sacramental interdictions, abstentions, purifications, etc. signify a progressive shedding of profane states, and thus serve as the necessary preparation for eventual sacral reunification.

Up to the present, the negative cult has been presented to us only as a system of abstentions. So it seems to serve only to inhibit activity, and not to stimulate it or modify it. And yet, as an unexpected reaction to this inhibitive effect, it is found to exercise a positive action of the highest importance over the religious and moral nature of the individual (EF:348).
We might first recall, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970, 1966) has insisted over the years, that the negative is crucial to human symbolicity. For only through the negative, in the sense of moral commands, is man moralized. Thus, man becomes a moral personality through the negative, through abstention and purification. For the suffering inherent in the negative thrust means that the individual rises above the profane; in other words, culture moralizes nature.

The positive cult is possible only when a man is trained to renouncement, to abnegation, to detachment from self, and consequently to suffering.... It is necessary that he train himself, and it is to this that the ascetic practices tend. So the suffering which they impose is not arbitrary and sterile cruelty; it is a necessary school.... Suffering is the sign that certain of the bonds attaching him to his profane environment are broken; so it testifies that he is partially freed from the environment and, consequently, it is justly considered the instrument of deliverance.... He is stronger than nature because he makes it subside (EF:355).

Indeed, the passage from the profane to the sacred requires a whole series of rites which serve to transform and liberate the moral subject. Van Gennep clearly recognized this with his distinctions between rites of separation (preliminal), transition (liminal), and incorporation (post-liminal). And Durkheim, in his discussion of the sacral origins of property, for instance, provided many insights into the symbolic significance of crossing thresholds and boundaries.

In fact, owing to the barrier which separates the sacred from the profane, a man cannot enter into intimate relations with sacred things except after rid- ding himself of all that is profane in him. He cannot lead a religious life of even a slight intensity unless he commences by withdrawing more or less completely from the temporal life. So the negative cult is in one sense a means in view of an end: it is a condition of access to the positive cult. It does not confine itself to protecting sacred beings from vulgar contact; it acts upon the worshipper himself and modifies his condition positively. The man who has submitted himself to its prescribed interdictions is not the same afterwards as he was before. Before, he was an ordinary being who, for this reason, had to keep at a distance from the religious forces. Afterwards, he is on a more equal footing with them; he has approached the sacred by the very act of leav-
ing the profane; he has purified and sanctified himself by the very act of debasing himself from the base and trivial matters that debased his nature. So the rites confer efficient powers just as well as the positive ones; the first, like the second, can serve to elevate the religious tone of the individual.... No one can engage in a religious ceremony of any importance without first submitting himself to a sort of preliminary initiation which introduces him progressively into the sacred world. Unctions, lustrations, benedictions or any essentially positive operation may be used for this purpose; but the same result may be attained by means of fasts and vigils or retreat and silence, that is to say, by ritual abstinences which are nothing more than certain interdictions put in practice (EF:348).

Indeed, noting that "asceticism ... is an integral part of human culture" (EF:356), Durkheim emphasized the universality of the separation phase as preparatory to the reunification phase.

There is no interdict, the observance of which does not have an ascetic character to a certain degree.... In order to have real asceticism, it is sufficient for these practices to develop in such a way as to become the basis of a veritable scheme of life. Normally the negative cult serves only as an introduction and preparation for the positive cult (EF:350).

Finally, we might recall, as Nisbet (1974) reminds us, that Durkheim considered ascetic suffering as good, for it creates self-discipline, it moralizes the ego. It implies a reordering of the world, the overcoming of nature by culture, a re-establishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great "Yea and Nay" of all things. And as fasting increases our hunger for the "Bread of Life," so privation, abstinence, and suffering increases the tension to consummate the positive pole of sociocultural life.

... abstinences and privations do not come without suffering. We hold to the profane world by all the fibers of our flesh; our senses attach us to it; our life depends upon it. It is not merely the natural theater of our activity; it penetrates us from every side; it is a part of ourselves. So we cannot detach ourselves from it without doing violence to our nature and without painfully wounding our instincts. In other words, the negative cult cannot develop without causing suffering. Pain is one of its necessary conditions (EF:351).
Let us next briefly explore the significance of the "liminal" period (see V. Turner, 1967 especially), seen for example in initiation ceremonies, in which a person's change in social status is portrayed and experienced as a change in being. These are critical transformation points, "watershed moments," when there are "changes of slope" (as Burke suggests) in one's life trajectory. Here, the young initiates are forced to become veritable ascetics for a short while--separated from society, they are forced to undergo various preparatory privations, abstentions, sufferings.

This is what generally takes place at certain critical periods when, for a relatively short time, it is necessary to bring about a grave change of condition in a subject. Then, in order to introduce him more rapidly into the circle of sacred things with which he must be put into contact he is separated violently from the profane world; but this does not come without abstinences, and an exceptional recrudescence of the system of interdicts. Now this is just what happens in Australia at the moment of initiation. In order to transform youth into men, it is necessary to make them live the life of a veritable ascetic. Mrs. Parker very justly calls them the monks of Baime (EF: 351).

Often this passage from a profane to a sacred status, that is initiation into the constitutive cultural mysteries and ranks (see the works of Kenneth Burke), is conceived of as a metamorphosis, a transformation totius substantiae.

... initiation is a long series of ceremonies with the object of introducing the young man into the religious life: for the first time, he leaves the purely profane world where he passed his first infancy, and enters into the world of sacred things. Now this change of state is thought of, not as a simple and regular development of pre-existent germs, but as a transformation totius substantiae, of the whole being. It is said that at this moment the young man dies, that the person that he was ceases to exist, and that another is instantly substituted for it. He is reborn under a new form. Appropriate ceremonies are felt to bring about this death and rebirth.... Does this not prove that between the profane being which he was and the religious being which he becomes, there is a break of continuity (EF:54)?
Later in *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim explored some of the specific privations required of the initiate in various Australian societies.

The neophyte is submitted to a great variety of negative rites. He must withdraw from the society in which his existence has been passed up until then, and from almost all human society. Not only is it forbidden for him to see women and uninitiated persons, but he also goes to live in the brush, far from his fellows, under the direction of some old men, who serve him as godfathers. So very true it is that the forest is considered his natural environment, that in a certain number of tribes, the word with which the initiation is designated signifies "that which is from the forest."

For this same reason, he is frequently decorated with leaves during the ceremonies at which he assists. In this way he passes long months, interspersed from time to time with rites in which he must take a part. This time is a period of all sorts of abstinences for him. A multitude of foods are forbidden him ... he is allowed only that quantity of food which is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of life; he is even sometimes bound to a rigorous fast, or must eat impure foods. When he eats, he must not touch the food with his hands. In some cases, he must go beg for his food. Likewise, he sleeps only as much as is indispensable. He must abstain from talking ... it is by signs that he makes known his needs. He must not wash; sometimes he must not move. He remains stretched out upon the earth, immobile, and without clothing of any sort (EF: 348).

Now, clearly one recurrent image for portraying this change of status and being is the cycle of death and rebirth. As Kenneth Burke says, "The symbolic slaying of an old self is complemented by the emergence of a new self" (1973:39). Very often this death to society, which is as Durkheim observed (eg. EF:55), the extreme logical expression of the ascetic thrust, is signified by withdrawal, segregation, by fasting, going naked, and so forth; in short, by separation from all those activities and ties which constitute the daily ground of prior social and cultural experience.

Now the result of the numerous interdictions is to bring about a radical change of condition for the initiate. Before the initiation, he lived with the women; he was excluded from the cult. After it, he is admitted to the society of men; he takes part in
the rites, and has acquired a sacred character. The metamorphosis is so complete that it is sometimes represented as a second birth. They imagine that the profane person, who was the young man up until then, has died and been carried away by the god of the initiation ... and that quite another individual has taken the place of the one that no longer is. So here we find the very heart of the positive effects of which negative rites are capable (EF:349-50).

Now, the very act of withdrawal from all these social forms and statuses means that the initiate becomes suspended in a "liminal" stage, as Turner (1967) after Van Gennep calls it, which is "betwixt and between." Here, the initiates are conceived of as neither children nor adults, neither living nor dead, and both living and dead, when seen from another aspect, as Turner notes. Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the normal categories. Withdrawal from the ordered social and cultural microcosm of the village, the initiate returns to that undifferentiated pole of experience--the forest, where he sheds his clothes, the marks of his social status, and covers himself with leaves. Quoting Jacob Boehme's aphorism that "In Yea and Nay all things consist," Turner observes:

Liminality may be regarded as the Nay to all positive structural assertions, but as in some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, as a realm of pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise (Turner, 1967: 97). Noting Mary Douglas's (1966) suggestion that "the unclear is the unclean," Turner observes that the initiates "... as a transitional being are considered particularly polluting, since they are neither one thing or another, or maybe both" (1967:97). Only the old men, who are, so to speak, "inoculated" against them because of their own store of sacredness, are allowed commerce with these ambiguously sacred and profane transitional beings.

We are not dealing with structural contradictions when we discuss liminality, but with the essentially unstructured (which is at once destructured and pre-structured) and often the people themselves see this in terms of bringing neophytes into close connection
with the deity or with superhuman power, with what is, in fact, often regarded as the unbounded, the infinite, the limitless. Since neophytes are not only structurally invisible (though physically visible), and ritually polluting, they are very commonly secluded from the realm of culturally defined and ordered states and statuses (1967:98).

We shall briefly explore Durkheim's own perceptions of the inherent ambiguity of sacred forces in the following section.

Since sex distinctions are so important in primitive societies, during the liminal period the initiate is portrayed as sexless, or as androgynous. Turner observes:

... in liminal situations (in kinship dominated societies) neophytes are sometimes symbolically represented as neither being male nor female. They are symbolically either sexless or bisexual, and may be regarded as a kind of human prima materia—as undifferentiated raw material. [For example, in Plato's Symposium] the first humans were androgynes. If the liminal period is seen as an interstructural phase in social dynamics, the symbolism both of androgyny and sexlessness immediately becomes intelligible in sociological terms without the need to import psychological (especially depth-psychological) explanations. Since sex distinctions are important components of structural status, in a structureless realm they do not apply (1967:98-99).

Further, since property is an essential component of the normal social order, the transitional beings must cast away their possessions. Again, for those who would be reborn in a new faith, all religions require a special form of institutionalized poverty, which signifies disengagement from the things of this world. Turner notes:

A further structurally negative characteristic of transitional beings is that they have nothing. They have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellows. Rights over property, goods, and services inhere in positions in the politico-jural structure. Since they do not occupy such positions, neophytes exercise no such rights (1967:98).

The symbolic analogues of the liminal period, in which retreat is preparatory to return (ala Toynbee), are often borrowed from basic organic processes. Turner observes:
... certain liminal processes are regarded as analogous to those of gestation, partuition, and suckling. Undoing, dissolution, decomposition, are accompanied by processes of growth, transformation, and the reformation of old elements into new patterns (1967: 99).

Further, in representations of the ambiguous nature of the transitional period, Turner notes how the principle of symbolic economy utilizes symbols carrying simultaneously several meanings. The greater the multiplicity of meanings, the greater the symbolic load and potency; thus, multivalent symbols are central to representations in this phase.

... logically antithetical processes of death and growth may be represented by the same tokens, for example, by huts and tunnels that are at once tombs and wombs, by lunar symbolism (for the same moon waxes and wanes), by snake symbolism (for the snake appears to die, only to shed its old skin and reappear), by the bear (for the bear "dies" in autumn and is "reborn" in the spring), by nakedness (which is at once the mark of a newborn infant and a corpse prepared for burial), and by innumerable other symbolic formations and actions. This coincidence of opposite processes and notions in a single representation characterizes the peculiar unity of the liminal: that which is neither this nor that, and yet is both (1967:99).

Thus, we see that in the "liminal" period, by its negative thrust, the "wayfarer" is returned to the primal undifferentiated ground of being, what Burke (1966:46) notes has been called, in negative theology, the Urground, or as Boehme termed it, the Unground. Here contact is reestablished with the primal unity, the time before distinction and form emerged. Here men reimmerse themselves in the original generative sources from which men were originally shaped, the primal clay. Again and again (eg. Genesis), we see religions portraying the time before time as formlessness, darkness, a primordial ocean, and so on, in which there is a creation of cosmos from chaos. The primordial act of creation is thus also a separation--the light from darkness, the waters above from the waters below, which signals the emergence of form and finiteness. Durkheim himself observed the importance of this aspect of symbolic process in many primitive creation
... other Australian societies place at the beginning of humanity either strange animals from which men were descended in some unknown way, or mixed beings, half-way between the two kingdoms, or else unformed creatures, hardly representable, deprived of all determined organs, and even of all definite members, and the different parts of whose bodies were hardly outlined. Mythical powers, sometimes conceived under the form of animals, then intervened and made men out of these ambiguous and innumerable beings which Spencer and Gillen say represent "stages in the transformation of animals and plants into human beings." These transformations are represented to us under the form of violent and, as it were, surgical operations. It is under the blow of an axe or, if the operator is a bird, blows of the beak, that the human individual was carved out of this shapeless mass, his mouth opened and his nostrils pierced. Analogous legends are found in America, except that owing to the more highly developed mentality of these peoples, the representations which they employ do not contain confusions so troublesome for the mind. Sometimes it is a legendary personage who, by the act of his power, metamorphosed the animal who gives its name to the clan into a man. Sometimes the myth attempts to explain how, by a series of merely human events and a sort of spontaneous evolution, the animal transforms himself little by little, and finally took on a human form (EF:157-9).

Finally, Turner notes how, as the initiation progresses from the negative to positive aspects and the liminal being is given greater form, the initiate is then introduced to the esoteric mysteries, the constitutive gnosis of the cult. Indeed, it is the communication of these sacra which confers form on the moral subject.

The arcane knowledge or gnosis obtained in the liminal period is felt to change the inmost nature of the neophyte, impressing him as a seal impresses wax, with the characteristics of his new state. It is not a mere acquisition of knowledge, but a change in being.

... Communication of the sacra is the heart of the liminal matter (1967:102).

Indeed, as with Parsons' 1973 suggestions that Durkheim came to conceive the significance of the generic symbolic religious process as equivalent to social DNA, so too does Turner consider the communication of these constitutive sacral symbols as the foundation of the entire culture.
The central cluster of non-logical sacra is then the symbolic template of the whole system of beliefs and values in a given culture, its archetypal paradigm and ultimate measure.... The term archetype denotes in Greek a master stamp or impress, and these sacra, presented with numinous simplicity, stamp into neophytes the basic assumptions of their culture.... The communication of sacra both teaches the neophytes how to think with some degree of abstraction about their cultural milieu and gives them ultimate standards of reference. At the same time, it is believed to change their nature, transform them from one kind of human being into another. It intimately unites man and office. But for a variable while, there was an uncommitted man, an individual rather than a sacral persona, in a sacred community of individuals (1967: 108).

Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's notion of the ambiguity of sacredness.

c. The Ambiguity of the Notion of Sacredness

Not only was Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy not a rigid opposition, but we should also note that Durkheim distinguished between various forms of sacredness itself, the prime constitutive pole of sociocultural life and phenomenological action. Moreover, Durkheim noted how these subdivisions of the sacred pole are not merely antagonistic but, given certain conditions, may be transformed one into the other. Now, perhaps Rudolf Otto's Idea of the Holy is the most famous expression of the duality of the "numinous."

Like Otto, Durkheim noted that the sacred simultaneously attracts and repels us; that we may simultaneously entertain two opposed attitudes toward it--horror and respect, awe and fascination. Such ambivalent sentiments toward the pure and the impure are directed toward those aspects of life endowed with a special potency, with "charisma" as Weber said. As Kenneth Burke notes, "Sacer might be more accurately translated as "untouchable," since the extremely good, the extremely bad, and the extremely powerful are equally "untouchable" (1973:55). In short, Durkheim observed that there were two poles within the sacred segment of culture; and he further
noted that the "sacredly inauspicious", the impure, may be transformed into the pure. When there is a passage from negative to positive status by situational changes, their definitions are transformed by their different meanings in different contexts. As Mary Douglas observes:

Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides the materials of pattern. Order implies restriction ... so disorder by implication is unlimited ... its potential for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though we seek to create order, we do not simply condemn disorder. We recognize that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that it has potentiality. It symbolizes both danger and power. Ritual recognizes the potency of disorder (1966:94).

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's recognition of this important insight, developed most fully by the British anthropologists of religion and ritual, that "formlessness is credited with powers, some dangerous, some good," and Van Gennep's insight that "danger lies in marginal states."

First, it should be recalled that Durkheim's distinction between the sacredly inauspicious and the sacredly auspicious was situationally defined, that is, these two aspects of the sacred pole of symbolic life depended on the specific definition of the situation. For example, only under certain circumstances may a man ingest the totemic animal; without a whole series of preparations, it becomes sacrilege and confers guilt instead of grace. It is a profanation of the sacred when performed "out of turn."

Owing to the contagiousness inherent in all that is sacred, a profane being cannot violate an interdict without having the religious force, to which he has upduly approached, extend itself over him and establish its empire over him. But, as there is an antagonism between them, he becomes dependent upon a hostile power, whose hostility cannot fail to manifest itself in the form of violent reactions which destroy him. This is why sickness or death are considered the natural consequences of transgressions of this sort; and they are consequences which are believed to come by themselves, by a sort of physical necessity. The guilty man feels himself attacked by a force which dominates him and against which he is powerless. Has he eaten the totemic animal? Then he feels it penetrating him and gnawing at his vitals; he lies down on the ground and awaits death (EF:360).
Indeed, Durkheim goes on to remark that "Every profanation implies a consecration":

... but one which is dreadful, both for the subject consecrated and for those who approach him. It is the consequences of this consecration which sanction, in part, the interdict (EF:360).

And Durkheim asks us: "Does not every consecration by means of anointing or washing consist in transferring into a profane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF:362)?

Now, Durkheim repeatedly gives Robertson Smith credit here for having been one of the first to recognize the inherent ambiguity of the notion of sacredness (see, however, Evans-Pritchard, 1965:51-2). This crucial duality or multivalency of sacred energies raises the problem of situational shifts, complex inversions, and transformations of symbolic equations.

One of the greatest services which Robertson Smith has rendered to the science of religions is to have pointed out the ambiguity of the notion of sacredness. Religious forces are of two sorts. Some are beneficent guardians of the physical and moral order, dispensers of life and health and all the qualities which men esteem: this is the case with the totemic principle, spread out in the whole species, the mythical ancestor, the animal-protector, the civilizing heroes, and the tutelar gods of every kind and degree. It matters little whether they are conceived as distinct personalities or as diffused energies; under either form they fulfill the same function and affect the minds of the believers in the same way: the respect which they inspire is mixed with love and gratitude. The things and the persons which are normally connected with them participate in the same sentiments and the same character: these are the holy things and persons. Such are the spots consecrated to the cult, the objects which serve in the regular rites, the priests, the ascetics, etc.

On the other hand, there are evil and impure powers, productive of disorders, causes of death and sickness, instigators of sacrilege. The only sentiments which men have for them are a fear into which horror generally enters. Such are the forces upon which and by which the sorcerer acts, those which arise from corpses or menstrual blood, those freed by every portion of sacred things, etc. The spirits of the dead and malign genii of every sort are their personified forms. Between these two categories of forces and beings, the contrast is as complete and even goes into the most radical antagonism. The good and the salutary powers
repel to a distance these others which deny and contradict them. Therefore the former are forbidden to the latter. Any contact between them is considered the worst of profanations. This is the typical form of those interdicts between sacred things of different species (EF:455-6).

Specifically, Durkheim cited the following illustrations of this principle of the multivalence or ambivalence of sacral energies:

Women during menstruation, and especially at its beginning are impure; so at this moment they are rigorously sequestered; men have no relations with them. Bull roarers and churingas never come near a dead man. A sacrilegious person is excluded from the society of the faithful; access to the cult is forbidden him. Thus, the whole religious life gravitates about two contrary poles between which there is the same opposition as between the pure and the impure, the saint and the sacrilegious, the divine and the diabolic (EF: 455-6).

In addition, Durkheim noted how the representations of sacred forces combine the "divine and the diabolic" in the same moral universe.

There is no physical or moral ugliness, there are no vices or evils which do not have a special divinity. There are gods of theft and trickery, of lust and war, of sickness and of death. Christianity itself ... has been obliged to give the spirit of evil a place in its mythology. Satan is an essential piece of the Christian system; even if he is an impure being, he is not a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and subordinated, it is true, but nevertheless endowed with extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignoring the real society and making abstractions of it, is in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found there, and if in the majority of cases we see the good victorious over the evil, life over death, the powers of light over the powers of darkness, it is because reality is not otherwise. If the relations between these two forces were reversed, life would be impossible; but as a matter of fact, it maintains itself and even tends to develop (EF:468).

Now, Durkheim proceeded to complicate the matter even further by noting that instead of a simple dichotomization between these two inverted halves of the religious life, there is actually a close inner relationship.
But while these two aspects of the religious life oppose one another, there is a close kinship between them. In the first place, both have the same relationship towards profane beings: these must abstain from all contact with impure beings, just as from the most holy things. The former are no less forbidden than the latter; they are withdrawn from circulation alike. This shows that they too are sacred. Of course, the sentiments inspired by the two are not identical: respect is one thing, disgust and horror another. Yet, if the gestures are to be the same in both cases, the sentiments expressed must not differ in nature. And, in fact, there is a horror of religious respect, especially when it is very intense, while the fear inspired by malign powers is generally not without a certain reverential character. The shades by which these two attitudes are differentiated are even so slight sometimes that it is not always easy to say which state of mind the believers actually happen to be in. Among certain Semitic peoples, pork was forbidden, but it was not always known exactly whether this was because it was a pure or an impure thing, and the same may be said of a very large number of alimentary interdictions (EF:456-7).

Sometimes this inner kinship between the dangerously sacred and the auspiciously sacred is revealed by the transformation of one into another through changes in the definition of the situation.

But there is more to said; it frequently happens that an impure thing or an evil power becomes a holy thing or a guardian power, without changing its nature, through a simple modification of external circumstances. We have seen how the soul of a dead man, which is a dreadful principle at first, is transformed into a protecting genius as soon as the mourning is finished. Likewise, the corpse, which begins by inspiring terror and aversion, is later regarded as a venerated relic: funeral anthropagy, which is frequently practiced in the Australian societies, is a proof of this transformation. The totemic animal is the pre-eminently sacred being; but for him who eats its flesh upduely, is a case of death (EF:457).

Now, since the relationship between the symbol and the structure of a situation may shift, so too may the meaning of its positive or negative sacredness. For example, as we have seen, to partake of the totemic animal, as today to eat the eucharistic host, without the proper preparations and special circumstances, almost necessarily implies sacrilege. Indeed, the passage from sacrilege to sacredness depends
largely upon these inner symbolic transformations.

In a general way, the sacrilegious person is merely a profane one who has been infected with a benevolent religious force. This changes its nature in changing its habitat; it defiles rather than sanctifies. The blood issuing from the genital organs of a woman, though it is evidently as impure as that of menstruation, is frequently used as a remedy against sickness. The victim involved in expiatory sacrifices is charged with impurities, for which they have concentrated upon it the sins which were to be expiated. Yet, after it has been slaughtered, its flesh and blood are employed for the most pious uses. [Footnote: Among the Hebrews, for example, they sprinkled the altar with the blood of the expiatory victim; they burned the flesh and used products of this combustion to make water of purification]. On the contrary, though the communion is generally a religious operation whose normal function is to consecrate, it sometimes produces the effects of a sacrilege. In certain cases, the persons who have communicated are forced to flee from one another as from men infected with a plague. One would say that they have become a source of dangerous contamination for one another: the sacred bond which unites them also separates them (EF:457).

Durkheim offers the following cogent summary of his insight into the ambiguity of the sacred:

So the pure and the impure are not two separate classes, but two varieties of the same class, which includes all sacred things. There are two sorts of sacredness, the propitious and the unpropitious, and not only is there no break in continuity between these two opposed forms, but also one object may pass from the one to the other without changing its nature. The pure is made out of the impure, and reciprocally. It is in the possibility of these transmutations that the ambiguity of the sacred consists * (EF:458).

Finally, Durkheim asks: How is it that the powers of evil have the same intensity and contagiousness as the sacred? Criticizing Robertson Smith's non-acknowledgement of these inner transmutations, Durkheim suggests that the key to these inner transformations may be found in the definitional sequence with which they enter into generic sociocultural process. While we need not follow, or even accredit, all the twists and turns of his argument, Durkheim was clearly aware that the sequence, what we might even call the musical pat-
tern (see Levi-Strauss, 1969), of symbolic ritual process is most complex, in which a symbol for one pole may substitute for the other, and the "pure may contaminate while the impure sometimes serves to sanctify" (EF:458). Basically, Durkheim argued from his sociological position that the direction and sequence of religious force may be inverted depending upon the sociocultural circumstances, from something being impure to becoming an instrument of purification.

... the sanctity of a thing is due to the collective sentiment of which it is the object. If, in violation of the interdicts which isolate it, it comes in contact with a profane person, then this same sentiment will spread contagiously to this latter and imprint a special character upon him. But in spreading, it comes into a very different state from the one it was in first. Offended and irritated by the profanation implied in this abusive and unnatural extension, it becomes aggressive and inclined to destructive violences: it tends to avenge itself for the offense suffered. Therefore, the infected subject seems to be filled with a mighty and harmful force which menaces all that approaches him; it is as though he were marked with a stain or blemish. Yet the cause of this blemish is the same psychic state which, in other circumstances, consecrates and sanctifies. But if the anger thus aroused is satisfied by an expiatory rite, it subsides, alleviated; the offended sentiment is appeased and returns to its original state. So it acts once more as it acted in the beginning; instead of contaminating, it sanctifies. As it continues to infect the object to which it is attached, this could never become profane and religiously indifferent again. But the direction of the religious force with which it seems to be filled is inverted: from being impure, it has become pure and and instrument of purification (EF:460).

We should not be surprised that, in the final analysis, Durkheim correlated these two different faces of the sacred with two different aspects of collective well-being and disharmony.

... the two poles of the religious life correspond to the two opposed states through which all social life passes. Between the propitiously sacred and the unpropitiously sacred there is the same contrast as between the states of collective well-being and ill-being. But since both are equally collective, there is, between the mythological constructions symbolizing them, an intimate kinship of nature. The sentiments held in common vary from extreme dejection to extreme joy, from painful irritation to ecstatic enthusiasm; but, in any case,
there is a communion of minds and a mutual comfort resulting from this communion. The fundamental process is always the same; only the circumstances color it differently. So, at bottom, it is the unity and the diversity of social life which make the simultaneous unity and diversity of sacred beings and things* (EF:460).

Let us now finally turn to consider the last stage of generic symbolic process--namely, the reunification of the compounding series of polarities through ritual transformation of opposites into a new and vital synthesis--in terms of Durkheim's description of oblation and totemic commensal sacrifice.

d. The Positive Cult: Oblation and Sacrificial Communion

The final phase of generic symbolic process generally centers on rituals which reconcile opposites, which transform diversity into unity, which restore harmony and wholeness to divided and suffering consciences and consciousnesses. Release and liberation from negative being is achieved through the symbolic mechanism of victimage, which leads to collective reunion. These symbolic transformations often center around mythic or ancestral commemorations, representations of ideal models of perfection and aspiration, oblations and sacrificial offerings, and a kind of sacred commensality which signifies some basic kind of consubstantiality. Durkheim noted:

In the form which it takes when fully constituted, a sacrifice is composed of two essential elements: an act of communion and an act of oblation. The worshipper communes with his god by taking in a sacred food, and at the same time he makes an offering to his god (EF:384).

Now, as we have seen, ascetic separation is always the prelude to mystical reunion, for these are best viewed as simply two basic phases of the same overall symbolic process. Negative or ascetic rites have always served to separate, to prepare the moral subject for the coming metamorphosis. As such, they signify the acknowledgement of guilt, of separation, of privation, which intensifies the tension between the
two poles of life, and thus, which helps propel the to-be reborn subject forward. Without the positive pole, there is no goal, no viable purpose or meaning to the trials of ascetic preparation. This is precisely the cause of the spiritual void so deeply felt in all cultures touched today by ascetic Protestantism. We are left hanging in moral space, as the goal drops out and Utilitarian logics remain. These are truly post-traditional cultures, "beyond belief," beyond hope. But Durkheim clearly noted:

If it (the negative cult) orders the worshipper to flee from the profane world, it is to bring him nearer to the sacred world. Men have never thought that their duties toward religious forces might have been reduced to a simple abstinence from all commerce: they have always believed that they upheld positive and bilateral relations with them (EF:366).

Further, the shedding of the old self is a prerequisite to rebirth. Combining these factors, as Kenneth Burke has observed, we see that the "principle of perfection" (akin to the self-equilibrativeness presumed by structuralists) inherent in symbolic systems necessitates a sacrificial victim on which to displace the collectively incurred guilt. As Burke proposes (eg.1966, 1970, 1973), victimage is expiatory; Christianity, of course, has developed this generic necessity to the highest degree with the representation of Christ as the "Perfect Victim." Burke says: "If action is to be our key term, then drama, if drama, then conflict, if conflict, then victimage" (1966:545). In other words, the collective release provided by sacrificial victimage generally serves as a prelude to some renewed form of communion and freedom. In its essential form this is the dramatic or dialectical structure of human symbolic action.

Now, it is precisely the mediatory function of the sacrificial oblation as a bridge between separated spheres of being which is the final prerequisite for the transformation of the profane into the sacred. Sacrificial victimage is the vehicle for the extension of the moral bond. For example, after reviewing various ceremonies of the Australian
aborigines such as scattering of a certain type of sacred
dust, of letting blood flow from the veins directly onto sa-
cred sites, and so forth, Durkheim noted the importance of
these oblations or sacrificial offerings to the sacred forces:

The interest of this system of rites lies in the fact
that in them we find, in the most elementary form act-
ually known, all the essential principles of a great
religious institution which was destined to become one
of the foundation stones of the positive cult in the
superior religions: this is the institution of sacri-
ifice (EF:377).

Indeed, we know what importance the Durkheimians placed upon
the institution of sacrifice by Hubert and Mauss's great mono-
graph on the subject (1964).

Here, Durkheim again paid homage to what he called Ro-
bertson Smith's revolution in understanding the nature of sac-
rifice (see however Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Throughout The
Elementary Forms Durkheim kept up a running conversation,
partly laudatory and partly critical, with Smith's work.

We know what a revolution the work of Robertson Smith
brought about in the traditional theory of sacrifice. Before him, sacrifice was regarded as a sort of tri-
bute or homage, either obligatory or optional, analo-
gous to that which subjects owe to their princes. Ro-
bertson Smith was the first to remark that this clas-
ic explanation did not account for two essential char-
acteristics of the rite. In the first place, it is a
repast: its substance is food. Secondly, it is a re-
past in which the worshippers who offer it take part,
along with the god to whom it is offered. Certain parts
of the victim are reserved for the divinity; others
are attributed to the sacrificers, who consume them....
Now, in a multitude of societies, meals taken in com-
mon are believed to create a bond of artificial kin-
ship between those who assist at them. In fact, rela-
tives are people who are naturally made of the same
flesh and blood. But food is constantly remaking the
substance of the organism. So a common food may pro-
duce the same effects as a common origin. According
to Smith, sacrificial banquets have the object of ma-
kings the worshipper and his god communicate in the
same flesh, in order to form a bond of kinship between
them. From this point of view, sacrifice takes on a
wholly new aspect. Its essential element is no longer
the act of renouncement which the word sacrifice or-
dinarily expresses; before all, it is an act of ali-
mentary communion (EF:377-78).
But Durkheim, proceeding to criticize Smith on various points, suggested that, for example, the oblations Australian aborigines offered up were part of the complex symbolic web of reciprocity which serve to bond together tribes and their gods. The seasonal cycle of death and rebirth of flora and fauna corresponded to a moral cycle of a crisis of confidence and rebirth of hope in men in the viability of the relationship between gods and men.

... Vegetation dies every year; will it be reborn? Animal species tend to become extinguished by the effect of natural and violent death; will they be renewed at such a time, and in such a way as is proper? Above all, the rain is capricious; there are long periods during which it seems to have disappeared forever. These periodical variations of nature bear witness to the fact that at the corresponding periods, the sacred beings upon whom the plants, animals, rain, etc. depend are themselves passing through grave crisis; so they, too, have their periods of giving way. But men could not regard these spectacles as indifferent spectators. If he is to live, the universal life must continue, and consequently the gods must not die. So he seeks to sustain and aid them; for this, he puts at their service whatever forces he has at his disposition, and mobilizes them for this purpose. The blood flowing in his veins has fecundating virtues; he pours it forth. From the sacred rocks possessed by his clans he takes those germs of life which lie dormant there, and scatters them into space. In a word, he makes oblations. The external and physical crises, moreover, duplicate internal and mental crises which tend toward the same result. Sacred beings exist only when they are represented as such in the mind. When we cease to believe in them, it is as though they did not exist (EF:386).

Pursuing the argument with Smith, Durkheim argued that the reciprocity implied in the continued viability of both gods and human culture demanded that men reverse the flow of energy, and periodically return some of the sacred substance back to the original source from which it was first received. To clarify this reverse flow of energy, Durkheim suggested:

Let us return to the first act of the Intichuma, to the rites destined to assure the fecundity of the animal or vegetable species which serves the clan as totem.
This species is the preeminently sacred thing; in it is incarnated that we have been able to call, by metaphor, the totemic divinity. Yet we have seen that to perpetuate itself it has the need of the aid of men. It is they who disperse the life of the new generation each year; without them, it would never be born. If they stopped celebrating the Intichuma, the sacred beings would disappear from the face of the earth. So in one sense, it is from men that they get their existence; yet in another way, it is from them that men get theirs, for after they have once arrived at maturity, it is from them that men acquire the force needed to support and repair their spiritual beings. Thus, we are able to say that men make their gods, or, at least, make them live; but at the same time, it is from them that they live themselves. So they are regularly guilty of the circle which, according to Smith, is implied in the very idea of a sacrificial tribute: they give to the sacred beings a little of what they receive from them, and they receive from them all that they give (EF:382-3).

Indeed, so necessary and universal is this generic inner reciprocal relationship between constitutive collective symbols and group processes that Durkheim insists that oblation is not a late product of civilization, but an original and continuing generic necessity.

If the sacrificer immolates an animal, it is in order that the living principles within it may be disengaged from the organism and go to nourish the divinity. Likewise, the grains of dust which the Australian detaches from the sacred rock are so many sacred principles which he scatters into space, so that they may go to animate the totemic species and assure its renewal. The gesture with which this scattering is made is also that which normally accompanies offerings.... We have seen that in order to have rain the Kaitish pour water over the altar, with the same end in view. The effusions of blood which are usual in a certain number of Intichuma are veritable oblations. Just as the Arunta or Dieri sprinkle the sacred rock or the totemic design with blood, so it frequently happens that in the more advanced cults, the blood of the sacrificed victim or of the worshipper himself is spilt before or upon the altar. In these cases, it is given to the gods, of whom it is the preferred food; in Australia, it is given to the sacred species (EF:383).

Finally, let us turn our attention to commensal communion. Released from profane or negative status through the mediation of the oblation, the worshippers then turn to celebrate their deliverance by replenishing their sacred energies.
By partaking of the sacred totem, they are mystically transformed into a common flesh and spirit. Commensal celebration creates a new moral bond; spiritual forces are renewed. The cycle which we entered many pages ago is now completed.

... a whole series of preliminary operations, lustrations, unctions, prayers, etc., transform the animal to be immolated into a sacred thing, whose sacredness is subsequently transferred to the worshipper who eats it. The alimentary communion is one of the essential elements of the sacrifice. After the totemic animal has been killed, the Alatunja and the old men solemnly eat it. So they communicate with the sacred principle residing in it and they assimilate it. The only difference we find here is that the animal is naturally sacred while it ordinarily acquires this character artificially in the course of the sacrifice. Moreover, the object of this communion is manifest. Every member of a totemic clan contains a mystic substance within him which is the preeminent part of his being, for his soul is made out of it. From it came whatever powers he has and his social position, for it is this which makes him a person. So he has a vital interest in maintaining it intact, and in keeping it, as far as possible, in a state of perpetual youth. Unfortunately, all forces, even the most spiritual, are used up in the course of time if nothing comes to return to them the energy they lose through the normal working of things; there is a necessity of the first importance here which is the real reason for the positive cult. Therefore, the men of the totem cannot retain their position unless they periodically revivify the totemic principle which is in them; and as they represent this principle in the form of a vegetable or animal, it is to the corresponding animal or vegetable species that they go to demand the supplementary forces needed to renew this and rejuvenate it (EF:378-9).

The civil status and personhood are reaffirmed in the recreation of the moral subject through commensal celebration. And, as we saw before, the rule governing such mystical reunification is "the part is equal to the whole."

A man of the Kangaroo clan believes himself and feels himself a kangaroo; is by this quality that he defines himself; it is this which marks his place in the society. In order to keep it, he takes a little of the flesh of this same animal into his own body from time to time. A small bit is enough, owing to the rule: the part is equal to the whole (EF:379).

The cycle of rebirth completed, let us now rest.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE EVOLUTIONARY TREE OF SOCIOCULTURAL LIFE

The succession of societies cannot be represented as in a single plane; it resembles, rather, a tree with branches extending in diverging directions (R:19).

The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This metaphor served as a logical axis for the classification of forms of human experience and entire social systems. The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant conditions of social and cultural life, while the branches represented different types of society (LaCapra, 1972:12).

Preface. True to the nineteenth century tradition of thought, Durkheim always married evolutionary perspectives with his sociological framework. Biological and evolutionary metaphors were "in the air," and found a ready adherent in the positivist Durkheim. Surely one of his key subterranean metaphors was the "tree of social life." As Giddens (1971a,b,c, 1972a,b) Lukes (1973), Nisbet (1974), and Hinkle (1976), among others, have pointed out, evolutionism permeated all of Durkheim's works. Lukes remarks that "It is interesting to note that Spencer also often used the analogy of a tree to symbolize evolution" (1973:150,#49). Whether it be Durkheim's sociology of religion, knowledge, morality, law, etc., all his special studies were articulated within a genetic and evolutionary framework. Indeed, consideration of the progressive changes from primitive to modern societies constituted both the departure and arrival points of Durkheim's sociology. It is important to emphasize and explore the crucial role played by evolutionary images in his sociological system, for Durkheim is still unfortunately portrayed as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist searching for the generic bases of social order and control. Careful analysis of Durkheim's embrace of evolutionary thinking reveals the
need to distinguish between the following related, but separable, elements: his metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life, his genetic approach and the importance of the primitive sacral complex as the evolutionary womb of society and culture, his methodological notion of a scale of progressive evolutionary types, and his perceptions of general evolutionary processes seen, for example, in the "progressive division of labor," the emergence of abstract, monotheistic religions, and the growth of rational, universalizable thought. Here we shall consider simply the substantive importance of Durkheim's key evolutionary metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life.

As with most great thinkers, Durkheim's preoccupation with progressive changes, especially on the world-historical level, stemmed from deep concern and erudite reflection on the basic forces transforming the society of his own day. Indeed, as Durkheim himself indicated (e.g., see "Les Principes de 1789 et la sociologie," 1900, translated by Tiryakian, 1971, and also in Bellah, 1973), one fruitful way of interpreting the historical significance of his positivist sociology of "moral facts" was as an attempt to institutionalize the central values of the French Revolution. For decades after this still-unresolved tempest, the contending forces continued their bitter national fratricidal quarrels; foremost here were questions of the legitimate grounds of moral authority. Durkheim's systematic study of the evolution of moral facts, and its ultimate pay-off—a positivist or "scientific" morality—served as a powerful intellectual tool justifying the still-to-be institutionalized ideas of the French Revolution and the Franco-Latin "Laic" Positivist Cultural Tradition. From his own special world-historical perspective, Durkheim legitimized this emerging morality as historically necessary. In short, Durkheim's life-work can be viewed as a profound attempt to construct new bases of argument demonstrating the significance and validity of these basic changes, and the emerging Positivist morality.

I submit, therefore, that Durkheim was always centrally
concerned with societal, cultural, and personal evolution. The transition from simple to complex societies, and the individual's changing position within that great historical transformation, constituted one of the central axes of Durkheim's thought. As Benjamin Nelson (1969b, 1972a) along with Giddens, has rightly insisted, Durkheim's sociological outlook was always "processual" through and through; that is, he was centrally concerned with the prime constitutive and transformative processes involved in basic world-historical transformations, especially those on the road to modernity. It is significant that Durkheim and Weber's macro-level concerns converged on this point, for evolutionary thinking was deeply embedded in their work.

Yet, the widely pervasive image of Durkheim as a "static" thinker remains strong today. Why? An eye for irony would help here, for the simple truth of the matter is this: he who first helped rescue Durkheim also distorted his doctrine in the very same process! I refer, of course, to Talcott Parsons in his magisterial *The Structure of Social Action*. Recognition of Parsons' enormous influence in this regard is a prerequisite to understanding the curious fate of Durkheim's doctrine in American sociology (see especially R. Hinkle, 1960). While Parsons must be granted his full due for the originality and profundity of his heroic rescue of Durkheim from the ignominious clutches of the radical empiricists and reductionists, nonetheless, Parsons must also assume responsibility for letting his own drama shunt aside the real underlying evolutionary structure of Durkheim's system. Perhaps one of the first keys to Parsons simultaneous "rescue" and subsequent distortion emerges from the famous assertion early in his treatment of Durkheim in *The Structure of Social Action*: "Durkheim was almost wholly concerned with ... "social statics." The problem of order is Durkheim's central problem from an early stage" (1949: 307). Although he admitted that Durkheim's first major work, *The Division of Labor in Society*, was "ostensibly a study of social differentiation," Parsons largely ignored his crucial evolutionary matrix. In addition, Parsons generally
devalued the importance of The Division of Labor in Durkheim's intellectual development; he especially slighted Durkheim's theoretical insistence on the important role played by social morphological changes underlying societal differentiation. Parsons suggested that these factors merely represented "dead-ends" in Durkheim's theoretical development. Similarly, Parsons largely ignored Durkheim's crucial underlying evolutionary perspective in his works dealing with the development of religion, morality, law, logical thought, science, the family, and so on. Parsons persisted throughout his discussion of the rest of Durkheim's sociological work in portraying him as he would have liked him to be--namely, an abstracted, static theorist, perplexed by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma" and searching, as Parsons himself did, for the generic bases of social order and control. I must insist, however, that real progress in understanding the potential significance of Durkheim's work for the human sciences cannot come until this wholly misleading image of Durkheim is finally set aside.

Recently, some perceptive observers have begun to raise serious questions concerning the Parsonian orthodoxy on Durkheim's supposed aversion to change and historical thinking. Anthony Giddens, for example, has pointedly and repeatedly criticized Parsons on precisely this matter. Far from the "problem of order" having been "Durkheim's central problem from an early stage," it can perfectly well be said that it was not a problem for Durkheim at all. The central issue informing his writings was that of change ... he was preoccupied with the confrontation between the dissolving "traditional" and the emergent "modern" type (1972a:41).

Even the oblique refutation of Parsonian orthodoxy by one of his own proteges, I mean Robert Bellah in his excellent article "Durkheim and History" (1959), has not overcome the popular misportrayal of Durkheim as a static, abstracted theorist. Nor has Parsons himself, even in his recent turn toward evolutionary theory, yet given Durkheim his just due as one of the great world-historical thinkers. And although Parsons recently admitted (1973:157), in an isolated comment, that Durk-
heimm must, indeed, he considered an evolutionary thinker, he has as yet done little to restore Durkheim's name to the first rank of world-historical thinkers, along with Weber and other pioneers of modern social science.

A. The Tree of Sociocultural Life as a Metaphor of Multilineal Evolution

As we shall soon discover, one of the major underlying reasons why Durkheim formulated this metaphor was to absolve himself of the typical charges against the simple unilinear, progressive evolutionary schemas characteristic of many nineteenth century thinkers. For example, Durkheim repeatedly criticized Comte for treating the progressive evolution of "mankind-in-general" as the subject matter of sociology (see especially The Rules of Sociological Method). Indeed, one of Durkheim's reasons behind his embrace of the metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life was to graphically portray the potentially manifold lines take in societal evolution. The growth of differentiated complexity was never simple nor uniform; therefore, the image of the tree of social life was meant to convey recognition of progressive as well as static or regressive evolutionary lines, and as we shall soon see, of evolutionary survivals as well as the leading edge of progressive evolution. As always, the philosopher in Durkheim sought to reconcile historical diversity with generic unity. Durkheim's image of the manifold lines taken by general evolutionary processes needs to be emphasized, I repeat, for, on the contrary, even among those who grudgingly recognize Durkheim's evolutionism, many persist in portraying him as a rather typical, unilinear social evolutionist. While Durkheim took over the evolutionism of the nineteenth century--the very leit-motif of the time--he did so critically; and thus he must be ranked, albeit tardily, as one of the pioneers of multilineal evolutionary theory.

Although most readers, if not too deeply under Parsons lingering spell, now recognize the crucial role of genetic-
evolutionary perspectives in Durkheim's work, until recently one of his guiding metaphors remained submerged, largely hidden from public view. Among the few secondary interpreters who must be given credit for having recognized the existence of Durkheim's metaphor (e.g. Alpert, 1939:197; J.A. Barnes, 1966:161; Wallwork, 1972:42; Lukes, 1973:149-50, 281 #27), most neglected to develop its general significance within Durkheim's system. In view of the typical ironies involved in the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974), it is not surprising that one of the first observers to move the metaphor of the tree of social life to center stage of Durkheim's system is both young and a relative outsider to the field of sociology. Given, however, his background as a historian, it is perhaps understandable that Dominick LaCapra has been the first, so far as I know, to repeatedly emphasize the potency of Durkheim's evolutionary metaphor within his doctrine.

The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This metaphor served as a logical axis for the classification of forms of human experience and entire social systems. The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant conditions of social and cultural life, while the branches represented different types of society (1972:12).

LaCapra rightly emphasizes that Durkheim's metaphor combined, in one and the same image, both evolutionary continuity (the roots and the trunk), and discontinuity and diversity (the branches and fruits). LaCapra suggests the derivation of these notions in this manner:

In his guiding model of the tree of sociocultural life, Durkheim combined a flexible theory of invariance with a notion of different "social species" or types. His conception of the common trunk and its relation to archaic societies owed much to Rousseau. His idea of typological branches and its relation to history derived in large part from Saint-Simon (1972:195).

Now, perhaps one of the main reasons why so many observers have had difficulty spotting this seminal metaphor in Durkheim's sociological system is due to its very ubiquity-ness. For while Durkheim explicitly formulated it, its perva-
sive influence can be seen almost everywhere beneath the surface. The almost wholly implicit status of a key image, metaphor, or assumption is certainly not unusual; often it is the rule rather than the exception. Many people feel no need to spell out what they take to be obvious, and, of course, as philosophers have often remarked, this is precisely the problem. Indeed, much of the potency of subterranean metaphors in linking diverse phenomena would be lost if they were constantly subjected to conscious and critical review. Whether specifically correct or not, it is precisely this implicit connotational load or metaphorical "penumbra" which often extends our imagination, and leads us in new directions and to crucial insights (see especially N.R. Campbell, 1920; N.R. Hanson, 1958; M. Hesse, 1963; T.S. Kuhn, 1970).

However, at certain points Durkheim's guiding metaphor did indeed surface to meet the reflective light of day. One of the earliest statements can be found, appropriately enough, in Durkheim's "Cours de science sociale: Leçon d'overture" published in the Revue Internationale de l'enseignement in 1883. Noting that Durkheim rejected the conception of unilinear evolution implied in Comte's famous law of the three stages, LaCapra provides the following translation:

Whatever Pascal may have said—and Comte mistakenly took up his celebrated formula—mankind cannot be compared to a man who, having lived through all past centuries, still subsists. Rather, humanity resembles an immense family whose different branches, which have increasingly diverged from one another, have become little by little detached from the common trunk to live their own lives. Besides, what assurance is there that this common trunk ever existed (1972:195)?

Again, in an important footnote halfway through his most explicitly evolutionary book, The Division of Labor, Durkheim characteristically reflects:

In speaking of one social type as being more advanced than another, we do not mean to suggest that the different social types are stages in one and the same ascending linear series, more or less elevated according to their historical places. It is, rather, certain that, if the genealogical table of social types could be completely drawn up, it would resemble a tufted tree, with
a single trunk, to be sure, but with diverging branches. However, in spite of this tendency, the distance between the two types is measurable; they are higher or lower. Surely we have the right to say of a type that it is above another when it began with the form of the latter and yet has gone above it. Such is certainly the case with a more elevated branch or bough (DL:141-2, #21).

Indeed, close scrutiny of this passage reveals that Durkheim took the time to explicitly state his subterranean metaphor in order to absolve himself of unfounded charges of "unilinear evolution." The explanations Durkheim himself offered for this metaphor reveals that his intention behind this image was not merely to indicate evolution, but to portray progressive evolution in terms of a multilinear matrix, including regressive as well as leading lines.

The same image, repeated in Durkheim's neglected article "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (1901; see Tiryakian, 1964, and Jones and Scull, 1973), makes it clear that the metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life was intended to combine, in one root image, both evolutionary continuity and discontinuity.

It is relatively easy to determine whether one social type is more or less advanced than another: one has only to see whether they are more or less complex, and as to the extent of similar composition, whether they are more or less organized. This hierarchy of social types, moreover, does not imply that the succession of societies takes on a unilinear form; on the contrary, it is certain that the sequence must rather be thought of as a tree with many branches all diverging in greater or lesser degree. But, on this tree, societies are found at differing heights, and are found at differing distances from the common trunk. It is on this condition that one looks at it in this way that one may talk in terms of a general evolution of societies (Jones & Scull, 1973:285-6).

In contrast to the simple varities abounding in his own day, Durkheim's own evolutionary perspective was more subtle and multilinear at its very heart. For although the tree of social life can have only one trunk, it has many branches reaching in different directions, and perhaps even incomparable fruits, issuing from many cross-fertilizations and unique graftings. Thus did Durkheim seek to reconcile historical diversity and essential sociocultural unity.
B. Multilineal Evolution, SocioCultural Sedimentation, and Evolutionary Survivals

All historical explanations must struggle with the problem of assigning ratios to evolutionary continuity and discontinuity. In terms of this basic problem, Durkheim's key metaphor of the tree of social life carried two different, though related, meanings. The first and most explicit connotation, the genetic evolutionary sense of the metaphor, conveyed the image of a progressive mainline of societal evolution. The second and more implicit connotation conjured up the image of different evolutionary strata layered and sedimented together in a new working sociocultural complex. The first sense of Durkheim's metaphor focused attention on the macro-level, on the leading edge of evolutionary progress, while the second sense reminds us, on the micro-societal level, of the continuing role played in contemporary society by certain sociocultural survivals held over from earlier periods and types. Thus, the duality of his metaphor implied that societal evolution could be compared to the tree of social life in a number of senses, for not only are contemporary societies based upon the progressive achievements of the present in overcoming the past, but some of the past continues to live on underneath the present.

Put another way, Durkheim's metaphor conveyed the dual sense of evolutionary stages and types on the one hand, and evolutionary survivals on the other. The first implies direct continuity with by-gone days. Yet both meanings, simultaneously opposed and related, were bound up with Durkheim's same guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life. Since this dual aspect of Durkheim's evolutionary thinking has been little noted, let us now briefly explore this fruitful ambiguity, especially in regard to the second sense of survivals or evolutionary holdovers from primitive or archaic societies once thought to be wholly passed over by the leading edge of progressive evolution.
Now, one finds references to various sorts of historical holdovers scattered throughout Durkheim's work. For example, in *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim spoke of folklore as "... the debris of passed religions, unorganized survivals" and offers the examples of "... celebrations of May Day, the summer solstice or the carnival, beliefs relative to genii, local demons, etc." (*EF*:51; see also 57). Moreover, Durkheim observed that certain traces of primitive totemism can be discovered even in the modern world.

Though no visible traces of collective totemism remain in civilized countries, the idea that there is a connection between each individual and some animal, plant, or other object, is at the bottom of many customs still observable in many European societies. (Footnote: Thus at the birth of a child, a tree is planted which is cared for piously; for it is believed that its fate and the child's are united) (*EF*:191).

Further, in *Primitive Classification*, at the very end, Durkheim and Mauss insist that the primitive sacral foundations of logical thought continue to this very day.

But it is not the case that these remote influences which we have just studied have ceased to be felt today. They have left behind them an effect which survives and which is always present; it is the very cadre of all classification, it is the ensemble of mental habits by virtue of which we conceive things and facts in the form of coordinated or hierarchized groups (*PC*:88).

Now, although some who persist in viewing Durkheim only as a anti-traditionalist positivist might think it strange, those who wish to grasp the full complexity and profundity of Durkheim's thought will not be surprised to discover that he suggested that it is well that "... the past persists beneath the surface of the present, even when they are at variance" (*PECM*:174). Although he stood for the future against the "repressiveness" of the past, nonetheless, Durkheim realistically recognized that the present, past, and future cannot always stand at war. Indeed, in contrast to those who railed against the historical indecency of "irrational survivals," Durkheim counseled: "Every social structure is full of these paradoxes" (*PECM*:174). So strong was this seemingly paradoxical convict-
ion, that Durkheim proposed at the end of his profound lectures "Physique des moeurs et du droit" that "Old institutions never disappear entirely; they only pass into the background and fade away by degrees" (PECM:217).

Durkheim evaluated the continuing importance of evolutionary survivals in a number of different ways—those that are non-functional or functional only as a transition from old to new structures, and those that become functional in certain ways because they become traditional. It is difficult, of course, to discriminate among these various shades and grades of continuing functional importance; further, it must be noted that other sedimented modes of survival and transformation are possible than those explicated here. In the first sense, and perhaps the most predictable way as a positivist interested in overcoming the tenacious clutches of the past, Durkheim insisted that certain sociocultural traits lingering on from earlier societies no longer were appropriate to the changed structures of modern societies. Several types of examples could be offered, but Durkheim's critique of the legal institution of inheritance is representative:

We have seen that inheritance ab intestat, a survival of the old right of family joint ownership, is today an archaic survival and without justification. It no longer corresponds to anything in our ethics, and could be abolished without disturbing the moral structure of our societies in any way (PECM:216).

Now, it was precisely these difficult distinctions between sociocultural forms that are to be judged as "archaic survivals" no longer corresponding to the present or emerging structure of modern societies, from those elements that are judged as still functional that underlies Durkheim's positivist attempt to build a new morality in terms of systematic evolutionary distinctions between "normal" and "pathological" social phenomena. Indeed, it is a common refrain in Durkheim, especially as he argued against traditionalists, that it is vain and useless to attempt to resuscitate or preserve the past beyond its appointed hour.

Nonetheless, it is the same Durkheim who next argued,
in an almost imperceptible shift, that evolutionary survivals may serve an important transitional function in the progressive move from the old to new structures. For example, Durkheim's image of the tree of sociocultural life led him, in terms of his genetic investigations into the primitive roots of the legal notion of property, to conclude that its communal origins continue in various forms even today: "Since communal property is the stock from which the other forms sprang, we find traces of it in their structure as a whole" (PECM:168). Now, although this image of survivals from earlier times led Durkheim to declare that these continuities with the communal origin of property (e.g. in legal inheritance) are archaic and do not fit the contemporary social structure and individualist achievement ethos of modern society, nevertheless, he also suggested that these earlier forms served as important transitional links between one notion of property and its successor.

Inheritance is therefore bound up with archaic concepts and practices that have no part in our present-day ethics. It is true that this fact alone does not warrant our thinking it is bound to disappear. We sometimes have to keep such survivals, where they are needed. The past persists beneath the present, even when they are at variance. Every social structure is full of these paradoxes. We can do nothing to cancel what has been—the past is a reality and not to be done away with. The earliest forms of society have provided a foundation for the most recent: it often occurs that a continuity of some sort has been kept up whereby the older forms in part are preserved to nourish the newer (PECM:174-5).

Here we see Durkheim employing both senses of his metaphor, for such survivals, though "archaic" remnants of the past, not only played an important transitional role, but also because the past lives on in attenuated form "beneath the surface of the present." Durkheim concluded, in regard to the same question of the proper role of the continuity of the communal basis of property, that:

The old institutions never disappear entirely; they only pass into the background, and fade away by degrees. This one has played too great a role in history for it to be conceivable that nothing of it should survive. It would only survive, however, in a weakened form (PECM:217).
Indeed, Durkheim's passion for paradox, surpassed perhaps only by Weber, led him, again and again, to insist that "life is made of contradictions," that we cannot wholly extirpate the past, just as the future cannot be seized immediately. For example, in relation to the question of the continuation of the altruistic type of morality appropriate to primitive social solidarity in the isolated modern structural context of the army, Durkheim observed:

... the suicide of lower societies, in survival among us because the military morality itself is in certain respects a survival of primitive morality. (Footnote: ... which does not mean that it is destined to disappear forthwith. These survivals have their own bases for existence, and it is natural for some of the past to remain in the midst of the present. Life is made of these contradictions) (S:238).

Finally, Durkheim explored, in passing, the other main possibility that certain historical holdovers, because of their traditional status, continue to play a role of certain significance in maintaining contemporary sociocultural equilibrium. Durkheim cited, for example, the survival of certain food taboos, dating back at least to the Pentateuch, among the strict adherents of Judaic Law. Such religious interdictions, having lost much or all of their original reason for being, come to be identified with the Judaic religion as a special "way of life." Though of primitive tribal totemistic origin, yet, Durkheim noted, "it becomes necessary that they persist, in spite of their irrationality."

Just as the individual type, the collective type is formed from very diverse causes and even from fortuitous combinations. Produced through historical development, it carries the work of circumstances of every kind which society has gone through in its history. It would be miraculous, then, if everything there were adjusted to some useful end.... There are some of them remaining without any use, and those whose services are most incontestable often have an intensity which has no relation to their utility, because it comes to them, in part, from other causes. The case is the same with collective passions. All the acts which offend them are not dangerous in themselves, or, at least, are not as they are made out to be. But, the reprobation of which these acts are the object still has reason for existing, whatever the origins of the sentiments involved, once they are made of a collective type, and especial-
ly if they are essential elements, everything which contributes to disturb them, at the same time disturbs social cohesion and compromises society. It was not at all useful for them to be born, but once they have endured, it becomes necessary that they persist in spite of their irrationality.... Of course, reasoning in the abstract, we may well show that there is no reason for a society to forbid the eating of such and such a meat, in itself offensive. But once the horror of this has become an integral part of the common conscience, it cannot disappear without a social link being broken, and this is what sane consciences obscurely feel (DL:106-7).

Besides describing the processes of sedimentation of old and new cultural elements into a new working sociocultural complex, Durkheim's profound observations make it clear that such vital links with the past, though changed from their original function, take on new integrative significance as symbolizing the very identity of the group itself; that is, they become true "collective representations." This can only happen because social and cultural life is historically constructed and sedimented. In sum, Durkheim's image of the growth and decline of various types of social life is really rather complex--old elements that no longer correspond to current necessities can and must give way, new elements constantly emerge; yet in the process older elements may change in their prime functions and gradually take on wholly different and perhaps even more important roles in the continuation and extension of the inherited and constantly reconstructed sociocultural complex.

As might be expected, however, lest Durkheim the positivist find his larger intentions misrepresented by his realistic attitudes toward historical complexities, he took pains to absolve himself in the following footnote of potential mis-casting as a conservative or closet traditionalist.

That does not mean that it is necessary to conserve a penal rule because, at some given moment, it corresponded to some collective sentiment. It has a raison d'être only if this latter is living and energetic. If it has disappeared or been enfeebled, nothing is vainer or worse than trying to keep it alive artificially, or by force. It can even be that it was necessary to combat a practice which was common, but is no longer so, and opposes the establishment of new
and necessary practices. But we need not enter into this casuitical problem (DL:107-8, #45).

But Durkheim's rhetorical device here of dismissing potential inconsistencies in his own doctrine as mere "casuitical problems" will not suffice. For it is precisely these ticklish dilemmas which generate so much of Durkheim's troubles in attempting to systematically distinguish between "normalities" and "pathologies" in relation to a series of evolutionary types. Indeed, it is no accident that LaCapra's attention was usurped by these implications, since he always added "normality" and "pathology" as the companion keys, along with the metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life, to comprehending the foundations of Durkheim's sociology.

But, in any case, whatever the problems Durkheim generated for himself in other parts of his system, it should be remembered that they came from a profound thinker's wrestlings with the eternal problems of historical diversity and generic unity. That Durkheim could so intimately intertwine past and present, progressive and evolutionary lines, historical holdovers and contemporary changes, in short, unity and diversity, in one potent and resonating image of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life, is added testimony to his dialectical genius.
CHAPTER SIX
THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX:
WOMB OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE

[In the beginning] religion comprises all, extends to all. It contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs properly religious, morality, law, the principles of political organization, and even science. Religion ... regulated the details of private life (DL:135).

In primitive societies, criminal law is religious law.... Offenses against the gods are offenses against society (DL:92).

... All laws come from the divinity; to violate them is to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins which must be expiated (DL:139).

If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything; everything social is religious, the two words are synonymous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, and constitute themselves apart (DL:169).

Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement that religion is the most primitive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of collective activity--law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc. have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. In the beginning, everything is religious [1897](in Giddens, 1972a:161).

Religion contains within itself from the very beginning, even if in an undistinct state, all the elements which in dissociating themselves from it, articulating themselves, and combining with one another in a thousand ways, have given rise to the various manifestations of collective life. From myths and legends have issued forth science and poetry; from religious ornamentations and cults have come the plastic arts; from ritual practice were born law and morals. One cannot understand our perception of the world, of immortality, of life, if one does not know the religious beliefs which are their primordial forms. Kinship started as an essentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift, and homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual, communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on....
A great many problems change their aspects completely as soon as their connections with the sociology of religion are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tracing these connections [1899](1960:350-51).

It is through a religion that we are able to trace the structure of a society, the stage of unity it has reached, and the degree of cohesion of its parts, besides the expanse of the area it inhabits (PECM:160).

Religions are the primitive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history. They are in the social order what sensation is in the individual (PECM:160).

Durkheim was interested to discover in ... primitive religion that undifferentiated whole from which the elements of society gradually differentiated.... With the example of the Australian clan and its religious life, he undertook to analyze the social analogue of the unicellular organism, the basic structural type from which all the other social structures have differentiated (Bellah, 1959:456).

Religion ... constitutes the fount from which all other institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society. One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ultimate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the prototype, and ultimate source, of all conduct (Poggi, 1971:253).

In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed he had found the seeds of all later developments of the human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that the original source of logical thought lies in the collectivity, and that religion was the first seat of collective consciousness. He held that science and philosophy, the crowning achievements of reason, also have their genesis in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man first conceived of things being related to one another internally; it is through religion that men first grasped the unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm of the sacred embraces both the physical and the social world; religious forces provide the nexus between things which to the senses appear discrete and unconnected. Once man began to think that what appears dissimilar to his senses may have an internal unity, science and philosophy become possible.... In brief, the dual aspects of religious forces--their physical and moral aspects--made religion the matrix from which the main seeds of civilization developed (Tiryakian, 1962:41-2).

[Durkheim's] ... historical studies pointed out that all social institutions develop from a common sphere of life which is the fountainhead, the primordial institution of all human societies (Tiryakian, 1964:250).
The fundamental categories of thought and ... science are of religious origin.... Up until a relatively advanced moment of evolution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions.... Nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion (EF:466).

Religion is the womb from which come all the leading germs of human civilization (EF:255).

Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even scientific thought were born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit (EF:87).

Between the logic of religious thought and that of scientific thought there is no abyss (EF:271).

We have shown ... that the most essential ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type and form, force and causality, and personality--those, in short, to which philosophers have given the name of 'categories,' and which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated within the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages in the intellectual life of mankind [1913] (in Giddens, 1972a:248).

Preface. "In the beginning," Emile Durkheim observed, "religion comprises all, extends to all" (DL:135). Throughout his career, Durkheim suggested that "the elementary forms of religious life" served as the original and prime matrix out of which all the other major cultural forms emerged. Durkheim discovered that originally "religion pervaded the whole social life" (DL:141); religion, society, culture, and the individual were fused together in what I shall call the "primitive sacral complex," or, for short, the "sacral womb." The primitive or elementary sacral complex served as the prime evolutionary womb of society and culture, as the original and fundamental ground of civilizational process. "Religion is the womb from which come all the leading germs of civilization" (EF:255). Indeed, Durkheim's special sociologies--his studies of religion, morality, law, logic and science, anomie, education, the family, and so forth--all were anchored in the notion of the primitive sacral complex as their prime genetic matrix.
I submit that the full significance of Durkheim's guiding paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the prime evolutionary womb of society, culture, and person still awaits rediscovery as a fundamental interpretive strategy in the human sciences. Moreover, Durkheim's forgotten seminal paradigm represents a needed complement and reinforcement for the work of the other pioneering architect of the sociology of religion--I mean Max Weber. This convergence of theoretical and evolutionary perspectives represents a most promising synthesis in the comparative and historical sociology of religion and culture (eg. see B. Nelson, 1973a).

Now, as we discovered in Chapter Four, Durkheim saw man in generic terms as homo religiosus. Man is the sociocultural animal who makes and remakes himself through the genetic medium of collective symbolic process. Thus, human society itself originates primarily through the creative medium of symbolic ritual. Collective ritual overcomes the egoism inherent in human nature, and by gathering people together and focussing social energies in a kind of moral implosion, generates the first symbolic form of collective self-consciousness. "Symbolism is 'necessary if society is to become conscious of itself' and 'no less indispensable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness;' indeed, 'social life in all its aspects and in every period of its history is made possible only by a vast symbolism' " (Lukes, 1973:472). Further, when human sentiments reach a high degree of intensity, they take on a religious aspect, that is, they become objects of obligatory respect, founts of moral authority, of legitimacy, of "sacredness." Through the creation of a public symbolic process, embodied in what Nelson (1973a) terms a "sacro-magical collective conscience,' we witness the awakening of the phenomenological anchors of collective symbolism (culture)--namely, conscience and consciousness, and thus, in turn, the creation of the person.

Two prime characteristics of the emergence of these elementary cultural forms are that they are: (a) socio-centric in terms of reference and, at the same time, (b) governed by sacro-magical rationales and practices. This means that structures of
conscience and consciousness, of prime rules and meanings, are simultaneously centered around social forms and permeated by religious rationales and magical rites. In sum, the collective foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority are grounded in the group and its religion; one might say that they are "fused" together. This is the basis of Mauss's famous notion of the sociological task as seeking out "total social facts" (eg. 1967). Here, we shall turn our attention to the high degree of fusion between these prime characteristics of early cultures.

But, since our focus has now shifted from generic to genetic-evolutionary perspectives, we shall also be concerned with the historical significance of the primitive sacral complex in which we may discover two opposed meanings. For the double historical significance of the sacral complex is that it both served as the creative womb of human culture and an obstacle to progressive cultural evolution. First, as a creative womb, Durkheim suggested that all the major cultural forms, and even the notion of the person, are originally sacral creations. "The most essential ideas of the human mind ... were elaborated within the very center of religion" (in Giddens, 1972a:248). For behind the elementary phenomenologies or concrete ana-logics of mythical and ritual processes, Durkheim professed to discover the "contagiousness" of what might be called "sacred electricity" as the unifying principle of primitive cosmologies and ethical systems. What sensory experience separated, religion bound together (as in the root meaning of "re-ligare"). Without the "essentialism" provided by the invisible world, which cuts across all empirically separate domains, neither logic, nor the person, nor even society itself, or indeed, any other crucial cultural form, could be constructed. Indeed, the fusion of society, culture, and person with religion and magic was the mutual precondition of their very existence. This awarding of the first, and in a certain sense, highest, rank, to the sacral womb was Durkheim's boldest, least known, and, perhaps to some, most astonishing idea.
But, if the sacral womb served as the essential principle of the fusion of society, culture, tradition, and person into a coherent and meaningful pattern, then it has to be acknowledged that it also served to confuse them. "It [religion] contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs properly religious, morality, law, the principles of political organization, and even science" (DL:135). Moreover, religious sanctions permeated everyday life, they "regulated the details of private life" (DL:135), which means, of course, since religion was collective, there was often no clear separation between public and private spheres. Indeed, as Durkheim noted, "Originally religion pervades everything; everything social is religious, the two words are synonymous" (DL:169). If "charisma," to use Weber's parallel term, transformed empirical diversity into moral and cognitive unity, it also acted to imprison the former in the latter. "To primitive societies, criminal law is religious law.... Offenses against the gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). Thus, the struggle to disengage from the intrusive and all-embracing claims of religious sanctions, the attempt to carve out autonomous spheres for thought and action--in short, the release from sacral control--becomes a key problematic for historical investigation. For, subsuming all certain knowledge under mythical and magical categories inevitably masks the autonomy of the empirical world; submitting all questions of valid judgement and action to the pressure of sacral and magical controls inevitably represses diversity and innovation. "All laws come from the divinity; to violate them is to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins which must be expiated" (DL:139). Indeed, these are the type of insights which formed the basis of the Enlightenment critique of religion, against which Durkheim took up such an ambivalent position.

Now, Durkheim proposed that as societies grow more complex and differentiate, cultural forms and the notion of the person also evolve. This differentiating co-evolution means that the various departments of society, spheres of cul-
ture, and dimensions of the person grow increasingly autonomous. Living their own life alone, each element develops its own special physiognomy, and becomes governed by its own law.

If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life.... Little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, and constitute themselves apart (DL:169).

The struggle of the various spheres of life to separate themselves out from their original fusion in the sacral womb becomes a central concern. Separation, division, differentiation, autonomization—all faces of the same process—become the roots of the historical problematic of secularization.

This historical dialectic of fusion and diffusion, of merger and division—two of the many faces of the eternal dialectic between the one and the many—constitutes an essential problematic of the comparative and historical sociology of religion to Durkheim. In his concern with the autonomization and rationalization of culture and person, Durkheim converged with Weber's great historical and comparative inquiries into the vicissitudes experienced by societies which attempt to prevent secularization by maintaining the fusion of the sacral complex or to accelerate diffusion and secularization.

But secularization always implies at least two related, though sometimes opposed, sociocultural processes. Religion becomes secularized, first, in the sense that the intensity of sacral images and sanctions, and the degree of social control exerted by sacerdotal institutions, are diminished or eroded in sociocultural evolution. But the second sense of secularization is equally crucial—namely, that sacral images and sanctions become progressively translated and sedimented into secular spheres.¹ This notion of secularization as cultural translation represents the crucial third term, or process, in the historical problematic of the relations between society and religion. For, if the archaic sacral complex served as the constitutive instrument and evolutionary womb of society, culture, and person, and if, on the contrary, much of progressive sociocultural evolution is accomplished only through separation from
the fusion demanded by religious norms and sacerdotal institutions, then secularization as translation mediates between these two apparently opposed processes. A primal unity anchored in religion, the separation and autonomization of the secular world, and then secularization as reciprocal translation become the three faces, or phases, of mainline world-historical process to sociologists of religion and culture.

It is precisely in his insightful recognition of the double significance of the primitive sacral complex and the double meanings of secularization that Durkheim overcame the prejudices against religion of his Enlightenment brethren, and which, albeit belatedly, constitutes his revolution in the human sciences. Thus, like his contemporary Max Weber, Durkheim viewed the intimate links between religion, society, culture, and the person as functioning sometimes as obstacles, sometimes as facilitators of sociocultural evolution. Although he did not possess Weber's sensitivity to the historical vicissitudes of this complex dialectic of release and control—best seen as struggles over claims to preeminent legitimate moral and intellectual authority—Durkheim was also fundamentally concerned with the ways in which religious rationales and ritual practices served to advance or retard cultures along the mainlines of increasing autonomization, rationalization, and universalization. We shall explore the latter processes more fully in the succeeding chapters.

It is appropriate, therefore, that when Durkheim came to announce his program in the prefaces to L'Annee sociologique he suggested to the several sciences of man: "A great many problems change their aspects completely as soon as their connections with the sociology of religion are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tracing these connections" [1899](1960:350). Yet, since Durkheim's death, few sociologists, and fewer still researchers in related areas, have heeded or, indeed, even recognized this crucial foundation of Durkheim's charter for sociology and the human sciences. What precisely does the notion of the primitive sacral complex imply? How did
Durkheim, an arch-positivist, come to grant religion both gen-
eric and genetic primacy? And what can Durkheim's seminal para-
digm of the primitive sacral complex mean to the systematic
study of the interrelations between religion, society, culture,
personal phenomenologies, and historical processes today?
We shall explore these and related questions in this chapter.

Before exploring the various phases in Durkheim's devel-
opment of the central significance of the primitive sacral com-
plex, let us first examine other observers' dawning recognition
of the importance of Durkheim's paradigm, and his genetic-evo-
lutionary presuppositions.

A. Precedents

Fortunately, the current renaissance in Durkheim studies
has shown some glimmering awareness of the centrality of Durk-
heim's notion of the primitive sacral complex. As Robin Horton
observes: "... people are mining the rich seams of his thought
as energetically as ever, and yet these seams show little sign
of exhaustion" (1973:271). This nascent recovery is even more
striking since it results from a converging series of largely
independent discoveries. Although influenced by the earlier
generation who "rescued" Durkheim (eg. Parsons, Alpert, Evans-
Pritchard, to mention only a few leaders) from the cudgels of
his less sympathetic critics, this current renaissance has
given Durkheim's life-work more systematic and detailed consi-
deration. In addition, many important articles and short pie-
ces have been newly translated. Slowly, a different picture of
Durkheim and his work begins to emerge; as Kenneth Burke said:
"A way of seeing is always a way of not seeing." This dictum
applies doubly to the present case. Since Durkheim rarely spel-
led out his fundamental interpretive logics, his evolving "lo-
gics-in-use," the "nuclear structure" of his work often remains
obscure. Consequently, even those who have recently rediscover-
ed Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral womb remain in-
clined to treat this notion only in passing. However, a few
theorists, boldly breaking with past neglect, and realizing
the evolutionary significance of this paradigm, have begun to incorporate Durkheim's original perspective into their own work.

A careful review of recent literature reveals a mounting series of what might be called "parenthetical" recognitions of Durkheim's thesis of the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex. For example, in 1959 in an important review of Durkheim's life-long concern with historical process (all the more remarkable since it came from within the Parsonian functionalist camp), Robert Bellah cited the programmatic passage from the second *Annee* preface, and remarked:

Durkheim was interested to discover in religion, especially primitive religion, that undifferentiated whole from which the elements of society gradually differentiated.... With the example of the Australian clan and its religious life, he undertook to analyze the social analogue of the unicellular organism, the basic structural type from which all the other social structures have differentiated (1959:456).

Bellah also noted, in regard to the second *Annee* preface, that Durkheim actually undertook researches into these problems, especially in what I shall call the second and third phases of his development of the significance of the sacral womb (see Bellah, 1959:456).  

A year later, Joseph Neyer also cited the relevant section from the second *Annee* preface, but in a footnote, and without developing its implications (1960:67, #61). In 1962, Edward Tiryakian clearly perceived the centrality of Durkheim's paradigm:

In presenting Durkheim's perspective on religion, our main interest has been to show the crucial role he attributed to religion in the development of human thought. In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed he had found the seeds of all later developments of the human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that the original source of logical thought lies in the collectivity, and that religion was the first seat of collective consciousness. He held that science and philosophy, the crowning achievements of reason, also have their genesis in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man first conceived of things being related to one another internally; it is through religion that men first grasped the unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm of the sacred embraces both the physical and the social
world; religious forces provide the nexus between things which to the senses appear discrete and unconnected. Once man began to think that what appears dissimilar to his senses may have an internal unity, science and philosophy became possible.... In brief, the dual aspects of religious forces--their physical and moral aspects--made religion the matrix from which the main seeds of civilization developed (1962:41-2).

And in 1964, Tiryakian remarked, in passing, that Durkheim's "... historical studies pointed out that all social institutions develop from a common sphere of life which is the fountainhead, the primordial institution of all human societies" (1964:250; my emphasis). 1

In 1965, Robert Nisbet, speaking of the analysis in The Elementary Forms of representative rites, noted that "... out of these representative rites also came ... esthetic and recreational activities .... The gradual disengagement of these activities from the original religious matrix constitutes one important phase of secularization of culture" (1965:87). 2 And in 1967, Raymond Aron remarked that in Durkheim's eyes: "Religion is the original nucleus from which not only moral and religious rules in the strict sense have emerged ... but from which scientific thought too has derived" (1967:61-2). 3 Also in 1967, W.H. Stanner noted the significance of Durkheim's claims for the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral complex, citing Durkheim's defense of the autonomization of religious collective representations vis-a-vis the materialist view of history in a book review in 1897 (1967:221). 4

In 1971, Poggi utilized the telling phrase "religion as the proto-institution" to characterize Durkheim's notion of the genetic primacy of the primitive sacral complex, which he described in these terms:

Religion ... constitutes the fount from which all other institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society. One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ultimate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the prototype, and ultimate source, of all conduct (1971:253).

Poggi also cited the relevant section to Durkheim's preface to the second volume of L'Annee sociologique. 5 In 1972, LaCapra, in another revealing phrase, described the genetic-evolutionary
primacy of the sacral womb as a "primitive nebula" (1972:105) from which all the other cultural forms have emerged.\(^1\) Also in 1971, Anthony Giddens noted in passing that "In his earliest writings, Durkheim commented on the importance of religion to society, recognizing it to be the original source of all subsequently evolved moral, philosophical, scientific, and juridical ideas" (1971a:105). And in 1972, Giddens proposed that one of the major propositions in The Elementary Forms was Durkheim's thesis that "... representations created in religion are the initial source from which all subsequent forms of human thought have become differentiated" (1972a:20-1). Giddens further observed:

In the collective representations of primitive religion, there are fused together nascent conceptions of science, poetry, and art. The various branches of intellectual activity only become differentiated out of this original set of representations with the growth of social differentiation in the division of labor and the consequent fragmentation of the integral conscience collective of primitive society. The differentiation of intellectual life accompanies the evolving differentiation in moral ideas (1972a:26).

And, finally, in 1973 Steven Lukes again cited the second Annee preface (1973:237), but without developing its significance. However, in regard to Durkheim's article published in the same volume "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena," Lukes remarks that it "... was a first, rather groping attempt, to see religion as a social phenomena, indeed, the primitive social phenomena, from which all others subsequently emerged" (1973:240). Of the same essay, Lukes further notes:

What characterized religion was the inseparable unity of thought and action: it corresponded to a 'stage of social development at which these two functions are not yet dissociated and established apart from one another, but are still so confused with one another that it is impossible to mark a clear dividing line between them' (1973:242).

Lukes, too, noted Durkheim's argument that "the fundamental notions of science are of religious origin" (1973:444). Further, Lukes cited the neglected Annee book review in 1913 by Durkheim of his own Elementary Forms and a related work by Levy-Bruhl in which Durkheim clearly reiterated the dual generic
and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex (Giddens, 1972a:246-9 provides a translation). Finally, although ambivalent about Durkheim's evolutionary claims, Lukes acknowledged that "... the hypothesis that primitive and traditional religions contain the germs of scientific thinking is, in many ways, both challenging and plausible" (1973:449).\(^1\) Finally, Neil Smelser noted in passing that "Religion was regarded by Durkheim as the undifferentiated parent of all succeeding cultural forms" (1976:111).\(^2\)

Now, one remarkable thing about this mounting series of rediscoveries of Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture is not only that these were (apparently) independent, but that these various observers managed to cite relevant evidence from many different Durkheimian texts!\(^3\) Again and again, which ever text or observer, revealing phrases such as fount, fountainhead, womb, matrix, nucleus, primordial institution, proto-institution, primitive nebula, and so forth, are invoked to describe the same fundamental insight of Durkheim. And yet, and this is the reason I cite so extensively, none of these recent observers apparently recognized the full significance of Durkheim's paradigm.\(^4\)

Happily, however, at least two different sociocultural and evolutionary thinkers have gone beyond these preliminary or "parenthetical" recognitions, and have moved to consciously incorporate Durkheim's paradigm into their own interpretive frameworks. Their independent rediscovery has stimulated them to some powerful intellectual reformulations which are destined to have an important impact on the comparative sociology of religion, and upon the study of the evolving relations between religion, society, culture, and the person in general. First, in a most thoughtful essay, Robin Horton was one of the first to begin to properly emphasize the genetic-evolutionary nature of Durkheim's theses in the sociology of religion, morality, and knowledge.

Horton is most sensitive to Durkheim's thesis that "... we find the vital germs of the most elaborated sciences in the first stirrings of the most primitive religions" (1973:262).
Concentrating his attention on Durkheim's notion of the "way in which primitive religious thought gives rise to the theoretical sciences," Horton states:

As I read Durkheim, the core of this sociology of thought is the thesis that most aspects of mental life have grown by differentiation and elaboration from a primitive religious basis. By 'most aspects,' I mean not only religion as moderns know it, but the arts, the theoretical constructions of the sciences, and, indeed, the very categories of logical thought (1973:258).

In an instructive comparison, Horton contrasts Durkheim's model of the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex with another classic paradigm deriving from the same general school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's notion of the chasm between primitive and modern mentality. Rather than contrasting and dichotomizing primitive (or sub-tribal and tribal) with modern (or civilizational) thought, Durkheim instead emphasized their fundamental evolutionary continuities. Where Levy-Bruhl entertained a contrast/inversion schema, Durkheim worked out of a continuity-evolution schema.

To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation between 'primitive' and 'modern' in terms of contrast, and the transition between them in terms of inversion, while Durkheim sees the relation in terms of continuity, and the transition as a process of evolution (1973:270).

But so surprising to those of us who have been brought up to believe the core of Durkheim's sociology of religion is the sacred/profane dichotomy is Durkheim's contention that "... our logic was born of this logic ... between the logic of religious and scientific thought there is no abyss" (EF:270), that Horton was led to remark:

Most readers are likely to be thoroughly puzzled by my exposition. For they have been brought up to believe that what I call Durkheim's subsidiary thesis is, in fact, his principal if not his only thesis. As for what I have taken as his primary thesis, this for many will be the first time they have heard of it. Some may even wonder if it isn't just a figment of my imagination! (1973:267).

Horton's point is well-taken, for so conditioned have we become to the standard, truncated image of Durkheim's sociology of religion that we may well be reluctant to part with our prejudi-
ces! Horton concludes:

... orthodox modern social scientists tend to proclaim themselves disciples of Durkheim in their approach to the study of religion. But, in their actual analyses, they ignore the main theme of their master's work in this sphere, and extol an inconsistent minor theme.... 1

This is a very odd situation (1973:276; my emphasis).

It is, indeed, a very odd situation; a problem for the history of sociological theory, and the sociology of knowledge. Why have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral complex?

Perhaps the most distinctive and potent effort yet made to incorporate aspects of Durkheim's notion of the centrality of the primitive sacral complex into a comparative and evolutionary sociocultural framework can be found in the 1973 essay "Civilizational Complexes and Inter-Civilizational Encounters" by Benjamin Nelson. From the perspective of an in-depth comparative and historical differential sociology of the changing foundations of claims to preeminent legitimate moral and intellectual authority, Nelson has distinguished three basic structures of conscience and consciousness on the world-historical level. His stated intention is "... to discriminate a series of patterns in the structures of consciousness, and the degree of collectivity or individuality in the forms of their representation" (1973a:91). Significantly, Nelson's path-breaking efforts have been inspired by the work of both Weber and Durkheim on primitive and archaic religion and culture. Nelson acknowledges the complementariness of these pioneer's perspectives: "Weber's frames need to be supplemented by reference to the works of Durkheim, Mauss, and Maine, especially the essay by Durkheim and Mauss on Primitive Classification, and Durkheim's ... Elementary Forms" (1973a:92). What Nelson has termed "Consciousness Type I"--a "sacro-magical collective conscience"--was directly influenced by Durkheim's notion of the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex, and the importance of "altruisme" as a suicidal "ideal type" which reveals its inner structure.
The first pattern of structures of consciousness is characterized by the predominance of collective acceptances of responsibility to make amends for collective wrongs or falls from a state of undividedness. The ruling supposition is that all lapses from unity in both macrocosm and microcosm have to be atoned by collective assumptions of liability, collective propitiations, sacrifices, commemorations... The ruling instances of these sacro-magical forms may be found in all societal and civilizational complexes dominated by prescriptive etiquettes and rituals all oriented to the total fulfillment of laws believed to be ontological in character and to have their sanctions in the cosmic orders, the commands of the ancestors, the primordial traditions, that require they be preserved through literal performance of fixed obligations. A number of variations are possible in the social structural guarantees of these ritual performances. These differences do not, however, fundamentally alter the central supposition that the whole society is under total obligation to fulfill the ontological demands and to offer totalistic propitiations, placations, commemorations, if the harmonies of the cosmos are to endure... or to be restored.... The central reality is the dominance of a sacro-magical structure which binds the entire community in... expressions of the collective conscience (1973a:91-2).

Surely we need deeply informed and bold extensions of our pioneer's paradigms, such as Nelson's, which help us to come to grips with the world-historical significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, person.
B. Durkheim's Genetic-Evolutionary Methodology

Why have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's central paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the evolutionary womb of society, culture, and person? Perhaps our neglect here stems from both our failure to adequately distinguish between analyses pitched at the generic and the genetic levels, and Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of the two approaches. Let us, therefore, briefly consider the "madness in Durkheim's method" in deliberately fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches in his paradigm of the sacral womb.

Stemming largely from the influence of the British anthropologists and American functionalists, the standard, truncated image of Durkheim's sociology of religion is that it was pitched primarily, or at least most intelligibly, on the generic or universal social structural level. The claim was that religion and ritual served multiple social functions--especially the promotion of social solidarity. Ever since Parsons proclaimed that Durkheim's central problem was the search for the generic bases of social order and control, and that Durkheim's central problem concerned "social statics," Durkheim's genetic-and evolutionary theses have languished in darkness. Durkheim's own claims for the genetic and evolutionary significance of his pilgrimage to the "elementary forms" have often annoyed (eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, W.H. Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973), or puzzled these theorists (eg. Bellah, 1973). The British anthropologists and American functionalists' search for the generic or universal structures of human society led them to persistently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; in short, their generic emphases swamped out Durkheim's genetic emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent "... tendency of secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's functional and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign to Durkheim's thought" (1971a:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's Elementary Forms has to be read genetically (1971a:114).

As early as 1895 in The Rules, Durkheim explicitly term-
ed his method "genetic" (R:138), and proposed the following interpretive canon: "One cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its complete development through all social species" (R:139). And in 1898, Durkheim prefaced his *Année* essay on "Incest" with this methodological rule:

In order to understand a practice or an institution, a juridical or moral rule, it is necessary to trace it as nearly as possible to its origin; for between the form it now takes and what it has been, there is a rigorous relationship. No doubt, as any institution is transformed during its course of development, the factors on which it largely depended for its existence have also varied. However, these transformations, in their turn, are likewise dependent on the nature of the point of departure. There are social phenomena, just as there are organic phenomena, and although the manner in which they must develop is not fatally predetermined by the properties which characterize them at their birth, these properties do not cease to have a profound influence on the entire course of their history [1898](1963:13).

Now, it must be acknowledged that much of the confusion and neglect was unintentionally assisted by Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary analyses. As Tiryakian reminds us, "The French *élémentaire* signifies not only 'elementary' as in a scale of complexity, but also 'fundamental' or 'basic' (1962:19). It is precisely in these terms that Durkheim's British anthropological critics have charged him with confusing "earliest" and "simplest" (eg. Lukes, 1973:456). Even so, the logic underlying Durkheim's "confilation" of his search for the universal or generic essence of human society with his genetic investigations into the evolution of society and culture remains opaque to many. For example, contrasting what he takes to be Weber's comparative and historical investigations into the world-religions with Durkheim's crucial experiment focussed on a single "elementary form," William Runciman contends that the latter's sociology of religion was "fundamentally misconceived" (1969:187; 191). But Runciman, and others, fail to perceive that by fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and development of society and culture, Durkheim sought
to find a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, in which there would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were, between symbolic forms and social forms, between the substratum of social morphological processes and superstructural social physiological or symbolic cultural processes.

Where collectively symbolic representations are deeply inter-fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durkheim felt he had discovered the "monocellular" (see Bellah, 1959:456-7) form of sociocultural life; the template, as it were, from which all complex sociocultural forms have evolved. Thus, the generic links between religion, society, and culture which Durkheim thought he had discovered in Australian aboriginal religion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connections. Durkheim himself went to great lengths in the introduction to The Elementary Forms to explain his seemingly peculiar method. To those who might object to his conflation of generic with genetic analyses, he rhetoricized: "But why give them [the elementary forms] a sort of prerogative? Why choose them in preference to all others as the subject of our study? It is merely for reasons of method" (EF:15). He then justified his genetic methodology in these terms:

Everytime that we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given moment in history--be it a religious belief, a moral precept, a logical principle, an esthetic style, or an economic system--it is necessary to commence by going back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characteristics by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question (EF:15).

Thus, Durkheim's approach was always processual--it is simply mistaken to portray Durkheim as a static, abstracted thinker searching for the generic bases of social order and control. For it is absolutely crucial to realize that Durkheim's causal model--substructural social morphological processes and superstructural collectively representational processes--led him to always return to the simplest case, the clearest connection between these two halves of human society. For here "All is reduced to that which is indispensable, to that without which
there could be no religion. But that which is indispensable is
that which is essential—that which we must know before all
else" (EF:18).

Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified
his characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolution-
ary analyses by likening them to Descartes' "first ring" (EF:
16) of certainty. For, in the last analysis, Durkheim's confla-
tion derived from his cultural tradition—it was the sociologi-
cal equivalent of the Cartesian method of systematic doubt,
and return to first principles as the only sure road to object-
ive certainty. Moreover, Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary
presuppositions were basically those of the Enlightenment (see
Cassirer, 1951). "He [Durkheim] simply took it as axiomatic
that there is an identity between simplicity and evolutionary
priority" (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his conflation of generic
and genetic in this perspective, we should no longer wonder
that only in terms of the most "elementary" forms—in both
senses—did Durkheim believe that he could surely uncover gen-
eric sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably inter-
fused with genetic-evolutionary ones. "Primitive civilizations
offer privileged cases because they are simpler ones" (EF:18).
And again, "In the primitive religions, the religious fact
still visibly carries the mark of its origins" (EF:20). Those
who persist in reading Durkheim's fundamental investigations
as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahistori-
cal, functional propositions, must continue to neglect Durk-
heim's own logic and method, and his insistence that the in-
timate relations between society, culture, and person are e-
volutionarily constructed. As Giddens rightly notes: "There
is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and
their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is con-
tingent upon the level of advancement of society" (1972a:27).

Indeed, Durkheim clearly saw, as did Weber, that as
societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance sys-
tems. In the general evolutionary passage from "mechanical" to
"organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a whole series of
progressive sociocultural shifts in the content, form, and di-
rection of development of collective symbolic forms, which more
or less corresponded to underlying social morphological differ-
entiations. From The Division of Labor, through Primitive Class-
ification to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim never wavered from
his primary concern (see Horton, 1973; Giddens, 1971a,b; 1972a,
b; 1973) with the transformation of the concrete, tribal, fused,
sacral-magical collective consciousness into ever-more abstract,
autonomous, differentiated, rational, and universalizable cul-
tural symbolic forms. Indeed, toward the end of his life, Durk-
heim (with Mauss) turned his attention explicitly to the sedi-
mentation and diffusion of universalizable symbolic forms on
the inter-societal level as these became the basis of civiliza-
tional bonds (see Chapter Seven).

In these terms, the genetic-evolutionary significance
of the primitive sacral complex becomes clearer—for it served
as the prime evolutionary matrix out of which all the other ma-
jor social, cultural, and phenomenological forms progressively
emerged. When he announced his program of detailed research
into the world-historical creativity of the sacral womb in the
preface to the second volume of L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim
acknowledged that awarding it primacy might surprise some: "The
According of first rank to this set of phenomena has produced
some astonishment, but it is these phenomena which are the germ
from which all the others ... are derived" [1899] (1960:350).
Lest he be misunderstood, 1 Durkheim hastened to add:

But it must be understood that the importance we thus
attribute to the sociology of religion does not in the
least imply that religion must play the same role in
present day societies that it has played at other times.
In a sense, the contrary conclusion would be more sound.
Precisely because religion is a primordial phenomenon,
it must yield more and more to the new social forms which
it has engendered. In order to understand these new forms,
one must connect them with their religious origins, but
without thereby confusing them with religious phenomena,
properly speaking (1960:352-3).

A decade and a half later, after devoting his energies
to his school’s famous journal L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim's
Elementary Forms represented the culmination of his program of
detailed, multi-disciplinary research into the genetic and evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex. Toward the end of this masterwork, Durkheim concluded:

... We have established the fact that the fundamental categories of thought, and consequently, of science, are of religious origin. We have seen that the same is true for magic and consequently for the different processes which have issued from it.... It has long been known that up until a relatively advanced moment of evolution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then, it may be said that nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion (EF:466).

If we still wish to lay claim to Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974), or if we hope to understand the complex relations between religion, society, culture, person, and historical process, can we any longer afford to continue slighting Durkheim's seminal paradigm of the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral womb?

C. Phases in Durkheim's Development of the Notion of the Primitive Sacral Complex

Preface. Durkheim's awareness of the significance of the generic and genetic evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex evolved over the years in a series of distinguishable phases. In the first phase, Durkheim's "laic" positivism led him to portray religion, defined as the preeminent form of the "collective conscience" (DL:85), largely in negative terms. Using juridical indexes to discern the stages in evolution of the "moral life," Durkheim first distinguished religion by its obligatory, "repressive," character. But it must always be remembered that primitive legal systems were "repressive," according to Durkheim, because "mechanical solidarity" was deeply embedded in traditional religious rationales and magical duties. Indeed, Durkheim repeatedly described transgressions in primitive cultures as a type of "religious criminality."

However, as he investigated further, Durkheim's opinion clearly shifted. By his own admission, 1895 was a crucial turning point. Reading Robertson Smith and lecturing on reli-
igion, Durkheim discovered how religious phenomena could fit more positively into his own sociological program. In his often repeated series of lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit," Durkheim constantly reworked his early emphasis on the "repressiveness" of early religions by exploring the creative embeddedness of primitive juridical forms such as property, taxes, contract, and so on, in archaic sacral and magical rationales. And in the great L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim both announced his special program to the human sciences, and carried much of it out through his own essays and the inspiration and direction he gave to the other members of the Annee school, most notably Marcel Mauss (see Paul Honigsheim, 1960).

In third phase, which centers, of course, on The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Durkheim's program and his own systematic insight into Australian aboriginal religion and rite yielded a profound and exquisitely wrought theory of the generic and genetic-evolutionary creativeness of the sacral womb. So central had the dual significance of the primitive sacral complex become to Durkheim's system, that he never tired of repeating (eg. vis-a-vis Levy-Bruhl), that there is no gap in continuity between these stages in sociocultural evolution! Let us now explore the first phase in Durkheim's development of the notion of the world-historical centrality of the primitive sacral complex as womb of society and culture.

1. The Early Phase: Religion in Primitive Society as Repressive

Durkheim cannot really be said to have had a sociology of religion in his early phase. As Lukes rightly observes, Durkheim's early writings on religion were rather "thin and inconclusive" (1973:238). At this stage, his nascent sociology of religion was really only an adjunct to his concern with law and morality, and what little there was was often negative. Basically, Durkheim's early view of religion was two-fold. First, he saw religion as the "preeminent form of the collective consciousness" (DL:285). Second, as the basis of "mechanical solidarity," religion was "repressive." Using law as an objective
index to determine the state of the "moral life," Durkheim found that "... in primitive societies, criminal law is religious law" (DL:92). Penal law in "mechanical solidarity" was viewed as "religious criminality," as transgressions against religiously sanctioned collective norms. In his early phase, Durkheim's critical positivism held the upper hand in determining his largely negative image of primitive religion as both "repressive" and "regressive."

Perhaps Durkheim's first explicit statements on the sociological nature of early religions are to be found in his review of Spencer's Ecclesiastical Institutions, which appeared as part of an 1886 review essay entitled "Les Etudes de Science Sociale" (translated by R.A. Jones, 1974). Of this essay, Lukes has remarked:

In 1886, he had written of religion as having, together with law and morality, the role of assuring the equilibrium of society and adapting it to external conditions and of its being a "form of social discipline," merely a form of custom; he also saw the idea of divinity as serving to 'symbolize traditions, cultures, collective needs,' and argued that the sociologist must look at what 'the symbol conceals and translates' (1973:238).

Jones has also noted some of the important continuities and discontinuities between this early essay and Durkheim's Elementary Forms. For instance, Durkheim was already insisting that we must attempt to translate the symbolic meaning of rite and myth through some type of sociological analogy.

What ought to concern us is not the symbol but what the symbol stands for and expresses. What is thus hidden under this wholly superficial phenomenon could perhaps be discovered if we could compare it with others which resemble it in certain ways. Indeed, what difference is there between religious prescriptions and the injunctions of morality? They are both addressed to the members of the same community, are supported by sanctions that are sometimes identical and always analogous; finally, the violation of both arouses in conscience the same feelings of anger and disgust (1974:212).

Further, Durkheim argues that "laws, morality, religion, are the three great regulating functions of society" (1974:213). The essential function of each is moral discipline of the ego. Religion is therefore only a form of custom, like law and manners. What distinguishes this form from all the
others is that it imposes itself not only on conduct but on the conscience. It dictates not only acts, but ideas and sentiments. Religion commences with faith, that is to say, beliefs accepted or submitted to without discussion (1974:212-13).

Thus, religion is, at root, irrational, and when reflection is awakened "It [religion] can remain a collective discipline only if it imposes itself upon all spirits with the irresistible authority of habit" (1974:213). Surprisingly, Durkheim rejected Spencer's notion that "... evolution presumes an increasing role for reason and free inquiry to the detriment of custom and prejudice" (Jones, 1974:207).

It is far from true, as Mr. Spencer thinks, that the place and importance of custom are going to diminish with civilization.... A society without prejudices would resemble an organism without reflexes: it would be a monster incapable of living. Sooner or later, therefore, custom and habit will recover their rights; it is this that authorizes us to presume that religion will survive the attacks upon it. As long as there are men who live together, there will be among them some common faith. What one cannot foresee and what the future alone can decide, is the particular form in which that faith will be symbolized (1974:213).

Thus, even at this early date, Durkheim began to separate himself from the general nineteenth century view of religion as, at best, an immature stage which had to be overcome. For religion is identified in 1886 with tradition, custom, and a common faith, and the need for these is perennial. Finally, we should note that Durkheim saw here that "... if one penetrates beneath the surface ... one discovers everywhere the same development, and at the origin, the same germ" (1974:211).

Let us turn next to The Division of Labor, published in 1893. Here, Durkheim characterized religion as the "eminent form of the collective conscience" (DL:285). And, as Lukes notes (1973:239), there was "also an inclusive and unpursued definition of religion" in these terms:

... the sole characteristic that all such ideas as religious sentiments equally present seems to be that they are common to a certain number of people living together, and that, besides, they have an average intensity that is quite elevated. It is, indeed, a constant fact that, when a slightly strong conviction is held by the same community of men, it inevitably takes on a reli-
ious character. It inspires in consciences the same reverential respect as beliefs properly religious. It is, thus, very probable ... that religion corresponds to a region equally central in the common conscience (DL:169).

However, Durkheim admitted the provisional nature of such a view: "It remains, it is true, to circumscribe this region, to distinguish it from that to which penal law corresponds, and with which, moreover, it is often wholly or in part confused. These questions are left to study" (DL:169).

Speaking of the "physiological" characteristics of "mechanical solidarity," Durkheim said "... religion pervades the whole society, but that is because social life is made up almost exclusively of common beliefs and of common practices which derive from unanimous adhesion a very particular intensity" (DL:178). This social intensity means that one might term primitive culture a "conscience collective," since "all consciences vibrate in unison" (DL:152). In "mechanical solidarity" "... all consciences are composed of practically the same elements" (DL:135). "Everybody professes and practices the same religion; schisms and dissents are unknown; they would not be tolerated" (DL:135). Clearly, Durkheim was here constructing an evolutionary "ideal type," rather than an accurate description of the diversity of all primitive cultures. Thus, "solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides at all points with it" (DL:130). In short, Durkheim argued that "... social life comes from a double source, the likenesses of consciences and the division of labor. The individual ... in the first case ... becomes part of the collective type" (DL:226; see also Lukes, 1973:151-2; Giddens, 1971b, 1972a; Chapter Eight of this dissertation).

As is well known, Durkheim chose law, and specifically types of punishment, as his positivist index to the evolving stages of the "moral life." Underlying this choice was the presumption that "law reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity" (DL:68). Durkheim termed "repressive" the type of
religiously sanctioned collective punishment appropriate to "mechanical solidarity." "The similitude of consciences gives rise to juridical rules which, with the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon all. The more pronounced this is, the more complete is social life confounded with religious life" (DL:226). Giddens summarized Durkheim's theses well:

This dominance of the individual by the collectivity is indexed by the nature of the punishment which is meted out when a man deviates from the rigidly specified codes of conduct which are prescribed by the conscience collective. Repressive sanctions are collective both in their source, and in their expression. A repressive sanction is a response to the highly intense emotions which are generated in the majority of individuals when a man transgresses the ideals embodied in the conscience collective. It is an expression of anger on the part of the community, the avenging of an outrage to morality (1972a:6).

Thus, "repressive" law is "diffuse," that is, "the whole society participates in it" (DL:76). Primitive penal law is not explicitly formulated because "... the rule is known and accepted by everybody." Further, primitive penal law is stationary, conservative: "... in lower societies, law ... is almost exclusively penal; it is likewise very stationary. Generally, religious law is always repressive; it is essentially conservative" (DL:78). Therefore, primitive penal law is often ritually and magically stereotyped: "We know what a large place in the repressive law of many peoples ritual regimentation, etiquette, ceremonial, and religious practices play" (DL:72).

In sum, religiously sanctioned "... repressive law corresponds to the heart, the very center of the common conscience" (DL:113).

Whether or not Durkheim ". . . vastly overstated the role of repressive law in pre-industrial societies" (Lukes, 1973: 159; see also Sheleff, 1975), is not our prime concern here. 2 What we are concerned with is elucidating Durkheim's evolving notion of the sacral complex as a central interpretive "ideal type," a useful heuristic in the human sciences. What most interests me here is Durkheim's thesis that the greater the degree of penetration of legal norms by sacral rationales and magical sanctions, the greater the repressiveness of the pun-
ishments for transgressions. What is at issue here, as Nelson (1973a) clearly saw, was the degree of collectivity or indivi-
duality in the logics of moral responsibility. That is why
punishment was first an act of collective vengenance against
the wrong-doer by the outraged sacral-magical common consci-
ence; it was a demand for an "expiation of the past" (DL:88).

When we desire the repression of a crime, it is not
that we desire to avenge it personally, but to avenge
something sacred.... Most often we represent it in the
form of one of several beings: ancestors, divinity.
That is why penal law is not simply religious in ori-
gin, but, indeed, always retains a religious stamp.
It is because the acts it punishes appear to be at-
tacks upon something transcendent (DL:100).

Durkheim's use of the word "expiation" here is most important.
For in the primitive sacral complex, "... offenses against the
gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). Because the struct-
ures of responsibility for maintaining harmonious relations be-
tween micro and macrocosm were primarily collective, violations
of religious interdictions were considered criminal because they
were, in effect, sacrilege involving the fate of the whole so-
ciety. "Everybody is attacked; consequently, everybody opposes
the attack" (DL:107). Indeed, in terms of the sacral-magical
collective conscience, as Nelson (1973a) has termed it, it is
believed that "... all laws ... come from the divinity; to vio-
late them is to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins
which must be expiated" (DL:139).

For these and other reasons, Durkheim argued that "it is
certain that penal law was religious in its origin" (DL:92).

Durkheim provided the following summary of the sacerdotal foun-
dations of primitive penal law.

It is an evident fact in India and Judea, since the
law practived there was considered revealed. In Egypt,
the ten books of Hermes, which contained the criminal
law with all the other books relative to the government
of the state, were called sacerdotal and ... from ear-
liest times the Egyptian priests exercised judicial
power. The same was the case in ancient Germany. In
Greece, justice was considered an emanation from Zeus,
and the sentiments a vengenance from God. In Rome, the
religious origins of penal law are clearly shown both
by old traditions, and by the juridical terminology it-
self (DL:92).
In the sacral complex, then (which may include archaic societies also),
many criminal acts are actually delictions which, by violating the law of the gods, disturb the harmonious relations between macrocosm and microcosm. Such delictions or transgressions constitute public sacrilege, since they put in jeopardy the fate of the whole society.

... in lower societies, the most numerous delicts are those which relate to public affairs; delicts against religion, against custom, against authority, etc. We need only to look at the Bible, the laws of Manou, at the monuments which of the old Egyptian law, to see the relatively small place accorded to prescriptions for the protection of individuals, and, contrariwise, the luxuriant development of repressive legislation, concerning the different forms of sacrilege, the omission of certain religious duties, the demands of ceremonial, etc. At the same time, these crimes are the most severely punished (DL:93).

Durkheim later counterposed "religious criminality" with "human criminality" in his elaboration of his earlier thesis in his Annee essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" [1900](1973). Clearly, Durkheim was building up a positivist counterpoint to the "repressiveness" of religion in traditional societies, where:

... because all the prescriptions that it lays down are commandments from God, so to speak, under his direct sovereignty, they all owe to this origin an extraordinary prestige which renders them sacrosanct. Thus, when they are violated, public conscience does not content itself with a simple reparation, but demands expiation which avenges it. Since what gives penal law its peculiar character is the extraordinary authority of the rules which it sanctions ... law which is agreed to be the word of God Himself cannot fail to be essentially repressive. We have even been able to say that all penal law is more or less religious, for its very soul is the sentiment of respect for a force superior to the individual man, for a power in some way transcendent, under some symbol which it makes penetrate into consciences, and this sentiment is also the basis of religiosity. That is why, in general fashion, repression dominates all law in lower societies. It is because religion completely pervades juridical life, as it does, indeed, all social life (DL:140-1).

It is about this point that we first encounter Durkheim's earliest formulation of the notion of the sacral complex:
Religion comprises all, extends to all. It contains, in a confused mass, besides beliefs properly religious, morality, law, the principles of political organization, and even science. Religion ... regulated the details of private life (DL:135).

Indeed, "Religion, the eminent form of the common conscience, originally absorbed all representative functions with practical functions" (DL:285). It is not, surprising, then, that in such a situation where crime is religious, or should we say, "sacrilegious":

... there exists a luxuriant criminality, peculiar to those societies ... delicts against religious faith, against ceremonial, against traditions of all sorts, etc. The real reason for this development of repressive rules is that this moment in the evolutionary scheme the collective conscience is extensive and strong, since labor has not yet divided (DL:146).

But this homogeneity, this fusion, cannot last. Inevitably, the various cultural forms begin to differentiate and autonomize themselves from their fused embeddedness in the primal sacral complex. With the division of labor, the progressive "extension of the radius of social life," the "effacement of the segmental type of society," and so on and so forth (see Chapter Four), the structures of collective responsibility begin to erode, and sacral rationales become secularized.

Indeed, Durkheim argued that "The more or less complete dissociation between law and religion is one of the best signs by which we can recognize whether a society is more or less developed than another" (DL:142). This is so because the grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shift from the group and its religious tradition to the individual.

Thus, Durkheim's perception of progressive moral evolution was intimately bound up with the passage from collective to individual structures of responsibility. Indeed, he held it as axiomatic that "... the more one closely approaches the origins of religious development, the more ritual and material practices surpass in importance purely moral beliefs and precepts, whereas the latter become more predominant in the religions of civilized peoples" (Soc:230). Through progressive sociocultural evolution, collective representations shift
in content from concrete, magically stereotyped, tribal, "repressive," sacral norms to increasingly abstract, universalizable, rational civilizational collective representations.

At the same time as religion, the rules of law become universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at first to local circumstances, to particularities, ethnic, climatic, etc., they free themselves little by little, and with the same stroke become more general. What makes this increase of generality obvious is the uninterrupted decline of formalism. In lower societies, the very external forms of conduct are predetermined even to the details. The way in which man must eat, dress in every situation, the gestures he must make, the formula he must pronounce, are precisely fixed. On the contrary, the further one strays from the point of departure, the more moral and juridical prescriptions lose their sharpness and precision. They rule only the most general forms of conduct, and rule them in a very general way.... Civilization has a tendency to become more rational and more logical ... that alone is rational which is universal.

What baffles understanding is the particular and the concrete (DL:289).

So closely do Durkheim's views on sociocultural evolution here complement Weber's (ie. the decline of sacral-magical formalism and stereotyping, etc.), that they both attributed a key role in this process of progressive rationalization and universalization of certain cultural forms to the evolving notions of the gods themselves (see Weber, 1963). The evolution of law, of conscience and consciousness, of society and culture, are, in short, all intimately bound up with religious evolution.

The fact which perhaps best manifests this increasing tendency of the common conscience is the parallel transcendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods, only sacred beings without their sacred character being related to any external entity as their source.... Little by little, religious forces are detached from the things of which they are at first only the attributes, and become hypostatized. Thus is formed the notion of spirits or gods who, while residing here or there as preferred, nevertheless exist outside of the particular objects to which they are specifically attached. By that very fact, they are less concrete.... They remain very near us, constantly fused into our life.... The Greco-Latin polytheism, which is a more elevated and better organized form of animism, marks new progress in the direction of
transcendence. The residence of the gods becomes more sharply distinct from that of men.... But it is only with Christianity that God takes leave of space; his kingdom is no longer of this world. The dissociation of nature and the divine is so complete that it degenerates into antagonism. At the same time, the concept of divinity becomes more general and more abstract, for it is formed, not of sensations, but of ideas. The God of humanity is necessarily less concrete than the gods of the city or the clan (DL:288-89).

It has not been sufficiently noticed that Durkheim maintained this view of moral and religious evolution throughout his career; clearly, the very structure of his essay (with Mauss) on Primitive Classification is genetic and evolutionary, as is so much of The Elementary Forms.

One crucial outcome of this progressive moral and religious evolution was the gradual erosion of collective structures of moral and intellectual authority, and thus, the disappearance of "religious criminality." Having so closely identified religion with strong and extensive states of the tribal collective conscience, Durkheim argued that as the latter is eroded by the division of labor, penal law is increasingly separated from religious interdictions. "... religious criminality ended by completely departing, or almost completely departing, from penal law" (DL:164); thus, "... a whole world of sentiments cease to count among the strong and defined states of the common conscience" (DL:159).

... if there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything; everything social is religious, the two words are synonymous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scientific, functions free themselves from the religious function, constitute themselves apart, and take on a more and more acknowledged temporal character. God, who was at first present in all human relations progressively withdraws from them; he abandons the world to men and their disputes.... The individual feels himself less acted upon; he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity. In short, not only does not the domain of religion grow at the same time and in the same measure as temporal life, but it contracts more and more. This regression did not begin at some certain moment of history, but we can follow its phases since the origins of social evolution. It is, thus, linked with the fundamental
conditions of the development of societies, and it shows that there are a decreasing number of collective beliefs and sentiments which are both collective enough and strong enough to take on a religious character.... The average intensity of the common conscience becomes progressively enfeebled.... The same law of regression applies to the representative element of the common conscience quite as much as to the affective element (DL: 169-70).

It is interesting to note, finally, that Durkheim appeared rather sanguine about the progressive secularization of culture at this point. Let us now turn to the next stage in Durkheim's development of the paradigm of the primitive sacral complex.

2. The Second Phase: Durkheim's Breakthrough to a Sociology of Religion

The second phase of Durkheim's developing interest in the sociology of religion is perhaps the most important and least known. This phase covers roughly the decade from 1895 to 1905. His last years at Bordeaux and first years at Paris were most creative--they were the "breakthrough" years. But since the bulk of Durkheim's efforts were invested during this time in teaching and building *L'Année sociologique*, we still have great difficulty in bringing the depth and scope of these achievements into clear focus. I must emphasize that this phase of development of Durkheim's concern with the creativity of the primitive sacral complex deserves more attention than it has yet received. For it was during this period that the foundations (still often unperceived--see Chapter Four) of Durkheim's sociology of religion and knowledge were laid down, and detailed, inter-disciplinary research into the crucial role of the primitive sacral complex begun. During this phase, the sociology of religion moved from a peripheral position, as merely an adjunct to his sociology of law and morality, to the center stage of Durkheim's program for the human sciences. In short, during this fertile, but half--invisible period, Durkheim moved away from his earlier negative view of religious phenomena toward viewing the sacral complex as the very womb, the creative matrix of human society, culture, and person.
Space does not here permit detailed examination of all the documents which appear in rapid succession in this phase; we shall now merely note some highlights. While the end of this second phase may be movable, the beginning is more definite--1895. For Durkheim himself acknowledged that his discovery of the works of the English anthropologists of religion, especially Robertson Smith, which were integral parts of his first lecture course on religion in 1894-95, served as turning points in his career. Of this breakthrough to a sociology of religion, Steven Lukes observes: "The work of Robertson Smith and his school offered Durkheim an overall perspective on religion, which he then transformed in light of his own theoretical preoccupations" (1973:239). Durkheim himself noted:

> It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view of the essential role played by religion in social life. It was in that year that, for the first time, I found the means of tackling the study of religion sociologically. This was revelation to me. That course of 1895 marked a dividing line in the development of my thought, to such an extent that all my previous researches had to be taken up afresh in order to be made to harmonize with these new insights.... [This reorientation] was entirely due to the studies of religious history which I had undertaken, and notably to the reading of the works of Robertson Smith and his school (in Lukes, 1973:237).

Apparently, none of Durkheim's 1894-95 lecture notes survive (Lukes, 1973:238). However, it appears that Durkheim had found in Robertson Smith's theory of religion "... the means of tackling the study of religion sociologically." Especially important, Lukes suggests, were Smith's "... emphasis on the social functions of totemic rituals and ... the central idea of the divinization of the community" (1973:239; see also 238). Clearly, much of Durkheim's later Elementary Forms was foreshadowed in Smith's Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (see also Durkheim, PECM:180, and EF; see Chapter Four).

The importance of Durkheim's breakthrough to a rudimentary sociocultural theory of religious process cannot be exaggerated; for the new importance attached to religious symbols even began to make Durkheim alter his underlying causal model. It has not been sufficiently recognized that his
growing understanding of religious processes led Durkheim to acknowledge the autonomization of collective representations. But this shift comes through very clearly in a book review in 1897 of Labriola's exposition of historical materialism. Durkheim explicitly rejected the Marxist claims, denied that his reductionism derived from Marxism, and insisted instead on the autonomization of collective representations, using religion as his prime example.

Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement that religion is the most primitive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of collective activity—law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc.—have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. In the beginning, everything is religious.... It is indisputable that, at the outset, the economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life is, by contrast, luxuriant and all-pervasive. Why could it not follow from this, and is it not more probable, that the economy depends much more upon religion than the former does upon the latter (in Giddens, 1972a:161-2)?

As Lukes (1973:62) and Jones (1974) note, this declaration represents a decisive shift from Durkheim's position in 1886 when he maintained that "... the role of the conscience collective is limited to acknowledging facts without producing them," and even his 1893 position vis-a-vis Fustel de Coulanges (DL:179). Thus, it was during the seminal 1897-99 period that Durkheim, under the new influence of sociology of religion, seeing that his causal model needed to be enlarged, first began to emphasize the autonomization of collective representations and the significance of the sacral complex (see also Book Three, Part I). I believe this coincidence to be more than accidental. Of this momentous shift, Lukes observes: "Largely as a result of his preoccupation with religion, he became more and more interested in the sphere of beliefs and ideals, and in the sociological explanation of the attribution of moral values" (1973:419).

In the same year, Durkheim published *Suicide* which also emphasized the importance of "collective representations," and the role of religions in primitive and modern suicides. For example, in Book Three, Chapter One, after insisting that
"... collective tendencies have an existence of their own" (S:309), Durkheim outlined his theory of culture. He remarked that "Religion is ... the system of symbols by which a society becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic way of thinking of collective existence" (S:312). Indeed, earlier Durkheim had interpreted altruistic suicides in precisely these terms. Altruistic suicide was used by Durkheim as an objective index revealing the nature of the social bond peculiar to traditional societies rooted in ties of "blood and soil." The fact that the altruistic suicide regards self-sacrifice as obligatory--a moral duty and perhaps even a privilege--signifies that the individual is here submerged in the "sacral-magical collective conscience." Self-sacrifice, or the systematic eradication of the ego in certain religions, implies a state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the "pantheistic" structure of society itself. Since religion was the symbolic way in which society crystallized self-consciousness, it follows, said Durkheim, that "mechanically integrated" societies, in which the individual counts for little, should express these social and cultural realities in pantheistic religious projections.

But it was in the Année sociologique, volume two (1897-1898), published in 1899, that Durkheim first explicitly announced his program of detailed research into the genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sacral complex. In the preface to the second volume, as many have noted but few have developed, Durkheim stated:

This year, as well as last, our analyses are headed by those concerning the sociology of religion. The according of the first rank to this sort of phenomenon has produced some astonishment, but it is these phenomena which are the germ from which all others—or at least almost all others—are derived. Religion contains in itself from the very beginning, even if in an indistinct state, all the elements which in dissociating themselves from it, articulating themselves and combining with one another in a thousand ways, have given rise to the various manifestations of collective life. From myths and legends have issued forth science and poetry; from religious ornamentations and cults have come the plastic arts; from ritual practice were born law and morals. One can-
not understand our perception of the world, our philosophical conceptions of the soul, of immortality, of life, if one does not know the religious beliefs which are their primordial forms. Kinship started out as an essentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift and homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual, communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on.... A great many problems change their aspects completely as soon as their connections with the sociology of religion are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tracing these connections (1960:350-51).

And indeed, Durkheim's efforts and those of the Année school were "aimed at tracing these connections" between modern social and cultural phenomena and their origins in the primitive and archaic sacral complex. As Durkheim himself acknowledged of his own work: "My previous researches had to be taken up afresh in order to harmonize with these new insights," so too did Durkheim expect his new "ideal type" of the sacral complex to reorient investigations in the human sciences. And the main site in which Durkheim worked out his program was the Année itself.

Indeed, in the same volume of the Année in which his seminal program was first announced, Durkheim also offered a tentative essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena." This lead article should be seen as Durkheim's first and admittedly preliminary attempt to "... view religion as a social phenomena, indeed the primitive social phenomena, from which all others subsequently emerged" (Lukes, 1973:240). Lukes rightly reports that Durkheim's approach to religion at this point was still "largely pre-ethnographic."

... Durkheim had not yet become "saturated" with the technical and first hand literature, and in particular he was not yet, as he later became, a "veteran of Australian ethnology." Indeed, the greater part of Australian ethnographic work, which aroused an immense amount of interest among European scholars, really dated from the later 1890's. At this early stage, Durkheim's approach was largely formal and rather simplistic: he worked out a number of hypotheses about the nature of religion and its role in social life, and he set out a range of questions for the sociology of religion to confront. Subsequently, his treatment of religion was to be considerably more nuanced and complex, and in contact with a rich and detailed mass of empirical detail (1973:240).

The results of Durkheim's deepening saturation in this "rich
and detailed" Australian ethnography as he sought to demonstrate the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral complex began to appear in rapid succession thereafter in *L'Année sociologique*. In 1898, there appeared the essay "La Prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines" (translated in 1963 by Sagarin). In 1899, as noted, there was his essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena." In 1900, Durkheim's development, extension, and refinement of his earlier argument concerning "religious criminality" and related topics appeared under the title "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (translated 1973 by Jones and Scull). Also, in the school year 1900-01, Durkheim lectured for the first time on "Les Formes élémentaires de la religion." In 1902, the untranslated article "Sur le totemisme" appeared. In 1903 Durkheim and Mauss wrote the great monograph *Primitive Classification* (translated by Rodney Needham, 1963). In 1905, Durkheim published the essay "Sur l'organisation matrimoniale des sociétés australiennes" (see also Bellah, 1959, Lukes, 1973). Truly, a most productive period, with a major monograph appearing almost every year!

Clearly, Durkheim was intent on elaborating the primitive sacral complex as the central interpretive "ideal type" for the human sciences. However, in addition to these many important essays, Durkheim and his colleagues contributed a massive outpouring of book reviews on diverse subjects of interest not just to sociology, but to all the sciences of man. Space does not here permit detailed review of this fascinating and seminal scholarship, but Durkheim's fundamental outlines of the centrality of the sacral complex begin to emerge rather clearly. For example, the moral authority of certain beliefs and social practices take on the character of "sacredness," and it is the moral community which is the carrier of legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness. The organizing opposition between "sacred" and "profane" appeared in the article on defining religion in 1899. The embeddedness of primitive kinship bonds in sacral symbols, the root-
edness of social and legal obligations in religious rationales and magical formulas, the embeddedness of primitive logic in collective mythological symbolism, the compounding binary system of symbolic equations being extended to all of existence, and so on and so forth, all first emerged during this highly creative period of group research into the significance of the sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person.

For illustrative purposes, one of the most revealing shifts in Durkheim's attitude toward the "repressiveness" or creativeness of the sacral complex can be found in his explanations of the sacral bases of legal phenomena such as property, contract, taxes, and so on. These shifts are especially noteworthy because they represent a clear continuity with Durkheim's earlier sociology of law, prior to the 1895 breakthrough. Durkheim developed these ideas in his often-repeated series of lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit" which, as Lukes tells us, reached their definitive form in the 1898-1900 lecture series at Bordeaux (portions of these lectures are translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals). For example, after defining the right of property as essentially resting on "the right to exclude others from use of things" (PECM: 142), Durkheim characteristically explained the origin of this specific right in sacral terms. For only the sacred can serve as the source of exclusionary taboo. Careful readers will note that here, as elsewhere, Durkheim often argued as much from an implied analogy as from historical fact.

... the thing appropriated is a thing distinct from common property. Now this feature is also shared by all religious and sacred things. Whenever we have a religious ritual, the world over, the feature that distinguishes the sacred entities is that they are withdrawn from general circulation; they are separate and set apart. The common people cannot enjoy them. Those who have a kinship, as it were, can alone have access to them—that is, those who are sacred as they are: the priests, the great, and the magistrates.... It is these prohibitions that lie at the foundation of what is called taboo.... Taboo is the the setting apart of an object as something consecrated, as something belonging to the sphere of the divine. By virtue of this setting apart, it is forbidden to appropriate the object of taboo under pain of sacrilege.... We can see how close the connection is between this con-
cept and that of ownership. Around the thing appropriated, as around the sacred thing, a vacuum formed.... Therefore, we are right in supposing that the origins of property are to be found in the nature of certain religious beliefs. Since the effects are identical, they can in all likelihood be attributed to similar causes (PECM:143-4).

Taxes also, Durkheim suggested, may have a sacral origin. For instance:

... the sacrilege that a man thinks he is committing against the gods by the very fact of tilling and breaking up the soil is, in truth, committed against society, since society is the reality hidden behind these mythical concepts. It is therefore, in a way, to society that man makes his sacrifices and offers up the victim.... These sacrifices, these first fruits of all kinds, are the earliest form of taxes. First, they are debts paid to the gods; they then become tithes paid to the priests, and this tithe is already a regular tax that later on is to pass into the hands of the lay authorities. These rites of atonement and propitiation finally become what amounts to a tax, although unsuspected. The germ of the institution is there, however, and is destined to develop in the future (PECM:162-3).

Durkheim offered a similar genealogy for the emergence of the legal institution of consensual contract. Originally, he contended, sacred oaths were the binding force for the exchange of obligations. "The consensual contract is a contract by solemn ritual" (PECM:194).

The wills can effect a bond only on condition of declaring themselves. The declaration is made by words. There is something in words that is real, natural, and living and they can be endowed with a sacred force, thanks to which they compel and bind those who pronounce them. It is enough for them to be pronounced in ritual form and in ritual conditions. They take on a sacred quality by that very act. One means of giving them this sacred character is the oath, or invocation of a divine being. Through this invocation the divine being becomes the guarantor of the promise exchanged. Thereby the promise becomes compulsive, under threat of sacred penalties of known gravity. For instance, each partypronounces some phrase that binds him and a formula by which he calls down upon his head certain divine curses if he should fail in his undertaking.... sacrifices and magical rites of all kinds reinforce still further the coercive force of the words uttered (PECM:182).

Indeed, it is interesting to note that, even in our own secularized era, legal oaths retain the character of a divinely guaran-
teed conditional self-curse (e.g., swearing on the Bible). The importance of primitive *sprachlogik* (see also Cassirer, 1953-1955-1957) and ritual stereotyping in undergirding contracts is developed further by Durkheim in terms of Roman law and culture.

This, then, seems to be the origin of contracts made in all due and solemn formality. One of their features is that they are binding only if the parties make an undertaking by a formula, solemn and agreed, which cannot be evaded. It is the formula which binds. This is the distinctive sign by which we recognize a main feature of magical and sacred formulas. The juridical formula is only a substitute for sacred formalities and rites. When certain definite words, arranged in a definite sequence, possess a moral influence which is lost if they are different or merely pronounced in a different sequence, we can be certain that they possess or have possessed a sacred significance and that they derive their peculiar powers from sacred causes. For it is only the sacred phrase which has this effect upon things and upon human beings. With the Romans especially, one fact tends to show clearly that the origin of the contract had a sacred character; this is the custom of the sacramentum. When two contracting parties were in disagreement on the nature of their respective rights and duties, they deposited a sum of money in a temple ... this was the sacramentum. The one who lost his case also forfeited the sum he had deposited. This means that he was fined to the benefit of the deity, which argues that his project was held to be an offense against the gods. These gods were, then, party to the contract*(PECM:182-3).

Durkheim then sketched out the stages in the evolution of the rights of contract as it became progressively secularized and assumed its present form. Since, again, Durkheim saw that "juridical formalism is only a substitute for sacred formalities and rites," we see that:

Had it not been for the existence of the contract by solemn ritual, there would have been no notion of the contract by mutual consent. Nor would there have been any idea that the word of honor, which is fugitive and can be revoked by anyone, could be thus secured only by magic and sacred processes.... The binding force, the action, are supplied from without. It is religious beliefs that brought about the synthesis; once formed, other causes sustained it, because it served a purpose (PECM:194).

Illustrations could be multiplied, but perhaps these suffice to indicate the brilliance of Durkheim's insight into
the sacral origins of legal, institutional, and other cultural forms, and the enduring fascination of his description of certain crucial sociocultural processes. We now see the nature and power of Durkheim's new interpretive perspective, and how far he had come, after the breakthrough of 1895, in exploring the cultural creativeness and evolutionary centrality of the primitive sacral womb. Indeed, it is, perhaps, not too much to suggest that Durkheim's emerging sociology of religion rested on this crucial paradigm.

3. The Third Phase: The Primitive Sacral Complex as Womb of Society and Culture

Durkheim's third phase centers, of course, on The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, published in 1912. In a very real sense this masterpiece represented the culmination of Durkheim's program announced in the preface to the second Année sociologique, which was first carried out by Durkheim himself and his co-workers in the pages of this famous "collective representation" of the Durkheimian school in France. Early in The Elementary Forms, we see Durkheim proclaiming: "Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit" (EF:87); he then proceeded to substantiate these claims in detail. Indeed, the very core of Durkheim's exhaustive examination of Australian aboriginal religion as the site for his crucial experiment into the genetic and evolutionary creativity of the sacral complex was his premise that only primitive religion was capable of imposing moral and conceptual unity upon empirical diversity; in short, of transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Thus, primitive rite and myth provided the crucial foundation, the template, as it were, which subsequent cultural forms only elaborated. "The fundamental categories of thought ... and science are of religious origin.... All the great social institutions have been born in religion" (EF:466).
This third and culminating period opens roughly around 1906, with Durkheim's lecture course on "La Religion: Origines" (see Stanner, 1967:225; Lukes, 1973:581). By this time, Durkheim had become thoroughly "saturated" with the ethnographic literature on Australia and North America. In 1907, Durkheim delivered his paper "The Determination of Moral Facts" in which he, as Parsons noted years ago, widened out his moral theory to include desirability as well as obligation. In 1909, Durkheim published the first part of his forthcoming Formes Elementaires. In this regard, Stanner tells us:

Durkheim at first intended to publish under the title Elementary Forms of Thought and Religious Life. In 1909 three parts appeared as articles with titles consonant with that intention. The introduction, plus a part omitted from the book, was printed ... as 'Sociologie religieuse et theorie de la connaissance,' and versions of the second and third chapters ... as "Examen critique des systemes classiques sur les origines de la pensee religieuse.' I have not seen any explanation of the changes of title, but the effect was to obscure the second though in no way secondary object of study: an attempt to 'renovate the theory of knowledge' by a new examination of the categories. This was unfortunate because the book's longer perspective went far beyond religion. It looked in the direction of a grander sociology based on what might be called a natural positivist epistemology.... It was by means of this epistemology that in his view religion, morals, and even science could be conciliated (1967:227).

Further, Stanner, Lukes, and Giddens, among others, have all seen the importance of Durkheim's acknowledgement, early in The Elementary Forms, that in his first attempt at defining religious phenomena in the Annee article fifteen years earlier, he had stressed the obligatory aspect to the neglect of religious ideas. Doubtless, this early stress on "constraint" came from his positivist emphasis, not so much on external indices, as upon the identification of religion with the "repressiveness" of archaic legal sanctions. In 1912, Durkheim said:

It is by this that that our present definition is connected to the one that we have already proposed.... In this work, we defined religious beliefs exclusively by their obligatory character; but, as we shall show, the obligation evidently comes from the fact that these be-
liefs are the possession of a group which imposes them upon its members. The two definitions are thus in large part the same. If we have thought it best to propose a new one, it is because the first was too formal, and neglected the content of the religious representations too much (EF:63, #68).

Now, we shall not focus here on the sacred/profane opposition (but see Chapter Four), but rather on the ability of the sacred principle to organize and energize the symbolic field. It is through the notion of sacred forces, invisible yet immanent in the world, Durkheim argued, that men are first able to impose conceptual order upon the world—to mold empirical diversity into moral unity. Surely, Durkheim argued, there is nothing in the sensation of the lone, isolated ego which can supply this ordering principle. No, it is religious symbolism. In a most revealing and significant statement in his important address "Judgments of Value and Judgments of Reality" in 1911, Durkheim observed:

Collective thought changes everything it touches. It throws down the barriers of the realms of nature and combines contraries; it reverses what is called the natural hierarchy of being, makes disparity equal, and differentiates the similar. In a word, society substitutes for the world revealed to us by our senses a different world that is the projection of the ideals of society itself (SP:94-5).

This is the master thesis underlying Durkheim's Elementary Forms.

Now, early in his masterwork, Durkheim discerned the sacral origins of art and writing in the totemic symbols and designs inscribed on the churinga and other sacred objects.

It cannot be doubted that these designs and paintings also have an esthetic character; here it is the first form of art. Since they are also ... a written language, it follows that the origins of design and those of writing are one. It even becomes clear that men commenced designing, not so much to fix upon wood or stone beautiful forms which charm the senses, as to translate his thought into matter (EF:149).

Further, Durkheim suggested that the original anchors of kinship relations lay in a sacral bond. Of course, in Elementary Forms Durkheim saw totemism as symbolizing this social-sacral link.
For the members of a single clan are not united to each other either by a common habitat, or by common blood, as they are not necessarily consanguineous and are frequently scattered over different parts of the tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from their having the same relations with the same categories of things, their practising the same rites, or in a word, from their participating in the same totemic cult. Thus, totemism and the clan mutually imply each other (EF:194).

Indeed, it is interesting to note that one of his most succinct summaries of the sacral basis of the kinship bond appeared in his lectures on the development of law and morals.

All members of the same clan have within them, as it were, a particle of the divine being from which the clan is supposed to be descended. Thus, they bear the mark of a sacred symbol, and this is why they are bound to be defended, to have their death avenged, and so on (PECM:178).

The evolution of thought—indeed, the very categories of logical thought itself—were seen to be of sacral origin. In other words, "logical evolution is closely connected with religious evolution" (EF:267).

For a long time it has been known that the first systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There is no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religion began by taking the place of the sciences and philosophy (EF:21).

But how could this be so? What enabled religion to act as the womb of society and culture? The answer is to be found in the master thesis of Durkheim's stated earlier from 1911. The symbolic potency of religious representations to embrace both material and moral realms, emotion and cognition—this ability to fuse opposites, separate similarities, in short, to turn empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity—it was this ability which lay at the heart of religion's unique power and evolutionary significance.

We are now able to explain the origin of the ambiguity of religious forces as they appear in history, and how they are physical as well as human, moral as well as material. They are moral powers because they are made up entirely of the impressions this moral being, the
group, arouses in ... its individual members.... Their authority is only one form of the moral ascendancy of society over its members. But, on the other hand, since they are conceived of under material forms, they could not fail to be regarded as closely related to material things. Therefore, they dominate the two worlds. Their residence is in men, but at the same time, they are the vital principles of things. They animate minds and discipline them, but it is also they who make plants grow and animals reproduce. It is this double nature which has enabled religion to be like the womb from which come all the leading germs of human civilization. Since it has been made to embrace all of reality, the physical world as well as the moral one, the forces that move bodies as well as those that move minds have been conceived in a religious form. That is how the most diverse methods and practices, both those that make possible the continuation of the moral life (law, morals, beaux-arts) and those serving the material life (the natural, technical, and practical sciences) are either directly or indirectly derived from religion *

Because the primitive religious force is represented as a form of energy, a sort of "sacred electricity" (Weber used similar analogies) which is highly fluid and flows in and out of things, inevitably it acts to "con-fuse" them. Sacred energies overflow, they are "contagious," as Durkheim observed; and whatever they touch becomes transformed in the same degree by this "sacred contagion" (see also Chapter Four). All things touched by the same sacred forces are conceived as possessing the same essence--this becomes the elementary classificatory principle.

We have seen the facility with which the primitive confuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see one of the causes which has contributed the most to facilitating these confusions. Since religious forces are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening that the same principle animates very different objects equally; it passes from some into others as the result of either a simple material proximity or of even a superficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals, plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men because they bear the name of the animal; the animals because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks because they mark the place where the ceremonials are celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore considered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one single religious principle ought to pass as having the
same essence, and as differing from one another only in secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite natural to arrange them in a single category, and to regard them as mere variations of the same class, transmutable into one another.

When this relation has been established, it makes the phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings, in spite of their natural differences? But we have seen that these confusions and participations have played a role of the highest utility in logic; they have served to bind together things which sensation leaves apart from one another. So it is far from true that contagion, the source of these connections and confusions, is marked with that fundamental irrationality that one is inclined to attribute it at first. It has opened the way for the scientific explanations of the future *(EF:364-5)*.

Thus, just as egos are moralized into forming a society, so too is the world moralized, unified, made into an intelligible cosmos through the medium of sacral symbolism. I repeat: sacral energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world, serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage.

For instance, Durkheim proposed that the scientific notion of "force," as that of "causality," is derived, ultimately, from religious notions such as "mana," the Sioux equivalent "wakan," etc.; in short, "charismatic" energies flowing, directing, and eventually condensing into spirits and gods. "It is the first form of the idea of force" *(EF:232)*.

In fact, the wakan plays the same role in the world, as the Sioux conceive it, as the one played by the forces with which science explains the diverse phenomena of nature.... This, however, does not mean that it is thought of as an exclusively physical energy; on the contrary ... we shall see the elements going to make up this idea are taken from the most diverse realms. But this very compositeness of its nature enables it to be utilized as a universal principle of explanation. It is from it that all life comes.... The wakan is the cause of all the movements which take place in the universe.... When the Iroquois says that the life of all nature is the product of conflicts aroused between the unequally intense orenca of the different beings, he only expresses, in his own language, this modern idea that the world is a system of forces limiting and containing each other and making an equilibrium.... So the idea of force is of religious origin. It is from religion that it has been borrowed, first by philosophy, then by the sciences *(EF:232-3)*.
Moreover, because the moral and the material, the cultural and the natural, are joined in a "... solid system whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically," the totemic system becomes a cosmological and moral system simultaneously. Totemism, as the most primitive religion Durkheim thought could be discovered, offers us a rudimentary explanation of the universe. "To a greater or less extent, all known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world" (EF:165).

For the Australian, things themselves, everything which is in the universe, are a part of the tribe; they are considered elements of it, and so to speak, regular members of it; just like men they have a determined place in the general schema of society.... All known things will thus be arranged in a sort of tableau or systematic classification embracing the whole of nature (EF:166).

Thus, the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are unified and vibrate sympathetically. This organization, which at first may have appeared to us as purely logical, is at the same time moral. A single principle animates it and makes its unity: this is the totem.... All the beings arranged in a single clan, whether men, animals, plants, or inanimate objects, are merely forms of the same totemic being.... All are really of the same flesh in the sense that all partake of the nature of the totemic animal (EF:175).

Thus, religion is seen as the great, original unifying principle in Durkheim's model of the sacral womb.

In contrast, for example, to Levy-Bruhl, who posited a "pre-logical" mentality, a non-Aristotelian logic, Durkheim posited the psychic unity of mankind, and thus perceived the fundamental sources of identity, of unity in diversity. This could never come from the senses alone.

... there is nothing in experience which could suggest these connections and confusions. As far as the observation of the senses is able to go, everything is different and disconnected. Nowhere do we see beings mixing their natures and metamorphosing themselves into each other. It is therefore necessary that some exceptionally powerful cause should have intervened to transfigure reality in such a way as to make it appear under an aspect that is not really its own.
It is religion that was the agent of this transformation; it is religious beliefs that have substituted for the world, as it is perceived by the senses, another different one. This is well shown by the case of totemism. The fundamental thing in this religion is that the men of the clan and the different beings whose form the totemic emblems reproduce pass as being made of the same essence. Now when this belief was once admitted, the bridge between the different kingdoms was already built. The man was represented as a sort of animal or plant; the plants and animals were thought of as the relatives of men, or, rather, all these beings, so different for the senses, were thought of as participating in a single nature. So this remarkable aptitude for confusing things that seem to be obviously distinct comes from the fact that the first forces with which the human intellect peopled the world were elaborated by religion. Since these were made up of elements taken from the different kingdoms, men conceived of a principle common to the most heterogeneous things, which thus became endowed with a sole and single essence (EF:268).

Against the inevitable objections, Durkheim acknowledged:

*It is true that this logic is disconcerting for us. Yet we must be careful not to depreciate it: howsoever crude it may appear to us, it has been an aid of the greatest importance in the intellectual evolution of humanity. In fact, it is through it that the first explanation of the world has been made possible.... So it is far from true that this mentality has no connection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic.... Between the logic of religious thought and that of scientific thought there is no abyss (EF:269,270,271).*

Indeed, this was Durkheim's constant refrain throughout his *Elementary Forms*—there is no gap in continuity between primitive and modern thought (see especially Horton, 1973). This thesis provides the evolutionary superstructure upon which his great masterpiece was organized. When shall we finally come to recognize his central intention was to reveal the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex?

That this was indeed Durkheim's core thesis can be seen from a most revealing contrast, drawn by Durkheim himself, between his own work and that of his colleague Levy-Bruhl in a book review which appeared in 1913 in *L'Année sociologique*. Although he acknowledged that they agreed on many points, most notably that "primitive mentality is essentially religious," Durkheim also took pains to distance himself from Levy-Bruhl's...
"contrast/inversion" schema, as Horton (1973) has termed the latter's description of the passage from primitive to modern thought.

We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of human mentality, however different they may be, far from deriving from different sources, are created one by the other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type and form, force and causality, and personality--those in short, to which philosophers have given the name of "categories," and which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated within the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages in the intellectual life of mankind.... Although, therefore, human mentality has changed and evolved over the centuries in relation to society, the different types which it has successively manifested have each given rise to the other. The higher and more recent forms are not opposed to the lower and more primitive forms, but are created out of the latter (in Giddens, 1972a:248-9).

Once one grasps the depth and meaning of Durkheim's vision, the whole world becomes transformed; one experiences the light dawning, the gestalt switch which constitutes scientific revolutions. For that which had been once outcast, especially by Durkheim himself and his Enlightenment brethren, I mean the unintelligible, chaotic, and even frightening pole in the positivist faith--namely, the past and religion--were now rehabilitated, transformed into meaning and historical order. Levy-Bruhl, who also overemphasized the rationality of "modern man," simply had not yet broken with Enlightenment dogma. But Durkheim had, at least in his own mind, effectively reconciled religion and reason; and the prime alchemical instrument was the creativeness of the sacral womb. Primitive man brought order out of chaos through myth and ritual. While many prepared the way, this was one of the most crucial aspects of Durkheim's revolution in the human sciences (see also Lukes, 1973:474-5).

Now, it must be remembered that the creativeness of the primitive sacral complex was evolutionary as well as genetic. Indeed, it was his evolutionism which first led Durkheim to discover the creativeness of primitive religion in the first place. For example, as we noted in review of The Division of
Labor, Durkheim had already recognized the close relation between the evolution of the collective and individual conscience, and the evolution of the notions of the gods. For, much like Weber in his profound sketch in The Sociology of Religion (1963), Durkheim outlined the progressive passage from clan-based exclusionary socio-religious bonds to universalistic or civilizational symbolic bonds. Originally, said Durkheim, totemism served as the sacral base of the kinship bond, for only those who had been similarly transformed in the ecstatic "collective effervescence" and the communion sacrifice, and who shared similar ancestral genealogies, could bond themselves together in a functioning cult. But the commensal barriers of clan particularism barred passage to a tribal or inter-societal symbolic bonds. Like Weber, then, Durkheim's key analytical variables here were the obstacles and facilitating channels for the progressive passages from particularistic to universalistic social and cultural bonds. For example, in speaking of clan totemism, he proposed:

... it is the nature of the social environment which has imposed this particularism. In fact, as long as totemism remains at the basis of the cultural organization, the clan keeps an autonomy in the religious society which, though not absolute, it always very marked.... The group of things attributed to each clan, which are a part of it in the same way the men are, have the same individuality and autonomy. Each of them is represented as irreducible into similar groups, as separated from them by a break of continuity, and as constituting a distinct realm. Under these circumstances, it would never occur to one that these heterogeneous worlds were different manifestations of one and the same fundamental force; on the contrary, one might suppose that each of them corresponded to an organically different mana whose action could not extend beyond the clan and the circle of things attributed to it. The idea of a single and universal mana could be born only at the moment when the tribal religion developed above that of the clans and absorbed them more or less completely. It is along with the feeling of tribal unity that the feelings of the substantial unity of the world awakens.... Totemism is essentially a federative religion which cannot go beyond a certain point of centralization without ceasing to be itself (EF:225-6).

Having noted the resistance of clan particularism to extension of the socio-religious bond, Durkheim next explored
some special channels which facilitated the spread of "religious internationalism." Cross-clan sexual totemism, tribal initiation rites stemming from the "organization of the tribe into phatries, matrimonial classes ... and the exogamic interdictions attached to them" (EF:319), become "veritable tribal institutions." Mythologies grow up around special heroes or sponsoring ancestors of these intra-tribal institutions. Such gods struggled, as the clans themselves struggled for structural and cultural supremacy; in the clash, and in the new order of reconciliation, one god emerged supreme.

... the authority of each of these supreme gods is not limited to a single tribe; it is recognized equally by a number of neighboring tribes.... There are very few gods for a relatively extended geographical area. So the cults of which they are the object have an international character. It even happens sometimes that mythologies, intermingle, combine and make mutual borrowings (EF:325).

The passage from the ancestral geniuses to the idea of a tribal god was accomplished through the medium of the civilizing heroes as a transitional third term (EF:328). Here:

... the clans were, in a sense, the fragments of the divine body. Now is this not just another way of saying that the great god is the synthesis of all the totems and consequently, the personification of the tribal unity?... Thus an international mythology was established, of which the great god was quite naturally the essential element.... So his name passed to it.... The internationalization of the totems opened the way for that of the great god.... This culminating idea is united without any interruption to the crudest beliefs which we analyzed to start with. In fact, the great tribal god is only an ancestral spirit who finally won a preeminent place. The ancestral spirits are only entities forged in the image of the individual souls whose origin they are destined to explain. The souls, in their turn, are only the form taken by the impersonal forces which are found at the basis of totemism, as the individualize themselves in the human body. The unity of the system is as great as its complexity (EF:332).

Finally, again emphasizing the importance of "religious cosmopolitanism" in extending the social bond from the sub-societal to the civilizational level, and consequently, in helping to build universalistic and universalizable structures of conscience and consciousness, Durkheim concludes:
So it is far from true that religious internationalism is a peculiarity of the most recent and advanced religions. From the dawn of history, religious beliefs have manifested a tendency to overflow out of one strictly limited political society; it is as though they had a natural aptitude for crossing frontiers, and for diffusing and internationalizing themselves. Of course, there have been peoples and times when this spontaneous aptitude has been held in check by opposed social necessities; but this does not keep it from being real and ... very primitive (EF:326; see also 473-4).

In sum, I submit that, almost a decade and a half after first announcing his program, Durkheim had demonstrated the generic and genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sacerd complex as the womb of society, culture, and person to the several human sciences. Should we not now, after many decades of neglect, turn our attention to Durkheim's revolution in the human sciences?1

D. Shifts in the Connotational Load Carried by the Term "Religion" in Durkheim's System of Sociology

Paradigmatic terms often depend for their symbolic potency on a series of connotations which they accumulate over the years. In general, the greater the connotational load, the greater the number of diverse meanings a paradigmatic term may embrace. Indeed, we often witness the "proteanization" of paradigms, of symbolically charged terms as they become capable of embracing myriad meanings, and thus, of transforming empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. Seen in this light, the potency of Durkheim's sociology of religion depended, to a large extent, upon the multiplicity of meanings or connotational load which it carried. Thus, perhaps it would be helpful if we attempted to sort out some of the separable meanings of the term "religion" which Durkheim managed to conflate, or tie together.

The first and most general way in which Durkheim utilized the term "religion" was in the common sense meaning of the term—he variously spoke of "religion as such," "religion properly considered," and so on. This everyday, unreconstructed connotation implied the usual elements of sacredness, cosmic
principles or divinities directing life, attempts by men to represent and communicate with these generative and directive forces, the problems of evil, institutions and religious specialists—in short, the system of reciprocal relations between macrocosm and microcosm. Indeed, the key elements of Durkheim's explicit definition of religion—namely, sacredness and the moral community (Lukes, 1973)—centered on just these generally accepted meanings of "religion as such."

However, it was precisely against these generalized background connotations that Durkheim directed his initial positivist revision of the meaning and referent of religious symbolism and action. As a positivist, Durkheim ruled out of court—even before proceedings began—the usual theological and metaphysical claims put forward by most religions. For he proposed:

[Men] invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way in which they were led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to trans-figure them by thought (EF:239-40).

References could be multiplied; but Durkheim never wavered from his positivist denial of a transcendental meaning to religion. Indeed, such transcendental truth claims had to be rejected out of hand, for as the French moral and intellectual reformers well knew, such "essentialist" appeals blocked their own "laic" program to construct an "existential" conscience and consciousness. Against the dominant claims of those wayward incumbents of "office charisma" (to utilize Weber's term) who maintained a monopoly over definitive interpretation of the "Book of Revelation," the French and Latin "laic" moral reformers and prophets raised the existential claims of "personal charisma" and the certainties to be read in the "Book of Nature." Thus, in short, in the modern world religion became reduced to morality, and theology to anthroposociology.

I cannot here enter into a detailed examination of Durkheim's positivist reduction of religious phenomena. Indeed, the question is most complex, and Durkheim's treatment often surprisingly subtle. But let us agree that any adequate explanation of human action must include both a set of interpretive symbol-
ic equations by which one sphere or level is to be linked with another, and a series of transformation terms which link constitutive processes. In these terms, the Marxist, Durkheimian, Freudian, Weberian, functionalist, structuralist interpretations, to mention only some of the leading contenders, all meet the basic criteria of in-depth interpretations of human action. However, at least one other crucial interpretive canon should be immediately introduced—namely, the phenomenological injunction to attempt to discern the multiple meanings actors themselves bestow upon their own actions. Clearly, from the various "distortive" perspectives, the stated intentions of those who generate and sustain religious action can and must be set aside in favor of "lower levels" (the spatial metaphor is revealing), the "unconscious" or "latent functions." Doubtless, there is much that cannot be explained in terms of "conscious" intention; there is much that escapes us, and which must be imputed by "outside" observers. But what, then, is to be the relation between "unconscious" and "conscious" levels, between "latent" and "manifest functions," between "sub" and "superstructures?" This fundamental dilemma is analogous to the problem faced by physicists and neurophysiologists in relating the so-called "primary" and "secondary qualities."

On what grounds, for instance, did Durkheim claim that "... the error concerns the letter of the symbol employed, not the reality of the fact symbolized" (EF:299). It has not sufficiently emphasized to this point that the special method which allowed Durkheim to transmute base theism into sociological gold—which allowed him to acknowledge that "... I can only add that I myself am quite indifferent to this choice [between God and society as the religious referent], since I see in the Divinity only society transfigured and symbolically expressed" [1906](SP:52)—was an ingenious and unreflective use of analogy. This can be seen most clearly in his lectures on the sacral and magical bases for the origin and evolution of such legal categories as property, contract, and so forth. For example, Durkheim argued that there was a fundamental similarity between the private appropriation of an object or place and
the rather unusual "set apartness" of "sacred" things and places. Only rarely did he enunciate one of his most fundamental interpretive principles: "Since the effects are identical, they can in all likelihood be attributed to the same causes" (PECM:143-4).

Inevitably, however, the "reductionistic" position involves one in various unforeseen difficulties. As William Kolb (1953), Evans-Pritchard (1965), Ricoeur (1970), and many others have pointed out over the years, if people did not believe in the reality and efficacy of their actions, they simply would not pursue them; as a consequence, the "distortive" theorists would be deprived of their complex and ingenious sets of interpretive symbolic equations. Unwittingly, Durkheim himself acknowledged this dilemma years ago: "It is undoubtedly true that if they were able to see that these influences which they feel emanate from society, then the mythological system of interpretations would never be born" (EF:239). Nevertheless, he still insisted on the unique truth of his own systematic insight: "But social action follows ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex, to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes" (EF:239). Lukes reports that in 1914, at a conference, Durkheim was asked directly this question by Gustave Belot:

Durkheim, Belot insisted, was (despite his claims to the contrary), maintaining that all religions were false, in so far as they did not accept his own theory. Who, asked Belot, would continue to pray, if he knew he was praying to no one, but merely addressing a collectivity that was not listening? Where, he continued: 'is the man who would continue to take part in communion if he believed that it was no more than a mere symbol, and that there was nothing real in it' (1973:518)?

Doubtless there are many subtleties not addressed here, but, ultimately this dilemma comes down to the fact that even the "distortive" theorists who reduce religion down to the "lower levels" must end up by laying claim to some special dispensation for their own uniquely inspired alchemies. So tenuous do these alchemies become sometimes, so dependent are they upon the special faiths which inspired them, that they all run the very real risk, as Raymond Aron remarked of Durkheim's inter-
pretation, of "making their object vanish" (1970:52). And, of course, if one does not succeed, any of the other contending reductions will only be to glad to assist in making their competitors' objects of interpretation vanish. Indeed, few have remarked upon the irony of this cacophany of competing "ultimate interpretations" (but see Ricoeur, 1975); perhaps we would be best advised to set each against the other, and let the Hobbesian struggle of each against all resolve the "battle royal" of the reductionists. In sum, Durkheim must be considered a positivist whose central problem in this regard was to 

"... rediscover the reality of religion after having eliminated the supernatural from it" (Aron, 1970:51). Further, besides eliminating the generic intention from religious action and the prime referent of religious symbolism, Durkheim added the characteristic historical charge, stemming from the various "Enlightenments," that religion traditionally held man in intellectual and moral "servitude;" that religions, in short, were always, by their very nature, "repressive." Indeed, as noted before, in any all-embracing cosmological system "... law which is agreed to be the word of God Himself cannot fail to be repressive" (DL:141). Thus, the initial thrust of Durkheim's critical sociology of religion was typical for his day; it coincides with the usual "Enlightenment" charges that "religion is neither good nor true," as Benton Johnson has lucidly summarized this position.

However, after saying all this, it is important to recognize that from this point on Durkheim parted company with his anti-metaphysical, anti-clerical, rationalist "Enlightenment" brethren. His dialectical genius as one of the great modern moral philosophers takes over; for Durkheim next mounted an equally ingenious "rescue campaign" to "save the phenomena" of religion. Indeed, is it not curious that neither of the twin architects of the modern sociology of religion (the other being the "religiously unmusical" Max Weber) themselves believed in the reality of religious action, only in its human significance? Instead of wholly setting aside religion as neither good ("repressive") nor true ("superstition, the lie of the
priests"), Durkheim attempted to transmute religious thought and action into acceptable metaphors and beneficial consequences. His first step was to insist that religion cannot simply be a total illusion, because all men have believed in it in one form or another throughout history. Thus, to refute those "distortive" theorists who argue that religion is illusion and bad, Durkheim appealed to the universality of religious beliefs. "It remains incomprehensible that humanity should have remained obstinate in these errors through the ages, for experience should have very quickly proven them false" (EF:257).

The second stage in Durkheim's positivist and "laic" program to "save the phenomena" of religion without its metaphysical and hierocratic base, was rooted in the very real insight that it is the "moral community" which is the cultural carrier of intellectual and moral legitimate authority, of, in a word, "sacredness."

From our point of view, these difficulties vanish. Religion ceases to be an inexplicable hallucination and takes a foothold in reality. In fact, we can say that the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society. When the Australian is carried outside himself and feels a new life flowing within him whose intensity surprises him, he is not the dupe of an illusion; this exaltation is real and is really the effect of forces outside of and superior to the individual. It is true that he is wrong in thinking that this increase of vitality is the work of a power in the form of some animal or plant. But this error is merely in regard to the letter of the symbol ... and not in regard to the fact of its existence. Behind these figures and metaphors ... there is a concrete and living reality. Thus, religion acquires a meaning and a reasonableness that the most intransigent rationalist cannot misunderstand (EF:257).

Durkheim thus came to see religion as the prime symbolic medium by which societies first attained self-consciousness of themselves as a group. "Before all, it is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it" (EF:257). Or as Giddens lucidly summarizes: "Religion is the symbolic self-consciousness of so-
ciety, but in a form which is not truly accessible to the very men who create it" (1972a:21).

The third stage by which Durkheim conferred new significance on his positivist transformation of religion into the symbolic self-consciousness emerging from the creativeness of generic sociocultural process was the one we are primarily interested in here--namely, the unique distinction of having served as the primal creative womb of society, culture, and person. Thus, instead of being viewed primarily as "repressive" and "regressive," primitive and archaic religions now became cast as the central evolutionary matrix for all human society. What lent this proposition a paradoxical air--especially coming from a life-long "laic" positivist--was that this implied the evolution out of religion of the very cultural forms with which the former is so often opposed--namely, logic and science, indeed, rational thought itself. An extraordinary suggestion! While religion and science may oppose each other in the modern world as competing bases for legitimate intellectual and moral authority, in their common origins in the primitive sacral complex they were as one. Rather than the over simple rationalist equation of evolutionary progress with secularization, Durkheim insisted that the achievements of primitive religions were an integral part of cultural evolution (see especially Robin Horton, 1973).

However, in the symbolic underground of this positivist moral philosopher's thought, I propose that Durkheim's dialectical drive took him even further in attempting to reconcile these apparent opposites. For Durkheim's dialectical genius led him to attempt to transmute religion, through the evolutionary process, into reason. The alchemical instrument was, of course, the notion of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture. Now, remember that one of the positions often held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren, against which he polemicized so vigorously, was the supposition that "Reason" is a generic human faculty, embedded deep within the lone, isolated, abstract ego. On the contrary, Durkheim argued, the fundamental categories of human thought,
and even the notion of the person itself, are social and cultural and historical constructions. As societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems; and, as Durkheim proposed, collective representations, once born in the primitive sacral complex, tend to become increasingly abstract, autonomous, universalizable, and rational as they reach civilizational levels. And, of course, public symbols and moral rules were the preconditions for the awakening of individual conscience and consciousness. In sum, Durkheim argued that the autonomization of the person, and rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse, proceed together on the world-historical level (see E. Leites, 1974; B. Nelson, 1973a). In short, what I suggest is that, by a complex and often circuitous series of more or less implicit symbolic equations and cultural-historical transformations, Durkheim's reconstructed positivist system tended to transmute religion into reason. Indeed, if one understands this complex transformational sequence, we can begin to fathom why Durkheim so assiduously pursued the construction of sociology as the "science of the moral life --for sociology was itself destined to become the new form of societal self-consciousness, the new fount of legitimate "laic" moral and intellectual authority, the new ground of "sacredness." Lukes, among others, has noted this crucial dialectical transformation: "... as a cognitive enterprise, religion was, if not quite defunct, certainly moribund. Sociology was its successor" (1973:476).

Thus, Durkheim's positivist paradox was made possible only by the combination of his dialectical genius and his moral earnestness. For although he set aside the generic religious intention, he simultaneously sought to save the moralizing effects of religious action by transmuting the religious core into his own sociological system--I mean quite literally. Yet, in any such profound series of symbolic transformations and intellectual alchemies, traditional connotational loads linger on. Now, it was precisely by redirecting these lingering meanings of religion in the traditional sense, by submitting them
to his own ingenious series of symbolic transmutations, that Durkheim's dialectical genius appeared to triumph in overcoming such potent traditional oppositions. If, in the final analysis, we cannot give ourselves completely over to his reductions and positivist symbolic equations, can we not, at least, follow his brilliant analytical leads into the world-historical significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person?
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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CHAPTER SEVEN

DURKHEIM ON CIVILIZATIONS AND INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL PROCESS

Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united, and combined their sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge (EF:29).

Civilization only expresses a collective life of a special genre, the substratum of which is a plurality of interrelated political bodies acting upon one another. International life is merely social life of a higher kind, and one which sociology needs to know (1971:813).

One of the most important and least explored aspects of Durkheim's system of sociology was his continuing concern with the civilizational level of sociocultural analysis. In terms of his basic explanatory model, Durkheim proposed significant parallel developments on the micro and macro levels of sociocultural process. His concern with the emergence of collectively symbolic representations out of specific social morphological conditions on the micro societal level led him to postulate, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and continuing parallel between social morphological differentiation and differentiation of the corresponding collective representations. This parallel evolutionary differentiation implied a series of key processual dimensions, including the movement from concrete to abstract symbolism, from parochial or tribal to universalizable representations, from the fused embeddedness of symbols in the primitive sacral complex to the differentiated autonomy of symbols, spheres, and persons, and so on. It is sad, but not surprising, that since the relations between societal and civilizational levels have vanished not only from secondary accounts of Durkheim's sociology but from the contemporary sociological horizon as well, the critical constitu-
tive sociocultural processes underlying these world-historic developments should also be slighted by subsequent generations of sociologists.

Durkheim's deep interest in sociocultural processes led him to investigate linkages between social morphological processes and cultural symbolic forms not merely in terms of their most elementary forms, where the essential links could be seen most clearly, but also in terms of their more complex forms, especially in terms of civilizations and inter-civilizational processes. Indeed, from his first great book to his last, Durkheim was centrally concerned with broad evolutionary passages from the simplest, most primitive levels of sociocultural process to modern complex civilizations. At various points in various works, Durkheim referred to certain collective representations (e.g. Christian individualism, Cartesian rationalism, etc.) which had become historically sedimented into Western civilization. In short, just as Durkheim recognized a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less fluid to crystallized collective representations, so too he postulated a vertical continuum of sociocultural processes ranging from the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive collective representations to the most differentiated, universal, autonomous cultural symbols on the macro-level of sociocultural process.

In The Division of Labor, for instance, Durkheim proposed that the "progressive effacement" of segmental society implied a parallel transformation of concrete and localized symbolism into more general, abstract, unifying collective representations.

In a small society, since everyone is clearly placed in the same conditions of existence, the collective environment is essentially concrete. It is made up of beings of all sorts who fill the social horizon. The states of conscience representing it have the same character. First, they are related to precise objects, as this animal, this plant, this natural force, etc. Then, as everybody is related to these things in the same way, they affect all consciences in the same way. The whole tribe, if not too widely extended, enjoys or suffers the same advantages or inconveniences from the sun, heat, or cold,
from this river, or that source, etc. The collective impressions resulting from the fusion of all these individual impressions are then determined in form as well as in object, and, consequently, the common conscience has a defined character. But it changes its nature as societies become more voluminous. Because these societies are spread over a vaster surface, the common conscience is itself obliged to rise above all local diversities, to dominate more space, and consequently to become more abstract. For not many general things can be common to all these diverse environments. It is no longer such an animal, but such a species... not this forest, but forest in abstracto (DL:287).

This movement from concrete, highly specific collective representations, especially those symbolizing the group itself in all its special particularities, is paralleled, given the underlying progressive social morphological differentiation, by another closely related evolutionary passage from highly particularized, formalized symbolisms, to increasingly generalized rules of conduct. Given the "repressiveness" of what I have earlier termed "the primitive sacral complex," Durkheim saw a progressive evolution of morality from highly ritualized, stereotyped, formalizable rules of specific conduct, to more flexible, generalized, rationalized, and more individualized forms of morality. As the index of the progressive effacement of the segmental type of tribal society in the face of the internationalization of social life, Durkheim looked to the decline of stereotyping formalism and the rise of generalizable rules of conduct. In short, the inevitable breakdown of segmental tribal society, and thus the cult upon which it rested, under the pressure of the ineluctable law of the progressive extension of the "radius of social life," meant that particularistic or tribal barriers to the internationalization of moral rules and conceptual meanings are increasingly attenuated.

At the same time as religion, the rules of law become universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at first to local circumstances, to particularities, ethnic, climate, etc., they free themselves little by little, and with the same stroke become more general. What makes this increase of generality obvious is the uninterrupted decline of formalism. In lower societies, the very external form of conduct is pre-
determined even to the details. The way in which man must eat, dress in every situation, the gestures he must make, the formula he must pronounce, are precisely fixed. On the contrary, the further one strays from the point of departure, the more moral and juridical prescriptions lose their sharpness and precision. They rule only the most general forms of conduct, and rule them in a very general manner, saying what must be done, not how it must be done (DL:289).

One of the clearest indices of this progressive movement from concrete, particularized, ritually stereotyped formalisms to abstract, increasingly universalistic symbolization, Durkheim argued, can be found in the progressive trend toward transcendental, universal, and monotheistic gods. The breakdown of the primitive sacral-magical complex is a key process in religious evolution.

The fact which perhaps best manifest this increasing tendency of the common conscience is the parallel transcendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods, but only sacred beings.... But little by little, religious forces are detached from the things of which they were first only the attributes, and become hypostatized. Thus is formed the notions of spirits or gods who, while residing here or there as preferred, nevertheless exist outside of the particular objects to which are more specifically attached. By that very fact they are less concrete.... The Graeco-Latin polytheism marks new progress in the direction of transcendence. The residence of the gods becomes more sharply distinct from that of man. Set upon the mysterious heights of Olympus, or dwelling in the recesses of the earth, they personally intervene in human affairs only in intermittent fashion. But it is only with Christianity that God takes leave of space; his kingdom is no longer of this world. The dissociation of nature and the divine is so complete that it degenerates into antagonism. At the same time, the concept of divinity becomes more general, and more abstract, for it is formed, not of sensations, as originally, but of ideas. The God of humanity necessarily is less concrete than the gods of the city or the clan (DL:288-9).

It is significant that Durkheim's description of the evolution of the gods, and the corresponding evolution of law and morality, parallels Weber's insights into the development of early religions. Both Durkheim and Weber--especially in his magisterial The Sociology of Religion (1963 and 1968)
--viewed the progressive tendency toward religious universalism, and the corresponding decline of the primitive stereotyped sacral-magical collectivized structures of conscience and consciousness, as one of the critical processes in sociocultural evolution. In contrast to Durkheim, however, Weber searched for the specific historical preconditions allowing specific cultural carriers of universalizing religious tendencies to breakthrough the primitive cosmological and ritual consciousness. Significantly, even though Durkheim viewed these cumulative series of specific historical breakthroughs abstractly, as constituting generic evolutionary processes, nonetheless, at certain points, he did acknowledge the uniqueness of Christian universalism, for example (see also Book Three).

While Durkheim abstractly viewed religious universalism as a generic evolutionary process in The Division of Labor, two decades later in The Elementary Forms he took greater care to explain how this tendency came about. At first, it might appear that Durkheim's turn to wider-than-societal frames such as universalistic religions and civilizations might prove inconsistent with the foundation theorem of his school. For how is it possible to link universalistic cultural forms to their functions in a specific social body? In other words, how are we to anchor collective representations on the civilizational level to a geographically determinable social morphological substratum, when such symbols by definition transcend tribal and national boundaries? In The Elementary Forms Durkheim answered by moving from the micro, intra-societal level to the macro-evolutionary, inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal level. On the intra-societal level, as our investigation of his basic causal model demonstrated, Durkheim proposed that cultural forms symbolized the collective relationships of people brought into sustained interaction. Now, as once before when he moved from the intra-societal level of competition to the international division of labor, on the inter-societal or civilizational level Durkheim extended the underlying logic of the collectively symbolizing process to include
the increasingly universalistic relations between members of different societies; or, as he would say, members of a new international social life.

... If religion is the product of social causes, how can we explain the individual cult and the universalistic character of certain religions? If it is born in foro externo, how has it been able to pass into the inner conscience of the individual and penetrate there ever more and more profoundly? If it is the work of definite and individualized societies, how has it been able to detach itself from them, even to the point of being conceived as something common to all humanity (EF:472)?

Durkheim answered that the increasing cosmopolitanism of religious life and symbols is a consequence of his basic law—the ever-increasing extension of the radius of social energy and collective life.

Neighboring tribes of a similar civilization cannot fail to be in constant relations with each other. All sorts of circumstances give an occasion for it: besides commerce, which is still rudimentary, there are marriages; these international marriages are very common in Australia. In the course of these meetings, men naturally become conscious of the moral relationship which united them.... If sacred beings are formed which are connected with no geographically determined society, that is not because they have an extra-social origin. It is because there are other groups above these geographically determined ones, whose contours are less clearly marked: they have no fixed frontiers, but include all sorts of more or less neighboring and related tribes. The particular social life thus created tends to spread itself over an area with no definite limits. Naturally, the mythological personages who correspond to it have the same character; their sphere of influence is not limited; they go beyond the particular tribes and their territory. They are the great international gods. Now there is nothing in this situation which is peculiar to Australian societies. There is no people and no state which is not part of another society, more or less unlimited, which embraces all the peoples and all the states with which the first comes in contact, either directly or indirectly; there is no national life which is not dominated by a collective life of an international nature. In proportion as we advance in history, these international groups acquire a certain importance and extent. Thus we see how, in certain cases, this universalistic tendency has been able to develop itself to the point of affecting not only the higher ideas of the religious system, but even the principles upon which it rests (EF:473-4).
Alongside these parallel passages in sociocultural evolution from concrete, tribal, sacreligious legitimated collective symbols to the later abstract, general, universalizable, differentiated, and secularly autonomous spheres of complex cultures, Durkheim posited a critical corollary movement—namely, the evolutionary emergence of logical thought itself. Here, Durkheim's view of universalization, abstraction, differentiation, autonomization, and rationalization was parallel in many ways to Weber's view of the increasing rationalization of all departments of life. In contrast to those who presumed that the structure of logical thought was inherent in human nature, Durkheim set out one of the most significant and overlooked postulates of his entire system—namely, that the very structures of rational thought, and, in turn, the rationales underlying modern individualism, are themselves sociocultural historical constructions. Given the inevitable extension of the radius of social life, and therefore progressive social morphological differentiation, then the corresponding differentiation and extension of collectively symbolic cultural forms served as critical vehicles for the elaboration of rationality and individualism. In other words, the widening of the social bond and rationalization of morality and thought proceed together on the world-historical level. It is, Durkheim argued, only the fact that these sociocultural constructions are so deeply sedimented in the very nature of modern complex civilization that we fail to perceive their historical character.

It has often been remarked that civilization has a tendency to become more rational and more logical. The cause is now evident. That alone is rational which is universal. What baffles the understanding is the particular and the concrete. Only the general is well thought of. Consequently, the nearer the common conscience is to particular things, the more it bears their imprint, the more unintelligible it also is*(DL:289-90).

Now, one of Durkheim's basic dichotomies in this regard was the opposition between concepts and sensations. Here, this root dichotomy takes on a genetic-historical character, for Durkheim identified primitive thought with localized sensations,
and logical thought with more generalized, differentiated, and abstracted social relationships.

That is why primitive civilizations affect us as they do. Being unable to subsume them under logical principles, we succeed in seeing only bizarre and fortuitous combinations of heterogeneous elements. In reality, there is nothing artificial about them. It is necessary only to seek their determining causes in sensations and movements of sensibility, not in concepts. And if this is so, it is because the social environment for which they are made is not sufficiently extended. On the contrary, when civilization is developed over a vaster field of action, when it is applied to more people and things, general ideas necessarily appear and become predominant there. The idea of man, for example, replaces in law, morality, in religion, that of Roman, which being more concrete, is refractory to science. Thus, it is the increase of volume in societies and their greater concentration which explains this great transformation (DL:290).

True to his fundamental postulates, Durkheim here expressed his seminal notion that logical or rational and universally valid thought is itself an evolutionary emergent—a sociocultural historical construction—rather than a generic given. In his conclusion to his masterpiece, The Elementary Forms, published almost two decades after The Division of Labor, Durkheim suggested:

If logical thought tends to rid itself more and more of the subjective and personal elements which it still retains from its origin, it is not because extra-social factors have intervened; it is much rather because a social life of a new sort is developing. It is this international life which has already resulted in universalizing religious beliefs. As it extends, the collective horizon enlarges; the society ceases to appear as the only whole, to become a part of a much vaster one, with undetermined frontiers, which is susceptible of advancing indefinitely. Consequently, things can no longer be contained in the social moulds according to which they were primitively classified; they must be organized according to principles which are their own, so logical organization differentiates itself from the social organization and becomes autonomous. Really and truly human thought is not a primitive fact; it is the product of a history* (EF:493).

Given the great value placed by Durkheim on these higher level evolutionary emergents—especially rationality and individualism—one might conclude that such sociocultural achieve-
ments are consciously won. However, true to his positivist commitments, and in direct contrast to spiritualistic or ethical philosophers who portray humanity as striving to reach ever-higher civilizational levels, Durkheim forcefully argued that these results are more or less mechanically produced. Far from serving as a conscious goal, these civilizational achievements are themselves mechanical results of ever-increasing social intensity, energy, social morphological differentiation and the progressive division of labor.

Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of the changes which are produced in the volume and in the density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity which is imposed upon men. It is because there is, for them, no other way of living in the new conditions in which they have been placed. From the time that the number of individuals among whom social relations are established begins to increase, they can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, harder work, and intensification of their faculties. From this general stimulation, there inevitably results a much higher degree of culture. From this point of view, civilization appears, not as an end which moves peoples by its attraction for them, not as a good foreseen and desired in advance... but as the effect of a cause, as the necessary resultant of a given state. It is not the pole towards which historical development is moving and to which men seek to get nearer in order to be happier or better, for neither happiness nor morality necessarily increases with the intensity of life. They move because they must move, and what determines the speed of this march is the more or less strong pressure which they exercise upon one another, according to their number (DL:336-7).

Toward the end of his life, Durkheim took greater care to develop the notion of civilization as the highest international level of sociocultural complexity. First, it is necessary to distinguish between several meanings of civilization, especially the meaning of "high" and "low" culture as implied in the phrase "state of civilization" as contrasted with the notion of sociocultural complexity. For example, in The Division of Labor, and even as late 1906, Durkheim still used the term civilization in the first sense:
Civilization is the result of cooperation of men in association through successive generations; it is essentially a social product. Civilization is the assembly of all the things to which we attach the highest price; it is the congregation of the highest human values (SP:54).

Second, Durkheim was often critical of other sociologists attempts to define civilizations in the second sense as a level of sociocultural complexity. He contended "... that these attempts, although conducted by sociologists of worth, have given only vague, indecisive results of little utility" (R:88,#10).

For example, in "Two Laws of Penal Evolution", Durkheim argued that "... the same society can no more change its type in the course of its evolution, than an animal can change its species during its own lifetime" [1900](1973:288), and then followed with this footnote:

This is why it does not seem to us to be very scientific to classify societies according to their degree of civilization, as both Spencer and Steinmetz have done. For one is then obliged to classify one and the same society into several social species, according to the political structure it has successively assumed or according to the degree of civilization which it has progressively passed through. What would one say of a zoologist who classified the same animal into different species in this fashion? And yet a society has even more than does an organism a definite character, unique to itself, in certain respects, from the beginning to the end of its existence; consequently, a system of classification which fails to recognize this fundamental unity seriously distorts reality. One can, of course, distinguish in this fashion between social states, not societies; and social states separated thus from the permanent substructures which binds them one to another, rest on a foundation of air. It is therefore the analysis of this infrastructure, and not the changing ways of living which it sustains, which alone can provide the basis for a rational classification (1973:307, #2).

And in the second edition of his Rules (1901), Durkheim briefly reviewed efforts such as those of the Germans Vierkadnt and Steinmetz (the latter which he published in the Année sociologique) as deficient for "... classifying not social species, but historical phases, which is quite different" (R:88). Clearly, Durkheim's own thought, still beset by biological analo-
gies, had not settled on a clear articulation of the sociological meaning and significance of "civilization."

It was not until 1913 that Durkheim, with the help of Mauss, turned attention to a fuller elaboration of this important concept in their joint "Sur la notion de civilisation" published in the last Année sociologique to appear with Durkheim at the editorial helm. Having just completed detailed analyses and explanations of the key intra-societal functions of collectively representational processes in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim next turned his attention to analysis of the inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal horizons implied in the passage from concrete, stereotyped formalisms, fused and sacralized symbols toward universalizable cultural forms. With this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level of sociocultural process the growing recognition of the importance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural forms marks a new and significant phase in Durkheim's development, albeit one which was cut short by the impending doom of World War I. Later, Mauss extended their original joint paper (see B. Nelson, 1971), and thereafter, the new thrust of Durkheimian sociology influenced some of the finest writing in the historical and social sciences produced in France (see especially the Annales...) during this era (see R. Rhodes, 1974).

Durkheim and Mauss began their important and overlooked "Note on the Notion of Civilization", only recently brought to our attention by Benjamin Nelson (1971), by observing that if the foundation theorem of their school was applied too narrowly, then crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic cultural forms constituting civilizational complexes would, unfortunately, be slighted.

One of the rules we follow here is that, in studying social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we take care not to leave them in the air but always to relate them to a definite substratum, that is, to a human group occupying a determinate portion of geographically representable space. But, of all these groups, the largest—that which comprises all of the others in itself and which consequently comprises all forms of social activity—is, it would appear, that which forms
the political society: tribe, clan, nation, city, state, and so on. It seems, then, on first view, that collective life can develop only within political organisms having definite contours, within strictly marked limits, that is to say, that the national life is the highest form of social phenomena and sociology cannot know one of a higher order. There are, nonetheless, phenomena which do not have such well-defined limits; they pass beyond the political frontiers and extend over less easily determinable spaces. Although their complexity renders their study difficult, it nonetheless behooves us to acknowledge their existence and to indicate their place within the bounds of sociology (1971:809).

Ethnography and prehistory, Durkheim suggested, have stood almost alone in "... directing our attention to this perspective," in contrast to both history, which has tacitly embraced the nation state as its basic unit of analysis, and sociology, which has looked either to sub-national social groupings or to an abstracted "humanity" (eg. see Durkheim's repeated criticisms of Comte on this matter in The Rules).

Now, this important recognition of certain potential limitations in the basic explanatory rule of their school represents not so much an abandonment of this rule on the part of Durkheim and Mauss, as a crucial turning point in the extension of their basic interpretive logics to new and more significant levels of complexity. Durkheim had previously prepared the way for this important extension by his early insistence that universal, abstract, and rational collective representations take on increasing significance in sociocultural evolution in that they come to symbolize the new emerging international social life. Universalizable symbols--those capable of constituting civilizational complexes--express public recognition of the growing bonds between members of diverse societies.

Social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a social organization do exist: they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or they develop over periods of time that exceed the history of a single society. They have a life which is some ways supranational (1971:810).
Durkheim and Mauss utilized the Indo-European family of languages to illustrate the significance of these crucial inter-societal, inter-temporal matrices of complex sociocultural life. If we limit ourselves simply to societal or subcultural analyses, we inevitably cut ourselves off from these wider horizons. This failure becomes more critical when we realize that, in general, higher levels of complexity exert greater influence on lower levels through time than vice versa.

... it has been recognized that phenomena which present this degree of extension are not independent of one another; they are generally linked in an interdependent system. It often occurs that one of these phenomena involves the others and reveals their existence.... All peoples who speak an Indo-European language have a common fund of ideas and institutions. There exist not merely isolated instances, but also complex and interdependent systems, which without being limited to a determinate political organism are, however, localizable in time and space (1971:810).

Durkheim and Mauss assigned the term "civilization" to these higher order of translocal sociocultural facts, and defined them thus: "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole" (1971:811). However, these theorists proceeded further, and noted the here-tofore neglected advantages of the civilizational perspective.

All sorts of problems, neglected until now, could be connected with this subject. One could ask what are the diverse conditions which determine variations in the areas of civilizations, why have they stopped here or there, what forms they have taken and what factors determine these forms. As Ratzel has shown, these questions that are asked concerning political frontiers could be posed equally well with respect to symbolic frontiers (frontieres ideales) (1971:812).

Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss's deep concern with the evolutionary emergence of these ascending orders of "symbolic frontiers" led them to conclude:

... civilization only expresses a collective life of a special genre, the substratum of which is a plurality of interrelated political bodies acting upon one another. International life is merely social life of a higher kind, and one which sociology needs to know. ... The exclusion of sociology from these studies would never have been considered if it were not still
believed that to explain a civilization one need
merely ask whence it comes, from what it has bor­
rowed, and by what means it has passed from one
point to another. In reality, the true manner of
understanding all this is to determine the causes
of which it is the result, that is to say, what col­
lective interactions of diverse orders produced it
(1971:813).

Further, Durkheim and Mauss emphasized the differential
susceptibility of various structural and cultural elements to
inter-cultural and evolutionary sedimentation into the socio-
cultural process on the civilizational level.

Furthermore, not all social phenomena are equally apt
to internationalize themselves. Political jurisdictions,
juridical institutions, the phenomena of social morphol­
ogy constitute part of the specific character of each
people. On the other hand, the myths, tales, money, com­
merce, fine arts, techniques, tools, languages, words,
scientific knowledge, literary forms, and ideas—all of
these travel and are borrowed. In short, they result
from a process involving more than a determinate society

Durkheim and Mauss emphasized here a critical dimension in
inter-civilizational process, for by their very nature, high­
er level cultural forms symbolizing links between diverse so­
cieties must rise above all tribalistic particularities to an
increasingly universalizable level. A year earlier in the con­
clusion to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to dis­
tinguish universality (or universalizability) from generality,
or the degree of extension of a concept.

The universality of the concept should not be confused
with its generality; they are very different things.
What we mean by universality is the property which the
the concept has of being communicable to a number of
minds, and in principle, to all minds; but this com­
municability is wholly independent of the degree of its
extension. A concept which is applied to only one ob­
ject, and whose extension is consequently at the mini­
mum, can be the same for everybody: such is the case
with the concept of a deity* (EF:482, #9).

Thus, a universalizable cultural form is one which is capa­
ble of symbolizing inter-societal, inter-temporal phenomena;
universalizable symbols lie at the very heart of the civili­
zational bond. Durkheim and Mauss developed further this cru­
cial criterion of degrees of potential universal communicabil­
ity or universalizability among the various social facts as more or less successful candidates for incorporation into the civilizational process. They noted that certain types of cultural elements, by their very nature, are predisposed to this very important process of inter-cultural and inter-temporal sedimentation.

It is justifiable, then, to ask on what this unequal coefficient of expansion and internalization depends. These differences are not determined solely by the intrinsic nature of the social phenomena, but also by the diverse conditions influencing societies. A certain form of collective life, then, may or may not be susceptible to internationalization depending on these circumstances.

Christianity is essentially international, but there have also been strictly national religions. There are some languages which are spread across vast territories; there are others which serve to distinguish nationalities, as is the case with those spoken by the great peoples of Europe (1971:812).

Durkheim and Mauss's potentially profound contribution here to the sociological theory of collective representations as key constitutive sociocultural processes on the civilizational level needs only the notion of cultural-historical traditions to become one of the most valuable perspectives in the human sciences of the future.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERSON THROUGH HISTORY

Introduction. At the outset, a paradox presents itself: how is it possible that the Durkheim who is portrayed as radically anti-individualist was also the very same thinker whose central value in the modern world was the human person? How could Durkheim deny the individual independent status, and then enshrine him at the core of modern culture? How could Durkheim, at one and the same time, authorize society as the foundation of human life, and then apotheosize the "modern cult of the individual"? Do these seemingly contradictory positions not bespeak of an ineradicable inconsistency in Durkheim's thought which vitiates its value?

Rather than demonstrating Durkheim at his worst, however, perhaps these positions reveal him at his best. For, as always, Durkheim sought to dialectically reconcile such antinomies in terms of a new and higher sociocultural synthesis. In transcending the limits of these received dichotomies, Durkheim sought to build a new foundation for the human sciences resting on the twin anchors of socio-logic and evolutionary progress. Problems in understanding this apparent combination of opposites are really ours, not Durkheim's. For we are so much the heirs of a strong tradition of individualism, of atomism and logical nominalism, that we implicitly assume there to be an inherent, ineradicable antagonism between the individual and society. As Louis Dumont (1965, 1970) suggests, our rather unique presuppositions may blind us to differing notions of personhood in other cultures; moreover, they may blind us to the sometimes destructive results of our own deepest moral commitments.

Stemming especially from Enlightenment notions of "natural reason," "natural rights," and the "social contract," we
tend to believe that the individual precedes society, that the individual is self-sufficient, and that social norms and cultural rules serve mainly to restrict the natural freedom of individuals. Indeed, freedom is often portrayed primarily in negative terms such as liberation, as shedding of controls, release from the "ancient servitudes," from the irrational constraints of blood, soil, tradition, and Church. Thus, our modern negative images of freedom as release from control rest on two essential corollaries: the notion of a self-subsistent ego which is the real source of moral virtue and the foundation of certain knowledge, and a state of nature in which this ego dwells. Freedom today, therefore, implies the release of the individual ego from irrational traditional social constraints, and return to its pre-established interior harmonies. Conceived with this rhetorical bias, then, freedom in positive terms means largely the spontaneous acting out of impulse and primary process, of total simultaneous integration of body and mind, of immediate consummation of desire. In the 1970's, at least in America, the Religion of The Self is deepened through the endless pursuit of myriad ingenious "therapeutics" designed to shed all distorting external constraints, and to restore the Self to its natural harmony. Starting from the lone, isolated ego, solipsism becomes the tacit epistemology, and narcissism our lived ethic.

The sources of this vast "transvaluation of values" are many; but their very diversity and pervasiveness reinforces the dynamic mainline of development. The intimate linkage between "Reason" and "Individual" in Rationalist and Utilitarian philosophy alike, and between the "Individual," subjectivity, and the inner emotions of angst in Romantic and Idealistic philosophy and art, both placed great emphasis on the generic individual. And Durkheim spoke of his own countrymen as "lone wolves, given to a fierce individualism, and suspicious isolation." But what these various cultural traditions, in their common opposition to the social organicism and interpersonal ethics of the lingering Catholic cultural tradition, had placed so high, Durkheim placed low with his notion of
the irrationality and insatiability of the pre-social ego.

Now, it may help to recall that the critical problem faced by the pioneers of early modern cultures was a compelling response to massive crises of human certainty and certitude. In the transitional passage to the modern era, haunting questions widely asked included: "How shall I know if I am saved? How do we know anything to be true? How shall we gain certain knowledge?" During that time which Huizanga called "the waning of the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed "the Counter-Renaissance," skepticism, fideism, and probabilism, and so forth held the day. Against this background, various priestly and prophetic figures, various ascetics and mystics, rose up to proclaim new and mighty objective certainties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certitude in the human subject, such pioneers of early modern cultures as Luther, Calvin, the spiritual radicals, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, and so forth (whatever their myriad other differences), all relied on a deeply interior faith, or feeling, the inherent rationality of the human mind, or some inner experience of an equally irreducible sort. In these parallel solutions, the religion of the "inner light" and the significance of the Self was raised to new heights. Thus, for example, Luther's response to the feeling of pervasive evil, of total guilt, and anxiety about his own salvation led him to the doctrine of justification by faith alone (sola fide). Descartes' response to skepticism and the reigning "fictionalism" of the Church establishment was to have recourse to a rigorous mathematical clarity anchored in the irreducible self-consciousness of the ego (cogito, ergo sum). And in a slightly different manner, Calvin's notion of the predestined elect and the Puritan's "automachia" (Bercovitch, 1975) reinforced the same trend. With these pioneers of the modern moral universe, there begins that momentous "journey into the interior" which also pervades Montaigne's essays, Pascal's frightened existential loneliness and conversion, the Elizabethan's melancholic malaise seen in Hamlet's anxiety without a true "objective correlative," Leibnitz's mon-
ads, Hobbes' atomism and nominalism, Locke's empiricism, the Scottish moralists' "common sense" and the unbridled egoism of the Utilitarian reformers, Rousseau's romanticism of feeling, and on through the various metamorphoses of the Transcendental Self of the idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and so many others. In the modern era, then, the anchor of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shifts decisively away from the intelligibility of the natural world mirrored in man's reason (logos), from tradition, from Church, from community, to the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible Subject.

In his profound extension of Durkheim's work on the evolution of the person through history, Marcel Mauss, after tracing the progressive sedimentation of the notion of personhood, for instance, speaks of the importance of the philosophy of the Transcendental Ego in the last couple of centuries.

However, the notion of the person had to undergo yet another transformation to become what it has become in less than one and a half centuries, the category of the ego. Far from being the primordial, innate idea, clearly inscribed since Adam in the most profound depth of being, here it continues almost to our day, slowly raising itself, clarifying, specifying, identifying itself with knowledge of the self, with the psychological consciousness (1968:477).

We enter here a new moral universe. Not only is this moral subject autonomous, but it is also, and this proved decisive, self-reliant by virtue of the "personal charisma" of its own "inner light." The same notion lay, of course, at the heart of the "Protestant principle;" truth and freedom in the "Protestant Era" (Tillich, 1957) came to be seen as the inherent possession or discovery of this moral subject, this intellectual and self-sufficient monad. Here again, Mauss, after Durkheim, sounds an important theme in the cultural-historical connections between religion and secular ideas which brings us close to Weber and which we shall explore at greater length in Book Three. For Mauss explicitly suggests some crucial connections between the sec-
tarian currents of the post-Reformation period and the Romantic-Idealistic philosophers and moralists.

The importance of the sectarian movements in the formation of political and philosophical thought throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not be exaggerated. There the questions of individual liberty, of individual conscience, of the right to communicate directly with God, to be one's own minister, to have an internal God, were posed. The notions of the Moravian Brethren, of the Puritans, the Wesleyans, the Pietists, are those which form the base on which the notion of the person-ego, ego-conscience, is established and is the primordial category there (1968:478).

After secularization, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic angst and Idealism remained rooted in the residues of this "inner light mysticism" in terms of each individual's private "stock of reason" granted him by nature, the Romantic Self, and so on (see especially Benjamin Nelson, 1965c).

Hence, to a great extent, modern ethics, as well as modern epistemology largely rest on this hidden, though fundamental, notion of the autonomous and self-reliant "inner light." Therefore, conventional epistemological distinctions between rationalism and empiricism, for instance, are not fully revealing in these terms. For the common foundations of these major modern cultural traditions are based on a new sense of self, a new moral and intellectual subject; in truth, a New Model Man. Indeed, only on such a basis could so much be set aside, and modern philosophy predicate itself on the autonomous, isolated, self-subsistent ego, floating in space, endowed with rationality, and able to directly intuit or experience the essential structures of the world. It is on such a basis that the ill-fated program of constructing a presuppositionless philosophy has failed, again and again.

Against this whole background, then, Durkheim took up an entirely different stance, a revolutionary position. He argued: "We have no justification for supposing that our mind has within it at birth, completely formed, the prototype of the elementary frameworks of classification" (PC:8). But the deeply embedded notion of the generic ego endowed with a self-guiding rationality shining by virtue of its own inviolable
"inner light" was difficult for Durkheim's socio-logic to dislodge because this counter-logic was ultimately rooted in a rhetorically inspired counter-ethic. Durkheim was insightful to observe that the religion and epistemology of the Self is a modern cultural institution; for the generic ego as the prime repository of an innate moral sense and a calculus of rationality depends on the prior negation of tradition and the delegitimation and stripping away of the authority of culture. Perhaps this is what is felt by so many to be at stake in these "realist" versus "nominalist" debates--namely, the implicit (and I believe misleading) symbolic equation between rationality, individualism, and freedom. In his program to dissolve the presumption of a necessary connection between nominalist premises, on the one hand, and rationality, freedom, and the value of the human person on the other, Durkheim had to move first against the unwarranted conflation of ego and person, and insist instead on the social construction of personhood, rationality, and freedom.

Perhaps we might term Durkheim's revolution in this forensic context the "social realism breakthrough," or the enshrinement of a "social reality principle" (eg. see B. Nelson, 1962). Now, as we discovered earlier in this Book (see also Book Three, part I), Durkheim set out to unravel the received systems of symbolic equations on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary levels. On the first level of universal or generic elements, Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex rhetorically incorporated the autonomous ego of the Utilitarians, Rationalists, and Romantics alike, but at a lower level. By inverting its high valuation, Durkheim transformed the ego into the negative pole of his world-view. The socially constructed person was counterposed to the organic ego as the soul had once been contrasted with the body. Ego is to person as body was to soul. Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with social norms and the moralized person, on the one hand, and the profane with dispersed egos engaged in mundane, self-centered, merely utilitarian tasks on
the other. Thus, on the abstract, generic level, Durkheim regarded the pre-social individual or organic ego as the negative carrier of insatiable and egoistic passions (or at least, as the locus of privatized passions). On the same level, he portrayed society as the source of moral discipline, legitimate authority, reason, concepts, universalizable rules, and so on and so forth.

Now, in one sense Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation of a key image of his opponents (even though inverted) must be considered a clever, though ultimately misconceived, forensic device since he thereby admitted in the backdoor some of the very elements against which he had so resolutely taken up arms in the first place (see also Book Three, part I). Nonetheless, in a different way, Durkheim's distinctions represented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens provides an important clue to the deeper significance of Durkheim's efforts in distinguishing between the generic ego and the socioculturally and historically constructed person when he insists: "Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach 'liberal individualism,' regarded as a conception of the characteristics of the modern social order, from 'methodological individualism'" (1971b:210).

The deeper intellectual and cultural ramifications of Durkheim's revolution in thought become more clear and compelling if we recognize that for centuries the progressive mainlines of European thought had tacitly presumed there to be necessary inner logical, ethical, and historical connections between so-called "methodological individualism" and atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism) and its supposed epistemological correlates of Pragmatic or Utilitarian empiricism, and its ethical correlates of individual freedom, liberal democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man" (see also Lukes, 1968, 1969, 1973). Thus, on the generic level, Durkheim set out to dissolve these symbolic equations by first denying isolated egos these claimed virtues and assigning them instead to society and culture. As Lukes notes "... [Durkheim] sought ... to cut the conceptual knot that has fre-
quently been held to tie methodological individualism to liberalism, asserting both the autonomy of sociology and the sacredness of the individual" (1969:19). The generic ego became the repository of negative, rather than positive, values such as insatiable sensual appetites, irrationality, and so forth—in short, of anomie and egoisme.

On the historical level, Durkheim insisted: "It is only by historical analysis that we can discover what makes up man, since it is only in the course of history that he is formed" (DHN:325). Recall, again, that one of the positions held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren against which he polemized so vigorously and successfully (eg. see The Elementary Forms) was the supposition that "Reason" is a generic human faculty, embedded by nature within the isolated, abstract Ego. On the contrary, Durkheim argued, the fundamental categories of human thought itself, and indeed the very notion of the person, are social and cultural and especially historical constructions. Indeed, Durkheim's key thesis which we shall presently explore is that the person emerges through history.

On the genetic-evolutionary level, Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social conditions at the two ends of history. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self is necessarily submerged in the group; it is permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective conscience. In evolutionary terms, we witness the progressive awakening of structures of conscience and consciousness, or the emergence of the person. Individual autonomy and responsibility progressively emerge with societal differentiation. Indeed, the de-collectivization of structures of responsibility forms a central theme throughout all of Durkheim's sociology. Far from being embedded in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person is rather a critically important sociocultural historical construction.

But how could the individual be at one and the same time considered basically amoral and the evolutionary object
and expression of a higher morality? No real paradox obtains, however, since Durkheim's philosophical notion of the pre-social or organic ego was couched on the generic or universal level, while, on the other hand, his notion of moralized individualism as a sociocultural emergent was cast on the evolutionary and historical level. The first image represents a generic given, while the second image concerns the construction of the autonomous moral conscience and consciousness as the preeminent value of the modern world. Durkheim clearly saw that instead of being primarily rooted as fixed faculties in the generic ego, modern universalistic and rational classificatory systems had undergone a long and difficult evolution which they could not themselves adequately explain in terms of their own premises. Modern science and philosophy, of course, have great trouble explaining their own histories in terms of their own special premises; Hegel saw this clearly. The inner key to the evolution of societies and their symbolic systems is the link between the extension of the social bond, widening fraternization, and rationalization and universalization of classificatory systems, and thus, of the foundations of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Scientific rationality, and even the logic upon which it rests, then, is itself a comparatively modern cultural institution!

Those who uncritically embrace the conventional portrait of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching for the generic bases of social order and control may find themselves puzzled by the fact that Durkheim did not urge a return to the "value consensus" of primitive "mechanical solidarity." After all, to Durkheim, wasn't society all and the individual nothing? Isn't this position inherently conservative? On the contrary, as an Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim's central value was the autonomy and rationality of the human person. What he called "moral individualism," as embodied for example in Christian ethics, especially in its Protestant varieties and certain secular variants (eg. "The Rights of Man," see his "Individualism and the Intellectuals," transla-
ted by Lukes, 1969) was his central value system. At no point did Durkheim urge a return to the "repressive" primitive sacrificial-magical complex.

Like his rhetorical opponents, Durkheim retained the modern cult of the human person (la personne humain) as the prime source of value integration in modern "organic solidarity." Durkheim's perennial moral dialectic between person, society, and history led him to seek to balance these relationships in a way never before fully achieved—namely, by rescuing both the moral solidarity of archaic societies and the respect for the person generated by societal differentiation and the division of labor. The dialectical balance he sought can be found neither in the "excessive individualisms" of modern society, nor in the "insufficient individuation" of "mechanical solidarity."

In sum, instead of the pre-social individual as the prime carrier of modern values, Durkheim polemicized against his opponents' enshrinement of the organic ego, the lower and lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amoral, egocentric, driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly destructive. In the process, Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of derivation of autonomous individualism from "realist" rather than "nominalist" premises. Hence, Durkheim's insistence on a negative image of the isolated generic ego, and his transference of the source of moral goodness to society, coupled with his corresponding postulate that moral individualism, far from being a human universal, is rather a sociocultural historical construction, snapped apart the tacit but deeply rooted prevailing presupposition of certain necessary inner links between logical nominalism and moral and political autonomy. Durkheim thus severed the inner symbolic links between these doctrines in mediating between preceding cultural traditions by rejecting certain points and incorporating others in a revised form in a new and more compelling model. A bold and powerful doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the still pervasive presumption of the necessity of the inner symbolic connections which Durkheim set out to dissolve, has
still to be understood in its full significance. I repeat: Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of derivation of autonomous or moralized individualism from "realistic" or "socially organic" premises. This was one of Durkheim's most profound revolutions in the human sciences.

Now, the long-standing critique of Durkheim as a kind of Platonizing metaphysician of society--an extreme hypostatizing social realist--persists in the still popular rendering of Durkheim as stridently anti-individualist (but see Chapter Four of this Book). Against this misleading image, Anthony Giddens rightly suggests:

Most secondary observers of Durkheim have failed to connect his analytical discussion (and rejection) of individualism as a methodological approach to social theory with his developmental conception of the emergence of individualism as a morality brought into being by the growth of the differentiated division of labor.... Durkheim is often regarded as being fervently anti-individualist. But his works contain a vigorous defense of individualism--understood in a specific way.... Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach "liberal individualism" regarded as a conception of the characteristics of the modern social order, from "methodological individualism" (1971b:210).

Hence, the misleading, but still pervasive, image of Durkheim as hostile to individualism must now give way to more subtly inflected distinctions drawn between the various meanings assigned by Durkheim to the term "individual" on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary levels (see Chapter Two; also Lukes, 1973:21-2; Giddens, 1971b:217).

This final chapter of Book One on the emergence of the person through history strives to pull together the various strands of our review of the substantive "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's work on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary levels as presented thus far; and it also serves as a transition between these considerations and the potent ambiguities to be discovered in switching from Durkheim's first to second schema of suicide as developed in Books Two and Three. It also helps to set up our investigation into the historical and cultural roots of anomie and egoisme in Book Three. In our
present synthetic effort, the essence of our analysis centers on these theses:

(1) the person, as contrasted with the ego, is socially and culturally constructed;

(2) as societies evolve, so too does the notion of the person;

(3) greater social fraternization, and the corresponding extension of the social bond, coupled with greater rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse, leads to greater autonomization of the person.

In light of the preceding chapters, then, let us turn first to consider crucial facets and phases in the generic phenomenologies of personhood. Then we shall move to our main consideration here—Durkheim's notion of the evolution of the person through history.

A. Generic Phenomenologies of Personhood

Preface. What is the person? What is personhood? Person, persona, impersonate. From such associations, Norman O. Brown weaves a highly negative view of the person which is very different than Durkheim's position. Noting the standard etymological and social psychological perspectives, Brown (1966) begins his discussion of personhood in terms of the persona as a mask, a disguise, used by actors—that is, characters or roles—in a social drama.

Personality is persona, a mask. The world is a stage, the self a theatrical creation.... The self does not belong to its possessor.... It is all psychodrama.... Personality is a social fiction, and name a magical invocation of a particular role in social drama.... Character is not innate: a man's character is his demon, his tutelar spirit; received in a dream. His character is his destiny, which is to act out his dream.... The dream stuff out of which personality is made is not private, but social; a collective dream.... The only soul is the group-soul, and this consists of nothing but group functions.... Personality is not innate, but acquired. Like a mask, it is a thing, a fetish or commodity.... Stereotypes. All personality is rigid.... Names and personalities are fixed by archetypal persons and situations; the voices coming through the masks are always ancestral voices.... The ego is public relations. ... In the Last Judgment, the apocalyptic fire will burn
up the masks, and the theater, not leaving a rack behind. Freud came to give the show away.... The ego is a "me-fabrication," a piece of illusion (Maya), which disintegrates at the moment of illumination.... The insane are closer to the truth.... (Ch. 5, Love's Body, 1966).

Assuming that separation is the root of evil, and thus denying the "social reality principle," dwelling instead in intrapsychic primary process, and preparing for an imminent apocalypse of the body, it is no wonder that Brown's metaphysics and ethics leave the notion of the person little existential or historical validity.

1. Ego and Person

Contrary to Brown's position, the first step toward a viable sociocultural understanding of personhood is to systematically distinguish between ego and person. We shall here take the term "ego" to refer to that centered bundle of drives in each organism which is concerned primarily with survival--with food, dominance, sex, flight, and so forth. Hence, we may justifiably speak of the pre-social or organic ego. The person, on the other hand, as designated by a name for instance, is a sociocultural emergent, not to be primarily understood in biological or even biopsychological terms. The ego is given, the person is constructed. Since sociocultural, the notion of the person implies a primary concern with the internalization and objectivation of rules and meanings, with questions of morality and knowledge, right and wrong, truth and error. In his later works, Durkheim was careful to make this crucial distinction between ego and person.

We say our individuality and not our personality. Although the two words are often used synonymously, they must be distinguished with the greatest possible care, for the personality is made up essentially of supra-individual elements (DHN:339).

Years later, Paul Henri Chombart de Lauwe still had to attempt to clarify this crucial distinction:

Durkheim's insistence on the existence of society independently of the sum of individuals is related to his subsequent position that the individual is only a receptacle and that the important thing is the emergence of
the person. Many errors concerning Durkheim's sociology come, we believe, from the lack of attention given to this cardinal distinction between the individual and the person, and to the transition from one to the other (1966:239, #2).

And in *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim remarked:

It is not at all true that we are more personal as we become more individualized. The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially individual; yet we are more personal the more we are freed from our senses and able to think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon all the social elements of the individual do not mean by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8).

Thus, the image of man as *homo duplex*, as two levelled, lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociocultural vision of morality, religion, and knowledge. Civilized man is "double." On the lower level, there is the organic ego; on the upper story there is the socialized person informed and directed by collective moral rules and intellectual concepts. Social man is superimposed over top of physical man. These images remain the valid core of Durkheim's doctrine of man as *homo duplex*; indeed, while I shall differ from Durkheim in regard to his negative characterization of the organic ego (see Book One, part I), I do consider some such distinction between ego and person as a foundation theorem for the human sciences. Indeed, the mind/body Cartesian dualism can then become resolved on a higher and different level. For as Mauss proposed, the person is a category of the human spirit (*le esprit humain*).

2. Conscience and Consciousness

At the very core of the notion of personhood are found the twin notions of conscience and consciousness (see Chapter Three of this Book). If we adopt a sociocultural phenomenology of the person, we shall investigate how structures of conscience and consciousness are constructed through a deepening awareness of good and evil, right and wrong, and of truth and
error. Since structures of conscience and consciousness are key anchors to group process, Durkheim anchored the awakening of moral rules and intellectual concepts in terms of group implosions. Egos are moralized and turned into subjects by contact with strong social and cultural energies. When a "critical mass" is reached, a moral implosion occurs, cultural energies generated and released, and egos are transformed into persons. Culture redirects nature; culture is to nature as person is to ego. Thus, awareness of good and evil, of truth and error, right and wrong, awakens through collective symbolic process. Conscience and consciousness are the key phenomenological poles of cultural process.

Now, Durkheim's usage of the ambiguities inherent in the French terms conscience and representation implied both noun and verb-like aspects of sociocultural and phenomenological process. The intimate linkage between conscience and consciousness in terms of the noun and verb-like meanings of representation—as both cultural object and process—is a crucial perspective which is central to the human sciences. The fruitful ambiguities inherent in these key Durkheimian terms led him to a fundamentally different, and more profound, perception of sociocultural and phenomenological process than the perspectives today which split apart the cultural object, generating group, constitutive symbolizing process, and phenomenological experience. Durkheim saw these as primarily relational, as merely separable elements in the on-going human equation.

Thus, in Durkheim's foundational sociocultural theory, the logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellectual judgment are always and everywhere intimately intertwined. The moralities of thought and the logics of action are always linked together and to the structure and process of collectivities. For instance, Durkheim suggested:

Even if we believe that religious and moral representations constitute the essential elements of the idea of the soul, still we do not mean to say that they are the only ones. Around this central nucleus are grouped other states of consciousness having this same
character, though to a slighter degree. This is the case with all the superior forms of the intellectual life, owing to the special price and dignity attributed to them by society. When we devote our lives to science or art, we feel that we are moving in a circle of things that are above bodily sensations.... This is why the highest functions of the intelligence have always been considered specific manifestations of the soul (EF:298-99, #123).

Indeed, the twin notions of conscience and consciousness constitute key links in Durkheim's system between different historical forms of society and culture and different phenomenologies of the person on the one hand, and Durkheim's corresponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of morality, religion, and knowledge on the other. And we propose, in general, that fundamental changes in the structures of conscience often precede fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness. Therefore, one central facet of sociocultural inquiry should focus on basic shifts in the collective foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority.

3. Collective Symbolic Process

Now, Durkheim proposed: "Social life in all its aspects, and in every period of its history, is made possible only through a vast symbolism" (EF:264). Man makes himself through the genetic medium of collective symbolic process. Man is the creature who dwells within his own images. The evolution of culture and the evolution of man are contemporaneous. Culture is like social DNA, for it serves as a symbolic guidance system. Every society has a symbolically expressed system of knowledge and values. Culture is the prime symbolic meaning and directive system of a group. Collective symbolic forms provide ready-made classificatory and interpretive frameworks for individual thought, feeling, and group action. Culture structures decision, and organizes and energizes human action. Societies and persons are constructed and sustained only through the action of long-term collective symbolic processes. Public process is symbolic process over time and space.

Now, the key link between what Durkheim called substruct-
Durkheim postulated that "collective effervescence" leads to a kind of "moral implosion" which results from the intense interaction. When a "critical mass" is reached, a kind of communion ensues; the resulting fusion into a common consciousness generates extra-ordinary energies which transform the isolated and privatized ego into a socially in-formed person.

With animals, the organism assimilates social facts to it, stripping them of their special nature, and transforms them into biological facts. Social life is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and particularly in higher societies, social causes substitute themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized (DL:346).

The organic cage is left behind; man ascends "from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (Engels, in Evans-Pritchard, 1965: 61). The center of the individual's existence thus comes to revolve not around private passions, but around public prescriptions. With this implosion and crystallization into symbolic consciousness, society and culture are born as entirely new levels of emergent world-activity.

Through this evolutionary breakthrough, society and culture are energized, thereafter to redirect organic activities. Through this communion or fusion process, the duality of human nature is constructed, and the person--as opposed to the ego--emerges. Society and person are twin-born; they are mutual co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the mid-wife. In sum, society and culture become the center of moral and conceptual life, having their key phenomenological anchors in the newly created person's conscience and consciousness.

In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed specifically that human society is first created through the symbolic medium of religious ritual. This symbolic process concentrates and intensely focusses social and psychic energies (as a solar mirror collects the rays of the sun), and generates the first form of group self-consciousness. Mythical and ritual symbolism play a critical creative role in the making of con-
science and consciousness, for what was private becomes open, public and generative.

It is only by expressing their feelings by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are by nature closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison (DHN:335).

These key representations are not merely neutral representative devices, but, as Bellah (1973) suggests, they are eminently creative—for they constitute the group. They serve as "constitutive symbolism." Acting as the collectively representational symbols of group self-consciousness, gradually they become the very foundation of a continuing moral and cognitive community over time, what we might term a cultural tradition. Because thinking implies use of communicable concepts, the mind is, to a great extent, an impersonal and public activity. As Durkheim proposed:

The distinguishing feature of the concept, as compared with a sensation or image, is its impersonality; it is a representation which ... is common and communicable. It can pass from one mind to another; it is by means of concepts that minds communicate. Now a representation can only be common to all the members of a single group if it was elaborated by them in common, if it is the work of the community. And if conceptual thought has a very special value for us, it is precisely because, being collective, it is replete with all the experience and science that has been accumulated by the community over the course of centuries (in Giddens, 1972a:249).

And Lawrence Krader usefully summarizes Durkheim's dialectic between personality and impersonality.

In Durkheim, the person takes the form of that which is most impersonal in us; the person and the individual are counterposed, and the person is defined by his participation in the universal quality of human reason. It is by his universal reason and will that man becomes a person, and not as an individual act, having (only) a relative autonomy in his social milieu; Durkheim here follows the Kantian notion of human reason as a synthetic a priori in his own methodology. The person is therefore an abstraction, being neither an individual nor a particular entity, but a point in social space at which different lines of social relations intersect, an objective social phenomena, universal in its phenomenality (1968:483).
Further, social interaction is always symbolic interaction—belief and act are joined in fundamental sociocultural process. Imagination and symbol are the key mediating terms. The key nexus between our inner and outer lives are these symbolically carried impersonal moral rules and intellectual concepts, these structures of conscience and consciousness. If it is important to note that society depends for its continued existence upon the persons it has created, the converse is equally true. Collective myth and ritual provide a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature." If moralized persons are not to lapse back into the scattered egoisms of pre-social organic nature, they can sustain themselves only by dipping back again and again into the very fount of their existence—namely, collectively effervescent, energizing, and redirecting symbolic process. Sociocultural life rises and falls in an oscillating rhythm. Thus, the moralized person's commitment to his newly found obligations and destiny also ebbs and flows with the decline and rise of the intensity and "fittingness" of sociocultural symbolism. The continued viability of prime significant symbols, as a cultural genetic medium, is vital to the continued viability of both society and moralized person. We thus see a periodic renewal of self and society through ritual celebration; and such collective ceremonial replenishes our moral natures. It publicly revalidates our sense of self as a socially constructed and valuable personage; it revalidates our civic status as a personality. Durkheim never separated sociocultural process from phenomenological process.

Now, symbols serve as "time binders" holding groups together through time and space. In terms of the elementary stages of these processes, Durkheim assumed that:

(1) structures of conscience and consciousness are socioculturally and historically constructed, and thus remain for a long time connected and even confounded with the structure and process of groups;

(2) the systems of morality and knowledge which are dominant first emerge in most systematic form out of the womb of religion and ritual.
Thus, the two inner constitutive principles of the construction of over-arching systems of moral and cognitive classification are that these are first: (a) sociocentric, and (b) sacro-magical. Indeed, the linkage of the form of symbolic systems to the structure and process of collectivities, and the linkage of their content to sacral outlooks and magical protocols, are two interpretive principles central to the human sciences. Both Durkheim and Weber were most sensitive to this inner linkage of legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness to the structure of groups and to their religious and legal systems.

Again, we propose that fundamental changes in the structures of conscience, of the collective grounds of right and wrong, generally precede fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness, of truth and falsity. And since the awakening and guiding of structures of conscience and consciousness—as prime phenomenological processes—are largely dependent upon religious symbolic forms, should we not then tend to seek out the changing foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority in terms of shifting religious images and sanctions? If we would know how persons are formed and reformed, should we not also look to the ways in which "souls" are conceived and reformed? Again, is the connection between these two not the notion that the person is a category of the human spirit?

4. Origins of Structures of Conscience

Society and person are mutual co-creations through that symbolic genetic medium which we call culture. Religious symbols, which by their very nature seek to establish definite and obligatory relationships between the human microcosm and the macrocosm, act as prime guidance systems. The cult is the original and prime matrix of culture (Pieper, 1963); it creates "cosmos" out of "chaos."

Now, tension is produced in the symbolic field, and conscience and consciousness organized and energized, by the compounding series of symbolic oppositions between the "sacred"
and the "profane." Such positive and negative categories are central to human imagination and action because they inform us what is "right and wrong," "true and false." The key to understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal significance of the oppositions between "sacred" and "profane" is to be sought in the symbolic sets of equations by which society, culture, and person are progressively constructed and reconstructed. Life becomes progressively organized around these two poles of positive and negative energies, like magnetic poles attracting and repelling us. The whole of existence becomes valorized through a ramifying series of symbolic equations linking different experiences together.

Now, as is true of all levels of reality, without this tension between incompatible energies or positions, no energy would flow. Difference energizes; diversity is generative. Energy flows only if there is a gap, a difference between positions. Without this fundamental and constitutive tension, the symbolic cosmos called culture would prove impossible. The tension between good and evil, between right and wrong, is the driving force in the symbolic field of society, and within the person, for it constitutes the two opposing "magnetic" poles of structures of conscience and consciousness. Energy flows generated by this deepening tension between the "sacred" and the "profane" serve to organize and energize the basic decision matrices of societies and persons. Here is a crucial key to a fundamental theory of motivation. Theories of personality which omit reference to this fundamental organizing tension deep within the very structure of personality are in that measure inadequate. For if human experience was merely neutral or homogeneous, we would find ourselves devoid of reason for choice, and therefore, action. If human reality lacked elementary invidious distinctions--between good and evil, order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher and the lower, positive and negative, the beautiful and the monstrous, the creative and destructive, the way forward and the way back--we would lack the basic organizing tension which energizes and directs human action. Systems built around the
notions of avoidance of pain and tropisms toward pleasurable stimuli (eg. behaviorism) are cast on the level of the organic ego, and thus must fall back on the weakest kind of mind/body analogies to describe these higher level processes. Every society and person make some such crucial series of distinctions between these and other fundamental polarities for without these compounding series of oppositions we stand paralyzed. In general, then, the deeper the tensions generated by the oppositions between these symbolic and phenomenological poles, the deeper the development of the person as moral agent and intellectual subject.

Always and everywhere, positive and negative aspects of these basic polarities are expressed in terms of opposing poles in conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral right and wrong, so insistent because they involve not merely the fate of on-going social relations but ultimate destinies as well, are always intimately intertwined with questions of consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality rather than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and persons place themselves under positive obligations to affirm as true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable those phenomena judged as "sacred" to the group. To Durkheim, the "sacred" means values constitutive to the group. Sacredness here implies hierarchical value, moral authority, and obligatory respect due to high position on the scale of values, the ability to repel the profane, and a certain "contagiousness" or tendency to spread. But it is important to remember that sacred and profane are relationally defined; their dichotomous existence is interdependent. Their contrast is necessary, much as the contrast between figure and field is essential for clear perception. These positive injunctions generate goals and values which are carried through imagination, and internalized in the emerging personality structure, and established in the institutions of the group.

Now, one of the basic classificatory principles is that things of unequal value must be separated. The boundary lines between the pure and the impure, between order and chaos,
must be constantly maintained and periodically realigned. Dirt, weeds, noise, chance, ugliness, etc., these and other similar negative phenomena which threaten the clear outlines and meaningful patterns of our axial coordinates must be controlled, interdicted, and revised. These demarcations are like survey markers on the base map of culture; but these cultural maps are not solely cognitive, but moral, emotional, and imaginative as well. As such, the passage from the profane to the sacred requires a whole series of rites which transform the moral subject. Rites are collective moral therapeutics which, by realigning the mutual relations between human microcosm and macrocosm, regenerate the moral community, and thus, provide a resustenance of our moral natures. As van Gennep clearly recognized, these symbolic therapeutics proceed in at least three main phases; he also noted the important "pivoting of the sacred" along various situational and temporal axes.

If harmony is to maintained, the relationships between sacred and profane in terms of the alignment of the microcosm with the macrocosm must be continuously regulated and reaffirmed. Through ascetic regulatory rites we reestablish and reinforce the boundaries separating the sacred from the profane. Naturally, because of their source and power, these interdictions spread to the whole of sociocultural life. Time, space, objects, events, people, and so on--indeed, all aspects of life and existence--become classified, separated, and relationships rearticulated in terms of the compounding oppositions between the sacred and the profane. The whole world becomes valorized--society progressively imputes positive, negative, and neutral valences to all details of existence. Hence, structures of conscience and consciousness are constantly assigned ever greater responsibilities--that of discerning the moral valences of actions which had been previously left outside the moral universe. And, of course, those who "take a lease on charisma" as Weber once remarked, those who professionally demarcate or realign the boundaries between sacred and profane become the arbiters of moral and
intellectual legitimacy. Distinctions and qualifications become more sophisticated, more rationalized, more systematic, and internally consistent, more comprehensive. Some virtuoso may even practice full-time asceticism as a life-vocation, and may engage in charismatic competitions to determine who can most systematically turn away from all that is branded profane, all that is a diverting temptation from the "one and true path" (eg. the early Egyptian eremites).

Since sacral and magical taboos come to permeate early tribal life, they come to constitute the early foundations of structures of conscience. Questions of right and wrong, of truth and error, become inextricably bound up with the ascent to a cosmic consciousness which is then reflected in the mirror of daily life in the human microcosm. Defilement, pollution, sin, and guilt come from violating the boundaries between sacred and profane. Disturbances of the harmonious relations between micro and macrocosm bring extreme culpability--for in bringing illness, death, attack by enemies, catastrophic weather, etc., evil threatens the whole society. Thus, the first forms of deviance are those of the "religious criminal," whose violations of norms laid down by the collective conscience are considered sacrilegious. Profaneness and deviance are intertwined, as the conscience counsels us to flee from negative status.

Since questions of apportioning moral responsibility, of assigning sin and guilt, are always central, the negative or ascetic rites take on a special significance. All societies and persons find themselves negatively obligated to avoid falsity, evil, destructiveness, and regions of unreality. Those who follow the positive normative prescriptions gain in self-esteem, and their sense of self-worth and contributions to moral order are often publicly validated. Those who violate, or congenitally follow negative prescriptions, lose in status and self-esteem. They may be branded or "labelled" as failures and, at worst, as dangerously destructive "deviants." As Robert Merton once observed, every society has its own peculiar set of "moral alchemies," especially for
the assignment of guilt and negative status. Thus, as Benja-
mmin Nelson (1964) observes, culture also acts as a symbolic
economy—that is, every society is engaged in the production
and distribution of valued symbols of varied worths. Anxiety,
fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate defilement or abandon-
ment are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate. Thus,
by its very nature, deviance is linked with the profane, and
the profane is also dependent, as Poggi (1972) clearly saw,
upon the prior definition of the sacred. As Mary Douglas
(1966) observes, "purity and danger" are relational.

Indeed, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1966) has noted for years,
the negative is crucial to human symbolicity. For only through
the negative, in the sense of prohibition and moral command,
is man moralized. Man takes on a moral personality through the
negative, through abstention and purification. That is why
Durkheim emphasized the importance of the negative rites, of
the ascetic movement toward separation and withdrawal. "Ascet-
icism is an integral part of human culture" (EF:356). For the
suffering inherent in the negative thrust means that the in-
dividual rises above the profane; in other words, culture
moralizes nature. And, indeed, when we see that the analogy
is often the sacred is to the profane as culture is to nature
as person is to ego, the importance of these negative associa-
tions becomes apparent. In considering asceticism good, Durk-
heim valued most the self-discipline it creates, for it mor-
alizes the recalcitrant ego (see Nisbet, 1974). Culture, the
realm of moral rules and concepts, of obligatory and authori-
tative sacredness, dominates nature, and reorders the ego and
its insatiable passions. This process implies the reordering
of the world, the overcoming of nature by symbolic culture,
a reestablishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great
"Yea and Nay" of all things. And, as fasting increases our
hunger for the "Bread of Life," so, too, privation, abstinence,
and suffering increase the tension to consummate the posi-
tive pole of sociocultural life.

Since the origin of these separations or interdictions
which we project outward and imprint upon the world is really
culture-and-mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred and profane lies within man himself. The taboo as interdiction is first and foremost a phenomenological injunction to keep separate things of unequal value which man directs toward his own conscience and consciousness, toward his own imagination and will. Since magical sanctions revenge violation of taboo in an automatic fashion as if by mechanical retribution, it is only religious sanctions involving socio-cultural and psychological punishment which lead to the development of the person. There is no "sin" in magic, and therefore no need for redefinition of self and internalization of guilt. Only in religious sanctions do we discover a deepening of the interior life, the perpetual reconstruction of will and imagination. Here we might recall Ricoeur's notion of the stages of development of the moral conscience from stain to sin to guilt (1969). We see that the consciousness of wrong-doing progressively shifts away from external, accidental violations to internal, intentional acts. Weber (1963) also clearly saw the crucial worldhistorical significance of religion and the notion of ethical-legal orders and the evolution of the images of gods for the development of the notion of sin as intentional, and involving individual moral culpability. Only much later do we see the emergence of a prospective moral conscience. The psychodynamics of sin and guilt, of intention and act, of retribution and salvation, and so on, are crucial to the construction in layers of the moral personage, the deepening of the levels of self. For this whole phenomenological-symbolic complex leads to intensified examinations of conscience, the searching of the soul for intentional commissions and unintentional omissions, for the determination of the moral valences of future actions, for the determination of degrees of guilt and the development of therapeutic modes for its exoneration and purgation; in short, it leads to greater ethical self-awareness. The progressive attachment of individuals to a "cosmos of obligations" leads to greater integration of the personality structure, observed Weber; it enabled, in the
realm of law for instance, a man's word to serve as his bond, as the signature to a contract binds. In sum, the emergence of complex religious and ethical-legal systems, and their evolution in terms of patterning the microcosm after the macrocosm played a crucial role in the in-depth integration of structures of conscience and consciousness.

Almost inevitably these struggles between good and evil take on a dramatic character. Indeed, it is primarily in terms of a symbolic struggle that a dramatic design first emerges. And it is primarily in terms of dramatic designs that conscience and consciousness take up their parts or identities as persona, as participants in the cosmic drama or "Divine Comedy." Symbolic process, and thus the structure of human action, inevitably takes on an inherently dramatic (or perhaps rhetorical-dialectical) character, and generally proceeds in at least three distinguishable phases. First, binary polarities create tension in the symbolic field and in the phenomenological field. Second, symbolic equations link together different experiences in a resonating system charged with multiple levels of meaning. Finally, transformations resolve the tension and create a new and higher unity.

"Right thinking" and "right acting" in this drama are judged in terms of our fidelity to our cosmically assigned roles, to the degree to which we pattern ourselves after the ancestors, the divine exemplars, or the founding fathers. The closer we pattern ourselves after the models of essential order, the closer the harmony between microcosm and macrocosm. Self and model become intertwined, much as socialization requires in-depth role models. The sensitive striving after fidelity to the cosmic models, of faithful patterning ourselves after the divine exemplars, deepens the structures of interiority, of will and imagination, of internal life-long consistency of character.

Now, by virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual commensality or the commemorative dramatic representations or mimetic reenactments of primordial founding deeds, sacral symbols become historicized. Sacral symbols become attached
to durable social sentiments and collective memories. In the ramifying dialectic between symbol, sentiment, and inter-generational sociocultural process, the horizons of conscience and consciousness are stretched into the past and into the future. If society and person are to perdure, they must become rooted in inter-generational collective symbolic forms. If symbols are to survive and evolve, they must become durable, beyond the reach of the effervescent moment; they must become historicized. Similarly, the construction of the person rests upon temporal extensions of the horizons of rules, meanings, obligations, concepts, models, and so on, through time and space. The person becomes progressively attached not merely to a specific group, but to a continuing moral and cognitive community stretching out indefinitely into time and place. The person becomes historicized and deepened through identification with myths of origin, and the corollary notions of destiny and salvation. The person becomes anchored in a temporal process of beinnings and ends which transcend his isolated existence and give life meaning in terms of a compelling dramatic design which redeems the sense of aimless flux from insignificance and invests it with ultimate purpose (Nelson, 1964).

In certain extraordinary periods, when the shared structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shift, such changes are most powerful when they strike deeply into the axial structures of conscience and consciousness. In such shifts, the sedimented layers of cultural traditions are reorganized. In such times of crisis, we attempt to locate the source of evil, of disorder, of suffering and disharmony in terms of "theodicies," couched in terms of falls from "undividedness," of failure to remain faithful to the prime exemplars, or by wandering from the "paths of truth and righteousness." As a general rule, all basic moral and intellectual positions originally rest on negations; they exist first in denial. They are relational—that is, rhetorical. When beset by crises of uncertainty, by paralyzing conflict, we simultaneously seek to construct "theodi-
cies" (explanations of the sources of evil, of disorder, of how things came to fall apart), and "therapeutics" (recipes for restoring wholeness, harmony). As we proceed to "diagnose" our personal troubles and collective calamities, we build up a whole resonating system of symbolic associations which link symptoms to causes, and a system of transformational processes which explain how our prior system of "theodicies" and "therapeutics" went astray. Again, questions of sin and guilt, of intention and act, are fundamental, for the grounds of their ascertainment and assuagement largely determine our collective therapeutics. The whole periodic process of determining "theodicies" and "therapeutics" raises consciousness to new heights and conscience to new depths in the search for verity and fidelity. The deepening and reordering of these twin structures in times of crisis, especially through prophetic pronouncements, often comes to constitute the prime guidance systems of societies and persons through the informing and inspiring medium of cultural traditions which act as carriers of this central charismatic cultural capital. This, roughly, is the generic dialectical process which Durkheim postulated between symbol and sentiment, communitas and history, charismatic and ordinary moment, between self and society.

5. Origins of Structures of Consciousness

Just as the logics of the construction of systems of morality ultimately rest on a compounding series of oppositions between the "sacred" and the "profane," so too the construction of systems of thought rests on refining and extending such oppositions throughout nature and society. The construction of elementary systems of consciousness proceeds through the extension of a system of symbolic equations throughout the whole of human experience. Since logic implies necessary connection, the first forms of conscious connection are those of value, of differentiating between experiences of unequal value, and reconnecting those of equal value. All logic is originally ana-logic; to a great extent mental
discourse remains analogical and phenomenological. The extension of value, and hence meaning, through fundamental guiding metaphors is crucial to both the symbolic "machinery" of the mind, and to cultural historical processes. Experience is first (and fundamentally) linked to experience, image to image, value to value, and only later are abstracted propositions connected to essential governing principles. Therefore, on the most elementary levels, truth and error depend ultimately on the closeness of connection to our notions of good and evil. Primary process is not so much logical or alogical as phenomenological, that is, analogical. As Ricoeur (1969) proposes, "the symbol gives rise to thought."

Analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for connection between disparate things, for the extension of meaning and experience, and the integration of knowledge and value into a compelling dramatic design. They allow us to link together separate things and events into a new and meaningful relationship which was not apparent before our sewing them together. Analogy and metaphor enable us to build up systems of relationships over time and through space, to order events into a meaningful sequence, and to communicate our concepts to others through appeal to similar experience. Recognition of phenomenological similarities or differences, and the construction of inner or essential comparisons, serve as basic logic of classification, of constituting systematic relationships on the elementary level. As Levi-Strauss (1966) observes, we start with a "science of the concrete;" we start where we are, for where else can we start?

Now, if systematic comparison and contrast are sure signs of intelligence at work, then the most elementary forms of classification proceed in terms of systematic extensions of crucial orienting "world-metaphors" (eg. see S. Pepper, 1942). Classification is first analogical; for example, language itself is built up extending a series of root phenomenological metaphors from one situation to another, by translating and retranslating basic guiding images into various manifestations. This is a crucial aspect of semiology. The more
seminal the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with potential meaning will the root metaphor become. In this spinning out process, a whole web of related meanings is gradually constructed, and the whole language can be seen to hang together on a surprisingly small number of cognitive and experiential pegs. Indeed, images come before words; an extended search through a good dictionary should convince one of the centrality and origin-ality of these root images, and the significance of the systems of symbolic equations in which whole rafts of words and phrases are interdefined. Literary meaning, too, is built up out of such compounding series of symbolic equations and transformations. Noting this universality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking devices, Northrop Frye has remarked on "the similarity between the units of literature and of mathematics--the metaphor and the equation." Indeed, all other forms of knowledge and cultural expression emerge out of their own special types of equations and sequences--religious mythologies, sacramental rituals, legal systems, poetry and literature, mathematics, and so on through the natural and social sciences.

Now, the systems of classification which we call primitive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding together moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a more or less coherent and compelling system. In such cosmological classifications, the body, human society, and the natural environment are used analogically as bases, as resonating microcosms of one another. For example, the body is often portrayed as a microcosm of the universe and parts of the body are mapped and correlated with astronomical configurations. One of the most sophisticated elaborations of this primitive type of intertwining can be found in the Chinese system of acupuncture, which is rooted in Taoist notions of energy flows which organize the universe and which are mirrored in the human body. Homeopathic medicine and even psychoanalytic therapeutics can be seen to rest also on not too dissimilar kinds of symbolic and structural correspondences. Hence, certain analytical, or perhaps anamorphical, dimen-
sions come to cross-cut knowledge, belief, imagination, and action.

Since logic implies mutually intelligible discourse and necessary connection, it is important not to impose contemporary notions of the rules of formal or so-called "symbolic logic" on other types of linkages. There are many types of "logic" or connection; just as formal philosophical logic does not invalidate socio-logic or bio-logic, so too we in the human sciences must take care not to impose our own "logics" on primitive cultures. We should set aside Levy-Bruhlian notions of a "pre-logical" mentality which does not abide by Aristotelian canons; for as Durkheim often argued "There is no gulf, no gap in continuity between these elementary forms of classification and our own." Now, if we accept the postulate of the psychic unity of mankind, then our problem becomes to understand the stages of construction of consciousness, of the emergence of "rational logics" from other types of connections which are primordial. Since all logic implies necessary connection, primitive logics are primarily moral logics which are both (a) socio-centric, and (b) sacral-magical. In this sense, the "moralities of thought and logics of action" are formed in terms of domestic and ritual metaphors. As Mauss and Durkheim discovered in Primitive Classification, logical relations are first, in a very real sense, domestic relations; that is, connections between members of the same class or group. The inner morality of primitive logics is familial; members of the same tribe or family share the same classifications. And since domestic relations are rooted primarily in sentiment, it is not surprising that these other (ana)logical relations should emerge out of, and become suffused and directed by, social sentiments. Elementary analogics are rooted in socio-logics.

But these elementary logics are also mytho-logics. For these sentiments are intimately intertwined with, and indeed grow out of, the authority of the fused sacro-magical collective complex. Indeed, it is the obligatoriness, the collectivization of responsibility for reparation and disharmonies
between the microcosm and the macrocosm which makes these representations sacred. The more elementary these systems, the more these representations also function, in turn, as reglementations. Representations and regulations, of course, both rest on norms and rules. Logic regulates mental life, moral rules regulate the life of action. Mental and moral healers alike rely on "rules for the direction of the mind and soul." Indeed, one of the secret appeals of logic has always been its claims to offer regulative norms for mental and moral conduct. Shelley's notion that poets are the "legislators of mankind" is also relevant here. Because elementary systems of classification are constitutive for their groups, they also carry systems of ethics. As always, ethics and epistemics, conscience and consciousness, are intimately intertwined. The linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies that elementary structures of morality and knowledge will be made to line themselves up in parallel fashion. There is no escaping this attempt at harmonious alignment, for in primitive cultures, the structures of responsibility and representation are preeminently collective. Changes come through closer alignment, shifts, or severing of relations between microcosm and macrocosm, and between integration of systems of morality and knowledge. Indeed, it is this on-going dialectic of sentiment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination and morality, microcosm and macrocosm, culture and nature, which marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory systems. In sum, these systems of resonating symbolic equations are intimately connected with the legitimate foundations of moral and intellectual authority of collectivities.

In a deeper sense, it is religion which provides the "essential" reasons for phenomenological linkages which are later seized upon by formal logics. Just as egos are moralized into forming persons and society, so too is the world moralized, unified, and made into an intelligible and meaningful cosmos through the "contagion" of sacral symbolism. Sacral energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world, serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage.
Flowing in and out of dissimilar objects, transforming disparate events, a separate world of real "essences" is postulated behind the world of sensory appearance and diversity. Things touched by the same energies—in terms of fundamental metaphorical notions of "like attracts like" and "the part is equal to the whole"—are thus to be classed together; this is another fundamental classificatory principle. The additional rule that things of unequal value must be separated then becomes subsumed under this more fundamental determination of "invisible, essential" inner connections. Thus, besides symbolic equations, the elementary elaboration of structures of consciousness depends upon series of symbolic inner transformations by which the "essential" ground is manifested in the phenomenal appearance. As Kenneth Burke notes, all interpretation requires that we ascertain not only symbolic equations—or "what goes with what"—but also symbolic transformations—or "from what to what," that is, a whole series of complex sequential equations which link separable phases, movements, cycles of terms, etc., to one another in a meaningful pattern or dramatic design. As Levi-Strauss observes, totemism serves as a complex equational and transformational structure of communications which converts phenomenological diversity into moral and conceptual unity; it transforms "chaos" into "cosmos." In short, structures of consciousness attempt to ground the existential in the essential which then converts the obligatory into the desirable.

These systems of moral and intellectual classification are "mytho-socio-logical" in that world, self, and society are pulled together in a "solid system all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically." In building a center to moral life, intellectual action moves through a progressive extension of symbolic equations originally rooted in the positive/negative, sacred/profane oppositions. Through progressive extension of ramifying analogies, these compounding systems of classification are interwoven more and more tightly; they become "cross-indexed." Indeed, the degree of complexity, cross-indexing, and internal consistency serves as
basic criteria for judging the comparative degree of cultural complexity as represented in the central classificatory system. Redundancy, as in all systems of communication, serves an important function. We constantly rotate the symbolic matrix, each time tying in yet another thread in the emerging cosmological fabric. These symbolic linkages continue to grow until "the whole world is covered like a gnosis or cabbala."

But if these analogical and transformational systems first grow out of concrete phenomenological experience, they also reveal a tendency to separate, to grow by their own autonomous rules. Since primitive classification systems are largely built on: (a) phenomenological analogies, (b) the fusion of cognitive, moral, and affective categories, (c) sociocentrism, and (d) sacral-magical protocols, philosophy and then modern scientific systems will emerge only where: (a) classifications become progressively rooted in abstract, "essential" principles which are true by their very nature, instead of by relation (eg. see J. Gittleman, 1974:83), (b) where structures of conscience and consciousness become more or less separated, and the latter granted some legitimate institutionalized autonomy and authority, (c) where these categories become detached from their original or prime group status referents, (d) and in which questions of truth and fidelity are resolved primarily by recourse to rational and evidential canons rather than by collective recourse to traditional magical praxis. Although first born in the clan and its totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connections with the restrictive structures of group and religion. There is no possibility of passages from "sciences of the concrete" to abstract sciences, however, without a trans-historical, or trans-mundane or transcendental, grounding of the necessary lawfulness and regularity of phenomenal patterns; here the passages to modern science rest on specific sorts of "essentialisms" (eg. see Whitehead, 1925). Passages to modernity come about through expansion of structures of fraternization,
and the resolution of conflict over alternate anchors of moral and intellectual authority and responsibility in terms of wider universalization, autonomization, and hence, rationalization. It should be emphasized that one of the hidden keys to understanding the growth of cultural complexity comes from the suppleness or differential ease with which classificatory matrices of various groups can progressively encompass the widening diversity of experience and empirical fact. This differential ability, as we saw in the previous chapter, to universalize symbolic systems, proves to be a critical factor in later sociocultural evolution.

Having outlined the construction of generic phenomenologies of personhood, let us next turn to consider Durkheim's elaboration of his crucial insight that the notion of the person emerges through history. I wish to emphasize at the outset that we shall be concerned here solely with elucidating only Durkheim's notions of the emergence of the person. Doubtless, many other interpretive perspectives could be brought to bear on this profound process to yield a more complete understanding. Our present effort, however, may be considered a preliminary contribution toward such a project, and to that end our main hope here is merely to bring into full relief precisely what Durkheim's theory of the historical emergence of the person specifically claimed. This careful delimitation of our task here is doubly necessary, for Durkheim himself never wrote systematically on this subject.
B. The Emergence of the Person Through History

Introduction. A crucial element of Durkheim's doctrine is the notion that the person, as a sociocultural construction, emerges through history. Unfortunately, Durkheim never systematically formulated this insight as a central theme of his work. Doubtless, Durkheim's doctrine would have fared better if he had explicitly developed this theme. It should be clearly understood that we make no claim here to offer a comprehensive explanation of the emergence of the person through history, but only Durkheim's potential contribution to such an outline.

Now, Durkheim's contribution to this important study is neither simple nor mechanical; rather, it is multi-faceted and often surprisingly subtle. For we shall discover that Durkheim, in turn, explained the emergence of the person in terms of societal differentiation as a general evolutionary process, in terms of the construction of the notion of the individual soul in the primitive sacral womb, in institutional terms of the growing power of the centralized state as guarantor of individual rights vis-a-vis traditional intermediate groups, in cultural terms with special focus on the civilizational significance of Christian individualism, in philosophical terms vis-a-vis Utilitarian and Romantic philosophies of the self, and in terms of the modern institutionalized "cult of the individual" as the base of the modern value system. Let us now turn to explore each of these "laminated" notions as they converge to constitute Durkheim's contribution to the understanding of the emergence of the person through history.
1. Societal Differentiation and Individuation

Preface. Durkheim postulated a general evolutionary connection between societal differentiation and individuation. He assumed that increasing social morphological differentiation increasingly frees the individual from the constraints of "mechanical solidarity." Now, it might be helpful to briefly recall that Durkheim saw two basic forms of social solidarity, two fundamentally different types of social being at the two ends of human history. The first type—"mechanical solidarity"—implies the fusion of individuals into a primitive sacral-magical collective conscience and consciousness. The individual's sense of self is submerged in his group ties and traditional obligations; he or she really has no independent life apart from the group. The second type of solidarity, the modern type, rests on "organic" social bonds which imply the progressive differentiation of occupational tasks leading to a continuously ramifying kind of interdependence. Repetitive identity and differentiated interdependence (eg. DL:129-31) are therefore the two basic forms the social bond may take. Unity through identity, or unity through diversity; a primitive fused identity or advanced differentiated interdependence—these are the two "ideal types" which Durkheim sketched broadly over the flow of history.

Given this interpretive focus on individuation within the content of societal differentiation, Durkheim always searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the structures of moral and intellectual responsibility marking progressive passages from the first to the second type of solidarity. In his early formulations, Durkheim's processual notion of increasing "moral or dynamic density" and the "law of the progressive extension of the radius of social (interactional) life" are central. As noted in Chapter Four of this Book, Durkheim postulated a complex series of sequential equations running something like this: greater population density within a given geographic area (the population/territory ratio) held together by increasingly comprehensive and
efficient infra-structural transportation and communications networks, leads to greater degrees of "moral or dynamic density" or sustained increases in "the quantity, intensity, and diversity of social relationships." Such increased interaction leads to greater competition for resources between members of the society, while increased intra-societal competition leads to greater specialization and occupational differentiation. These typical socio-economic responses to long-term changes in supply and demand lead almost inevitably to greater total productivity, which accelerates, in turn, the progressive division of labor by increasing the potential for population growth, and the extension of key transportation and communications networks. This progressive "extension of the radius of social life" leads, in turn, to greater social energies and intensities and sociocultural change which continues progressively onward in a kind of self-stimulating feedback cycle. Hence, the generic micro sociocultural process of increasing social intensities leads, on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad constitutive historical processes linking the progressive division of labor, moral evolution, and the emergence of the person through history.

Let us look first to the state of "primitive indistinc-
tion" which Durkheim postulated as characteristic of the place of the individual in "mechanical solidarity." Then we shall explore Durkheim and Spencer's differing notions of the nature of archaic society, consider "altruisme" as the early type of suicide which most clearly reveals the inner nature of the tribal social bond, note Durkheim's suggestion that the "chief" represents the emergence of the first individual type, compare and contrast Durkheim and Toennies on the nature of primitive and modern societies, consider Durkheim's discussion of some of the obstacles to progressive division of labor, review his notion of the division of labor and societal differentiation, and finally, his idea of universalization process in relation to the evolution of the person.
a. Durkheim's Notion of "Mechanical Solidarity"

At this early stage, having first conceived as a graduate student that his essential life-project centered on the shifting relations between individual and society, in his dissertation Durkheim thought of individuation and differentiation as corollary central processes; he also regarded them as a sufficient explanation of the emergence of the person through history. The smaller and more intense the social life, the less individuation—at root, it was really a rather simple equation. Yet, even at this point, Durkheim qualified his thesis. Later, his emphasis shifted from the notion that the individual became progressively freed from the constraints of primitive society to the seminal idea that the very notion of the individual (eg. the soul, see EF) is socially constructed. In these terms, "mechanical solidarity" implied the primitive social and cultural state in which the individual was almost wholly submerged in the group, and his nascent conscience permeated by traditional, collective, sacro-magical rationales and prescriptive etiquettes.

In adopting repressive penal law as an external, positive index to the inner nature of primitive social solidarity, Durkheim observed: "In determining what fraction of the juridical system penal law represents, we, at the same time, measure the relative importance of this solidarity" (DL:109). For it is in the nature of penal law that "... the rules it sanctions express the most essential social likenesses" (DL:105). Indeed, here is to be found a "... social cohesion whose cause lies in a certain continuity of all particular consciences to a common type which is none other than the psychic type of society" (DL:105).

It is important to emphasize that, from the beginning, Durkheim conceived of these relations between individual and society from the point of view of shifting historical relations in this bond not solely in external structural terms but also in terms of conscience and consciousness. The distinction, as we might say today, is not merely ecological-demo-
graphic and structural-institutional but also cultural and phenomenological as well. For Durkheim notes the existence of two types of consciences in man; indeed, in observing that man is double, Durkheim sounds a crucial note which pervades his later work.

There are in us two consciences: one contains states which are personal to each of us and which characterizes us, while the states which comprehend the other are common to all society. The first represent only our individual personality, and constitute it; the second represent the collective type, and, consequently, society, without which it cannot exist.... Although distinct, these two consciences are linked one to the other since, in sum, they are only one, having one and the same organic substratum. They are thus solidary. From this results a solidarity sui generis, which, born of resemblances, directly links the individual with society (DL:105-6).

However, at this early state, Durkheim had not distinguished the process of individuation from personalization.

Now, secondary observers over the years would have served us better had they emphasized more that Durkheim chose penal law as the external index revealing the inner nature of the relationship of the individual to the traditional sacromagical collective conscience. It is a collective identity rooted in ancestral myths and in magical rites (see especially Chapter Six of this Book) which repressive law seeks to protect and revenge.

... It is this solidarity which repressive laws expresses.... It is this force which penal law protects against all enfeeblement, both in demanding from each of us a minimum of resemblances without which the individual would be a menace to the unity of the social body, and in imposing upon us the respect for the symbol which expresses and summarized these resemblances at the same time that it guarantees them (DL:106).

It is the commonness of these mythical identities and collective ritual responsibilities which define the strength of the the collective conscience, and thus of mechanical solidarity. Violations of these collective identities and responsibilities are considered sacrilegious because they threaten the fate of the whole society; that is why early penal law is so repressive, and the first type of criminal the "religious
There exists a social solidarity which comes from a certain number of states of conscience which are common to all the members of the same society. This is what repressive law materially represents.... The part that it plays in the general integration of society evidently depends upon the greater or lesser extent of the social life which the common conscience embraces and regulates (DL:109).

Thus, in the early type of social solidarity centered on traditional sacro-magical themes and practices, Durkheim viewed the individual as almost wholly submerged in the collective conscience. Likeness, or identity, is demanded of every member since individual violations or lapses from the collective protocols and magical etiquettes may threaten the whole group. But, again, at this early stage, Durkheim considers collectivization and individuation as proceeding in inverse proportion to the other. Again, at this stage, Durkheim had not sufficiently distinguished between personalization and individuation. Mechanical solidarity, then, refers simultaneously to an ecological-demographic, social institutional, cultural and phenomenological "ideal type" of early society in which the moralities of thought and logics of action are almost wholly collective.

[In mechanical solidarity] ... what we call society is a more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all members of the group; this is the collective type.... The first can be strong only if the ideas and tendencies common to all the members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each member.... But what makes our personality is how much of our individual qualities we have, what distinguishes from others. This solidarity can grow only in inverse ratio to personality. There are in each of us ... two consciences: one which is common to our group in its entirety, which, consequently, is not our self, but society living and acting within us; the other, on the contrary, represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that which makes us an individual. Solidarity which comes from likenesses is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides at all points with it. But, at that moment, our individuality is nil. It can be born only if the community takes smaller toll of us.... If our ideal is to present a singular
and personal appearance, we do not want to resemble everybody else. Moreover, at the moment when this solidarity exercises its true force, our personality vanishes, for we are no longer ourselves, but the collective life (DL:129).

Thus, Durkheim's early conceptualization of his problem as the degree of collectivization or individualization in the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual responsibility and authority led him to assign the former designation to primitive culture and the latter to modern society. I must emphasize that Durkheim seemed to assume at this point, along with many of his Enlightenment brethren, that if the individual were simply freed from the irrationalities of tradition, then the individual would naturally come to assume his own physiognomy, his own rightful autonomy, and intellectual responsibility. This was, after all, at the heart of the dogmatic claims of the French "laic" moral reformers. In his later work, Durkheim questioned this inherited faith more completely, and recognized that society constructs the person, and that the historical relationship between individual and society is not adequately conceptualized in terms of a simple opposition between the presence and absence of collective control.

It is about this point that Durkheim explained why he chose the designation "mechanical solidarity" to characterize this embeddedness of the individual in the sacro-magical collective conscience. In the background of this analysis were, of course, multiple polemics--against Spencer, Comte, and also against Toennies.

The social molecules which can be coherent in this way can act together only in the measure that they have no actions of their own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies. That is why we propose to call this type of solidarity mechanical. The term does not signify that it is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which unites the elements of an inanimate body, as opposed to that which makes a unity out of the elements of a living body. What justifies this term is that the link which thus unites the individual to society is wholly analogous to that which attaches a thing to a person. The individual conscience ... is a simple dependent
upon the collective types and follows all of its movements, as the possessed object follows those of its owner. In societies where this type of solidarity is highly developed, the individual does not appear. Individuality is something which the society possesses. Thus, in these social types, personal rights are not distinguished from real rights *(DL:130).

Shifting in mid-paragraph from the biological to legal analogy, Durkheim here proposed that the individual in early societies is like a simple dependent, a possession of society. Indeed, in his notion of altruistic suicide, Durkheim explored this insight that primitive and archaic cultures permeated by sacro-magical structures may bid their members to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group.

In his lectures on "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit," Durkheim reiterated this image of the collective possession of the individual.

How then it came that the individual could thus occupy himself with the pursuit of aims which were to such a degree foreign to his own private concerns? The answer is this: his private concerns were relatively unimportant to him and his personality and everything that hung on it had slight moral weight. His personal views, his private beliefs and all his diverse aspirations as an individual seemed insignificant factors. What was prized, above all, were the beliefs held in common, the collective aspirations, the popular traditions, and the symbols that were an expression of them.... Absorbed, as he was, into the mass of society, he meekly gave way to its pressures and subordinated his own lot to the destinies of collective existence without any sense of sacrifice. This is because his particular fate had in his own eyes nothing of the meaning and high significance that we nowadays attribute to it. If we are right in that estimate, it was in the nature of things that it should be so; societies could only exist at that time by virtue of this subservience (PECM:55).

Besides altruisme, Durkheim also identified communism (see Socialism, and Part II of Book Two of this dissertation) with the collective sharing of property in primitive society.

Communism, in effect, is the necessary product of this cohesion which absorbs the individual in the group, the part in the whole. Property is definitive only of the extension of the person over things. Where the collective personality is the only one existent, property must also be collective. It will become individual only when the individual, disengaging himself from the
mass, shall become a being personal and distinct, not only as an organism, but also as a factor in social life (DL:179).

Because of the essential likeness of everyone within the same culture, Durkheim perceived these groups as homogeneous repetitive units, "segemental societies" as he called them. The horde, the clan, are composed by repetition of like aggregates within them.

This organization ... carries with it no other solidari­ty than that derived from likenesses, since the society is formed of similar segments and these in their turn enclose only homogeneous elements.... For segmental or­ganization to be possible, the segments must resemble one another; without that, they would not be unified. And they must differ; without this, they would lose themselves in each other and be effaced (DL:176).

Again, we must emphasize that the homogeneity here depends on the common permeation of all individuals by the sacro-mag­ical collective conscience.

Originality is not simply rare there, but it has no place. Everybody professes and practices ... the same religion; schisms and dissent are unknown; they would not be tolerated. But, a this time, religion compris­es all, extends to all.... Religion regulates the de­tails of private life.... All individual consciences are composed of practically the same elements (DL:135).

We know that, in them, religion pervades the whole so­cial life, but that is because social life is made up almost exclusively of common beliefs and of common practices which derive from unanimous adhesion a very particular intensity.... Because all social masses have been formed from homogeneous elements ... because the collective type was very developed there, and the in­dividual type in a rudimentary state, it was inevitable that the whole psychic type of society should take on a religious character (DL:178-9).

And thus, the moralities of thought and logics of action are primarily collective.

If there is one rule of conduct which is incontestable, it is that which orders us to realize in ourselves the essential traits of the collective type. Among lower peoples, this reaches its greatest rigor. There, one's duty is to resemble everybody else, not to have any­thing personal about one's beliefs or actions. In more advanced societies, required likenesses are less numero­us... (DL:396).

Contrary to Nisbet's assertion (1965, 1974:30) that
Durkheim abandoned the mechanical/organic dichotomy, and never returned to it again, we have seen that he anchored his notion of altruistic suicide in this type, and that it can be said that The Elementary Forms was an extended commentary on this type of collective conscience and consciousness. Indeed, in the very beginning to his final book, Durkheim again sounded the same notes in characterizing this type of cultural and phenomenological bond as he had almost twenty years earlier in The Division of Labor.

Things are quite different in the lower societies. The slighter development of individuality, the small extension of the group, the homogeneity of external circumstances, all contribute to reducing the differences and variations to a minimum. The group has an intellectual and moral conformity of which we find examples in the more advanced societies. Everything is common to all. Movements are stereotyped; everybody performs the same ones in the same circumstances, and this conformity of conduct only translates the conformity of thought. Every mind being drawn into the same eddy, the individual type nearly confounds itself with that of the race. And while all is uniform, all is simple as well (EF:18).

b. Durkheim Versus Spencer on the Nature of "Military Societies"

Part of the intellectual intrigue of The Division of Labor was the underlying forensic context, for Durkheim entertained multiple polemics here. Spencer's schema of "military and industrial societies" was as well-known to Durkheim as Toennies' notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Now, Durkheim agreed with Spencer that "... the place of the individual ... becomes greater with civilization" (DL:193). But, as Jones remarks, it appears "... that Durkheim was most critical [of Spencer] at precisely those points where two appeared to have most in common" (1974a:346). Indeed, as Durkheim took pains to establish, such agreement (which misled Toennies) was only apparent, for at many points their interpretive frameworks were fundamentally opposed.

For instance, at first glance one might suppose that Spencer's famous general evolutionary law would also describe Durkheim's thesis of the movement from social likeness and
homogeneity to social differentiation. But Durkheim observed:

Spencer has already said that social evolution, just as universal evolution, begins in a stage of more or less perfect homogeneity. But this proposition does not in any wise resemble the one we have just been developing. For Spencer, a society that was perfectly homogeneous would not truly be a society, for homogeneity is by nature unstable, and society is essentially a coherent whole. The social role of homogeneity is completely secondary; it may look towards an ulterior cooperation, but it is not a specific source of social life. At times, Spencer seems to see in societies such as we have just been describing only an ephemeral juxtaposition of independent individuals, the zero of social life. We have, on the contrary, just seen that they have a very strong collective life, although sui generis, which manifests itself not on in exchanges and contracts, but in a great abundance of common beliefs and practices. These aggregates are coherent, not in spite of their homogeneity, but because of it. Not only is the community not too weak; but we may even say that it alone exists. Moreover, these societies have a definite type which comes from their homogeneity. We cannot treat them as negligible quantities (DL:179, #12).

(For differing interpretations of Durkheim's treatment of Spencer's ideas here, see Perrin (1975) and Jones (1975).

This disagreement between Durkheim and Spencer over the nature of "mechanical" or "military" societies continued on other fronts; it is especially significant for our present purposes that many of the crucial differences between these two pioneers of sociological theory centered on their estimates of the way in which the individual was bonded to society in primitive culture. Thus, although again Durkheim may seemed to have started out from the same point as Spencer, he began to draw the line rather quickly. For instance:

With him [Spencer], we have said that the place of the individual in society, of no account in its origins, becomes greater with civilization. But this incontestable fact is presented to us under an aspect totally different from that of English philosophy, so that, ultimately, our conclusions are opposed to his more than they are in agreement (DL:193).

Specifically, Spencer's view of evolution led him to view primitive societies as a loose collocation of individuals.

"Committed to such a view, Spencer had to regard primitive, homogeneous societies as mere ephemeral juxtapositions of
individuals..." (Jones, 1974:346). Durkheim observed:

First of all, according to him, this absorption of the individual into the group would be the result of force and of an artificial organization necessitated by the state of war in which lower societies chronically live. It is especially in war that union is necessary to success. A group can defend itself against another group or subject it to itself only by acting together. It is necessary for all the individual forces to be concentrated in a permanent manner in an indissoluble union. But the only means of producing this concentration instantaneously is by instituting a very strong authority to which individuals are absolutely submissive. It is necessary that as the will of the soldier finds itself suspended in executing the will of his superior, so too does the will of citizens find itself curtailed by that of the government. Thus, it is an organized despotism which would annihilate individuals, and since this organization is essentially military, it is through militarism that Spencer defines these types of society (DL:193).

While Spencer defined primitive societies as "military" because the autonomous individual was oppressed there, Durkheim reversed the equation and began with the group instead of the individual. As Jones observes:

Durkheim's response argued that the effacement of the individual is characteristic, not of societies possessing a centralized authority, but rather of societies characterized by the complete absence of centralization. It is the homogeneous (or mechanically solidary) society in which the individual personality holds little sway, not because it is suppressed by some political or military force, but because as such "the individual" does not exist in such societies. For Durkheim, the emergence of centralized authority is not the sign of an impending suppression of individualism; rather, it is itself the first manifestation of individualism. The power granted to the despotic ruler frees him from the dictates of the group, and he is the thus the first personality to emerge as distinct from the social mass. ... The individual ... does not exist prior to the form of social organization and bring it into being; on the contrary, the "individual" is the consequence of some pre-existing state of social solidarity (1974a:347).

Now, the fundamental difference here between Spencer's and Durkheim's position was, of course, that Spencer assumed that the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible individual enshrined in nineteenth century English Utilitarian political and moral theory was to be found at the origin
of human society. The "natural rights" and "social contract" theorists had, of course, developed this rhetorical fiction in their struggles to disengage from control of Church and State. As Jones remarks: "... Durkheim's opposition to the view of rights as fixed in human nature was directed against Spencer's notion that man "by nature" possesses the right to free contract and equal exchange of value" (1974:347). Thus, to Spencer, "industrial societies," based on free contractual relations among individuals in a market, were peaceful, while primitive societies which repressed individual freedom were "military." Durkheim, on the contrary, rejected the corollary notions of a morally autonomous ego in a state of nature, and the idea of an early centralized state despotism.

We have seen, on the contrary, that this effacement of the individual has as its place of origin a social type which is characterized by a complete absence of all centralization. It is a product of that state of homogeneity which distinguishes primitive societies. If the individual is not distinct from the group, it is because the individual conscience is hardly at all distinguishable from the collective conscience. Spencer and other sociologists with him seem to have interpreted these distant facts in terms of very modern ideas. The very pronounced contemporary sentiment that each of us has his own individuality has led them to believe that personal rights cannot be restrained to this point except by a coercive organization. We cling to them so firmly that they find it inconceivable for man to have willingly abandoned them. In fact, if in lower societies so small a place is given to individual personality, that is not because it has been restrained or artificially suppressed. It is simply because, at that moment of history, it did not exist.

Extending his counter-logics, Durkheim also moved to refute the egoism/altruism evolutionary schema of Spencer. Now, Spencer and some of the later "Social Darwinists" sometimes claimed that egoism was basic, the elementary natural state of mankind, and altruism only a recent development. Durkheim inverted this notion by insisting that a wider sociocultural perspective reveals altruism as elementary and original, and egoism as a new social condition. Such a perspective became the framework for Durkheim's schemas of sui-
... we see how ... false is the theory which makes egotism the point of departure for humanity, and altruism only a recent conquest. What gives this hypothesis authority in the eyes of certain persons is that it appears to be the logical consequence of the principles of Darwinism. In the name of the dogma of struggle for existence and natural selection, they paint for us in the saddest of colors this primitive inhumanity whose hunger and thirst, always badly satisfied, were their only passions; those somber times when men had no other occupation than to quarrel with one another over their miserable nourishment. To react against those retrospective reveries of the philosophy of the eighteenth century and also against certain religious doctrines, to show with some force that the paradise lost is not behind us and that there is nothing in our past to regret, they believe we ought to make it dreary and belittle it systematically. Nothing is less scientific than this prejudice in the opposite direction. If the hypotheses of Darwin have a moral use, it is with more reserve and measure than in other sciences. They overlook the essential element of social life, that is, the moderating influence that society exercises over its members, which tempers and neutralizes the brutal action of the struggle for existence and selection. Wherever there are societies, there is altruism because there is solidarity. Thus, we find altruism from the beginnings (DL:197).

Durkheim was then driven by this polemic to attempt to more precisely define the sphere of the individual and the personal. Though still confusing personality with individuation, Durkheim sounded a note which he later elaborated in "The Dualism of Human Nature" and The Elementary Forms that the uniquely bodily locus of sensations is the foundation of individuality and individuation.

... conduct is egotistical in the measure that it is determined by sentiments and representations which are exclusively personal. If, then, we remember to what extent in lower societies the conscience of the individual is wrapped in the collective conscience, we may even be led to believe that it is a thing totally different from the individual himself, as Condillac would say. This conclusion, however, would be exaggerated, for there is a sphere of psychic life which, however developed the collective type may be, varies from one man to another and remains peculiar with each. It is that which is formed by representations, by sentiments and tendencies which relate to the organism and to the state of the organism. It is the world of internal and external sensations and the
movements which are directly linked to them. This first foundation of all individuality is inalienable and does not depend upon any social state. Thus, one must not say that altruism is born from egotism. Such a derivation would be possible only through a creatio ex nihilo. But, to speak vigorously, these two sides of conduct are found present from the beginning in all human consciences, for there cannot be things which do not reflect both of these aspects, the one relating to the individual alone, and the other relating to the things which are not personal to him (DL:197-8).

Durkheim continued with this line of thought, developing a notion of a shifting balance in sociocultural evolution between egoism and altruism, and concluded: "... individualism has developed in absolute value by penetrating into regions which were originally closed to it" (DL:198).

In short, while Durkheim and Spencer seemed to take off from a common point of departure, at many points Durkheim moved to reverse the underlying presuppositions of Spencer's thought, especially in regard to the shifting evolutionary relations between individual and society.

It is not necessary, then, with Spencer, to present social life as a simple resultant of individual natures, since, on the contrary, it is rather the latter which come from the former. Social facts are not the simple development of psychic facts, but the second are in large part only the prolongation of the first in the interior of consciences (DL:349).

Thus did Durkheim's social realism and careful evolutionary investigations correct Spencer's nominalism. "Society does not find the bases on which it rests fully laid out in consciences; it puts them there itself" (DL:350).

c. Altruisme as an Index to Mechanical Solidarity

Whereas in The Division of Labor Durkheim mainly took repressive penal law as his prime external index, in Suicide he focussed on altruistic suicide as revealing the collective nature of the archaic social bond. Altruistic suicide serves as a prime illustration (see especially Part I, Book Two) of the active acceptance of overwhelmingly strong cultural sanctions of self-abnegation in "mechanical solidarity. However, Durkheim did occasionally speak in his first book of altruisme
in relation to suicide.

We find altruism from the beginning of humanity and even in a truly intemperate form. For these privations that the savage imposes upon himself in obedience to religious tradition, the abnegation with which he sacrifices his life when society demands such sacrifice, the irresistible desire of the widow of India to follow her husband to the grave, of the Gaul not to survive the head of his clan, of the old Celt to free his companions from useless trouble by voluntary death—is not all this altruism (DL:197)?

Thus, altruisme implies that the individual in primitive and archaic societies with low degrees of segmentation, and governed by traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to sacrifice himself for the group as a duty and an honor. To Durkheim, for the individual to emerge as a full-fledged entity in his own right—as an intellectually responsible and autonomous person—the sacro-magical collective prescriptive etiquettes must first recede.

According to Durkheim's heuristic "ideal type," in primitive society the individual is more or less submerged in the group. The collective conscience takes precedence over the rudimentary individual conscience in the public mores. Indeed, the individual there is so permeated and penetrated by the collective conscience that if tradition demands self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide embraces self-homicide as a duty, perhaps even a privilege to be competed for. In contrast to egoistic suicide, the altruist considers self-sacrifice for the group an obligation, a moral duty which fulfills his own nature.

In this sense, altruistic suicide was utilized by Durkheim as an objective index revealing the inner nature of the social bond peculiar to traditional societies rooted in ties of "blood and soil" and religion. Altruistic suicide is testimony to the low degree of individuation in mechanical solidarity.

For society to be able thus to compel some of its members to kill themselves, the individual personality can have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it.... But there can be only one cause of this
feeble individuation itself. For the individual to occupy so little place in collective life he must be almost completely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a compact, continuous mass.... As they consist of a few elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, because of the small size of the group, it is close to everyone and loses no one from sight; consequently, collective supervision is constant, extending to everything, and thus more readily prevents divergences (S:220-221).

In a real sense, altruistic suicide is the ultimate expression of "mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really has little life apart from his group, sacrifices himself for his group when deemed necessary. This extreme sense of moral obligation is due not only to external conditions in which such groups often find themselves, but primarily to the extreme degree of penetration of the collective conscience by sacral and magical sanctions. Durkheim refers to altruisme in these terms as "... a state of impersonality which may be regarded as a moral characteristic of primitive man" (S:223).

Hence, primitive cultures exist in a "state of impersonality" because the person has little autonomous status there. In such situations, the individual is submerged in the dictates of the sacro-magical collective conscience. Indeed, Durkheim suggests that self-sacrifice and the systematic eradication of the ego in certain archaic religions implies a state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the "pantheistic" structure of such societies. Since religion is the symbolic way in which society first crystallized self-consciousness, it follows, argued Durkheim, that "mechanically integrated" societies, in which the lone individual counts for little, should express these social and cultural realities in terms of pantheistic religious projections. As the individual counted for little in society, so, too, the ego counted for little in religion. Indeed, Durkheim's insight here would lead us to expect that societies that had not overcome segmental bases, tribalistic structures of fraternization, and collective sacro-magical moralities of
thought and logics of action would probably never construct
European notions of the autonomy and moral value of the in-
dividual person.

d. The Chief as the Emergence of Individual Physiognomy

One of Durkheim's interesting insights into the general
evolutionary process of individuation was his suggestion that "... Chiefs are the first personalities to emerge from the so-
cial mass" (DL:195). With the chief as the administrative fo-
cus of the collective conscience, as it were, we witness the
emergence of process by which an individual, in representing
the mass, rises above and takes on an individual physiognomy.
Hegel also saw the ruler as the collective representation of
his community, in which the principle of individuation is im-
personality. "The youth goes forth from the unconscious life
of the family and becomes the individuality of the community"
(1967:493). It is precisely this dialectic of individuation
through becoming the symbolic representation of the communi-
ty--that is, the incarnation of an impersonal type--which we
shall meet again and again.

Now, it is important to emphasize that Durkheim's no-
tion of mechanical solidarity is not refuted by the rise of
larger political units; rather, it is confirmed. As noted in
Chapter Six of this Book, perhaps the closest fusion between
religious, ritual, and political structures occurred in the
archaic empires of the ancient world. Indeed, it is precisely
under such conditions, rather than in the primitive case,
that mechanical solidarity and the "sacral womb" reach their
paradigmatic level.

If in some types of societies, the directive power has
so much authority, it is ... because this authority
emanates directly from the common conscience, and it
is great because the common conscience itself is high-
ly developed.... It is under these conditions that me-
chanical solidarity reaches its maximum power, for the
action of the common conscience is stronger when it is
exercised, not in a diffuse manner, but through the me-
dium of a defined organ (DL:181).

Durkheim later explored some of these processes at length in
his interesting essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (translated by Jones and Scull, 1973). Here, Durkheim foreshadowed his later analysis by observing:

... primitive peoples do not at all present this absence of centralization that we have just observed. There are some, on the contrary, subservient to an absolute power. The division of labor has then made its appearance among them. But in this case, the tie which binds the individual to the chief is identical with that which in our days attaches the thing to the person. The relations of a barbarous despot with his subjects, as that of a master with his slaves, of a father of a Roman family with his children, is not to be distinguished from the relations of an owner with the object he possesses. In these relations there is none of the reciprocity which the division of labor produces. They have with good reason been called unilateral. The solidarity that they express remains mechanical. The whole difference is that it links the individual, not more directly to the group, but to the image of the group. But the unity of the whole is, as before, exclusive of the individuality of its parts *(DL: 180).

In sum, where religion and political-legal structures are fused, the individual is depersonalized by submergence in the collective image of the group.

Now, Durkheim later summarized this process of the subordination of the social mass under all sorts of traditional collective sacro-magical injunctions to the centralized image of the group in these terms:

Individuals, instead of subordinating themselves to the group, were subordinated to that which represented it, and as the collective authority, when it was diffuse was absolute, that of the chief, who is only its organized incarnation, naturally took on the same character (DL:195).

In this dialectic between individuation and attachment to an impersonal image, on the one hand, and between center and periphery on the other, the social mass, especially in emerging large scale political units, becomes subordinated to a specific individual who focusses and incarnates the existence of the group. The chief becomes the first individual in history, according to Durkheim, to separate himself from the social mass only because he serves as an the image of an impersonal type, a collective representation of the group.
It is a general law that the eminent organ of every society participates in the nature of the collective being that it represents. Where society has a religious, and, so to speak, superhuman character, whose source ... lies in the constitution of the common conscience, it necessarily transmits itself to the chief who directs it and who is thus elevated above the rest of men. Where individuals are in simple dependence upon the collective type, they quite naturally become dependent upon the central authority in which it is incarnated. Indeed, the right of property which the community exercises over things in an undivided way passes intact into the superior personality who finds himself thus constituted (DL:180).

Here Durkheim suggests that the collective or "undivided" rights of ownership pass over into the next political stage as the undisputed possession of all the goods and people of the realm by the political chief. Thus, by an imperceptible evolution, the chief, as the collective representation or figurehead of the group, becomes endowed with all the traditional prerogatives once jealously held by the group itself for itself. But, the dialectics of this very process lead to an inversion for the figure who symbolically incarnates the group then comes to usurp or claim these powers and possessions as his own, often hereditary, right and privilege.

Possessing deep insight into this interesting dialectic and reversal, Durkheim then cautioned us:

Rather than dating the effacement of the individual from the institution of a despotic authority, we must, on the contrary, see in this institution the first step made towards individualism. Chiefs are the first personalities who emerge from the social mass. Their exceptional situation, putting them beyond the level of others, gives them a distinct physiognomy and accordingly confers individuality upon them. In dominating society, they are no longer forced to follow all its movements. Of course, it is from the group that they derive their power, but once power is organized, it becomes autonomous and makes them capable of personal activity. A source of initiative is thus opened which had not existed before then. There is, hereafter, someone who can produce new things and even in certain measure, deny collective usages. Equilibrium has been broken (DL:195).

However, by extension, would not also shamans, medicine men, magicians, priests, prophets, and so forth, who serve as in-
carnations of sacred collective forces, also be capable of "breaking the equilibrium"? Would they also not qualify as social sites for the emergence of individual physiognomy as much as chiefs?

e. Durkheim Versus Toennies on The Division of Labor and Community and Society

Two classics of modern historical sociocultural theory appeared within five years of each other toward the close of the nineteenth century--Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1897) and Emile Durkheim's De la division du travail social (1893). Comparing and contrasting these two classics not only demonstrates how two pioneer sociological theorists came to grips with similar historical processes, but also how their analyses reveal fundamentally different attitudes and commitments. Recently, a fascinating exchange between Durkheim and Toennies has been translated (see Al- doux, 1972), which is not only important in terms of the history of social science, but also because it reveals the conflict between these thinkers as spokesman for different cultural traditions. While Durkheim and Weber never collided in public (see Part I, Book Three), Toennies and Durkheim's mutual book reviews reveal basic differences as they confronted each other's formulation.

Throughout his life Durkheim was involved on multiple polemical fronts against opposing cultural traditions. Take, for example, The Division of Labor; as noted, Durkheim was here engaged in polemics against not only Spencer and Comte, but also against Toennies. It is interesting to note, however, in light of the preceding section, that Toennies saw Durkheim's whole sociology as merely "a modification of Spencer's." Now, Durkheim's critique of Toennies' schema in Community and Society falls into at least two categories: valuations of the past versus the present, and the problematic relations between the individual and society through history. First, Durkheim acknowledged that Toennies' notion of "Community" was very similar to what he called "mechanical soli-
... Gemeinschaft is the community. It constitutes an absolute unity which is incompatible with the distinction of parts. To merit the name community ... a group is not a collection of individuals differing from one another; it is a mass, undifferentiated and compact.... It is an aggregate of minds so strongly cohesive that no one is able to stir independently of the others.... It is a community where ... communism is carried to the highest point of perfection. The whole alone exists; it alone has a action sphere peculiar to itself (1972: 1193).

We might recall here that Durkheim's original problem was how to combine the solidarity found in traditional communities with the respect for the individual found in modern "civil society." So, in contrast to the Romantics, he could not simply look back to the past, for he was not willing to give up certain positive values found mainly in modernity. The past to him meant high social solidarity, which was good, but it also meant the submergence of the individual in the traditional collective conscience. But this problem of disengagement from lingering hierocratic control confronted the French "laic" moral reformers far more than it did the German Romantics and Idealists.

Now, in terms of Toennies' notion of modern society, Durkheim remarked:

Individual minds, far from merging within Gesellschaft, are differentiated and even opposed to each other. While the first form of society is that which Hegel prefers, one recognizes in the second the theory of Bentham.... Thus, while in Gemeinschaft the whole had primacy over the parts, now under Gesellschaft, the parts are given precedence over the whole. The latter is formed only by the juxtaposition of the separate parts. That is why, while the composition of Gemeinschaft is organic, that of Gesellschaft is mechanical (1972:1196).

Durkheim next stated that he decisively differed from Toennies in regard to the latter's theory of Gesellschaft. Toennies' image of modern society is predominantly negative; if he painted the traditional community in warm tones, modern society would be filled in cold tones. Moreover, Toennies was pessimistic about the fate of the individual and the future of social relations in modern Gesellschaft. Toennies' typology seemed to
Durkheim, as Durkheim's typology seemed to Parsons, to be too dichotomous, as if the two parts had little inner or developmental relation to one another. Durkheim described what saw as Toennies' analysis of modern society, and responded negatively to Toennies' pessimism, likening it to Spencer's vision. Here enters another complexity, for while Durkheim saw Toennies' description of modern society as similar to Spencer's, Hobbes', or Bentham's, Toennies and Spencer themselves placed different valuations on the matter. In short, Spencer's sanguine or optimistic view is countered by Toennies' pessimism or negative view, while Durkheim opposed both or tried to mediate between the two. With Spencer, he wished to preserve modern individualism, yet with Toennies (against Spencer) he wished to emphasize the crucial importance of social solidarity or Gemeinschaft relations in modern society. Against Toennies, and with Spencer, Durkheim recognized the impossibility of any return to the earlier type of social solidarity built upon likeness and submission to traditional sacro-magical rationales and practices. Benjamin Nelson has said of these multiple interactions that:

The most critical fact about the Durkheimian view is its awareness of the immense challenges confronted by men and groups in the phase of organic solidarity when they seek to coordinate and synchronize their activities and functions. Unlike Spencer, Durkheim does not fancy that the simple breakdown of the unit and its unities assures to each and all the ultimate consummation and satisfaction. Unlike Toennies, he recognizes that in the development of society new sorts of solidarity to have to be evolved, achieving new kinds of communitarian and individuating structures of consciousness and function, if the trends and tendencies toward anomie and normlessness in complex societies are to be moderated (1972:120).

Now, Durkheim himself stated in this regard that:

It [Gesellschaft] is very similar to Spencer's industrial society. It is seen in the reign of individualism.... The regime of status is, under Gesellschaft replaced by the regime of contracts. Since individual wills are no longer absorbed in the collective will but are placed opposite one another in the full sense of their independence, the only thing that could put an end to this state of war is a treaty of peace con-
sciously signed ... agreement or contract. The immanent and unconscious law of Gemeinschaft is now replaced by a deliberate law, a contractual law. Property also individualized becomes mobile and money appears. It is the era of commerce, of industry, of great cities, of free exchange and of cosmopolitanism. In sum, one sees that the society which Toennies paints at this moment is the capitalistic society [as described by] ... the socialists; and, in fact, the author often borrows the somber colors ... from Karl Marx and from LaSalle (1972: 1196).

Of course, two of the main influences on Toennies conception of modern society were Hobbes and Henry Sumner Maine. Of the latter's influence on Toennies, Nelson remarks:

Maine was not unaware of the losses incurred in the course of the passage from what I have called the tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood. Progress had been purchased at a price. The close and compelling loyalties of the kindred group of real or assumed brothers ... had been displaced by a new world of economic relations. Primitive communalism and cooperation had given way to impersonal competition where each was assumed to be free to assert his self-interest without immediate regard as to the concern for others. Laissez-faire, which embodied the belligerency permissible in primitive society only between distinct kindred groups, had triumphed over customary fraternalistic relations. Everywhere that the village community had been allowed to disintegrate precipitously, melancholy effects had been the result.

Maine's notions undergo both a loss and a gain at the hands of Toennies. Under the names of Gemeinschaften and Gesellschaften, Tonnies describes opposed structures of wills and social relationships. Gemeinschaften comprises groups that are expressions of organic nonreflective wills. Associational forms, Gesellschaften, originate in a negation of the Gemeinschaften. The market and industrial relations of complex societies are characterized by transitory, segmental, and calculating relationships. Actually, Toennies went beyond these simple formulations in his later less well-known studies, but he never quite integrated the social group analysis and his cultural analysis.... A little known book review of Toennies book by Durkheim detects a critical limitation in Toennies argument (Nelson, 1972: 117).

One might add that detailed analysis of their mutual critiques reveals that both seem critically aware of the other theorist's flaws, and equally oblivious of the weaknesses in their own theses.

Let us next turn to briefly consider the political frame-
works or overtones of their respective analyses. It is most significant, again, that both Durkheim's *The Division of Labor* and Toennies' *Community and Society* revolved around the relations between the individual and society, or in slightly different terms, between communism, socialism, and individualism. As Mauss tells us (1958:32), Durkheim originally drafted his dissertation as "The Relationship Between Individualism and Socialism," while Toennies first subtitled his book "A Study of Communism and Socialism Considered as Empirical Forms of Civilization." These titles throw light, in turn, on the differences between Durkheim's political sociology and that of Toennies. Thus, for instance, Durkheim proposed that secondary groups such as occupational associations should be endowed with both power and moral legitimacy to stand between the lone individual and the powerfully centralized state. Mauss tells that Durkheim thought:

... it necessary to grant the professional group a portion of the ancient political and property rights which domestic groups had, if the individual is not to be alone in the face of the State and live in a kind of alternation between anarchy and servitude (1958:33).

Of Toennies' quasi-Hobbesian theory of the relations between the individual and the modern state, Durkheim observed:

It is necessary that this state be strong to contain all the individual wills, all the individual interests that no longer are bound one to the other, all the unchained lusts. One now understands the subtitle .... Communism is the regime of Gemeinschaft, as socialism is that of Gesellschaft.... But while the socialists hail Gesellschaft, the regime of their preference as the ideal end of progress, Toennies sees in it only the inevitable consequence of social evolution, and even suggests it may be the forerunner of society's final dissolution. He speaks of Gesellschaft without enthusiasm.... It is indispensable that the state form and develop in order that Gesellschaft be able to endure; but, on the other hand, it is able to exercise on the members of society only a mechanical action which cannot last indefinitely. By completely artificial coercion it is able to restrain for a time all the internal contradictions, all the discords that work within the society, but sooner or later they will end by breaking out. There is true power only in the extent to which it represents common ideas and interests. For as Gemein-
schaft declines, the number of these common ideas and the importance of common interests also becomes progressively fewer. The state of internal war that society discloses cannot fail sooner or later to produce, as natural consequences, the rupturing of all social bonds and the decomposition of the social organism. Thus, the life of society comprises two great phases, communism and socialism, but the latter is the beginning of an end more or less close*(1972:1197).

Now, let us recall that Durkheim and Toennies used the term "mechanical" to refer to societies at the two opposite ends of history. Durkheim used "mechanical" to refer to a society based on likeness, in which the individual stood merely as a repetitive, mechanical part submerged in the traditional collective conscience. Toennies, on the other hand, used mechanical to refer to an impersonal, atomized aggregate of individuals pursuing their own self-interests in the market society. This interesting inversion of terms led Durkheim to put his finger on the very point at which he differed from Toennies.

The point where I part company with him [Toennies] is with his theory of Gesellschaft.... Gesellschaft would be characterized by a progressive development of individualism that the State could forestall only for a time and by artificial procedures. It [society] would be essentially a mechanical aggregate; all that would still remain of the truly collective life would result not from internal spontaneity, but from the impetus of the State.... It is society as Bentham imagined it (1972:1198).

Of course, Durkheim opposed the idea that modern society was either artificial or forced. As we shall see in Part II, Book Two, Durkheim believed that the progress of organic solidarity was spontaneous and harmonious. As Giddens observes:

The main theme of The Division of Labor is that modern complex society is not, in spite of the declining significance of traditional moral beliefs, inevitably tending towards disintegration. Instead the "normal" state of the differentiated division of labor is one of organic stability. This does not mean, however, (as Durkheim considered Toennies' analysis to imply), that the integrating effect of the specialized division of labor can be satisfactorily interpreted in the mode of Utilitarianism, as the result of multifarious individual contracts (1971c:191).
On this matter, Durkheim himself stated:

Now, I believe that all the life of great social agglomerations is as natural as that of small aggregations. It is neither less organic nor less internally activated. Beyond purely individual actions there is in our contemporary societies a type of collective activity which is just as natural as that of the less extended societies of former days. It constitutes a different type, but between the two species from the same genus, as diverse as they are, there is not a difference in their basic natures. In order to prove it, a book is necessary... There is so little continuity between these two types of societies that it is impossible to conceive how they could be part of the same development (1972:1198).

The book was, of course, The Division of Labor in Society. Durkheim then criticized Toennies' description of Gesellschaft as purely ideological, and suggests that a "better way" would have been to empirically study juridical structures, as he himself was doing in the drafts of his first great book.

But, in what does the collective life of Gesellschaft consist? The method the author follows... is completely ideological.... Toennies elaborates concepts more than he observes the facts about the phenomena delineated by his concepts. He proceeds dialectically, making those distinctions and those symmetrical classifications of concepts so dear to the German logician. A better way to reach his goal would have been to proceed inductively... to study the Gesellschaft phenomena through law and mores appropriate to it which would reveal its structure. But... one cannot fail to recognize in this book truly forceful thinking and an uncommon power of organization (1972:1198).

Let us now turn to Toennies' reply to Durkheim.

Toennies' response to Durkheim's critical review was brief but cogent. Toennies' reply appeared in 1896 in brief comments on Durkheim's The Division of Labor. His review is noteworthy because he expressed surprise at Durkheim's usage of his terms "mechanical" and "organic" in a reverse manner, he insisted that his intentions have not been adequately recognized, and from his own special perspective, Toennies saw Durkheim's sociology as basically congruent with Spencer's, and finally, he revealed a critical attitude toward Durkheim's work which probably derives from the conflict between their respective cultural traditions.
First, Toennies protests that his presentation of organically and mechanically integrated social structures is not merely the reverse of Durkheim's.

What I referred to were the possible kinds of positive attitudes of people toward each other, hence those of the individual toward the social entirety. My types are as follows: the entirety is perceived and considered as a goal—as a natural whole; or the entirety is perceived and considered as a means for individual goals and consequently as an intentionally devised tool (1972:1199).

Toennies thus started from the individual's perceptions and the content of his will while, on the contrary, Durkheim started from the social and cultural structures and related these back to the individual. Toennies continues:

I understand both kinds of structures in a sense completely different from that of Durkheim, Barth, and all other sociologists known to me. I understand them in the first range according to their ... esse objectivum, and I am delineating the progressive rationalization and externalization of these relations which derive from these esse objectivum and reach their climax in the conceptions of the universal society and the universal state. This doctrine of mine is basically indifferent toward the theory that the esse formale of the social life or that of Gesellschaft is organic (1972:1199-2000).

Thus, Toennies reiterated that his starting point and central focus were very different from Durkheim's. Implying that Durkheim was centrally concerned with the structural relations between individual and society through history, Toennies started with the individual's perception of the essential goal of his life-activity. Toennies' perspective is valuable in itself and because Durkheim largely ignored phenomenological approaches, and because Toennies' approach influenced both Weber's typologies and his notion of verstehen.

Then, Toennies' pointed out that Durkheim appeared to slight the negative features of the progressive division of labor. "I objected several times to his failure to consider the negative side of the entire evolution" (1972:2000). Of course, Durkheim did see a negative side to the breakdown of the division of labor in terms of the forced and anomic divisions of labor (see Part II, Book Two). Thus, Durkheim's view
of the negative consequences was simply not what Toennies saw; Durkheim ignored the Romantics' charges of impersonalization, and assumed that specialization of functions was necessary and good (e.g. see DL:402-3). Toennies' sardonic summary of Durkheim's theses went like this:

The essential subject of Durkheim's work is the moral value of the division of labor; he expects public opinion to turn increasingly toward the goal of making the division of labor an object of obligation. Thus belonging to positive and current morals, it unfolds its real (natural) moral value. The author is defending the division of labor against the reproach of diminishing human personality. The entire sociology of Durkheim is a modification of Spencer's sociology. In the way this perspective is criticized as well as in several other commentaries, I found some thoughts I agree with (1972:2000).

These observations raise a crucial question in regard to the emergence of the person through history. Toennies rightly saw that Durkheim took pains to defend the division of labor against the charge of diminishing human personality (DL:402-3), but clearly this very charge lay at the heart of the Romantics' critique of progress. Toennies and other thinkers in the Romantic tradition (see Part I, Book Three), stood for the life of the Spirit, for the Faustian universality of the whole man. The integrated personality and the deepened interior life versus the narrow, fragmented, functionalized bureaucrat—it was this opposition between life and death, Spirit and Mechanism—which lay behind Weber's haunting plaint at the close of his Protestant Ethic... book. It also lay behind Toennies' subsidy of the whole personalism of community, of the warm, extended primary group relations. The organicism of personality thus was associated with the organicism of early community versus the impersonalized atomism of market society which necessitated the rationalization and specialization of personality and social structure.

Let us conclude this brief review of the confrontation between Toennies and Durkheim by reflecting on the differences between their usages of the key terms "organic" and "mechanical." Perhaps this might reveal key outlooks of their respec-
tive cultural traditions. In essence, by the term "mechanical" Toennies implied impersonality, atomized Utilitarian social relations, while to Durkheim "mechanical" implied forced likeness, repetition as in a machine, and a low degree of individuation as in a flock or birds or school of fish turning with a single movement. By "organic," Toennies roughly meant undifferentiated, personalistic, stable, communal social relations found in traditional village communities, while Durkheim meant complex differentiation and interdependency of function.

f. Obstacles to the Progress of Organic Solidarity

Although Durkheim's general evolutionism did not lead him to Weberian insights into the differential preconditions for specific historical breakthroughs, recognition of obstacles to the progress of organic solidarity was not wholly absent from his work. For example, Durkheim did acknowledge that that clan particularism, the force of tradition and heredity, and so forth were obstacles which had to be overcome if the division of labor was to perform its function of liberating the individual from the sacro-magical collective conscience. Indeed, at one point, in an important footnote, Durkheim acknowledged the possibility of crucial exceptions to his highly generalized notion that the division of labor, the effacement of the segmental type of society, economic development, and the liberation of the individual necessarily and everywhere go hand in hand. Let us briefly explore these "Weberian" emphases.

Noting how the new builds on the old—ie. occupational functions on class and caste lines—Durkheim adopted an almost Weberian emphasis in observing that organic solidarity had to breakthrough the restrictive clan barriers to open up wider arenas of exchange and universes of discourse.

In a general way, classes and castes probably have no other origin nor any other nature; they arise from the multitude of occupational organizations being born amidst the pre-existing familial organization. But this mixed arrangement cannot long endure, for between the two states that it attempts to reconcile, there is an
antagonism which necessarily ends in a break. It is only a very rudimentary division of labor which can adapt itself to those rigid, defined moulds which were not made for it. It can grow only by freeing itself from the framework which encloses it. As soon as it has passed a certain stage of development, there is no longer any relation either between the immutable number of segments and the steady growth of functions which are becoming specialized, or between the hereditarily fixed properties of the first and the new aptitudes that the second calls forth. The social material must enter into entirely new combinations in order to organize itself upon completely different foundations. But the old structure ... is opposed to this. That is why it must disappear. The history of these two types shows in effect that one has progressed only as the other has retrogressed (DL:182-3).

Here Durkheim clearly stated that the division of labor must breakthrough older and narrower structures, that it faces conflict, that it does not proceed automatically and ineluctably, that it may be blocked by the rigidity of clan and familial based occupational differentiation. Now, the underlying reason for this resistance of familial structures to progressive and impersonal functionalization of occupational tasks is the rootedness of the clan in the collective conscience.

Examples are numerous where this neutralizing influence of the common conscience on the division of labor can be directly observed. As long as law and custom make a strict obligation of the inalienability and communism of real estate, the necessary conditions for the division of labor do not exist. Each family forms a compact mass, and all devote themselves to the same occupation, to the exploitation of the hereditary patrimony. Among the Slavs, the Zadruga is often increased to such proportions that great misery becomes prevalent. Nevertheless, as domestic spirit is very strong, they generally continue to live together, instead of taking up special occupations outside such as mariner and merchant. In other societies, where the division of labor is more advanced, each class has determinate functions, always the same, sheltered from all innovation. Elsewhere, there are entire classes of occupations whose cultivation is more or less forbidden to citizens. In Greece, in Rome, industry and commerce were scorned careers. Among the Kabyles, certain trades like those of butcher, shoemaker, etc. are held in low esteem by public opinion. Specialization, thus, cannot move in these directions. Finally, even with those peoples where economic life has already attained some development, as with us during the days of the old corporations, func-
tions were regulated in such a way that the division of labor could not progress. Where everyone was obliged to manufacture in the same manner, all individual variation was impossible (DL:284-5).

Further, closely allied to the segmental structure of mechanical solidarity was the force of heredity and ascribed status systems. In his concern for the liberation of the individual from the fused common conscience, Durkheim saw a series of factors holding back the de-collectivization of structures of moral and intellectual responsibility, and thus, in turn, the development of differentiated occupational responsibility.

Race and individuality are two contradictory forces which vary inversely with each other. As long as we only continue to follow in the path of our ancestors, we tend to live as they have lived, and remain adamant to all innovation.... The obstacle that progress meets in this quarter is even more difficult to surmount than that coming from a community of beliefs and practices. For the latter are imposed upon the individual only from without and by moral action, whereas hereditary tendencies are congenital and have an anatomical base. Thus, the greater the part of heredity in the distribution of tasks, the more invariable the distribution, the more difficult, consequently, the advances of the division of labor are, even when they are useful.... A great many facts tend to prove that, in the beginning, heredity had a considerable influence over the division of social functions (DL:304-5).

Now, a special case of this retarding influence of heredity and ascribed status on occupational differentiation and the liberation of the individual is the caste division of labor.

As soon as the division of labor appears in characteristic fashion, it is fixed into a form transmitted by heredity. Thus castes grow up. India offers the most perfect model of this organization of work, but it is found elsewhere. With the Jews, the only functions which were sharply separated from others, sacerdotal functions, were strictly hereditary. It was the same at Rome for all public functions, which implied religious functions, which were the privilege of the patricians alone. In Assyria, Persia, Egypt, society is divided in the same manner. When castes tend to disappear, they are replaced by classes, which, in order to keep their close exclusion and privileges, rely on the same principle (DL:306).

Thus, clans, castes, and classes all constitute obstacles to
the differentiation of function, to the division of social labor on an open and universalistic base of natural aptitude and technical competence. The cultural thrust toward universalism and individual achievement underlies the progressive division of labor to Durkheim.

For the division of labor to be able to develop, men had to succeed in shaking off the yoke of heredity, progress had to break up castes and classes. The progressive disappearance of these latter tends to prove the reality of his emancipation, for we cannot see how, if heredity had lost none of its claims over the individual, it could have been weakened as as institution.... What is certain is that faith in heredity, formerly so intense, has today been replaced by an almost opposed faith. We tend to believe that the individual is in large part the son of his work, and even to scorn the bonds which attach him to his race and make him depend upon it (DL:308).

Durkheim's observations here about obstacles lead us to a most significant footnote in which he acknowledged that there might be important exceptions to his general law of differentiation and individuation. Indeed, this admission of the insufficiency of his general evolutionary schema leads us directly to Weber's investigations into the complex and shifting series of relations which advance or retard evolutionary breakthroughs. Perhaps Donald Nielsen has put the significance of Durkheim's acknowledgement that the division of labor, effacement of segmental type, and economic development do not necessarily go hand in hand most succinctly:

... a high degree of differentiation and division of structure and function do not necessarily imply or carry with them a full and total thrust toward universalization and fraternization and the makings of newer senses of brotherhoods, community, self, and world. We err grievously if we suppose that every time we perceive differentiated structures at work we are seeing a society which has undergone extensive cultural modernization (1973:108-9).

Durkheim himself observed:

But it may well happen that in a particular society ... the division of economic labor may be greatly developed, although the segmental type may be strongly pronounced there. This seems to be the case with England. Great industry and commerce appear to be as developed there as on the continent, although the cellular system is still
very marked, as both the autonomy of local life and authority of tradition prove.... It is sufficient, then, that some sort of circumstance excite an urgent need of material well-being with a people for the division of economic labor to be developed without the social structure visibly changing. One must not judge the place of a society on the social ladder according to its state of civilization, especially of its economic civilization, for the latter can be only an imitation, a copy, and conceal a social structure of inferior species. The case, if it is true, is exceptional. It appears, however (DL:282, #30).

Besides opening the way for a discussion of Weber's work, Durkheim's admission here of exceptions to his general law means, as Nielsen suggests, that some societies may break with the sacro-magical collective structures of conscience and consciousness independently of structural differentiation. Conversely, even with societies which are differentiated institutionally, the failure to break with either sacro-magical praxis and classificatory systems rooted primarily in the collectivity, constitute prime obstacles to modernization.

These multiple possibilities are true in cultural spheres as well as in the division of labor. Although science and philosophy were symbolically associated in Durkheim's Enlightenment France with the over-coming of religion, magic, and superstition and the liberation of the individual, again Durkheim acknowledged that these processes are not necessary and inevitable and universal developments.

In Athens, intellectual development--scientific and philosophical--was far greater than in Rome. Now, it is held that science and philosophy and collective thinking develop in the same way as individualism. True, they very often accompany it, but that is not inevitably so. In India, Brahminism and Buddhism have a very learned and subtle metaphysic--the Buddhist religion rests on a whole theory of the world. The sciences were developed to a high degree in the temples of Egypt. We know, however, that in the case of both India and Egypt, there was an almost complete absence of individualism. It is this fact more than any other that goes to prove the pantheistic nature of these metaphysics and religions: they attempted to give the pantheism a kind of rational and charted faith. Clearly, a pantheistic faith is not possible where individuals have a lively sense of their indi-
Here, again, Durkheim connected pantheistic religious and metaphysical projections with the pantheistic structure of society--namely, with the penetration of culture by traditional sacro-magical collective structures of morality and thought. Finally, Durkheim considered the possibility that the development of philosophy and speculative thought are not necessarily correlated with the development of individualism. For the emergence and establishment of autonomous spheres for the individual are preeminently practical, i.e. structural, processes.

... for the Athenian, the matter of practical life was reduced to something insignificant. He lived a life of leisured pursuits. In such a setting there comes a remarkable flowering of science and philosophy. Once they flower, they may, to be sure, inspire an individualist movement, but we cannot say they derive from it. It is possible, of course, that speculation, opening out in this way, may not have this result and that it remains in its essence conservative. In that case, it is taken up with making a theory of the state of things as they exist or perhaps with a commentary on it. Such, in the main, is the nature of sacerdotal speculation: and even Greek speculation as a whole had this same tendency over a long period. The political and moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do more than reflect in their systems the political structure of Sparta and Athens respectively.

Finally, one last reason that prevents our measuring the degree of individualism in a country by the development reached in the faculties of speculative thought. This is, that individualism is not a theory: it lies in the region of practice, not in that of speculation. For it to be true individualism, it must make its mark on morals and social institutions (PECM:59).

In sum, while remaining for the most part on the general evolutionary level correlating societal differentiation and individuation, Durkheim did occasionally descend to the historical level of specific preconditions retarding or advancing societies in different ways along one or other evolutionary line. While more of this differential-historical analysis would have been desirable (see Part I, Book Three), Durkheim did recognize a series of obstacles to progressive division of social labor.
g. The Progress of Organic Solidarity

We propose here to treat the coming of organic solidarity from a different point than normal. Instead of focusing on the movement from one type of social organization to another, we shall turn our primary attention to Durkheim's original and deepest concern—the shifting historical relations between individual and society. If the significance of the movement from mechanical to organic solidarity is viewed in terms of background shifts in the relations between the person's conscience and consciousness and systems of group morality, of shifts in the anchors of legitimate moral and intellectual authority from the group to the individual, then the deeper historical meaning of Durkheim's correlation of societal differentiation and individuation may be read as the de-collectivization of structures of morality and thought and the emergence of the autonomous and responsible person.

Durkheim himself compared and contrasted the two types in terms of their significance for the individual in these terms:

Whereas the previous type [mechanical solidarity] implies that individuals resemble each other, this type presumes their difference. The first is possible only in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality; the second is possible only if each one has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him; that is, a personality. It is necessary, then, that the collective conscience leave open a part of the individual conscience in order that special functions be established there, functions which it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity. On the one hand, each one depends as much more strictly on society as labor is divided; and, on the other, the activity of each is as much more personal as it is specialized. The yoke that we submit to is much less heavy than when society completely controls us, and it leaves much more place open for the free play of our initiative. Here the individuality of all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Society becomes more capable of collective movement, at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom of movement. This solidarity resembles that which we observe among the higher animals. Each organ, in effect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And, moreover, the unity of the organism is as great as the
individuation of the parts is more marked (DL:131).

To the early Durkheim, then, societal differentiation implied individuation because (a) the hold of the collective conscience demanding collective acting out of responsibilities is attenuated, and, therefore, a sphere for individual moral and intellectual responsibility is progressively opened up, and (b) because functional specialization demanded by the division of social labor also requires greater use of individual capacities. The organic solidarity of complex sociocultural formations, then, depends upon the emergence of differentiated individual responsibilities which knit the social fabric together in a new and more interdependent way. As Durkheim later proposed "The division of labor unites at the same time that it opposes; it makes the activities it differentiates converge; it brings together those it separates." Organic solidarity implies a complex, differentiated, interdependent social bond—unity through diversity instead of unity through identity. "The more one goes back in history, the greater the homogeneity. On the other hand, the further one approaches to the highest social types, the greater the development of the division of labor" (DL:138).

Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim sounded the same refrain from multiple perspectives—social morphological differentiation requires greater diversity, and, thus, frees the individual. Noting that small scale groups surround the individual, Durkheim observed:

But for it to be otherwise, would it not be enough for the society to be on a fairly large scale? There is no doubt that when it is small—when it surrounds every individual on all sides and at every moment—it does not allow of his evolving in freedom. If it be always present and always in action, it leaves no room for his initiative. But it is no longer the same case when it has reached wide enough dimensions. When it is made up of a vast number of individuals a society can exercise over each a supervision only as close and as vigilant and effective as when a surveillance is concentrated on a small number. A man is more free in the midst of a throng than in a small coterie. Hence, it follows that individual diversities can then more easily have play, that collective tyranny declines and that individualism establishes itself in fact, and that, with time,
Having just reviewed some obstacles which Durkheim himself cited to the progress of the division of labor, one might question here his overly abstracted, general evolutionary views on rights following on changed states of fact. Durkheim then compared and contrasted mechanical and organic solidarity in terms of changes in the volume, intensity, and definition of the collective conscience (see also Giddens, 1972a:5).

Not only, in a general way, does mechanical solidarity link men less strongly than organic solidarity, but also, as we advance in the scale of social evolution, it grows ever more slacker. The force of social links which have this origin vary with respect to the following three conditions:

(1) the relation between the volume of the common conscience and that of the individual conscience. The links are stronger as the first more completely envelops the second.

(2) the average intensity of the states of the collective conscience. The relation between volumes being equal, it has as much power over the individual as it has vitality.

(3) the greater or lesser determination of these same states. That is, the more defined beliefs and practices are, the less place they leave for individual divergences. They are uniform moulds into which we all ... couch our ideas and our actions. The consensus is then as perfect as possible; all consciences vibrate in unison. Inversely, the more general and indeterminate the rules of conduct and thought are, the more individual reflection must intervene to apply them to particular cases. But it cannot awaken without upheavals occuring.... Centrifugal tendencies thus multiply at the expense of social cohesion and the harmony of its movements * (DL:152).

This is a crucial passage; close attention to it could have avoided many subsequent misunderstandings among secondary interpreters. Contrary to Parsons (1949) and J. Poskett (1939), among others, who dropped out Durkheim's evolutionism and never recognized the centrality of his notion of the primitive sacred complex, Durkheim never meant to say that the main difference between mechanical and organic solidarity lay in the presence or absence of shared values or a common value system. Rather, as we see in the preceding quotation, he distinguished between the two in terms of their volume, intensity, ri-
gidity, and content. In other words, Durkheim contrasted a strong, repressive, highly stereotyped religious and magically dominated traditional tribal or communal value system with a modern secularized and individualized value system.

Since he linked religion with a "central region in the common conscience," we should not fail to note a crucial ambiguity in Durkheim's usage of the key terms "common conscience" or "collective conscience." Lack of recognition of Durkheim's special meanings for these terms has led many observers astray. In a series of key passages early in The Division of Labor (eg. 79-80), Durkheim acknowledged that the "conscience collective" could be viewed in two ways—as the generally diffused value and symbolic system of any society (eg. Parsons' generic Central Value System), and as the situation, most clearly represented by primitive mechanical solidarity, in which the logics of moral decision and intellectual judgment are primarily collective, traditional, and permeated by sacro-magical rationales and practices. Once again we encounter the conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary meanings in Durkheim's terms and system. However, it must be noted that Durkheim, remarking on this ambiguity ("the word we have just employed is not, it is true, without ambiguity," DL:80), intended that the term conscience collective be specifically reserved for the historical situation of early society, for the social situation of "the totality of social likenesses" (DL:80). Durkheim even observed that it might be better to designate a special term for this notion of "the totality of social similitudes"—whose clearest expression is primitive tribal culture (eg. DL:80). Unfortunately, he did not do so, and, hence, bequeathed us much confusion. But he did emphasize that "we shall employ the well-worn expression 'collective or common conscience,' but we shall always mean the strict sense in which we have taken it" *(DL:80).

In addition to this explicit proviso, Durkheim's intentions here are clear from the way in which he described the crucial transformations from mechanical to organic solidarity.
This is clearly seen in Part V of Chapter Five of Division, where Durkheim spoke of the role of religion in primitive society and its secularization and attenuation in organic solidarity (see also Chapter Six of this Book on the "primitive sacral complex").

If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything; everything social is religious; the two words are synonymous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from their religious function, constitute themselves apart, and take on a more and more acknowledged temporal character. God, who was at first present in all human relations, progressively withdraws from them; he abandons the world to men and their disputes. At least, if he continues to dominate it, it is from on high and at a distance, and the force which he exercises, becoming more general and more indeterminate, leaves more place to the free play of human forces. The individual really feels himself less acted upon; he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity (DL:169).

It is, therefore, transformation and secularization of values, and their disappearance, which constitutes the essence of the momentous historical shift in relations between the individual conscience and the common conscience.

This is not to say, however, that the common conscience is threatened with total disappearance. Only, it more and more comes to consist of very general and very indeterminate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave open a place for a growing multitude of individual differences. There is even a place where it is strengthened and made precise: that is the way in which it regards the individual. As all the other beliefs and all the other practices take on a character less and less religious, the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We erect a cult in behalf of personal dignity which, as every strong cult, already has its superstitions (DL:172).

Anthony Giddens has emphasized this crucial aspect of Durkheim's ideas in succinct fashion:

There is a fundamental distinction between "individuation" and "individualism." The growth of individuation presupposes a decline in the volume, intensity, and rigidity of the conscience collective: individuals are able to develop their own particular propensities and inclinations to the degree to which these are freed from the control of the moral homogeneity of the com-
munity. But this in turn entails a transformation in the content of collective moral ideals: the decline of traditional religion and the emergence of what Durkheim calls variously "moral individualism" or the "cult of the individual." The main thesis of The Division of Labor is that while individuation is a necessary concomitant of the dissolution of traditional society, it implies, not the complete eradication of the conscience collective, but its transmutation in the form of the development of new moral ideals: those comprised in the "cult of the individual." Thus, the "cult of the individual" provides a moral validation of the specialized division of labor. The values and beliefs composing moral individualism, stressing as they do the dignity and worth of the human individual, emphasize that each man should develop his talents and capacities to their fullest extent (1972a:6-7).

Again, one cannot hope to understand why Durkheim viewed the progress of the division of labor and the coming of organic solidarity in such a virtuous light unless one sees him as part of a long-term continuing cultural struggle with the Catholic Hierocratic Cultural Tradition to de-collectivize and secularize the foundations of morality and thought.

Against this background, we can better see why Durkheim saw the progressive division of labor in a moral light, why he saw the coming of organic solidarity as liberating the individual from archaic repression, and why he correlated differentiation and individuation.

If there are more things common to all, there are many more that are personal to each. There is, indeed, every reason for believing that the latter have increased more than the former, for the differences between men have become more pronounced in so far as they are more cultivated.... special abilities are more developed than the common conscience. It is at least probable that, in each particular conscience, the personal sphere is much greater than the other (DL:153).

Individual diversities multiply as societal diversity increases--this is Durkheim's fundamental law here. Along with this parallel movement, Durkheim saw progressive extension of juridical protection for the individual. (We shall soon explore the role of the State as a guarantor of individual rights).

If all the individuals who make up society are today equally protected, no matter what their status, this tempering of customs is due, not to the appearance of
a really new penal rule, but to the extension of the old one. In the beginning, it was forbidden to make an attempt upon the life of the members of the group; but this did not apply to children and slaves. Now that we no longer make this distinction, some acts which were not criminal have become punishable. If, however, there is place for admitting that the respect of society for the individual has become stronger, it does not follow that the central region of the common conscience [religion] is more extended (DL:166-7).

Now, it is this emerging "cult of the individual" which comes with the progressive division of labor and organic solidarity which we are centrally concerned with tracing here. Indeed, Durkheim's central value in the modern world was precisely this "cult of the individual."

It is, indeed, remarkable that the only collective sentiments that have become more intense are those which have for their object, not social affairs, but the individual. For this to be so, the individual personality must have become a much more important element in the life of society, and in order for it to have acquired this importance, it is not enough for the personal conscience of each to have grown in absolute value, but also to have grown more than the common conscience. It must have been emancipated from the yoke of the latter, and, consequently, the latter must have fallen from its throne, and lost the determinate power that it originally exercised (DL:167).

In other words, Durkheim saw a long-term transformation from the cult of the group and tradition to the cult of the individual; both were culturally sanctioned, however. Finally, we cannot fail to observe that Durkheim sounded occasionally a critical note concerning the emerging "cult of the individual" which may lead to extremes.

It is thus ... a common cult, but it is possible only by the ruins of all others, and, consequently, cannot produce the same effects as this multitude of extinguished beliefs. There is no compensation for that. Moreover, if it is common in so far as the community partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If it turns all wills toward the same end, this end is not social. It thus occupies a completely exceptional place in the collective conscience. It is still from society that it takes all its force, but it is not to society that it attaches us; it is to ourselves. Hence, it does not constitute a true social link. That is why we have been justly able to reproach the theorists who have made this sentiment exclusively basic in their moral...
We see Durkheim acknowledging simultaneously that the "cult of the individual" in modern society is culturally sanctioned (else it could not be a "cult"), but one which is non-social. This curious state of affairs suggests that the egoistic extremes of this cult may be connected with egoistic and anomic suicides. We shall, of course, pursue this critical emphasis of Durkheim's, especially in terms of his multiple polemics against the opposing Anglo and Romantic notions of the individual.

Now, against the notion that differentiation necessarily implies dispersion, a dissolution of values, and a rending of the social fabric (as implied by Comte, see Book Two), Durkheim repeatedly insisted:

Social progress ... does not consist in a continual dissolution. On the contrary, the more we advance, the more profoundly do societies reveal the sentiment of self and of unity.... It is the division of labor which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the principal bond of social aggregates of higher types (DL:173).

Durkheim thus came, in a slightly different way, to reiterate the essence of organic solidarity, in contrast to mechanical solidarity. Again, the crucial factors to Durkheim here were the de-collectivization of structures of conscience and consciousness and the emergence of the autonomous person.

This social type rests on principles so different from the preceding that it can develop only in proportion to the effacement of that preceding type. In effect, individuals are here grouped, no longer according to their relations of lineage, but according to the particular nature of the social activity to which they consecrate themselves. Their natural milieu is no longer the natal milieu, but the occupational milieu. It is no longer real or fictitious consanguinity which makes the place of each one, but the function he fills (DL:182).

Durkheim saw both types as structured in terms of moral rules—only the duties demanded of the individual by the group were diametrically opposed. Social life, moral life,
then, can take two fundamentally different forms.

Social life comes from a double source, the likenesses of consciences and the division of social labor. The individual is socialized in the first case, because, not having any real individuality, he becomes, with those he resembles, part of the same collective type; in the second case, because, while having a physiognomy and a personal activity which distinguishes him from others, he depends upon them in the same measure that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the society which results from their union. The similitudes of consciences gives rise to juridical rules which with the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon all. The more pronounced this is, the more completely is social life confounded with religious life, and the nearer to communism are economic institutions. The division of labor gives rise to juridical rules which determine the nature and the relations of divided functions, but whose violation calls forth only restitutive measures without any expiatory character. Each of these bodies of juridical rules is, moreover, accompanied by a body of purely moral rules. Where penal law is very voluminous, common morality is very extensive; that is to say, there is a multitude of collective practices placed under the protection of public opinion. Where restitutive law is highly developed, there is an occupational morality for each profession. In the interior of the same group of workers, there exists an opinion, diffuse in the entire extent of this circumscribed aggregate, which, without being furnished with legal sanctions, is rendered obedience. There are usages and customs common to the same order of functionaries which on one of them can break without incurring the censure of the corporation. This morality is distinguished from the preceding by differences analogous to those which separate the two corresponding types of law. It is localized in a limited region of society. Moreover, the repressive character of the sanctions attaching to it is much less attenuated. Professional misdeed call forth reprobation much more feeble than attacks against public morality (DL:226-7).

It must be emphasized that Durkheim considered the modern morality of organic solidarity just as moral as the shared common conscience of societies permeated by religion and magic. For both attach the individual to the group; the type and content of attachment merely differs in these two cases.

The rules of occupational morality and justice, however, are as imperative as the others. They force the individual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compro-
mises, even where society relies most completely upon the division of labor, it does not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms, between which it can establish only external, transient contacts. Rather, the members are united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made. Each of the functions that they exercise is, in a fixed way, dependent upon others, and with them forms a solidary system. Accordingly, from the nature of the chosen task permanent duties arise. Because we fill some domestic or social function, we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no right to free ourselves. There is, above all, an organ upon which we are tending to depend more and more; this is the State. The points at which we are in contact with it multiply as do the occasions when it is entrusted with the duty of reminding us of the sentiment of common solidarity (DL:226-7).

In contrast to those who portray modern society as atomistic, Durkheim reminds us of the extensive interdependence occasioned by organic solidarity. And, in what may be the weak link in his theoretical chain (see also Books Two and Three), Durkheim presumed that the interaction necessitated by widespread economic interdependence inevitably will generate moral rules and a new form of stable social solidarity.

Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and, consequently, making mutual sacrifices, without tying themselves into one another with strong durable bonds. Every society is a moral society. In certain respects, this character is even more pronounced in organized societies. Because the individual is not sufficient unto himself, it is from society that he receives everything necessary to him, as it is for society that he works. Thus is formed a very strong sentiment of the state of dependence in which he finds himself.... On its side, society learns to regards its members no longer as things over which it has rights, but as co-operators whom it cannot neglect and towards whom it owes duties. Thus, it is wrong to oppose a society which comes from a community of beliefs to one which has a cooperative basis, according only to the first a moral character, and seeing in the latter only an economic grouping. In reality, cooperation also has its intrinsic morality * (DL:228).

Organic solidarity, then, has its own distinctive morality; because it frees the individual to develop his or her own talents, and liberates us from the repressive and narrow rules of societies rooted in blood and soil, its prime concern, as Durkheim saw it, was the individual.
But it [the morality of organic solidarity] is not of same nature as the other. The other is strong only if the individual is not. Made up of rules which are practiced by all indistinctly, it receives from this universal, uniform practice an authority which bestows something superhuman upon it, and which puts it beyond the pale of discussion. The cooperative society, on the contrary, develops in the measure that individual personality becomes stronger. As regulated as a function may be, there is a large place always left for personal initiative (DL:228).

Hence, organic solidarity depends upon individual diversity and responsibility; it opens up new areas for individual initiative. It bonds individuals together in an interdependent occupational network rather than in terms of traditional framework of collective sacral rationales and magical protocols. Durkheim summarizes these differences in this manner:

There are, then, two great currents of social life to which two types of structure, not less different, correspond. Of these currents, that which has its origin in social similitudes first runs on alone and without a rival. At this moment, it confounds itself with the very life of society; then, little by little, it canalizes, rarefies, while the second is always growing. Indeed, the segmental structure is more and more covered by the other, but without completely disappearing (DL:229).
2. The Symbolic Construction of the Person: Dialectic of Impersonality and Personality

Preface. Without setting aside anything which has been said before, in this section we shall come at the same basic question from the opposite direction; we shall proceed in reverse or complementary gear. In his early writings, as we have discovered, Durkheim correlated historical individuation with societal differentiation, thus presuming that the liberation of the individual was a largely unproblematic process. But is increasing diversity alone sufficient to generate the person as a moral agent and intellectual subject? Although still necessary, Durkheim's initial framework suffered from the too simple equation of individuation with differentiation; this masked the hidden presumption that there lay ready to hand an autonomous, rational, indivisible substance which only had to be separated out or released in order to take on its full individual physiognomy. Hence, even though he spoke of the transformation rather than the disappearance of the common conscience, Durkheim's rhetorical animus lead him to view the process of de-collectivization and individuation as still primarily a negative process, while only secondarily did increasing competition and occupational diversity stimulate moral and intellectual individualism. In short, the latter process remained dependent on the former.

Yet, in his later writings, Durkheim overcame these hidden presumptions inherited from the Enlightenment by focusing more profoundly on the sociocultural construction, from the very beginning, of the person. Instead of evolutionary discontinuity and breakthrough, generic continuity moved to central stage of his thought. It was especially in The Elementary Forms that Durkheim developed the positive sociocultural logic of the construction of the person complementary to his earlier largely negative equation of de-collectivization with individuation in The Division of Labor. In this last work, Durkheim explored in great detail the symbolic construction of the notion of the soul, the relation of an
individual to his totem, and to the ancestors and spirits which lay at the heart of the emergence of persons as informed centers of conscience and consciousness. Durkheim proposed the emergence of the notion of the person under the aegis of the notion of the individual soul. The origin of the notion of personality was thus placed in the generating matrix of the primitive sacral complex as the great womb of society and culture.

In focussing on the generative relationships between public symbols and phenomenological process, between the growth of moral rules and intellectual concepts and the emergence of the personality, Durkheim seized upon a profound dialectic between impersonality and personality. The link between the impersonal, collective, communicable public sphere and the private, personal sphere is symbolic process. As in drama, the persona is a mask or role, the individual person first emerges in terms of a specific incarnation of a general soul substance. Hence, in a dialectical paradox, the individual first emerges under the aegis of a generic type; only later is the individual judged significant apart from his or her participation in the collective essence. We see the same process in reverse today; whenever a group or institution takes on personal qualities, such as "Ma Bell" or "Uncle Sam," the individual members participating in that collective identity are correspondingly de-personalized in the same degree. That is, their own specific qualities are set aside in favor of more or less compulsory adherence to the homogeneous projected corporate image. Whereas Durkheim spoke of mechanical solidarity to express this depersonalization, today we speak of becoming social robots; the repetitiveness remains. Kenneth Burke has clearly glimpsed the significance of this universal process:

Once you linger on this question of personality, you find it bristling with dialectical paradoxes, whereby the personal and the impersonal subtly change places (paradoxes that furtively invest humans with "divine" attributes, hence adding to the "mystifications" so important in rhetorical prodding). When a figure becomes the personification of some impersonal motive,
the result is a depersonalization. The person becomes the charismatic vessel of some "absolute" substance. And when thus magically endowed, the person transcends his nature as an individual, becoming instead the image of the idea he stands for (1962:273).

Now, Durkheim provided abundant illustrations of these dialectical paradoxes which stood at the moment of the birth of the person; for if, today, an individual can become depersonalized through this process of submergence in a collective symbolic projection, it is equally true that the very notion of the individual person could only first emerge out of the very same process.

After considering the symbolic construction of the notion of the person, we shall have the sufficient analytical core to understand the complex processes governing the emergence of personhood under the double movement of individualization (de-collectivization and separation) and phenomenological deepening and centering through symbolic processes. These two complementary constitutive sub-processes must go together in any adequate notion of the construction of the person.

After this section, then, and for the rest of our exploration of the emergence of the person through history, we shall try to keep in mind this double dialectic. For example, we shall see that Durkheim viewed the State as an emancipator of the individual, but after overcoming its rivals for the allegiance of the individual, the State, in turn, oppresses the individual. And, further, Christianity and especially Protestantism, comes to liberate the individual from the old law and the hierocracy, but in the process of deepening the structures of interiority, submit the individual, in turn, to the destructive rigors of a new "iron cage," a new form of invisible and self-reinforcing bondage. These are simply some of the dialectical paradoxes which lead to the shift from Durkheim's first to second schemas of suicide.
a. The Transitional Phase

As noted in Chapter Six, Durkheim's thought underwent a crucial transitional phase in his understanding of the evolution of society, religion, and person in his middle period -- the later Bordeaux and early Paris years when his main energies were invested in building up L'Annee sociologique. With his developing recognition of the creativeness of the primitive sacral womb, Durkheim came to see better the relation between the emergence of the notion of the person and religious symbolism. Here we can only consider a few representative illustrations of Durkheim's deepening awareness of the dialectic of impersonality and personality.

Now, in speaking of altruistic suicide, Durkheim noted how society and culture in mechanical solidarity are so deeply rooted in religious rationales and magical protocols that the ensemble may be termed "pantheistic."

The metaphysical and religious systems which form the logical settings for these moral practices give final proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has long been observed that they coexist generally with pantheistic beliefs.... [the] essential quality is the idea that what reality there is in the individual is foreign to his nature, that the soul which animates him is not his own, and that consequently he has no personal existence. Inversely, where the principle of being is not fused with such doctrines but is itself conceived of in an individual form ... among monotheistic peoples like the Jews, Christians, Mahometans, or polytheists like the Greeks and Latins, this form of suicide is unusual (S:226).

Durkheim here embarked upon the trail of a profound dialectic between the evolution of the individual person and the development of religious representations centering on shifts in impersonality and personality. In general, where the "principle of being" is portrayed in impersonal form, the individual is accorded little reality or value. Where, however, the individual person is valued in his or her own right, religious representations tend to take on a personal physiognomy (see Part I, Book Two).

And in his Annee monograph on "Incest" published in 1898 (translated 1963), Durkheim first explored the dialecti-
cral relationship between the totem as the representation of the ancestor and the individual. Individual identity comes through identification with the ancestral totem, and thus, the ground of Being.

The totem ... is the ancestor of the clan ... and all the members of the clan, having been descended from this unique being, are made of the same substance as himself. This substantive identity is even understood in a much more literal sense than we are able to imagine. One must in fact refrain from confusing the animal or the vegetable species, to which the totemic being is believed to belong, and this being itself. The latter is the ancestor, the mythical being, whence there came both the members of the clan and the animals or plants of the totemized species. The totemic being is therefore, an individual, but containing within itself the species and the entire clan. In fact, for the savage the fragments which can detach themselves from an organism do not cease to be a part of it, despite the material separation. Thanks to a far-off action whose reality is at no time questioned, a severed limb continues, it is believed, to live, separate from the body to which it formerly belonged. All that one contained is retained in the other. That is to say, the living substance, even though divided, retains its unity. It is complete in each of its parts, as if one were acting on the entirety (1963:86).

Hence, the clan is ontologically constituted, it is believed, through its continuing participation with the totemic being; splitting or separating from it do not decrease its potency. The same is true of the individual, Durkheim suggested, whose existence also derives from, and continues to be dependent upon, a similar type of ontological and symbolic participation.

The same is true of each individual in relationship to the totemic being. The latter has been able to give birth to his progeny only in fragmenting it, but it is complete in each of the fragments and it remains identical in all of the divisions and subdivisions, down to infinity. It is therefore literal that the members of the clan consider themselves as forming a single flesh ... a single blood, and this flesh is that of the mystical being from whom they have all descended. These conceptions, strange as they appear to us, are not without a fundamental objective; for they only serve to express in a material form, the collective unity which is characteristic of the clan. A homogeneous and compact mass where these exist, so to speak, no differentiated parts, where each one lives like all
and each resembles all—this is the clan. Such a group sees its own image in terms of a feeble individuation, of which it has a vague consciousness, by imagining that its members are incarnations, hardly at all different, from one and the same principle; they are various aspects of the same reality, a single soul is several bodies (1963:87).

The analogies with the Christian notion of the mystical body of Christ are certainly striking here; one wonders to what extent this well-known theological doctrine may have influenced Durkheim's formulation. In any case, Durkheim suggested here that the primitive clan solved the perennial problem of unity and diversity, and at the same time constituted itself as a collectivity and the individuals within it, by portraying themselves as parts of the totemic being.

Durkheim went on to speak in this context of the role of the notion of the "blood-covenant," a seminal insight which he learned from reading Robertson Smith (see Lukes, 1973). Here, a different sort of consubstantiality is seen:

One practice particularly demonstrates ... the importance which is then attributed to this con-substantiality, and at the same time, it goes to make us see what this common substance is. The physiological unity of the clan is ... far from absolute; it is a society where one can enter by a road other than birth. The formality by which a stranger is adopted and naturalized into the clan consists of introducing into the veins of the neophyte some drops of the familial blood: what is called, according to the work of Smith, the blood covenant.... Since the community of blood suffices to form a foundation of this identity of nature, it is hence the blood that contains primarily the common principle, which is the soul of the group and of each of its members. Nothing is more logical than this conception. For the chief functions that the blood fulfills in the organism designate it for such a role. Life ends when it spills out; therefore, it must be the vehicle of life.... It follows that through this intermediary the life of the ancestor was propagated and dispersed across the lives of his ancestors (1963:88).

Thus, besides the symbolic participation in a common totem, individuals may participate in the clan by joining the same stream of life symbolized by blood. As a principle of life, then, the blood symbolizes the creative flow from the founding ancestor; it serves as a link to the ontological level.
Thus, the totemic being is immanent in the clan; it is incarnate in each individual, and it is in the blood that it resides. It is in the very blood itself. But not only is this an ancestor, at the same time it is a god; protector born of the group, it is the object of a veritable cult, the center of the very religion of the clan. It is on this being that the destinies of so many of the individuals, as well as of the collectivity, depend. As a result, there is god in each individual organism (for he is complete in each) and it is in the blood that this god resides; from which it follows that the blood is a divine thing (1963:89).

Durkheim would later elaborate these insights in his *The Elementary Forms*.

In 1903, in *Primitive Classification*, Durkheim and Mauss declared:

If we descend to the least evolved societies ... we shall find an even more general mental confusion. Here, the individual loses his personality. There is a complete lack of distinction between him and his exterior soul or his totem. He and his fellow animal together compose a single personality (PC:6).

This passage shows that Durkheim had not yet fully arrived at the position of the symbolic construction of the person by society; for if the individual does not yet really exist, as he proposed earlier in *The Division of Labor*, how is it possible for him to lose his personality? What this suggests instead is that because the earliest structures of morality and knowledge were collective, traditional, and sacro-magical, the individual was bound to think in these terms also. The representational life, as well as moral life, was collective, and thus the individual's status was conflated or embedded in the group's identity. Toward the end of *Primitive Classification*, Durkheim and Mauss noted how the emotion attached to such collective representations interfered with cognitive clarity.

From another point of view, in order to be able to mark out the limits of a class, it is necessary to have analyzed the characteristics by which the things assembled in this class are recognized and by which they are distinguished. Now emotion is naturally refractory to analysis, or at least lends itself uneasily to it, because it is too complex. Above all, when
it has a collective origin, it defies critical and rational examination. The pressure exerted by the group on each of its members does not permit individuals to judge freely the notions which society itself has elaborated and in which it has placed something of its personality. Such constructs are sacred for individuals. Thus, the history of scientific classification is, in the last analysis, the history of the stages by which this element of social affectivity has progressively weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflective thought of individuals (PC:87).

In short, only when the structures of conscience and consciousness are universalized and rationalized, in another one of those fundamental dialectical paradoxes, does the person attain a secure place to stand.

b. Individual and Totem

In The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life, Durkheim explored the symbolic relationship between an individual and his totem which granted the person civil status, and informed, directed, and energized structures of conscience and consciousness. Elaborating his insights of fifteen years previous, Durkheim noted how the individual person came to take on a sacred and permanent status through his or her connection with a totemic being. Through the symbolic symbiosis of man and totem, the individual takes on a specific name and unique physiognomy.

Every member of the clan is invested with a sacred character.... This personal sacredness is due to the fact that the man believes that while he is a man in the usual sense of the word, he is also an animal or plant of the totemic species.... In fact, bears its name; this identity of name is therefore supposed to imply an identity of nature. The first is not merely considered as an outward sign of the second; it supposed it logically. This is because the name, for a primitive, is not merely a word or a combination of sounds; it is a part of the being, and even something essential to it. A member of the Kangaroo clan calls himself a Kangaroo; he is, therefore, in one sense, an animal of this species. So each individual has a double nature: two beings coexist within him, a man and an animal (EF:156).

Thus, by participating through symbolic mediations such as a shared name and rituals, the individual is ontologically
and culturally constituted, and thus can take on an individual profile within the horizon of the group.

In certain Australian tribes, and in the majority of tribes of North America, each individual personally sustains relations with some determined object, which are comparable to those which clan sustains with its totem.... The name of the thing also serves as the name of the individual. It is his personal name, his forename, which is added to that of the collective totem.... There is an identity of nature between the individual and the thing; now, an identity of nature implies one of name. Being given in the course of especially important religious ceremonies, this forename has a sacred character (EF:183-4).

Symbolic identification becomes participation; animal and man stand as alter egos.

Between the individual and his animal namesake there exist the very closest bonds. The man participates in the nature of the animal.... The relationship of the two is even so close that it is believed that in certain circumstances, especially in the case of danger, the man can take the form of an animal. Inversely, the animal is regarded as a double of the man, as his alter ego. The association of the two is so close that their destinies are frequently thought to be bound up together: nothing can happen to one without the other's feeling a reaction. If the animal dies, the life of the man is menaced. Thus, it comes to be a very general rule that one should not kill the animal nor eat its flesh. On its side, the animal protects the man and serves him as a sort of patron. It informs him of possible dangers and of the way of escaping them; they say that it is his friend. Since it frequently happens to possess marvellous powers, it communicates them to its human associate, who believes in them.... This confidence of an individual in the efficacy of his protector is so great that he braves the greatest dangers and accomplishes the most disconcerting feats with an intrepid serenity: faith gives him the necessary courage and strength. However, the relations of a man with his patron are not purely and simply those of dependence. He, on his side, is able to act upon the animal. He gives it orders; he has influence over it (EF:185-6).

By becoming identified, then, with a specific totemic animal, the individual becomes separated out from his fellows, and becomes constituted as a active agent by tapping into a extra-human source of power.

Thus, the individual first emerges in symbolic connec-
tion with an impersonal, non-human type. Durkheim said:

The primitive has a certain incapacity for thinking of the individual apart from the species; the bonds uniting him to the one readily extend to the other; he confounds the two in the same sentiment. Thus, the entire species becomes sacred for him (EF:186).

For our present purposes, however, instead of saying that the individual is at first confounded with the group, it may be preferable to propose that the individual first only emerges in symbolic connection with the group type, as a special incarnation of the general essence. Indeed, only in this way is individuation made possible as a subsequent process.

The same principle is applied in the one case to the clan and in the other to the individual. In both cases we find the same belief that there are vital connections between the things and the men, and that the former are endowed with special powers, of which their human allies may also enjoy the advantage. We also find the same custom of giving the man the name of the thing with which he is associated and of adding an emblem to this name. The totem is the patron of the clan, just as the patron of the individual is his personal totem (EF:187).

c. The Emergence of the Notion of the Soul as the Foundation of Personhood

One would not have predicted that the Durkheim who in 1893 argued that individuation was dependent upon de-collectivization and separation out from the fused, sacro-magical collective conscience of archaic society would come, in his later years, to anchor the first emergence in this very same primitive symbolic structure. The very notion of the individual first emerged under the aegis of the religious notion of the soul, Durkheim proposed in The Elementary Forms. As with religion itself, Durkheim had first to establish that the notion of the soul was generic, a human universal.

Just as there is no known society without a religion, so there exist none, howsoever crudely organized, where we do not find a whole system of collective representations concerning the soul, its origin and destiny.... The idea of the soul seems to have contemporaneous with humanity itself (EF:273).

Then, Durkheim observed that, to the Australians, each indivi-
dual is seen as a new reincarnation of a previous soul; there is a fixed "pool of souls" into which each generation dips and returns.

... the souls which, in each generation come to animate the bodies of newly born children, are not special and original creations; all these tribes hold that there is a definite stock of souls, whose number cannot be augmented at all, and which reincarnate themselves periodically. When an individual dies, his soul quits the body in which it dwelt, and after the mourning is accomplished, it goes to the land of the souls; but after a certain length of time, it returns to incarnate itself again, and these reincarnations are the cause of conception and birth. At the beginning of things, it was these fundamental souls which animated the first ancestors, the founders of the clan. At an epoch, beyond which the imagination does not go, and which is considered the very beginning of time, there were certain beings who were not derived from any others. For this reason, the Arunta called them the Altjirangamitjina, the uncreated ones, those who exist from all eternity (EF:280-81).

Now, since the ancestors, the founders commemorated and apotheosized in the group myths, are sacred, those individuals in which they are reincarnated are sacralized also, that is, given civic status and a separate and meaningful identity as valued personages.

... each individual is considered as a new appearance of a determined ancestor: it is this ancestor himself, come back in a new body and with new features. Now, what were these ancestors? In the first place, they were endowed with powers infinitely superior to those possessed by men today, even the most respected old men and the most celebrated magicians. They are attributed virtues which we may speak of as miraculous... It was they who gave the earth the form it has at present. They created all sorts of beings, both men and animals. They are nearly gods. So their souls also have a divine character. And since the souls of men are these ancestral spirits reincarnated in the human body, these are sacred beings too (EF:282).

It is, then, the collective participation in the founding ancestor's patrimony which enables both group and individual to exist. They view themselves, quite literally, as not only spiritual but genetic heirs. All members of the group are con-substantial with him.

... tradition puts the origin of each clan, not in a
number of ancestors, but only two, or even in one. This unique being, as long as he remained single, contained the totemic principle within him integrally, for at this moment there was nothing to which this principle could be communicated. Now, according to this same tradition, all the human souls which exist, both those which now animate the bodies of men and those which are at present unemployed, being held in reserve for the future, have issued from this unique personage; they are made of his substance (EF:283).

The sacred substance is thus transmitted from generation to generation; and it is this spiritual-genetic continuity which enables group and individual to act as moral agents in the world and with each other. They are contemporaneous on the spiritual level; they partake of the same vital substance.

Thus, there is a perfect spiritual continuity between the generations; it is the same soul which is transmitted from a father to his children and from these to their children, and this unique soul, always remaining itself in spite of its successive divisions and subdivisions is the one which animated the first ancestor at the beginning of all things (EF:292).

Each generation, therefore, shares genetically in the sacred center; each is genetically consubstantial.

Now, the Australians cherished certain symbolic objects called churinga, which served as mediators between the ancestors, the individual, and the totemic animal.

... there is a mystic, religious principle in each new-born child, which emanates from an ancestor of the Alcheringa. It is this principle which forms the essence of each individual, therefore, it is his soul or in any case the soul is made of the same matter and the same substance.... The idea of the totem and that of the ancestor are even so closely kindred that they sometimes seem to be confounded.... In a word, the ancestors are the fragments of the totem.... But if the ancestor is so readily confused with the totemic being, the individual soul, which is so near the ancestral soul, cannot do otherwise. Moreover, this is what actually results from the close union of each man with his churinga.... The churinga represents the personality of the individual who is believed to have born of it.... It also expresses the totemic animal.... Thus, the churinga is at once the body of the ancestor, of the individual himself, and of the totemic animal.... These three beings form a solid unity. They are almost equivalent and inter-
Durkheim then summarized the thrust of his thought in terms of the emergence of the individual person under the title of reincarnated soul in these terms:

Since no other souls than these exist, we reach the conclusion that, in a general way, the soul is nothing other than the totemic principle incarnate in each individual (EF:282).

The soul, then, to Durkheim, was first seen as an individualized incarnation of the same general totemic principle under which the group came to symbolically conceive of itself. The construction of a collective conscience and the awakening of individual conscience are corollary, contemporaneous processes; both are dependent upon the same symbolic processes of projection, crystallization, and retrojection. Self and society are twin-born, and symbolic culture acts as the prime genetic medium.

Now, these processes illustrate Durkheim's insistence that phenomenological processes are intimately intertwined with social and cultural processes. It makes little sense to oppose the individual to society, and society to culture, since these poles of the human microcosm work with, not against, each other; they are continuing mutual co-creations. Here, Durkheim noted that collective representations must become individualized in a unique fashion in each person if they are to really take hold of each individual's full inner life.

But in penetrating into these individuals, it must inevitably individualize itself. Because the consciousnesses, of which it is thus an integral part, differ from each other, it differentiates itself according to their image, since each has its own physiognomy, it takes a distinct physiognomy in each (EF:282).

And in "The Dualism of Human Nature," after noting that "once the group has dissolved and the social communion has done its work, the individuals carry away within themselves these great religious, moral, and intellectual conceptions that societies draw from their hearts during their periods of greatest creativity" (DHN:336), Durkheim proposed:
In mingling with our individual lives in this way, however, these various ideals are themselves individualized. Because they are in a close relation with our other representations, they harmonize with them, and with our temperaments, characters, habits, and so on. Each of us puts his own mark on them; and this accounts for the fact that each person has his own particular way of thinking about the beliefs of his church, the rules of common morality, and the fundamental notions that serve as the framework of conceptual thought (DHN:336-7).

Here we witness the individualization of collective representations, the particularization of shared symbols in terms of each person's own special outlook and moral and intellectual physiognomy.

Now, it is in this way that we see Durkheim unfolding the dialectic of impersonality and personality. For the individual to emerge as an independent center of action and thought in his own right, he must first participate through symbolic mediators in the collective essence. Only through this collective, impersonal participation is later individualization--special unique incarnations--possible at all.

So the individual soul is only a portion of the collective soul of the group; it is the anonymous force at the basis of the cult, but incarnated in an individual whose personality it espouses; it is mana individualized.... If the soul is a particular form of the impersonal principle which is diffused in the group, the totemic species and all the things of every sort which are attached to these, at bottom it is impersonal itself. So, with differences only of degrees, it should have the same properties as the force of which it is a special form, and particularly, the same diffusion, the same aptitude for spreading itself contagiously and the same ubiquity. But, quite on the contrary, the soul is voluntarily represented as a concrete definite being, wholly contained within itself and not communicable to others; it is made the basis of our personality. But this way of conceiving the soul is the product of a late and philosophic elaboration. The popular representation, as it is spontaneously formed from common experience, is very different, especially at first. For the Australian, the soul is a very vague thing, undecided and wavering in form, and spread over the whole organism.... So it has a diffusion, a contagiousness and an omnipresence comparable to those of the mana. Like the mana, it is able to divide and duplicate itself indefinitely, though remaining entire in each of its parts; it is from these divisions and...
duplications that the plurality of souls is derived. On the other hand, the doctrine of reincarnation, whose generality we have established, shows how many impersonal elements enter into the idea of the soul and how essential those are. For if the same soul is going to clothe a new personality in each generation, the individual forms in which it successively develops itself must all be equally external to it, and have nothing to do with its nature. It is a sort of generic substance which individualizes itself only secondarily and superficially (EF:299).

This, then, is the dialectic—something internal depends for its existence upon something external; something individual and unique depends upon something generic and universal. The individual first emerges as an emanation from, and then returns to, the collective, impersonal, "pool of souls" in which each generation is successively clothed. It is this double movement of emanation and return which illustrates the dialectic of impersonality and the growth of personality.

... the existence of individual souls, when once admitted, cannot be understood unless one imagines an original supply of fundamental souls at the origin of things, from which all the others were derived. Now these archetype souls had to be conceived as containing within them the source of all religious efficacy; for, since the imagination does not go beyond them, it is from them and only from them that all sacred things are believed to come, both the instruments of the cult, the members of the clan, and the animals of the totemic species. They incorporate all the sacredness diffused in the whole tribe and the whole world, and so they are attributed powers noticeably superior to those enjoyed by the simple souls of men (EF:313).

Thus, "the individual, the soul of an ancestor which he reincarnates or from which he is an emanation, his churinga, and the animals of the totemic species ... are partially equivalent and interchangeable things" (EF:301). These things are intimately linked symbolically because all necessarily partake of the respect bestowed by the group on its own constitutive collective representations. The same collective sentiments are attached to each.

So all these various objects, whether real or ideal, have one common element by which they arouse a single affective state in the mind, and through this, they become confused. In so far as they are expressed by
one and the same representation, they are indistinct. This is how the Arunta has come to regard the churinga as the body common to the individual, the ancestor and even the totemic being. It is his way of expressing the identity of the sentiments of which these different beings are the object (EF:301).

True to his basic hermeneutic of interpreting sacral representations as symbolic equations or translations of social realities, Durkheim then argued that the notion of the immortality of the soul was a metaphorical representation of the continuity of the clan over many generations.

The primitive does not have the idea of an all-powerful god who creates souls out of nothing. It seems to him that souls cannot be made except out of souls. So those who are born can only be new forms of those who have been; consequently, it is necessary that these latter continue to exist in order that others may be born.... In fine, the immortality of the soul is the only way in which men were able to explain the fact which could not fail to attract their attention; this fact is the perpetuity of the group. Individuals die, but the clan survives. So the forces which gave it life must have the same perpetuity. Now these forces are the souls which animate individual bodies; for it is in them and through them that the group is realized. For this reason, it is necessary that in enduring, they remain always the same; for, as the clan always keeps its characteristic appearance, the spiritual substance out of which it is made must be thought of as qualitatively invariable. Since it is always the same clan with the same totemic principle, it is necessary that the souls be the same, for souls are only the totemic principle broken up and particularized. Thus there is something like a germinative plasm, of a mystic order which is transmitted from generation to generation and which makes ... the spiritual unity of the clan through all time (EF:304).

Finally, just as Durkheim noted earlier how the totemic principle becomes individualized in each consciousness and consciousness, so too he next noted the emergence of a "... protecting genius who is attached to each individual" (EF:314). Here, "... a sympathetic bond unites each individual to his protecting ancestor" (EF:315).

The individual soul is only another aspect of the ancestral spirit ... this serves after a fashion, as a second self.... At bottom, it is one soul in two bodies. The kinship of these two notions is so close that they are sometimes expressed by one and
same word.... The individual totem is merely the outward and visible form of the ego or personality, of which the soul is an inward and invisible form (EF:316).

Here, we see the emergence of the notion of an individual guardian spirit, the daemon of the Greeks, for example. Hence, at one and the same time, the ancestor or founding hero or demi-urge serves as a principle of generic impersonality and highly individualized personality. "... the genius is another form or double of the soul of the individual" (EF:311).

Thus, the individual totem has all the essential characteristics of the protecting ancestor and fills the same role: this is because it has the same origin and proceeds from the same idea. Each of them, in fact, consists in a duplication of the soul. The totem, as the ancestor, is the soul of the individual, but externalized and invested with powers superior to those it is believed to possess while within the organism. Now this duplication is the result of a psychological necessity; for it only expresses the nature of the soul which is ... double. In one sense, it is ours: it expresses our personality. But at the same time, it is outside of us, for it is only the reaching into us of a religious force which is outside of us. We cannot confound ourselves with it completely, for we attribute to it an excellence and a dignity by which it raises far above us and our empirical individuality. So there is a whole part of ourselves which we tend to project into the outside. This way of thinking of ourselves is so well established in our nature that we cannot escape it, even when we attempt to regard ourselves without having recourse to any religious symbols. Our moral consciousness is like a nucleus about which the idea of the soul forms itself; yet when it speaks to us, it gives the effect of an outside power, superior to us, which gives us our law and judges us, but which also aids and sustains us.... Everything goes just as if we really had two souls; one which is within us, or rather which is us; the other which is above us, and whose function is to control and assist the first one (EF:316-17).

c. Conclusion: Soul and Person

"The idea of the soul was for a long time ... the popular form of the idea of personality" (EF:305). Thus did Durkheim trace the emergence of the notion of the individual person under the aegis of impersonal concepts and rules.
... the notion of the person is the product of two sorts of factors. One of these is essentially impersonal: it is the spiritual principle serving as the soul of the group. In fact, this which constitutes the very substance of individual souls. Now, this is not the possession of any one in particular: it is a part of the collective patrimony; in it and through it, all consciousnesses communicate. But, on the other hand, in order to have separate personalities, it is necessary that another force intervene to break up and differentiate this principle: in other words, an individualizing factor is necessary. It is the body that fulfills this function. As two bodies are distinct from each other, and as they occupy different points of space and time, each of them forms a special center about which the collective representations reflect and color themselves differently. The result is that even if all the consciousness in these bodies are directed towards the same world, to wit, the world of ideas and sentiments which bring about the moral unity of the group, they do not all see it from the same angle; each one expresses it in its own fashion (EF:305-6).

Thus, as in his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, to Durkheim the impersonal, shared, collective moral and intellectual meanings which lay at the basis of personality are individualized by the body. As noted in the first chapter of this Book, moral rules and intellectual concepts are general; the individualizing principle is the body.

Of these two equally indispensable factors, the former is certainly not the less important, for this is the one which furnishes the original matter of the idea of the soul. Perhaps some will be surprised to see so considerable a role attributed to the impersonal element in the genesis of the idea of personality. But the philosophical analysis of the idea of person, which has gone so far ahead of the sociological analysis, has reached analogous results on this point. Among all the philosophers, Leibnitz is one of those who have felt most vividly what a personality is; for above all, the monad is a personal and autonomous being. Yet, for Leibnitz, the contents of all the monads are identical. In fact, all are consciousnesses which express one and the same object, the world; and as the world itself is only a system of representations, each particular consciousness is really only the reflection of the universal consciousness. However, each one expresses it from its own point of view, and in its own manner. We know this difference of perspectives comes from the fact that the monads are situated differently in relation to each other and to the whole system which they constitute (EF:305-6).
Along with Kant, Durkheim saw the personal as anchored in the impersonal, in shared concepts and moral rules; in short, in universal Reason. Thus, it is not merely difference, separateness, or uniqueness which constitutes the essence of individual personhood, but also the phenomenological deepening and centering of active structures of conscience and consciousness. Therefore, there are two complementary poles in the symbolic construction of the person; there are two crucial processes which proceed simultaneously or reciprocally extend one another—namely, individuation in the sense of separation and deeper participation in symbolic, and universalizable, culture.

Kant expresses the same sentiment, though in a different form. For him, the cornerstone of the personality is the will. Now, the will is the faculty of acting in conformity with reason, and the reason is that which is most impersonal within us. For reason is not my reason; it is human reason in general. It is the power which the mind has of rising above the particular, the contingent, and the individual, to think in universal forms. So from this point of view, we may say that what makes a man a personality is that by which he is confounded with other men, that which makes him a man, not a certain man. The senses, the body and, in a word, all that individualizes is, on the contrary, considered as the antagonist of the personality by Kant. This is because individuation is not the essential characteristic of the personality. A person is not merely a single subject distinguished from all the others. It is especially a being which is attributed a relative autonomy in relation to the environment with which it is most immediately in contact. It is represented as capable of moving itself.... Now our analysis permits us to see how this conception was formed and to what it corresponds (EF:306).

It is in this sense that we come to speak of the individual as an active whole, an indivisible and self-moving center of thought, feeling and action. I am a person, I have a body.

In fact, the soul, a symbolic representation of the personality, has the same characteristic. Although closely bound to the body, it is believed to be profoundly distinct from it and to enjoy, in relation to it, a large degree of independence. During life, it may leave it temporarily, and it definitely withdraws at death. Far from being dependent upon the body, it dominates it from the higher dignity which is in it. It may well take from the body the outward
form in which it individualizes itself, but it owes nothing essential to it. Nor is the autonomy which all peoples have attributed to the soul a pure illusion; we now know what its objective foundation is. It is quite true that the elements which serve to form the idea of the soul and those which enter into the representation of the body come from two different sources that are independent of one another. One sort are made up of the images and impressions coming from all parts of the organism; the others consist in the ideas and sentiments which come from and express society. So the former are not derived from the latter (EF: 307).

In sum, Durkheim reminded us that individuation and personalization are complementary, rather than identical, processes. We shall, in turn, hold Durkheim to this crucial recognition of the double dialectic of impersonality and personality in Books Two and Three as we explore his notions of egoistic and anomic suicide in relation to the modern status of the individual; we shall especially hold to the recognition that the construction of the individual person is a symbolic, and not merely mechanical social morphological, process. And, thus, as in a following section on the contribution of Christian culture to the emergence of the individual person through history, we shall look especially for cultural sanctioning of extreme forms of individualism. Here, Durkheim summarized his basic position in this manner:

Whatever we receive from society, we hold in common with our companions. So it is not at all true that we are more personal as we are more individualized. The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially individual; yet we are more personal the more we are freed from our senses and able to think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon all the social elements of the individual do not mean by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF: 307).

Finally, contrary to those who persist in portraying him radically anti-individualist, we can do no better than to cite Durkheim's concluding footnote to this profound section on the symbolic construction of the notion of the person in terms of the idea of the soul.
For all this, we do not deny the importance of the individual factor: this is explained from our point of view just as easily as its contrary. If the essential element of the personality is the social part of us, on the other hand there can be no social life unless distinct individuals are associated, and this is richer the more numerous and different from each other they are. So the individual factor is a condition of the impersonal factor. And the contrary is no less true, for society itself is an important source of individual differences (EF:308, #128).

Contrary to some, Durkheim did not postulate a Platonic society floating in space; rather, as we discovered in Chapter Four of this Book, Durkheim always acknowledged that it is only through interaction of individuals that society is possible. As a corollary, shared, public culture must become internalized within the personality structure, if it is to be effective socially and phenomenologically; conversely, as internalized in specific individuals, it is refracted in a unique light and individualized. Then, such individualized and altered ways of feeling and thinking may then come, in turn, to contribute something new and significant to the group. As Durkheim himself said:

... just as society exists only in and through individuals, the totemic principle exists only in and through the individual consciousnesses whose association forms the clan. If they did not feel it is them, it would not exist; it is they who put it into things (EF:283).

Just as there is no society without individuals, so those impersonal forces which are disengaged from the group cannot establish themselves without incarnating themselves in the individual consciousnesses where they individualize themselves. In reality, we do not have two different developments, but two different aspects of one and the same development (EF:302).

Let us, therefore, lay this chimera to rest once and for all; let us learn from Durkheim who never separated sociocultural from phenomenological process.
3. **The State as Guarantor of Individual Rights**

Returning to Durkheim's earlier theme of the emancipation of the individual from the "despotisms of the group," let us briefly explore the historical role which Durkheim assigned the State as guarantor of individual rights. Now, as we noted in our discussion of obstacles to individuation through the progressive division of labor, the emergence of the person is not an automatic, mechanical process. There are many factors which may retard these advances such as clans, castes, and classes. These secondary groups resist differentiation and thus individuation; hence, their claims on the individual must be opposed by an equally strong force. Durkheim found this counter-vailing force in the State; he spoke of the "... individual rights that the State secures by stages, overcoming the resistances of collective particularism" (PECM:66). De-collectivism, and the liberation of the individual from the restrictive and narrow claims on his loyalty comes through shifting his protection and obligations to a new and higher level, a centralized and autonomous level which cuts across multiple and conflicting social groups.

Proceeding on the principle that "... it is out of the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born" (PECM:63), Durkheim argued that individual rights emerged out of this tension between the centralizing State and traditional secondary groups. The State thus comes to stand alongside the division of labor as a prime instrument of individuation. Durkheim's discussion here looks back to his suggestion that the chief is the first individual person to emerge from the social mass, and forward to his discussions of the rise of socialism, of the new representative role which should be assigned to corporate groups in modern polity and society, and his extensive discussion of the complex and changing relations between law and governmental intervention in his essay on "Two Laws of Penal Evolution."

While these historical processes are most complex, we shall pursue Durkheim's contribution to their elucidation in
terms of the rather narrow frame of the State acting as the guarantor of individual rights vis-a-vis secondary groups.

Although Durkheim's political sociology (see also Part II, Book Two) has been too often slighted by sociologists, some secondary observers, especially Bendix (1960a), Richter (1960), Giddens (1971b), LaCapra (1972), Lukes (1973), and Nisbet (1974), have noted the crucial role played by the State in Durkheimian sociology. Recognizing the importance Durkheim placed on "... the special relation between the rise of the political state and the emergence of the individual from what Durkheim calls the social mass" (1974:145), Nisbet devoted a section to discussion of the relation between the growth of the State and the emergence of the individual in Durkheim's sociology. Nisbet's discussion is valuable in that he placed Durkheim's argument within the context of eighteenth and nineteenth century sociopolitical theory (eg. Rousseau and Tocqueville), and because he detected a certain ambivalence in Durkheim's treatment.

... it is possible to see in Durkheim's political thought adequate recognition of the historical role of the political state in the West in, first, actually creating the seminal idea of individual positive rights, rights not to be abrogated by any internal association within the political order, and, second, by this very fact, a sphere of freedom unknown in simple societies where the local or functional association is supreme. In this respect, Durkheim's political thought is fully up to the mark in that long tradition of political thought in the West beginning with Plato and culminating in Rousseau and Austin that has stressed the profound role of the political state in providing the context of rights and liberties. But so is it possible also to see Durkheim in that other--related but different--tradition which reaches from Aristotle to Burke and Tocqueville and which, without denying the value, even necessity, of the state nevertheless recognizes, as the first tradition does not, the vital importance of institutional checks upon political power, division of authority, pluralism, localism, and the indispensable role of intermediate associations (Nisbet, 1974:150).

Durkheim's relation to Rousseau and the problem bequeathed by the Enlightenment in attempting to maintain a dualistic theory which places polity and society in separate
compartments has been profoundly explored by Reinhard Bendix. Bendix sees a hiatus between Durkheim's sociological and political theories: "The liberal tradition in its classical or Durkheimian version is characterized by a 'dualism' according to which society and government constitute two interdependent, but partially autonomous, spheres of thought and action" (1960a:189). "For Durkheim, it was the State alone which guarantees the 'moral existence' of the individual, and in his judgment the State was capable of having this effect because it is 'an organ distinct from the rest of society'" (1960a:200-01).

The emancipation of the individual from the "despotism of the group" appears in the bulk of his work as a result of the increasing division of labor and the related attenuation of custom and law. Though as a political liberal Durkheim valued this "range of individual development," as a social philosopher he feared its consequences for social mobility where these consisted in the isolation of the individual and the loss of regulative norms of conduct (anomie). Accordingly, he sought to safeguard the individual against the dangers of anomie by his reintegration in the secondary groups of society.... Yet, at the same time, he called on the aid of the State to preserve individual liberties against the "despotism" with which these groups would seek to control the individual. Implicit in this approach is, therefore, a "dualism" whereby man's psychological and moral attributes are explained in terms of his membership in the society, while the society as a whole is characterized by an overall process (the increasing division of labor) which accounts among other things for man's capacity to alter these attributes through State intervention in the interest of justice. This incongruity between Durkheim's sociological and political theories was symptomatic of the liberal tradition in the nineteenth century (Bendix, 1960a:188-89).

Then Bendix provides an extraordinarily cogent summary of the evolution of three types of relations between State and society in the West, leading up to the modern situation of highly centralized national power, the destruction of intermediate centers of authority, and the institution of national citizenship. Not the least of the virtues of Bendix's summary here is that it ties in Durkheim's political theory to that of Max Weber's.
The "great transformation" leading to the modern political community made the decline of social solidarity inevitable, because (if so complex a matter can be stated so simply) no association based on a coalescence of interests or an ethnic and religious affiliation could recapture the intense reciprocity of rights and duties that was peculiar to the "autonomous jurisdictions" of an estate society. The reason is that in these "jurisdictions" or "law communities" as Max Weber called them, each individual was involved in a "mutual aid" society, which protected his rights only if he fulfilled his duties. This great cohesion within social ranks was above all a counterpart to the very loose integration of a multiplicity of jurisdictions at the "national" political level. In this respect, the absolutist regimes achieved a greater integration though centralized royal administration and the people's loyalty to the king, although the hereditary privileges appropriated by Church and aristocracy also subjected the ordinary man to the autocratic rule of his local master. Where such hereditary privileges replaced the "law communities" of an earlier day, the privileged groups achieved considerable social cohesion, but the people were deprived of what legal and customary protection they had enjoyed and hence excluded even from their former passive participation in the reciprocity of rights and obligations.

Modern political communities have achieved a greater centralization of government than either the medieval or the absolutist political systems, and this achievement has been preceded, accompanied, or followed by the participation of all adult citizens in political life (on the basis of the formal equality of the franchise). The price of these achievements consists in the diminished solidarity of all "secondary groups." This price is a by-product of the separation between society and government in the modern political community. Whereas solidarity had been based on the individual's participation in a "law community," or on his membership in a privileged status group possessing certain governmental prerogatives, it must arise now from the social and economic stratification of society aided by the equality of all adult citizens before the law and in the electoral process (Bendix, 1960a:201-2).

Durkheim did recognize this dilemma in his observation that the State, too, can become despotic in turn if it has no counter-vailing force, and thus, in his proposals for the enfranchisement of professional-occupational groups (see Part II, Book Two). Further, in Socialism, Durkheim focussed on the double movement--the individualist and centralizing "statist" tendencies--inherent in the French Revolution.
The first resulted in having it admitted as evident that the place of individuals in the body politic should be exclusively determined by their personal value, and consequently of having traditional inequalities rejected as unjust. The second had the result that the reforms judged necessary were considered realizable, because the State was conceived as the natural instrument of their realization. Besides, these principles are jointly responsible for another in the sense that the stronger the State is constituted, and the higher it is raised above all individuals, of whatever class or origin, the more, therefore, did all individuals appear equal through connection with it (Soc:102-3).

Thus, after the Revolution, only the central State survived and grew stronger. Collective life was then caught between two opposing forces—the central bureaucratic State on the one hand, and the anomic, dispersed ego on the other. And these opposing poles of modern life "fed off each other," as it were (see, for e.g., S:389, and Part II, Book Two).

Having noted that the liberation of the individual by the State from restrictive "collective particularisms" is a double-edged sword which can work against, as well as for, the individual, let us now turn to consider Durkheim's main thesis here. In The Division of Labor, Durkheim sounded this theme which he was to later develop in his lectures translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals—namely, that respect for the individual grows along with State power.

... the place of the individual becomes greater and the governmental power becomes less absolute. But there is no contradiction in the fact that the sphere of individual action grows at the same time as that of the State, or that the functions which are not made immediately dependent upon the central regulative system develop at the same time as it (DL:220).

Now, Durkheim had here again to confront the modern liberal notion that the State and the Individual are opposed to each other as Society and the Individual. Thus, as we discovered in Durkheim's discussion of Spencer's doctrine, there is presumed to be an inherent contradiction between the growth of the power of the central State and the emergence of individual rights and freedom. In liberal doctrine, the State was seen as encroaching upon individual freedoms; "... the ideal
State of Spencer is really the primitive form of the State" (DL:221).

Do we not arrive here at a contradiction that cannot be resolved? On the one hand, we establish that the State goes on developing more and more; on the other, that the rights of the individual, held to be actively opposed to those of the State, have a parallel development. The government organ takes on an ever greater scale, because its function goes on growing in importance and because its aims, that are in line with its own activity, increase in number; yet we deny that it can pursue aims other than those that concern the individual. Now, these aims are by definition held to belong to individual activity. If, as we suppose, the rights of the individual, the State does not have to establish them, that is, they do not depend on the State. But then, if they do not, and are outside its competence, how can the cadre of this competence go on expanding, in face of the fact that it must less and less take in things alien to the individual (PECM: 57)?

Here, again, we see the momentous import of Durkheim's shift in the grounds of argument; for, in rejecting the "natural rights" and "social contract" theories, Durkheim argued that the notion of personhood is a social construction, and hence, that the notion of individual rights is a legal and political construction.

The only way of getting over the difficulty is to dispute the postulate that the rights of the individual are inherent, and to admit that the institution of these rights is in fact precisely the task of the State. Then, certainly, all can be explained (PECM:57).

Thus, with the shift in viewpoint we can extricate ourselves from the ideological conflicts of modern political theory, and we can also make better sense of the emergence of the individual person and the growth of State power through history.

We can understand that the functions of the State may expand, without any diminishing of the individual. We can see too that the individual may develop without causing any decline of the State, since he would be in some respects the product himself of the State, and since the activity of the State would in its nature be liberating to him. Now, what emerges, on the evidence of the facts, is that history gives sound authority for this relation of cause and effect as between the progress of moral individualism and the ad-
vance of the State. Except for abnormal cases ... the more the individual is respected (PECM:57).

History seems indeed to prove that the State was not created to prevent the individual from being disturbed in the exercise of his natural rights: no, this was not its role alone--rather, it is the State that creates and organizes and makes a reality of these rights. And, indeed, man is man only because he lives in society (PECM:60-1).

In sum, against the Utilitarian and Kantian forms of individualism which opposed the power of the State to the autonomy of the individual, Durkheim began from the premise of man-in-society and argued that the State creates rights.

If we work on the premise that the rights of the individual are not ipso facto his at birth; that they are not inscribed in the nature of things with such certainty as warrants the State in endorsing them and promulgating them; that, on the contrary, the rights have to be won from opposing forces that deny them; that the State alone is qualified to play this part--then it cannot keep to the functions of supreme arbiter and administrator of an entirely prohibitive justice, as the Utilitarian or Kantian individualism would have it (PECM:65).

Here we see in capsule Durkheim's theses--that rights are natural only in society, hence are created by society, not in opposition to it; that rights have to be won from opposing social forces which deny them; and that the State plays a crucial historical role in establishing individual rights.

Durkheim elaborated his ideas in his lectures. Reiterating his themes of The Division of Labor that societal differentiation leads generally to individuation, and that "... that individualism which establishes itself in fact, and ... with time, the fact becomes a right" (PECM:61), Durkheim then qualified this general law.

Things can, however, only have this course on one condition: that is, that inside this society, there must be no forming of any secondary groups that enjoy enough autonomy to allow of each becoming in a way a small society within the greater. For then, each of these would behave towards its members as if it stood alone and everything would go on as if the full-scale society did not exist. Each group, tightly enclosing the individuals of which it was made up, would hinder their development; the collective mind would impose itself on conditions applying to the in-
dividual. A society made up of adjoining clans or of towns or villages independent in greater or lesser degree, or of a number of professional groups, each one autonomous in relation to the others, would have the effect of being almost as repressive of any individuality as if it were made up of a single clan or town or association. The formation of secondary groups of this kind is bound to occur, for in a great society there are always particular local or professional interests which naturally bring together those people with whom they are concerned. There we have the very stuff of associations of a special kind, of guilds, of coteries of every variety; and if there is nothing to offset or neutralize their activity, each of them will tend to swallow up its members (PECM:61-2).

Here, then, is Durkheim's starting point--intense social interaction leads to the development of moral interests, and each group comes to exert, therefore, a compelling influence over the individuals on whom it lays obligations. Each is jealous of its own particular moral life; each lays upon its members claims which exclude other obligations, wider interests. For example, of domestic society Durkheim remarked: "... we know its capacity to assimilate when left to itself. We see how it keeps within its orbit all those who go to make it up and are under its immediate domination" (PECM: 61). As with the illustration of altruistic suicide, then, Durkheim viewed unchallenged group influence over an individual as inherently repressive. Therefore, some force must oppose the claims of secondary groups on the individual. The liberation of the individual from the hold of tight, narrow, local scale secondary groups must be won by the State.

In order to prevent this happening, and to provide a certain range for individual development, it is not enough for a society to be on a big scale; the individual must be able to move with some freedom over a wide field of action. He must not be curbed and monopolized by the secondary groups, and these groups must not be able to get a mastery over their members and mould them at will. There must therefore exist above these local, domestic--in a word, secondary--authorities, some overall authority which makes the law for them all: it must remind each of them that it is but a part and not the whole, and that it should not keep for itself what rightly belongs to the whole. The only means of avoiding this collective particularism, and all that involves for the individual, is to have a
special agency with the duty of representing the overall collectivity, its rights and its interests, vis-a-vis these individual collectivities (PECM:61-2).

As noted from Bendix's observations earlier, it is the State which, in overcoming the conflicting claims of various status groups and law communities, elevates the individual to the rank of citizen and then grants formal equality to all adults through the franchise. The national centralizing State then depends on the institution of national citizenship and vice versa. Here, Durkheim observed of the State:

These rights and these interests merge with those of the individual. Let us see why and how the main function of the State is to liberate the individual personalities. It is solely because, in holding its constitutive societies in check, it prevents them from exerting the repressive influences over the individual they would otherwise exert. So, there is nothing inherently tyrannical about State intervention in the different fields of a collective life; on the contrary, it has the object and effect of alleviating tyrannies that do exist (PECM:62-3).

Nisbet, after Durkheim, offers the concrete historical example of:

... the Cleisthenean reforms at the end of the sixth century B.C., with their reduction of the power of traditional society resting on kinship and their specific granting to the individual of positive rights they had not previously known... (1974:147).

The emancipation of the individual, and the creation of individual rights and protection of the dignity of the human person, then, is one of the prime functions of the growth of the State in history, according to Durkheim.

... the State must deploy energies equal to those for which it has to provide a counter-balance. It must even permeate all those secondary groups of family, trade, and professional associations, Church, regional areas, and so on ... which tend to absorb the personality of their members. It must do this in order to prevent this absorption and free these individuals, and so as to remind these partial societies that they are not alone and there is a right that stands above their own rights. The State must therefore enter into their lives, it must supervise and keep a check on the way they operate and to do this it must spread its roots in all directions. For this task, it cannot just withdraw into the tribunals, it must be present in all spheres of social life and...
make itself felt. Wherever these particular collective forces exist, there the power of the State must be, to neutralize them: for if they were left alone and to their own devices, they would draw the individual within their exclusive domination. Now, societies are becoming every greater in scale and ever more complex: they are made up of circles of increasing diversity, and of manifold agencies.... Therefore, if it is to fulfill its function, the State, too, must branch out and evolve to the same degree (PECM:65).

Here, then, was the liberal singing the praises of the interventionist State; the Enlightenment still lived on strongly in Durkheim as he everywhere saw the necessity of de-collectivization and the sanctioning of the Individual and Reason. Listen to his summary of this theme:

It is only through the State that individualism is possible, although it cannot be the means of making it a reality, except in precise conditions. We might say that in the State we have the prime mover. It is the State which has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State which has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyranny. It may take too violent a course, but the action becomes vitiated only when it is merely destructive. And this is what justifies the increasing scope of its functions (PECM:64).

Finally, it should be noted that Durkheim went beyond the assertion that the State played a merely negative role in emancipating the individual from the grip of secondary groups to propose that the State also played a positive role in the construction of the moral milieu to nourish a new notion of the individual. This new, positive conception is the right and dignity of the human person seen, for example, in "The Declaration of the Rights of Man." Durkheim said that the fundamental duty of the State "... is to call the individual to a moral way of life."

... our moral individuality, far from being antagonistic to the State, has on the contrary been a product of it. It is the State that sets it free. And this gradual liberation does not simply serve to fend off the opposing forces that tend to absorb the individual: it also serves to provide the milieu in which the individual moves, so that he may develop his faculties in freedom. There is nothing negative in the part played
by the State. Its tendency is to ensure the most complete individuation that the state of society will allow. Far from tyrannizing over the individual, it is the State that redeems the individual from society. But whilst this aim is essentially positive, it has nothing transcendental about it for the individual consciousness, for it is an aim that is also essentially human.... It is not this or that individual that the State seeks to develop, it is the individual in genre, who is not to be confused with any single one of us. And whilst we give the State our cooperation--and it could do nothing without it--we do not become the agents of a purpose alien to us; we do not give up the pursuit of an impersonal aim which belongs to a region above all our own private aims but which nevertheless has close ties with them (PECM:69).

In contrast to the Romantic-Idealist philosophers (eg. Hegel), Durkheim contended that his notion of the liberating State had nothing mystic about it; it was not a transcendental entity floating above all individuals and over the nation.

On the one hand, our concept of the State has nothing mystic about it, and yet, it is still in its essence individualistic. The fundamental duty of the State is laid down in this very fact: it is to persevere in calling the individual to a moral way of life (PECM:69).

Finally, Durkheim argued that the central State is today one of the prime upholders of the cult of the human person, of moralized individualism.

If the cult of the human person is to be the only one destined to survive, as it seems, it must be observed by the State as by the individual equally. This cult, moreover, has all that is required to take the place of the religious cult of former times (PECM:69).

On the other hand, Durkheim also recognized, as Bendix and Nisbet observed, the danger of the reverse process—namely, that the centralized State, in turn, having conquered secondary institutions may itself become despotic without rivals. With no competitors, the State then threatens to reabsorb the mass of individual molecules.

It will be argued, might not the State in turn become despotic? Undoubtedly, provided there were nothing to counter that trend. In that case, as the sole existing collective force, it produces the effects that any collective force not neutralized by any counter-force of the same kind would have on individuals. The State itself then becomes a leveller and repressive. And its
repressiveness becomes even harder to endure than that of small groups, because it is more artificial. The State, in our large scale societies, is so removed from individual interests that it cannot take into account the special or local conditions in which they exist. Therefore, when it does attempt to regulate them, it succeeds only at the cost of doing violence and distorting them. It is, too, not sufficiently in touch with individuals in the mass to be able to mould them inwardly, so that they readily accept its pressure on them. The individual eludes the State to some extent -- the State can only be effective in the context of a large scale society -- and individual diversity may not come to light. Hence, all kinds of resistance and distressing conflicts arise (PECM:63).

Here, we see a more somber note enter into Durkheim's discussion of the role of the State in regard to the liberation of the individual; for Durkheim recognized that the State's power could cut both ways, for and against the individual. Durkheim's basic problem in this context, then, became the balancing off of State and secondary groups against one another, each serving not only to check the other's weakness but to contribute in a complementary manner its own strengths.

... small groups do not have this drawback. They are close enough to things that provide their raison d'être to be able to adapt their actions exactly and they surround their individuals closely enough to shape them in their own image. The inference to be drawn is simply that if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by those secondary groups. It is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone, nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born. Here again we see the significance of these groups. Their usefulness is not merely to regulate and govern the interests they are meant to serve. They have a wider purpose; they form one of the conditions essential for the emancipation of the individual*(PECM:63).

And as we shall discover in Part II of Book Two, Durkheim became less sanguine about the beneficence of the State. Indeed, Durkheim sounded the note in these lectures that we shall greatly amplified later in Suicide and the preface to second edition of The Division of Labor; we are suffering from a malaise; the cure is the national enfranchisement of occupational groups.
Our present malaise has the same origin as the social malaise we are suffering from. It is due to the lack of secondary organs intercalated between the State and the rest of society.... These organs seem necessary to prevent the State from tyrannizing over individuals: it is now plain that they are equally essential to prevent individuals from absorbing the State. They liberate the two confounded forces, whilst linking them at the same time.... We can see how serious this lack of internal organization is ... it involves ... a profound loosening and an enervation ... of our whole social and political structure. The social forms that used to serve as a framework for individuals and a skeleton for the society, either no longer exist or are in course of being effaced, and no new forms are taking their place. So that nothing remains but the fluid mass of individuals. For the State itself has been reabsorbed by them. Only the administrative machine has kept its stability and goes on operating with the same automatic regularity (PECM:106).

Now, since Durkheim himself directly linked the modern social malaise with its political counterpart, we shall do so also. Since Durkheim acknowledged that when the pursuit of a value --the emancipation of the individual by the State--goes to extreme, it may end in disaster, we too shall look for the unanticipated negative consequences of extreme individuation pursued as an absolute value (see Books Two and Three).
4. Law and the Person: The Development of Individual Property and Contract

One of the most fascinating and least explored areas in Durkheim's work is his evolutionary sociology of law contained primarily in his lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit." We shall trace here the coming of individual property and contract as "objective correlatives" of the general emergence of the individual through history. For, as Durkheim himself noted of the frequent failure of French individualism to resist lapsing into authoritarian regimes after an orgy of revolution:

"... in order to set up an individualistic moral code, it is not enough to assert it or to translate it into fine systems. Society, rather, must be so ordered that this set-up is made feasible and durable. Otherwise, it remains in a vague doctrinaire state (PECM:60)."

One can hardly conceive of the emergence of the modern notion of individualism, especially as it emerged out of the Anglo-American democracies, without its anchors in the free individual control of property and freedom of contract. Indeed, these socio-economic-legal-political processes are one of a piece; was not the cry "free markets make free men"?

Rejecting again Utilitarian explanations of the origin of property, and Locke's legitimation of property in terms of individual labor, Durkheim began with the collective ownership of land in traditional agricultural societies. He then traced some main steps through which property, too, became de-collectivized.

"... precisely because property, in its origins, can only be collective, it remains to explain how it became something individual. How is it that individuals thus grouped together, attached to an identical group of things, came to acquire separate rights over separate things? The land holding cannot, in principle, be broken up: it forms a single unit, and that is the unit of inheritance; and this indivisible unit is imposed upon the group of individuals. How does it happen that, in spite of this, any individual should have been able to reach the point of having a property of his own? As we might guess, this individuation of property could not come about without involving other changes in the situation between things and persons. For as long as
the things preserved this moral superiority over persons, as it were, it was impossible for the individual to become their owner and establish his own command over them (PECM:164-5).

Thus, instead of starting with the natural rights of individuals to hold separate property, Durkheim began with the socio-historical fact of the collective holding of land. Since the land was indivisible as a hereditary unit, how did it come to be divided, held, or controlled by individuals?

Durkheim saw a two-fold process. First, there was the emergence of an individual as head of the group (eg. patriarchal power). Then there was the development of moveable forms of property. The first change was analogous to the emergence of the chief from out of the social mass, and the second to the shift away from land as the basis of wealth.

To begin with, it was enough for one of the members of the family group to be raised in some rank in some way--by a chain of circumstances--for him to be lent a prestige that none of the others had and to make him the representative of the family group. In consequence, the ties binding the things to the group bound them direct to this privileged personality. And since this individual embodied in himself the whole group, men and things, he was in fact invested with an authority that placed things as well as men under his dominance, and thus an individual property came into existence. This change was achieved with the coming of paternal, and more especially, patriarchal, power....

It is not alone people, traditions and sentiments that happen to find expression in his person. It is, too, above all the patrimony, with all the concepts attaching to it. The Roman family was made up of two kinds of elements: the head of the family, on the one hand, and on the other the rest of the family, called the familia, which comprised at once the sons of the family and offspring, the slaves and all things or property. All that was of moral or religious significance in the familia was, as it were, concentrated in the person of the head of the family. This is what gave him such a supreme position. The family's center of gravity thus became displaced. It passed from the things it was vested in to a given person. Henceforward, an individual came to be an owner, in the full sense of the word, since the things were subject to him, rather than he to them (PECM:165-6).

Just as the chief or patriarch was lifted above the group, so, too, the collective possessions which had possessed him
earlier now became part of his possession. As a symbolic representative of the group, his person came to absorb the possessions and property of the group; they became part of his collective patrimony.

The second cause—the development of moveable property as the basis of wealth—largely depended on the development of industry and commerce. As long as land was the productive base of society, it was withdrawn from individual use; the linkage of land to kinship barred treating land as a commodity for sale on a market (see also Karl Polanyi, 1944).

This second cause was the development in the sphere of personal or moveable property. Indeed, it was only landed property that had a sacred character. This had the effect of withdrawing it from being within the disposal of individuals and so made a communal system necessary. Personal or moveable property, on the other hand, was in itself, as a rule, of profane nature. However, so long as industry remained solely agricultural, personal property played only a secondary and auxiliary part; moveables were hardly more than adjuncts or annexes of landed property. This was the center to which all that was moveable in the family gravitated, things as well as people. It kept all things within its sphere of action and thereby prevented them from acquiring any legal status in keeping with their particular features, and from developing within them of some new right. Also, any earnings that members of the family could make outside the family community flowed into this family patrimony and was merged with the rest of the property, on the theory that the accessory follows the principal (PECM:166).

While real estate was hedged about with all kinds of traditional constraints and prohibitions, moveable property coming from trade and manufactures was considered comparatively profane, did not directly involve the fate of the group, and thus was able to develop in a freer fashion under the control of individuals. The individual was allowed to dispose of such "personal property," as opposed to "real property," according to his discretion, because it did not involve the fate of the collective patrimony.

With time, however, and with the progress of trade and industry, the personal or moveable property took on greater importance; it then cut away from this landed property of which it was only an adjunct; and became
an autonomous factor in economic life. Thus a fresh nucleus was made outside real estate, and so did not of course have its characteristic features.... Nothing tied them to any given point in space; nothing made them immovable. This meant that they depended directly only on the person of the one who acquired them.... It is clear, in the light of present day laws, that real estate and moveable property are quite different in nature, and this reflects the separate phases in the evolution of the law. The former is still loaded with prohibitions and obstacles which are mementoes of its ancient sacred character. The latter has always been freer, more flexible, more entirely left to the discretion of individuals. Real as this duality may be, we must not lose sight of the fact that the one type of property issued from the other. Personal property, as a distinct entity in law, was formed only as a result of landed property and on its pattern: it is a weak reflection, an attenuated form of it. It was landed property as an institution which first established a bond sui generis between groups of persons and certain given things. Once that had been done, public opinion was quite naturally ready to admit that, as social conditions changed, bonds similar in main might link things with personalities in place of collectivities (PECM:167).

Thus, collective ownership established the bond between things and men because it was hedged about with sacredness; after this legal precedent, a similar bond between men and things emerged, only in terms of non-landed property. Finally, as Durkheim noted in the following summary of his theses here, the sacredness invested in the collective holding of land passed over into the individual person.

 Originally, property was related to land, or at least the distinguishing features of landed property extended even to moveables, owing to their lesser importance; these features, by virtue of their sacred nature, imply of necessity communalism. Here, then, we have the starting point. Then, by a dual process, individual ownership splits off from collective ownership. The concentration of the family, on the other hand, which established patrimonial powers, causes all these sacred virtues ... to issue from the person of the head of the family. From now onwards, it is man who stands above things, and it is a certain individual in particular who occupies this position, that is, who owns or possesses. Whole categories of profane things take shape independently of the family estate, free themselves of it, and thus become the subject of the new right of property, one that is in its essence individual. Then again, the individualizing of property followed from
landed property losing its sacrosanct quality—a quality which was absorbed by the human being (PECM: 168).

Now, Durkheim proposed a similar evolution for the emergence of individual contract. Originally, as we saw in Chapter Six, the contract was guaranteed by external ritual formulas; it was regarded as sacred because the gods were thought to be a party to the contract. Indeed, "juridical formalism is only a substitute for sacred formalities and rites" (PECM:182). As with property, while sacro-magical anchors serve to establish contract as a legal institution, as these fade in force other concepts come to the fore. What becomes especially central to the evolving institution of contract is the notion of intention, of freely given mutual consent, of the individual as a responsible moral agent in his own right. Thus, instead of external guarantees, the individual's word becomes his bond. As Weber (1963) observed, the evolution of gods as ethical-legal deities, and the corresponding "attachment of the individual to a cosmos of obligations" is of great importance for the evolution of culture; it enables, for instance, an individual's universalistic commitment to honesty and equity to secure for him a new legal status, including the right to enter into individual contracts. And, of course, one of the central themes of classical sociology, echoed in Durkheim's concern with the evolving relations between de-collectivization and legal sanctions in The Division of Labor, has been the passage from "status to contract" (Maine).

Again, versus Spencer and the Utilitarians (recall Durkheim's emphasis on the non-contractual elements in contract in Division), Durkheim argued that "... nothing has fluctuated so much in the course of time as the idea of freedom of contract" (PECM:67). And then he outlined his thesis concerning the parallel evolution of the value placed on individual intentionality and the development of individual consensual contract.

With the Romans, the contract came into force at the moment when its text was declared and it was the phra-
sing of the text that governed the engagements entered into and not the intention behind the words. Later, the intention began to come into the reckoning, and the contract made under material duress was no longer held to be regular. Some forms of moral pressure likewise began to be ruled out. What brought about this development? The answer is, that people began to have a far loftier idea of the human person and the smallest attempt on his freedom became more intolerable. Everything points to this development not having ended yet, and to our becoming even more severe in this matter (PECM:67-8).

Now, Durkheim began with two traditional legal forms from which consensual contract emerged—namely, the real contract (so-called because it focussed on the transfer of a material object or possession) and the ritual contract. In both these forms it is the external transfer of a thing or the external formula which is the force which binds, which makes the contract. The consensual contract emerges by degrees from the socio-legal foundation which these types established.

The consensual contract (or contract by mutual consent) in the final analysis is, as it were, a point of convergence where the real contract and the ritual contract meet in their process of development. In the real contract there is the transfer of a thing and it is this transfer that gives rise to the obligation; in receiving a certain object that you hand to me, I become your debtor. In the contract by ritual, no performance takes place; everything takes place by words, usually accompanied by ritual gestures.... Our word, once given, is no longer our own. In the solemn agreement or contract by ritual, this transfer had already been achieved, but it was subject to the magic-religious processes... which alone made the transfer possible since it was these ceremonies that gave an objective character to the word, and to the resolve of the promisor. Once this transfer sheds the ritual that was previously a condition of it and is rid of it, once it constitutes the whole contractual act in itself, then the consensual contract has come into existence (PECM:196).

Then, for the passage to consensual contract, Durkheim postulated a continuing process of simplification and secularization. Once the form was established, the different uses it was put to led to changes in its structure and in its internal guarantee.

Now, given the contract by ritual as an existing fact,
this process of cutting down and simplifying was bound to come about of itself. On the one hand, we see a diminishing of the verbal or other ritual ceremonies was brought about by a kind of decline from within, under the pressure of social needs that called for greater speed in the process of exchanges. On the other hand, the practical effects of the contract by ritual could be got adequately by means other than those of ceremonies; it was enough for the law to declare as irrevocable any declaration of the will presented as such: this simplification was the more easily allowed of, since in the natural course of time the practices that had accumulated had lost a great part of their meaning and early authority (PECM:196-7).

Now, Durkheim connected these early forms of contract to the early structure of society in which the individual counted for little. Civil and criminal law were not clearly distinguished; the most heinous crimes, as we saw in Chapter Six, were crimes against religious authority, which demanded expiation by the sacro-magical collective conscience. The individual who was wronged in an agreement, who could not collect debts, had little recourse except self-help. He could, for instance, post himself outside the door of the debtor, calling public attention to the deliction and, ultimately, even die there and haunt his nemesis.

The system of real contract and the ritual contract correspond to a stage in social evolution in which the right of individuals commands only a slight measure of protection.... It is true that the defaulting debtor or often was sentenced to a penalty such as whipping, imprisonment, or fine.... But the rule was still unknown whereby the true sanction is one of compelling the contracting party to keep his word, or to make good the loss or injury inflicted on the other party by failing to honor an undertaking. In other words, penal sanctions at this stage are only applied in respect of a contract where it appears to be an offense against the public authority; the way in which it affects the individual does not enter into consideration. For loss or injury in private cases there is no provision (PECM:197-8).

Then Durkheim noted that not only external sanctions--the outer structure of the contractual right--have been modified in the course of time to yield the consensual contract, but the internal structure also. The traditional forms of contract were largely unilateral--one party gave and the other
received. For consensual contract to emerge, there must be the possibility of bilateral relations, of mutual give and take.

In the beginning, the formal or ritual contract, like the real contract, could only be unilateral.... To create a bilateral bond, that is, in order that there shall be an exchange in the course of the contract, in order that each contracting party shall be both debtor and creditor at once, there had to be two separate contracts, independent one of the other, for the role assigned to each was entirely different. There was of necessity an actual transposition. The one who spoke first as stipulator or creditor later on spoke as debtor or promisor, and vice versa. The independence of the two processes was such that the validity of the one was entirely distinct from that of the other.... The consensual contract alone was able at a single stroke to create the two-way track of bonds that we find in any reciprocal agreement. For the greater flexibility of the system allows any contracting party to play at one and the same time the dual role of debtor and creditor, of stipulator and promisor. As a man is no longer under compulsion to adhere strictly to a definite formula, the reciprocal obligations can be contracted simultaneously. The two parties declare at one and the same time that they consent to the exchange on the conditions agreed between them (PECM:199-200).

Akin to the greater flexibility of bilateral, mutual relations, was the emergence of bona fide contracts which were, quite literally, dependent on the reciprocal "good faith" of each party. Here, the possibility of "taking the role of the other" and the freedom from fixed, ritual formulas moved individual intentions to center stage. Will, intention, personal honesty, fidelity, trustworthiness—in short, the internalization of authority—became the foundation on which consensual contracts rested.

Another new feature of some significance arose when consensual contracts became inevitably contracts in good faith (or bona fide). The name is given to contracts whose range and legal effects must be exclusively determined by the intent of the parties. The real contract and the consensual contract were not able to claim this characteristic, or at least, only very imperfectly. Indeed, in each case the obligation did not come about purely and simply from the consent given or from the demonstration of will. Another factor needed to bind the parties come into it. Therefore, this very factor which was indeed the decisive
one, was bound deeply to affect the nature of the form of both these contracts; so it was impossible that these forms of contract should depend exclusively or even mainly on what we might call the psychological factor, that is, the will or intention (PECM: 200-01).

The reason that a new factor had to enter into these traditional forms of contract is that they both derived their binding force from their form, rather than the mutual resolve of the parties directly involved. It is the formula rather than the intention which binds and obligates.

The role played by the thing in the real contract is filled by the words or the ritual used in the formal contract. Here, it is the words used and the gestures that make the obligation; it is these, too, that define it. In order to know what the provisor or debtor is bound to give or to do, we must not consider his intent or that of the opposite party, but the formula he has used. The legal analysis, at least, has to start with the formula. Since it is the words that effect the binding, it is the words, too, that give the measure of the bonds forged.... The formula has a value in itself... has its own force, and this force could not depend on the wills of the contracting parties since, on the contrary, the formula produces its effects, mechanically, as it were, no matter what the intentions of those using it.... For all these reasons, good faith and the intent of the parties hardly came into the reckoning, whether for real or ritual contracts (PECM:201).

Now, Durkheim suggests that a great change came with the emergence of the consensual contract, a break through parallel to societal differentiation and the erosion of sacro-magically stereotyped and guaranteed mechanical solidarity. Thus, just as altruisme is used by Durkheim as an index to mechanical solidarity, so, too, he used the emergence of consensual, bona fide contracts as a sign of the progressive emergence of the individual person through history.

From the time the consensual contract was established, however, it was a different matter. Here we no longer find anything intervening in the relation contracted and affecting its nature. Certainly, there are still words being used ... but these no longer have any force in themselves because they lack any sacred character. Their only value now is in giving expression to the wills they reveal and therefore in the end it is the state of these wills that decides the obligations con-
tracted. The words in themselves are no longer of importance; they are only symbols to be interpreted, and what they signify is the state of the mind and will that inspired them... What I am giving to another is my firm resolve to act in a specified way (PECM:202).

Hence, the emergence of consensual, bona fide contracts is significant not only in sociocultural terms, but also because it marks a new stage in phenomenological evolution; it helped create a new type of character structure.

... if a contract is to be achieved, the main thing is that it shall exist in the intention or will of the party to it. If the will is lacking on either side, there can be no contract. For what the one in fact is giving, is his intention of acting in a certain way, of transferring his ownership in a certain object; what the other declares, is his intention of accepting what is thus transferred to him. If the intention is absent, nothing remains but a form of contract empty of any positive content. All that is pronounced is words devoid of meaning and so, devoid of value.... The consensual contract had to be a bona fide contract, and now it could not be one of good faith except on condition of its being one by mutual consent (PECM:203).

In this way, Durkheim again used shifts in the foundations of legal institutions as reflecting shifts in the fundamental relations between society and culture; just as Durkheim never separated sociocultural from phenomenological process, so, too, he intimately linked social, cultural, legal, and phenomenological evolution. Again, his complex matricing of cultural processes should serve as a guide to us.

We can see how far the consensual contract amounts to a revolutionary innovation in the law. The dominant part played in it by consent and the declaration of the will had the effect of transforming the institution. It differs from the earlier forms of contract from which it descends by a whole series of distinctive features. That is not all. The principle on which the institution in its new form rests, contains in itself the germ of a whole new development (PECM:203).

The principle involved here is, of course, the emergence of the autonomous and responsible person. Durkheim then briefly traced the ways in which free consent was made central to this new legal institution.

The idea governing this development is that the consent is truly itself, and binds truly and absolutely
the one who consents, only on condition that it has been freely given. Anything that lessens the liberty of the contracting party lessens the binding force of the contract (PECM:203).

Now, it must be emphasized that Durkheim had a keen grasp of the difficulties encountered in the evolution of free consensual contract; for various traditional, collective encumbrances and obstacles had to be overcome.

To us this idea may seem a natural one but it only broke through very slowly and in the course of meeting with resistance of every kind. For centuries, the binding force of the contract had been supposed to reside outside the parties, in the formula pronounced, in the gesture made, in the thing delivered. Given this fact, the worth of the bond contracted could not be made to depend on what might have occurred in the depths of consciousness of the contracting parties, or on the conditions in which their resolve was taken (PECM:204).

Thus, various coercive pressures, the conditions in which the contract was formulated and agreed upon, and so on, became the background for passing judgment on the legal validity of contracts; anything blocking the free consent of the parties came under scrutiny. But, eventually, it was not merely the degree of responsibility or free will involved which determined the validity of the contract, but the nature and degree of undeserved injury to one party by another. Equity and justice—expressed in terms of a broad sympathy for human suffering—changed the conditions of validity of consensual contracts.

It is therefore not the amount of a greater or lesser freedom that matters; if contracts imposed by constraint, direct or indirect, are not binding, this does not arise from the state of the will when it gave consent. It arises from the consequences that an obligation thus formed inevitably brings upon the contracting party. It may be, in fact, that he took the step that has bound him only under external pressure, that his consent has been extracted from him. If this is so, it means that the consent was against his own interests and the justifiable needs he might have under the general principles of equity. The use of coercion could have had no other aim or consequence but that of forcing him to yield up something which he did not wish to do, to do something which he did not wish to do, or indeed of forcing him to one action or the other on conditions he did not will. Penalty and distress
have thus been undeservedly laid on him (PECM:206).

Durkheim next links our notions of equity and justice with an emerging broad sympathy for human suffering in general, the same sort of sentiments which lie behind the modern "cult of the individual" or our institutionalized respect for the rights and dignity of the human person.

The feelings of sympathy that we usually have for our fellow creatures are outraged when suffering is inflicted on someone when it is in no way deserved. The only kind of infliction that we find just is a penalty, and the penalty presupposes a culpable act. Any act must therefore seem immoral to us that causes injury to a fellow man who has otherwise done nothing to alienate our ordinary human sympathies. We declare it to be unjust. Now an unjust act could not be sanctioned by law without inconsistency. This is why any contract in which pressure has a part becomes invalid. It is not at all because the determining cause of the obligation is exterior to the individual who binds himself. It is because he has suffered some unjustified injury, because, in a word, such a contract is unjust. Thus, the coming on the scene of contract by mutual consent, together with an increase in human sympathies, inclined the minds of men to the idea that the contract was only moral and only to be recognized and given sanction by society, provided it was not merely a means of exploiting one of the contracting parties, in a word, provided it was just (PECM:207).

In sum, "... just as the consensual emerged from the ritual contract" so the objectively equitable contract succeeded the consensual contract. This whole legal process, then, underlies, reinforces, and accelerates the emergence of the individual person through history.
5. **Christian Universalism and the Sanctification of the Person**

In the passage from Judaism to Christianity, we witness a momentous dialectic between universalism and individualism. For the breakdown of Jewish ritual-legal particularism and the breakthrough to a universalistic "faith structure of consciousness" was closely allied with a new sanctification of the individual person. It is important for our present purposes to recognize that Durkheim emphasized the moral creativity of Christian culture in enlarging the sphere of operation of the individual conscience. And since conscience is inherently a phenomenological category, the coming of Christianity has great significance for phenomenological, as well as sociocultural, evolution.

The phenomenology of Christian individualism, as both Durkheim and Weber noted, was a powerful, even decisive, force in sanctioning an autonomous sphere for the individual person, over against the traditional collective claims of "blood and soil." For as Nelson (1973a) has observed, the prime sociocultural significance of Christianity was that it decisively broke through the tribal sacro-magical collective conscience of the archaic "sacral complex," and extended the new socio-religious bond to all "brothers" in the faith. Whereas post-exilic Judaism anchored its collective identity in the traditional Mosaic law and ritual prescriptions designed to insure ethnic purity, Christianity broke through these restrictive tribal bonds and extended its message of salvation to all men. Whereas the Judaism of the Pharisees and the Sadducees, of the scribes and rabbis, was restricted to the cultural heritage of an exclusive ethnic group, Christianity constructed a new type of socio-religious bond which cut across ethnic barriers and social statuses. Christianity constituted a new form of fraternization which cut across tribal and regional boundaries; it represented one of the first massive and sustained breakthroughs to a more universalistic "faith structure of consciousness." Paul's famous
proclamation sums up this simultaneous cross-cutting of territorial and socio-religious bonds, and the emergence of a new universalistic and internalized faith: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Jesus Christ" (Galatians, 3:28).

Now, in a striking convergence of perspectives concerning the world-historical significance of this awakening of new universalistic depths of conscience, both Durkheim and Weber saw this expansion to be of crucial evolutionary importance. The deepening of personal obligation, both in regard to abstract impersonal ideals and to interpersonal obligations, was seen as of prime importance in the in-depth construction of character structures. Indeed, Weber emphasized that "... the increased importance of an ethical attachment of individuals to a cosmos of obligations, making it possible to calculate what the conduct of a given person may be ... has the greatest importance" (1963:35-6). The progressive awakening of a universalistic conscience and consciousness, the deepening internalization of moral and ethical obligations, the heightened responsibility for one's own sins and salvation, the growing centrality of a more or less systematic phenomenology of intentions as the basis of casuistry (especially from Abelard on, see D. Luscombe, 1971; Nelson, 1973a; E. Leites, 1974), were all of critical significance in the evolutionary construction of the moral individualism so revered by Durkheim.

Indeed, we see here the subtle and continuing dialectic between universalism and individualism which made Christianity significant for Durkheim, Weber, and Troeltsch. For the Christian appeal to all men rests on a certain irreducible equality between them (all are children of one God, all are sinners, etc.). And the essential key to this new found equality is the potential internal response of each individual to the kerygma of the Gospel message--that is, the capacity for faith. "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you"
(Luke, 17:21). Here, the Pauline mission to the Gentiles proved crucial in its double emphasis on universalism and internal, individual faith commitment. The new Christian community, freed from Jewish collective ritual-legalism, was a community founded on individual belief in a universalistic and personalistic revelation, not on ethnic or territorial ties. As Nock (1938) emphasized, the growth of Christianity depended upon individual acts of conversion. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God" (John, 3:3). And Paul said in his second letter to the Corinthians: "Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new" (5:17). Inevitably, as Durkheim observed, this strong emphasis on conversion and internal faith paved the way for a profound deepening of the internal life, the life of the spirit, of la personne humain. The sensitive striving after fidelity to the divine model, of faithful patternning ourselves after the incarnated exemplar, inevitably deepens the structures of interiority, of will and imagination, of life-long consistency of character.

We see here another facet of the world-historical process of rationalization so central to Weber's perspective. Through the progressive internalization of ethical-legal norms, the personality structure becomes more integral, more consistent, and hence, as we discovered in the preceding section on legal evolution, more predictable and reliable. When notions of individual guilt and responsibility, of sin and the culpability of the individual conscience, come to be linked with a systematic casuistry of the prospective moral conscience and the sorting through of logic and evidence governing the choice of alternative moral judgments, then we witness a tremendous step forward in the emergence of the notion of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person. Further, in identifying the emergence of the individual conscience with the construction of a new level of in-depth integrated personality structures, Weber also
included, as a corollary process, the growing autonomization of facts and individuals, and the greater degree of calculability and universalizability which accompanies these linked processes. As we have seen, Durkheim, too, believed that the autonomization of the person, and rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse proceed together on the world-historical level. Recently, Edmund Leites has described this crucial process with particular cogence:

... two of the most decisive advances in the philosophic and theoretical development of the norm of moral and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an extraordinary extension (in moral and religious matters) of "universalities in terms of reference and communities of discourse".... Major advances in the articulation of the norm of autonomy have gone along with rejections of moralities and theologies whose terms of reference and modes of argumentation are believed to be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cultures and traditions. What is sought are ways of deciding moral and religious matters which all reasonable men, whatever their history and culture, would accept and would have to accept, given the correctness of the procedures.... There are important cultural and civilizational linkages between: (1) the struggle for universalities in terms of reference, and argumentation in moral and religious matters, and (2) the development of norms of individual autonomy (1974:97-8).

Besides Christianity, of course, there is the example of Socrates, subsequent Greek philosophy, Stoic philosophy and Roman law, all of which became fused together in medieval Europe. Indeed, as we saw in a previous section of this chapter, Durkheim himself declared "Rationalism is only one of the aspects of individualism ... each is the converse of the other" (ME:12); Durkheim also noted the importance of these developments in the Middle Ages (DL:163-4; see also his discussion of Abelard in L'Evolution pedagogique en France).

Let us briefly explore Durkheim's scattered comments on the civilizational significance of Christian universalism and individualism for the emergence of the person through history. It is clear that Durkheim judged the Christian contribution to be of momentous importance:
But remarkable as Roman individualism may be, it is slight enough compared to that which developed within Christian societies. The Christian form of religion is an inward one; it consists of inward faith rather than outward observances, for a deeply held faith eludes any external constraint (PECM:58).

With Christianity, we witness a fundamental shift in the grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority from a traditional tribal-ritual structure of conscience and consciousness to a new kind of cross-cutting socio-religious bond in which all become "brothers in the faith," and in striving to model themselves on the divine exemplar, deepen the structures of interiority. "For Christianity ... it is the mind, the conscience of man which is sacred and incomparable; for the soul is ... a direct emanation of divinity" (in Lukes, 1973:387,#39). Durkheim recognized, as did Weber, that the fundamental Christian experience of conversion demanded a wholly different level of personality integration.

True conversion is a profound transformation whereby the soul in its entirety, through turning in a completely new direction, changes its position or standpoint, and consequently alters its perspective on the world (in Giddens, 1972a:207).

Christian conversion signifies, in historical perspective, the phenomenological revolution implied in the shift in the legitimate grounds of conscience and consciousness. The individual believer, freed from the restrictive bonds of tribal and territorial religion, came to focus on his internal states, his convictions, examination of conscience, prayer, and so forth. Thus, Christianity demanded a great deal more from the individual than previous religions; more than the others, Christianity is, as Durkheim noted, an inward, individualistic religion, not only in practice but in doctrine.

Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit. .... The most common rite is prayer; and prayer is an internal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue and piety do not consist in material acts, but in internal states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a perpetual surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged to perpetually examine his conscience, he must learn to question himself, to analyze himself and scrutin-
ize his intentions: in short, to reflect upon himself. Thus, of the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one hand, and man on the other, it is necessarily around the second that the thought of the Christian societies and also consequently their system of education, has come to gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a: 239-40).

Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nascent conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than adherence to the multiple religious cultures of Antiquity.

In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective of communicating to the child a certain number of defined talents. These were either considered as a sort of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic value of the individual, or else they were seen, as was the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools which an individual needed in order to play his role in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating into the pupil certain habits and items of knowledge. ... It was not a question of influencing the personality in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity, but in clothing it in a sort of external framework, the different parts of which could be created independently.... Christianity, by contrast, very early on acquired the conception that there is in each of us an underlying mode of being from which forms of intelligence and sensibility derive, and in which they find their unity; and that it is this underlying mode of being which has to be reached if one really wants to carry out the work of the educationalist and to produce a lasting effect. According to Christian belief, to shape a man is not to embellish his mind with certain ideas or to allow him to acquire certain specific habits, but to create in him a general attitude of the mind and the will which makes him see reality in general in a definite perspective. And it is easy to understand how Christianity came to hold this view. It is because ... in order to be a Christian, it is not enough to have learnt this or that particular item, to know how to discriminate between certain rites or pronounce certain formulas, or to know certain traditional beliefs. Christianity consists essentially in a certain attitude of the soul, in a certain habitus of our moral being. To foster this attitude in the child is thus the essential goal of education (in Giddens, 1972a:206-7).

Now, this "certain habitus of the entire moral being," this commitment to influencing the total personality in its
depths, was based upon the Christian notion of the "unity and intrinsic moral value of the self" (Wallwork, 1972:132).

... the goal of Christian education always involved directing the basic orientation of the self as a unified whole.... The important thing was the general disposition of the mind and the will of the whole personality. In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian concept of training the total personality distinguishes the whole of Western pedagogical instruction (Wallwork, 1972:132).

Modern Western education, even though now largely secularized, Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on the total personality, and on penetrating with transcendental values and moral habits the "inner, deep recesses of the soul."

For us the principal object of education is not to provide the child with a greater or lesser degree of items of knowledge, but to create within him a deep-lying disposition, a kind of perspective of the soul which orients him in a definite direction, not only during childhood, but for life.... Our conception of the goal has become secularized; consequently, the means employed must themselves change. But the abstract schema of the educational process has not altered. It is still a matter of descending into depths of the soul which Antiquity was unconscious of (in Giddens, 1972a:207-8).

Indeed, the deep religio-cultural sanction of individualism and the development of the interior life, the life of the human spirit, which came with Christianity, served as an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral individualism" which Durkheim held dear. This intimate historical and cultural connection between Christianity and individualism is most important for our present purposes (see Part I, Book Three). Giddens remarks that:

Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, is the immediate source from which modern moral individualism is derived.... Christian ethics provided the moral principles upon which the "cult of the individual" is founded, but now Christianity is becoming supplanted by sacred symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, in the events of the French Revolution, where freedom and reason were glorified.... The French Revolution gave the most decisive impetus to the growth of moral individualism in modern times (1971a:115-16).
Thus, Christian sanctions, especially in their later Protestant forms, became secularized in the Enlightenment notions of the "Individual" and universal "Reason," which were, according to Max Weber, among the last great forms "charisma has taken in its fateful historical course" (1968:1142). In his review of Saint-Simon's historical analysis of the passage to the modern era, Saint-Simon, said Durkheim, saw the Protestant Reformation (rather than the Italian Renaissance) as the crucial opening wedge in the fundamental reorganization of the "moralities of thought and logics of action" underlying European social and cultural order. Especially important here was the individualistic "Protestant principle" (Tillich, 1948) of free examination in matters of conscience and inner faith.

It was only in the sixteenth century that the forces antagonistic to the old system found themselves strong enough to come into the open.... At first these forces were directed against theological rule; Luther and his co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a power in Europe. At the same time in a general way, they undermined theological authority by "destroying the principle of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of examination, which--restrained at first within quite narrow limits--was to inevitably increase and ... finally embrace an indefinite area." This two-fold change operated not only among peoples converted to Protestantism, but even among those who remained Catholic. For once the principle was established, it extended well beyond the conditions where it had first been proclaimed. As a result, the bond which tied individual consciences to ecclesiastical power--although not shattered--was loosened and the moral unity of the social system definitely unsettled (Soc:151-2).

Saint-Simon, and Durkheim after him (see also Part II, Book Two), also clearly perceived the spreading secularization of this individualistic aspect of the Protestant Ethos into political revolution (see also, Jellinek, 1901, Weber, 1968). In a curiously parallel movement, both this individualistic drive and the trend toward political centralization proceeded together (eg. see Soc:152). Eventually, as the struggle deepened, the new "Protestant principle"--the new moralities of thought and logics of action--of freedom of conscience and rationalistic or mystical individualism which accompan-
ied it, became extended to their outer limits. "One sees the principle of the right of examination in religious matters extended to its extreme limit" (Soc:153). Hence, we see the progressive extension of individualism as an absolute principle into the legitimized egoism at the base of modern economies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim attacked so relentlessly with his notion of anomie and egoisme.

Finally, we should not fail to note that at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to the defense of the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, he rhetorically used the origins of Western individualism in Christian doctrine to invert the attacks of the Catholic conservatives against the "laic" Third Republic intellectuals and moral reformers.

What, in any case, are we offered in place of this individualism that is so disparaged? The merits of Christian morality are extolled to us and we are subtly invited to rally to its support. But are those who take this position unaware that the originality of Christianity has consisted precisely in a remarkable development of the individualist spirit? While the religion of the Ancient City was entirely made up of material practices from which the spiritual element was absent, Christianity expressed in an inward faith, in the personal conviction of the individual, the essential conditions of godliness. It was the first to teach that the moral virtue of actions must be measured in accordance with intention, which is essentially private, escapes all external judgments and which only the agent can competently judge. The very center of the moral life was thus transferred from outside to within and the individual was set up as the sovereign judge of his own conduct having no other accounts to render than those to himself and to his God. Finally, in completing the definitive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, in abandoning the world to the disputes of men, Christ at the same time opened the way for science and freedom of thought. In this way, one can explain the rapid progress made by scientific thought from the date that Christian societies were established (Trans. by Lukes, 1969:26-7).

We shall follow Durkheim's own counsel in the rest of our exploration that "It is a singular error to present individualist morality as antagonistic to Christian morality; quite the contrary, it is derived from it" (1969:27). And we shall
ask how it was that, by adhering to the religion of the self and, thus, continuing the Christian heritage, modern cultural traditions came to exert extraordinary pressures on certain individuals ultimately issuing in suicide. In sum, we shall hold it as established, even in Durkheim's doctrine, that our modern ethos of individualism is ultimately derived from the belief systems and continuing phenomenological sanctions of Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular.

6. The Modern Cult of Moral Individualism

The emergence of the person through history finds its culmination in Durkheim's religion of la personne humain. As a nineteenth century liberal and positivist moralist, Durkheim's central value in the modern world was the cult of moral individualism. Far from being anti-individual, the de-collectivization of structures of morality and thought, and the emergence of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person lay at the heart of Durkheim's concern. Durkheim was critical of those who attempted to derive society from the association of autonomous individuals; but his criticism served only to demonstrate the possibility, indeed, the necessity, of deriving autonomous moral individualism from socially realistic or organic premises. Indeed, far from the individual being identified with the release of the lone ego from traditional social control, Durkheim repeatedly argued that the notion of the person—as a category of the human spirit—is a prime sociocultural and historical construction.

Now, Durkheim's remarks on the modern cult of moral individualism centered in the years 1897 and 1898 with the publication of Suicide, the definitive draft (see Lukes, 1973: 254, #5) of his lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit," and his revealing polemical article "Individualism and the Intellectuals" (trans. By S. Lukes, 1969; see also Bellah, 1973). In Suicide, Durkheim offers the following summary of his valuation of the emerging cult of the individual
and the religion of humanity.

Not only is this aim [the exaltation of the human personality] really one of the aims of modern societies, but it is a law of history that peoples increasingly detach themselves from every other objective. Originally, society is everything, the individual nothing. Consequently, the strongest social feelings are those connecting the individual with the collectivity; society is its own aim. Man is considered only an instrument in its hand; he seems to draw all his rights from it and has no counter-prerogative, because nothing higher than it exists. But gradually things change. As societies become greater in volume and density, they increase in complexity, work is divided, individual differences multiply, and the moment approaches when the only remaining bond among the members of a single human group will be that they are all men. Under such conditions, the body of collective sentiments inevitably attaches itself with all its remaining strength to its single remaining object, communicating to this object an incomparable value by so doing. Since human personality is the only thing that appeals unanimously to all hearts, since its enhancement is the only aim that can be collectively pursued, it inevitably acquires exceptional value in the eyes of all. It thus rises far above all human aims, assuming a religious nature (5:336).

Here, we see Durkheim ground this "law of history" not merely in terms of societal differentiation and individuation, but also in terms of the need for an over-arching collective representation wide enough to encompass all of humanity itself. Since all we share in common in the modern world is our humanity itself, this becomes the central value and sacred collective representation. Later, we shall see that Durkheim "rotated" his "analytical matrix" and offered other reasons to ground this "cult of the individual." But, with one eye to the Books to follow, I merely wish to raise now the question of the possible relationship between this religion of the individual and anomic and egoistic suicides: what do the pathologies of individualism have to do with the religion of individualism? Are they simply opposites, as Durkheim sometimes suggests, or are they intimately related, as he suggests at other points? These problems are crucial to issues discussed in Books Two and Three of this dissertation.

Let us consider Durkheim's general evolutionary observations on the emergence of individualism in his lectures
translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals which form a link to his earlier work in The Division of Labor. Here, again, de-collectivization in terms of societal differentiation and individuation is central.

... the further one travels in history, the more one is aware of the process of change. In the early stage, the individual personality is lost in the depths of the social mass, and then later, by its own efforts, breaks away. From being limited and of small regard, the scope of the individual life expands and becomes the exalted object of moral respect. The individual comes to acquire ever wider rights over his own person and over the possessions to which he has title; he also comes to form ideas about the world that seem to him most fitting and to develop his essential qualities without hindrance (PECM:56).

This development is inevitable, necessary, and legitimate to Durkheim, of course. It cannot be reversed, for it lays at the foundation of modern social institutions and cultural order. It represents the culmination of the main line of development of history; we cannot return to the past.

Shall we find some people saying that the cult of the individual is a superstition of which we ought to rid ourselves? That would be to go against all the lessons of history: for as we read on, we find the human person tending to gain in dignity. There is no rule more soundly established. For any attempt to base social institutions on the opposite principle is not feasible and could be convincing only for a moment: we cannot force things to be other than they are. We cannot undo the individual having become what he is—-an autonomous center of activity, an impressive system of personal forces whose energy can no more be destroyed than that of cosmic forces (PECM:56).

Now, Durkheim was quick to emphasize, again, that this ideal is a social ideal; the person is a social and cultural construction and, thus, the cult of la personne humain has for its central object not the concrete individual but the symbol of humanity itself.

What lies at the base of individual rights is not the notion of the individual as he is, but the way in which society puts the rights into practice, looks upon it and appraises it. What matters, is not what the individual is, but how much he counts, and on the other hand, what he ought to be. The reason why he has more or fewer rights, certain rights and not others, is not that he is constituted in a particular way; it is be-
society attributes this or that importance to him and attaches a higher or lower value to what concerns him. If all that affects the individual affects the society, the society will react against all that might diminish him. This would not only forbid the slightest offences against him, but even more, the society would hold itself bound to work towards increasing his stature and towards his development (PECM:66-7).

In rejecting the nominalist biases of the "natural rights" tradition, Durkheim argued that rights are social creations; that the legal enfranchisement of, and respect for, the individual person was a sociohistorical construction. Instead of society itself being the prime value, it is the social sanctioning of the autonomous human person, and his institutionalized rights, which moves to center stage of social progress.

... the rights of the individual, then, are in a state of evolution: progress is always going on and it is not possible to set any bounds to its course. What yesterday seemed but a kind of luxury becomes overnight a right precisely defined.... Everything indicates that we are becoming more alive to what touches on the individual personality (PECM:68).

Now, as we saw in an earlier section, the individual's rights emerge with, and are guaranteed by, the State in Durkheim's political sociology. Here, Durkheim suggests that modern democracy is the political system best suited to modern individualism.

Whilst the advances in democracy are thus made inevitable by the state of the social milieu, they are prompted equally by our inmost moral concepts. Democracy indeed, as we have defined it, is the political system that conforms best to our present day notion of the individual. The values we attribute to individual personality make us loath to use it as a mechanism to be wielded from without by the social authority. The personality can be itself only to the degree in which it is a social entity that is autonomous in action (PECM: 90).

It is significant that Durkheim here noted that democracy and individualism are rooted in "our moral concepts" as well as in the advanced organic division of labor. Further, democracy's superiority as a political system, Durkheim argued, was that it encouraged a constant interchange of information
between the central administrative apparatus and the dispersed citizenry (see also Giddens, 1971c; Lukes, 1973).

To be autonomous means, for the human being, to understand the necessities he has to bow to and accept them with full knowledge of the facts. Nothing that we do can make the laws of things other than they are, but we free ourselves of them in thinking them, that is, in making them ours by thought. This is what gives democracy its moral superiority. Because it is a system based on reflection, it allows the citizen to accept the laws of the country with more intelligence and thus less passivity. Because there is a constant flow of communication between themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them. Owing to constant exchanges between them and the State, its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life does with that of the State (PECM:91).

Further, Durkheim noted that whereas the type of crimes that were most severely repressed in archaic society "... were those carried out against the family or religious or political orders" (PECM:111), today it is crimes against individuals which draw public concern. Whereas before "the suffering of the individual made little impact on the feelings," today:

... it is individual suffering that is the hateful thing. The notion that a man suffers without deserving it is intolerable to us.... The reason is that these sentiments that center on man, the human being, become very strong, whilst those that link us direct with the group pass into the background. The group no longer seems to have value in itself and for itself: it is only a means of fulfilling and developing human nature to the point demanded by the current ideals. It is the supreme aim, compared with which all others are but of secondary value. That is why morals of individual man have come to transcend all others (PECM:112).

This shift testifies to an underlying shift in the grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. A similar shift can be detected in terms of the general duties of man to man, especially seen in the increase of homicide prohibitions with the progress of civilization. Instead of the dualistic in and out-group moralities of early societies, we see the progress of the religion of humanity, of univer-
salistic moralities and obligations; again, we see Durkheim's inner equation between universalism and individualism.

The reason why homicide is prohibited nowadays under threat of the most severe penalties ... is that the human person is the object of a sacred respect that was formerly attached to very different things.... There is no doubt at all that the respect and the value attached to the person by public opinion grow with civilization. Might we then not say that the homicide rate varies according to the relative position of the individual in the mounting scale of moral ends (PECM:113, 114)?

But it was really in his polemical article, published during the Dreyfus controversy in France, that Durkheim most explicitly stated his doctrine of the religion of humanity and the cult of la personne humain. Now, in attempting to turn back the conservative attack on the individualism of the intellectuals, Durkheim had first to disengage his notion of the grounds of moral individualism and civil rights from their Utilitarian and Romantic variants (see also the succeeding section). Durkheim began by distinguishing between egoism and moral individualism.

... once one has ceased to confuse individualism with its opposite, that is to say, utilitarianism, all these contradictions vanish as if by magic. The religion of humanity has all that is required to speak to its believers in a tone that is no less imperative than the religions it replaces. Far from confining itself to indulging our instincts, it offers us an ideal which infinitely surpasses nature; for we do not naturally have that wise and pure reason which, dissociated from all personal motives, would make laws in the abstract concerning its own conduct. Doubtless, if the dignity of the individual derived from his individual qualities, from those particular characteristics which distinguish him from others, one might fear that he would be enclosed in a sort of moral egoism that would render all social cohesion impossible. But in reality he receives this dignity from a higher source, one which he shares with all men. If he has the right to this religious respect, it is because he has in him something of humanity. It is humanity that is sacred and worthy of respect. And this is not his exclusive possession. It is distributed among all his fellows, and in consequence he cannot take it as a goal for his conduct without being obliged to go beyond himself and turn towards others. The cult of
which he is at once both object and follower does not address itself to the particular being that constitutes himself and carries his name, but to the human person, wherever it is found, and in whatever form it is incarnated. Impersonal and anonymous, such an end soars far above all particular consciences and can thus serve as a rallying point for them (1969:23).

Precisely because the religion of humanity is universal, it may serve as a central focus for each individual; this abstract, impersonal, altruistic religion of the human person is the descendant of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man."

The individual who is the subject of the ideals embodied in moral individualism is not the concrete individual, the particular personality, but "man" in general. The morality of the "cult of the individual" is composed of those values given intellectual expression by the eighteenth-century philosophers and inspiring the French Revolution. These are values which emphasize the dignity of "man" in the abstract; as such, not only do they not derive from the "egoism" of the utilitarians, but they are its direct opposite. Egoism is the pursuit of self-interest. But these values imply sentiments of sympathy for others and for human suffering. Precisely because they are created by society, they have a religious quality (Giddens, 1971b:213).

But, as we shall see, there may, indeed, be an unintended, indirect connection between moral individualism and its devolution into egoism. Durkheim's rhetorical task in disengaging individualism from Utilitarianism, however, made him emphasize their differences so as to deflect the attack of the Catholic conservatives. Durkheim claimed:

... In short, individualism thus understood is the glorification not of the self, but of the individual in general. Its motive force is not egoism but sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice. Is this not the way to achieve a community of all men of good will (1969:24)?

In short, moral individualism is altruistic, Utilitarian individualism is egoistic.

Moreover, Durkheim connected this altruistic, abstract French moral individualism with Enlightenment "Reason." "This cult of man has for its first dogma the autonomy of reason and for its rite the freedom of thought" (1969:24). However,
again, against the \textit{anti-Dreyfusards}, Durkheim felt compelled to defend the liberal equation of "Individual" and "Reason" from some of its extreme or destructive consequences.

Now, it will be said, if all expressions are free, by what miracle will they then be harmonious? If they are formed without knowledge of one another, and without having to take account of one another, how can they fail to be incoherent? Intellectual and moral anarchy then would be the inevitable consequence of liberalism. Such is the argument, always being refuted and always reappearing, which the perennial adversaries of reason take up periodically.... Certainly, it is true that individualism does not go without a certain intellectualism; for liberty of thought is the first of all liberties. But why has it been seen to have as a consequence this absurd self-infatuation which would confine each within his own desires and create a gap between men's minds (1969:24)?

To deflect these charges that individualism may lead to an "absurd self-infatuation," Durkheim insisted that his own type of individualism did not challenge all authority, but simply demanded that "authority be rationally based."

What it demands is the right of each individual to know those things that he may legitimately know. It does not sanction unlimited right to incompetence. Concerning a question on which I cannot pronounce with expert knowledge, my intellectual independence suffers no less if I follow a more competent opinion. The collaboration of scientists is only possible thanks to this mutual deference. Each science borrows continuously from its neighbors propositions which it accepts without verifying. The only thing is that my intellect requires reasons for bowing to the authority of others. Respect for authority is in no way incompatible with rationalism provided that authority be rationally based (1969:24).

Durkheim then defended the \textit{Dreyfusards} whose authority in this matter came "... not because, as chemists or philologists, philosophers or historians, they attribute to themselves any special privileges" (1969:25), but rather because "... being men they seek to exercise their entire right as men and to keep before them a matter which concerns "reason alone" (1969:25). It was simply a problem of "... practical morality concerning which every man of good sense is competent and about which no one ought to be indifferent" (1969:25).

Not only did Durkheim defend individualism by trying
to set aside the conservative equation of anarchy and ego-
ism, but he argued that the religion of humanity, the "cult
of moral individualism," is the only value system which can
integrate modern societies.

Not only is individualism distinct from anarchy, but it
is henceforth the only system of beliefs which can
ensure the moral unity of the country. One often hears
it said today that only a religion can bring about this
harmony. This proposition, which modern prophets feel
it necessary to utter in a mystical tone of voice, is
really no more than a simple truism over which every-
one can agree. For we know today that a religion does
not necessarily imply symbols and rites in the full
sense, or temples or priests. All this external appa-
ratus is merely its superficial aspect. Essentially, it is
nothing other than a system of collective beliefs and
practices that have a special authority. Once a
goal is pursued by a whole people, it acquires, as a
result of this unanimous adherence, a sort of moral su-
premacy which raises it far above private goals and

But, to Durkheim, there was no possibility of returning to
past religio-social organization. It is not enough, as the
Parsonians have done for several decades, to insist that
every society must have some over-arching value system which
functions as a religion; the question is what kind of value
system is needed in the twentieth century.

On the other hand, it is clear that a society cannot
hold together unless there exists among its members
a certain intellectual and moral community. However,
having recalled this sociological truism, one has not
advanced very far. For if it is true that religion is,
in a sense, indispensable, it is no less certain that
religions change, that yesterday's religion could not
be that of tomorrow. Thus, what we need to know is
what the religion of today should be (1969:25).

Durkheim claimed, of course, that only the religion of human-
ity was suited to serve as the central value system of modern
societies; indeed, it was made necessary by the very process
of societal differentiation, de-collectivization, and indivi-
duation traced earlier.

Now, all the evidence points to the conclusion that
the only possible candidate is precisely this religion
of humanity whose rational expression is the indivi-
dualist morality. To what, after all, should collec-
tive sentiments be directed in the future? As socie-
ties become more voluminous and spread over vaster territories, their traditions and practices, in order to adapt to the diversity of situations and constantly changing circumstances, are compelled to maintain a state of plasticity and instability which no longer offers adequate resistance to individual variations (1969:25-6).

Now, as Lukes observes, Durkheim's dialectical genius came here to the fore in taking over the conservative's own argument, and turning it against them.

Thus, by an ingenious inversion of the characteristic anti-Dreyfusard argument that the unity, indeed the very survival, of the nation were being threatened for the sake of one individual's rights, Durkheim argues that the "individualist, who defends the rights of the individual, defends at the same time the vital interests of society." A religion which tolerates sacrilege loses its authority, and since the religion of the individual is "the sole link which binds us one to another, such a weakening cannot take place without the onset of social dissolution" (1969:15).

Thus, only the religion of humanity, the "cult of moral individualism," is at the center of modern culture; contrary to the Catholic conservatives, it is attacks on this religion which endanger social stability.

... as a consequence of a more advanced division of labor, each mind finds itself directed towards a different part of the horizon, reflects a different aspect of the world and, as a result, the content of men's minds differ from one subject to another. One is thus gradually proceeding towards a state of affairs, now almost attained, in which the members of a single social group will no longer have anything in common other than their humanity, that is, the characteristics which constitute the human person in general. This idea of the human person ... is therefore the sole idea that survives, immutable and impersonal, above the changing tides of popular opinions; and the sentiments which it awakens are the only ones to be found in almost all hearts. The communion of minds can no longer form around particular rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices have been swept away in the natural course of things. In consequence, there remains nothing that men may love and honor in common, apart from man himself. This is why man has become a god for man, and it is why he can no longer turn to other gods without being untrue to himself. And just as each of us embodies something of humanity, so each individual mind has something within it of the divine, and thereby finds itself marked by a characteristic which renders
it sacred and inviolable to others. The whole of individualism lies here * (1969:26).

While one cannot help but admire Durkheim's dialectical genius here, there is, perhaps, some justification in wondering about his apotheosis of the fact that we moderns have nothing in common anymore except the lowest common denominator—our humanity itself. Can we today remain as sanguine as Durkheim about the liberal anchoring of the modern world in our most abstract and lowest common denominators? Is this not an inherently weak point of unity? Is this bond sufficient to attach individuals to altruism and turn them away from egoism? Just as Durkheim said that "the whole [the philosophy] of individualism lies here," may we not wonder if the crux of Durkheim's later problems, especially in terms of the ambiguities besetting his suicide schemas, might not also lie in these tenuous, and often inverted, connections?

At this point, however, in the heat of battle, Durkheim could not pause to trace some of the potential inversions of his central value system. He insisted that the "cult of moral individualism" is anchored in historical necessity.

That is what makes it into the doctrine that is currently necessary. For, should we wish to hold back its progress, we should have to prevent men from becoming increasingly differentiated from one another, reduce their personalities to a single level, bring them back to the old conformism of former times, and arrest, in consequence, the tendency of societies to become ever more extended and centralized, and stem the unceasing growth of the division of labor. Such an undertaking, whether desirable or not, infinitely surpasses all human powers (1969:26).

Thus, those intellectuals who defended the civil rights of unjustly treated individuals were, in fact, defending the cultural foundation of modern social organization.

We are now in a better position to understand the reason why certain people believe that they must offer an unyielding resistance to all that seems to threaten the individualist faith. If every attack on the rights of an individual revolts them, this is not solely because of sympathy for the victim. Nor is it because they fear that they themselves will suffer similar acts of injustice. Rather, it is that such outrages cannot rest unpunished without putting national existence in jeopardy.
It is indeed impossible that they should be freely allowed to occur without weakening the sentiments that they violate; and as these sentiments are all that we still have in common, they cannot be weakened without disturbing the cohesion of society. A religion which tolerates acts of sacrilege abdicates any sway over men's minds (1969:27).

Since all we share in common in modern "organic solidarity" is our common humanity itself, attacks on the religion of the individual attack the very foundation of modern society.

The religion of the individual can, therefore, allow itself to be flouted without resistance, only on penalty of ruining its credit; since it is the sole link which binds us to one another, such a weakening cannot take place without the onset of social dissolution. Thus, the individualist, who defends the rights of the individual, defends at the same time the vital interests of society; for he is preventing the criminal impoverishment of that final reserve of collective ideas and sentiments that constitutes the very soul of the nation. He renders his country the same service that the ancient Roman rendered his city when he defended traditional rites against reckless innovations. And if there is one country among all others in which the individualist cause is truly international, it is our own; for there is no other whose fate has been so closely bound up with the fate of these ideas. We gave the most recent expression to it, and it is from us that other people have received it. We cannot, therefore, renounce it today, without renouncing ourselves; without diminishing ourselves in the eyes of the world, without committing real moral suicide (1969:27-8).

Now, Durkheim was forced to acknowledge, however, that many people still confused egoistic individualism with moral individualism. And while he insisted that the latter is a social construction, cannot the same be said of the former?

A verbal similarity has made it possible to believe that individualism resulted from individual, and thus egoistic, sentiments. In reality, the religion of the individual is a social institution like all known religions. It is society which assigns us this idea as the sole end which is today capable of providing a focus for men's wills. To remove this ideal, without putting any other in its place, is therefore to plunge us into that very moral anarchy which it is sought to avoid (1969:28).

In light of the ambiguities abounding in his treatment of the causes and types of suicide (see Books Two and Three), however, one is led to wonder whether the "moral anarchy"
marked by anomie and egoisme may not be ironically connected with this very religion of the self; whether the cultural sanctioning of the individual as the source and foundation of modern values, especially in the Romantic and Utilitarian traditions, might not lead to extreme, unforeseen, and destructive outcomes. Durkheim himself had to criticize, as we shall see in the following section, these two opposing cultural traditions for basing individualist ethics on the lone individual. Instead, Durkheim argued for social realism and the derivation of moral individualism from cultural values.

This is how it is possible, without contradiction, to be an individualist while asserting that the individual is a product of society, rather than its cause. The reason is that individualism is itself a social product, like all moralities and all religions. The individual receives from society even the moral beliefs which deify him. This is what Kant and Rousseau did not understand. They wished to deduce their individualist ethics not from society, but from the notion of the isolated individual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from it resulted the logical contradictions of their system (1969:28, #1).

However, this passage and many to follow do acknowledge that it was common for cultural values to sanction types of individualism different from Durkheim's non-egoistic, abstract, altruistic, religion of humanity. As Durkheim himself noted in Suicide, then, even our egoism is, in large part, a product of society!

Now, Durkheim himself admitted that even his own type of rationalistic individualism, as derived from the eighteenth century Enlightenment and the French Revolutionary declarations, was primarily negative. It was advanced primarily as a rhetorical weapon to de-collectivize society; and because of the intensity of the struggle, this negativistic thrust itself became destructive.

All the same, we should not consider as perfect and definitive the formula with which the eighteenth cen gave expression to individualism, a formula which we have made the mistake of preserving in an almost unchanged form. Although it was adequate a century ago, it is now in need of being enlarged and completed. It
presented individualism only in its most negative aspect. Our fathers were concerned exclusively with freeing the individual from political fetters which hampered his development. Freedom of thought, freedom to write, and freedom to vote were thus placed among the primary values that it was necessary to achieve, and this emancipation was certainly the necessary condition for all subsequent progress. However, carried away by the enthusiasm of the struggle, solely concerned with the objective they pursued, they ended by no longer seeing beyond it, and by converting into a sort of ultimate goal what was merely the next stage in their efforts. Now, political liberty is a means, not an end. It is worth no more than the manner in which it is put to use. If it does not serve something which exists beyond it, it is not merely useless: it becomes dangerous. If those who handle this weapon do not know how to use it in fruitful battle, they will not be slow in turning it against themselves *(1969:28-9).

While it is probable that Durkheim was issuing here a call for a kind of party unity, over against the age-old anti-republican threat from the monarchic and hierocratic forces in France, is it not also possible that the achievement of a largely negative kind of freedom might lead certain individuals to turn their extreme individualism against themselves—namely, in suicide? Durkheim himself notes the disenchantment that came after the achievement of the aspiration to found the Third Republic; might we not apply Durkheim's reasoning in Suicide about the anomie of success to this victory of individualism and the resulting ennui?

It is precisely for this reason that it has fallen today into a certain discredit. The men of my generation recall how great was our enthusiasm when, twenty years ago, we finally succeeded in toppling the last barriers which we impatiently confronted. But alas! disenchantment came quickly; for we soon had to admit that no one knew what to do with this liberty that had been so laboriously achieved. Those to whom we owed it only made use of it in internecine strife. And it was from that moment that one felt the growth in the country of this current of gloom and despondency, which became stronger with each day that passed, the ultimate result of which must inevitably be to break the spirit of those least able to resist *(1969:29).

Like Saint-Simon after the French Revolution (see Socialism), Durkheim wished to see rationalistic individualism move for-
ward from negative to positive expressions; hence, their positivism. Here, Durkheim acknowledged that "individual liberty is a delicate instrument," even a double-edged sword which might unwittingly be turned against self as well as to defend individual freedom.

Thus, we can no longer subscribe to this negative ideal. It is necessary to go beyond what has been achieved, if only to preserve it. Indeed, if we do not learn to put to use the means of action that we have in our hands, it is inevitable that they will become less effective. Let us, therefore, use our liberties in order to alleviate the functioning of the social machine, still so harsh to individuals, in order to put at their disposal all possible means for developing their faculties unhindered, in order, finally, to work towards making a reality of the famous precept: to each according to his works! Let us recognize that, in general, liberty is a delicate instrument the use of which must be learnt, and let us teach this to our children; all moral education should be directed to this end (1969:29).

Thus, at a time when the moral foundations of the Third Republic were threatened, Durkheim issued a call to the rationalistic individualists to hold fast to their values, and also to refine and extend them; to move beyond the negative thrust of the past to positive reconstruction of the society in terms of the classical French ideals. Might he not, had the connections been made clear (as we shall attempt in the succeeding Books of this dissertation), in different circumstances, also issued a call to disentangle the negative and destructive and unintended outcomes of this religion of the self from its valid foundations? In other words, can we any longer ignore the real contemporary relevance of the ancient wisdom that virtues, pushed to extreme, may become vices?

It is a matter of completing, extending, and organizing individualism, not of restricting it or struggling against it. It is a matter of using and not stifling rational faculties.... In all these circumstances, does not our duty appear to be clearly marked out? All those who believe in the value, or even merely in the necessity, of the moral revolution accomplished a century ago, have the same interest: they must forget the differences which divide them, and combine their efforts so as to hold positions already won.... For today, the
urgent task, which must be put before all else, is that of saving our moral patrimony; once that is secure, we shall see that it is made to prosper (1969:29-30).

Finally, in many of his statements in Suicide, it must be noted that, for rhetorical reasons again, Durkheim could not and did not acknowledge explicitly that moral individualism and the religion of the self, even in their Utilitarian or Romantic forms, might invert itself into "moral anarchy." But here, of course, Durkheim argued normatively, in terms of a projected ideal, not actuality.

This cult of man is something ... very different from the egoistic individualism ... which leads to suicide. Far from detaching individuals from society, and from every aim beyond themselves, it unites them in one thought, and makes them servants of one work. For man, as thus suggested to collective affection and respect, is not the sensual, experiential individual that each one of us represents, but man in general, ideal humanity as conceived by each people at each moment of its history. None of us wholly incarnates this ideal, though none is wholly a stranger to it. So we have, not to concentrate each separate person upon himself and his own interests, but to subordinate them to the general interests of mankind. Such an aim draws him beyond himself; impersonal and disinterested, it is above all individual personalities; like every ideal, it can be conceived of only as superior to and dominating reality. This ideal even dominates societies, being the aim on which all social activity depends. This is why it is no longer the right of these societies to dispose of this ideal freely (S:337).

At its best, Durkheim's projection may be true; in the normal case, however, it is hard to deny the devolution, inversion, or extremity of most cultural-ethical ideals. Durkheim's condemnation of suicide as immoral because it "denies the religion of humanity" may be commendable, but it is insufficiently dialectical for our present purposes. What is missing here is the ironic insight that, as he stated elsewhere, ". . . even our immorality is part of our morality," that the religion of the self can become self-destructive; in short, that our virtues may also become the source of our vices.
Under these conditions, suicide must be classed among immoral acts; for in its main principle it denies this religion of humanity.... Society is injured because the sentiment is offended on which its most respected moral maxims today rest, a sentiment almost the only bond between its members, and which would be weakened if this offense could be committed with impunity. How could this sentiment maintain the least authority if the moral conscience did not protest its violation? From the moment that the human person is and must be considered sacred, over which neither the individual nor the group has free disposal, any attack upon it must be forbidden (S:337).

For our part, we cannot accept such an undialectical point of view, and shall, instead, search out all those parts of Durkheim's treatment of suicide which admit the ironic insight. The notion that the modern cult of moral individualism, when pushed to extreme, like all cults, ends in inverting itself, shall serve as our basic guide in Books Two and Three which follow. There, we shall explore the possibility that anomic and egoistic suicides in the modern world ultimately stem from cultural sanctions.

7. **Durkheim's Critique of Anglo Utilitarian and Romantic-Idealistic Notions of Individualism**

Before we begin our detailed exegesis of the logic and structure of Durkheim's famous book, Suicide, we should not fail to notice that Durkheim himself felt obliged in various places to attempt to refute those traditions which gave cultural sanction to individualism on nominalistic premises. Such traditions largely failed to meet his criteria for dissolving the possible equation between individualism and egoism—namely, the impersonal, altruistic marriage of the abstract Individual and Reason projected by the French Cultural Tradition. For example, Durkheim acknowledged:

Doubtless it can happen that individualism is practised in quite a different spirit. Certain people use it for their own personal ends, as a means of disguising their egoism and escaping more easily from their duties toward society. But this deceptive misuse of individualism proves nothing against it, just as the utilitarian fictions of religious hypocrites prove nothing against religion (1969:24).
For such traditions rooted individualistic ethics in the moral autonomy of the individual alone, and some Utilitarians, in equating egoism and individualism, went so far as to proclaim that competitive economic egoism inevitably leads to altruism, to the common good.

Here, Durkheim had to face the fact, quite apart from the arguments about methodology in the social sciences, that egoisme, anomie, and an individualism couched in ethical terms were often intimately intertwined. His normative protestations aside, the amoralism of the man in the state of nature of the eighteenth century philosophers was very close to anomie; this identification was, of course, the source of Parsons' linkage of anomie to the Hobbesian dilemma. Indeed, as we shall see, Guyau (1962) earlier used the term "anomie" in a laudatory way in approximately this sense. Hence, we shall watch with fascination as Durkheim, in Suicide, attempts to deal with this dilemma that values lead to vices, that good intentions lead to bad results; in short, that extreme individualism was (is) widely sanctioned by the dominant cultural values of the modern world.

As noted earlier in this chapter, Durkheim directed much of his polemical skill in The Division of Labor to refuting Spencerian liberal Utilitarian individualism. This nominalist position deduced society from the lone individual; but Durkheim argued, "... the psychologist who starts by restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find the non-ego." Association is a primary social phenomena which cannot be abstractly derived from self-interested contractual relations.

If this important truth has been disregarded by the Utilitarians, it is an error rooted in the manner in which they conceive the genesis of society. They suppose originally isolated and independent individuals, who, consequently, enter into relationships only to cooperate, for they have no other reason to clear the space separating them and to associate. But this theory, so widely held, postulates a veritable creatio ex nihilo. It consists, indeed, in deducing society from the individual. But nothing we know authorizes us to believe in the possibility of such spontaneous genera-
tion. According to Spencer, for societies to be formed within this hypothesis, it is necessary that primitive units pass from the state of perfect independence to that of mutual dependence. But what can have determined such a complete transformation in them? Is it the prospect of the advantages presented by social life? But they are counterbalanced, perhaps more than counterbalanced, by the loss of independence, for, among individuals born for a free and solitary life, such a sacrifice is most intolerable. Add to this, that in the first social types social life is as absolute as possible, for nowhere is the individual more completely absorbed in the group. How could man, if he were born an individualist, as is supposed, be able to resign himself to an existence clashing violently with his fundamental inclination? How pale the problematical utility of cooperation must appear to him besides such a fall! With autonomous individualities, as are imagined, nothing can emerge save what is individual, and, consequently, cooperation itself, which is a social fact, submissive to social rules, cannot rise. Thus, the psychologist who starts by restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find the non-ego (DL:279).

Here, we see one of the clearest expressions of Durkheim's social realism (see also Part I, Book Three). Indeed, if one starts from social realism, and then attempts to "get inside" the nominalist perspective, it is clear that egoistic individualism can and is socially created; that the Hobbesian dilemma is not natural but social; that social nominalism leads to a culturally sanctioned collocation of atoms trading goods on an international market. In such a moral universe, individual persons are enjoined to be egoistic; they are forced to act as if they were Robinson Crusoes. Durkheim pointed out the logical contradictions of such a world-view:

Collective life is not born from individual life, but it is, on the contrary, the second which is born from the first. It is on this condition alone that one can explain how the personal individuality of social units has been able to be formed and enlarged without disintegrating society.... It is not the absolute personality of the monad, which is sufficient unto itself, and could do without the rest of the world, but that of an organ or part of an organ having its determined function, but which cannot, without risking dissolution, separate itself from the rest of the organism. Under these conditions, cooperation becomes not only possible but necessary. Utilitarians thus reverse the natural order of facts, and nothing is more deceiving than this inversion (DL:279-80).
Durkheim didn't exclude the Idealist philosophers and ethicists from his rebuttal of nominalistic individualism; he accused them also of starting their ethical systems from the absolute autonomy of the lone individual.

As the utilitarians, the idealists have it [cooperation] consist exclusively in a system of economic relations, of private arrangements in which egotism is the only active power. In truth, the moral life traverses all the relations which constitute cooperation (DL:280).

Indeed, Durkheim saw the common foundations between the opposed camps of Romantic-Idealist and Anglo Utilitarian philosophers in terms of the moral subsidy of the autonomous individual. The Enlightenment, Durkheim recognized, started from the ego in a state of nature, which was, from the sociological point of view, inherently amoral.

... man is a moral being only because he lives in society, since morality consists in being solidary with a group and varying with this solidarity. Let all social life disappear, and moral life will disappear with it, since it would no longer have any objective. The state of nature of the philosophers of the eighteenth century, if not immoral, is at least amoral. Rousseau himself recognized this (DL:399).

In his polemical article, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," Durkheim was careful to distinguish his type of rationalistic moral individualism from its Utilitarian and Romantic variants. First, Durkheim attacked the "narrow egoism" of the Utilitarian economists.

In order to facilitate the condemnation of individualism, it has been confused with the narrow and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists. This is to take the easy way out. It is not hard, in effect, to denounce as an ideal without grandeur that narrow commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange, and it is only too clear that all social life would be impossible if there did not exist interests superior to the interests of individuals. Nothing is more just than that such doctrines should be treated as anarchical, and with this attitude we are in full agreement. But what is admissible is that this individualism should be presented as the only one that there is or even that there could be. Quite the contrary, it is becoming more and more rare and exceptional. The practical philosophy of Spencer is of such moral poverty that it now has scarcely any supporters. As for the economists, even if they
once allowed themselves to be seduced by the simplicity of this theory, they have for a long time now felt the need to temper the rigor of their primitive orthodoxy and to open their minds to more generous sentiments... In truth, if individualism had no other representatives, it would be quite pointless to move heaven and earth in this way to combat an enemy that is in the process of quietly dying a natural death (1969:20).

While Durkheim was certainly right in describing the shift away from Utilitarian individualism among many intellectuals (the "Social Gospel" movement in the United States and Fabian socialism in Britain were two indicators of this shift), one wonders if Durkheim would have been quite so sanguine about the death of Utilitarian individualism had he survived into the mid-twentieth century. Further, this passage is important because Durkheim agreed with the conservatives here that Utilitarian individualism is "anarchical," yet, this movement marked by a fundamental "moral poverty" itself emerged as an ethically rooted and motivated reform movement.

After dismissing the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian individualism, Durkheim turned to consider the other contender—namely, Kantian Idealistic individualism.

However, there exists another individualism over which it is less easy to triumph. It has been upheld by the great majority of thinkers: it is the individualism of Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualistes, that which the Declaration of the Rights of Man sought, more or less successfully, to translate into formula, that which is currently taught in our schools and which has become the basis of our moral catechism. It is true that it has been thought possible to attack this individualism under the cover of the first type, but that differs from it fundamentally and the criticisms which apply to the one could not be appropriate to the other. So it is far from making personal interest the object of human conduct, that it sees in all personal motives the very source of all evil. According to Kant, I am only certain of acting well if the motives that influence me relate, not to the particular circumstances in which I am placed, but to my quality as a man in abstrato (1969:20-21).

Such a moral stance carried, of course, real moral grandeur. For instead of justifying egoism, as the Utilitarians had done, by arguing that the pursuit of self-interest inevita-
bly leads to the common good, that egoism regulated only by competition leads to altruism, the Idealists and Rationalists argued that egoistic judgments must be overcome through universalization.

Conversely, my action is wicked when it cannot be justified logically except by reference to the situation I happen to be in and my social condition, my class or caste interests, my passions, etc. That is why immoral conduct is to be recognized by the sign that it is closely linked to the individuality of the agent and cannot be universalized without manifest absurdity (1969:21).

However, when Durkheim was not engaged in polemics with the right-wing, and he was simply trying to establish his own "science of morality," he was less generous to the Kantian categorical imperative (e.g. see DL:412).

Another expression of this universalization of individual wills as the basis of moral action was to be found in Rousseau's Social Contract and his notion of the "general will." Durkheim noted:

Similarly, if according to Rousseau, the general will, which is the basis of the social contract, is infallible, if it is the authentic expression of perfect justice, this is because it is a resultant of all the particular wills; consequently, it constitutes a kind of impersonal average from which all individual considerations have been eliminated, since, being divergent and even antagonistic to one another, they are neutralized and cancel each other out. Thus, for both these thinkers, the only ways of acting that are moral are those which are fitting for all men equally, that is to say, which are implied in the notion of man in general (1969:21).

Now, Durkheim insisted that the Rationalist and Idealist notions of abstract, impersonal moral individualism are far removed from the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian individualism which confuses the ego and the person.

This is far from that apotheosis of comfort and private interest, that egoistic cult of the self for which utilitarian individualism has been justly reproached. Quite the contrary: according to these moralists, duty consists in averting our attention from what concerns us personally, from all that relates to our empirical individuality, so as uniquely to seek that which our human condition demands, that which we hold in common with all our fellow men. This ideal goes
so far beyond the limit of utilitarian ends that it appears to those who aspire to it as marked with a religious character. The human person, whose definition serves as the touchstone according to which good must be distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred.... It has something of that transcendental majesty which the churches of all times have given to their Gods. It is conceived as being invested with that mysterious property which creates an empty space around holy objects, which keeps them away from profane contacts and which draws them away from ordinary life. And it is exactly this feature which induces the respect of which it is the object (1969:21).

And it is exactly this feature of Rationalist and Idealist moral philosophy which must be examined to see if here, as elsewhere, the high-sounding moral idealism and good intentions may not lead to unanticipated, destructive results. Surely when such a premium is put upon the individual person, when man becomes god, then the balance between community and self shifts decisively. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, for instance, we see the "cult of the individual" metamorphosing into the "cult of the self," into the "Religion of the Self," with myriad therapeutics designed to rid the Self of all unnecessary and artificial distractions. Durkheim here argued in his normal tone of high-minded seriousness that this extreme emphasis on the individual was balanced by a corresponding emphasis on supra-individual norms and concern with the community.

Now, it is a remarkable fact that all these theorists of individualism are no less sensitive to the rights of the collectivity than they are to those of the individual. No one has insisted more emphatically than Kant on the supra-individual character of morality and law. He sees them rather as a set of imperatives that men must obey because they are obligatory.... Now, Kantianism led to the ethics of Fichte, which was already thoroughly imbued with socialism, and to the philosophy of Hegel whose disciple was Marx. As for Rousseau, one knows how his individualism is complemented by an authoritarian conception of society. Following him, the men of the Revolution, in promulgating the famous Declaration of Rights, made France one, indivisible, centralized, and perhaps one should even see the revolutionary achievement as being above all a great movement of national concentration. Finally, the chief reason for which the spiritualistes have always fought against utilitarian morality is that it seemed to them...
to be incompatible with social necessities (1969:22).

Now, even granting that Durkheim was here involved in a rhetorical defense of rationalistic individualism against the conservative right, one wonders about the oscillation in such ethical systems between the individual and the centralized and often authoritarian State; indeed, Durkheim himself counted this as one of the great problems of the modern era (see Part II, Book Two). Durkheim himself stated "... there is no reason of State which can excuse an outrage against the person when the rights of the person are placed above the State" (1969:21-22); but the problem remains nevertheless. Thus, Durkheim was forced, by the rhetorical situation, in defending French rationalistic "moral individualism" to: (a) set aside as indefensible the Utilitarian equation of egoism with individualism, and (b) argue that true individualism, such as expressed in Kant, the Enlightenment, and the "Declaration of the Rights of Man," was rooted in an abstract, altruistic religion of humanity which, nonetheless, depended upon a strong centralized State in which the relations between the lone individual and the society's means of governance remained problematical. Of course, these were not merely philosophical problems, for the moral demands and the culture of the individual had changed the very foundations of modern social organization (a principle which we shall critically apply to Durkheim's theses in Part I of Book Two).

One can see how grave this question is. For the liberalism of the eighteenth century which is, after all, what is basically at issue, is not simply an armchair theory, a philosophical construction. It has entered into the facts, it has penetrated our institutions and customs. It has become part of our whole life, and, if we really must rid ourselves of it, it is our entire moral organization that must be rebuilt at the same time (1969:22).

Now, when Durkheim permitted himself a few critical remarks on the uncertain empirical fate of his values, he acknowledged some of the crucial difficulties in living out "moral individualism." Indeed, did not Rousseau himself note that although "... the Protestant is forced to be free, this
burden may be too great for some to bear"?

Certainly, we do not propose to defend the way in which these different thinkers have set about combin­
ing these two aspects in the construction of their sys­
tems. If, with Rousseau, one begins seeing the indivi­
dual as a sort of absolute who can and must be suffi­
cient unto himself, it is obviously difficult then to Explain how civil society could be established


Indeed, although earlier he used the example of Kant and Rousseau to deflect the conservatives' equation of indivi­
dualism with anti-social egoism, Durkheim later admitted some crucial flaws in their points of departure. Even though their positions favored altruism and the religion of humani­
ty, their whole framework started from the pre-social autono­my of the individual person.

This is what Kant and Rousseau did not understand. They wished to deduce their individualist ethics not from society, but from the notion of the absolute in­
dividual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from it resulted the logical contradictions of their system (1969:28, #1).

We might also add, besides "logical contradictions," social, cultural, and phenomenological contradictions. One might as well rephrase Durkheim's objection to the Utilitarian starting point: if, instead of starting from the ego, one starts from the absolute autonomy of the individual, how can one emerge to find the embeddedness, the relationalness of the person? If from ego you cannot emerge to find non-ego, then from absolute autonomy you cannot emerge to find relational interdependence. We have, here, then the first crucial fac­
tor in our second schema of suicide--namely, an extraordinar­ily strong modern cultural sanction for absolute indi­
individualism; this recognition shall prove crucial.

Now, one may find scattered throughout Durkheim's works critical references to both the Utilitarian and Ideal­
ist-Romantic positions; we shall explore several passages directly relevant to the second schema of suicide in Part II of Book Three of this dissertation. Let us, now briefly note, however, some of the few criticisms which Durkheim permitted himself in his summary review of Rousseau's doc­
trine in his Latin dissertation *Quid Secundatus politicæ scientiæ instituendae contulerit* published in 1892 (translated by Ralph Manheim 1965). These criticisms are important for our present purposes because Rousseau combined so many different strains of thought; beginning as a republican Calvinist, he moved from the Enlightenment rationalism of the eighteenth century to the Romanticism of the nineteenth century. Hence, he mediates between all three major modern cultural traditions. For example, Durkheim observed of Rousseau's philosophy of government that "The existence of a government is in such sharp contradiction with Rousseau's general principles of social philosophy that even the genesis of government is difficult to explain" (1965: 130). And, after noting the absence of intermediary institutions and the restriction of the "general will" to a realm of universals, Durkheim explained one of the crucial unresolved tensions in Rousseau's work in this way:

This conception is itself a consequence of the fact that Rousseau sees only two poles of human reality, the abstract, general individual who is the agent and objective of social existence, and the concrete empirical individual who is the antagonist of all collective existence. He fails to see that, though in a certain sense these two poles are irreconcilable, the first without the second is no more than a logical fiction (1965:131).

Further, in his conclusion, after comparing and contrasting the various solutions of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau to the problem of relating absolute individualism to society and the state, Durkheim noted:

Though the three thinkers agree that the social and the individual are dissimilar, we observe an increasing effort to root the social being in nature. But therein lies the weakness of the system. While ... social life for Rousseau is not contrary to the natural order, it has so little in common with nature that one wonders how it is possible. Rousseau says somewhere that respect for the legislator's authority presupposes a certain social spirit. But his remark applies still more to the establishment of a society. If, however, a society is formed of isolated, atomized individuals, one is at a loss to see where it comes from. Perhaps if Rousseau had granted a Hobbesian state of war we might understand why, with a view to ending it, men
should organize into a body and go so far as to recast their original nature. But he cannot advance this explanation because in his view the state of war is a result of life in common. And just as he fails to explain how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms, could come into being, he has great difficulty in showing how it can possibly cast off its imperfections and establish itself on a logical basis. So unstable is its foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but appear to us as a tottering structure whose delicate balance can be established and maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances (1969:137-8).

We shall also ask, in relation to anomic and egoistic suicides (see Books Two and Three), whether or not the relation between society and the absolutized individual, and the internal equilibrium within the latter, in the modern world is not so delicate that it may be "maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances."

Finally, let us recall that the first time Durkheim used the term anomie in one of his own works it was directed against the absolute individualism and apotheosis of the imagination among the Romantic artists (see also Part II, Book Three for references to the Romantics). For the Romantics (eg. see N. Frye, 1947) claimed special dispensations for themselves; they were above rules and "normal morality."

In claiming special powers, the Romantic artists equated divine inspiration with the individual imagination. Durkheim's acknowledgment of this pathology appeared in a footnote in the suppressed part of the introduction which Simpson included as an appendix to The Division of Labor.

There is very often attributed to the aesthetico-moral activity a certain superiority. Now, the sentiment of obligation, that is, the existence of duty, is in danger of being weakened in admitting that there is a morality, and perhaps a higher, which rests in the independent creations of the individual, which no rule determines, which is essentially anomic. We believe, on the contrary, that anomie is the contradiction of all morality (DL:431, #21).
FOOTNOTES

BOOK ONE

#1, page 119--translation by Marsha R. and David McCloskey.

#1, pg. 146--I owe the Latin translation to Fr. James G. Goodwin, S.J., Professor of Sociology, Seattle University.

#1, pg. 164--Terry Clark (1968:88) observes how the Durkheimians also came to celebrate "periodical reunions" which generated a "veritable collective effervescence" and "collective representations."

#1, pg. 295--It is this second meaning of secularization as translation of religious symbols and ethical drives into secular spheres which underlies our Weberian insights into ethical sanctioning of the second schema of suicide which we shall construct in Book Three. Unfortunately, space does not permit a full Weberian investigation into the historical-cultural origins and development of these sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability.

#1, pg. 298--If there was one sociologist of religion best situated to discover the significance of Durkheim's notion of the primitive sacral complex, it was Robert N. Bellah, student of Parsons, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, consider the fact that in neither his 1964 article on "Religious Evolution" nor his 1973 Introduction did Bellah develop his earlier insights. It is one indication of how powerful conceptual blinders can become that even when personally presented, in 1976, with a draft copy of this chapter, Bellah still failed to comprehend the significance of Durkheim's seminal paradigm.

#1, pg. 299--Yet, to the best of my knowledge, Tiryakian has not incorporated this paradigm into his other work.

#2, pg. 299--But see Nisbet's insistence in the same work that "... it remains true that the long-range significance of Durkheim's study of religion ... is not so much developmental ... as it is what can best be described as micro-sociological" (1965:94). Nisbet hadn't changed his structural emphasis in 1974:168; yet, see 1974:170 where he again notes the evolutionary emphasis on religion, but makes little of it; all in all, a curious performance of recognition and then tossing the insight away.

#3, pg. 299--See also Aron (1967:109); Aron's ambivalence toward the Durkheimians is revealed in his critical stance throughout this volume; so that one suspects to gain a sym-
pathetic perspective from which to interpret Durkheim, Aron comes to America and views Durkheim through Parsons' eyes. Thus, to a large measure, both Durkheim and Weber were favorably mediated to their respective countrymen through Parsons' reconstruction in his *The Structure of Social Action*.

#4, pg. 299—See also Stanner (1967:219), who, true to the neo-functionalism of anthropology, neglects Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary emphasis. "Fundamentally, it was the failure to break with historicism that prevented the proposition from emerging clearly as one of identity [of religious and social thought]" (1967:221).

#5, pg. 299—See also Poggi (1971:242) "Religion was ... not just one institution among others, but rather the paradigm, the matrix, and ultimate support of all institutions." Also, Poggi sums up the Durkheimian relationship between religion and other institutions in this way: "Religion is the paradigmatic, proto-, and meta-institution" (1971:250).

#1, pg. 300—Although clearly sensitive to Durkheim's general evolutionary perspective, LaCapra felt constrained to reinterpret (eg. 1972:107-117) Durkheim's theses in terms of Mauss, Levi-Strauss, and Victor Turner. Significantly, LaCapra cited as evidence rather obscure and previously untranslated material, rather than from classics such as *The Division of Labor*, L'Annee preface, or *The Elementary Forms*. Apparently, this prime translated material had become so burdened over the years with obfuscatory secondary interpretations that it became almost impossible to recover the full meaning of Durkheim's paradigm. The problem lies not with the paradigmatic text but with our distorting secondary filters.

#1, pg. 301—Significantly, both Giddens and Lukes, surely two of the most sensitive and prolific recent reinterpreters of Durkheim's work, addressed the problem of the generic and genetic role of religion in Durkheim's thought without bothering to formulate his central paradigm.

#2, pg. 301—Yet, once again, in several chapters devoted to Durkheim's methodology, Smelser neglects Durkheim's fusion of his generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches in his seminal paradigm of the primitive sacral complex.

#3, pg. 301—Positively, it speaks well for the now well-documented objectivity of Durkheim's model. Negatively, it reflects badly on the inherent discontinuity, the built-in loss, in the development of sociological theory. For even when the model is recovered by one, they lose it; without a full statement legitimating this model by a
contemporary leader in the discipline, the idea shall continue to languish.

#4, 301—I call this sadly inevitable process the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974), and apply it to Durkheim's notion of anomie as another paradigmatic case (see appendix).

#1, 303—Horton has also wondered "why this striking aspect of Durkheim's sociology of ideas has been so neglected by posterity." It is a problem for the sociology of knowledge, and cultural processes.

#1, 309—When Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary emphases drop from view, or are collapsed into his generic analyses of religion, it appears that religion would have argued for a return to primitive religion; but, as we shall see, Durkheim viewed this situation as highly repressive.

#1, 315—There was a certain ambivalence toward repressive religious law even in Durkheim's early phase. For the positivists, the irrationalities of traditional society were, of course, bad. But because Durkheim also postulated the need for moral discipline of the pre-social ego, the repressiveness of primitive religion had a positive evolutionary value. For religious rules attached the ego, as Weber also noted, to a "cosmos of obligations."

#2, 315—Sheleff's argument does not impress me, largely, because he lacks recognition of the "nuclear" or paradigmatic structure of Durkheim's thought.

#1, 317—The crucial fact to recognize is that structural differentiation and cultural transformation are not necessarily correlated. The archaic empires also were dominated by sacro-magical collective structures of conscience and consciousness (see Nelson, 1973a). Indeed, such large scale empires (eg. advanced horticultural societies or agrarian empires) serve as the fullest expressions of this structure of conscience.

#1, 321—Much of the work of the Annee circle focussed on the primitive sacral complex and its cultural creativity and evolutionary centrality; see, for eg. Honigsheim, 1960. In many ways, this literature remains unexplored.

#1, 326—See also Tiryakian (1964) for a discussion of this neglected but important article.

#2, 326—A full-scale review of this literature would be fascinating; for a check-list, see Honigsheim (1960).

#1, 341—Implied in Durkheim's notion of progressive cultural evolution and societal differentiation was seculariza-
tion and the growing autonomy of spheres of life and persons. This evolutionary view implies that religion too has become differentiated from the other main societal and cultural forms in which it was formerly embedded. To the positivists religion was something to be overcome; but cannot religionists also take certain heart from this process? For if everything else is allowed to take on its own special nature, freed from sacral control, then does it not follow also that religion is freed to take on its own special nature?

#1, 342--Parsons's sleight-of-hand in inserting an "ultimate, non-empirical reference" as implied in Durkheim's sociology of religion was nothing short of remarkable; even more surprising, no one called him on it. See Parsons (1949).

#1, 364--In the original plan, this dissertation contained a systematic introduction to the methodology of interpreting cultural traditions; space limitations forced its deletion. However, for some references, see Parts I and II, Book Three.

#1, 395--See Frye, 1947: 352.
BOOK TWO

DURKHEIM'S FIRST SCHEMA OF SUICIDE

Synopsis. Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolve around the problem of locating egoism and insatiable desires. I propose that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern suicides, to the insight that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions. Hence, absence/presence is the fundamental axis of this dissertation; we shall explore each of these possibilities in the following two Books.

In Part I of Book Two, we shall explore Durkheim's first schema of suicide. This schema presumes absence of moral constraint over the desires of the organic ego in the modern transitional crisis. This schema rests on Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex; thus, both anomie and egoisme imply the release of the inherently egocentric and insatiable passions from the traditional moral discipline. Another key to Durkheim's schemas was his evolutionary framework. Thus, modern "moral anarchy" contrast with altruisme and fatalisme in traditional societies. Altruisme and fatalisme represent the repressive discipline of "mechanical solidarity" which keeps the ego's passions in rigid check.

The first two polar types--egoisme versus altruisme--connote self versus group primacy. Altruisme refers to the primitive, archaic, or traditional society in which the individual is made to feel morally obligated to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his group. Altruisme is used by Durkheim as a visible, objective index revealing the inner nature of the social bond of archaic societies, that is, of the inter-dependence found in "mechanical solidarity." By contrast,
egoisme refers to the state of "moral anarchy" in the contemporary transitional era in which there is no effective moral discipline over the infinite passions of the organic ego. Analogously, fatalisme implies passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate, while anomie implies the release of the insatiable desires of the organic ego.

However, it should be noted that the weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acts merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of the inherent egoism and insatiability of the organic ego. Thus, we must distinguish between two phases in the origin of anomie and egoisme--breakdown and breakthrough. Durkheim's central concern was not so much with the breakdown of norms as with the breakthrough or eruption of an "infinity of dreams and desires." Thus, even in the first schema, the basic problem is not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the presence of destructive egocentric passions.

In Part II of Book Three we shall explore Durkheim's explanations of the causes of the modern crisis, and his remedies. Now, anomie and egoisme are historically specific; they represent not so much the generic breakdown of social order and control (Parsons' "Hobbesian dilemma") as the release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Anomie and egoisme stand as objective, outward indices of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the transitional era, prior to the full institutionalization of "moral individualism" and "organic solidarity." To curb the modern "infinity sickness," Durkheim suggested constructing social structural supports for the new type of moral individualism appropriate to emerging "organic solidarity."

The specific historical causes of the modern transitional crisis include the Industrial and French Revolutions. The rapid displacement of secondary groups in these "twin revolutions" meant that the individual is caught between the centrifugal pull of his own egocentric, anarchic passions on the one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of
the modern state on the other. There were too few secondary groups standing between the central State and the lone individual to effectively moralize egos as the family, guild, local community, and religion had once done. This malintegration not only strained the institutional structure, but also released the egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic ego. To remedy modern "moral anarchy," Durkheim proposed to reconstitute professional groups as a regular part of social life.

Proceeding chronologically, starting with his analyses of the anomie and forced divisions of labor, we shall consider Durkheim's analysis of socialism as a historically specific response to the rise of market capitalism. Finally, we shall review his remedial proposal for increasing the "moral mechanics" of professional groups, and the enfranchisement of these intermediate associations on the national political level.
PART I

ANOMIE AND EGOISME AS CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF HISTORICAL SOCIAL CONSTRAINT OVER THE ORGANIC EGO

Preface. The richness of Durkheim's Suicide is still not fully perceived. Involved in an exceedingly complex argument, the subtlety of which is too often ignored, Durkheim first proposed that anomie and egoisme are generated by the absence of crucial social and cultural factors. His first schema rests on the tacit image of human nature as inherently egoistic and insatiable, and on an evolutionary schema of the two types of solidarity found in human societies at the two ends of history. His first schema concerns the breakdown of effective legitimate social and cultural constraints over the unsocialized or organic ego in the modern transitional crisis, prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity." This breakdown of moral discipline releases the floods of egoistic and insatiable passions characteristic of the pre-social half of homo duplex. Egoisme and anomie, as the primary forms of the "moral anarchy" endemic to the modern world, contrast with the altruisme and fatalisme seen in primitive or archaic societies. There the "repressive" social and moral discipline of "mechanical solidarity" holds the ego's natural passions in rigid check by subordinating the individual to the fused, sacro-magical "collective conscience." Thus, altruisme implies active acceptance of group primacy, while fatalisme implies resignation to one's collectively assigned fate. The entire first schema is graphically summarized in Figure 4.

The first schema emphasizes the historical importance of long term structural transformations. To illuminate these we shall draw especially on The Division of Labor, Socialism, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, among other shorter pieces.
Figure 4. Durkheim's First Schema

Axis Ia. Homo Duplex
(generic desires of organic ego)

Axis IIa.
Control Release

Axis IIIa.
Active/Passive Active/Passive

Axis IIb.
Mechanical Solidarity
Altruisme/Fatalisme

Sociocultural Evolution

Contemporary Transitional Crisis
Anomie/Egoisme

The Future:
Organic Solidarity via Corporations
"The Golden Mean"
To remedy these modern forms of "moral anarchy," Durkheim, contrary to some portrayals of him as a conservative primarily concerned with value consensus, order and social control, never argued for a regression back to the earlier religiously sanctioned "repressive" type of social solidarity. Such a return is neither possible nor desirable, according to Durkheim. Rather, to curb the modern "infinity sickness," Durkheim first argued that we must move forward by constructing social structural supports for the new type of "moral individualism" appropriate to emerging "organic solidarity."

By contrast, Durkheim's second implicit schema rests on the notion that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of culturally sanctioned drives for absolute individualism and "progress and perfection." To curb these "infinities of dreams and desires" is much more difficult than in the first schema, and requires more than piecemeal reforms. For such drives for autonomy and perfection lay permanently embedded in the ethos of European civilization. Such drives constitute our most distinctive virtues, as well as our vices. Now, the image of modern egoisme and anomie as generated by the absence of something social is the only one perceived and pursued so far by most sociologists. The discovery of the second schema may well represent a landmark in the history of sociological theory. For it shall afford us the opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to substantively link two of the master paradigms of two great pioneers of modern sociology—namely, Durkheim's Suicide with Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

I wish to emphasize at the outset, however, that Durkheim's masterpiece remains ambiguous at many points (see also Book Three). At no point did he attempt to summarize these schemas as I shall do. Nor did he ever outline anything similar to the many other schemas that abound on reinterpreting the logic of Suicide (see appendix). Therefore, the fact remains that Durkheim's underlying schemas in Suicide must be constructed and interpreted in accordance with the underlying
"nuclear structure" of his thought outlined in Book One. This is precisely where most previous interpretations of his typology of suicide have broken down (see, for example, Whitney Pope, 1976). We must perform both systematic "stratigraphies" and systematic "topographies." Having undertaken the first task in Book One, we now turn to take up the latter task of detailed exegesis in Book Two.

Now, although egoisme and anomie are two central concepts in Suicide, Durkheim began with neither. Instead, he spent all of Book One outlining his intentions, giving a positivist definition of suicide, arguing for a purely sociological explanation, eliminating counter-claims to causal priority (eg. psychopathic states, race, heredity, cosmic factors, imitation), defending his inverted method of considering causes before descriptions, and his use of statistics as prime sets of evidence. In over a hundred carefully argued pages, Durkheim revealed his deductive method, his positivist premises, his use of objective indices to reveal the state of the "moral life," and his characteristic method of argumentation by elimination of counter-claims (see Alpert, 1939). Durkheim began Suicide as a battling positivist. He sardonically noted that "Although sociology has been in vogue for some time ... it must be confessed that results up to this point are not really proportionate to the number of publications nor the interest which they arouse" (S:35). Of course, the present work was destined to become the most famous vindication of Durkheim's own program for this growing social science.

Durkheim's introduction provides us with a characteristic foretaste of what was to come: the seemingly strange combinations of opposing elements in his sociology such as deductive rationalism coupled with statistical empiricism, the positivist's anti-metaphysical passion for facts and "Science" coupled with the positivist's equally strong passion for social and moral reform, and so on. Indeed, as we noted at the outset, one of the very hallmarks of Durkheim's thought is the attempt to bind together seemingly contradictory elements.
in a new and viable synthesis which would overcome previous antinomies. The measure of Durkheim's greatness are these pervasive dialectical reconciliations. The measure of his failure is the strength of these inherent polarities, and the drift of modern events.

Throughout Book One, Durkheim characteristically reminded us of the moral fervor and deeper concern underlying that classic of modern sociology which has become all things to all people—Suicide. Clearly, beyond any concern for establishing sociology as an autonomous discipline, and establishing it on a rigorously scientific basis through systematic examination of suicide statistics, Durkheim was engaged in both a fundamental critique of modern society and an exploration of possible remedies for moral reconstruction. His deeper purpose was to take the "pulse of our moral life."

There will emerge from our study some suggestions concerning the causes of the general contemporary maladjustment being undergone by European societies and concerning remedies which may reduce it.... Suicide as it exists today is precisely one of the forms through which the collective affliction from which we suffer is transmitted; thus, it will aid us to understand it (S:37).

Although it may sound strange to some at first, I propose that suicide as such was not really Durkheim's prime concern in writing his famous book on the subject. Rather, as always, Durkheim was a positivist moral philosopher working sociologically. What he really sought to do in Suicide was to provide an anatomy and critique of the two dominant forms of modern "moral anarchy." Comparative statistics and multivariate analysis served merely as the means, the instrument of objective examination of the collective pathologies of modern civilization. Although important, statistics concerning differential suicide rates served merely as Durkheim's objective means for taking the "pulse of our moral life." And what Durkheim's statistics showed was that the "moral temperature" of modern societies was dangerously low. Taking a seemingly individual phenomena such as suicide, Durkheim sought not only to demonstrate beyond question its collective basis, but also to thereby lay
bare the two halves of the modern soul.

Durkheim's argument here rested on the premise that individual pathology must be explained sociologically—that is, in terms of collective pathology. Any adequate therapeutic, therefore, must also be collective, if we ever hope to cure the individual manifestations. To this end, Durkheim proceeded throughout the early part of Suicide to systematically eliminate all non-sociological explanations of suicide, this seemingly most solitary of all human vocations. Durkheim summed up his eliminations of counter-positions in these terms:

We have shown that for each social group there is a specific tendency to suicide explained neither by the organic-psychic constitution of individuals nor by the nature of the physical environment. Consequently, by elimination it must necessarily depend upon social causes and be in itself a collective phenomenon (S:145).

Inverting the normal inductive sequence, Durkheim began with a purely sociological explanation of the social causes of self-homicide.

Disregarding the individual as such, his motives and his ideas, we shall seek directly the states of the various social environments (i.e. religion, family, political society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms of which the variations of suicide occur. Only then returning to the individual, shall we study how these general causes become individualized so as to produce the homicidal results involved (S:151).

I cannot now consider Durkheim's procedure here critically from the point of view of the philosophy of science (see Toby Huff, 1975). Suffice it to say that the socio-logic of his procedure in the early pages of Suicide is clear—for Durkheim began with suicide rates instead of individual suicidal events (see, however, Jack Douglas, 1967). Hereafter this insistence was to become a principle of positivist sociology—that is, sociological explanation deals with rates, not individual occurrences. Explaining the differentials in rates among different groups thus becomes a central sociological problem. On the other hand, the casual reader may become misled if he hastily concludes from such passages that Durkheim was insensitive to psychological issues, or that he was not con-
cerned with individual manifestations of collective pathologies. For, on the contrary, the use of objective statistical indices was simply the positivist's chosen vehicle for passing from the exterior to the interior of the "moral life."

Durkheim himself anticipated many of these potential charges against him when he exclaimed in a footnote in Suicide:

We do not expect to be reproached further ... with wishing to substitute the exterior for the interior in sociology. We start from the exterior because it alone is immediately given, but only to reach the interior (S:315, #12).

Not wishing to mistake the sign for the thing signified, we shall, of course, follow Durkheim's lead here in focussing attention primarily not upon statistics but upon his rationales in explaining the historical development of differential rates of suicide in modern European society. 1
CHAPTER ONE

EGOISME

Preface. One need be neither a linguist nor a Durkheim scholar to recognize that his first suicidal types--egoisme and altruisme--refer primarily to self or group primacy, as Parsons (1949) among others has rightly noted. For the contrast is as old as moral philosophy itself. It is not surprising that Durkheim, as a positivist moral philosopher working sociologically, as one deeply concerned with the "chronic" "moral anarchy" of the modern world, began by giving this ancient dichotomy a new historical anchor and sociocultural meaning.

Given his doctrine of the inherent egoism and insatiability of human nature (see Book One), it is clear that in his first schema Durkheim identified these two moral categories with the two opposite ends of history. Altruisme referred to the primitive, archaic, or traditional type of society in which the individual is made to feel morally obligated to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his group. By contrast, egoisme referred to the state of "moral anarchy" in the contemporary transitional or "critical" era in which no legitimate social mechanism constrained the natural egoism and insatiable passions seemingly embedded in the pre-socialized ego. Thus, while altruisme implies group primacy, this legitimate precedence of the group over the individual is historically specific. And egoisme implies not only the precedence of the individual over the group, but also, in historical terms, the release of the inherently egoistic passions from their traditional restraints. Anomie versus fatalisme, in turn, refers to the insatiability of modern egoistic passions, in contrast to their rigid repression in archaic "mechanically integrated society."
A further comparison between the two suicidal (and societal types) at the two ends of history is that the egoistic individual suffers, in his isolation, from a lack of objects or goals for his thought or action. On the other hand, the altruistic suicide's field of moral perception is so penetrated by the sacro-magical "collective conscience" that few thoughts of his own welfare are allowed to intrude. In turn, anomic suicides suffer from the "disease of the infinite," a morbid condition caused by the release of the insatiable passions inherent in the organic half of human nature. The anomic individual's lack of limits to his "dreams and desires" is historically contrasted with the extreme passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate in fatalistic suicide. In both sets, Durkheim postulated that society, as the only moral phenomena in nature, is capable of providing the amoral individual ego with both limits and goals (see also Giddens, 1971b).

Since Durkheim saw modern egoistic suicides as resulting from the release of the amoral organic ego from traditional social constraints, his first problem was to locate the main modern structural and cultural sites of this excessive or pathological form of individualism. Thus, in his chapter on egoistic suicide, Durkheim loosely linked the following factors: Protestantism and related individualisms, free inquiry, education, the liberal professions and well-off classes, despair, and, ultimately, suicide. It is significant that Durkheim began his exploration, not with an abstracted schema, but with historical and statistical correlations of these concrete social and cultural factors. We would do well to remember that such concrete historical facts served as the empirical points of departure for Durkheim's concern with "infinity sickness" in the modern world.

After loosely correlating such facts, however, Durkheim attempted to logically demonstrate that they are only outwardly associated. Actually, he said, they merely correspond to the same root transformation—the weakening of traditional beliefs. Such a linkage is typical of Durkheim, not merely
because he attempted to demonstrate a deeper, more historically rooted causal relationship than at first apparent, but also because Durkheim repeatedly placed himself in "double binds" by virtue of his multiple and sometimes conflicting cultural commitments. Caught here between his positivism, "laic morality," and anti-clerical republicanism, and his over-riding concern for social solidarity, Durkheim found an acceptable way out in terms of his own historical group--the Jews. According to Durkheim, Jews combined love of learning, professional status and upward mobility with high social solidarity and the lowest suicide rates of any religious group. Let us now examine Durkheim's developing logic more closely.

A. Confessional Group Influence on Suicide Rates

After deciding on the basis of comparative statistics that "confessional influence is so great as to dominate" (S: 154) all other categories, Durkheim embarked upon an analysis of the causes behind the differences in suicide rates of the various religious groups. At the outset, we should note Durkheim's curious notion, perhaps derived from his positivism or his early "mechanistic" emphasis (see Book Three), that religious beliefs per se play little causal role in generating the differential suicide rates between Protestant and Catholic.

... they both prohibit suicide with equal emphasis; not only do they penalize it morally with great severity, but both teach that a new life begins beyond the tomb where men are punished for their evil actions, and Protestantism as well as Catholicism numbers suicide among them.... If Protestantism is less unfavorable to the development of suicide, it is not because of a different attitude from that of the Catholics.... Their dissimilar influence must proceed from one or more of the general characteristics differentiating them (S:157).

But whether or not these religious groups explicitly prohibit suicide with equal severity is hardly the point. What should be at issue is whether, and to what extent, these different religious cultures generate tensions reaching suicidal intensity. It does not seem too harsh or summary a judgment to note that Durkheim's positivism, at least at this point in his career,
generally allowed him to penetrate into the role of religious images, beliefs, and sanctions only insofar as necessary to negate the content of religion as a crucial factor. This constitutes one prime difference with his great sociological contemporary Max Weber, who also correlated Protestantism with distinctive features of the modern world (see Book Three). Although religious prohibitions of suicide hardly exhaust the potentially relevant contributions of religious culture to suicide, Durkheim hastily concluded that the difference underlying the differential between Protestant and Catholic suicide rates must necessarily be found in the contrasting organizations of religious society.

Especially important here are the different ways in which these groups envelop and direct the individual. Focusing on types of religious organization, Durkheim argued that the key difference between Protestant and Catholic society is that the former favors individualism and free inquiry, while the latter demands obeisance to traditional hierarchical authority.

The only essential difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is that the second permits free inquiry to a far greater extent than the first. Of course, Catholicism as an idealistic religion concedes far greater place to thought and reflection than Greco-Latin polytheism or Hebrew monotheism. It is not restricted to mechanical ceremonies but seeks the control of the conscience. So it appeals to conscience, and even when demanding blind submission of reason, does so by employing the language of reason. Nonetheless, the Catholic accepts his faith ready made, without scrutiny.... A whole hierarchical system of authority is devised, with marvellous ingenuity, to render tradition inviolable. All variation is abhorrent to Catholic thought (S:157-8).

Obviously, Catholic hierocratic control of the individual conscience represented to Durkheim a survival of "repressive, mechanical solidarity." Hardly concealing his anti-clerical, "laic" morality, Durkheim noted that, by contrast, because the Protestant is more "the author of his own faith," that the latter religion more closely corresponds with the type of individualism appropriate to advanced types of social solidarity.
The Protestant is far more the author of his faith. The Bible is put in his hand and no interpretation is imposed upon him. The very structure of the reformed cult stresses this state of religious individualism. ... What best proves that this freedom of inquiry proclaimed by the founders of the Reformation has not remained a Platonic affirmation is the increasing multiplicity of all sorts of sects so strikingly in contrast with the indivisible unity of the Catholic Church. We thus reach our first conclusion, that the proclivity of Protestantism must relate to the spirit of free inquiry that animates this religion (S:158).

While granting a certain truth to Durkheim's argument, we need not also acquiesce to some of the more questionable tacit presuppositions here--especially the notions that the Reformation leaders valued free inquiry for its own sake, or that free and open public discourse and a sort of Enlightenment rationalistic individualism equally pervades all Protestant denominations today.

Durkheim's general law of societal and moral evolution—that the autonomy of the individual person emerges with progressive societal differentiation and rationalization (see Book One)—governs the next twist in his argument. For he proposed that the need for free inquiry arises out of the breakdown of traditional beliefs. Or, differently put, the erosion of the all-embracing certainties provided by the shared sacro-magical conscience of early culture requires the constant intervention of critical intelligence. The progressive "effacement of the segmental type of society" requires the individual to increasingly assume responsibility for his own conduct, since past directive norms, so often mechanically invoked, become irrelevant to complex, changing circumstances.

Free inquiry is only the effect of another cause. When it appears that men, after having received their faith ready-made from tradition, claim the right to shape it for themselves, this is not because of the intrinsic desirability of free inquiry, for the latter involves as much sorrow as happiness. It is because men henceforth need this liberty. This very need can have only one cause: the overthrow of traditional beliefs (S:158). Thus, Durkheim assumed that modern Protestant man has had this individualism thrust upon him by historical necessity.
Now, I have argued for recognition of the significance of Durkheim's ideas concerning the evolution of morality, of conscience and consciousness (see Book One). That social differentiation and autonomization of the person proceed together on the world-historical level is a profound insight. However, it is, at most, a necessary, though insufficient, complementary perspective to the far more difficult Weberian task of detailed digging into the specific transformations generating new forms of autonomy for the person. Of course, the Reformation, and especially its secularized aftermath, was one of those crucial transformations that rose to world-historical significance. Hence, we ask: even granting that the structural origin of the need for individual free inquiry might be the recession of traditional beliefs, what new sources of legitimate moral authority broke through this heavy and ancient tradition? It is this notion of specific historical breakthroughs that is so often conspicuous by its absence from Durkheim's evolutionary outlook (see also Book Three). Surely no devout "laic" moralist like Durkheim would admit, for instance, that the Catholic Church, to this day the predominant congregation in France, simply rolled over and acquiesced in the historical inevitability demanded by the progressive division of social labor. On the contrary, it was the very tenacity of this cultural tradition in France in face of the centuries-long opposition from Huguenots, Jansenists, Enlightenment "philosophes," "laic" reformers, liberals, socialists, Marxists, and so forth, that makes the French tradition so tempestuous and anti-clerical. Unfortunately, Durkheim's positivism and abstracted evolutionism--themselves reflections of the process he sought to understand--barred access here to analyses of specific historical challenges to traditional religious legitimations of embedded social structures.

If they [traditional beliefs] still asserted themselves with equal energy, it would never occur to men to criticize them. If they still had the same authority, men would not demand the right to verify the source of this
authority. Reflection develops only if its development becomes imperative, if certain ideas and instinctive sentiments which have hitherto adequately guided conduct are found to have lost their efficacy. Then reflection intervenes to fill the gap that has appeared, but which it has not created. Just as reflection disappears to the extent that thought and action take the form of automatic habits, it awakens only when accepted habits become disorganized. It asserts its rights against public opinion only when the latter loses strength, that is, when it is no longer prevalent to the same extent. If these assertions occur not merely occasionally and as passing crises, but become chronic; if individual consciences keep reaffirming their autonomy, it is because they are constantly subject to conflicting impulses, because a new opinion has not formed to replace the old one no longer existing. If a new system of beliefs were constituted which seemed as indispensable as the old, no one would think of discussing it any longer. Its discussion would no longer be permitted; for ideas shared by an entire society draw from this consensus an authority that makes them sacrosanct and raises them above dispute. For them to have become tolerant, they must first already have become the object of less general and complete assent and have been weakened by preliminary controversy *(S:158-9).

To be sure, there are many valuable insights into sociocultural change in this passage. However, one detects beneath the surface Durkheim's strongly positivist premises—namely, the rationalistic belief that the use of individual reason, as a substitute for tradition and collective control, emerges to serve as an evolutionary "need" mechanically created (see also Book Three). One cannot help feeling ambivalent toward Durkheim's summary statement here:

... if it is correct to say that free inquiry once proclaimed, multiplies schisms, it must be added that it presupposes them, for it is claimed and instituted as a principle only in order to permit latent or half-declared schisms to develop more freely (S:159).

Such theses may accurately describe the historical situation in France; however, the complexities and paradoxes of complex sociocultural processes lead me to begin to part company with Durkheim here.

Durkheim's generalized propositions are next applied to the specific problem of explaining the root reasons for the differential in Protestant-Catholic suicide rates.
... if Protestantism concedes a greater freedom to individual thought than Catholicism, it is because it has fewer common beliefs and practices. Now, a religious society cannot exist without a collective credo and the more extensive the credo the more unified and strong is the society. For it does not unite men by an exchange and reciprocity of services, a temporal bond of union which permits and even presupposes differences, but which religious society cannot form. It socializes men only by attaching them completely to an identical body of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as this body of doctrine is extensive and firm.... The greater concessions a confessional group makes to individual judgment, the less it dominates lives, the less its cohesion and vitality. We thus reach the first conclusion that the superiority of Protestantism with respect to suicide results from its being a less strongly integrated church than the Catholic Church * (S:159).

Again, Durkheim presumed that there are two main types of social solidarity: one based on a segmental society sharing an obligatory sacro-magical culture, and the modern complex type based upon occupational differentiation. Hence, there are two distinct historical paths to societal unity: the "repressive" type fused together through religious obligations, and the "liberal" modern type linked through occupational diversification and the market place as nexus. Further, he presumed that the more the individual is released from the repressive control of the archaic, fused conscience (represented by the Catholic Church as an evolutionary holdover in the modern era, especially in France), the less cohesion and vitality in religious society. But such an explanation has certain embedded flaws (eg. see Parsons, 1949). For one can hardly believe that the modern social order is devoid of legitimizing ethical foundations. Perhaps this is why Parsons, sensitized to these problems by Weber, continued to insist on the central importance of Durkheim's chapter on "Contractual Solidarity" (eg. see Parsons, 1960a). Clearly, Parsons believed that "contractual solidarity" is normatively underpinned by the Protestant Ethos. And Durkheim appears to confuse organizational diversity with religio-cultural unity; but these are not necessarily congruent. To assert, for instance, that Protestant organizational diversity (always a problematic
situation), was responsible for the emergence of modern religious individualism runs counter to the generally accepted historical explanation that it was the "Protestant principle" itself which underlay the increasing diversity of Protestant denominations (eg. see Richard Niebuhr, 1929, William Haller, 1955).

Let us compare Durkheim's generalizations to those of Weber on the same subject. It is not certain, for instance, as Durkheim stated, that "The greater concessions a confession-group makes to individual judgment, the less it dominates lives." For this abstract proposition, derived from Durkheim's general evolutionary schemas, neglects the crucial historical fact that was so significant to Weber--namely, that the "inner-worldly ascetic" of the Protestant sects represented a New Model Man in world history--the secular monk who tamed himself and the world for God's glory. The splintered denominationalism of Protestantism was not the most significant fact to Weber; rather, it was the creation of a new rationalizing, individualistic order of lay ascetics and mystics whose emerging ethos, when progressively secularized throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, transformed the traditional social, cultural, political, and economic order. Thus, the very core of Weber's theses run counter to Durkheim's here; the latter's abstracted propositions concerning the recession of the archaic common conscience and the release of the organic ego are no match for the former's historical insight that with Protestantism a new type of in-depth integration of the personality and internalization of sociocultural values was reached. Against Tawney and others, Parsons rightly insisted in The Structure of Social Action that Protestantism represented not simply the release of the individual from traditional control, but also the imposition and internalization of a new and even more rigorous type of moral discipline and social control. And so significant are these ethical sanctions for "inner-worldly asceticism," that Parsons added, echoing Rousseau, this enforced freedom--this absolute individualism and unending drive for perfection--may
have become too great a burden for some to bear.

Now, Weber argued that Catholicism never penetrated the personality structure the way Protestantism did (eg. 1963). While Durkheim's suggestion that Protestantism implies weakness in modern religious organization may seem warranted because its splintered denominationalism repels centralized control, nonetheless, it also neglects other important factors. For only in liberal Protestantism is there found the type of rationalistic or liberated individual Durkheim appears to have had in mind. In fundamentalist Protestantism there is neither the pervasive rationalism nor the weak organizational structure. Indeed, many conservative sects impose extremes of social discipline and mutual watchfulness that might repel a Catholic. In addition, the lack of central monocratic religious control does not allow one to summarily conclude, with Durkheim here, that religions "socialize men only by attaching them completely to an identical body of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as this body of doctrine is extensive and firm." While this may be true in Durkheim's evolutionary schema of archaic religion, such a proposition is manifestly not true of modern religion, for example in America, the most resolutely Protestant nation of the "Protestant Era." The absence of an established national church, and extreme denominational diversity, may simply mask an underlying religio-cultural unity, as in America. Indeed, Weber (1973) himself observed that Protestantism in America pervades almost all aspects of life, and comes closest here to be a true "folk religion" in the sense of being tacitly shared as a common tradition by all.

Clearly, then, Durkheim's preliminary propositions concerning correlations between centrality of religious control and degree of religious penetration of society and personality are questionable. We must, therefore, regard with suspicion his first conclusion that the "superiority of Protestantism with respect to suicide results from its being a less strongly integrated church than the Catholic." For if egoisme, Protestantism, and suicide are linked, as Durkheim
proposed, it must be for other reasons than that "men kill themselves because of loss of cohesion in religious society."

B. The Anomaly of the Jews: High Intellectualism and Low Suicide Rates

Durkheim next considered the seemingly anomalous case of the Jews, who combined low rates of suicide with high intellectual achievement, professional status, upward mobility, and high economic achievement. As always, Jews appeared to out-Protestant the Protestants! However, Durkheim proceeded to detect here precisely the same factor protecting Jews from suicide that appeared to account for the Protestant proclivity—namely, social integration.

... the reproach to which the Jews have for so long been exposed by Christianity has created feelings of unusual solidarity among them. Their need for resisting a general hostility, the very impossibility of free communication with the rest of the population, has forced them into strict union with themselves. Consequently, each community became a small, compact, and coherent society with strong feelings of self-consciousness and unity.... The Jewish church has thus been more strongly united than any other, from its dependence on itself because of being the object of intolerance. By analogy with what has just been observed apropos of Protestantism, the same cause must therefore be assumed for the slight tendency of the Jews to suicide.... Doubtless they owe this immunity to the hostility surrounding them. But if this is its influence, it is not because it imposes a higher morality but because it obliges them to live in greater union (S:159-60).

Faced with the same intervening variable in both Protestantism and Judaism, Durkheim was here forced to explain how this same factor yet arises from different sources. Like Weber, then, for analytical purposes Durkheim used Jews as an internal check. For while Jews share high intellectualism with Protestant groups, Durkheim discovered that the crucial differentiating factor between these two religious groups having the highest and lowest suicide rates in Europe was the varying degree of social integration. Durkheim argued that the ostracism to which Jews were subjected in Christian Europe reinforced the traditional "mechanical integration"
of Judaism as an earlier religio-cultural system.

Besides, the ostracism to which they are subject is only one of the causes producing this result; the very nature of Jewish beliefs must contribute largely to it. Judaism, in fact, like all early religions, consists basically of a body of practices minutely governing all the details of life and leaving little room to individual judgment (S:160).

Now, as a "laicized" Jew, Durkheim noted that Judaism, in combining modern rationalistic individualism and ancient social solidarity, seems singularly free of the "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Certainly, it appears that Durkheim himself was free of these collective pathologies; for his philosophy of "human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) and the "golden mean" (see Book Three) as the norm for health and happiness rendered him immune. But one wonders whether other "laicized" Jews equally escaped, for it is uncertain how far Judaism as a sociocultural system retreats as Judaism as a religion recedes from the foreground of personal concern. In any case, in the following explanation of Jewish intellectualism, note how much Durkheim's tacit "laic" positivist rationalism intrudes, going so far as to slight the crucial role of the Law and the rabbi in Jewish tradition; factors impossible for Durkheim not to be aware of, coming as he did from a long line of rabbis!

The Jew seeks to learn, not in order to replace his collective prejudices by reflective thought, but merely in order to be better armed for the struggle. For him it is a means of off-setting the unfavorable position imposed on him by opinion and sometimes by law. And since knowledge by itself has no influence upon a tradition in full vigor, he superimposes this intellectual life upon his habitual routine with no effect of the former upon the latter. This is the reason for the complexity he presents. Primitive in certain respects, in others he is an intellectual and man of culture. He thus combines the advantages of the severe discipline characteristic of small and ancient groups with the benefits of the intense culture enjoyed by our great societies. He has all the intelligence of modern man without sharing his despair (S:168).

Thus, in terms of their similarities—high intellectualism, achievement, and upward mobility—Jews differ from Protest-
tants in the historical conditions generating their respective desires for learning. Here "the exception proves the rule" for, in contrast to Judaism as a traditional "pariah religion," Protestants are forced to think for themselves because of the breakdown of previous traditional normative direction, according to Durkheim. Indeed, the case of the Jews, Durkheim suggested:

... proves that if the suicidal tendency is great in educated circles, this is due, as we have said, to the weakening of traditional beliefs and to the state of moral individualism resulting from this; for it disappears when education has another cause and responds to other needs (S:168).

In addition, Durkheim held it as axiomatic that the higher the intellectual life, professionalization, and upward mobility, the greater the affliction by "diseases of the infinite."

The liberal professions and in a wider sense, the well-to-do classes are certainly those with the liveliest taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual life.... Suicide is undeniably exceptionally frequent in the highest classes of society (S:165).

C. Suicide Increases With Knowledge: An Apparent Correlation

But Durkheim was faced with another problem: if suicide generally increases with higher intellectualism, are we then to conclude that greater knowledge itself is the cause?

Let us first summarize Durkheim's causal linkages so far. His proposed sequence, at this point, goes like this: the universal social division of labor, ramifying occupational specialization, and the accompanying progressive social differentiation, coupled with the corresponding "effacement of the segmental type of society," and the accompanying recession of the fused, sacro-magical collective conscience, means that the individual ego is thrown back on its resources. The result of the erosion of traditional moral and social supports is that the individual must, of necessity, bring his own capacity for reasoning to bear upon the mounting problems of existence in complex society (see also Chapter Eight, Book
One); this was part of Durkheim's notion of the increasing substitution of individual rational consciousness for archaic collective consciousness. And, in turn, the exercise of individual reason acts a further solvent of traditional mores, and thereby increases the need for further self-education, in a reenforcing feedback process.

But the problematics inherent in Durkheim's symbolic equations that individual rational consciousness necessarily substitutes for the narrow and automatic dictates of the earlier conscience collective are revealed in this passage:

Does the craving for knowledge to the degree that it corresponds to a weakening of common faith really develop as does suicide? The very facts that Protestants are better educated and commit suicide more than Catholics is a first presumption for this (S:164).

But, having seemed to have made the link between the educated intelligence of modern man and the type of modern despair which may lead to suicide, Durkheim took pains—as a post-Enlightenment liberal—to exonerate free inquiry and the individual quest for rational knowledge from blame in eroding social solidarity. We shall further investigate the inner nature of this apparent correlation in Book Three.

The taste for free inquiry can be aroused only if accompanied by that for learning. Knowledge is free thought's only means of achieving its purposes. When irrational beliefs or practices have lost their hold, appeal must be made, in the search for others, to the enlightened consciousness of which knowledge is only the highest form. Fundamentally, these two tendencies are one and spring from the same source. Men generally have the desire for self-instruction only insofar as they are freed from the yoke of tradition; for as long as the latter governs intelligence it is all sufficient and jealous of any rival. On the other hand, light is sought as soon as customs whose origins are lost in obscurity no longer correspond to new necessities. This is why philosophy, the first synthetic form of knowledge, appears as soon as religion has lost its sway, and only then; and is then followed progressively by the many single sciences with the further development of the very need which produced philosophy. Unless we are mistaken, if the progressive weakening of collective and customary prejudices produces a trend to suicide, and if Protestantism derives its special predisposition to suicide from it, the following two facts should be
noted: (1) the desire for learning must be stronger among Protestants than among Catholics; (2) insofar as this denotes a weakening of common beliefs, it should vary with suicide (S:162).

And, of course, Durkheim's rule by which he rescued his chosen cause is apparently confirmed by his statistics on differences in popular education in Europe. It is striking that both Durkheim and Weber utilized in their classics educational differentials between Protestants and Catholics as supporting evidence for their theses.

... the level of primary instruction ... has a certain relevance to the extent of the desire for knowledge of a people as a whole. A people must feel this need very keenly to try to spread its elements among the lowest classes. Thus to place the means of learning within everyone's reach, and even to legally forbid ignorance, shows a national awareness of the indispensability of broadened and enlightened intelligence of the individual for the nation's own existence (S:163).

However, Durkheim's Enlightenment rationalism again intrudes on historical reality. Indeed, Durkheim himself knew better, as he admitted in the following aside: "Actually, Protestant nations have so stressed primary instruction because they held that each individual must be able to understand the Bible" (S:163). This curious (and accurate) admission highlights Durkheim's underestimation of the significance of the internal logics of different historical religio-cultural systems. Indeed, Durkheim's causal theses here reveal more about his own core cultural commitments than about the original problem. Durkheim's explanations are themselves culture-bound. The goal of these "laic" reforming intellectuals and public moralists was to wrest the schools away from clerical control, especially that of the Jesuits, and to inculcate there a new anti-metaphysical, rational, and "laic" morality (eg. see Henri Peyre, 1960; H. Tint, 1957; J.E.S. Hayward, 1960; LaCapra, 1972; Lukes, 1973). The crux of their effort centered around building "... a national awareness of the indispensability of broadened and enlightened intelligence of the individual for the nation's own existence."
Having reviewed the logic of Durkheim's argument so far, let us briefly summarize the empirical conclusions deriving from the evidence he had so carefully marshalled from generations of work in European "moral statistics" (see Jack Douglas, 1966; A. Giddens, 1965; Toby Huff, 1975). First, statistics showed that suicide was chronic and increasingly general in the modern era. Second, by almost all accounts, suicide is symptomatic of a basic breakdown in social and cultural solidarity. Third, Protestants appeared to have had the highest suicide rate of the three major European religious congregations; Jews had the lowest rate. Fourth, one of the distinguishing features of Protestantism, as contrasted with Catholicism, is the taste for free inquiry and rationalistic individualism. Fifth, the urban, educated, well-to-do classes have the highest suicide rates; for some reason, it appears that "poverty protects against suicide"! Sixth, although Jews share high intellectualism with Protestants, their love of learning derives from other historical necessities than is true of their more modern counterparts.

Now, true to his own special positivistic cultural commitments, Durkheim began to try to extricate himself from a potential difficulty implied in the preceding empirical conclusions. For he next argued that although the quest for knowledge and its highest form, modern science, are nominally associated with higher suicide rates, the apparent correlation is not causally significant. Indeed, according to Durkheim, far from reason and the individual representing the pathological agents, they are, on the contrary, the only real means of remedying European "moral anarchy."

... we see why as a rule suicide increases with knowledge. Knowledge does not determine this progress. It is innocent; nothing is more unjust than to accuse it, and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively. But these two facts result simultaneously from a single state which they translate into different forms. Man seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss of cohesion in religious society; he does not kill himself because of his learning. It is ... not the learning
he acquires that disorganizes religion; but the desire for learning awakens because religion became disorganized. Knowledge is not sought as a means to destroy accepted opinions but because their destruction has commenced.... Faith is not uprooted by dialectic proof; it must be already shaken by other causes to be unable to withstand the shock of argument.* (S:168-9).

Thus, Durkheim suggested that education and suicide are indirectly correlated with a deeper transformation of European society: the fading of "mechanical solidarity" and the lack of any new and compelling order to replace it. In this situation of "collective asthenia," the ego has been thrown out, alone, on its meager resources. If the isolated individual is to survive the birth pangs of the modern world, his reflective intelligence must play an ever larger role in existence.

At this point, the outline of Durkheim's first schema of suicide is unfolding fairly clearly: as the common conscience of archaic societies recedes before the pressure of the progressive division of labor, the pre-social ego is released from traditional forms of social constraint and must confront the world on its own inadequate terms. As an ardent positivist and post-Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim issued an eloquent defense of the importance of knowledge and science in the evolving social order, especially against Catholics on the conservative right who trumpeted, in effect, "look what has happened—we told you so!"

Far from knowledge being the source of the evil, it is its remedy, the only remedy we have. Once established beliefs have been carried away by the current of affairs, they cannot be artificially reestablished. Once the social instinct is blunted, intelligence is the only guide left us and we have to reconstruct a conscience by its means. Dangerous as is the undertaking, there can be no hesitation, for we have no choice. Let those who view anxiously and sadly the ruins of ancient beliefs, who feel all the difficulties of these critical times, not ascribe to science an evil it has not caused but rather which it tries to cure! Beware of treating it as an enemy! It has not the dissolvent effect ascribed to it, but is the only weapon for our battle against the dissolution which gives birth to science itself. It is not an answer to denounce it. The authority of vanished traditions will never be restored by silencing it; we shall only be more powerless to replace them (S:169).
Durkheim concluded his first chapter on egoistic suicide by reiterating his arguments concerning the importance of social cohesion in preventing suicides. His next task was to begin to spell out some of the reasons why loss of social cohesion or low social integration should lead to suicide. Characteristically, his explanation was a good deal more subtle than the common summaries or reductions. Noting that "in general, religion has a prophylactic effect on suicide," Durkheim contended that:

If religion protects man against the desire for self-destruction, it is not because it preaches the respect for his own person to him with arguments sui generis; but because it is a society. What constitutes this society is the existence of a certain number of beliefs and practices common to all the faithful, traditional, and thus obligatory. The more numerous and strong these collective states of mind are, the stronger the integration of the religious community, and also the greater its preservative value. The detail of dogmas and rites are secondary. The essential thing is that they be capable of supporting a sufficiently intense collective life. And because the Protestant church has less consistency than the others, it has less moderating effect on suicide *(S:170).*

D. *Egoisme as Lack of Social Integration*

Durkheim next proceeded to explore further empirical evidence that egoistic suicide results from loss of cohesion in society. Specifically, he argued that the greater the degree of integration of domestic and political society, the greater their "coefficient of preservation." Of course, he was heading for his famous summary that "Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration in society." Let us briefly explore Durkheim's causal propositions in chapter three of Book Two.

But if religion preserves men from suicide only because and insofar as it is a society, other societies probably have the same effect. From this point of view, let us consider the family and political society *(S:171).*

As always, Durkheim's discussion is complex, and not without some problems. I personally do not think that Durkheim's examples concerning domestic society, for instance, serve as
the best illustrations of his theses. For Durkheim's doctrines concerning marriage and womanhood are often inconsistent; indeed, Barclay Johnson (1965:881) has suggested that "So muddled and fluctuating a doctrine must have been made up as circumstances required, quite after the fact." Barbara Cashion (1970) also has been critical of Durkheim's implied sociology of women. However, Cashion rightly emphasizes the significance of the notion of insatiability underlying Durkheim's discussion. She observed that, to Durkheim, the possibility of divorce—which meant the opening up of potentially unlimited emotional and sexual horizons—itself contributed to matrimonial anomie. Indeed, Cashion proposed that as women become more liberated, they may also become as vulnerable to anomie as men. With changing sex roles, "open marriage," more divorces than marriages, and so on, Cashion makes part of Durkheim's sociology of the family and marriage look prescient when she concludes: "The roots of future marital anomie may be found in the decreasing responsibilities and limitations of the marriage partners, and the increasing wealth and freedom of the partners" (1970:78).

In any case, Durkheim chose domestic society as simply another empirical confirmation of his basic thesis concerning the importance of social integration. In these terms, the following passage is one of Durkheim's most cogent statements of the sociological principles governing the "laws" of the "coefficient of preservation" in society, whether domestic, political, or religious.

The density of a group cannot sink without its vitality diminishing. Where collective sentiments are strong, it is because the force with which they affect each individual conscience is echoed in all the others, and reciprocally. The intensity they attain therefore depends on the number of consciences which react to them in common.... Consequently, in a family of small numbers, common sentiments and memories cannot be very intense; for there are not enough consciences in which they can be represented and reinforced by sharing them. No such powerful traditions can be formed there as unite the members of a single group, even surviving it and attaching successive generations to one another. Small families are also inevitably short-lived; and without duration no so-
Society can be stable. Not only are collective states weak in such a group, but they cannot be numerous; for their number depends on the active interchange of views and impressions, on the circulation of these views and impressions from one person to another; and, on the other hand, this very exchange is the more rapid the more persons there are participating in it. In a sufficiently dense society, this circulation is uninterrupted; for some social units are always in contact, whereas if there are few their relations can only be intermittent and there will be moments when the common life is suspended. Likewise, when the family is small, few relatives are ever together; so that domestic life languishes, and the home is occasionally deserted *(S:201-2).

Essentially, Durkheim proposed here that higher rates of sustained interpersonal interaction act to create and sustain both society and individuals. Hence, any factor that serves to bind people more closely together through time and space, that acts to increase the longevity and intensity of social interaction, increases the "coefficient of preservation." Thus, group process serves as Durkheim's first analytic key. What remains to be explained, however, as too many sociologists have ignored, is why Durkheim thought lessened social interaction and integration should lead to suicide.

But for a group to be said to have less common life than another means that it is less powerfully integrated; for the state of integration of a social aggregate can only reflect the intensity of the collective life circulating in it. It is more unified and powerful the more active and constant is the intercourse among its members. Our previous conclusion may thus be completed to read: just as the family is a powerful safeguard against suicide, so the more strongly it is constituted the greater its protection *(S:202).

Durkheim next extended the same thesis to statistics concerning suicides in relation to the integration of political society. Basically, Durkheim argued that whenever passions are aroused by a great event or crisis in the public or political life of a people, the tendency to centrifugal egoism is checked. Egos are moralized, that is, brought into sustained contact with a public life and ideal higher than their own interest. The very act of bringing people together thus increases the "coefficient of preservation."
... great social disturbances and great popular wars rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith alike, and concentrating activity toward a single end, at least temporarily cause a stronger integration of society. The salutary influence which we have just shown to exist is due not to the crisis but to the struggles it occasions. As they force men to close ranks and confront the common danger, the individual thinks less of himself and more of the common cause. Besides, it is comprehensible that this integration may not be purely momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate causes, especially when it is intense (S:208).

Having explored comparative statistics in three different sub-types of society, Durkheim then offered the following explicit summaries of his theses.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of religious society.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of domestic society.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of political society.

So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part *(S:208-9).

This summary proposition is, of course, the most famous of Durkheim's explicit theses in Suicide. It has served as the basis, for instance, of Halbwachs' (1930) formulation, and for Gibbs and Martin's (eg. 1964) later notion of "status integration and suicide" (see appendix). Perhaps subsequent sociologists have lavished attention on this single concise formula because it was Durkheim's only explicit summary of his very complex theses, or because it seemed to resonate with American sociologists' concern with social integration, disorganization, and social control. However, as we shall soon discover, Durkheim's seminal formula concealed as much as it revealed. For Durkheim did not mean by social integration, for example, what many of his followers presume in using the same term. Durkheim used "social" to refer not only to what present sociologists term as "social," but to cultural life as well. Moreover, the social and cultural spheres together represented the "moral life" to Durkheim. Further,
Durkheim's critical notion of man as homo duplex meant that if sufficiently high rates of social interaction and cultural intensity were not maintained, society itself was in constant danger of lapsing back into a welter of autistic egos. Clearly, most contemporary sociologists do not share Durkheim's image of human nature. Therefore, for these and other reasons which shall become apparent, their implicit explanations of why lessened rates of social integration should lead to suicide are often very different (see appendix). Durkheim's explanation of egoisme and suicide, much less anomie, is simply not yet understood in its full complexity. Let us now attempt to unravel the twists and turns in Durkheim's developing theory that suicide rates are inversely related to social integration.

E. Egoisme Explained: The Release of the Pre-Social Ego

From Traditional Constraints

Society cannot disintegrate without the individual simultaneously detaching himself from social life, without his own goals becoming preponderant over those of the community, in a word, without his personality tending to surmount the collective personality. The more weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his own private interests. If we agree to call this state egoism in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego and at its expense, we may call egoistic the special type of suicide springing from excessive individualism.

But how can suicide have such an origin (S:209)?

Indeed, how can suicide be caused by the lack of social integration? Why should social isolation precipitate suicide? Contemporary sociologists seem so permeated by the group perspective that apparently they assume that the isolated individual is almost inevitably crushed by the lack of enduring social supports. But I do not believe that the answer is so simple, and neither did Durkheim. For he next began to spell out his basic explanatory logics. He began by introducing another key variable intervening between isolation and suicide
namely, the lack of objects or goals for individual action (see Giddens, 1971b). The first reason, then, why lack of social integration underlies egoistic suicides is that the pre-social ego becomes demoralized, as it were, and as a result egocentricity asserts itself at the expense of the moral life found only in society and culture. The individual ego is amoral, only society is moral. The pre-socialized or organic ego is unable, by itself, to rise above its own fatally circumscribed concerns. Let us now explore further how Durkheim's doctrine of morality and the dualism of human nature underlay his theses on suicide.

To his own question—"how can suicide be born of excessive individualism"—Durkheim gave this reply:

First of all ... as collective force is one of the obstacles best calculated to restrain suicide, its weakening involves a development of suicide. When society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, considers them at its service, and thus forbids them to dispose willfully of themselves. Accordingly, it opposes their evading their duties to it through death. But how could society impose its supremacy upon them when they refuse to accept this subordination as legitimate? It no longer then possesses the requisite authority to retain them in their duty if they wish to desert; and conscious of its own weakness, it even recognizes their right to do so freely what it can no longer prevent. So far as they are the admitted masters of their destinies, it is their privilege to end their lives. They, on their part, have no reason to endure life's sufferings patiently. For they cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply. There is, in short, in a cohesive and animated society a constant interchange of ideas and feelings from all to each and each to all, something like mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the individual on his own resources, leads him to share in the collective energy and supports his own when exhausted * (S:209-10).

Since contemporary sociologists commonly presume that the individual only becomes fully human when socialized, there seems to be little problem in assuming that when the process is reversed—when the individual becomes, in effect, deso-
cialized, that the isolated ego has lost its very reason for living. We have little trouble today in positing that social interaction and heightened social intensity energize the individual. Indeed, it is this tacit consensus which has helped give Durkheim's thesis on suicide its hallowed status as a classic over the last three-quarters century. For not only did his classic *Suicide* help establish the autonomy of sociology as a separate discipline, but it also provided the very paradigm of modern sociological structural theory—namely, that breakdown in social structure leads to breakdown in psychological well-being and balance. Would, however, most sociologists blink twice if it were pointed out that the very pioneer who was later enshrined as a founding father insisted that this is only a secondary and insufficient explanation?

The reasons we have so persistently misrepresented Durkheim's theses on suicide are rather simple at base. We have neglected both his evolutionary framework and his doctrine of the dualism of human nature. We have neglected to portray Durkheim as a moral philosopher who worked sociologically. Specifically, this meant that Durkheim conceived of suicide as a process involving two basic processes: the breakdown of traditional social control and the breakthrough of the directionless and proportionless passions of the presocialized ego. I repeat: the structural factor which most sociologists have taken as the decisive element of a sociological explanation of suicide—the breakdown of social integration—was not considered by Durkheim to be the critical factor. Rather, social isolation, lack of social cohesion, low social participation, low status integration, etc.—however one wishes to state the same reality—acted, in Durkheim's theory, merely as the precipitating or releasing condition of the insatiable and self-centered passions of the organic ego. In regard to the breakdown of social integration, Durkheim himself insisted:

But these reasons are purely secondary. Excessive individualism not only results in favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such a cause. It not
only frees man's inclination to do away with himself from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a special suicide which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood for this is what constitutes the special character of the type of suicide just distinguished and justifies the name we have given it. What is there then in this individualism that explains this result?

We might have suspected that something was wrong with most of our summaries of his theses, for if in his first type of suicide Durkheim merely meant to refer to structural breakdown, why then did he call it by that curious name--egoistic? Clearly, Durkheim meant by this designation to indicate that with the loss of social cohesion, the ego grows ascendant, and becomes demoralized. Durkheim's first suicidal type, then, is, at root, caused by the release of this "excessive individualism." But how can this be so? Is this really a sociological explanation? The answer--an embarassing one to sociological theory--is: no, at base, Durkheim's seemingly purely sociological explanation of the root causes of egoistic suicide is not really sociological after all! (See also Book Three for further evidence). Durkheim's answer to his own question "What is there in this individualism?" is, instead, derived from moral philosophy.

In this vein, Durkheim proceeded to consider the oft-stated notion that man needs a transcending purpose, a raison d'etre. But in its traditional form, Durkheim rejected the usual formulation of this problem. To him the dilemma is not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the presence of destructive egocentric passions.

It has sometimes been said that because of his psychological constitution, man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and survives him, and that the reason for this necessity is a need we must have not to perish entirely. Life is said to be intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved, some purpose justifying life's trials. The individual alone is not a sufficient end for his activity. He is too little. He is not only hemmed in spatially; he is also limited temporally. When, therefore, we have no other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought that our efforts will finally end in nothingness, since
we ourselves disappear. But annihilation terrifies us. Under these conditions one would lose courage to live, that is, to act and struggle, since nothing will remain of our exertions. The state of egoism is supposed to be contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too uncertain to have chances of permanence (8:210).

One cannot help but acknowledge that such a position enjoys a certain resonance with us, even today. But it was not Durkheim's position.

As Durkheim proceeded to criticize this common argument, and to restate it in more acceptable form, we would do well to observe Durkheim here at his rhetorical and dialectical best—a moralist philosophizing on the social and cultural dimensions of man, often reaching profound and even poetic insights into the human condition. That such a book as Suicide should not only be considered a methodological classic, but also a social philosophical classic, is testimony to the genius of a founding father who combined, in a natural way, what we rent asunder.

In this absolute formulation, the proposition is vulnerable. If the thought of the end of our personality were really so hateful, we could consent to live only by blinding ourselves voluntarily as to life's value. For if we may in a measure avoid the prospect of annihilation, we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, whatever we do. We may push back the frontier for some generations, force our name to endure for some years or centuries longer than our body; a moment, too soon for most men, always comes when it will be nothing. For the groups we join in order to prolong our existence by their means are themselves mortal; they too must dissolve, carrying with them all our deposits of ourselves. Those are few whose memories are closely bound enough to the very history of humanity to be assured of living until its death. So, if we really thirsted after immortality, no such brief perspective could ever appease us. Besides, what of us is it that lives? A word, a sound, an imperceptible trace, most often anonymous.... It is therefore untrue that life is only possible by its possessing its rationale outside of itself (8:210-11).

Next, Durkheim imperceptibly shifted the grounds of argument. He observed that there are a whole range of functions that pertain only to the individual—namely, organic needs. Now, the critical thing to note about such biological functions is not only that they are individually circumscrib-
ed, but also that they are limited by their very nature. On the contrary, truly human (that is, sociocultural) functions not only have their purpose outside the ego, but also they are potentially unlimited. Man's estate, then, and his burden, is to live on these higher "civilizational" levels.

These functions serve by merely serving him. Insofar as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many ideas, feelings, practices, unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political faith, science itself, are not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life is built and expanded not because of the demands of the cosmic environment, but because of the demands of the social environment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its own image, fills us with religious, political, and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this development by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge (S:211-12).

Thus, man is the cultural animal. The biological ego, once moralized, is changed--the human person is born (see Book One). Conscience is awakened, a higher mental life begins. And since this new moral and intellectual life, what Chardin (1961) called the "noosphere," emerges from society and culture, it continues to focus individual energies on cultural ideals.

Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society, they have reference to it; rather they are society itself incarnated in each of us. But for them to have a raison d'être in our eyes, the purpose they envisage must not be one indifferent to us. We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society itself. Contrariwise, in the same measure as we feel detached from society, we become detached from that life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do these rules of morality, these precepts of law binding us to all sorts of sacrifices, these restrictive dogmas exist, if there is no being outside of us whom they serve and in whom we participate? If its only use is to increase our chances for survival, it does not
deserve the trouble it entails. Instinct acquits itself better of this role; animals prove this. Why substitute for it a more hesitant and uncertain reflection (S:212)?

Not only is man called to this higher life, but, as Durkheim observed, this emergent evolution is not without costs to the ego. Certainly, there are benefits: the biological ego is introduced to a new morally superior and intellectually intense life. But, on the other hand, the higher moral life of human civilization is a difficult calling, for it involves not only anxiety and uncertainty, but suffering (see also Book Three). Higher life is a trial; if the individual loses the focus of this moral life, what purpose has he left? Why should the trial be endured?

What is the end of suffering above all? If the value of things can only be estimated by their relation to this positive evil for the individual, it is without reward and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist for the believer firm in his faith or the man strongly bound by ties of domestic or political society. Instinctively and unreflectively they ascribe all that they are and do, the one to his Church or his God, the living symbol of the Church, the other to his family, the other to his country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do homage to it. So, the Christian ultimately desires and seeks suffering to testify more fully to his contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his divine model. But the more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a real participant in the religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself, the more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose *(S:212)*?

Of course, one of the classic formulations of man's dilemma is the notion of homo duplex. Now, without this crucial distinction between ego and person, and the characterization of the pre-social ego as inherently egocentric, passionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim's theory of egoisme and anomie, and the corresponding need for constant moral discipline and goals for individual action makes little sense. For the image of man as homo duplex lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociological theory of morality,
religion, and knowledge. Civilized man, Durkheim posited, is "double," and this dilemma is the source of our troubles. On the one hand, there is the organic ego; on the other, there is the moralized (socialized) person. Social man is superimposed over top of physical man.

If ... as has often been said, man is double, that is because social man superimposes himself upon physical man. Social man necessarily presupposes a society which he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no longer feel in it existence and action about and above us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective foundation. All that remains is an artificial combination of illusory images, a phantasamagoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can be the goal of our action. Yet this social man is the essence of civilized man; he is the masterpiece of existence. Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence; for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything actual; the only existence still based upon reality no longer meets our needs. Because we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless. So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of, and we feel them lose themselves in emptiness. In this sense it is true to say that our activity needs an object transcending it. We do not need it to maintain ourselves in the illusion of an impossible immortality; it is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even partially lost without this losing its raison d'être in the same degree. No proof is needed that in such a state of confusion the least cause of discouragement may easily give birth to desperate resolutions. If life is not worth the trouble of living, everything becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it *(S:213).

It is not altogether clear whether Durkheim meant that with the breakdown of social integration, and the corresponding recession of cultural ideals, the moralized person finds himself bereft of reasons for existence, or whether the pre-social ego supersedes its socialized counterpart. It would seem that Durkheim would not have named this type "egoistic" if he did not mean to imply that, as society and the moralized person fade in intensity and purpose, the individual lapses back into the self-centered egoisms of nature. Yet, since both meanings seem to be implied here, perhaps we can surmise that his underlying doctrine had not yet been fully worked out.
Next, Durkheim added a crucial qualification to this notion of social breakdown and cultural anemia—namely, that the specific forms taken by egoïsme (and anomie) are determined by cultural or "national temperament." This insight shall serve as one important foundation for my second schema (see Book Three).

One of the constitutive elements of every national temperament consists of a certain way of estimating the value of existence. There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see things in bright or somber lights. In fact, only society can pass a collective opinion on the value of human life; for this the individual is incompetent. The latter knows nothing but himself and his own little horizon; thus his experience is too limited to serve as a basis for a general appraisal.

... On the contrary, without sophistry, society may generalize its own feelings as to itself, its state of health or lack of health. For individuals share too deeply in the life of society for it to be diseased without their suffering infection. What it suffers, they necessarily suffer. Because it is the whole, its ills are communicated to its parts. Hence it cannot disintegrate without awareness that the regular conditions of general existence are equally disturbed. Because society is the end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us escaping it without a simultaneous realization that our activity is purposeless. Since we are its handiwork, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value.

This passage is most significant. For in addition to the suggestion that the tendency to egoïsme is connected with certain "national temperaments," Durkheim here set out in ambigious form his underlying causal model. "Society generalizes its own feelings of itself," whether healthy or sick. Durkheim's profundity, his tendency to anthropomorphize society, his Rousseauian undercurrents, all are to be found in this provocative passage. Yet it is not clear, again, which comes first: does society begin to breakdown, "feel" egos detaching themselves and wandering aimlessly around, and then "generalize" its own sickness, in a kind of on-going feedback cycle? Or, rather, do egos begin to successfully...
resist social control and moral direction, break down the social bond, and so forth? Whatever Durkheim really intended to say, his statements are often ambiguous in their deeper import. However, we shall follow Durkheim in assuming that the conditions precipitating egoistic suicides are "felt" on a wider societal basis.

As Durkheim continued developing this line of thought, his hypostatizing language ramified and deepened. Instead of lone isolated egos, Durkheim spoke of the egoistic condition as carried by definite "social currents" (see also Part I, Book Three). These "social currents" seem to generalize the breakdown of the social bond.

Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but expressing society's state of disintegration. They reflect the relaxation of social bonds, a sort of collective asthenia, or social malaise, just as individual sadness, when chronic, in its way reflects the poor organic state of the individual. Then metaphysical systems and religious systems spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments to formula, attempt to prove to men the senselessness of life and that its self-deception to believe that life has purpose. Then new moralities originate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a minimal existence. On their appearance, they seem to have been created out of whole cloth by their makers who are sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines. In reality they are an effect rather than a cause; they merely symbolize in abstract language and systematic form the physiological distress of the body social. [Footnote: this is why it is unjust to accuse these theorists of sadness of generalizing personal impressions. They are the echo of a general condition] *(S:214).

While Durkheim is correct, to a certain extent, to insist on a social structural approach to the origin of philosophical and ethical perspectives, on the other hand, to insist categorically that systems of thought and moralities critical of life and the world are always and everywhere, at root, simply reflections of the "relaxation of social bonds" is to impose a positivistic and limited model over the complexities and paradoxes of historical process. Although Durkheim's basic causal model here observed how changes become "culturally
generalized," and feedback to further alter individuals and society itself again, he did not here allow the possibility that such moral critiques may themselves lead, ultimately, to social structural transformations. In other words, he appeared to rule out of court that the causal arrow may just as well lead from culture to structure as well as from structure to culture.

At many places Durkheim's statements grew more ambiguous in terms of causal priority (see also Part I, Book Three). Indeed, I shall later marshal evidence from his own texts showing Durkheim himself saying that anomie and egoisme are caused by collective currents, that is, sanctioned by cultural ideals and values. It can hardly be imagined, in that case, why society would generalize and idealize these "exaggerated individualisms" and "drives for progress and perfection" if they lead to its own dissolution. But for now, Durkheim had not crossed over this bridge.

As these currents are collective, they have, by virtue of their origin an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by that disintegration of society. Thus, at every moment that, with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social environment, he still submits to its influence. However individualized a man may be, there is always something collective remaining—the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he has no longer anything else with which to achieve it (S:214).

Almost inevitably, Durkheim's concern as a moral philosopher over modern "moral anarchy" and his keen empirical insight into the ravages of the modern "infinity sickness" led him away from his rather simple mechanical "structural feedback" model. Indeed, the contradiction implied in proposing that society, in effect, promotes its own destruction through self-homicide had apparently not occured to Durkheim. That some other factors might be operating here, in a rather different way than Durkheim's explicitly positivistic causal model allowed, can be seen by an insightful comment into the
empirical sanctioning of egoisme:

Today neurasthenia is rather considered a mark of distinction than a mark of weakness. In our refined societies, enamoured of things intellectual, nervous members constitute almost a nobility (S:181).

The ambiguity of Durkheim's causal theory underlying egoistic suicide can also be seen from the following summary, in which egoisme is seen both as an effect of the "relaxation of social bonds" and as a cause of this "collective asthenia." Moreover, whether this type of suicide is called egoistic because the pre-social ego "asserts itself" in the face of social ideals, or because the individual has only himself and his localized interests to fall back on after the "higher existence into which he had been initiated" faded is not clear.

Hence this type of suicide well deserves the name we have given it. Egoisme is not merely a contributing factor in it; it is its generating cause. In this case, the bond attaching men to life relaxes because that attaching him to society is itself slack. The incidents of private life which seem the direct inspiration of suicide and are considered its determining causes are in reality only incidental causes. The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstances because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide.

... as thought and activity develop, they increasingly overflow antiquated forms. But then he needs others. Because he is a more complex social being, he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more points of support outside himself, and it is because his moral balance depends on a larger number of conditions that he is more easily disturbed *(S:214-15, 216).

Durkheim thus concluded this chapter by outlining a balance theory of psychological well-being. After being initiated into the higher moral and intellectual existence of human culture, the person becomes increasingly dependent on more and varied types of social and cultural life; indeed, "all life is a complex equilibrium." When this complex balance becomes upset, when the myriad points of mutual dependence become altered, the internal psychological balance is correspondingly upset. This notion of equilibrium and health and even virtue as a balance or "golden mean" is fundamental to Durkheim's perspective on normality and pathology.
Now, whether or not Durkheim's underlying causal model here is clear or consistent, one conclusion seems warranted: Durkheim's explanation of egoistic suicide is a good deal more inflected than most contemporary sociologists have recognized. By no stretch of the imagination can his developing theory be portrayed in the simplistic terms of the "social integration" hypothesis. Further, little has been said of the historical or evolutionary framework underlying Durkheim's first type. It should be noted, however, that Durkheim's entire work presumes an evolutionary perspective in which modern pathologies are historically grounded in terms of the recession of previous disciplines and the lacuna of new ones. But, more to the point, egoisme is relationally defined in terms of altruisme, Durkheim's second suicidal type, to which we now turn. Clearly, altruisme, by contrast with egoisme, serves as an "ideal type" of the kind of moral solidarity characteristic of primitive or archaic societies.
CHAPTER TWO

ALTRUISME AS OBLIGATORY SELF-SACRIFICE: CONSCIENCE IN MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX

Preface. Altruisme is the opposite of egoisme in a number of ways. First, as the terms connote, altruisme refers to a condition in which group well-being takes precedence over individual self-interest. Second, Durkheim attached specific historical significance to these perennial opposites, for he used them as "ideal types" to refer to differences in social and cultural solidarity at the two ends of history. The individual in primitive society, according to Durkheim, is more or less submerged in group life. The conscience collective takes precedence over the rudimentary individual conscience in public mores. Indeed, the individual is so permeated and penetrated by the conscience collective that if tradition demands self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide gladly embraces self-homicide as a duty, perhaps even a privilege. In contrast to the first type of suicide, the altruistic suicide considers self-sacrifice an obligation, a moral duty that fulfills his own nature. This obligation is increased by the "repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex," in which magic and religion pervades all (see Book One).

Once again, to adequately understand altruisme and egoisme one must differentiate between Durkheim's generic and genetic-evolutionary notions of the individual (see Giddens, 1971b). As we noted in Book One, on the generic level Durkheim viewed man as homo duplex--each individual was split between his physical and social selves. Ego is to person as body is to soul. However, on the genetic-evolutionary level, Durkheim posited that the autonomous person was a historical emergent, that is, the notion of the morally autonomous per-
son with certain "inalienable rights" was a sociocultural and historical construction. Basically, Durkheim proposed that as the social morphological substratum differentiated, the individual took on greater and greater autonomy. In a corollary process, as differentiation proceeded, rationality and abstract thought ramified. Thus, the autonomy of the person and the rationalization of the universe of "moral discourse" proceeded together on the world-historical level (see Book One).

Those who uncritically embrace the conventional image of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching for the generic bases of social order and control (Parsons, 1949; L. Coser, 1971), may find themselves puzzled by the fact that Durkheim did not urge a return to the "value consensus" of primitive society. After all, to Durkheim wasn’t society all and the individual nothing? Isn't this position inherently conservative? Space allows me to merely note now (however see appendix) that, as an Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim's central value was the autonomy and rationality of the individual person (see Chapter Eight, Book One). What he termed "moral individualism," as embodied in Christian ethics, especially in its Protestant varieties and their secularized variants, especially "The Rights of Man" (e.g. see "Individualism and the Intellectuals," Jellinek, 1901, Weber, 1968), was his fundamental positive value. At no time did Durkheim urge return to "mechanical solidarity;" at no point did his so-called "social realism" ever lead him to urge the submergence of the person in the group, as was the case in archaic societies. At no point did he yearn to return to the "repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex;" indeed, wasn't this clear from his highly negative early image of religion (see Chapter Six, Book One). In short, Durkheim's perennial moral dialectic between person, society, and history led him to seek to balance these relationships in a way never before fully achieved--namely, rescuing both the moral solidarity of archaic societies and the respect for the per-
son generated by the progressive division of labor. Whether he successfully resolved this eternal dilemma can only be answered at the end of the present study.

Characteristically, Durkheim began this section by noting that the dialectical balance he so ardently sought can be found neither in the "excessive individualism" of modern society, nor in the "insufficient individuation" of "mechanical solidarity."

In the order of existence, no good is measureless. A biological quality can only fulfill the purposes it is meant to serve on condition that it does not transgress certain limits. So with social phenomena. If excessive individuation leads to suicide, insufficient individuation has the same effects. When man has become detached from society, he encounters less resistance to suicide in himself, and he does so likewise when social integration is too strong *(S:217).

Drawing his illustrations from a variety of texts on archaic societies, Durkheim seized upon customs in which self-sacrifice was seen as a moral obligation. In such cases—old men, women on their husband's death, servants after a leader's passing—are required by ancient and venerable custom to commit self-homicide.

Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails in this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished, usually, by religious sanctions.... We have seen that if such a person insists on living he loses public respect; in one case, the usual funeral honors are denied, in another a life of horror is supposed to await him beyond the grave. The weight of society is thus brought to bear on him to lead him to destroy himself *(S:219).

Further, in contrast to egoistic suicide in modern societies which is often legally proscribed, altruistic suicide is positively enjoined because it is symptomatic of "mechanical solidarity."

To be sure, society intervenes in egoistic suicide, as well, but its intervention differs in the two cases. In one case, it speaks the sentence of death; in the other, it forbids the choice of death. In the case of egoistic suicide, it suggests or counsels at most; in the other case it compels and is the author of conditions and circumstances making this obligation coercive *(S:219-20).
Altruistic suicide is here used by Durkheim as a visible objective index revealing the inner nature of the social bond peculiar to primitive or archaic societies, those groups still rooted in ties of "blood and soil." Altruistic suicide serves as an an external visible symbol of the interdependence mandated in "mechanical solidarity." If the social bond is broken by death, the remaining relatives' first obligation is to maintain the former social bond as far as possible by themselves joining the same condition as the deceased. They have no other self-definition or value apart from their assigned roles. In death as in life, the social bond remains.

This sacrifice then is imposed by society for moral ends. If the follower must not then survive his chief or the servant his prince, this is because so strict an interdependence between followers and chief, officers and king, is involved in the constitution of society that any thought of separation is out of the question. The destiny of one must be that of the others (S:220).

Such "strict interdependence" is more understandable if we remember that even today kinship terms are relationally defined—the term "mother" having meaning only in relation to the terms "children" or "son" or "daughter." The leaving of children from the parental home can still be a traumatic experience today; there is often the feeling that "everything has changed," including oneself, and perhaps even that the reason for living may have vanished. This happens, even in so attenuated family circumstances as today because these roles and statuses are relationally defined, and functionally and normatively interdependent; and because these social definitions of self are so deeply internalized that they permanently alter the personality structure.

Durkheim continued developing this notion of the socially obligatory character of suicide in primitive society, observing that it is possible only where the individual is submerged in the traditional conscience collective.

For society to be able thus to compel some of its members to kill themselves, the individual personality can have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it.
... But there can be only one cause of this feeble indi-
viduation itself. For the individual to occupy so little place in collective life he must be almost completely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a compact, continuous mass.... As they consist of a few elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, because of the small size of the group it is close to everyone and loses no one from sight; consequently, collective supervision is constant, extending to everything, and thus more readily prevents divergences (S:220-21).

Altruistic suicide, then, is the ultimate expression of "mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really has little life apart from his group, sacrifices himself when necessary. This extreme sense of moral obligation is due not merely to the social morphological and structural conditions in which the group finds itself, but also to the extreme degree of penetration of the conscience collective by sacral and magical duties. From Durkheim's perspective, for the individual to emerge as a morally valuable and autonomous person in his own right, the sacral-magical conscience collective must recede as the social morphological substratum differentiates.

The individual has no way to set up an environment of his own in the shelter of which he may develop his own nature and form a physiognomy that is his exclusively. To all intents and purposes indistinct from his companions, he is only an inseparable part of the whole without personal value. His person has so little value that attacks upon it by individuals receive only relatively weak restraint. It is thus natural for him to be yet less protected against collective necessities and that society should not hesitate ... to bid end a life it values so little (S:221).

Durkheim then attached a label to this suicide typical of "mechanical solidarity," defining it in evolutionary contrast to egoisme and modern society.

We thus confront a type of suicide differing by incisive qualities from the preceding one. Whereas the latter [egoisme] is due to excessive individuation, the former is caused by too rudimentary individuation. One occurs because society allows the individual to escape it, being insufficiently aggregated in some parts of even in the whole; the other, because society holds him
in too strict tutelage. Having given the name of egoisme
to the state of the ego living its own life and obeying
itself alone, that of altruisme adequately expresses the
opposite state, where the ego is not its own property,
where it is blended with something not itself, where the
goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one
of the groups in which it participates. So we call the
suicide caused by intense altruisme altruistic suicide.
But since it is also characteristically performed as a
duty, we shall call such a type obligatory altruistic
suicide (S:221).

Now, even though Durkheim proceeded to state that "not every
altruistic suicide is necessarily obligatory," he acknowled­
ged that, even in optional situations, it is still a sign of
prestige or moral virtue.

Though public opinion does not formally require them,
it is certainly favorable to them. Since here not cling­
ing to life is a virtue, even of the highest rank, the
man who renounces life on least provocation of circum­
stances or though simple vainglory is praiseworthy. A
social prestige thus attaches to suicide, which receives
encouragement from this fact, and the refusal of this
reward has effects similar to actual punishment, al­
though to a lesser degree. What is done in one case to
escape the stigma of insult is done in the other to win
esteem. When people are accustomed to set no value on
life from childhood on, and to despise those who value
it excessively, they inevitably renounce it on the least
pretexct. So valueless a sacrifice is easily assumed.
Like obligatory suicide, therefore, these practices are
associated with the most fundamental moral characteris­
tics of lower societies. As they can only persist if
the individual has no interests of his own, he must be
trained to renunciation and an unquestioned abnegation;
whence come partially spontaneous suicides. Exactly like
those more explicitly prescribed by society, they arise
from this state of impersonality, or as we have called
it, altruisme, which may be regarded as a moral char­
acteristic of primitive man * (S:222-23).

"Mechanical solidarity" is thus a "state of impersonality"
because the person has so little autonomous status there. Im­
personal altruisme was regarded by Durkheim as one of the
prime "moral characteristics of primitive man" because the
consience collective (the impersonal or social part of cul­
ture and personality) pervades and dominates the individual
consience and consciousness. Whether empirically grounded
in all traditional societies or not, Durkheim's schema
heightened the contrast between modern and traditional societies by setting up two heuristic "ideal types."

Now, as Durkheim noted, "altruistic suicide is a species with several varieties" (S:222). One of the most revealing types is mystical or religious suicide. These closely correspond with the sacral and magical character of traditional societies. Dominated by religious rationales and magical etiquettes, the mystical suicide, of which Hindu and Buddhist India is "the classic soil," needs no stark precipitating circumstances as spur on other altruistic suicides to their honorable self-homicide.

In the preceding examples, it [altruisme] caused a man to kill himself only with the concurrence of circumstances. Either death had to be imposed by society as a duty, or some question of honor was involved, or at least some disagreeable occurrence had to lower the value of life in the victim's eyes. But it even happens that the individual kills himself purely for the joy of sacrifice, because, even with no particular reason, renunciation in itself is considered praiseworthy (S:223). Durkheim further noted that such mystical suicides of religious "virtuosos" are the very prototype of "impersonalized altruisme." The pantheistic urge to suppress or eradicate the ego because it is an illusion is the opposite of the modern attitude in which the ego, autonomous and alone, is morally enshrined as an absolute value. In the former, the ego is considered unreal; in the latter, the ego alone is real; both are absolutized.

We actually see the individual in all these cases seek to strip himself of his personal being in order to be engulfed in something which he regards as his true essence.... He feels that he exists in it and in it alone, and strives so violently to blend himself with it in order to have being. He must therefore consider that he has no life of his own. Impersonality is here carried to its highest pitch, altruisme is acute (S:225).

Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the implications of Durkheim's linkage of pantheistic religious drives for the eradication of the ego, and the "pantheistic" organization of archaic societies. Now, it is understandable that Durkheim would emphasize these points, since to him religion was
merely the way in which society collectively represented itself to itself. It followed, then, that "mechanically integrated" societies, in which the individual counted for little, would tend to express these social and cultural conditions in pantheistic projections. As the individual counted for little in society, so, too, the ego counted for little in religion. Salvation was neither deliverance nor redemption (see Weber, 1963), but rather eradication of individual suffering through transcendence of the ego's desires. Indeed, Durkheim's key insight here would lead us to expect that societies that had not overcome a segmental base and tribalistic structures of fraternization would probably never construct European notions of the autonomy and moral value of the individual person.

Durkheim next explored some relations between the organization of primitive societies and primitive religious ethics. These passages delineating the correspondence between the primitive sacral complex, in which society and culture are deeply embedded in religious rationales, and pantheistic religious images, reveal the core of Durkheim's evolutionary sociology of religion, knowledge, and morality.

The metaphysical and religious systems which form the logical settings for these moral practices give final proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has long been observed that they coexist generally with pantheistic beliefs. To be sure, Jainism as well as Buddhism is atheistic, but pantheism is not necessarily theistic. Its essential quality is the idea that what reality there is in the individual is foreign to his nature, that the soul which animates him is not his own, and that consequently he has no personal existence. Now this dogma is fundamental to the doctrines of the Hindus; it already exists in Brahminism. Inversely, where the principle of being is not fused with such doctrines but is itself conceived of an individual form, that is, among theistic peoples like the Jews, Christians, Mahommetans, or polytheists like the Greeks and Latins, this form of suicide is unusual. It is never found there in a state of ritual practice. There is probably a relation between it and pantheism. What is this relation (S:226)?

Here Durkheim discovered a profound dialectical relation between the evolution of the individual person and the develop-
ment of religious representations centering on shifts in impersonality and personality (see also Chapter Eight, Book One). In general, where the "principle of being" is portrayed in impersonal form, the individual ego is accorded little reality or value. However, where the individual person is valued in his own right, religious representations accordingly take on, as it were, a personal physiognomy. But why? As one might expect, since we know that he treats religious representations as projections of society and the fused primitive conscience collective, Durkheim suggested that the underlying reason is that here society itself is structured, as it were, pantheistically.

It cannot be conceded that pantheism produced suicide. Such abstract ideas do not guide men, and the course of history could not be explained through the play of purely metaphysical concepts. Among peoples as well as individuals, mental representations function above all as expression of a reality not of their own making; they rather spring from it and, if they subsequently modify it, do so only to a limited extent.

Religious conceptions are the products of the social environment, rather than its producers, and if they react, once formed, upon their original causes, the reaction cannot be very profound. If the essence of pantheism, then is a more or less radical denial of all individuality, such a religion could be constituted only in a society where the individual really counts for nothing, that is, is almost wholly lost in the group. For men can conceive of the world only in an image of the small social world in which they live. Religious pantheism is thus only a result and, as it were, a reflection of the pantheistic organization of society. Consequently, it is also in this society that we must seek the cause for this special suicide which everywhere appears in connection with pantheism (S:226-27).

Again, it is true, socioculturally, that religious conceptions are products of the social environment. However, I cannot fully endorse Durkheim's radically positivistic notion that "abstract ideas do not guide men," since, on the contrary, I believe that there is a constant interplay between conditions and intentions. Surely Weber taught us that images and ideas, when strongly sanctioned—that is, when they percolate through the imagination and penetrate the will—definitely influence human action. In short, there is almost
always a constant dialectic between structure, culture, and personality systems, not simply the one-way causality here suggested by Durkheim when he argued that if religious conceptions "react upon their original causes, the reaction cannot be very profound" (see also Part I, Book Three). Durkheim's underlying model must be supplemented by Weber's.

Further, various comments by Durkheim look forward to the second schema in which all four types of suicide are seen as rooted in extreme forms of moral obligation. For instance, in the following passage, ostensibly devoted to showing that religious dogma per se counts for little in producing suicide, Durkheim acknowledged that Christian doctrine itself was significant in raising the moral worth of the individual person (see also Chapter Eight, Book One).

... the aversion to suicide professed and inspired by Christianity is well-known. The reason is that Christian societies accord the individual a more important role than earlier ones. They assign to him personal duties which he is forbidden to evade; only insofar as he has acquitted himself of the role incumbent upon him here on earth is he admitted or not to the joys of the hereafter, and these joys are as personal as the works which make them his heritage. Thus the moderate individualism in the spirit of Christianity prevents it from favoring suicide, despite its theories concerning man and his destiny (S:226).

Next, Durkheim compared the psychological attitude of the egoistic suicide with the altruistic type. He indicated two crucial aspects which we shall later retain—namely, that the altruistic suicide reveals an active acceptance of his collectively sanctioned moral obligation, while the egoistic type betrays a passive melancholy, the world-weariness or moral exhaustion akin to acedia. I believe, in turn, that the active-passive distinction applies equally well in contrasting anomie with fatalisme. In my second schema, both altruisme and anomie are active, while both egoisme and fatalisme are passive (see Part II, Book Three).

While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing real in the world but the individual, the intemperate altruist's sadness, on the contrary, springs from the individual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One is detached
from life because, seeing no goal to which he may attach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless; the other because he has a goal but one outside this life, which henceforth seems merely an obstacle to him. Thus, the difference of the causes reappears in the effects, and the melancholy of the one is quite different from the other. The former consists of a feeling of incurable weariness and sad depression; it expresses a complete relaxation of activity, which, unable to find useful employment, collapses. The latter [altruisme], on the contrary, springs from hope, for it depends on the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life. It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith eagerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of extreme energy * (S:225-6).

By extension, fatalisme also proceeds from the internalization of collective sanctions, only here the individual finds himself overwhelmed or oppressively regulated by the conscience collective, and resigns himself passively to his assigned fate. Looking ahead to the second schema, then, we see that both fatalisme and altruisme proceed from the same source; they differ merely in their prime of expression.

Adding another comparison between egoistic and altruistic suicide, Durkheim again emphasized that different levels of societal complexity and corresponding systems of organized knowledge and morality are always in the background of his discussion.

One is related to the crude morality which disregards everything relating solely to the individual; the other is closely associated with the refined ethics which sets the human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything. Between the two there is all the difference between primitive peoples and the most civilized nations * (S:227).

Here we see Durkheim moving toward the second schema, in which egoisme is generated not simply by the breakdown of integration but by cultural sanctions, by modern "ethics setting the individual on so high a pedestal that he may no longer be subordinated to anything."

Observing that "in our contemporary societies, the individual personality becomes increasingly free from the collective personality" (S:228). Durkheim turned to consider the major example of suicide in the modern era in which the
the reverse is true. Altruistic suicides in the military served, in Durkheim's "ideal typical" schemas, as the major example of the evolutionary survival of primitive ethics in the modern world. Durkheim finds in the modern soldier the same quality of impersonality, of self-abnegation which he thought characterized primitive moral solidarity. Unfortunately, those few secondary discussions (e.g. Parsons, 1949) that mention altruistic suicide also tend to ignore its main historical site—namely, primitive moral solidarity. They have thus missed the important fact that Durkheim discussed military suicides in the modern world largely as an illustration of the survival of superseded moral patterns, especially to heighten the contrast with the contemporaneous, but very different, egoisme.

Of all elements constituting our modern societies, the army, indeed, most recalls the structure of lower societies. It, too, consists of a massive, compact group providing a rigid setting for the individual and preventing any independent movement. Therefore, since this moral constitution is the natural field for altruistic suicide, military suicide may certainly be supposed to have the same character and derive from the same source (S:234).

... the causes of military suicides are not only different from, but in inverse proportion to, the most determining causes of civilian suicide. The latter causes in the great European societies spring from the excessive individuation characteristic of civilization. Military suicides must therefore depend on the reverse disposition, feeble individuation or what we have called the state of altruisme. Actually, those peoples among whom the army is most inclined to suicide are also the least advanced, those whose customs most resemble the customs observed in lower societies. Traditionalism [is] the chief opponent of the spirit of individualism. ... As it guards against egoistic suicide, one readily understands that where it still has power, the civilian population has few suicides. But it has this prophylactic influence only if it remains moderate. If it exceeds a certain degree of intensity, it becomes itself an original cause of suicide (S:236).

Surely, Weber and Durkheim would have agreed that "traditionalism is the opponent of the spirit of modern individualism" which, when gone to extreme, results in egoistic suicide.

Finally, Durkheim concluded this chapter on altruistic
suicide with the crucial observation that "every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue." Clearly shading over now into his second and very different schema that anomie and egoisme are caused by extreme modern cultural sanctions, Durkheim next proposed that both altruistic and egoistic suicides are perceived as the carrying out of moral duties. Ultimately, we shall see that all four types of suicide are generated by extreme cultural sanctions—that is, considered in both primitive and modern societies as the logical, though extreme, outgrowths of deeply internalized moral obligations.

... the motives of certain altruistic suicides reappear in slightly different forms as the basis of actions regarded by everyone as moral. But is egoistic suicide any different? Has not the sentiment of individual autonomy its own morality as well as the opposite sentiment? If the latter serves as a foundation to a kind of courage, strengthening and even hardening the heart, the other softens it, and moves it to pity. Where the altruistic suicide is prevalent, man is all ready to give his life; however, at the same time, he sets no more value on that of another. On the contrary, when he rates individual personality above all other ends, he respects it in others. His cult for it makes him suffer from all that minimizes it even among his fellows. A broader sympathy for human suffering succeeds the fanatical devotions of primitive times. Every sort of suicide is then merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue *(S:240).

Now, we shall consider Durkheim's critical insight that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue" as an epigrammatic summary of my second schema on Durkheim's theories of suicide (see Part II, Book Three). Let us now turn to consider Durkheim's most famous suicidal type—anomie—and see whether the same ambiguities permeate its description.
CHAPTER THREE
ANOMIE AS THE RELEASE OF THE INSATIABLE DESIRES OF THE
PRE-SOCIAL EGO FROM TRADITIONAL MORAL DISCIPLINE

Preface. Certainly it is true, as Talcott Parsons claims, that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly cen­
tral concepts in contemporary social science" (1968a:316). However, as we have unhappily discovered (see also appendix), the origins and meanings of this paradigmatic concept have often been faultily reported. Moreover, its great cultural and historical significance has been slighted. Since Durk­
heim's passages on anomie are far from unambiguous, and fur­
ther, since even some of the better secondary interpreta­
tions cannot be fully relied on to accurately reflect Durk­
heim's theoretical framework and historical intentions, great caution must be exercised in interpreting the essential structure and meaning of Durkheim's first theory of anomie.

At the outset, we need not engage in complex intellec­
tual convolutions to wrench Durkheim's first schema into line with our own predelictions. For, as with egoisme and altru­
isme, we might simply start with the connotations of these words themselves. Fatalisme implies a pervasive sense of re­
signation to one's fate. Anomie, by contrast, implies not that amorphous and protean term "normlessness" (see appen­
dix), but rather the unleashing of desires beyond all order or meaningful limits. Anomie here implies not so much the lack of order as the lack of limits, in the sense of classi­
cal Greek and Christian philosophy (eg. see Haydn, 1950). Moreover, Durkheim assigned these terms to two extremes at the two ends of history. Hence, anomie versus fatalisme rep­resents the historical contrast between the insatiable pas­sions released in our contemporary transitional era and the
ego's passive resignation to his collectively assigned fate in the "repressive" regime of traditional "mechanical solidarity."

As always, Durkheim's thought moved here on two levels simultaneously: the generic and the genetic. On the generic level, Durkheim posited the insatiable and egocentric passions of human nature. On the genetic-evolutionary level, he proposed that at one end of human history, the individual ego's naturally insatiable desires were held in rigid check by traditional subordination to the fused sacro-magical conscience collective. On the other hand, in the modern world there is no adequate social or cultural mechanism working to discipline individual egotistic desires. Therefore, in the modern transitional crisis, prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity," "diseases of the infinite" emerge, and "moral anarchy" threatens to reign over all. Let us now explore anomie more carefully.

A. Anomie: A Preview

Even though today anomie may be considered one of the paradigmatic concepts of sociology, nevertheless, the origin and complexity of Durkheim's arguments underlying his first notion of anomie remain misperceived. Instead of a mechanical, ahistorical, baldly sociological series of assertions concerning the need for integration of the individual into social groups, Durkheim's arguments were subtly inflected, and historically and philosophically grounded. Lest this subtlety and potential significance be lost in the welter of reductions and textbookish presentations, let us briefly outline the developing logic of Durkheim's argument concerning anomie.

(1) Durkheim assumed that the human ego is naturally passionate, undisciplined, and inherently insatiable. Hence, in his first schema, he located the source of the self-destructive forces of undisciplined insatiable passions in the organic or pre-social half of the individual.

(2) Durkheim further assumed a series of basic dualisms in regard to human nature, which mirror other "root dichotomies"
Paralleling a series of dichotomies such as: society/individual, sacred/profane, concepts/sensations, normal/pathological, science/mysticism, universals/variables, necessary/contingent, and so forth, Durkheim added another root dichotomy: moral rules/sensual appetites (see also Lukes, 1973, and Book One). Of course, Durkheim then posited society as the only source providing the necessary collective discipline to counterbalance the inordinate sensual appetites of the inherently egocentric and passionate pre-social ego.

(3) Further, Durkheim assumed that every society regulates individual satisfaction through a social schedule stratified for various groups and occupations. This socio-economic schedule of the gratification of wants is, in a relatively stable society, accepted generally by each as legitimate, and each is relatively adjusted to his scheduled ratio of reward. This notion of the social schedule is one of the key foundations of the distribution aspect of economic systems. Durkheim's unexplored theorem holds great potential significance for theoretical economic sociology.

(4) Disturbances in social and economic equilibrium weaken the hold of collective moral discipline, thereby releasing the destructive energies and desires characteristic of all unlimited passions and morbid conditions. Each individual is then subjected to a more or less painful "moral reeducation." The moral legitimacy of ratios of expectation, especially the discipline holding individuals to their scheduled ratio of satisfaction, is upset; and even personal equilibrium is thrown out of adjustment. Contrary to most images of anomie, the consequent deregulation is merely the releasing and sustaining condition of Durkheim's central concern--the "diseases of the infinite."

(5) Finally, Durkheim observed that anomie is chronic in the most progressive segments of modern society. In these areas the moral legitimacy of traditional schedules is most insensitively repealed, and thus egocentric passions reign by default. By contrast, in earlier, more stable societies, traditional social schedules restrain and regulate potentially insatiable desires. Today, however, no social mechanism works to discipline the "diseases of the infinite;" hence, we live in an age marked by "moral anarchy."

Unfortunately, when most contemporary interpreters of Durkheim's typology discuss the meaning of anomie, they tend to skip the key premises and crucial intervening steps in his argument, and collapse it down to the last condition of "deregulation." But Durkheim's central concern was not so much the breakdown of norms as with the breakthrough of an "infinity of dreams and desires." The weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acted merely as the re-
leasing and sustaining condition of this egocentricity and insatiability. Now, in shifting to his second schema, Durkheim implicitly shifted the location of these egocentric and insatiable drives from that useful fiction—the pre-social ego—to absolutizing cultural sanctions. For locating such destructive drives in the organic ego put Durkheim in something of a bind, since then the crucial aspects of human action were derived from lower (i.e. biological and psychological) levels, instead of from society and culture themselves.

Society in the first schema is reduced to the passive role of restraining and redirecting organic drives, instead of the fully sociological position that society and culture are the key sources of the most significant features of human action. However, in the second schema, being led to the fully sociocultural position that sanctions which become absolute can cause tremendous tensions by such insights as "every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," we see that "drives for progress and perfection," "daily represented as virtues," act as solvents of traditional types of moral authority and social integration, and may lead, ultimately, to suicide.

B. The Generic Need for Limitation of the Passions of the Pre-Social Ego

Durkheim began his section on anomie with this brief observation:

But society is not only something attracting the sentiments and activities of individuals with unequal force. It is also a power controlling them. There is a relation between the way this regulative action is performed and the social suicide rate (S:241).

The initial key to explaining anomie and suicide, Durkheim suggested, is the lack of regulation or moral discipline (or as it might be said today, with a slightly different meaning, the lack of normative integration). Just as he began his analysis of egoism with statistical correlations between this type and Protestantism, education, occupational achievement, etc., so, too, did Durkheim began his section on anomie with
important empirical insights correlating rises in suicides, commercial activities, and industrial and financial crises.

If therefore industrial or financial crises increase suicides, this is not because they cause poverty, since crises of prosperity have the same result; it is because they are crises, that is, disturbances of the collective order. Every disturbance of equilibrium, even though it achieves greater comfort and a heightening of general vitality, is an impulse to voluntary death. Whenever serious readjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a sudden growth or to an unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self-destruction. How is this possible? How can something generally considered to improve existence serve to detach men from it (S:246)?

In order to explain this curious occurrence—that men should take their own lives when things are getting better—Durkheim began to outline here what he took to be the underlying nature of human nature (see also Book One). He began by observing that desires must always be proportionate to what is possible if happiness is to be possible.

No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means. If his needs require more than can be granted, or even merely something of a different sort, they will be under continual friction or can only function painfully. Movements incapable of production without pain tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the impulse to live is merely the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken as the others relax (S:246).

Then Durkheim compared the organic needs of animals, which are physiologically limited, to the socially and culturally generated desires of human beings, which, because they move in the realm of the ideal, are potentially unlimited.

In the animal, at least in a normal condition, this equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions. All the organism needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement should be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in its own resources is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its physical nature (S:246).

Thus, in contrast to man, organic life lives in a more or
less mechanically equilibrated balance with material conditions.

But man has no such built-in limitations. Even though we are part animal, we are also persons; and the major part of our personhood, as opposed to our egos, is composed of impersonal and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture. In effect, man defines his own world. Sociocultural desires enjoy no such natural automatic constraints.

This is not the case with man, because most of his needs are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree. Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot pass. But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort, or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his physiological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginning of history, receiving more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health (S:247).

Since "man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" through the genetic medium of symbolic culture, man himself must construct his own social schedule of this ever-escalating scale of wants. Every society is thus forced to negotiate a variable ratio between organically generated needs and socioculturally generated desires.

Above all, how to establish their proper variations with different conditions of life, occupations, relative importance of services, etc.? In no society are they equally satisfied on the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet human nature is substantially the same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss * (S:247).

Having thus posited the notion of the pre-social ego as inherently insatiable (see also Book One), Durkheim proceeded to set up society and cultural norms as the necessary coun-
terweight to these generically undisciplined egoistic passions. Sensual appetites, Durkheim said, can only be constrained by culturally generated moral rules. Thus, culture (as a kind of social DNA) redirects biological processes. Desocialized (that is, demoralized), the individual ego reverts back to generic type and, ultimately, destroys itself in the fruitless and random passions so often seen in self-destructive behaviors.

But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition, and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits, and sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an undetermined state be any more reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? *(S:247-8)*

Having set up the specter of the release of the floods of passion inherent in the undetermined and random energies of the organic ego, Durkheim then explored the necessity of controlling such desires. The first requirement of morality and knowledge (see Book One) is discipline and definition of these potentially insatiable desires.

... the passions must first be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted the state of equilibrium of the animal's dormant existence; only conscience, therefore, can furnish the means to reestablish it? *(S:248)*.

The expansiveness inherent in such desires, whether organic or sociocultural, can be likened to the rapid diffusion of all forms of energy. Energy, whether it be physical, social, or cultural, Durkheim argued, indefinitely expands its radius of movement. Norms then become containers, as it were, of this vital but always potentially dangerous expansion. As with physical, so with sociocultural, energies; if desires
explode rapidly and massively, then destruction inevitably results. With the coming of market capitalism, especially, the almost infinite expansion of the scope of the market and the range and depth of desires and cultural expectations meant that the radius of energies destructive of self, world, and society has been greatly expanded.

Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body of gas, provided no other matter resists its expansion, fills the immensity of space, so all energy—whether physical or moral—tends to expand itself without limit so long as nothing intervenes to stop it. Hence, the need for regulatory organs, which constrain the total complex of our vital forces within appropriate limits. The nervous system has this function for our physical being. This system actuates the organs and allocates whatever energy is required by each of them. But the moral life escapes the physical system. Neither our brain nor any ganglion can assign limits to our intellectual aspirations or to our wills. For mental life, especially in its more advanced forms, transcends the organism. Sensations and physical appetites express only the conditions of the body, not ideas and complex sentiments. Only a power that is equally spiritual is able to exert influences upon spiritual forces. This spiritual power resides in the authority inherent in moral rules. (ME: 40-1).

Yet, Durkheim's statements remain ambiguous and confusing at many points. A logical point: if, as Durkheim says elsewhere "the natural is necessary," and "only the universal is rational," then how can there be any moral appeal against the clearly generic and natural constitution of human nature? I had thought that, to Durkheim, what is natural and universal could not, by definition, be pathological. However, the same logical problem was endemic in the Enlightenment philosophes' appeal to nature (see R.R. Palmer, 1947, Ernst Cassirer, 1951). Second, clearly Durkheim began to shade over into his second schema. For he insisted that the "mental life" as well as the physical must accept certain constraints. But, on the other hand, how can even physical needs be potentially unlimited? I thought they enjoyed the benefits of an automatic equilibrium with the natural environment. If so, then the Durkheimian "awakening of conscience" was a social and cul-

tural event of the first magnitude; man now became the cultural animal. If any insatiable passions or appetites are to be released, the source can only be society and culture. If the recession of traditional moral discipline over the supposed insatiability of the organic ego, especially in terms of economically expressed desires, releases the "diseases of the infinite," then how can intellectual and moral desires also be potentially unlimited but ignored in the present sociological explanation of rising suicide rates? In short, if man is, indeed, the cultural animal, and if culture grows increasingly rationalized, universalized, and more complex in evolutionary progress, then how can we avoid the conclusion that it is the growth of civilization itself which engenders these infinite aspirations? Specifically, how can we continue to slight the fact that, in the West especially, absolute individualism, crusades to master the world for "God's glory," and drives for unending and relentless "progress and perfection" became massively secularized from at least the seventeenth century onward? How can we ignore such crucial cultural historical facts in our investigations of the ravages of the modern "infinity sickness"? What happens when striving for religious infinities becomes displaced into the finite, into the "muddly actual"? Durkheim himself observed:

All man's pleasure in acting, moving, and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he had advanced. However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal—or what is the same—when his goal is infinity *

Can we any longer seriously hope to plumb the depths of Durkheim's insights unless we pursue, not moralistic philosophies of human nature pitched covertly on biological levels, but properly drawn sociocultural explanations, especially those couched in cultural-historical terms of the development in the West of both absolutizing individualism and a massive, sustained, and ethically subsidized "march toward the infinite"? Such commitments are so deeply embedded in our wills and imaginations and so deeply sedimented in our institutions and culture, that the universal tendency
toward lapsing into "historical amnesia" leads us to pitch these symbolic drives at the generic bio-psychological lev­els. Instead, we should undertake a full-scale exploration of how we came to value individualism and "marches to the infinite" above all else (see Part II, Book Three). Doubt­less, there are many surprises here; yet guided by the an­cient wisdom that virtues, gone to extreme, become vices, can we any longer ignore the foundations and paradoxical consequences of some of our own deepest commitments?

In any case, Durkheim must be given full credit for his discerning insights, as a pioneering sociologist and moral philosopher, into the phenomenological ravages wrought by these "infinities of dreams and desires."

Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feelings of pride at the distance cover­ed can cause only deceptive satisfaction since the re­maining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pur­sue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to con­demn onself to a state of perpetual unhappiness (S:248).

Durkheim next raised the important question of the nature and role of hope in regard to societies where, for whatever reason, the "marches to infinity" reign. Here, hope becomes counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue us pre­cisely when all reason for hope is gone (W. Lynch, 1966).

Of course, man may hope contrary to all reason, and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may sustain him for a time, but it cannot survive the re­peated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What more can the future offer him than the past, since he can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal (S:248)?

It is significant that Durkheim introduced the idea of hope, and its opposite—hopelessness or despair. For unfulfilled expectations lie at the basis of revolt and suicide. As Durk­heim noted, infinite expectations are, by definition, unat­tainable. If hope is not for something real and attainable, if we invest ourselves instead in the hopeless aspiration toward infinities while remaining mired in the finite human
condition, then inevitably disillusionment and despair ensue. Such an aspiration only masks a deeper hopelessness, a deeper estrangement, perhaps even alienation. Hope must be for the possible, we must relearn how to imagine the real, if hope is to perform its necessary function in human affairs.

Durkheim continued, almost epigrammatically pinning our age in one revealing phrase.

"The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall such action be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly, for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half-veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which it entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever encountered. Our thread of life on this conditions is pretty thin, breakable at any instant."

(S:248).

The restlessness we feel, whether it be expressed in economic, artistic, or moral terms, is judged by Durkheim to be both substantively and functionally irrational (see also LaCapra, 1972). This lack of fit should lead us to expect that they must then be supported by some tacit ethical commitments which may have shifted from their original locus and intention to these inappropriate spheres. Our congenital lack of ease—economic, artistic, moral, our dis-ease over the world as it is given over to us—is deeply embedded, not so much in our biological egos, as in our peculiar Western cultural traditions. Because they are so much a part of us, like breathing air, they become invisible.

C. The Social Schedule as the Mechanism Regulating Wants

But how is this type of generic dis-ease to which Durkheim alludes controlled by society? Is there some basic social or economic mechanism regulating the satisfaction of wants? That helps set us at ease by scheduling gratification? Certainly, suggested Durkheim:

Physical restraint would be ineffective; hearts cannot be touched by physico-chemical forces. So far as the appetites are not automatically restrained by physiolo-
gical mechanisms, they can be halted only by a limit that they recognize as just. Men would never consent to restrict their desires if they felt justified in passing the assigned limit. But, for reasons given above, they cannot assign themselves this law of justice. So they must receive it from an authority which they respect, to which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and as a whole, or thought the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law, and to set the point beyond which the passions must not go. Finally, it alone can estimate the reward to be prospectively offered to every class of human functionary, in the name of common interests *(5:248-9).

This passage represents a crucial transition in Durkheim's argument, for he had now begun to translate his abstract premises about the need for regulation of egoistic passions into a basic sociocultural rule. Since human hearts and minds cannot be moved by physical forces, only moral forces are adequate to the task. In moralizing the drives of the organic ego, and generating the desires of the socially constructed person, society constructs parameters for potential satisfactions. Desires within these forms and bounds are legitimate, those beyond are proscribed. Thus, with Max Weber, Durkheim's basic category of control is not power or constraint, but rather legitimate moral authority (as Giddens, 1972a notes). For the socioeconomic order to work, for the individual to be properly motivated, for culture to keep desires within acceptable limits and meaningful forms, certain ratios of satisfaction must be considered legitimate by all.

Specifically, this means that every society must construct some mechanism, accepted generally as legitimate, to regulate the appropriate levels of ratios of satisfaction of individuals in terms of a social schedule. This schedule will be stratified depending upon degrees of functional contribution and cultural honor. Thus, each status position will generally receive the approximate rewards considered legitimate, both by the larger society and by the receiving stratum itself.
At every moment of history there is a dim perception, in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation. The different functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the hierarchy. According to accepted ideas, for example, a certain way of living is considered the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence, and there is another limit below which he is not willingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned himself. Both differ for city and country workers, for the domestic servant and the day-laborer, for the business clerk and the official, etc. Likewise the man of wealth is reproved if he lives the life of a poor man, but also if he seeks refinements of luxury overmuch. Economists may protest in vain; public opinion will always be scandalized if an individual spends too much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even seems that this severity relaxes only in times of moral disturbance * (S:249).

Durkheim here introduced a theorem of major, yet largely unexplored, significance for sociological and economic theory. In Durkheim's theory of the social schedule underlying economic production, distribution, and consumption, price and income ratios are based, to a large extent, on the social contribution and cultural status of different occupations, and on the belief in the legitimacy of their status and the appropriate reward accorded each status.

A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire. However, there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It changes with the increase or decrease of collective revenue, and the changes occurring in the moral ideas of society. Thus, what appears to be luxury to one period no longer does so to another; and the well-being which for long periods was granted to a class only by exception and superogation, finally appears strictly necessary and equitable * (S:249-50).

The Social Schedule of economic satisfaction, then, is a generic socio-economic cultural institution. In turn, significant changes in the social schedule should be registered in the basic alterations of price and income structures.
Historical inquiries might benefit by including this crucial factor in the search for underlying causes of inflation or "price revolutions," for instance.

Throughout his account, Durkheim emphasized the importance of belief in the legitimacy of the sociocultural regulation of wants. Raw power alone is not sufficient to maintain the internal order of the social schedule of incomes and prices (these two factors always being closely related). For people must believe in the rightness, the moral justness of the basic ratios of rankings and rewards.

But it would be of little use for everyone to recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established by public opinion, if he did not also consider the distribution of these functions just. The workman is not in harmony with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his desserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has could not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more precise rule, must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit.... It is possible everywhere, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by superior authority, that is, by collective authority. For it can be established only by requiring of one or another group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and concessions in the name of the public interest *(S:250-51).

Today these are commonplaces of sociology—for all societies combine variable ratios of ascribed and achieved status. But, in general, the former predominates in traditional societies, while the latter predominates in modern societies. Indeed, the modern world is only possible if the highly restrictive social bonds of fraternization of primitive societies rooted in "blood and soil" are progressively set aside in favor of more universalistic bonds. In this world-historical process, the individual person emerges (see Book One), freed from the "too strict tutelage" of sib and cult. However, in terms of anomie, Durkheim suggested that the contemporary process of freeing or releasing the individual ego from traditional
moral constraints has gone to extreme; there must be a re-
dress of the balance.

Against the *laissez-faire* economic moralists, Durkheim
 countered that the first step toward real freedom is self-
control and the internalization of moral discipline (see also
Book One).

It is not true, then, that human activity can be re-
leased from all restraint. Nothing in the world can
enjoy such a privilege. All existence being part of
the universe is relative to the remainder; its nature
and method of manifestation depend not only on itself
but on other beings, who consequently restrain and reg-
ulate it. Here there are differences of degree and form
between the mineral realm and the thinking person. Man's
characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is
not physical, but moral; that is, social. He is governed
not by a material environment brutally imposed on him,
but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority
of which he feels. Because the greater, better part of
his existence transcends the body, he escapes the body's
yoke, but is subject to that of society.* (S:252).

Clearly, even the Durkheim of *Suicide* was no crude Parsonian
type positivist. For he insisted that the constraint exercised
by the external environment is not the key to the human equa-
tion. Rather, man escapes the "body's yoke," and becomes fully
human only by embracing the "yoke of society," that is, the
moral legitimacy of the conscience collective. There is no
real contradiction in this Rousseauean position that one must
give up the primitive anarchy of desires in order to become
free through society, for Durkheim posits a constant dialectic
between release and control. One becomes free from the anar-
chic passions of the organic ego only through embracing the
moral self-discipline afforded by social norms. Indeed, it is
true as Evans-Pritchard (1965) said, paraphrasing Engels,
that Durkheim believed that "man ascends from the kingdom of
necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see also Book One).

In contrast to the moral anarchy of infinite, bound-
less, or indeterminate desires, Durkheim suggested that the
socioeconomic schedule helps to regulate, define, or limit hu-
man wants. Desires are given specific and meaningful form. De-
inition here means the same as in the definition of a concept
or word—namely, the staking out of discernible boundaries, limiting, giving it, as Shakespeare said, "a name and a local habitation." But Durkheim's first theory of anomie rests on the perception that the traditional socioeconomic schedule must have broken down. Why else are we swamped today by an "infinity of dreams and desires"? What else could be the source of this "infinity sickness," this "moral anarchy" that plagues the economic and artistic ethoses especially? Yet, as a close look at the paradoxes of Western history reveals, there is a basic difference between a system breaking down, and a system being broken through, being delegitimized, and then a new alternative and more dynamic system being constructed in its place. But here Durkheim was concerned with the stability given the person by a stable or slowly evolving social schedule.

Under this pressure, each in his own sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects regulations and is docile to collective authority, that is, has a wholesome moral constitution, he feels that is not well to ask more. Thus, an end and goal are set to the passions. Truly, there is nothing rigid nor absolute about such determination. The economic ideal assigned each class of citizens is itself confined to certain limits, within which the desires have free range. But it is not infinite. This relative limitation and the moderation it involves makes men contented with their lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it; and this average contentment causes the feeling of calm, active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living which characterizes health for societies as well as individuals. Each person is then ... in harmony with his condition, and desires only what he may legitimately hope for as the normal reward for his activity. Besides, this does not condemn man to a sort of immobility. He may seek to give beauty to his life; but his attempts in this direction may fail without causing him to despair. For, loving what he has and not fixing his desire solely on what he lacks, his wishes and hopes may fail of what he has happened to aspire to, without his being wholly destitute. He has the essentials. The equilibrium of his happiness is secure because it is defined, and a few mishaps cannot disconcert him. 

Exonerating himself from imputations of conservatism, Durkheim thus made clear his essential kinship with the ancient moral
philosophy of the "golden mean." "Human experience sees the
case of happiness in the golden mean" (DL:237). And, of
course, in the Nichomachean Ethics, a book Durkheim certainly
knew, Aristotle said: "Evil belongs to the indeterminate, good
to the determinate.... excess and deficiency characterize
vice, while the mean characterizes virtue" (1962:43; see also
Book Three of the present dissertation).

D. The Release of the Ego's Insatiable Passions in the
Modern Transitional Crisis

But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or
beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily in-
capable of exercising this influence; thence comes the
sudden rises in the curve of suicides... (S:252).

Durkheim thus next observed that when the stability of society
and moral discipline are disrupted, the legitimacy of the so-
cial schedule is also challenged, whether implicitly or expli-
citly, and, as a consequence, becomes less able to restrain
and direct individual desires. Although in normal times, Durk-
heim suggested, people more or less accept the basic ratios
of reward, in extraordinary or revolutionary times these are
no longer inevitably regarded as just or legitimate. Raw po-
lice power is then needed to maintain and enforce the inequi-
ties in distribution. Taking his notion of stable and disrup-
ted social equilibrium from Saint Simon's idea of "organic"
and "critical societies," Durkheim argued that the latter
type of period is "abnormal."

... discipline can be useful only if considered just by
the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained by
only customs and force, peace and harmony are illu-
sory: the spirit of unrest and discontent are latent;
appetites superficially restrained are ready to revolt.
This happened in Rome and Greece when the faiths under-
lying the old organization of the patricians and pleb-
ians were shaken, and in our modern societies when a-
ristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascen-
dancy. But this state of upheaval is exceptional: it
occurs only when society is passing through some ab-
normal crisis. In normal conditions, the collective or-
der is regarded as just by the great majority of per-
sons. Therefore, when we say that an authority is ne-
cessary to impose this order on individuals, we certainly
do not mean that violence is the only means of establishing it. Since this regulation is meant to restrain individual passions, it must come from a power which dominates individuals; but this power must also be obeyed through respect, not fear (S:251-2).

In short, the socioeconomic schedule of satisfaction of wants will inevitably break down if enforced only by raw power. Only widespread belief in the moral legitimacy of a set of ratios of reward will suffice. Thus, just as contemporary stock markets experience crises of confidence, so, too, the most critical times which societies and their economies undergo are when there is a widespread doubt or uncertainty concerning the dominant system of legitimate authority; of course, revolutions are one outcome.

However, one can hardly refrain from asking: given Durkheim's philosophically and historically based schema of release and control, precisely what are the historical sources of the progressive breakdown of moral discipline, and thus the release of egocentric and insatiable desires in the modern world? Could it also be that the release of such egocentric and insatiable desires might themselves be the unanticipated result of the extreme development of a certain peculiar type of moral discipline? Is there a real historical possibility that release of egocentric "infinities of dreams and desires" may be normatively or culturally sanctioned? In other words, that anomie and egoisme may be the result of the presence, rather than the absence, of moral discipline? Perhaps there are a series of historical paradoxes hidden here which remain untapped by Durkheim's rather bland mechanical model underlying his first schema. For it would seem that even Durkheim himself might agree, since the legitimacy of moral authority was his fundamental category here, that if the socioeconomic schedule is basically upset, then its traditional and revered legitimacy must also come to be fundamentally challenged by some group. How can we believe otherwise—that the legitimacy of the old ways and ratios of reward were simply eroded by the mechanical progress of the division of labor? Often these type of challenges are advanced on moral grounds, much
as the heralds of the new social and economic order ushered in by international market capitalism were themselves moral prophets appealing to a new structure of conscience formed in the secularized air of ascetic Calvinism (eg. Adam Smith and the Scottish moralists). Such moral challenges—the competition of one type of charisma against another—are most complex symbolic sociocultural processes, which are not adequately portrayed in mechanical terms. For how can mechanical processes include rhetorical processes, questions of moral legitimacy, and so forth? If moral challenges to existing legitimate authority, and the progressive substitution of a new and more rigorous system is the central problem, then the question of the nature and source of egocentric insatiability might change also. In short, why has the traditional social schedule broken down? Was it because of the cumulative impacts of the mechanically driven division of labor (see Part II of this Book). Or was it, perhaps, due to a long series of rhetorical challenges and conflicts between competing systems of moral authority (see Book Three)?

Whatever the causes, the result of this breakdown or weakening of the moral legitimacy of the traditional social schedule of satisfaction of wants is similar. The ratio assigned each group becomes disturbed, uncertain, unsatisfying. The individual becomes deregulated, declassified, or, in Durkheim's terms, demoralized. Once it is released from collective moral discipline, the pre-social ego reverts to type. And the intervening process of "moral reeducation" is inevitably painful.

In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous one. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All the advantages of social influence are lost so far as they are concerned; their moral education has to be recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantaneously to this new life and teach them to practice the increased self-repression to which they are unaccustomed. So they are not adjusted to the condition forced on them; and its very prospect is intolerable; hence,
the suffering which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they made a trial of it (S:252).

Paradoxically, this painful "moral reeducation" commences both when things change for the worse and for the better. But why should people grow unhappy when things rapidly get better? And conversely, why shouldn't poverty itself lead to despair and perhaps even to suicide? Our economic and materialist presuppositions regarding the logic of rising human expectations run into a brick wall here. Why should wealth—the epitome of individual success in modern society—lead to unhappiness so severe that men can no longer bear the afflictions of affluence?

It is the same if the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs are regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint on aspirations * (S:252-3).

Thus, at the core of Durkheim's theory of anomie is the presumption that the immoderate desires congenital to human nature are released when individuals are morally deregulated in the wake of economic crisis or social transformation. When the change is as fundamental as the wrenching metamorphosis from traditional to market society, this "state of deregulation or anomie" becomes chronic.

If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the principles controlling the distribution of men among various occupations. Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion, become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to
to them.... With increased prosperity, desires increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of deregulation or anomie is thus further heightened by passions becoming less disciplined, precisely when they need more disciplining * (S:253).

In prolonged disruptions, then, the whole occupational scale is upset. Deregulation leads to release of sensual appetites. Individuals and groups act entirely for their own self-interest. In this sense, anomie refers to the historical socio-economic condition in which the traditional schedule of expectations has broken down so that sensual appetites are not merely released but even stimulated.

Durkheim's sociological concern with the breakdown of the traditional social regulation of wants is important. The release of constantly escalating demands leads those not similarly favored to resent others' advances. Indeed, perhaps one of the key sociological supports underlying the upward wage-price spiral in modern economies is precisely this pervasive deregulation and continuing release of competing collective egoisms. Perhaps inflation has a key sociocultural foundation. This real possibility might have been explored had we sufficiently noted Durkheim's thesis that the ratio of scheduled rewards is relational—that is, relative deprivation is a key motivating force.

But then their very demands make fulfillment impossible. Overweening ambition always exceeds the results obtained, great as they may be, since there is no warning to pause here. Nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement. Above all, since this race for an unattainable goal can give no other pleasure but that of the race itself ... once it is interrupted the participants are left empty-handed. At the same time, the struggle grows more violent and painful, both from being less controlled and because competition is greater. All classes contend among themselves because no established classification any longer exists. Effort grows just when it has become less productive. How could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions * (S:253)?

I propose that insatiable and escalating competition between
occupational groups is an independent contribution to inflation. We would well to remember that market capitalism was legitimized by the Enlightenment Utilitarian moralists as a projection of the law of nature, the "war of each against all," of "nature red in tooth and claw." If unending and unrestrained competition becomes the accepted norm, then what results is a kind of sanctioned anarchy, a legitimate socio-economic civil war in which each group practices a kind of extortion vis-a-vis other groups.

It is most interesting to observe that, contrary to Merton and his legions of followers, Durkheim argued that poverty acts to immunize against anomie because it serves as a restraint in itself. The moral virtue of poverty which Durkheim emphasized, along with traditional religious moralists, is that there is no ever-widening gulf between our efforts and the hopes aroused by infinite aspirations. There is no gulf, and therefore no widening despair, because the infinite goals entertained by religious ascetics--by those who embrace or "choose poverty" as St. Dominic counseled--are not to be satisfied through economic means. Clearly, something crucial must have changed or shifted for moral and religious drives for "progress and perfection" to have been transformed or translated into secular economic action. Normally, for those mired in secular poverty there are no infinite aspirations.

Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired to. So the less one has, the less he is tempted to extend the range of his need indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, it prepares us to accept collective discipline with
equanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten.* (S:254).

Durkheim as a moral philosopher critical of the modern world is clearly in the forefront here. Indeed, in contrast to the traditional Western moral philosophy of "human finitude" and the "golden mean" (e.g. see LaCapra, 1972; Hadyn, 1950), the modern world somehow has come to sanction the legitimacy of unlimited aspirations, the rightness of an "infinity of dreams and desires." Indeed, the stimulation of infinite desires is the very cornerstone of modern economic growth. In this regard it is interesting to recall that Keynes' diagnosis of the underlying ills causing the Great Depression of the 1930's was that demand was not being sustained on sufficiently massive levels to absorb the productive capacity, and thus keep the great industrial engine of modern economies going. One of the meanings, therefore, of post-Keynesian economics is that the traditional relations between supply and demand have been inverted. No longer can manufacturers rely on the practical common sense of people to recognize that they constantly need new and ever-more superfluous consumer goods. Rather, through massive, subliminally directed advertising, they seek to convince consumers to believe that they constantly need these proliferating product lines. Fashion changes and restyling are part of the same process. Hence, one of the secrets underlying much of the continuous expansion of the American economy since World War II is the constant stimulation of an "infinity of dreams and desires;" this underlies the high mass consumption economy. (Incidentally, recognition of some of these mechanisms helping to fuel insatiable desires further weakens Durkheim's first notion that human nature is inherently insatiable; if that were the case, manufacturers would be relieved of much of the necessity of pumping billions of dollars annually into media advertising!) The imperative underlying the continual escalation of the contemporary social schedule be-
comes clear: first create demand through advertising and other means, then gear up to supply the demand that you have just stimulated. Such an inversion of the traditional relations between supply and demand also helps to minimize risk and uncertainty, the old nemesis of businessmen and bureaucrats.

In a sense, Durkheim the rationalistic "laic" moralist was one with traditional metaphysics and moral theology when he noted that "the less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitations appear;" and when he reflected that the "spirit of rebellion is the very source of immorality." It is interesting to note that religious philosophers have traditionally given another name to that type of "moral immorality" or "immoral rebellion" which Durkheim perceived at the very heart of anomie--namely, acedia. Etymologically, acedia means "not to yield," that is, not to yield to the will of God or to acquiesce in His system of world-order. Now, Merton's historical erudition alerted him to this older usage which he assigned, in the case of the medieval monk, to the category of "retreatism" (see appendix). In Durkheim's typology, this usage would roughly correspond with "fatalisme."

However, there is another possibility here: for besides passive resignation, there is also an alternative drive for active mastery and control. Merton, as did Zetterberg (1967) after him in speaking of a kind of "academic acedia," (eg. in the case of Darwin's or Weber's prolonged melancholia), saw the state as one of deepening apathy, "anhedonia," and even generalized despair. But the philosopher Josep Pieper has given another, deeper meaning, to acedia. Pieper proposed that the "contrary of acedia is man's happy and cheeful affirmation of his own being, his acquiescence in the world and in God" (1963:39). The reason, then, why religious moralists have often seen "anomic acedia" as a form of metaphysical rebellion is not only because of the challenge to "God's order" in an active sense, but also because of the tacit refusal to accept "God's gift" in the more passive sense. So, whatever
forms an obstacle to the fundamental acquiescence of the self to its natural place in the cosmos--whether these be fundamentally negative images of world or of self--can lead to acedia as a corollary of anomie. And, of course, systems of cosmology and ethics which would deny out of hand that man has any natural place to stand are inevitably linked to various forms of anomic self-destruction, also. What matters here most is the possible attitude of primal hostility or fundamental acceptance of the world. Significantly, Pieper added that idleness and the incapacity for leisure are twins in human despair.

Leisure is only possible when a man is at one with himself, when he acquiesces in his being; whereas the essence of acedia is the refusal to acquiesce in one's own being. Idleness and the incapacity for leisure correspond with one another (1963:40).

It is a profound insight into the ravages of the "children of despair" upon the modern mind and soul that there is a fundamental commonality underlying these two seemingly opposite and unrelated states--namely, extreme energy and extreme paralysis. For the instantaneous and the endless are but two sides of the same gnostic coin (eg. see W. Lynch, 1966). Differently put, it comes down to the difference between "unreal city, under the brown fog of a winter dawn" (T.S. Eliot), and "Soul, clap its hands and sing" (W. B. Yeats).

The final element Durkheim added to the first installment of his theory of anomie was that of time and historical process. The socially and culturally carried moral discipline that once helped constrain passionate desires is no longer effective. For whatever reasons, the ego's sensual appetites are released from the constraining mold of moral reglementation. Anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors of the modern world, especially in commerce, industry, the professions, among intellectuals, artists, the upper middle and educated classes, and so on. At these specific sites, the remaining strength of the traditional social schedules is weakened to the greatest extent. At these locations, where externalized desires and inward dreams are most insistently
individualized, the underlying reason is that the traditional social schedule is chronically upset, thus releasing the insatiable egoism inherent in human nature. By historical contrast, in earlier and more stable societies, traditional social schedules, enforced by a shifting network of institutions (eg. kinship, religion, government, occupational groups, etc.), worked to constrain, regulate, and redirect individual wants. But today no social or cultural mechanism in "market society" works to discipline the always latent "diseases of the infinite." However, the historical situation is even further inverted. Whereas in earlier societies deviation from the traditional social schedule were punished as illegitimate, today no regulation is perceived as legitimate. In other words, the market itself became a deus ex machina by taking over the place of former ethical principles in working to regulate desires in a mechanical manner through egoistic competition. Indeed, this implicit recognition of the legitimization of insatiable desires, of a culturally sanctioned "longing for the infinite," lies at the very heart of Durkheim's second schema. When we couple Durkheim's keen phenomenological insight with the actual historical fact that the key ethical supports for market capitalism first emerged from the secularization of Calvinistic moral thought in the Scottish Enlightenment, the evidence becomes compelling: modern anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimized insatiability (themselves deflections of the earlier Calvinistic ethos).

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's notions underlying the historical transformation from earlier forms of moral regulation to modern "moral anarchy."

Durkheim began by emphasizing two important facts. One, anomie is chronic, not intermittent, in the modern world. Two, anomie is most intense in the most advanced areas of commerce, industry, science, and so forth. We should always remember that Durkheim's empirical points of departure were the infinite drives for "progress and perfection," the infinities of
aspiration and ego seen in modern economic and intellectual culture.

If anomie never appeared except ... in intermittent spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social suicide rate to vary from time to time, but it would not be a regular, constant, factor. In one sphere of social life, however—the sphere of trade and industry—it is actually in a chronic state (S:254).

Durkheim noted that in traditional societies several social institutions served to regulate satisfaction of individual desires through the economic sphere. In medieval and early modern European society, for instance, various levels of government and occupational groups such as guilds restrained competition and thus regulated desires. However, in modern societies, religion, government, and guild-like groups have lost much of their regulatory power over economic life. Indeed, in the Utilitarian doctrine, the political sphere was to support and stimulate the market economy, but not to regulate or constrain it (see especially Elie Halley, 1955). Their heretical heirs, the critical radicals (ie. Marxists), merely moved one step further and freely reveled in economic control by governments who committed all their resources to economic modernization, industrialization, to "Taylorization" and "electrification of the nation." Durkheim made the acute observation that for all modern nations, socialist and capitalistic alike, economic growth and industrial prosperity constitute the central goal of economic and social life (see also Part II of this Book).

For a whole century, economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation. Until very recently, it was the function of a whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline. First, the influence of religion was felt alike by workers and masters, the poor and the rich. It consoled the former and taught them contentment with their lot by informing them of the providential nature of the social order, that the sphere of each class was assigned by God Himself, and by holding out the hope for just compensation in a world to come in return for the inequalities of this world. It governed the latter, recalling that worldly interests are not man's entire lot, that they must be subordinate to other and higher interests, and that they should therefore not be pursued with-
out rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over them and by the relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income in which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances (S:254).

Later in Suicide Durkheim proposed to reappropriate the morality of occupational groups as a remedy for anomie (see Part II of this Book). Durkheim's occupational and economic remedies were based on the incisive political insight that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the individual became stranded between the huge and the small, between the remnants of the family and the modern state, with no effective intermediary institutions to intervene on his behalf (see Giddens, 1971c; Reinhard Bendix, 1960a). Durkheim's solution to the historical problem posed by his first schema depended on a structural remedy for both a structural and a cultural problem; therein lay its essential weakness. Surely we cannot uncritically accept Durkheim's tacit notion that structural fusion inevitably leads to normative regulation. Here Durkheim took pains to emphasize that he was not an historical reactionary, that the socioeconomic and cultural context which nourished the guilds had passed. In facing up to the enormity of the modern problems of anomie, there is no real possibility of resurrecting antiquated forms inadequate to the present task.

We do not mean to propose this organization as a model. Clearly, it would be inadequate to existing societies without great changes. What we stress is its existence, the fact of its useful influence, and that nothing today has taken its place. Actually, religion has lost most of its power. And government, instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the later leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue, and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it
any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On both sides, nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the implication of the dogma of economic materialism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems. And as these theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike *(8:255).

Now, if "industrial prosperity" is the "chief aim" of modern nations, this goal is itself the outcome of "public opinion." Clearly, then, the "dogma of economic materialism" must also then be a reflection of some deeply held ethical beliefs from which it derived its dogmatic or sacred status. In other words, it must be culturally sanctioned. Durkheim rightly noted that both the exponents of market capitalism and bureaucratic socialism share this underlying dogma, and the underlying logics of Utilitarianism. Now, the contrast between both these modern socioeconomic systems and all those preceding the modern world is most instructive. Karl Polanyi (1968) worked out a schema of the dominant rationales and organizational logics of different historical types of economic systems which may be of value here. As Polanyi observed, in primitive or "reciprocally" organized economies, this sphere of human action was subordinated to the ruling rationales of another institution—the kinship group. In archaic, agrarian "redistributive" economies, economic action was governed by the fusion of political-religious-military rationales. The unique feature of "market capitalism" is that, for the first time in world history, the economy was freed from all traditional moral restraints. Purely Utilitarian economic rationales (atomism, the logic of means-ends efficiency, insatiability, etc.), and the automatic balance mechanism of the "invisible hand" began instead to dominate all social action and cultural values. Everything became subordinated to the impersonal, mechanical, natural "iron laws" of the automatically self-equilibrating market. Instead of economic action being the means to the material survival of the group,
a momentous historical inversion of ruling moral rationales or dominant motivations took place. Economics, in terms of the semi-magical mechanisms of market capitalism, had been freed from its instrumental role, and had, instead, become elevated to the first rung of the hierarchy of sacred values. That this was done in the name of the liberation of the individual and the potential productive powers of modern societies does not change this devastating unintentioned (and far too often unacknowledged) result. Consequently, modern social institutions have been subordinated to the ethically sanctioned "iron laws" of the automatic market mechanism. The market itself became the chief means of social control and moral discipline. Moreover, the Utilitarian moralists positively enjoined "endless strivings."

Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege. For this reason, even the purely utilitarian regulation of them exercised by the industrial world itself through the medium of occupational groups has been unable to persist. Ultimately, this liberation of desires has been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market.

So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not overmuch excite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects? (S:255-6)

Clearly, if the release of sensual appetites is "sanctified," if their restraint "seems like sacrilege," then they must be morally sanctioned; Durkheim's use of sacral metaphors here is no mistake.

Durkheim proceeded with his critical moral phenomenology of the despair induced in the economic arena by the frustration of constantly rising expectations (and one might add prices!)

Such is the source of the excitement predominating in this part of society, and which has thence extended to the other parts. There, the state of crisis and anomie is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to bot-
tom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn becomes reality. A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth, one has no strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and the sterility of the tumult is apparent, and it is seen that all these new sensations in their infinite quantity cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without having constantly to replace them with others, finds in them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived with his eyes fixed upon it, has nothing in the past as a comfort against the present's afflictions; for the past was nothing to him but a series of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his expectation always to find further on the happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or ahead to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the end escape the futility of an endless pursuit.

Durkheim constantly expanded on this theme of the psychological ravages of the "yearning for infinity," of the exhaustion of the will and the collapse of the imagination throughout his classic monograph on suicide, especially in the chapter on "Individual Forms of Suicide." Durkheim then directly related this psychological condition to insatiability and suicides in the economic arena.

We may even wonder if this moral state is not principally what makes economic catastrophes of our day so fertile in suicides. In societies where a man is subjected to a healthy discipline, he submits more readily to the blows of chance. The necessary effort for sustaining a little more discomfort costs him relatively little, since he is used to discomfort and constraint. But when constraint is hateful in itself, how can closer constraint not seem intolerable? There is no tendency to resignation in the feverish impatience of men's lives. When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how painful to be thrown back! Now this very lack of organization throws the door open wide to every sort of adventure. Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it groipes at random.
Setbacks necessarily increase with risks, and thus crises multiply, just when they are becoming destructive *(S:256-7).*

Yet, Durkheim admitted that these "thirsts for novelty," for ever-changing stimulation," "when constraint is hateful in itself," are morally legitimized. In historical and cultural terms, Durkheim clearly recognized that these insatiable and egoistic passions cannot be adequately explained as inherent in human nature. For, contrary to Durkheim's underlying causal model in his first schema, if the individual ego is simply released from traditional moral discipline, then why should this amorality become sanctified? No, "eternal dissatisfaction" is not simply due to the release of the organic ego from traditional regulation. Rather, embarking upon infinite quests, going back at least to the ascetics and mystics of the Mediterranean deserts, and to the sedimentation of Christianity in medieval Gothic culture (see Spengler's notion of "Faustian Man," 1922), have been, and continue to be, preached and morally sanctified by certain leading groups. These culturally and structurally powerfully situated groups socialized masses of people over a long period of time into internalizing these norms and images, if not as moral virtues at least as the means of successful competition. Truly such drives are deeply embedded in our cultural traditions.

Yet these dispositions are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is accustomed to think of them as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer *(S:257).*

Again, if "these dispositions are so inbred that society has grown to accept them as normal," and if it is claimed that man's nature is to be "eternally dissatisfied," and, indeed, if "the longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction," how can we escape the conclusion that egoisme and anomie are culturally sanctioned? That they are
themselves the result of moral obligations gone to extreme? At this point, however, Durkheim did not deal with the problem of the origin of the "longing for infinity," these deeply "inbred predispositions."

More importantly, the actual evidence here was forcing Durkheim to shift on his analytical axes. For next he began to acknowledge that if the "longing for infinity" comes only from "unregulated consciences," nonetheless, these must be considered new rationales of conscience because they, as Durkheim ambiguously stated, "elevated to a rule the very lack of rule from which they suffer." Thus, contrary to Durkheim's initial presumptions, the clear implication that emerges from careful review of his own analysis is that these new structures of conscience are led by their inherited cultural norms to actively resist traditional constraints and to be self-regulating—to be self-interrogating, to have an "internal gyroscope" as David Riesman once suggested of the "inner-directed person"—much as the market mechanism that supposedly governs all our fates is also supposed to be automatically self-equilibrating. The rejection of traditional moral control and the elevation of absolute or atomistic individualism and the pursuit of infinite tasks within the world became the new constitutive norms for modern consciences, the very heart and soul of the "New Modern Man" pioneering the "Brave New World." Clearly, market capitalism, Utilitarian theory, industrialization, professionalization, and so on, as Weber (eg. 1968) demonstrated, have continuing ethical foundations. Among contemporary sociologists, Talcott Parsons has for many years rightly insisted that modern economies are underlain by secularized Calvinistic ethics.

The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith.... Industrial and commercial functions are really among the occupations which furnish the greatest number of suicides. Almost on a level with the liberal professions, they sometimes surpass them; they are especially more afflicted than agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make their appearance felt most and where the fever of business has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what
was once the general constitution of the economic order. And the divergence would be greater yet if, among the suicides of industry, employers were distinguished from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken by the state of anomie. The enormous rate of those with independent means sufficiently shows that the possessors of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces subordination attenuates the effects of this state. At least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by those above them, and for this reason their desires are modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them (S:257).

Suicide can be seen as Durkheim's ironic epistle to the modern world. In The Division of Labor he refuted the Utilitarian's argument that we specialized in order to produce more in order to increase our happiness, saying that "nothing could be less certain." Indeed, much of his later analysis was foreshadowed in his early article "Suicide et natalite" (1888). In Suicide, Durkheim took this analysis several steps further. He asked, in effect, how it can be the case that if "drives for progress and perfection" are meant to make us happier, they often lead instead to dissatisfaction bordering on a kind of endemic loneliness and restlessness—in short, despair? Why is it that "the more we have, the more we want"? Is it really man's nature to be "eternally dissatisfied"? If so, then is it also man's nature to face eternal unhappiness? How could such a self-contradictory apparition survive? Durkheim as moralist raised these and other questions which we must now explore, keeping in mind that we must go beyond Durkheim himself in seeking answers.

E. Matrimonial Anomie: Divorce as Deregulation

A bit later in Suicide, Durkheim turned briefly from the mainline of his argument to illustrate yet another instance of anomic deregulation, specifically the release of insatiable passions or sensual appetites through divorce and other factors mitigating against the strength of the marriage bond. Although the specific details are different than in
economic anomie, matrimonial anomie involved the same basic principle—namely, the weakening of moral discipline over the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. As a basic social institution, marriage meant moral regulation of sensual appetites to Durkheim. Divorce, on the other hand, "implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation."

The institution of divorce must itself cause suicide through its effect on marriage. After all, what is marriage? A regulation of sexual relations, including not merely the physical instincts which this intercourse involves but the feelings of every sort gradually grafted by civilization on the foundation of physical desire. For among us love is a far more mental than organic fact. A man looks to a woman, not merely to the satisfaction of the sexual impulse. Though this natural proclivity has been the germ of all sexual evolution, it has become increasingly complicated with aesthetic and moral feelings, numerous and varied, and today it is only the smallest element of the total complex process to which it has given birth. Under the influence of these intellectual elements it has itself been partially freed from its physical nature and assumed something like an intellectual one. Moral reasons as well as physical needs impel love. Hence, it no longer has the regular, automatic periodicity which it displays in animals. A psychological impulse may awaken it any time: it is not seasonal. But just because these various inclinations, thus changed, do not directly depend upon organic necessities, social regulation becomes necessary. They must be restrained by society since the organism has no means of restraining them. This is the function of marriage. It completely regulates the life of passion, and monogamic marriage more strictly than any other. For by forcing a man to attach himself forever to the same woman it assigns a strictly definite object to the need for love, and closes the horizon.

Certainly, Durkheim was right in observing that, on the human level, love has many dimensions; it is at the same time, physical, emotional, sociocultural, and moral. But, by the very fact that socioculturally generated desires are now recognized as working down to redirect organic needs, can it be legitimately claimed that the release of biological desire is the central cause of matrimonial anomie? Surely this question has become even more urgent today, when there are often more divorces (or "dissolutions of marriage") than marriages,
when "open marriage, "swinging," and one-parent families have become the norm for large segments of the population.

Now, one can hardly wish to maintain that physical sexual relations retain the central position in man as in lower animals. For, by definition, man is the cultural animal. Not only do culture and society restrict the immediate satiation of organic and sexual desires, but they also generate myriad other activities that tend to crowd out purely organic activities from the center stage of human concern. While being partially weakened in their purely organic state, these lower level needs are restricted, redirected, and differentially stimulated by special social conditions and cultural mandates. To maintain Durkheim's two level model of man with insatiable and egoistic passions erupting from lower organic levels, and controlled or released on higher sociocultural levels, is simply sociologically untenable. Rather, the true sociocultural position would be to reverse the causal sequence, and be primarily concerned instead with the subtle ways in which social influences and cultural sanctions feedback down and reorient lower biological and psychological levels.

In terms of the freer (at least traditionally) sexual partner--the man--Durkheim's view was that marriage acts to regulate and redirect organic urges. With the sociocultural transcendence of the periodic or seasonal mating systems of higher primates, Durkheim argued, the sexual horizon in man has become potentially unlimited. The function of marriage, then, is moral--to "regulate the life of passion," "to close the horizon."

This determination is what forms the state of moral equilibrium from which the husband benefits. Being unable to seek other satisfactions than those permitted, without transgressing his duty, he restricts his desires to them. The salutary discipline to which he is subjected makes it his duty to find his happiness in his lot, and by doing so supplies him with the means. Besides, if his passion is forbidden to stray, its fixed object is forbidden to fail him; the obligation is reciprocal. Though his enjoyment is restricted, it is assumed and this certainty forms his mental foundation (S:270-1).
In contrast to the married man, the unmarried male enjoys no such moral reglementation of his sensual appetites. Inevitably, according to Durkheim, his inherently egoistic and insatiable passions are released from moral control—"he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing." This is the "Don Juan" syndrome.

The lot of the unmarried man is different. As he has the right to form attachment wherever inclination leads him, he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing. This morbid desire for the infinite which everywhere accompanies anomie may as readily assail this as any other part of our consciousness; it very often assumes a sexual form which was described by Musset. When one is no longer checked, one becomes unable to check one's self. Beyond experienced pleasures one senses and desires others; if one happens almost to have exhausted the range of what is possible, one dreams of the impossible; one thirsts for the nonexistent. [Footnote: see the monologue of Faust in Goethe's work]. How can the feelings not be exacerbated by such unending pursuits? For them to reach that state, one need not even have infinitely multiplied the experiences of love and lived the life of a Don Juan. The humdrum existence of the ordinary bachelor suffices. New hopes constantly awake, only to be deceived, leaving a trail of weariness and disillusionment behind them. How can desire, then, become fixed, being uncertain that it can retain what it attracts; for the anomie is two-fold. Just as the person makes no definitive gift of himself, he has definitive title to nothing. The uncertainty of the future plus his own indeterminateness therefore condemns him to constant change. The result of it all is a state of disturbance, agitation and discontent which inevitably increases the possibilities of suicide * (S:271).

Now, according to Durkheim, divorce has a similar effect—it releases the potentially insatiable sensual appetites of the ego from matrimonial regulation. Instead of one definite object for their attentions, passions are suddenly opened up to an infinite series of possibilities with no restraining horizon.

Divorce implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation. Where it exists, and especially where law and custom permit its excessive practice, marriage is nothing but a weakened simulacrum of itself; it is an inferior form of marriage. It cannot produce its useful effects to the same degree. Its restraint upon desire is weakened; since it is more easily disturbed and superseded, it controls passion less and passion tends to rebel. It
consents less readily to its assigned limit. The moral
calmness and tranquility which were the husband's
strength are less; they are replaced to some extent by
an uneasiness which keeps a man from being satisfied
with what he has. Besides, he is the less inclined to
become attached to his present state as his enjoyment
of it is not completely sure: the future is less cer-
tain. One cannot be strongly restrained by a chain which
may be broken on one side or another at any moment. One
cannot help looking beyond one's own position when the
ground underfoot does not feel secure. Hence, in the
countries where marriage is strongly tempered by di-
vorce, the immunity of the married man is inevitably
less. As he resembles the unmarried under this regime,
he inevitably loses some of his own advantages. Conse-
quently, the total number of suicides rise (S:271-2).

As always, Durkheim's explanations are ingenious. But we can
hardly follow him in his sociology of men and women. For, as
noted earlier, Durkheim's sociology of sex roles is a "mud-
dled doctrine." His sociology of marriage is certainly open
to serious question. Whereas traditional explanations of the
marriage bond stress the protection of the woman, and the
granting of moral and legal guarantees to her, Durkheim con-
tended that marriage actually works for the man's benefit,
since it helps restrain passions that the male could not
control otherwise by himself.

Thus we reach a conclusion quite different from the
current idea of marriage and its role. It is supposed
to have been originated for the wife, to protect her
weakness against masculine caprices. Monogamy, espe-
sially, is often represented as a sacrifice made by man
of his polygamous instincts, to raise and improve wo-
man's condition in marriage. Actually, whatever histor-
ical causes may have made him accept this restriction,
he benefits more by it. The liberty he thus renounces
could only be a source of torment to him. Women did not
have the same reasons to abandon it and, in this sense,
we may say that by submitting to the same rule, it was
she who made the sacrifice *(S:275-6).

After mentioning the supposed sacrifice of the woman's sex-
ual liberty in marriage, and the acceptance of an oftentimes
oppressive restriction of her horizon of emotional attach-
ment, Durkheim appended his famous footnote on the fourth
type of suicide--fatalistic--to which we now turn.
CHAPTER FOUR

FATALISME AND PASSIVE RESIGNATION IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSIVE MORAL REGLEMENTATION

Surely, fatalisme is the "neglected stepchild" of Durkheim's typology. No less a leading light than Talcott Parsons, in his famous *The Structure of Social Action*, managed to completely ignore fatalisme; the balance had not yet been redressed thirty years later in his 1968 *Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences* article on Durkheim. Accordingly, Dohrenwend's major task in 1959 was to somehow fit fatalisme into a Parsonian or normative framework. However, although Durkheim did not help us much in delineating the characteristics of fatalistic suicides, I trust that we can recognize how well it fits into his first underlying schema.

Clearly, fatalisme and anomie are opposites in at least two senses. First, as noted earlier, the very terms themselves give us strong clues as to their essential meaning. For just as anomie refers to the release of infinite desires, so does fatalisme refer to a sort of passive resignation to oppressive moral regulation. I believe Durkheim chose the term fatalisme to imply what we commonly mean—namely, resignation to one's fate, whether it be assigned by blind chance or society and history. Fatalisme thus implies the extreme confinement of expectations in a narrow order, to a "claustrophobic" way of life. On the contrary, anomie signifies the ominous yet tempting presence of a constantly expanding horizon of desires, a constantly renewed diversity of stimulation, a constantly lifting or receding of constraints. Anomie is "Faustian"—for it presumes accelerating expansion to infinite horizons. Second, anomie and fatalisme are not merely generic opposites, but
historical ones as well. As Parsons noted that "altruisme is on the same plane as mechanical solidarity," so, too, should we note that the opposite of modern anomie is the sociocultural and psychological state where the mandates of the traditional collective conscience, rooted ultimately in sacral and magical rationales, fatally over-burden the individual. With anomie the individual is deregulated, with fatalisme he is over-regulated.

Just as Durkheim used the example of the army as an illustration of altruistic suicide in the modern world mainly as an evolutionary holdover, so, too, he used the oppressive matrimonial regulation of men and women as an example of the survival of an over-bearing traditional collective conscience. It must be emphasized, however, that the prime historical location of both altruisme and fatalisme is traditional society (see, for example, Edward Banfield, 1967). I repeat: altruisme and fatalisme always have a prime historical referent, as do anomie and egoisme.

... there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are opposites. It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. It is the suicide of very young husbands, of the married woman who is childless. So for completeness sake, we should set up a fourth suicidal type.

But it has so little contemporary importance and examples are so hard to find aside from the cases just mentioned that it seems useless to dwell upon it. However, it might be said to have historical interest. Do not the suicides of slaves, said to be frequent under certain conditions, belong to this type, or all suicides attributed to excessive physical or moral despotism? To bring out the ineluctible and inflexible nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression "anomie" we might call it fatalistic suicide *(S:276)*.

Indeed, the paucity of textual evidence here leaves us little choice other than to simply take Durkheim at his word that he included fatalisme mainly for the sake of completeness and internal consistency. In explaining his apparent lack of concern with fatalisme as a type, Durkheim con-
tended that it is of "little contemporary importance;" presumably because there are few sociocultural sites in the modern world where the ego is over regulated! Clearly, fatalisme is primarily of evolutionary significance. Fatalisme and its twin, altruisme, are to be seen as different modes of expression of the same fundamental cultural content--namely, the overwhelming emphasis in primitive or archaic societies on the predominance of the collective conscience over the individual. The altruistic suicide actively accepts the moral demand of self-sacrifice for the group, while the fatalistic suicide passively resigns himself to the inevitability of his collectively assigned fate. He does not struggle with his inexorable destiny, he simply attempts to escape from it by usurping his one last right and possession--the refusal to live and submit to an awful fate. The altruistic suicide thus deprives his oppressive group of its object of extreme reglementation. If we apply, in turn, Durkheim's crucial notion of the social schedule of satisfaction of wants and expectations to altruisme and fatalisme, as did Durkheim himself with anomie, a different picture than commonly presented emerges. And if we pull together the time frames of both sets of suicide the schema again takes on a different and perhaps more profound meaning. Indeed, we shall undertake this task in Book Three in exploring the foundations of Durkheim's second implicit typology of suicide.

But let us first turn to consider in some detail Durkheim's own explanations of the origins of the modern crisis of anomie and egoisme. This task shall occupy our attention in Part II of this Book.
PART II: THE CONTEMPORARY TRANSITIONAL CRISIS
AND MODERN MORAL ANARCHY

We are living precisely in one of those critical, revolutionary periods, when authority is usually weakened through the loss of traditional discipline—a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy (ME: 54).

Preface. Against abstracted formalizations of Durkheim's schemas of suicide, Anthony Giddens (see especially 1971a, b, c; 1972) has rightly emphasized that anomie and egoisme are historically specific. They represent not so much the generic possibility of breakdown of social order and control (the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"), as the release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Giddens argues that:

..."regulation" (society, social constraint) cannot simply be juxtaposed in an abstract and universal sense with "lack of regulation" (anomie). The notions of both egoisme and anomie must be understood within the scope of the general conception of the development of society presented in The Division of Labor. Seen in this context, egoisme and anomie are not simply functional problems facing all types of society in equivalent degree: they are stimulated by the very moral individualism which is the outcome of social evolution. The dilemmas facing the modern form of society, Durkheim maintained, are not to be resolved through a reversion to the autocratic discipline found in traditional societies, but only through the moral consolidation of the differentiated division of labor, which demands quite different forms of authority from those characteristic of earlier types of society (1971a:117-118).

I cannot emphasize enough that Durkheim's dialectic of release and control was always evolutionarily grounded. Anomie and egoisme, as twin forms of modern suicide, stand as objective or outward indices of the social, cultural, and psychological "moral anarchy" plaguing the "critical" or transitional phase of modern society, prior to the full institu-
tionalization of "moral individualism" and "organic solidarity."

Since Durkheim's causal-evolutionary explanation of the roots of this transitional crisis is most complex, I shall here only sketch its general outlines. The key transformations underlying his first schema are social structural and morphological in nature. For Durkheim always linked these processes: on the general evolutionary level, the progressive division of labor, societal differentiation, and individualization are greatly accelerated and even disrupted by two recent historical events of epochal significance. First, there was the rapid expansion of industry and the corresponding internationalization of the market. Second, there was the cataclysm of the French Revolution. These "twin revolutions," as Nisbet (1967) calls them, were the prime historical causes of the modern transitional crisis. The displacement of secondary groups meant that the individual is caught between the centrifugal pull of his egocentric, anarchic passions, on the one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of the remote modern State on the other. To remedy this "moral anarchy," Durkheim proposed to reconstitute "professional groups" and their political enfranchisement on the national level.

Since we rarely place Durkheim's notions of anomie and egoïsme in historical perspective, perhaps a brief recap of the general evolutionary processes which Durkheim posited as underpinning this transitional crisis might be helpful. Recall, first, Durkheim's complex series of sequential equations intervening between increasing moral density, his law of the continuous extension of the "radius of social life," and the progressive division of labor, and societal differentiation. First, greater population density within a given region (the population/territory ratio), linked together by growing transporation and communications networks, leads to greater degrees of "dynamic or moral density" or sustained "increases in the quantity, intensity, and diversity of social relationships" (Alpert, 1939:90-2). On the macro-level,
increased "moral density" (or sustained social intensities) lead, in turn, to greater competition for resources among members of the same society. Now, this increased intra-societal competition leads, in turn, almost inevitably, to greater specialization and occupational differentiation. These typical socioeconomic responses to long-term changes in supply and demand often result, as is generally agreed, in greater productive efficiencies. Greater total productivity, in turn, accelerates the division of labor by increasing the potential for population growth and the elaboration and extension of technologies, especially the key infrastructural transportation and communication networks. The progressive "extension of the radius of social life" almost inevitably generates greater social energies, and, therefore, greater economic and sociocultural change. In short, Durkheim postulated a most complex, spiralling feedback process (see Book One). Thus were Durkheim's notions of progressive social morphological and social institutional changes linked on the micro-societal and macro-evolutionary levels.

Further, we should recall that the "progressive effacement of the segmental type of society" and culture by these ramifying social morphological and institutional processes led to two additional corollary transformations. The breakdown of the early, fused, "sacro-magical collective conscience," led to: (1) the progressive elaboration of increasingly more abstract, rational, and universalizable cultural forms, and forms of consciousness; (2) the evolutionary emergence of the individual personality as morally worthy in its own right (see especially Giddens, 1971a, b). Indeed, it was Durkheim's keen insight, as Nelson (1973a) and Leites (1974) have discovered, that the autonomizing of the person, and rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse proceed together on the world-historical level. In other words, the very structures and logics of rational thought and, in turn, the rationales of the autonomous individual person, are simultaneous sociocul-
tural constructions.

Perhaps the Parsonian notion of progressive evolutionary differentiation can initially help to illuminate Durkheim's general evolutionary view of the modern transitional crisis. Since Durkheim first indicated that everything progresses "mechanically," Parsons' mechanistic metaphors of equilibrium and strain in the differentiating social system are helpful here as guides. What are the proximate causes, according to Durkheim, of the contemporary crisis of anomie and egoisme? And what is the way out of this "moral anarchy?"

Now, if the social division of labor normally produces "organic solidarity," then how is it possible for the contemporary social and economic system to become "pathological"? Essentially, Durkheim argued that two recent transformations have radically altered the conditions of social existence in European culture, and thus fatally disrupted the generally beneficial evolutionary differentiation process. First, there was the radical destruction of the ancien régime in the French Revolution, plus its uncertain aftermath. Second, there was the Industrial Revolution involving the rapid growth of large-scale industry, and the progressive internationalization of the market. These "twin revolutions"--the French and the Industrial--are the twin historical keys to Durkheim's notion of the contemporary crisis. Nisbet notes:

The breakup of the old order--an order that had rested on kinship, land, social class, religion, local community, and monarchy--set free, as it were, the varied elements of power, wealth, and status that had been consolidated for centuries. Dislocated by revolution, scrambled by industrialism's inexorable march, fomented by the new voices of reaction and radicalism, these elements tumbled across the political landscape of nineteenth century Europe in search of new and more viable contexts (1965:20).

In his underlying notion of societies marked by an evolving and shifting equilibrium and societies torn by crisis--a view of the "historical process as oscillation between varying states of order and chaos" (LaCapra, 1972:202)--Durkheim was basically influenced by Saint-Simon's notion of "organic" and "critical" societies. LaCapra suggests:
... Durkheim's concepts of normality and pathology were more sophisticated versions of Saint-Simon's ideas of organic and critical periods in history. Like Saint-Simon, Durkheim believed modern society to be, in significant ways, pathological. He discussed at length and with apparent agreement Saint-Simon's model of evolution in Western Europe in terms of a growing conflict between a religio-military and a scientific-industrial type of society. In France, this had culminated in the great Revolution... The Revolution had destroyed the old order, but had miscarried in the creation of the new. It gave birth to the highest ideals of modern society, but it did not specify and establish these ideals in institutions and rational beliefs. At the start of the nineteenth century, after the Revolution had run its course, the basic problem of a new social order was presented in the same terms as in 1789. Only the problem had become more urgent (1972:204-5).

It is, however, important to also remember that Durkheim opposed neither of these twin transformations, since both represented, in condensed form, the necessary culmination of long-term evolutionary changes. What was bad about them was instead the astonishing and violent speed with which they destroyed the old order. The basic problem was the destructive rapidity and massiveness of these changes. Too much had happened too fast; as a result, the old ways were justifiably gone, but nothing adequate had yet grown up to take their place. Modern society was thus caught in a moral and institutional vacuum, a historical void in which the inherent "moral anarchy" of the organic ego was left free to expand.

... we are going through precisely one of these critical phases. Indeed, European society records no crisis as serious as that in which European societies have been involved for more than a century. Collective discipline in its traditional form has lost authority, as the divergent tendencies troubling the public conscience and the resulting general anxiety demonstrate. Consequently, the spirit of discipline itself has lost its ascendancy....

For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact that the relationships between its parts are exactly regulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious articulation of its various functions assured by effective discipline, and if, in addition, society lacks the unity based upon the commitment of men's wills to a common objective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter. As a result, under present conditions, it is above all
the faith in a common ideal that we must seek to elicit (ME:101-2).

Yet, there could be no question, as the French conservatives and some of the German romantics wished, of reviving the old order; it was gone forever, in the blink of an eye, as it were. Such nostalgia was foreclosed by the very "mechanicalness" of the historical process, according to Durkheim. It was neither possible nor desirable to go back. Yet, the full depths of the tragedy of modern man, as Durkheim perceived our continuing predicament, is that there was nothing viable to take the place of traditional order. Especially, there were few secondary groups standing between the central State and the lone individual to effectively moralize egos as the family, guild, and archaic religions had once done. This "malintegration" or lack of effective sociocultural and socioeconomic coordination not only "strained" the remaining institutional structure, but most importantly, released the egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic ego. In the last analysis, anomie refers both to the historical breakdown of traditional moral discipline and direction, and the breakthrough and release of the "infinity sickness" of the pre-socialized ego.

Although the specific details of his remedies and the tenor of his early optimism changed, from the beginning to the end of his career Durkheim rarely wavered from his abiding concern with the destructive dimensions of the modern transitional crisis. Indeed, as the crisis deepened, on the eve of World War I Durkheim melancholically reflected:

The old ideals and the divinities which incarnate them are dying because they no longer respond sufficiently to the new aspirations of our day; and the new ideals which are necessary to orient our life are not yet born. Thus, we find ourselves in an intermediary period, a period of moral cold which explains the diverse manifestations of which we are, at every instant, the uneasy and sorrowful witnesses [1914] (in Bellah, 1973:xlvii).

At the mid-point of his career (the period in which are presently most interested), Durkheim argued: "The change in moral temperament thus betrayed bears witness to a profound change
in our social structure. To cure one, therefore, the other must be reformed" (S:387). In Suicide, Durkheim attempted to determine, in effect, the "moral temperature" of the modern world. And he found us, in this advanced stage of crisis, to be "pathologically ill," beset by an endemic moral "malaise." The high suicide rate of certain groups conclusively demonstrated that this "moral anarchy," although abnormal in macro-evolutionary terms, was nevertheless embedded in the very nature of the modern world. At the conclusion to Suicide Durkheim remarked:

Thus, a monograph on suicide has a bearing beyond the special class of facts which it particularly embraces. The questions it raises are closely connected with the most serious practical problems of the present time. The abnormal development of suicide and the general unrest of contemporary societies spring from the same causes. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths manifests the state of deep disturbance from which civilized societies are suffering, and bear witness to its gravity. It may even be said that this measures it. When these sufferings are expressed by a theorist they may be considered exaggerated and unfaithfully interpreted. But in these statistics of suicide they speak for themselves .... The only possible way to check this current of collective sadness is by at least lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign and a result (S:391).

As with all moral philosophers, Durkheim sought to offer us, from a sociologistical perspective on societal health and pathology, both what we might call a "theodicy"--an explanation of how we got into our present predicament--and a "therapeutic"--or a prescription to remedy our pervasive sense of malaise.

Now, I make no claims here to present new material from the corpus of Durkheim's work, or basically new perspectives on this aspect of his work. Rather, I shall primarily offer a systematic exegesis of Durkheim's basic series of explanations of the specific historical causes of the modern crisis of anomie and egoisme. To a great extent, it has been this persistent slighting of the important historical background of Durkheim's thesis on anomie that has continued to lead so many astray (eg. see McCloskey, 1974, 1976).
ly, it is strange that we do not yet have a systematic ac-
count of Durkheim's attempt to explain the roots of the mod-
erm crisis. Further, while Durkheim's analytical and pre-
scriptive work on the modern transitional crisis is largely
consistent, he continually added new facets to his argument
over the years. Perhaps it is best, therefore, if we ap-
proach his developing argument chronologically, starting with
his analyses of the anomic and forced division of labor. Then
we shall consider his analysis of socialism as a historically
specific critical response to the rise of market capitalism.
Finally, we shall review his remedial proposals for increas-
ing the "moral mechanics" of professional groups, and the en-
franchisement of these intermediate associations on the na-
tional political level. As we proceed, we should pay special
attention to the deficiencies in Durkheim's causal-historical
explanation of anomie and egoisme as the release of the pre-
socialized ego from the constraint of traditional moral dis-
cipline in the modern transitional crisis.
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE ANOMIC DIVISION OF LABOR

It has been said with justice that morality ... is going through a real crisis.... Profound changes have been produced in the structure of our societies in a very short time; they have been freed from the segmental type with a rapidity and in proportions such as never have been seen in history.... The morality which corresponds to this social type has regressed, but without another developing quickly enough to fill the ground that the first left vacant in our consciousnesses. Our faith has been troubled; tradition has lost its sway; individual judgment has been freed from collective judgment. But, on the other hand, the functions which have been disrupted in the course of the upheaval have not had the time to adjust themselves to one another; the new life which has emerged so suddenly has not been able to be completely organized, and above all, it has not been organized in a way to satisfy the need for justice which has grown more ardent in our hearts (DL:408-9).

Preface. In Book Three, Chapter One, of The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim presented his analysis of the anomic division of labor. This type is the first abnormal form endemic to the contemporary transitional crisis prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity" and the "cult of the individual." Giddens reminds us:

The analysis given in The Division of Labor demonstrates that organic solidarity is the essential basis of the modern social order; there can be no return to the form of solidarity which is typical of traditionalism. It is fundamentally important to recognize, however, that organic solidarity, at the present juncture, is emergent, rather than fully institutionalized. The modern world is still in a transitional phase (1972a:10).

While the progressive division of social labor, on the world-historical level, normally creates unity through diversity--by putting into ever-more dependent contact various specialized occupations--nonetheless, in contemporary economic life this is not the case. Industrial and commercial crises (eg.
the business cycle, conflict of labor and capital, class conflict, etc.) serve as stark testimony to an abnormal disruption of the normally integrative powers of the social division of labor. In parallel fashion, Durkheim noted, the same process occurs in the field of science, for the unity of science is lost as scientific labor grows progressively specialized.

Yet, against Comte and others, Durkheim also argued that the modern anomic deregulation of industry and the internationalization of the market are due to "effects inherent in the division of labor." Against the Utilitarian economists, on the other hand, Durkheim contended that the division of labor is not merely material in its effects but moral as well. Although agreeing with the Socialists that the modern economic world is beset by crisis, internal contradictions, and a kind of legitimized egoistic anarchy, Durkheim refused to believe that simply tying economic life to the central government was an adequate solution, since the "State" is too far removed from the daily details of life. Only the "corporation" (in the French sense) could hope to adequately regulate the anti-social (amoral) elements of modern economic action. Let us now look more closely at this first installment of Durkheim's notion of the modern transitional crisis in terms of the anomic division of labor.

A. The Moral Creativity of Organic Solidarity

As a background to the problem of the anomic division of labor, however, let us first recall that one whole axis of Durkheim's argument in The Division of Labor maintained that there are two basic types of social solidarity. "Mechanical solidarity" implied the fusion of individuals into a primitive sacramental-magical collective consciousness. "Organic" social bonds, on the contrary, implied the progressive differentiation of occupational tasks leading to a sort of ramifying interdependence. Identity and differentiated interdependence are therefore the two fundamental forms the social
bond may take.

... this mechanism is not identical with that which serves as a basis for sentiments of sympathy, whose source is resemblance. Surely there can be no solidarity between others and us unless the image of others unites itself with ours. But when the union results from the resemblance of two images, it consists in an agglutination. The two representations become solidary because, being indistinct, totally or in part, they confound each other ... and they are solidary only in the measure in which they confound themselves. On the contrary, in the case of the division of labor, they are outside each other and are linked only because they are distinct (DL:62).

Thus, unity through identity, or unity through diversity, are the two basic modes of construction of the social bond. Although always and everywhere composed of both types (contra Nisbet, 1965), in evolutionary terms the social bond was originally based on the first type of relationship, and then progressively extended through the second type. In the first case, the social bond was highly particularistic or tribal, and thus exclusionary (see Nelson, 1969a, 1973a), magically stereotyped, and so on (see Chapter Six, Book One). On the other hand, the world-scale complexity of modern life is only possible if the social bond is progressively extended through the medium of what Durkheim called the "organic" or differentiating division of social labor. Here, as elsewhere, biological analogies (eg. see P. Hirst, 1973) guided Durkheim's "ideal typical" evolutionary constructions.

The difference between these two types of social arrangements is as great as that which separates the organization of certain colonies of polyps from that of superior animals. In the first, each of the associated individuals hunts on his account, in his own right; but what he catches is deposited in a common store, and he cannot have his share of the community wealth, that is to say, he cannot eat without all the society eating at the same time. On the contrary, among vertebrates each organ is obliged in its functioning to conform to rules designed to put it in harmony with the others; the nervous system assures this conformity. But each organ, and in every organism each tissue, and in every tissue each cell, maintain themselves apart, freely, without being dependent on the others. Each major part of the organism has its own special food. The distance is no less considerable between the two societal concepts which have been
As emphasized earlier (see Book One), as the progressive elaboration of ever-more complex social morphological structures proceeds on the intra-societal level, Durkheim posited a corresponding shift on the inter-societal level. The segmental type of social structure breaks down as "tribal" structures coalesce into larger units. As always, Durkheim posited a very close correlation between the progressive social morphological extension of the social bond, and the evolutionary passage from "tribal" to "civilizational" symbolism (eg. see Chapter Seven, Book One).

... organized structure, and thus, the division of labor, develops as the segmental structure disappears. Hence, either this disappearance is the cause of the development, or the development is the cause of the disappearance. The latter hypothesis is imadmissible, for we know that the segmental arrangement is an insurmountable obstacle to the division of labor, and must have disappeared at least partially for the division of labor to appear. The latter can appear only in proportion to the disappearance of the segmental structure. To be sure, once the division of labor appears, it can contribute towards the hastening of the other's regression, but it is in evidence only after the regression has begun. The effect reacts upon the cause, but never loses its quality of effect. The reaction it exercises is, consequently, secondary. The growth of the division of labor is thus brought about by the social segments losing their individuality, the divisions becoming more permeable. In short, a coalescence takes place which makes new combinations possible in the social substance (DL:256).

Normally, the progressive division of labor and the resulting social differentiation, according to Durkheim, is healthy and creative, not only because it breaks down the early archaic "repressive," fused, sacral-magical complex, but also because it creates a new and powerful type of social solidarity. This new type of extended or universalistic social bond also moralizes egos, but in a different way-- instead of fusing them into a conscience collective, it differentiates them into inter-dependent occupational specializations in the socioeconomic web of modern life. And since the only real point of identity we now share in the organic or complex type of solidarity is our common humanity itself, the
"cult of the individual" and "Reason" emerge as the prime forms of legitimate moral authority.

... not only does the division of labor present the character by which we have defined morality; it more and more tends to become the essential condition of social solidarity. As we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given him, to collective group usages, become loose. More mobile, he changes his environment more easily, leaves his people to go elsewhere to live a more autonomous existence, to a greater extent forms his own ideas and sentiments. Of course, the whole common conscience does not, on this account, pass out of existence. At least there will always remain this cult of personality, of individual dignity ... which today is the rallying point of so many people (DL:400).

Although the differentiated unity of the "organic" social bond is extended "mechanically" (that is, social morphologically and institutionally), it also is simultaneously a moralizing process. The social division of labor creates a new type of extended social bond, and thus, a new and richer base for both intelligence and morality.

As intelligence becomes richer, activity more varied, in order for morality to remain constant, that is to say, in order for the individual to remain attached to the group with a force equal to that of yesterday, the ties which bind him to it must become stronger and more numerous. If, then, he formed no others than those which come from resemblances, the effacement of the segmental type would be accompanied by a systematic debasement of morality. Men would no longer be sufficiently obligated; he would no longer feel about and above this salutary pressure of society which moderates his egoism and makes him a moral being. This is what gives moral value to the division of labor. Through it, the individual becomes cognizant of his dependence upon society; from it comes the forces which keep him in check and restrain him. In short, since the division of labor becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it becomes, at the same time, the foundation of moral order (DL:400-01).

At this point, it becomes necessary to introduce a little noticed distinction Durkheim made between two types of conscience collective and the prime historical referent of each (see also Book One). Early in The Division of Labor, Durkheim acknowledged that the conscience collective could be viewed in at least two different ways—as the generally dif-
fused value and symbolic system of any society (ala Parsons' generic Central Value System), or as the special historical situation represented most clearly by primitive "mechanical solidarity," in which the logics of moral decision and intellectual understanding were primarily collective and traditional. The distinction is important, yet our failure (eg. see Parsons, 1949, Foskett, 1939) to recognize the evolutionary dimension of Durkheim's thought means that we have collapsed the latter into the former. Wallwork is one of the few to note the importance of Durkheim's distinction between la conscience collective and la conscience sociale.

The spontaneous emergence of a common life together and of shared rules within smaller institutions in pluralistic societies is an exceedingly important subtheme running through Durkheim's early writings, the theme which leads him to draw a careful distinction between la conscience collective ou commune on the one hand, and la conscience sociale on the other. The former refers to the system of ideas or norms held in common throughout an entire society, while the latter and more inclusive term refers not only to beliefs and norms held in common, but also to institutionally engendered rules held by some but not all of the members of the larger collectivity (1972:84).

Durkheim himself remarked on the ambiguity of the term conscience collective when he observed: "The word we have employed is not, it is true, without ambiguity" (DL:80), and observed, in passing, that it might be better to designate a special term for his notion of the "totality of social likenesses" whose clearest expression is primitive tribal culture. Unfortunately, he did not do so, and thus bequeathed us much confusion. Yet, it is worth noting the distinctions which Durkheim did make:

As the terms collective and social are frequently taken for one another, one is led to believe that the collective conscience is the whole social conscience, that is, that it extends as far as the psychic life of society, although, especially in advanced societies, it is only a very restricted part of the social conscience. Judicial, governmental, scientific, industrial, in short, all special functions are of a psychic nature, since they consist in systems of representations and actions. They are, however, clearly outside the common conscience (DL:80, in Wallwork, 1972:84).
Wallwork draws out the implications of Durkheim's distinction for our present task of understanding why Durkheim placed such importance on the role of professional groups in the modern "organic" or differentiated social division of labor.

Each of these functionally specific groups has its own morality "... so that morality is diversified with social conditions ... there is one morality for each social stratum of the society." Gurvitch is essentially correct, then, when he states: "... whereas in mechanical solidarity, it is a matter of identical collective beliefs, in organic solidarity it is a matter of collective beliefs differentiated in subgroups." From this analysis proceeds Durkheim's observation that subgroups constitute extraordinarily important moral communities in advanced societies. Such groups, by spontaneously generating shared norms and enforcing these obligations by their authority, are, as it were, the moral equivalent in advanced societies of the collective or common conscience in primitive tribes since these groups are now primarily responsible for the specific duties that regulate most of our day-to-day activities in the family, the workshop, the university, and so forth.... The rules of such secondary group formations are thus the natural complement of the highly general, abstract principles shared throughout modern societies, and protected by public opinion at large. It is in this way that Durkheim succeeds in demonstrating that the rise of individualism, specialization, and differentiation does not necessarily lead to the normally dispersive consequences envisaged by Toennies (1972:84-5).

Finally, the evolutionary division of social labor is both necessary and desirable, since our occupational obligations also serve simultaneously to moralize us. From this "mechanical" necessity, Durkheim didn't hesitate to derive moral obligation and individual duty. Durkheim's anti-romanticism is evident here; there is no critique of the oppressive forces of "mechanism," and the fragmentation of man through the modern economic process, for example, as there was in Marx or Weber.

... our duty is not to spread our activity over a large surface, but to concentrate it and specialize it. We must contract our horizon, choose a definite task and immerse ourselves in it completely, instead of trying to make ourselves a sort of creative masterpiece, quite complete, which contains its worth in itself, and not in the services it renders.... We do not
cling to very much when we have no determined objective, and, consequently, we cannot very well elevate ourselves beyond a more or less refined egotism (DL:401-2).

Thus, in contrast to Weber's latent hoped-for "Faustian" universality (see Part I, Book Three on his cultural tradition), Durkheim viewed specialization as good because it moralizes the ego by attaching it to a group.

B. The Conflict Between Labor and Capital: The Separation of Producer and Worker

As the social bond is progressively extended, the intensity of solidarity is also attenuated (Nelson, 1969a). This attenuation of the intensity of primary group relationships is especially marked in revolutionary times, when the lingering remnants of the earlier type of solidarity based on fused identity are ripped loose from the changing social fabric. Moral discipline and social coordination then rapidly fade. However, at the beginning of the section on the anomic division of labor, Durkheim took pains to emphasize that conflict and anomic deregulation are not inherent in the progressive division of social labor. Against Espinas, Comte, and others, Durkheim insisted that "division (differentiation) is not necessarily dispersion." Indeed, since there are two basic ways to social unity--primitive fused identity and advanced differentiated interdependence--Durkheim always searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the structures of responsibility which marked the passage from the first to the second type of solidarity.

Here Durkheim acknowledged that the division of social labor can have negative or "pathological forms" because coordinating or integrating links become disrupted in the general evolutionary process of de-collectivization.

Up to now, we have studied the division of labor only as a normal phenomenon, but, like all social facts, and, more generally, all biological facts, it presents pathological forms which must be analyzed. Though normally the division of labor produces social solidarity, it sometimes happens that it has different, and even
contrary results. Now, it is important to find out what makes it deviate from its natural course, for if we do not prove that these cases are exceptional, the division of labor might be accused of logically implying them. Moreover, the study of these deviant forms will permit us to determine the conditions of existence of the normal state better. When we know the circumstances in which the division of labor ceases to bring forth solidarity, we shall better understand what is necessary for it to have that effect. Pathology, here as elsewhere, is a valuable aid to physiology.... The first abnormal case is furnished by industrial or commercial crises, by failures, which are so many partial breaks in organic solidarity.... Certain social functions are not adjusted to one another. But, insofar as labor is divided more, these phenomena seem to become frequent.... The conflict between capital and labor is another example, more striking, of the same phenomenon (DL:353-4).

In terms of the growing conflict between labor and capital as a "pathological exception" to the normally beneficent progress of the division of labor, Durkheim sketched these historical phases. First, in the guild system of the middle ages, worker and employer worked and lived side by side. Second, with the growth of commerce and cities in the fifteenth century:

... the occupational circle is no longer a common organization, it became an exclusive possession of the masters, who decided all matters.... From that time, a sharp line was drawn between masters and workers ... quarrels became numerous. But, even then, conflict was not everlasting. The workshops did not contain two opposing classes (DL:354-5).

Third, in the seventeenth century, with the growth of large industry, and international extension of the market:

... the third phase of this history of the working classes begins.... The worker is more completely separated from the employer.... At the same time that specialization becomes greater, revolts become more frequent.... Warfare becomes more violent (DL:355).

But Durkheim, relying on Levasseur, provided us with only the barest overview of this growing conflict.
C. Durkheim's Polemic Against Comte and the Need for a Value Consensus to Integrate Industrial Society

Durkheim differed from Comte in prescribing solutions for the anomic deregulation of industrial relations. Since the early segmental type of society had been broken through forever, there could be no question of restoring the old social bond in "mechanical" terms. One could not hope to resurrect the conscience collective for modern society (see DL: 80). Neither would mere overt or external regulation suffice, whether from the government, as the socialists wished, or increased moral regulation, as Comte and other conservatives proposed. Only a concrete, living society, such as that provided by occupational groups which are in continuous contact with both producers and consumers, producers and workers, would be capable of regulating and moralizing these twin sets of relations. "In order that the sentiment of our state of dependence be effective, it would be necessary for it also to be continuous, and it can be that only if it was linked to the very practice of each special function" (DL: 361). In contrast to Comte and others, Durkheim wished no return to the kind of "repressive" moral regulation characteristic of the fused, sacro-magical, collective conscience of early "mechanical solidarity." To regulate egos and moralize them into consciences, Durkheim argued that what was needed was not an overarching moral consensus—a Parsonian Central Value System—enforced by some hierarchical institution, whether it be the Church, a bureaucratic state, or a Saint-Simonian Council of Industrialists and Scientists.

... since we have shown that the enfeeblement of the collective conscience is a normal phenomena, we cannot consider it as the cause of the abnormal phenomena that we are studying. If, in certain cases, organic solidarity is not all it should be, it is certainly not because mechanical solidarity has lost ground, but because all the conditions for the existence of organic solidarity have not been realized (DL:364-5).

In his introduction to Durkheim's lectures on socialism, Alvin Gouldner rightly suggested: "Durkheim is unmistak-
ably conducting a polemic against Comte for having overstressed the need for moral consensus in maintaining social stability" (1958:15). Gouldner continues:

In Comte's view, the increasing division of labor in modern society threatened its social cohesion. For it brought with it a 'fatal disposition towards a fundamental dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests' .... The increasing division of labor was, in this analysis, subversive of social stability because it undermined the fundamental requisite of order, namely, the consensus of moral beliefs.... Comte failed to see that the social solidarity produced by the division of labor with its web of interdependence, was gradually being substituted for the earlier solidarity which had rested mainly on shared moral beliefs (1958:13-14).

Actually, in The Division of Labor, Durkheim moved rhetorically on at least three separate fronts simultaneously in relation to the question of the creative or disorganizing effects of the social division of labor. Besides rejecting Comte's and the conservatives' argument for an enforced moral consensus, Durkheim also rejected both the Socialists and the Utilitarians' positions alike since they both devalued the moral aspects of socioeconomic action. Gouldner rightly notes:

Durkheim was engaged on several fronts simultaneously: on the one hand, opposing the socialists and the utilitarian individualists' neglect of moral elements, and, on the other, opposing Comte's overstatement of the contemporary significance of moral norms in a society with an advanced division of labor (1958:13).

Durkheim criticized the Utilitarian moralists in these terms:

... we are led to consider the division of labor in a new light.... The economic services it renders are picayune compared to the moral effect it produces, and its true function is to create in two or more persons a true feeling of solidarity (DL:56).

Rather, Durkheim argued that mutual *reglementations* emerged in "organic solidarity," acting to pull the new social fabric together.

Because they have misunderstood this aspect of the phenomena, certain moralists have claimed that the division of labor does not produce true solidarity. They have seen in it only particular exchanges, without past or future, in which the individual is thrown on his own resources. They have not perceived the slow work of consolidation, the network of links which little by little
have been woven and which marks something permanent of
organic solidarity (DL:366).

In this rhetorical context, Giddens provides a useful summa-
tion (see also Lukes, 1973):

The modern world is still in a transitional phase. This
is what has misled both the idealist and utilitarian
thinkers. The former still cast their eyes back to pre-
vious times, seeking to reestablish the moral consensus
of traditional societies.... The utilitarians ... have
developed their theories on the basis of generalizing
from other areas of society where the traditional moral
forms have been dissolved but have not yet been replaced
by new moral prescriptions. This is particularly the case
with certain sectors of industrial life, which are ano-
ic ... which have broken away from the moral bonds of
traditionalism, but which have not yet become subject to
new and more appropriate regulation (1972a:10).

Insisting that social scientists put systematic analysis be-
fore instant remedies, Durkheim summed up his argument toward
the end of his first great book:

... the remedy for the evil is not to seek to resusci-
tate traditions and practices which, no longer corres-
ponding to present conditions of society, can only live
an artificial false existence. What we must do to re-
lieve this anomie is to discover the means for making
the organs which are still wasting themselves in discor-
dant movements harmoniously concur by introducing into
their relations more justice by more and more extenua-
ting the external inequalities which are the source of
the evil. Our illness is not then, as has often been be-
lieved, of an intellectual sort; it has more profound
causes. We shall not suffer because we no longer know on
what theoretical notion to base the morality we have
been practicing, but because, in certain parts of its
functions, this morality is irretrievably shattered, and
that which is necessary to us is only in process of
formation.... Because certain of our duties are no long-
er founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has re-
sulted which will be repaired only insofar as discipline
is established and consolidated. In short, our first
duty is to make a moral code for ourselves * (DL:409).
D. Pre-Organic Solidarity and Deregulation of Relations Between Worker and Employer, Consumer and Producer

But, today the normal equilibrium between worker and employer, between consumer and producer, has been fatally disrupted, Durkheim argued. Such inter-dependent groups have been separated from one another, thus breaking off the normal moral regulation exerted by each upon all. "The relations of the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of anomie." Because the economy is caught in a transitional crisis, and because old moral relationships, mutual obligations and duties have been swept away by the impact of the twin revolutions, society, too, is affected.

Today there are no longer any rules which fix the number of economic enterprises, and, in each branch of industry, production is not exactly regulated on a level of consumption.... What is certain is that this lack of regulation does not permit a regular harmony of functions. The economists claim, it is true, that this harmony is self-established when necessary, thanks to rises or declines in prices which, according to needs, stimulate or slacken production. But, in every case, this is established only after ruptures of equilibrium and more or less prolonged disturbances. Moreover, these disturbances are naturally more frequent as functions are more generalized, for the more complex an organization is, the more is the need of extensive regulation felt (DL:366-67).

Because the intimate links between those who are engaged in different phases of the same overall economic process are snapped in modern market economies, not only is there conflict between labor and capitalists, but also crises of overproduction occur. With the internationalization of the market and production for sale instead of production primarily for "household" use (see K. Polanyi, 1968, Weber, 1968), the intimate links between producers and consumers were also snapped. This hiatus leads to the plagues of the business cycle, constantly expanding desires, unemployment, recession and so forth.

The anomic condition of the division of labor, which is reflected both in occurrence of industrial crises and in class conflict, is directly connected with the mode in which the expansion of occupational differentiation de-
stroys the integrity of the local community. In the traditional community, production is oriented to a specific, and known, set of local needs.... With the growth of the division of labor, however, and the formation of a large-scale market, each of these conditions becomes undermined. A dislocation is introduced between producer and consumer, because there is no longer a direct tie between the volume of production and the known needs of the market: thus crises of overproduction occur (1972a:10).

Durkheim's insight into the economic and political foundations of the modern order was keen. He saw that many of our problems stemmed from the unanticipated consequences of the breakdown of old moral bonds. The bond of "tribal brotherhood" that marked primitive and peasant economies was now broken through; the "neighborhood ethic" (as Weber called it, 1968) was dissolved in the rush to modernity. Rapid, large-scale industrialization, and the internationalization of the market, not only came to dominate economic action, but social and cultural life as well. The supposedly self-equilibrating market was mechanically driven; and this economy-as-natural-machine made social relationships mechanical in turn. Freed from traditional mutual constraints--the stubbornly interpersonal ethics of early society--social relationships became impersonal, abstracted, calculating, uncertain, even anomic. These are among the "costs" we pay in the epochal transformation from "tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a).

As the market extends, great industry appears. But it results in changing relations of employers and employees. The great strain upon the nervous system and the contagious influence of great agglomerations increase the needs of the latter. Machines replace men; manufacturing replaces hand-work. The worker is now regimented, separated from his family throughout the day.... These new conditions of industrial life naturally demand a new organization, but as these changes have been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict have not yet had the time to be equilibrated (DL:370).

However, even here, Durkheim's primary concern was moral. He emphasized that the negative consequence of this anomic deregulation--this lack of constraining and directing, mutual, inter-personal moral discipline--was the release of
egotistic and infinite desires. Thus, even the anomic division of labor, then, cannot be portrayed simply in terms of the breakdown of moral consensus or the breakdown of structural integration. From the first Durkheim saw this structural breakdown as simultaneously also a breakthrough and a release of the potentially insatiable appetites of the organic ego.

In so far as the segmental type is strongly marked, there are nearly as many economic markets as there are different segments. Consequently, each of them is very limited. Producers, being near consumers, can easily reckon the extent of the needs to be satisfied. Equilibrium is established without any trouble and production regulates itself. On the contrary, as the organized type develops, the fusion of different segments draws the markets together into one which embraces almost all society. This even extends beyond, and tends to become universal, for the frontiers which separate peoples breakdown at the same time as those which separate the segments of each of them. The result is that each industry produces for consumers spread over the whole surface of the country or even of the entire world. Contact is then no longer sufficient. The producer can no longer embrace the market in a glance, nor even in thought. He can no longer see its limits, since it is, so to speak, limitless. Accordingly, production becomes unbridled and unregulated. It can trust only to chance, and in the course of these gropings, it is inevitable that proportions will be abused, as much in one direction as another. From this come the crises which periodically disturb economic functions. The growth of local restricted crises which result in failures is in all likelihood an effect of the same causes *(DL:369-70).

In regard to the negative aspects of occupational specialization--of workers becoming simply cogs in the great economic machine--Durkheim disagreed with those who argued that a generalized education is necessary. Against all humanistic and Faustian dreams of universality, Durkheim contended that specialization was good since it limited the horizons of the undisciplined ego. Over-regulation and deregulation were bad also; what was needed was the ancient wisdom of the "golden mean." Durkheim took care to absolve the division of social labor itself from any necessary complicity: "The preceding has removed one of the most serious charges brought against the division of labor." Durkheim denied that there is
any inherent contradiction in the division of labor which, through progressive occupational specialization, may make the worker more interdependent and organically solidary, may also make him simultaneously into a mere machine, to degrade and dehumanize him. True to his basic conviction that certain types of diversity can create unity, and the organic ego needs "circumscribed tasks and limited horizons," Durkheim argued that what we need to remedy the anomic division of labor is to give the individual worker a clearer and stronger sense of the purpose and place of his functional contribution to the total "social organism." Greater complexity requires greater organizational clarity. Few would dispute this proposition, merely whether it adequately describes all the key aspects of the problem.

What resolves the contradiction is that, contrary to what has been said, the division of labor does not produce these consequences because of a necessity of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances. In order for it to develop without having such a disastrous influence on the human conscience, it is not necessary to temper it with its opposite. It is necessary and it is sufficient for it to be itself, for nothing to come from without to denature it. For, normally, the role of each special function does not require that the individual close himself in, but that he keep himself in constant relations with neighboring functions, take cognizance of their needs, of the changes which they undergo, etc. The division of labor presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to them. He is, then, not a machine who repeats his movements without knowing their meaning, but he knows that they tend...towards an end that he conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that he is serving something. For that, he need not embrace most portions of the social horizon; it is sufficient that he perceive enough of it to understand that his actions have an aim beyond themselves (DL:372-3).

While there are many possible criticisms of Durkheim's explanations here, Lukes' short summary is especially cogent:

The only trouble with this account of anomie is that, although it pinpointed the central ills of capitalism—unregulated competition, class conflict, routinized, degrading, meaningless work—it characterizes all of them as "abnormal." This procedure tended to hinder any full-scale investigation of their causes (which were as-
sumed not to be endemic), especially given the evolutionary optimism Durkheim espoused at this stage. They were to be explained by the temporary and transitional lack of the appropriate economic controls, the appropriate norms governing industrial relations, and the appropriate forms of work organization—a lack that would in due course be remedied by allowing the operation of interdependent functions to produce its natural consequences (1973:174).

But this was not all, for Durkheim added another chapter "On the Constrained Division of Labor" to which we now turn.
CHAPTER SIX
THE FORCED DIVISION OF LABOR

Preface. The essential problem underlying the "forced or constrained division of labor"—the class war—is structured inequality. Constraint here means inequality in the "external conditions of life." With the progressive effacement of the segmental "mechanically integrated" type, the substitution of "organic solidarity" signals that fewer inherited inequalities will be crucial in social and economic life. Impersonal and universalistic standards are implied in the epochal transformation of "tribal brotherhoods" into "universal otherhoods" (Nelson, 1969a). As the social bond is progressively extended, hierarchies rooted in "blood and soil" become less salient, and individual merit and achievement supposedly come more to the fore. Most modern sociologists believe this not only to be a correct historical analysis, and that such changes are inevitable, but also that these are necessary and morally right. Justice, a prime concern of both critics of the ancien regime and the industrial regime, is only possible when the external conditions of existence are equal for all. Thus, each person's occupation and functional contribution will be spontaneously matched to his inherited abilities. Here Durkheim presumed that "all external inequalities endanger organic solidarity." Steven Lukes helpfully observes:

Durkheim conceived of inequality in two broad ways: first, as the misallocation of individuals to social roles; and second, as a lack of reciprocity or equivalency in the exchange of goods and services (1973:175). Giddens also usefully summarizes the almost Mertonian aspects of this second strand of Durkheim's argument on the "pathological" nature of the modern transitional crisis:
The elimination of the anomic division of labor is impossible while there are still major inequalities in the distribution of opportunities for occupational achievement. Moral regulation of the division of labor only becomes adequately developed insofar as it is spontaneous, which means that individuals have to be able to fill occupational positions which accord with their talents and capabilities, and which, therefore, they will accept as legitimate.... But this situation of equality of opportunity cannot prevail where the class system inhibits the chances of large masses of attaining positions commensurate with their abilities.... The forced division of labor can be abolished if the hereditary transmission of property is ended.... Durkheim does not envisage a society in which either private property or inequality will be eliminated. Both will persist, but the existing relation will be reversed: instead of of the former determining the latter, access to material rewards will be governed by the distribution of natural inequalities. There are "internal" (biological) inequalities, of capacity and aptitude which, according to Durkheim, are ineradicable. "External inequalities," on the other hand, can and will become dissolved with the further development of the division of labor---"labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities" (Giddens, 1972a: 11-12).

Thus, because Durkheim's notion's here are, in a number of ways, close to the functionalists' theory of social stratification, it shares many of their limitations.

In this chapter, Durkheim argued normatively, deductively, and almost functionally that normally the progressive division of labor produces "organic solidarity" and, thus, interdependent social health. Durkheim presumed that only under abnormal circumstances was it possible for power to come to dominate and distort social and economic organizations. (Neither Marx nor Weber similarly deluded themselves that domination played so little generic role in human affairs). But Durkheim's primary stance as a moral philosopher led him always and everywhere to presume that social relations were primarily moral relations. If so, then how could obligation and legitimate moral authority be rooted in pure power or domination? Power was only a secondary aspect of social life to Durkheim (however, see M. Richter, 1960; Bendix, 1960a;
and Giddens, 1971c). To Durkheim, the social or moral order is fundamentally ideal. Applying this basic bias to the study of the division of labor, Durkheim argued:

... For the division of labor to produce solidarity, it is not sufficient that each have his task; it is still necessary that this task be fitting to him.... If the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives rise to anxiety and pain instead of producing solidarity, this is because the distribution of social functions on which it rests does not respond, or rather no longer responds, to the distribution of natural talents (DL:375).

In the forced division of labor, "constraint alone ... links them to their functions.... Consequently, only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is possible" (DL:376). Here "... civil wars arise due to the manner in which labor is distributed" (DL:374).

To emphasize the contrast between the pathological forms of the anomie and constrained division of labor, Durkheim further developed his thesis that in the spontaneous division of labor, all functions are harmoniously adjusted to each other.

The case is quite otherwise when it is established in virtue of purely internal spontaneity, without anything coming to disturb the initiative of individuals. In this condition, harmony between individual natures and social functions cannot fail to be realized at least in the average case. For if nothing impedes or unduly favors those disputing over tasks, it is inevitable that only those who are the most apt at each kind of activity will indulge in it. The only cause determining the manner in which work is divided, then, is the diversity of capacities. In the nature of things, the apportioning is made through aptitudes, since there is no reason for doing otherwise. Thus, the harmony between the constitution of each individual and his condition is realized of itself.... Constraint begins when regulation, no longer corresponding to the true nature of things, and accordingly, no longer having any basis in customs, can only be validated through force.... The division of labor produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in proportion as it is spontaneous... No obstacle ... prevents them from occupying the place in the social framework which is compatible with their faculties. In short, labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities *(DL:376-7).

One fears, however, that Durkheim invested here in the pro-
gressive division of labor such virtues that his normal case where "harmony between individual natures and social functions cannot fail to be realized" was endowed with special magical, life-giving qualities. As Hayward observed:

Social harmony and solidarity come from below, were immanent in the various groups and associations which constituted society rather than transcendent and superpersonal. It was spontaneous, implicitly natural and rational, rather than the artefact of a hypostatized supreme will. It was unity in diversity, the infinite complexity of special interests and groups extending far beyond the reach of the state (1960:30).

Again, Durkheim appeared to have endowed the "naturally harmonious" division of social labor with spontaneous, self-equilibrating qualities, at least as questionable as those which the Utilitarian moralists bestowed upon the "invisible hand" of the market. I simply do not believe that either the generic or historical evidence demonstrates that any basic sociocultural process is marked by such quasi-metaphysical and ethical powers. On the contrary, social, economic, and cultural life is a "long and a hard row"; these on-going processes are beset by constant conflict, uncertainty, competing claims for priority, power, and legitimating moral authority. Even science, perhaps the only cultural form which can truly claim to be cumulative, is won only by much trial and error (eg. see Popper, 1963).

Even Durkheim's qualifications do not basically modify the quasi-magical potencies which he seemed to impute to the division of labor. Although he insisted that perfect spontaneity is only possible when the "external conditions of existence are equal," nonetheless he also admitted: "It is true that this perfect spontaneity is never met with anywhere as a realized fact" (DL:378).

Perfect spontaneity is, then, only a consequence and another form of this other fact--absolute equality in the external conditions of the conflict. It consists, not in the state of anarchy which would permit men to freely satisfy all their good or bad tendencies, but in a subtle organization in which each social value, being neither overestimated nor underestimated by anything foreign to it, would be judged at its true worth.
... All external inequality compromises organic solidarity (DL:379).

But if the economic moralists were unjustified in beginning with perfectly competitive markets, for instance, as an analytical baseline, why was Durkheim any more justified in presuming absolute equality and spontaneity in the external conditions of existence as the natural or normal state? Both of these notions are merely useful, legitimizing fictions for the underlying ethical imperative. As Durkheim himself admitted, this normative notion is nowhere to be found in actuality. It is rather, like the self-equilibrating market and "civil society," an ideal to be consummated. These notions stand not as "ideal types" in the Weberian sense, but rather as ideal standards, states of desirable social or economic health, as norms from which all deviations are to be critically judged.

Durkheim's normative concerns are seen again in the sections which follow where it is argued that the remedial task of "advanced societies is a work of justice." Closing the gap between the ideal of perfect spontaneity and social harmony, and the sad actualities of the transitional crisis is the task which many liberals, including Robert Merton (1938) in his own way, took as their prime directive program. As Merton's development of this special aspect of Durkheim's notion of anomie demonstrates, this drive to eliminate all vestiges of structured inequality has become the implicit social, educational, economic, and political program of the liberal social scientists (see appendix). In this sense at least, Durkheim's critique was prophetic. But even here, it is clear that this imposition of ever-widening standards of universalism has encountered stiff resistance, not only from entrenched upper classes in various regions, but especially from lower-middle strata which feel threatened by this incursion of an "interventionist" liberal elite (eg. forced school bussing in the 1970's in America). A universal otherhood, a consensually based egalitarian society, it must be acknowledged, is the normative ideal demanded over the past few centuries by a
strategically located upper and upper-middle class (see, for example, Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975). Universalistic cultural logics are not necessarily universally shared.

As a French positivist moral reformer, and part of the contemporary intellectual elite, Durkheim, of course, shared many of these same political passions.

The task of the most advanced societies is, then, a work of justice.... Just as the ideal of lower societies was to create or maintain as intense a common life as possible, in which the individual was absorbed, so our ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so as to assure the free development of all our socially useful forces.... Because the segmental type is effaced and the organized type developed, because organic solidarity is slowly substituted for that which comes from resemblances, it is indispensable that external conditions become level.... Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so we need justice (DL:387-8).

Certainly, Durkheim's first installment of his explanation of the transformations underlying his first schema of anomie and egoisme was more complex than commonly perceived. LaCapra rightly argues that we should try to recapture the "full range of Durkheim's concept of anomie" (1972:136). He also correctly observes that beneath Durkheim's notion of a structural and normative breakdown in modern economy and society was the image of the release of amoral and insatiable passions.

In the first edition of The Division of Labor, Durkheim did provide sufficient grounds for rejecting any attempt to identify anomie with a total absence of institutions, norms, or values--a situation which in Durkheim's usage of the term "anomie" constituted only an extreme case. The Durkheimian definition of anomie was the absence of consensually limiting norms (1972:136-7).

And, finally, LaCapra also rightly notes how, in historical terms, it was the new moral and institutional system of Western Europe and America which itself raised and sanctioned unlimited economic expectations. This is a crucial insight into the second schema of anomie, in which Durkheim fundamentally shifted on his analytical axes.
... institutions or ideologies might be anomic in the sense that they imposed limitless assertion or expansion, which for Durkheim was invariably bound up with substantive irrationality in the larger society.... In The Division of Labor, as in Suicide, Durkheim treated as anomic an institutional system which structurally imposed limitless maximizing activity upon members of society: a profit-oriented market economy *(1972:137).

Lukes (1973:172-78) critically reviews Durkheim's theories here, including the potent objections of Friedmann and others. As for the present study, the limitations in Durkheim's early formulation of the nature and causes of our modern pathology are that it was really neither institutional, nor cultural, nor historical. Durkheim provided no detailed historical and structural critique like that of Marx, nor did he offer a cultural analysis of the moral underpinnings of market capitalism as did Weber. Perhaps he neglected to do so because he was primarily a moralist, and was often forced, by the very logic of his multiple polemics, to embrace the faulty notion that the organic division of labor naturally and normally produces moral solidarity. Durkheim sometimes overburdened his evolutionary metaphysic. As Friedmann remarked, history has not proven his initially sanguine; correct; and indeed, Durkheim himself grew more pessimistic over the years (see "Dualism of Human Nature"). In any case, let us follow Gidden's insistence that the anomic and forced divisions of labor be considered together.

If his treatment of the forced division of labor is neglected, then his discussion of the anomic division of labor is seen in a false light. It is this neglect of his analysis of the forced division of labor which has helped to foster the misconception that he failed to concern himself with the sources of conflict in modern societies (1971c: 511).

Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's analysis of socialism as a historically specific response to the destructive aspects of the spread of market capitalism.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DURKHEIM'S ANALYSIS OF SOCIALISM: A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO THE GROWTH OF MARKET CAPITALISM

The essential feature of communism is the peripheral position it assigns economic functions in social life; while socialism places them as centrally as possible. The society envisioned by communists is ascetic; while socialist society would be essentially industrial. These are two opposing attributes that one should always keep in mind to prevent confusion (Soc: 107).

Preface. Marcel Mauss (1958:32) told us that early on Durkheim had posed his essential sociological problem in terms of the "relationship between individualism and socialism." After finishing his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim turned to study socialism itself as a doctrine (see Mauss in Gouldner, 1958; also Lukes, 1973). Also, in 1893, Durkheim published a "Note on the Definition of Socialism," and gave lectures on the historical development of socialism at Bordeaux in 1895-6. These lectures, however, abruptly ended with analysis of Saint-Simon, as Durkheim turned his full energies toward developing L'Annee sociologique and other demanding tasks. So we are left with a tantalizing fragment here.

Although incomplete, this effort was still brilliant, and provides us with invaluable insights into the period and its doctrines, and also into Durkheim's own ambivalent attitudes. Durkheim addressed here a massive and sustained criticism of specific modern structural transformations, centered around the historical relations between economy, polity, and society. Durkheim's abstracted causal-evolutionary model was forced here to come to grips with the complexity of specific modern historical changes. Durkheim focussed in these introductory lectures on Saint-Simon, the founder of positivism
and sociology, and one of the prime intellectual forces in French socialist theory.

Now, Durkheim often appeared to agree with many of Saint-Simon's brilliant schematic analyses of the causes of the transformation from medieval to modern society. To Durkheim, perhaps the key to Saint-Simon's doctrine was his historical analysis of the modern crisis as involving the breakdown of the old social order and the struggling to be born of a new order based on industry and science. Characteristically, however, Durkheim differed from Saint-Simon on the moralization and apotheosis of industry. "We know that Saint-Simon's error consisted in wishing to construct a stable society on a purely economic foundation" (Soc:274). As always, Durkheim argued that society must constrain and redirect individual "anomic" appetites.

This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him it appears that the way to realize social peace is to free economic appetites of all restraint on the one hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For such appetites cannot be appeased unless they are limited, and they cannot be limited except by something other than themselves. They cannot be regarded as the only purpose of society since they must be subordinated to some end which surpasses them, and it is only on this condition that they are capable of being really satisfied *(Soc:241-2).

As always, Giddens provides a useful summary:

(Socialism) ... is historically specific, and is tied to a very particular combination of social conditions: those which are identified in The Division of Labor as being the transitional phase between mechanical and organic solidarity. Socialism is a response to the state of deregulation of industry. Socialism has appeared for the reason that "in the most advanced societies of present-day Europe, production appears to be unrelated to consumption needs".... The significance of socialism is two-fold: it recognizes that the advanced societies are passing through a major stage of transition which demands the emergence of new social forms; and it perceives that some kind of regulation or control of the "free" play of market forces is necessary in the nascent society. The limitation in socialist doctrine is that the regulation which it advocates is purely economic in character. The conception of the abolition of the "political" and of the disappearance
of the "state" really implies that the "state" should have only economic functions, that in Saint-Simonian terms, government should be the "administration of things, and not the administration of men." But, in Durkheim's view, in advocating this conception, socialism shares the premise of its main opponents, Utilitarianism and political economy, holding that society can be treated as an economic process. The only important difference is that, while the latter believe that this operates spontaneously, the former consider that economic life has to be consciously directed. The disjunctions and conflicts in the division of labor are not simply to be explained in terms of too much economic regulation (political economy), or too little (socialism), but derive from the very predominance of the "economic" over the "social;" more specifically, that not merely economic change, but the moralization of economic relationships, is what is demanded (1972a:13-14).

A. The Dual Nature of Socialism

Durkheim recognized the dual ambitions of socialism as an ethical doctrine and political movement—for it was (is) simultaneously an attack upon, and appeal to, structures of conscience and consciousness. Resolving to study socialism scientifically, Durkheim wisely refused to trade debating points with this reform movement, since it represented a morality "aspiring to a complete remodeling of the social order." "All these fine refutations are a veritable work of Penelope, endlessly beginning again, because they touch socialism from without.... They blame the effects, not the causes" (Soc:44). Indeed, it was (is) this duality of ambition which marks most socialist doctrines, especially in their Marxist-Leninist or Maoist forms, as closed circles of thought and action. It is interesting to note that it was precisely this impermeability to contradiction which led Karl Popper, in his famous The Logic of Scientific Discovery (see also 1963), to postulate new evidential canons (i.e. "falsifiability") for the conduct of scientific inquiry. Durkheim recognized the simultaneous moral and intellectual drives of socialist theory, and wisely declined to enter into their closed circle.
It is a fervor that has been the inspiration of all these systems; what gave them life and strength is a thirst for a more perfect justice, pity for the misery of the working classes, a vague sympathy for the travail of contemporary societies, etc. Socialism is not a science, a sociology in miniature—it is a cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by men who most keenly feel our collective malaise. Socialism is to the facts which produce it what the groans of a sick man are to the illness with which he is afflicted, to the needs that torment him (Soc:41).

Since their prime point of departure is moral critique, socialists often regard as morally tainted all those who decline to embrace their fevered ambitions; for does not refusal to enter into their critique and utopia imply acceptance of the economic and social evils all around us everywhere? For my own part, I think not; I confess that I agree with Durkheim that socialism is hardly the answer to these problems. It does not provide a cure, but should itself be seen as a symptom (not a cause) of our modern travail. Although socialists pride themselves on being the prime critical movement of the day (for example, the still lingering symbolic equations of radicalism and Marxism in many universities even today), and many who are not themselves socialists also still respond in their conditioned fashion to these cliches, I must insist that from a historical and cultural perspective, Marxist social theory simply does not go far enough! It is far too conventional, too loaded down with traditional symbolic equations, too dependent on its apparent enemies for emotional charge and polemical direction, too dependent on its opponents for its prime premises, and so on and so forth. Perhaps the central flaw of socialist theory is that it rhetorically incorporated key premises of its opponents—I mean the Anglo Utilitarian economists.

Karl Polanyi (1944, 1968) clearly saw that Marx made a fatal mistake by incorporating Ricardian economic theory into his system. For Marx's economic materialism indirectly strengthened the key premise of Utilitarian ethics and political economy. Polanyi said: "The societal approach personified in Marx was sapped by the economic element in-
herited from the classics" (1968:134). This mistaken rhetorical incorporation was also indirectly strengthened by the inverted incorporation of Hegelian dialectic. Durkheim also recognized the crucial links between the socialist and individualist Utilitarian moral and social philosophers; in short, between the "philosophical radicals" (see Halevy, 1955) and their heretical heirs, the "critical radicals."

Instead of debating the socialists and the Utilitarian individualist and materialist philosophers on their own grounds, Durkheim wisely chose to study socialism "from the outside."

We will regard socialism as a thing, a reality—we will attempt to determine what it consists of, when it began, what transformations it passed through, and what has determined those transformations.... We are going to study it as we did suicide, the family, marriage, crime, punishment, responsibility, and religion (Soc:44).

With these cautions in mind, let us turn to Durkheim's very careful definition of socialism, and its difference from communist theory.
B. Durkheim's Definition of Socialism

Durkheim defined socialism in these terms: "We define as socialist every doctrine which demands the connection of all economic functions, or certain among them, which are at the present time diffuse, to the directing and conscious centers of society" (Soc:54). This was an unusual and insightful definition, for Durkheim made the relations between the economy and polity the crux of his definition. Setting aside the discussion of classes as secondary, Durkheim also recognized that there were two types of socialism—depending upon whether the demands for linking economy to polity came from the top down (e.g., Bismarck's Germany) or from the bottom up (e.g., China).

Socialism ... is above all an aspiration for a rearrangement of the social structure by relocating the industrial set-up in the totality of the social organism, by drawing it out of the shadow where it was functioning automatically, summoning it to the light and to the control of consciousness. One can see that this aspiration is not felt uniquely by the lower classes but by the state itself which, as economic activity becomes a more important factor in the general life, is led by force of circumstances, by vital needs of the greatest importance, to increasingly supervise and regulate these economic manifestations. Just as the working masses tend to approach the state, the state also tends to be drawn toward them, for the single reason that it is always further extending its ramifications, and its sphere of influence. Socialism is far from being an exclusively workingman's affair! Actually, there are two movements under whose influence the doctrine of socialism is formed: one which comes from below and directs itself toward the higher regions of society, and the other which comes from the latter and follows a reverse direction.... At root, each is only an extension of the other, as they mutually imply each other, they are merely two different aspects of the same organization.... The result is two different kinds of socialism: a worker's socialism or a state socialism, but the separation is a simple difference of degree.... They are varieties of the same genus (Soc:61-2).

Durkheim's insight here was keen: he rightly noted that the problem with modern societies—a problem deeply felt by socialists and other contemporary social critics—was that the economy was fundamentally separated from the polity and from
the society. Socialists, of course, wished to link them again, as did Durkheim though in a different way. This common insight is of fundamental historical importance, for the great world-historical significance of the "Great Transformation," as Karl Polanyi (1944) suggested, was the unprecedented separation of the economy from other basic institutional processes, and, indeed, the inversion of previous multi-institutional relations that characterized international "market capitalism." This unprecedented cleavage and inversion must be neither assumed to be normal or inevitable (certainly no one would presume that it is unproblematic). Rather, its historical uniqueness cries out to be explained (see especially, Polanyi, 1944, 1968; Weber, 1958a, 1968; Nelson, 1969a, 1975a).

C. The Contrast Between Socialism and Communism

In addition to his unconventional definition of socialism, Durkheim offered an invaluable series of theoretical and historical contrasts of the former with communist theory, with which it is commonly identified. On the basis of his previous definition, Durkheim insisted that socialism appeared rather recently in history. Communism, on the other hand, is ancient and generic. Choosing between these two systems of thought and moral reconstruction is potentially very important, Durkheim argued, for their respective "theodicies" and "therapeutics" are very different.

... it is highly material to determine the epoch when socialism began to appear.... It is essential to fix the moment when this cry was uttered for the first time. For if we see it as a recent fact related to entirely new social conditions, or, on the contrary, as a simple recurrence--at most a variation of the lamentations that the wretched of all epochs and societies have made heard --we will judge its tendencies quite differently. In the second case, we will be led to believe that these grievances can no more be terminated than human misery can end. They will be thought of as a kind of chronic illness of humanity... (Soc:42-3).

The initial basic similarity between these two systems of thought and moral reconstruction, Durkheim observed, which
has often led to their conflation, is their mutual opposition to economic egoism.

Both are concerned with the dangers that private interest can present to the general interest. Both are impelled by this double feeling that the free play of egoisms is not enough to automatically produce social order, and that, on the other hand, collective needs must outweigh individual convenience. In short, communism and socialism have this similarity: they both oppose radical and intransigent individualism (Soc:75-6; see also Lukes, 1973:250).

Let us briefly explore some of the contrasts between socialist and communist theory as seen by Durkheim. Now, Durkheim took as prototypes of communist theory such classics of political literature as Plato's Republic, Thomas More's Utopia, and so on; in other words, critical and utopian works that have appeared sporadically throughout history. By contrast, Durkheim observed that the word "socialism" was only coined around 1835, apparently in one of Robert Owen's groups in England. To communist theorists, wealth is bad, anti-social, the very paradigm of egoism. Of Plato's outlook, Durkheim said: "... wealth and all that relates to it is the primary source of public corruption. It is the thing that, stimulating individual selfishness, sets citizens to struggling and unleashes conflict which ruin states" (Soc:68). Communist theory, then, to Durkheim, is abstracted, generic, moralistic, ahistorical--it is primarily a socio-economic-political critique directed at the egoism inherent in human nature. It is not a critique directed at the flaws of a historically specific socio-economic system, as socialist theory is.

... the fundamental communist idea ... is that private property is the source of selfishness and that from selfishness springs immorality. But such a proposition does not strike at any social organization in particular ... it applies to all times and all countries.... Communism holds to a common authority of abstract morality.... What it questions are the moral consequences of private property in general and not—as does socialism—the expediency of a specific economic organization appearing at a particular time in history (Soc:73).

As ahistorical moralists, communist moral philosophers propose that the cause of social evil and suffering is the
generic egoism of human nature. Thus, their theodicy—or explanation of how evil came to reign—is very different from that of the socialists. According to Durkheim, the fundamental question communist theorists ask is:

What are the sources of selfishness and immorality? 
... The question is eternal.... Egoism is too essential to human nature to be uprooted from it—as desirable as that might be. But in the measure that one sees it as an evil, one knows that it is a chronic illness of humanity (Soc:74).

Communist theory attempts to maintain the close-knit interpersonal ethics of tribal brotherhoods; it wishes to extend the primary group, as it were, throughout the whole social system. Because this is so difficult, given man's egoism, utopias are the prime form of expression of communistic dreams (see B. Nelson, 1954, 1958, 1972a). In a tribal brotherhood, where each man is a brother to every other, where there is no "mine and thine," charity and the ethics of the neighborhood reign as dominant inter-personal norms. In a fine phrase, Durkheim termed communism a type of "compulsory fraternity" (Soc:89), since each is obliged to share with all.

To ameliorate misery is not to organize economic life, and communism does naught but push charity to the point of suppressing all property. It arises from a double feeling: pity for the wretched and fear of the anti-social greed and hate which the spectacle of wealth can rouse in their hearts. Under its most noble form, it expresses a movement of love and sympathy. Socialism is essentially a process of economic concentration and centralization (Soc:89).

Durkheim further noted that because of their fundamental critique of economic egoism and their embrace of "compulsory fraternity," communist theorists take as their prime model the type of social conditions in which inter-personal ethical obligations rule all—namely, in primitive tribal society. Indeed, obligatory sharing between kinship groups is the ruling principle of reciprocity (Polanyi, 1968) in primitive economies. Communist theory, then, is basically retrogressive in that it wishes to return to the inter-personal obligations of the family and the neighborhood, of the tribal brotherhood, a primal ground of undifferentiated unity before
the fall. Socialism, on the other hand, realistically accepts the modern, impersonal, mass-scale, international order generated by market capitalism, and seeks to transform this into a new type of less oppressive universal otherhood.

The theoreticians of communism have their entire thinking oriented not toward the future, but toward the past. They are retrogressive. What they demand is not that one hasten the revolution—but that one turn back. It is behind them that they seek their models. Thus, the Platonic city does nothing but openly reproduce the ancient organization of Sparta, that is to say, what was most archaic in the constitutional forms of Greece ... the successors of Plato have merely repeated the master. It is the primitive peoples whom they offer us as an example (Soc:79).

Steven Lukes provides the following useful summation of Durkheim's outline of communist theory:

... he (Durkheim) contrasted socialism with communism, by which he meant utopianism—radical demands for justice, or equality, occurring sporadically throughout history, and typified by Plato, More, and Campanella. Communism was anti-industrial (putting 'industrial life outside the state'), in favor of private production and communal consumption, ascetically opposed to all wealth and abundance, and in favor of small-scale homogeneous societies in which desires are few and horizons narrow (1973:250).

Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim continued to build up a series of contrasts between modern socialism and timeless communist theory based on "tribal brotherhood."

Communism views the respective situations of poor and rich in general, independent of any consideration about the state of commerce and industry, and in the way each contributes to it. So its demands apply to all societies where inequalities exist, whatever the economic regime. Socialists, on the contrary, are concerned only with the particular part of the economic machine that we call the workers, and with the relationships they maintain with the rest of the structure. Communists treat poverty and wealth in abstracto, on logical and moral grounds; socialists examine the conditions in which the non-capitalist workingman exchanges his services (Soc:88-89).

"To equate socialism and communism is to equate contrary things" (Soc:70), Durkheim insists.

For the first, the economic organ must almost become the controlling branch of society; for the second, one could not be far enough removed from the other.... For communists, the state can fulfill its role only if it is com-
pletely insulated from industrial life; for socialists this role is essentially industrial and the connection could not be too complete. To the former, wealth is malevolent and must be put away from society; to the latter, on the contrary, it is bad only if it is not socialized. Without doubt—and this is deceiving—in both there is to be regulation, but it must be noted that it operates in opposing ways. Here, it aims to elevate industry by binding it to the state; there, to elevate the state by excluding it from industry (Soc:70).

Their basically opposed opinion of economic activity, then, leads socialism and communism to propose very different solutions to the problem of linking society, economy, and state. Since communist theorists view economic action as inherently egoistic and anti-social, as corrupting public morals, they wish to exclude it from the state and banish its baneful influence as much as possible from public life. Production is to be private, distribution and consumption public, as in some primitive societies. Socialism, on the other hand, because of its modern nature and tacit acceptance of Utilitarian premises, similarly apotheosizes economic and technological growth, and therefore strives to integrate more closely the economy, state, and society.

It is true that both systems allocate types of activity to the collective sphere which according to individualist concepts would belong in the private realm, and undoubtedly this has contributed to the confusion. But here again they are sharply contrasted. According to socialism, strictly economic functions—activities productive of services (commercial and industrial)—must be socially organized, but consumption is to remain private.... Quite to the contrary, in communism there is consumption that is communal and production which remains private (Soc:70-1).

Again and again Durkheim drives home the same point—communism and socialism are two different theoretical and historical species.

... far from being able to contain the two kinds of doctrines in one definition, they contradict each other in essential characteristics. Whereas communism consists of an excommunication of economic activities, socialism, on the other hand, tends to integrate them more or less tightly into the community, and it is by this tendency that it is defined. For one they could not be relegated far enough from the essential branches of public life;
for the other, they had to be its center of gravity. For the first, the job of the state is specific, primarily moral, and it can acquit itself only if withdrawn from economic influences. For the second, it must before all serve as a unifying bond between the various industrial and commercial relations, for which it would act like a commercial sensorium (Soc:72).

According to Durkheim's unique and insightful contrasts, communist and socialist theory are two very different types of doctrines corresponding to two different ideals and evolutionary levels. Socialism is historically specific: "...it is only countries with developed industry that it impugnes" (Soc:73). Being "heretical" heirs of the Utilitarian radicals, the socialists apotheosize economic growth and rationalization while excoriating industrial and market capitalism; communists, on the other hand, anathematize economic activity altogether.

The two sets of problems are entirely different. On one side, you set out to judge the moral value of wealth in the abstract and deny it; on the other, one asks whether a kind of commerce and industry harmonizes with the conditions of existence of the peoples practicing it, and if its normal or unhealthy. Thus, while communism concerns itself only occasionally with so-called economic arrangements and modifies them only to the degree necessary to place them in keeping with its principles (the abolition of private ownership), socialism, inversely, touches private property only indirectly, to the degree required to change it so that it may harmonize with the economic arrangements—the essential object of its demands (Soc:73).

To so regulate the productive operations that they cooperate harmoniously—that is the formula of socialism. To regulate individual consumption in such a way that is everywhere equal and everywhere moderate—that is the formula of communism. On the one side, one wishes to establish regular cooperation of economic functions with each other and also with other social functions, so as to lessen friction, to avoid loss of energy, and to obtain the maximum return. On the other side, one seeks only to prevent some from consuming more than others. On the one case individual interests are organized; in the other, they are suppressed. What is there in common between these two programs (Soc:88)?

Durkheim further distinguished between the underlying intentions of communist and socialist theoreticians. These mounting series of incisive contrasts are illuminating not
only because they allow us to distinguish modern from ancient characteristics of social criticism, but also because they help us to see the commonalities between the two dominant opposing socioeconomic systems of the modern world. The common opposition of socialism and communism to economic individualism, Durkheim noted:

... gives them a certain family resemblance which explains the confusion so often created. But in reality, the (economic) particularism which these two schools oppose is not the same. One school labels anti-social everything which is private property in a general way, while the other considers dangerous only the individual appropriation of the large economic enterprises which are established at a specific moment in history. Therefore, their significant motives are not at all the same. Communism is prompted by moral and timeless reasons; socialism by considerations of an economic sort. For the former private property must be abolished because it is the source of all immorality; for the latter, the vast industrial and commercial enterprises cannot be left to themselves, as they affect too profoundly the entire economic life of society. Their conclusions are so different because one sees the remedy only in a suppression, as complete as possible, of economic interests; the other, in their socialization. They only resemble each other, therefore, in a vague tendency to attribute to society a certain predominance over the individual; but there is nothing in common in their reasons for asserting this predominance--nor about the situations producing these assertions, nor in the ways it is expected that such predominance will manifest itself (Soc:75).

Now, socialism, Durkheim insisted, is historically specific--it is a critical response to the increasing separation of the economy from polity and society in the modern transitional era. Because socialist theory is a massive and sustained criticism of the ill-effects of international market capitalism, Durkheim presumed that it responds to a deep and divisive gap in the structure of modern societies.

... because socialism is bound to a socially concrete setting, it reveals itself at once as a social and enduring tendency. For the sentiments it expresses--being general--manifest themselves with persistence so long as the conditions which created them have not disappeared. And this is also what gives socialism a practical orientation. The situation to which it corresponds, being recent, is too harsh to tolerate or be declared incurable. It is not an inveteratedisease, like human immoral-
ity in general.... Right or wrong, men have not yet had
time to accustom themselves to modern conditions....
Thus, in whatever way we view communism and socialism,
we perceive contrast rather than identity. The problem
they pose is not the same; the reforms demanded by them
contradict more than they resemble each other.... These
are two orders of historical fact which must be studied
separately (Soc:74-75, 76).

Because they arise from different "theodicies," Durkheim cor-
rectly argued that their respective "therapeutics" are also
basically different. However confused these types may become
in the popular mind, Durkheim emphasized their prime histori-
cal and theoretical differences. Indeed, because of these
crucial differences, "there is a place for both communism and
socialism precisely because they are not oriented in the same
direction" (Soc:91).

In sum, Durkheim always saw the modern crisis histori-
cally--his problem was not the abstract "Hobbesian dilemma"
as Parsons would have it, but rather the release of atomistic
individualism and an "infinity of dreams and desires" in the
modern transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. I
must emphasize that, contrary to Parsons (1949), Durkheim
did not perceive anomie and egoisme to be caused by the gen-
eric absence of social control or moral discipline over the
pre-social ego. Parsons was led astray here, as he was in his
mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as a communist thinker (see
Part I, Book Three), because he abstracted Durkheim's work,
and insisted that Durkheim's prime concern was not change
but rather "social statics." Now, Durkheim shared certain as-
psects of both the socialist and communist critiques. With the
communists, he too portrayed human nature as inherently ego-
istic and economic activity as amoral (this also led Parsons
astray). With the socialists, Durkheim saw the need for prac-
tical measures to socialize egoistic economic activity, espe-
cially as these problems were exacerbated by the historical
nature of the modern crisis generated by the separation of
the economy from the polity and society. This is why Durkheim
talked about politically enfranchising occupational groups.
D. **Changes in Eighteenth Century Communist Theory:**

**Seeds of Socialism**

How, then, did socialist theory arise from communist theory? While contrasting them in many important ways, Durkheim next explored some of the key transitional links between eighteenth century communist theory and nineteenth century socialist theory.

... still we know that, in spite of everything, some relationship does exist between these two doctrines. The sentiments that are at the root of communism, being of all times, are also of ours.... But they do not disappear completely just because they are not vigorous enough to give birth to a system which states them methodically (Soc:89).

Recall first that Durkheim considered socialism to be historically grounded in the separation of the market from occupational, political, and social control, which occurred in the late nineteenth century. More specifically, Durkheim dated its emergence to the special conditions generated by the convolutions of the French and Industrial Revolutions. Now, one of the virtues of Durkheim's brief historical sketch here is that he portrayed the developmental problem in terms of preconditions and breakthroughs. For example, before socialism could emerge, the following conditions must obtain:

- Big industry is in process of development; the importance attributed to economic life is sufficiently established by the fact that economics began to be considered a science; the state is secularized and the centralization of French society is accomplished (Soc:80).

Although communism was still the predominant critical social doctrine of the eighteenth century, Durkheim suggested that we encounter there:

... the two important seeds of socialism. First, a sentiment of protest against traditional social inequalities; and second, a conception of the state which allows it the broadest of rights. Applied to the economic order, the first of these factors gave birth to the desire to modify the system, and at the same time the second furnished the means and the necessary instrument to achieve these modifications (Soc:107).

A new note was sounded in eighteenth century communist theory, Durkheim suggested. Theorists like Rousseau, Morelly,
Mably, etc. "... were more morally imperative, more saddened, disturbed by their own societies, and they betrayed a stronger and more generalized concern for social justice" (Lukes, 1973:251). A few theorists, such as Linguet, Necker, and Graslin, turned critical attention to the sad realities of modern industrial life, "... but at first it is only among a few rare writers that the feeling of protest ... left the sphere of philosophical abstractions to address itself to economic reality" (Soc:99). And even their conclusions were rather "timid and conservative" (Lukes, 1973:251), for they assigned the state only a "negative role."

In short, a hope for a more just social order and an idea of the state's rights which, together are the seeds of socialism, but which were limited at the time to only rudimentary wishes--that is all we find in the eighteenth century (Soc:101).

Durkheim then posed two important historical questions:

(1) "Where does this double seed come from, how was this new concept of justice and the state constituted; (2) What prevented it from leading to the socialist consequences it implied?" (Soc:102) The form of these historical inquiries is important, for here Durkheim searched not only for the specific origins and carriers of different values, but also for the preconditions acting as obstacles to breakthroughs, a typically Weberian procedure. In this way one can build a comparative check into studies of historical development.

Durkheim's answer to the first question is that this "double seed" was an outgrowth of the "double movement"--the individualist and statist tendencies--of the French Revolution itself.

It is evident that these ideas are none other than the two fundamental principles on which all the political transformations of 1789 rest. They are the result of the double movement from which the Revolution sprang: the individualist movement and the statist movement. The first resulted in having it admitted as evident that the place of the individuals in the body politic should be exclusively determined by their personal value, and consequently of having traditional inequalities rejected as unjust. The second had the result that the reforms judged to be necessary were considered realiza-
ble, because the state was conceived as the natural instrument of their realization. Besides, these principles are jointly responsible for each other in the sense that the stronger the state is constituted, and the higher it is raised above all individuals, of whatever class or origin, the more, therefore, did all individuals appear equal through connection with it. This is where the two tendencies sprang from. They were born for the sake of the political organization and with a view to modifying this organization. They appeared to have so little contact with economic reality because they were formed under altogether different influences.... It is political ideas which are the center of gravity of the system (Soc:102-3).

But what happened to these dynamic individualist and statist forces? Why didn't they immediately produce socialist consequences?

Arising in connection with the political organization, these two ideas were applied to it, they stimulated the transformations which are the work of the Revolution, but they were hardly extended beyond it. How is this? Since these tendencies are precisely those from which revolutionary events derived, we might suppose that before they could cause economic changes they had to transform the political structure.... For these facts to produce their social or socialist consequences, they had first to produce their political consequences (Soc:107, 105).

Thus, Durkheim's model of explanation, when confronted with actual historical problems of interpretation, converged with Weber's--for before socialism could demand the closer linking of the economy to the central state, these dynamic forces first had to transform the political order itself. Given this precondition, these same forces then extended their dynamic demands to the complex relations between economy and polity, on the one hand, and to society on the other. This sort of historical reasoning is vastly superior to Durkheim's earlier general evolutionary abstractions in *The Division of Labor*. We should now hold him to these more adequate forms of explanation in terms of interpreting the sources of anomic and egoistic suicide.
E. Saint-Simon's Explanation of the Origins of the Industrial System and the Modern Transitional Crisis

The entire doctrine of Saint-Simon hinges upon the following problem: 'What is the social system required by the present situation of the European peoples?' To answer this question, Saint-Simon examines history. It reveals that modern societies carry within themselves two social systems—not only different but contradictory—which have been developing in opposite directions since the early Middle Ages. One has as its key military force and the unreasoned prestige of faith; the other, industrial capacity and the freely accepted authority of the learned. Temporally, one is completely organized for war, for depravation—the other for peaceful production. Spiritually, the former systematically turns men's minds away from all that is earthly, whereas the latter centers them on things of this world. Such an antagonism precludes mixing and eclectic solutions.... A society cannot be consistent and stable as long as it rests concurrently on two principles so manifestly contradictory. It cannot be in equilibrium unless it is organized completely in a homogeneous fashion—that is, unless all collective forces move in the same direction and around a single and identical center of gravity. It is therefore necessary to choose firmly between the two systems. Either wholly restore one, or else extend the other to the entirety of social life (Soc:179).

Preface. Durkheim clearly agreed with much of Saint-Simon's explanation of the origins and problems of the industrial system—"... it cannot be posed with greater profundity" (Soc: 160). Durkheim's fulsome praise of Saint-Simon is important in itself, but doubly so for our present purposes because here Saint-Simon is acknowledged to have provided a brilliant historical explanation of the origins and causes of the contemporary crisis underlying anomie and egoisme. Indeed, Durkheim himself never provided as detailed or subtly inflected an historical-causal explanation of the roots of the modern crisis.

According to Saint-Simon, the two key forces growing up in the womb of medieval "organic" society which were destined to transform it from within were the "commune" and the growth of scientific or positive knowledge. The first notion represents a significant convergence with Weber (1968), who
also pointed out the importance of the Occidental city as an "oath-bound confederation." The new Western commune represented a new structure of human fraternization, and thus a key phase in the world-historical extension of the social bond. Equally important was the extension and theoretical systematization of scientific knowledge in providing the "positive" logics of modern thought and action, instead of hierocratic direction and control. In this Saint-Simon showed himself to be a true son of the French Enlightenment. As a follower of Condorcet, Saint-Simon believed the growth of scientific knowledge to be the prime historical mover. Knowledge was the causal agent of historical change; the great law of "progress" ruled man's destiny (eg. see Soc:138-40). In essence, Saint-Simon wished to more explicitly link these two related historical trends: "To reorganize European societies by giving them science and industry as bases--that was the objective he never lost sight of" (Soc:123).

In contrast to the reforming "critical" philosophies of the eighteenth century, however, Saint-Simon's philosophy was to be "positive."

[The eighteenth century philosophes of the Encyclopaedia] .... were above all critical. It demonstrated that the old systems of ideas was no longer in harmony with the new discoveries of science, but it did not say what it ought to be. It was a weapon of war, made to destroy, not to reconstruct. But today reconstruction is needed. "The philosophy of the eighteenth century was critical and revolutionary, while that of the nineteenth will be inventive and organizational" (Soc:130).

Now, sociology was to be the theoretical instrument to this practical end of "positive" social and moral reconstruction. Although other sciences were ready to be used, "social physiology," conceived on the model of the natural sciences, had to be constructed by Saint-Simon and his great protege, Comte. Saint-Simon clearly believed, Durkheim relates, that "In times of trouble and crisis, when a new system of common beliefs is straining to be worked out, it is philosophy that must direct this elaboration" (Soc:130). Without this overriding intention, French positivism and sociology itself
might never have been born. Indeed, Saint-Simon's typically rationalistic belief that thought itself must direct action and the new social order is clearly seen:

'Every social regime is an application of a philosophic system, and consequently it is impossible to institute a new regime without having previously established the new philosophic system to which it must correspond' (Soc:131).

Durkheim concluded:

A definite social crisis had stirred his thought, and it was entirely to solve it that his efforts were bent. His entire system, consequently, has a practical... objective.... Although he was the first to have a really clear conception of what sociology had to be and its necessity... he did not create a sociology. He didn't use the method, whose principles he had so firmly stated, to discover the laws of evolution--social and general--but in order to answer a very special question--of entirely immediate interest--what is the social system required by the condition of European societies on the morrow of the Revolution (Soc:146)?

How did the present crisis come to be? To answer these and other questions, Saint-Simon turned back to the womb of Western culture in the so-called "Middle Ages," and proceeded to offer a brilliant retrospective analysis of the birth of the modern world. Saint-Simon saw European society, especially after the French Revolution, as caught between two opposing types of social organization--the lingering structures of medieval "organic" society, on the one hand, and the modern industrial, urban, scientific system still straining to be born on the other. The troubles of the contemporary age, according to Saint-Simon, were due to the transitional crisis of European society. The notion of alternating "organic" and "critical" periods was central to Saint-Simon's historical perspective. Thus, the prime point of departure for Saint-Simon's historical explanations of the origins of the industrial system and our modern crisis was the religio-military system of the "Middle Ages."

... the social system revolved completely around two centers of gravity, distinct but closely related. On the one hand, there were the chiefs of the army, who constituted what is since called feudalism, and to whom all of secular society was closely subjected. All prop-
erty was in their hands, and workers ... were dependent on them. On the other hand, there were the clergy, who controlled the spiritual direction of society generally. ... Their doctrines and decisions served as guides to opinion; but what overwhelmingly established their authority was their absolute mastery over general and particular education. In other words, the entire economic life of society depended on the lords, and all intellectual life on the priests. The first rule supremely over productive operations, the second over consciences. Thus all collective functions were strictly subordinated either to military power or religious authority, and this double subjugation constituted the social organization. ... This two-pronged supremacy was based on the nature of things (Soc:148).

Taking this as his original analytical anchor, Saint-Simon then began to detect contrary forces growing up within the bosom of the older religio-military system. After Saint-Simon, Durkheim enunciated the following hermeneutical principle: "It is a general rule that the apogee of a social system coincides with the beginning of its decadence. In the eleventh century, spiritual and temporal powers were definitively established; never was the authority of clergy and lords more undisputed" (Soc:149).

But coming into existence at that very moment were two new social forces. Being opposed to the preceding ones, they entered into struggle with them, gradually destroying them, and thus disintegrated the system whose parts had been bound together only because they were all subjected to the all-powerful action of the double authority. These two forces were the free commune and exact science (Soc:149).

As Weber did in his monograph on The City (1968), Saint-Simon focussed on the emerging social organization of the oath-bound confederations, the new urban economic and political entities. Starting first in the eleventh and twelfth century Renaissance (centered in France), Saint-Simon observed:

... with the twelfth century began the great movement of the emancipation of the commune. Villages ... were freeing themselves from seigneurial tutelage. And they were totally composed of artisans and merchants. A whole segment of the economic structure thus found itself detached from the others who until then were forcing their control on it. Transformed into a special, relatively independent organ, henceforth the villages were going to live their own lives, to pursue their particular inter-
ests--outside of any military influence.... Liberated industry was going to be able freely to realize its own nature.... A new force, sui generis, had entered the heart of the social body, and as by nature and origin it was foreign to the old organization--and could only disturb it--it was inevitable that its very presence would disconcert the latter's functioning, and would develop only by destroying it (Soc:149-50).

Among the important aspects of the Renaissance of the twelfth century was the re-introduction of classical literature and philosophy. The Arabs were the prime conduits for the transmission of Greek philosophy, and their oftentimes sophisticated development of this classical tradition helped generate a "rational structure of consciousness" (see Nelson, 1973a) within the old feudal system. In the new urban confederations, a new institution and professional group was arising--namely, the university and the scholastic philosophers.

Gradually, in opposition to the clergy, a new body was forming, which like the preceding one aimed at directing the intellectual life of society. These were the scholars who, in their relation to the clerical class were exactly in the same situation as were the enfranchised communes--that is, the corporation of artisans and merchants--vis-a-vis feudalism. Thus two seeds of destruction were introduced into the theological feudal system, and from that moment the two forces which were the source of its strength began to grow weaker (Soc:150).

For centuries, these "seeds of destruction"--the urban commune as a new form of voluntaristic fraternization, and rational philosophy--continued growing in strength, until the massive dislocations and religious wars of the sixteenth century. "Although the conflict never ceased, it was some time before it produced visible results. The old system was too solidly entrenched, and too resistant, for obscure causes to immediately manifest their action through exterior and apparent effects" (Soc:150). Saint-Simon's keen insight into the complexities and dialectics of sociocultural process led him to recognize these crucial "subterranean processes" running beneath the long-distorted Enlightenment images of the so-called "dark ages." Durkheim noted: "He (Saint-Simon) keeps repeating that this arrangement of European societies establishes itself spontaneously because it alone correspond-
ed to the state of civilization" (Soc:148). Indeed, Saint-Simon not only granted the medieval period its due in the rise of Western civilization, but he insisted that in its social organization it fitted the needs of the day, and, moreover, represented a necessary phase in human progress. Along with later sociocultural historians such as Fustel de Coulanges, Saint-Simon, said, Durkheim, saw the real underlying creativity of this period (see also Durkheim, 1938). Durkheim gave to Saint-Simon the honor of being one of the first post-Revolutionary thinkers to view the middle ages objectively, without the partisan polemic so characteristic of French and other reformers.

It is through failing to recognize the importance of this subterranean process that one so often sees the Middle Ages as a dark era in which a veritable intellectual night reigned, and that consequently nothing about it was related to the period of light which followed. In reality, it was the Middle Ages which paved the way for modern times. It contained them in embryo (Soc:150).

Rightly sensing the moral and religious component in these developing changes, Saint-Simon saw the Protestant Reformation (rather than the Italian Renaissance) as the crucial opening wedge in the fundamental reorganization of the "mor- alities of thought and logics of action" underlying European social and cultural order. Especially important here was the individualistic "Protestant principle" (eg. see Tillich, 1948) of free examination in matters of faith and conscience.

... it was only in the sixteenth century that the forces antagonistic to the old system found themselves strong enough to come into the open.... At first these forces were directed against theological rule; Luther and his co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a power in Europe. At the same time in a general way, they undermined theological authority by 'destroying the principle of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of examination which--restrained at first within quite narrow limits--was to inevitably increase and ... finally embrace an indefinite area.' This two-fold change operated not only among peoples converted to Protestantism, but even among those who remained Catholic. For once the principle was established, it extended well beyond the conditions where it had first been proclaimed. As a result, the bond which tied individual consciences to the
ecclesiastical power—although not shattered—was loosened and the moral unity of the social system definitely unsettled (Soc:151-2).

Saint-Simon also clearly perceived the spread of secularization of this Protestant individualism into political revolution. In a curiously parallel movement, both this individualistic drive and the trend toward political centralization proceeded together, especially in France and England.

The entire sixteenth century was seized by this great intellectual revolution. But it was at its close that the struggle—begun against spiritual power—proceeded against temporal power. It took place almost at the same time in France and England. In both countries it was led by the common people, with one of two branches of temporal power as leader. With the English, feudalism placed itself at their head to combat royal authority; in France, royalty made itself their ally against feudal strength.... Here Richelieu, then Louis XIV shattered seigneurial power; there, the Revolution of 1688 broke out, limiting royal authority as much as possible without overturning the old organization. The final result of these events was a weakening of the military system in its entirety (Soc:152).

Eventually, as the struggle deepened, the new "Protestant principle"—the new "moralities of thought and logics of action"—of freedom of conscience and rationalistic individualism which accompanied it, were extended to their outer limits. Such a process of dialectical polarization is almost as inevitable as the routinization of charisma. Thus, we see the progressive extension of individualism as an absolute principle into the legitimized egoism at the base of modern economies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim attacked so relentlessly with his notions of anomie and egoism.

In the eighteenth century, the shocks had gone so deep, the feudal order's resistance became so weak, that the attack on it became generalized, and directed against the whole of its organization. One then sees the principle of the right of examination in religious matters extended to its extreme limit *(S:153).

Durkheim summed up Saint-Simon's account of the separation or differentiation out of these new elements crucial to the emerging social order in these terms:
The history of the old system .. up to the eve of the Revolution, shows us a spectacle of an uninterrupted decadence. But at the same time that this regressive progress was developing, another was occurring in reverse direction with no less significance. Industrial and scientific forces, once formed, did not manifest themselves exclusively by destructive effects, that is, by overthrowing the old social order they gave rise to another. They did not limit themselves to detaching consciences and individual wills from the center which until then ... had made a single body of them. But to the degree they acquired more energy, they themselves became foci of common action and centers of organization. Around them gradually formed the social elements which the old forces--more or less powerless to keep them subordinate--were allowing to escape. Under these new influences, a new social system was slowly arising in the bosom of the old, which was disintegrating.

As long as the arts and crafts had been narrowly subordinated to the theological and military authority, having to serve as instruments for ends which were not their own, they had been impeded in their progress. But as soon as they began to be free--thanks to the liberation of the common people--they took flight and developed so quickly that they soon became a social force to be reckoned with. Little by little all society fell into dependence upon them, because nothing was any longer possible without them. Military force itself was subjected to them, once war became a complex and costly thing, once it demanded not merely native courage and a certain disposition of character, but money, machines, arms. More and more, improvements in industry, the inventions of science, and finally, wealth, were proving more vital to success in arms than innate bravery (Soc:153-4).

Focussing on these rising middle classes, the prime carriers of the new religious individualism, capitalism, and urban life, Saint-Simon further observed that the bourgeoisie increasingly became part of, and then progressively transformed, the administrative apparatus of political and legal institutions.

But when a class acquires greater importance and respect, when the functions it fulfills become more essential, it is inevitable for it to wield greater influence on the direction of society and increased political authority. This is in fact what occurred. Little by little, one sees representatives of industry admitted to governmental councils, playing a greater and greater part, and as a result having a larger share in determining the general course of society. It is in England that this phenomena manifests itself. Gradually, the common people--the classes which fulfill only econo-
mic functions—obtain first a voice in the tax vote, then a deliberative voice, and then the exclusive right to vote on budgets. They substitute themselves for the old temporal power in one of its most important functions, and are able henceforth to act in conformity with their own interest in the direction of society; they modify its orientation, since they have altogether different ends than the military classes. In other words, the social system began to revolve around a new center (Soc:154-5).

In addition to the administrative control over tax revenues, the growing cities began to gain control over their own system of the administration of justice in the municipal tribunals.

Once the villages were freed, one of the rights considered most important to achieve was the administration of justice.... From this moment the industrial class had a judiciary organ which was its own, in harmony with its special nature, and which contributed to complete the system which was in process of formation.... This spontaneous organization... extended to every detail of collective life, to the whole mass of population which it affected in an entirely new way. Before the liberation of the communes, the people—in secular matters—had as their only continuing leaders the chiefs of the army. But with enfranchisement, they gradually became detached, and organized under the leaders of the arts and crafts (Soc:155).

Further, Saint-Simon emphasized the importance of the changes in the technology of warfare and the innovation of national armies in this overall development.

... It is especially due to the institution of permanent armies that this new grouping of social forces could separate itself completely from the old and become independent.... From this moment on, the task of soldiering was a special function, separated from the remainder of the population. As a result, the 'mass of people had no longer any connection with the military heads. It was organized only industrially' (Soc:155-6).

Science, too, became increasingly separated from its prime locus—scholastic theology; gradually, natural and moral philosophy became autonomous. Scientific scholars increasingly moved to the center stage by becoming advisers to the new national monarchs, who required their skills in governing and in military and public works projects (eg. Leonardo da Vinci's involvement with Ludovico Sforza and Caesare Bor-
gia). Out of this liaison between scientists and monarchs, scientific academies—the first modern scientific institutions—were eventually born. Saint-Simon took this close alliance as a model for his ideal "positive" society.

Just as with industry, science, as it grew, developed an organization appropriate to its own character, and very different, consequently, from that permitted by theological authority. Scholars became esteemed personages whom royalty more and more made a habit of consulting. It is as a result of these repeated consultations that great scientific bodies were gradually established at the pinnacle of the system. These were the academies (Soc:156).

Durkheim (after Saint-Simon), summed up these twin socio-economic and religio-cultural developments in this way:

The results of this double evolution can be summarized as follows: in the measure that the ancient social system gave way, another was formed in the very bosom of the first. The old society contained within itself a new society, in process of formation and everyday acquiring more strength and consistency. But these two organizations are necessarily antagonistic—they result from opposing forces and aim at contradictory ends. One is essentially aggressive and warlike; the other, essentially pacifist.... One has conquest for its aim, the other, production. Similarly, in spiritual affairs the first calls on faith and imposes beliefs which it puts beyond discussion. The second calls on reason and even trust—it requires a type of intellectual subordination essential to rationality. Thus, these two types of societies could not exist without contradicting each other.

... The old morality and law were discredited in the new world which was arising; but a new juridical and moral order, without which the new system could not be considered organized, did not come into being automatically. Thus, scientific industrial society reached out for an appropriate social organization which was not yet in existence. To succeed, it had both to overcome the inertia of the old and to shape the new. As long as this two-fold result was not achieved, it was inevitable that disorganization and conflict would be severe and would affect the whole of society * (Soc:157; 158).

I must emphasize that Durkheim enunciated here a crucial insight which I should like to hold him to in later causal explanations—namely, that the old order must be broken through by a new innovation, a new way whether it be technological or ethical, and then subsequently spread and become institution-
alized, as the old system begins to break down under the pressure. Lack of recognition of this Weberian principle often leads historians astray, as it does Durkheim's abstracted general evolutionism (see Part I, Book Three). We must lay aside the old notion of slow, inevitable progress. Our real challenge here is to marry general and specific evolutionary explanations in sociological theory; specifically, this means linking Durkheim and Weber (see Part I, Book Three). One cannot hope, for instance, to adequately explain the origins and significance of anomie and egoisme except by seeing them against the background of the breakthrough of old medieval casuistries of moral decision (see Nelson, 1969a, 1973a, 1973b) by the new Protestant "moralities of thought and logics of action" (see Part II, Book Three). Hence, on the mainline of world-historical evolution, our interpretive image should be of breakthroughs and breakdowns.

However, the French Revolution's net effect was destructive, observed Saint-Simon. It was necessary, but not sufficient, for while it broke down the old order, it failed to create something new and viable in its place. Thus, the transitional crisis between the two types of social order was prolonged and even exacerbated.

Such was the situation on the eve of the Revolution, and out of it the Revolution was born.... 'A civil and moral revolution which had gradually developed for more than six centuries engendered and necessitated a political revolution.... If one insists on attributing the French Revolution to one source, it must be dated from the day of the liberation of the communes, and the cultivation of exact sciences began.' A two-fold need gave rise to it: the need of being extricated from the past, and the need to organize the present; the Revolution met only the first of these needs. It succeeded in striking the final blows at the old system. It abolished all that remained of feudalism—even royal authority—and all that survived from the old temporal power. It gave to freedom of conscience the juridical consequences it implied, whereas before it had only the weight of moral sanction (Soc:158-159).

The incompleteness of the Revolution, Durkheim explained in his Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, was the prime reason why France to his day continued to oscillate back and
forth between individualism and despotic monarchies. In sweeping away the past, its influence was largely negative; what was next needed was "positive" social action. Our contemporary crisis deepens, for the old way is gone forever, but the new order is not yet mature.

But on the land thus cleared, the Revolution built nothing new. It asserted that no one was obliged to accept the old beliefs but did not attempt to elaborate a new body of rational beliefs that all minds could accept. It destroyed the foundations on which political authority rested, but failed to establish others of any stability. It proclaimed that political power was not to belong to those who had monopolized it until then, but did not assign it to any definite organ. In other words, it neglected to state what it was for.... An action so exclusively destructive, far from attenuating the crisis which had given rise to it, could only make the evil more acute and intolerable. For the absences of organization from which industrial society suffered became far more perceptible once all that remained of the old had disappeared. The weak cohesion of this dawning society became a much graver social peril once the old social bonds were completely destroyed.... 'No longer having anything that was agreed upon, people separated and became enemies. It was a struggle of all whims, a battle of all imaginations'.... This was one indication of the partial miscarriage of the Revolution. As a society so disoriented cannot live, one soon sees reborn from their ashes certain of the destroyed institutions. Royal authority was reestablished. But these revivals of the past did not constitute a solution. So the problem is posed on the morrow of the Revolution, at the start of the nineteenth century, in the same terms as on the eve of 1789, only it has become more pressing. The denouement is more urgent if one does not wish to see each crisis produce another, exasperation the chronic state of society, and finally, disintegration more or less the result. One must take a stand. Either completely restore the old system or organize the new. It is precisely this that is the social question (Soc:159-60).
F. Durkheim's Critical Reflections on Saint-Simon's Doctrine: Economics as Amoral Activity

Durkheim repeatedly acknowledged Saint-Simon's historical analysis of the historical roots of our contemporary crisis as profound (eg. Soc:160); however, he also insisted that it contained a basic flaw. For, Durkheim charged, Saint-Simon sanctified the very type of activity that was symptomatic of modern "moral anarchy." Saint-Simon wished to deregulate economic appetites, he apotheosized economic desires. Saint-Simon wished to enshrine the very amoral element against which Durkheim's "philosophy of finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) was fundamentally opposed. In these terms, the problem Durkheim next set himself was outlining the kind of decentralized democratic socialism which, through the social interactional medium of occupational groups, would act to restrain and morally discipline these egoistic and insatiable appetites. Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's critique of Saint-Simon's doctrine, for it reveals, once again, the depth of Durkheim's concern with anomie and egoisme as an "infinity of dreams and desires."

Granting Saint-Simon's historical insight, Durkheim restated his generalized moral argument, and his philosophy of "human finitude" versus the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. He carried this critique and philosophy through at least four major books--The Division of Labor, Socialism, Suicide, and Moral Education.

As we view it, it cannot be posed with greater profundity. The originality of this historic analysis is that Saint-Simon very correctly felt that the changes spontaneously produced in European societies since the Middle Ages had not simply acted upon this or that particular characteristic... but that the social organism had been affected to its very foundations. He understood that the liberal movement of which the Revolution was only the culmination, but which had been incubating for centuries before it--had not merely the effect of unchaining citizens from burdensome shackles as an end in itself. He saw the dissolution of the old order of things that had resulted, that this dissolution had not solved the central problem, but was making such a solution more immediately necessary. He understood that to reorganize
society it was not enough to destroy the old system of forces which united it, and that once this destruction is accomplished social equilibrium itself—as essential as it might otherwise be—in its turn becomes precarious, is maintained only by a miracle, and can fall with the slightest wind. Consequently, it is necessary to rebuild on new foundations according to a plan which is not simply a reproduction of the old. Thus the great contemporary questions are found to be related to the whole course of our historical development (Soc:160).

Again, Durkheim took pains to acknowledge that Saint-Simon was the first major liberal thinker in France after the Revolution to offer a critically objective view of the Revolution, while still resolving to carry on its work. Saint-Simon judges the work of the Revolution with independence—sometimes every severity ... (yet) it would be a mistake to see a condemnation in his criticism. First, he postulates the principle that it was necessary and inevitable; our history ... is but its long preparation. Further, he reproaches the men of the Revolution for having overthrown the ancient institutions without determining what to put in their place.... In short, he objects not its having been, but to its not having been all that it might (Soc:161).

In a fascinating account (Soc:161-4) which we cannot include here, Durkheim reviews Saint-Simon's explanation of why the Revolution miscarried, or rather, stopped halfway. "What prevented it from ending on positive results?" In essence, Saint-Simon blames the influence of a specific occupational group—the lawyers, a group he personally encountered in jail during the Revolution and Reign of Terror. Their mentality was too critical, too linked to the past, too abstract to generate a truly "positive society."

Now, Saint-Simon's life-task was to get the new system up "on its feet." Thus, at the root of his historical analyses, was a very practical problem: "Granted that our present societies contain within them two different, and even contradictory social systems—one which is becoming weaker and weaker, and the other emerging more and more—how can the crisis resulting from their antagonism be solved" (Soc:167) The complex details of Saint-Simon's cascade of reform proposals need not detain us here. What is most important for
our present purposes is that Saint-Simon proposed that industry and economic activity must become sanctified and centralized. "Society must become a vast production company" (Soc: 173). However, instead of arguing for laissez-faire (the separation of political from economic functions), Saint-Simon strove to link the economy much more closely with the polity. At the same time, the State's role was not to repress industrial activity, but to socialize it.

This is where Saint-Simon distinguished himself from the system of the classic economists. For them economic life is completely outside politics; it refers wholly to the individual. For Saint-Simon it is the whole substance of politics; not only is there a politics of economic interests, but there is no other. 'Politics is the science of production' (Soc:179).

Durkheim acknowledged some important similarities between individualist and socialist theory; but in the end, they differed on the proper relations between society, economy, and polity.

Historically, socialism does not spring from economics, but is derived from a similar source. Born at almost the same time, the two systems should obviously correspond to the same social state they express differently. ... Not only did we find in both the same tendency to cosmopolitanism, the same sensuous and utilitarian tendency, but further, the fundamental principle on which they rest is identical. Both are industrialist; both proclaim that economic interests are social interests. The difference is that Saint-Simon, and all subsequent socialists, conclude that since economic factors are the substance of common life, they must be organized socially, whereas the economists refuse to subject them to any collective control and believe they can be arranged and harmonized without prior reorganization (Soc:238).

According to Durkheim, Saint-Simon saw correctly, along with the Utilitarian individualist economists, that industrial activity could no longer be subordinated to the remnants of the traditional social and political order. But he erred in apotheosizing this dynamic, even demonic, force.

Saint-Simon demonstrated that the powers which had dominated industry until the present were going into decline and that this decline was inevitable. From this he concluded that it did and should tend toward complete enfranchisement, toward absolute liberation, that it was no longer to be subordinated to anything which would
surpass it, that henceforth it was to be its own end, and draw from itself its own rule (Soc:239).

Durkheim next launched into his chief objection against this apotheosis of amoral economic activity. He emphatically rejected the notion that such activity can be self-regulating. Hence, the central postulate of a self-equilibrating market mechanism balancing production and consumption, supply and demand, was also ruled out of court. Nothing in nature, Durkheim contended, can be freed of the need for limitation.

But this conclusion was premature. To assume that the particular state of subjection in which industry had formerly been held could not be in agreement with the new conditions of collective life, does not imply that every other type of dependence would be devoid of reason. It can well be that the transformation now necessary does not consist in suppressing all subordination, but in changing its form—not in making industrial interests a kind of unlimited absolute beyond which there is nothing, but rather in limiting them in a different manner and spirit than formerly. Not only does this hypothesis deserve examination, but in fact is easy to understand that in any social organization, however skillfully ordered, economic functions cannot cooperate harmoniously nor be maintained in a state of equilibrium unless subjected to moral forces which suppress, contain, and regulate them (Soc:239).

Unfortunately incorporating the portrayal of economic motivation and action projected by his opponents—the Utilitarian ethical economists—Durkheim took economics as the very prototype of amoral, egoistic activity (see also Part I, Book Three). If there can be no question of the organic ego disciplining its own egoistic and insatiable sensual appetites, how can there be any question that economic action based on this ego can really be self-regulating? (Of course, to the Utilitarians, the conclusion was precisely the opposite—because the generic individual was self-guiding, possessed of an innate "moral sense," the prime arena of individualistic activity—the economy—would also be self-regulating, if only the medieval state could be set aside. To them economic demands were moral demands, while they were inherently amoral to Durkheim). The very basis of Durkheim's "philosophy of human finitude" was that the insatiability of the pre-social
ego must always be constrained by moral discipline.

... It is a general law of all living things that needs and appetites are normal only on the condition of being controlled. Unlimited need contradicts itself. For need is defined by the goal it aims at, and if unlimited has no goal—since there is no limit. It is not true aim to seek constantly more than one has—to work in order to overtake the point one has reached, with a view only to exceeding the point at which one will have arrived. From another point of view, one might say that the persistence of a need or appetite in a living body can be explained only if it secures some satisfaction for the being who experiences it. But an appetite that nothing can appease can never be satisfied *(Soc:239-40).

It is important to recognize that Weber (1958a,1968) agreed that functionally rational economic action (e.g. Utilitarian or pragmatic logics) is substantively irrational; and here Durkheim made this absence of substantive or goal-directed behavior one of the inner meanings of α-nomie as purposeless in the sense of limitless action. Why so many would strive so hard for "infinitely receding" goals with so little hope of satisfaction is a most curious ethos, one which is wholly inexplicable by Durkheim's notion of man as homo duplex, but which was powerfully and brilliantly dissected by Weber. If Weber explained the historical origins of the modern ethos better than Durkheim, nonetheless, the latter provided a portrait, perhaps unsurpassed even by Freud, of the phenomenological torment implied in living out the mandates of modern cultural traditions.

Insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering. Whatever one does, it is never slaked. Every being likes to act, to move, and movement is life. But he must feel his action serves some purpose—that by walking he goes forward. But one does not advance when he proceeds without a goal—or what comes to the same thing—toward a goal situated in infinity. The distance is always the same, whatever the road, and no matter what the pace, one seems to be simply marking time. It is well-known that insatiability is a sign of morbidity. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has taken a certain amount of nourishment; it is the glutton who cannot be satisfied. Healthy people enjoy motion, but at the end of exercise, they like to rest. The deambulatory maniac experiences the need of perpetually moving without stop or rest; nothing satisfies him. In its normal state sexual desire is aroused for a time,
then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there are no limits *(Soc:240).

If only Durkheim had turned from his brilliant insights, instead of reducing this substantively irrational "moral anarchy" to organic "pathologies," to the sociocultural-historical level which he seemed to champion, he might have broken consciously through to the second schema. But his biological analogies, and his genetic equation of society with rationality and moral discipline led him in the wrong direction here.

Once again, it must be noted, however, that Durkheim's own doctrine was ambiguous on this point. Man, he observed, is less fettered by instinct than animals. A new life is awakened in man, which cannot be satisfied by the old minimum sustenance of innate drives. Even so, Durkheim admitted, man's appetites are limited (see also Part I, Book Three).

For beyond this indispensable minimum—which satisfies the need on the instinctive level—reflection, more alert, glimpses better conditions which appear as desirable ends and which invite activity. Yet it is clear that appetites of this kind sooner or later meet a boundary they cannot overstep (Soc:241).

But socially and culturally generated desires face no such inherent biological limitations. That which is generated by society can only be constrained and redirected by society. Certainly Durkheim would have spared us much trouble had he made this central fact clearer, instead of portraying the source of insatiable desires as the organic ego. For if society is the ultimate source of values which encourage absolute individualism and insatiable desires, then Durkheim's dark doctrine of man as homo duplex falls into the background. Our prime sociological task here would then be to discover the different ways in which historical types of societies energized, expressed, or repressed the limitless possibilities of human culture. The way would then be opened to the second schema.

But how to fix the quantity of well-being, comfort, luxury, that a human being ought to possess. Nothing is found either in the organic or psychological constitution of man which sets a limit to such needs. The functioning of an individual life requires only
that he halt here rather than there, that he satisfy himself at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that such needs have continued to develop in the course of history, and have found increasingly complete satisfaction, and nevertheless the average state of health has improved, and average happiness has not diminished. But as there is nothing within an individual which constrains these appetites, they must surely be contained by some force exterior to him, or else they would become insatiable—that is, morbid. Either, knowing no limits, they become a source of torment for man, irritating and plaguing him in a pursuit without possible end, or there must be, outside the individual, some power capable of stopping them, disciplining them, fixing a limit that nature does not * (Soc:241).

All of this Durkheim laid against Saint-Simon's apotheosis of industrial economy. Saint-Simon did not seem to have understood, argued Durkheim, that by unleashing and sanctifying these sensual appetites, he actually would have fed the fires of "moral anarchy." His remedy would have only aggravated the evil!

This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him it appears that the way to realize social peace is to free economic appetites of all restraint, on the one hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For such appetites cannot be appeased unless they are limited, and they cannot be limited except by something other than themselves. They cannot be subordinated to something which surpasses them, and it is only on this condition that they are capable of being really satisfied (Soc:241-2).

Speaking to our ideal of affluence for all, our highest economic and democratic dream, Durkheim suggested that such an ideal is an illusory and self-deceptive dream. For what is the final standard of affluence? When shall we have reached utopia? When is enough enough? Since these desires are socially and culturally generated, and since society is inevitably structured in some sort of hierarchy, the phenomena of rising expectations, coupled with the sense of relative deprivation, creates a strong sociological pressure toward constant inflation. Durkheim asked us to:

Picture the most productive organization possible and a distribution of wealth which assures abundance to even the humblest--perhaps such a transformation, at
the very moment it was constituted, would produce an instant of gratification. But this gratification could only be temporary. For desires, though calmed for an instant, will quickly acquire new exigencies. Unless it is admitted that each individual is equally compensated ... there will always be some workers who will receive more and others less. So it is inevitable that at the end of a short time, the latter find their share meager compared with what goes to the others, and as a result new demands arise, for all levels of the social scale. And besides, even apart from any feeling of envy, excited desires will tend naturally to keep outrunning their goals, for the very reason that there will be nothing before them which stops them. And they will call all the more imperiously for a new satisfaction, since those already secured will have given them more strength and vitality. This is why those at the very top of the hierarchy, who consequently would have nothing above them to stimulate their ambition, could nevertheless not be held at the same point they had reached, but would continue to be plagued by the same restlessness that torments them today (Soc:242).

This "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville spoke (e.g. see Nisbet, 1966, 1974), is the modern analogue of what medieval "physicians of the soul" had called acedia, or as Josef Pieper (1963) puts it, the "inability to acquiesce in one's own being." As a moral philosopher, Durkheim saw that rather than the root problem being the lack of affluence as the Utilitarians argued, or even the burden of structured inequality as Marxists and liberals like Merton (1938, see appendix) argued, in the last analysis the problem is one of moral legitimacy and of substantive rationality. The prior question is: to what end shall we direct our lives, our actions, our thoughts, our desires? To what purposes, to what end? These are the substantively rational questions that Durkheim raised, and that we fail to answer in our daily modern anomie strivings.

What is needed if social order is to reign is that the mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content is not that they have more or less but that they are convinced that they have no right to more. And for this, it is absolutely essential that there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge and which tells them what is right. For an individual committed only to the pressure of his needs will never admit he has reached the extreme limits of his rightful
portion. If he is not conscious of a force above him which he respects, which stops him and tells him with authority that the compensation due him is fulfilled, then inevitably he will expect as due him all that he demands. And since in our hypothesis, these needs are limitless, their exigency is necessarily without limit. For it to be otherwise, a moral power is required whose superiority he recognizes, and which cries out 'You must go no further' *(S:242-3).

Durkheim here explicitly acknowledged his subterranean hypothesis of man as homo duplex, but again he seems to have mixed the two different possible sources of insatiability. For if it is socially and culturally generated, then it has already been legitimized, especially in modern society. Our attention should then shift to uncovering the specific rationales mandating and legitimizing insatiable strivings and aspirations; from focus on the absence to the presence of norms--in short, from the first to the second schema.

Now, clearly the moral power above the individual that cries out "You must go no further" in traditional societies is very strong indeed. In traditional societies, the social schedule of satisfaction counseled the precedence of collective over individual interests, and resignation to one's collectively assigned lot, rather than insatiable individual striving. But, as noted earlier (see Part I of this Book), in modern society egoism and insatiability (whatever their source), are released from moral constraint and meaningful direction.

This is precisely the role played in ancient society by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint-Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be content with their situation, at the same time that it taught them that the social order is providential, that it is God Himself who has determined each one's share, and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of another world where everything will be balanced, whose prospect made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped them from feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, precisely because it held economic functions under its domination, contained and limited them. But even a priori, it is impossible to suppose that for centuries it was in the nature of economic interests to be subordinated but that in the future the roles will becomes so completely reversed. This would be to admit that the nature of things could
be completely transformed in the course of evolution. Undoubtedly, one can be certain that this regulatory function can no longer be exercised today in the same manner or spirit as formerly. The industrial organ, more developed, more essential than before to the social organism, can no longer be contained within the same bounds, subjected to a position so subordinate. But it does not follow from it that it should be freed of all regulation, liberated from all checks (Soc:234).

Durkheim then posed the historical problem created by the recession of traditional moral controls over the egoistic and insatiable desires of individuals in these terms: "What forces today play the moderating role of former times?"

The problem is to know, under the present conditions of social life, what moderating functions are necessary and what forces are capable of executing them. The past not only helps us to pose the problem--it also indicates the direction in which the solution should be sought. What, in fact, were the temporal and spiritual powers that for so long moderated industrial activity? Collective forces.... They had the characteristic that individuals acknowledged their superiority, bowed voluntarily before them, did not deny them the right to command. Normally, they were imposed not through material violence, but through their moral ascendancy. This is what accounted for the efficacy of their action. So today, as formerly, there are social forces, moral authorities which must exercise their regulating influence, and without which appetites become deranged and economic order disorganized. And, in fact, from the moment that this indispensable curb does not come from the inherent nature of individuals, it can only come from society. Society alone has the capacity to constrain and only it can do so without perpetually making use of physical constraint--because of the moral character in which it is clothed. In short, society, through the moral regulation it institutes and applies, plays, as far as superorganic life is concerned, the same role that instinct fills with respect to physical existence. It determines, and it rules what is left undetermined. The system of instincts is the discipline of the organism, just as moral discipline is the instinctive system of social life * (Soc:243-4).

Moving from his classical notion of the "golden mean" (see also Book Three), Durkheim counterposed his philosophy of human finitude to Saint-Simon's apotheosis of amoral economic action.

Now, it can be seen what, according to us, is Saint-Simon's mistake. He described perfectly the present
situation, and made a careful history of it. He showed: (1) that industry had been, up to the present, placed under subordination to powers which rose above it; (2) that these powers retrogressed irretrievably; (3) that this situation was unhealthy and is the cause of the crisis from which we suffer... But did Saint-Simon properly interpret it? Noting the progressive weakening of the old powers, he concluded that our modern uneasiness is due to the fact that, not having disappeared, they still disturb industrial activity. It followed that their downfall had only to be hastened in order to assure industry the supremacy it had a right to, and that industry should be organized without subordinating it to anything—as if such an organization were possible. In short, it seems to us that he was mistaken about what, in the present situation, is the cause of the uneasiness, and in having proposed as a remedy, an aggravation of the evil (Soc:244-5).

Saint-Simon's basic error, argued Durkheim, was uncritically accepting that abstraction "economic man," which leads us to presume that social and economic activity are identical. Durkheim rightly rejected this reduction of society to economy, and thus reintroduced the key question of ends and legitimate goals, which the positivists' reduction of government to technical questions (the "administration of things, not men"), had obscured. One can only wish that Durkheim had been able to further free himself (see Book Three) from the economistic fallacy (see especially Karl Polanyi, 1944, 1968).

We know that Saint-Simon's error consisted in wishing to construct a stable society on a purely economic foundation. As he began by postulating in principle that there are only industrial interests, he was obliged to grant that they could be balanced through skillful management, but without the intervention of any factor of a different nature. It was sufficient to organize society in such a way that, by producing as much as possible, it could satisfy the various requirements as completely as possible. For it assumes that men's desires can be satisfied by a certain quantity of comfort, that in themselves they have a limit and are appeased once it is reached. But in reality all needs exceeding simple physical necessities are unlimited, for there is nothing within the organism that imposes a boundary. Therefore, in order for them not to be without end—that is, so that they are not forever unsatisfied—there must be forces outside of the individual, in society, which hold them in check, and with authority acknowledged by all—indicate what is the proper standard. And in order to thus contain and regulate economic forces, forces of
another nature are required. It is indispensable that there exist in society powers other than those deriving from industrial capacity. These are moral forces *(Soc:274-5).

Durkheim rightly noted that the reduction of society to a moral economic action also seemed to bother Saint-Simon himself, or to capture only part of his own sense of need for moral reform which he later expressed in his emphasis on religion.

We saw ... that Saint-Simon, toward the end of his life, had become aware of the inadequacy of his system on this point, and had accentuated its religious character. The considerable development of religion in Bazard's system demonstrates that the School understood more and more the need to complete purely industrial organization by another which would rise above it. Actually, one of the functions of religion has always been to place a rein on economic appetites (Soc:275).

In all of Saint-Simon's doctrine, Durkheim exclaimed, "Where is the bridle that curbs passions" (Soc:276)? Durkheim explicitly rejected the notion that structural inequalities alone are at the basis of our contemporary crisis. What was needed, rather than simple structural reform, is the "establishment of moral powers capable of disciplining individuals" (Soc:279).

... if it is admitted that the most essential thing is to refuse all social sanction to hereditary inequalities, that this should be the basis of social reorganization, then needs are unleashed which cannot be satisfied and new dissatisfactions created at the very moment when everything was believed pacified (Soc:278).

Therefore, Merton's (1938, 1949, 1957) anomie—which had seemed supported by Durkheim's argument concerning the forced division of labor—can now be seen to have been rejected by Durkheim himself. For the problem of anomie is far deeper than structured inequality (see appendix).

Speaking in terms that apply to Utilitarians, Marxists, socialists, and liberal reformers alike, Durkheim incisively recognized that each of these groups, no matter how violently they might seem opposed, are actually prisoners of the same historical premises. Rather than an epic struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness, today left, mid-
dle, and right are actually only warring bedfellows!

When one starts with the maxim that there are none but economic interests, one is their prisoner and cannot rise above them. Bazard tried in vain to subject them to a dogma which dominates them. But this dogma merely exposes them in another tongue.... When passions are overtly sanctioned, how can there be a question of limiting them? If they are hallowed they should be permitted to exist.... (Bazard) has strengthened industrialism instead of subordinating it. Such a doctrine could only end in a mystical sensualism, in an apotheosis of comfort, in the sanction of excess *(Soc:279).

Is it not ironic that Durkheim, who is mistakenly portrayed as a conservative by left (eg. L. Coser, 1960, John Horton, 1964) and right (eg. Nisbet, 1965, 1974) alike, actually transcended the rhetorical frames of his opponents and delivered a more far reaching critique of the modern world than either?

Alas, Durkheim didn't seem to have recognized the full implications of his mounting critique. His proposals for reform were largely structural and piecemeal. Had he reached full clarity and seen that anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned by various forms of the constitutive modern ethos (eg. the Protestant Ethos), and had he as great an eye for historical irony as Weber, he might have concluded that, in the modern world, our virtues become our vices!

... One will ask where, today, are the moral forces capable of establishing, making acceptable, and maintaining the necessary discipline?... Among the institutions of the old regime there is one that Saint-Simon does not speak of but which perhaps, if transformed, could suit our present state. These are the professional groupings or corporations. In all times they played the role of moderator, and moreover, if one takes into account the fact that they were suddenly and violently destroyed, one has the right to ask whether this radical destruction was not one of the causes of the evil. In any event, the professional grouping could well fit all the conditions we have set. On the one hand, because it is industrial, it will not weigh down industry with too burdensome a yoke; it is close enough to the interests it will have to regulate not to heavily repress them. In addition, like every group formed of individuals united by ties of interests, ideas, and feelings, it is capable of being a moral force over the members who compose it. Let it be made a definite agency of society,
whereas it is now merely a private association. Transfer certain rights and duties to it which the State is less and less capable of exercising and assuring. Let it be the administrator of affairs, industries, arts, that the State cannot manage through its remoteness from industrial things. Grant it the power necessary to resolve certain conflicts, to apply the general laws of society according to the variety of labor, and gradually, through the influence it will exercise, through the rapprochement that it will produce in the work of all, it will acquire the moral authority which will permit it to play this role of restraint—without which there could be no economic stability (Soc:245-6).

It almost seems as if Durkheim had not followed out the full ramifications of his own deepening critique, as if he stopped short, and seized upon an answer that much of his own phenomenological and sociocultural anatomies of anomie and egoisme had already set aside. In the following declaration, for instance, Durkheim lapsed back into the framework of his first schema.

(This solution) declares, in the interest of both the necessity of a curb from above which checks appetites, and so sets a limit on the state of disarrangement, excitement, frenzied agitation, which do not spring from social activity, and which even make it suffer.... It is a question not of money or force; it is a question of moral agents. What dominates it is not the state of our economy, but much more, the state of our morality (Soc:246-7).

Let us now turn to consider his concrete proposals for structural reform that would lead to the elimination or control of anomie and egoisme in the modern world.
CHAPTER EIGHT

DURKHEIM'S THERAPEUTIC FOR THE MODERN CRISIS OF ANOMIE AND EGOISME: THE "MORAL MECHANICS" OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The change in moral temperament ... bears witness to a profound change in our social structure. To cure one, therefore, the other must be reformed (S:387).

Preface. How could Durkheim, although close to the second schema that the twin forms of our modern crisis--anomie and egoisme--were culturally sanctioned, have failed to breakthrough to explicit recognition of this ironic twist? What held him back? Why did Durkheim persist in his first schema that anomie and egoisme were generated by the slow evolutionary release of egoistic and insatiable passions, only recently compounded by the twin revolutions of the modern era? Not only logic but Western history before and after Durkheim demonstrates the essential incompleteness of his first "theodicy" and his only explicit "therapeutic." As Durkheim correctly saw in his first implicit schema, the roots of our contemporary crisis run so deep--to the very constitutive logics, models, and world-images of Western civilization--that the "moral mechanics" of occupational groups are impotent to stem the tide. One cannot hope to "mechanically" draw the ego out of its state of "moral isolation," especially not when our cultural models have sanctioned this extreme individualism which we see in anomie and egoisme in the first place!

To the present day, our crisis has continued to deepen; and, if anything, it has been the Vietnam War and the prolonged environmental and energy crises which have finally begun to bring home, at least to Americans, Durkheim's wisdom of our essential finitude. Our "Faustian" and "Promethean"
aspirations shrink before this new limited horizon. In a certain fitting irony, just as the most "Promethean" nation (excepting China, perhaps) of the modern world broke through the space barrier and landed men on the moon, so, too, did fixed horizons of many sorts spring to life on this limited planet. As "Faustian" morality depends on unlimited horizons and infinite resources, so, too, the end of infinite horizons marks the end of an era in human culture.

One might offer many possible answers to explain why Durkheim failed to breakthrough—for instance, his embeddedness in the Franco-Laic Positivist Cultural Tradition, his nineteenth century liberal republicanism, his own personality, or various other core commitments. But such reasons lead, in turn, only back to reconsideration of certain key premises that held Durkheim back—for example, his basic causal or explanatory model, his image of man as homo duplex, his materialist emphasis on social morphology and a naive faith in "moral mechanics," his devotion to biological analogies, his notion that micro-structural processes were the ultimate sources of moral life, his lack of a notion of cultural traditions on the civilizational level, and so on (see also Book One and Part I, Book Three). In any case, it is not uncommon for men of great vision to become prisoners of the very premises which constitute the virtue of their particular perspective. "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" wrote Kenneth Burke. In the end, of course, short of interrogating Durkheim himself, or at least watching over his shoulder as he worked, we shall never know the reason why. All we can now do is simply indicate how this road was seen, but never taken.

Since in the succeeding section I shall systematically analyze key limitations in Durkheim's logic, model, and specific arguments (see Book Three), at this point I shall address only his structural "therapeutic" for curing the transitional crisis of modern "moral anarchy." In barest outline, Durkheim proposed a structural-social interactional remedy for
moral reform. Reconstituted "corporations" (guild-like occupational groups), which would be close to worker and industrialist, to producer and consumer alike, would work to regulate economic conflict and social aspirations.

In place of the class struggle and economic crises which were the symptoms of capitalism's inability to reconcile the needs of the individual and the prevailing social order, Durkheim advocated a reformist syndicalism.... Durkheim looked to the professional association rather than to the state to provide ... economic organization. ... He looked to the professional associations to regulate wages and conditions of work, provide pensions, and welfare services in diverse ways appropriate to the conditions prevailing in each profession (Hayward, 1960:32).

Due to their beneficent interactional or micro-structural processes, these socio-economic organizations would become part of the formal political life of the nation. As the base of a whole new network of publicly constituted secondary or intermediate groups, they would replace territorial habitation as the base of national representation. The state itself was incapable of exercising such moral reglementation, because it was too large, too distant. Hayward observed:

Durkheim appreciated that though in its capacity as the defender of the rights and interests of all its citizens from group tyrannies, the state effectively prevented piecemeal despotisms, unless its power was counterbalanced, it too could become despotic.... This led him to conclude in Prudhonian vein that the power of the state 'should be limited by other collective forces, i.e. by secondary groups.... And it is out of the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born (1960: 36, #45).

The family, on the other hand, has become too weak. Raymond Aron sums up well here:

The state is no longer capable of exercising this moral function because it is too remote from individuals. The family, on the other hand, has become too narrow and has lost its economic function; economic activity normally proceeds outside of the family, the place of work is not identified with the place of residence. Therefore, neither state nor family can exercise the controlling influence over economic life; it is professional groups, reconstituted corporations, which will serve as intermediaries between individuals and the state and which will be endowed with the social and moral authority to reestablish discipline, without which men give way to...
the infinity of their desires * (1970:92).

Thus, Durkheim's sociology of morality, politics, and social and cultural process meshed in his structural proposals for the national political reconstruction of occupational groups as the basis for moral reform. LaCapra provides the following summary of Durkheim's position:

Essential to his vision of modern social normality was a triangular model of the state, the corporative group, and the individual, existing in a dialectical balance. Durkheim's conception of the situation and needs of modern society was based upon an analysis of historical evolution in Western Europe. Corporative groups such as the commune, the guild, and the estate had become increasingly restrictive at the same time that their importance declined with the growing power of the central state. At first, the conflict between the state and the corporative groups had a positive function. For it was the concrete historical basis of individual rights. 'It is from the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born.' But the extreme development of this process of rising state power and individual emancipation from increasingly oppressive secondary groups threatened to have negative consequences. It unintentionally culminated in a social situation in which the State, as the sole significant organized power, confronted the atomized individual. This confrontation 'had long since been prepared by progressive centralization under the ancien regime.' But 'the great change which the French Revolution accomplished was to carry this levelling process to a point hitherto unknown.' Without the counter-vailing protection of secondary groups, the individual liberties first won through the intervention of the State became both of dubious existential value and of uncertain duration in the face of state power. 'Thus, by a series of endless oscillations, we pass alternately from authoritarian regulation, which excessive rigidity makes impotent, to systematic abstention which cannot last because of the anarchy which it provokes.' Simultaneously, the largely uncontrolled development of the economy gave rise to classes whose relations were not based upon consensually accepted norms but upon unequal market power. The problem of modern society, according to Durkheim, was to create consensual institutions which viably realized the democratic values brought to the forefront of consciousness during the classical revolutions of the past (1972:211-12).

The professional or corporative group was the crux of Durkheim's idea of a possible means of creating a tense balance among the elements of social justice and health in modern society.... Through functional decentraliza-
tion, the corporative group could simultaneously pro-
vide a counter-weight to the central state and a social
context in which communis and a more cumulative arti-
culation of social and cultural experience might deepen.
Acting in accordance with the fundamental economic and
occupational functions of modern society, the corpora-
tive group would also have a role in the inheritance of
wealth, education, economic regulation, welfare servi-
ces, political representation and artistic creation.
Most important, it would be a center of genuine communal
commitment—a real existential group—with moral power
to restrain anomie and transcend egoism. In the corpora-
tive group, people would come to know one another and
enjoy what might be called a supplementary kinship
(1972:216-17).

Now, Durkheim's recipes for resolving the modern crisis
of anomie and egoisme evolved over many years. Apart from his
early review work (see Giddens, 1970), Giddens (1971c:488)
oberves that "... the first edition of The Division of Labor
already contained a fragmentary analysis of the role of occu-
pational association" (eg. DL:227). Thereafter, his develop-
ing proposals are to be found, in sequence, in his lectures
"Physique des mœurs et du droit," translated in 1957 as
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, which were first de-
ivered in 1896, and repeated at intervals up to 1912 (see
Lukes, 1973), but reached definitive form in 1898; his con-
clusio to Suicide published in 1897; and his famous preface
on occupational groups to the second edition of The Division
of Labor in 1902. Other works may contain relevant passages,
but these shall act as prime references for our present
study.

Hence, Durkheim's thought concerning possible struc-
tural reforms for resolving our modern crisis of anomie and
egoisme crowded around a decade (roughly 1892-1902) in the
middle of his intellectual career. It is striking to note
that in the fifteen years after his famous preface in 1902,
Durkheim gave little attention to his earlier reform propos-
als. As his interest in the evolving structures of knowledge,
morality, and religion deepened, his concern—perhaps because
of some subterranean effects of his insights into the second
schema of suicide—became deeper and shifted. As several ob-
servers have noted, Durkheim became increasingly pessimistic over our ability to resolve the modern crisis, as did his great contemporary, Max Weber. In 1912, in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim seemed to assuage his melancholy by relying on historical inevitability (incidentally, it was this passage that led Parsons to mistakenly conclude that Durkheim entertained a cyclical vision of historical process; see also Bellah, 1973, for great emphasis on Durkheim's hopes for moral reconstruction through collective effervescence).

... We are going through a state of transition and moral mediocrity.... The old gods are growing old or already dead, and others are not yet born. This is what rendered vain the attempts of Comte with the old historical souvenirs artificially revived: it is life itself, and not a dead past which can produce a living cult. But this state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last forever. A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formula are found which serve for a whole as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits (EF:475).

As they both grappled separately at ever-deeper and wider levels, trying to uncover the world-historical roots of our contemporary crisis, perhaps both Durkheim and Weber came to see our predicament in terms of an ironic double-bind—namely, that the very elements which make us different in cultural-historical terms may also be the prime cause of our contemporary malaise. I do not think it over-stepping the evidential bounds to speculate, even strongly suggest, that toward the end of their lives both Weber (see, for example, Mitzman, 1969) and Durkheim came to see the essential truth of that old and wise aphorism: "Virtues, pushed to extreme, become vices."

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's concrete proposals for practical reform—the reconstitution of occupational groups in national economic, political, and social life. We
shall begin with the reiteration of his thesis concerning the spontaneous creation of morality through social interaction.

A. "Moral Mechanics" and Group Life

Since Durkheim's proposals for practical reform presumed that moral regulation was spontaneously generated through social interaction, let us first take another look at Durkheim's basic premises in this regard (see also Book One). The theory of small-group processes that Durkheim neglected to spell out in the conclusion to *Suicide*, or in the second edition preface to *The Division of Labor*, can be found briefly stated in his lectures translated as *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. It is a "law of moral mechanics," Durkheim argued, that putting individuals into close and sustained contact inevitably generates moral reglementation. Indeed, to Durkheim, society itself is a new level of association that generates new products—collective representations and individual conscience and consciousness.

Man is only man because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal.... It is society that has raised him to this level above physical nature: it has achieved this result because association, by grouping the individual psychic forces, intensifies them. It carries them to a degree of energy and productive capacity immeasurably greater than they could achieve if they remained isolated one from the other. Thus, a psychic life of a new kind breaks away which is richer by far and more varied than one played out in the single individual alone.... The life thus freed pervades the individual who shares in it, and so transforms him. It is precisely because the group is a moral force greater to this extent than its parts, that it tends of necessity to subordinate them to itself.... Here is a law of moral mechanics * (PECM:60).

In short, given a long interactional sequence (see Book One), in the end the new life created is the source of legitimate moral authority that orients, regulates, and guides individual thought and action. In a sense, of course, Durkheim was correct, for intense and repeated social interaction does tend to create an ethos—the "T groups," "encounter," and
"marathon" sessions so popular in the late 1960's and early 1970's testifies to this generic fact. And certainly, cultural models at least partially reflect group structure. Yet, the main question here is whether or not Durkheim's basic model is complete, and exhausts all other major factors and sequences; especially whether the "law of moral mechanics" is adequate to resolve the mounting crisis of anomie and egoisme.

It is interesting that Durkheim started these lectures by reemphasizing the importance of the link between social morphological or micro-interactional processes, and collectively representational (both normative and cognitive) symbolic processes.

In general, all things being equal, the greater the strength of group structure, the more numerous are the moral rules appropriate to it, and the greater the authority they have over their members. For the more closely the group coheres, the closer and more frequent the contact of the individuals, and, the more frequent and intimate these contacts and the more exchange there is of ideas and sentiments, the more does a public opinion spread to cover a greater number of things. This is precisely because a greater number of things is placed at the disposal of all *(PECM:7)*.

Durkheim asks us to picture, on the contrary, a structural situation in which there is no direct and symbolic interaction; that is, where moral rules have no material or social morphological link.

Imagine, on the other hand, a population scattered over a vast area, without the different elements being able to communicate easily; each man would live for himself alone, and public opinion would develop only in rare cases entailing a laborious calling together of these scattered sections. But when the group is strong, its authority communicates itself to the moral discipline it establishes, and thus, it follows, is respected to the same degree. On the other hand, a society lacking in stability, whose discipline is easy to escape and whose existence is not always felt, can communicate only feeble influence to the precepts it lays down.... *(PECM:7)*.

A system of morals is always the affair of a group, and can operate only if this group protects them by its authority. It is made up of rules which govern individuals, which compels them to act in such and such a way and which imposes limits to their inclinations, and forbids
them to go beyond. Now there is only one power—moral, and hence common to all—which stands above the individual and which can legitimately make laws for him, and that is collective power. To the extent the individual is left to his own devices, and freed from all social constraint, he is unfettered too by all moral constraint (PECM:6-7).

Underneath Durkheim's notion of the "law of moral mechanics" there lies hidden, of course, his doctrine of man as *homo duplex*, and its portrayal of the pre-socialized individual as inherently recalcitrant to moral reglementation.

There is no form of social activity which can do without the appropriate moral discipline.... The interests of the individual are not those of the group he belongs to and indeed there is often a real antagonism between the one and the other. These social interests that the individual has to take into account are only dimly perceived by him: sometimes he fails to perceive them at all, because they are exterior to himself and because they are the interests of something that is not himself. He is not consistently aware of them, as he is of all that concerns and interests himself. It seems, then, that there should be some system which brings them to mind, which obliges him to respect them, and this system can be no other than a moral discipline. For all discipline of this kind is a code or rules that lays down for the individual what he should do so as not to damage collective interests and so as not to disorganize the society of which he forms a part. If he allows himself to follow his bent, there would be no reason why he should not make his way—regardless of everyone in his path (PECM:14).

Without direct social interaction, there can be no moral discipline. Without moral reglementation, the pre-social ego is left prey to anomie and egoisme.

It is this discipline that curbs him, that marks the boundaries that tells him what his relations with his associates should be, where illicit encroachments begin, and what he must pay in current dues towards maintenance of the community. Since the precise function of this discipline is to confront the individual with aims that are not his own, that are beyond his grasp and exterior to him, the discipline seems to him—and in some ways is so in reality—as something exterior to himself and also dominating him. It is this transcendent nature of morals that finds expression in popular concepts when we find them turning the fundamental principles of ethics into a law deriving from a divine source. And the bigger the social group becomes, the more this making of rules becomes necessary. For, when
the group is small, the individual and the society are not far apart; the whole is barely distinguishable from the part, and each individual can therefore discern the interests of the whole to those of each one. But as the society expands, so does the difference become more marked. The individual can take in no more than a small stretch of the social horizon; thus, if the rules do not prescribe what he should so to make his actions conform to collective aims, it is inevitable that these aims will become anti-social (PECM:14-15).

A few brief reflections seem warranted here, especially in regard to Durkheim's presumption, as Gouldner has noted, "that patterns of social interaction form the basis upon which moral beliefs spontaneously develop" (1958:26). Among other things, it is this continuing micro-social or interactional foci that repeatedly led Durkheim astray. Contrary to Marks (1974, 1976), had Durkheim moved beyond this narrow insistence that social interaction is the ultimate source of cultural phenomena (see McCloskey, 1976a), he might have also broken through explicitly and systematically to the second schema. Certainly, his developing interest in civilizational processes (see Chapter Seven, Book One), could have led to a very different heuristic for interpreting the origin and development of anomie. Had he begun to systematically anchor his "theodicies" and "therapeutics" on the cultural-historical level, Durkheim might have explicitly broken through to the second schema, and left us with a different, and perhaps more profound, heritage.

B. "Moral Particularism" and Occupational Groups

Durkheim next observed that, in every society, there appear two sets of moralities (see also Wallwork, 1972:84-5). First, there are general rules pertaining to the whole society—the common or "collective conscience." Then, second, there are moral rules specific to each group.

There are as many forms of morals as there are different callings.... These different forms of morals apply to entirely different groups of individuals. These differences may even go so far as to present a clear contrast. ... We find within every society a plurality of morals that operate on parallel lines (PECM:5).
As always, Durkheim saw moral particularism in evolutionary terms; thus, not only is it mistaken to accuse him of over-emphasizing normative consensus and ignoring normative conflict, but also (far from abstracting norms ala Parsons) Durkheim always historically grounded values.

Now, this "moral particularism" of increasingly specialized occupational groups constantly appearing in the progressive division of social labor poses a complex problem regarding the dual sets of relations between these multiple moral realities--this "moral polymorphism" and the central "social conscience" on the other. For Durkheim observed that the generalized public morality regards these specialized moral dilemmas and therapeutic recipes for resolving doubt with great unconcern.

The distinctive features of this kind of moral and what differentiates it from other branches of ethics is the sort of unconcern with which the public consciousness regards it. There are no moral rules whose infringement ... is looked on with so much indulgence by public opinion. The transgressions which have only to do with the practice of the profession come in merely for a rather vague censure outside the strictly professional field. They count as venial.... They cannot be of deep concern to the common consciousness precisely because they are not common to all members of the society and because ... they are outside the common consciousness. It is exactly because they govern functions not performed by everyone, that not everyone is able to have a sense of what these functions are, of what they ought to be, or of what special relations should exist between the individuals concerned with applying them. All this escapes public opinion in a greater or lesser degree or is at least partly outside its immediate sphere of action. This is why public sentiment is only mildly shocked by transgressions of this kind. This sentiment is stirred only by transgressions so grave that they are likely to have wide general repercussions (PECM:5-6).

Specific situations and specific moralities, general societal concerns and a societal "common consciousness"--these are the two poles of the moral life of complex societies (see also C.P. Wolff, 1970). The main problem Durkheim set himself in this regard, then, was how to first regulate previously deregulated spheres of modern life such as economic activity, and second, how to link or integrate all these
distinct special group moralities and needs with the "common conscience." He tried to resolve these conflicts with his proposal for national political enfranchisement of occupational associations.

... Whilst common morality has the mass of society as its sole substratum and only organ, the organs of professional ethics are manifold. There are as many of these as there are professions; each of these organs—in relation to one another as well as in relation to society as a whole—enjoys a comparative autonomy, since each is alone competent to deal with the relations it is appointed to regulate.... We see in it a real decentralization of moral life. Whilst public opinion, which lies at the base of the common morality, is diffused throughout society, without our being able to say exactly that it lies in one place rather than another, the ethics of each profession are localized within a limited region. Thus, centers of a moral life are formed which, although bound up together, are distinct, and the differentiation in function amounts to a kind of moral polymorphism (PECM:7).

Hence, each occupational situation demands its own special rules for regulating desire and conflict; if no regulations emerge, it is because there is no sustained pattern of social interaction. Further, if no sustained interaction regulated by norms emerge, the insatiable desires of the pre-social ego are bound to be released.

It is not possible for professional ethics to escape the fundamental condition of any system of morals. Since society as a whole feels no concern in professional ethics, it is imperative that there be special groups in society within which these morals may be evolved, and whose business it is to see that they be observed. Such groups are and can only be formed by bringing together individuals of the same profession or professional groups.... It can be said that professional ethics will be the more developed, and the more advanced in their operations, the greater the stability and the better the organization of the professional groups themselves (PECM:7,8).

Now, there is one arena of social life that has developed so explosively, thrown off all traditional constraints, and rejected all new attempts to regulate its life as the very principle of its existence, that the lack of moral regulation may be truly called anomie. And, of course, this anomie area is the economic and industrial arena.
C. Economic Deregulation as Anomic Norm

As we have already seen, Durkheim noted how modern industrial and economic life has become progressively freed from its traditional embeddedness in kinship, religious, and political controls (see also K. Polanyi, 1968). In Durkheim's day (prior to the advent of the welfare state), lack of regulation of economic action—between producer and consumer, worker and entrepreneur—had, of course, crucial societal consequences.

... There is a whole category of functions that do not satisfy this condition [of moral life] in any way: these are the economic functions, both industry and trade.... There is no corporate body set above all members of a profession to maintain some kind of unity, to serve as the repository of traditions and common practices and see they are observed at need. There is no organ of this description, because it can only be the expression of a life common to the group, and the group has no life in common ... at least, not in any sustained way.... Now, this lack of organization in the business professions has one consequence of the greatest moment: that is, that in this whole sphere of social life, no professional ethics exist.... Thus, there exists today a whole range of collective activities outside the sphere of morals and which is almost entirely removed from the moderating effects of obligations (PECM:9-10).

The curious thing about this disengagement of economy from polity and kinship, and the consequent release of infinite desires, is that it is ideologically sanctioned. Such anomie does not simply represent the breakdown of moral controls over the ego; it cannot be represented simply as the result of social breakdown, because it has been repeatedly sanctioned by the most dynamic cultural traditions of the modern world. The Utilitarian and individualist economists, observed Durkheim, have sanctioned what he saw as amoral economic activity; moreover, this is true of classical economists and socialist thinkers alike.

Is this state of affairs a normal one? It has the support of famous doctrines. To start with, there is the classical economic theory according to which the free play of economic arrangements should adjust itself and reach stability automatically, without its being necessary or even possible to submit it to any restraining
forces. This, in a sense, underlies most of the socialist doctrines. Socialist theory, in fact, like classical economic theory, holds that economic life is equipped to organize itself and to function in an orderly way and in harmony, without any moral authority intervening; this, however, depends on a radical change in the laws of property, so that things cease to be in exclusive ownership of individuals or families and instead, are transferred to the hands of society. Once this were done, the State would do no more than keep accurate statistics of the wealth produced over given periods and distribute this wealth amongst the associate members according to an agreed formula. Now, both these theories do no more than raise a de facto state of affairs which is unhealthy, to the level of a de jure state.... It is not possible for a social function to exist without moral discipline. Otherwise, nothing remains but individual appetites, and since they are by nature boundless, and insatiable, if there is nothing to control them they will not be able to control themselves *(PECM:10-II).

This is a most revealing passage! Moreover, the main cause of the contemporary crisis of anomie is precisely this public sanctioning of commercial and industrial action as the highest activity of society, along with the unprecedented expansion of trade in the last hundred years or so.

And it is precisely due to this fact that the crisis has arisen from which the European societies are now suffering. For two centuries economic life has taken on an expansion it never knew before. From being a secondary function, despised and left to inferior classes, it passed on to one of the first rank. We see the military, governmental, and religious functions falling back more and more in the face of it. The scientific functions are alone in a position to dispute its ground, and even science has hardly any prestige in the eyes of the present day, except in so far as it may serve what is materially useful, that is to say, serve ... the business professions (PECM:10-II).

This unprecedented apotheosis of industrial and commercial activity, freed from all previous moral discipline, means that anomie—or an anarchy of insatiable warring egoisms—dominates the day. Indeed, market capitalism is a kind of restrained civil war; legitimized extortion, a war of "each against all." However, the important fact to here note is that both the individual drive for infinite perfection and the sanctification of economic activity in the modern world can hardly be attributed to the egoism of human nature. For
it is precisely the peculiarly modern nature of economic ego-
ism and insatiability which needs to be explained, as Weber
saw, and not simply explained away.

A form of activity that promises to occupy such a place
in society taken as a whole cannot be exempt from all
precise moral regulation, without a state of moral anar-
chy ensuing. The forces thus released can have no guid-
able for their normal development, since there is noth-
ing to point out where a halt should be called. There
is a clash when the moves of rivals conflict.... The
stronger succeed in crushing the not so strong, or at
any rate in reducing them to a state of subjection. But
since this subjection is only a de facto condition sanc-
tioned by no kind of morals, it is accepted only under
duress until the longed-for day of revenge. Peace treat-
ies signed in this fashion are always provisional forms
of truce that do not mean peace to men's minds.... If
we put forward this anarchic competition as an ideal we
should adhere to ... then we should be confusing sick-
ness with a condition of good health.... A state of or-
der or peace amongst men cannot follow of itself from
any entirely material causes, from any blind mechanism.
... It is a moral task (PECM:11-12).

The dream acted out by the Utilitarian moral philosophers
was, of course, that the impersonal and universalistic self-
equilibrating market mechanism would itself act as the prime
instrument of social control and moral discipline of the in-
dividual. For what turned out to be the "moral anarchy" of
modern anomie was itself originally fashioned as a moral
task by these very same moralists! Indeed, the role of the
Scottish Presbyterian moral philosophers, and the English
non-conformists, in translating or secularizing Calvinistic
ethics into social and political norms simply has not yet
been fully understood; even Weber did little to help here.

Even though he did not perceive these Weberian-type
anchors for anomie, Durkheim had keen insight into the ram-
ifications of basing a society on the atomistic and racion-
alizing logics of the Anglo Utilitarian moral philosophers.

From yet another point of view, this amoral character
of economic life amounts to a public danger. The func-
tions of this order today absorb the energies of the
greater part of the nation. The lives of a host of in-
dividuals are passed on the industrial and commercial
sphere. Hence, it follows that, as those in this milieu
have only a faint impress on morality, the greater
part of their existence is passed divorced from any moral influence. How could such a state of affairs fail to be a source of demoralization? If a sense of duty is to take strong root in us, the very circumstances of our life must serve to keep it always active. There must be a group about us to call it to mind.... If we live amorally for a good part of the day, how can we keep the springs of morality from going slack in us? We are not naturally inclined to put ourselves out or use self-restraint; if we are not encouraged at every step to exercise the restraint upon which all morals depend, how should we get the habit of it? If we follow no rule except that of clear self-interest, in the occupations that take up nearly the whole of our time, how should we acquire a taste for any disinterestedness, or selflessness or sacrifice? Let us see, then, how the unleashing of economic interests has been accompanied by a debasing of public morality. We find the manufacturer, the merchant, the workman, the employee, in carrying out his occupation, is aware of no influence set above him to check his egotism; he is subject to no moral discipline whatever, and so he flouts any discipline at all of this kind (PECM:12).

Clearly, Durkheim seemed here able to conceptualize the source of egoism and insatiability only in terms of the release of the pre-socialized individual or organic ego from traditional moral discipline. But the very sanctification of economic individualism by the leading spokesman of Western culture in the last two centuries demonstrates that such explanations are misleading, or at best, seriously incomplete. What is needed, rather, is a notion of a two-step process of breakthrough and breakdown. First, the initial breakthrough, both normative and structural—for example, the Weberian notion of the "New Model Man," the visible saints of ascetic Protestantism breaking forth from the medieval cloister to master self, society, and the world for God's greater glory. It could only have been some such unprecedented and massive and sustained breakthrough to "inner-light, inner-worldly asceticism and mysticism" that could have produced the modern world. Only after the secularization and institutionalization of various Protestant themes and sanctions do we find, as an unanticipated and extreme consequence, Durkheim's "isolated and amoral action" on a massive scale. The second phase of this dual process of breakthrough and release came with two dif-
ferent sets of groups and their experiences: (a) either the running down or secularization of Protestant norms and sanctions; (b) non-Protestant and non-Western groups whose way of life and prime cultural values were disrupted by the influence of this powerful new ethos, or among those who come to be permeated or unconsciously embrace aspects of the Protestant Ethos. While Durkheim's critique of classical economic theory is insightful, his "theodicy" and "therapeutic" are limited to describing the ravages of the second process. Rightly noting that the new sanctification of the impersonal and atomizing market mechanism as the new nexus of "civil society" has broken through old moral norms, he unfortunately concluded that the lack of sustained, direct social interaction was the prime cause. On the contrary, in actual historical fact, the seeming lack of moral rules due to lack of group cohesion is itself only a result; it is, at most, a secondary and derived cause, not an original motive force.

... no professional activity can be without its own ethics.... It is the functions of the economic order alone that form an exception.... This moral anarchy has been claimed, it is true, as a right of economic life. It is said that for normal usage there is no need of regulation. But from what source could it derive such a privilege? How should this particular social function be exempt from a condition which is the most fundamental to any social structure? Clearly, if there has been self-delusion to this degree amongst the classical economists, it is because the economic functions were studied as if they were an end in themselves, without considering what further reaction they might have on the whole social order. Judged in this way, productive output seemed to be the sole primary aim in all industrial activity.... In some ways, it might appear that output, to be intensive, had no need at all to be regulated; that, on the contrary, the best thing were to leave individual businesses and enterprises of self-interest to excite and spur one another in hot competition, instead of trying to curb and keep them within bounds. But production is not all, and if industry can only bring its output to this pitch by keeping a chronic state of warfare, and endless dissatisfaction amongst the producers, there is nothing to balance the evil it does * (PECM:15-16).

As a moral philosopher, Durkheim noted that Utilitarian "moralities of thought and logics of action" are not substan-
tively rational; for they have no meaningful or achievable goals in sight. For as many have discovered, functional rationality and the logics of efficiency and infinite growth can be used to further any end whatsoever—it offers an indiscriminate calculus for "progress." Truly, the ideal of classical Utilitarian economic theory is goalless and thus, substantively irrational, for, as Weber (1958a, 1968) showed, it is believed to be a valuable moral exercise in itself!

Even from the strictly Utilitarian viewpoint, what is the purpose of heaping up riches if they do not serve to abate the desires of the greatest number, but, on the contrary, can only rouse their impatience for gain? That would be to lose sight of the fact that economic functions are not an end in themselves, but only a means to an end; that they are one of the organs of social life, and that social life is above all a harmonious community of endeavors, when minds and wills come together to work for the same aim.... Society has no justification if it does not bring a little peace to men—peace in their hearts and peace in their mutual intercourse. If, then, industry can be productive only by disturbing their peace and unleashing warfare, it is not worth the cost *(PECM:16)*.

It is a strangely superficial notion—this view of the classical economists—to whom all collective discipline is a kind of tyrannous militarization. In reality, when it is normal and what it ought to be, it is something very different. It is at once the epitome and the governing condition of a whole life in common which individuals have no less at heart than their lives *(PECM:29)*.

Thinking that it was primarily the erosion of traditional moral discipline over the organic ego that released anarchic and insatiable desires, Durkheim presumed that if strong enough patterns of structural integration could be built, then the organic ego could once again be socialized. Demoralized and thus, desocialized, egos were, it must be remembered, the result of the modern transitional crisis. Hence, anomie and egoisme could be overcome if the anomic deregulation of economic action could be structurally remedied. To this end, Durkheim turned to the task of reconstituting the professional group as the new basis of social, economic, and political organization.
It is therefore extremely important that economic life should be regulated, should have its moral standards raised, so that the conflicts that disturb it have an end, and further, that individuals should cease to live within this moral vacuum where the life-blood drains away even from individual morality. For in this order of social functions there is need for professional ethics to be established, nearer the concrete, closer to the facts, with a wider scope than anything existing today. There should be rules telling each of the workers his rights, and his duties, not vaguely in general terms, but in precise detail, having in view the most ordinary day-to-day occurrence (PECM:12-13).

Since moral rules express the life of a group, Durkheim presumed that where group life was strong, moral rules would also be so; where social cohesion is low, normative direction and discipline also suffer. Therefore, since the economic arena was so clearly anomic, the remedy was to restore stability to the "corporations" (in the French sense).

A system of ethics, however, is not to be improvised. It is the task of the very group to which they are to apply. When they fail, it is because the cohesion of the group is at fault, because as a group its existence is too shadowy and the rudimentary state of its ethics goes to show its lack of integration. Therefore, the true cure for the evil is to give the professional groups in the economic order a stability they do not now possess. Whilst the craft man or corporate body is nowadays only a collection of individuals who have no lasting ties with one another, it must become or return to being a well-defined and organized association. Any notion of this kind, however, comes up against historical prejudices that make it still repugnant to most, and on that account it is necessary to dispel them (PECM:13).

Durkheim hoped that such professional "corporations" would become veritable "moral milieux" for anomic, demoralized egos.

... When we wish to see the guilds reorganized ... it is not simply to have new codes superimposed on those existing; it is mainly so that economic activity should be permeated by ideas and needs other than individual ideas and needs, in fine, so that it should be socialized. It is, too, with the aim that the professions should become so many moral milieux and that these (comprising always the various organs of industrial and commercial life), should constantly foster the morality of the professions. As to the rules, although
necessary and inevitable, they are but the outward expression of these fundamental principles. It is not a matter of coordinating any changes outwardly and mechanically, but of bringing men's minds into mutual understanding. Moreover, it is not on economic grounds that the guild or corporative system seems to me essential but for moral reasons. It is only through the corporative system that the moral standard of economic life can be raised (PECM:29).

On the other hand, Durkheim made it clear that, for him at least, there could be no question of going back—it is neither possible nor desirable to restore the old repressive other-worldly discipline of archaic religious culture. But clearly, Durkheim's view of the possible relations of religious attitudes toward economic activity was limited; for instance, the ironic logic of Weber's thesis does not seem to cross the threshold of consciousness here.

... Religion, which once partially assumed this role, would now be unadapted to it. For the essential principle of the only regulation to which it can subject economic life is contempt for riches. If religion exhorts its followers to be satisfied with their lot, it is because of the thought that our condition on earth has nothing to do with salvation. If religion teaches us that our duty is to accept with docility our lot as circumstances order it, this is to attach us exclusively to other purposes, worthier of our efforts, and in general, religion recommends moderation in desires for the same reasons. But this passive resignation is incompatible with the place which earthly interests have now assumed in collective existence. The discipline they need must not aim at relegating them to second place, and reducing them as far as possible, but at giving them an organization in harmony with their importance. The problem has increased in complexity, and while it is no remedy to give appetites free rein, neither is it enough to suppress them in order to control them. Though the last defenders of the old economic theories are mistaken in thinking that regulation is not necessary today as it was yesterday, the apologists of religion are wrong in believing that yesterday's regulation can be useful today. It is precisely its lack of present usefulness which causes the evil (S:383).
D. The Lacuna of Intermediate Groups in the Modern Crisis

In *Suicide*, Durkheim briefly explored alternative remedies for restoring social cohesion and resocializing the anomie ego. In one of his typical "arguments by elimination," both modern political and familial organization are judged inadequate to his task, because they are either too large and remote (the State), or too small and closely-knit (the family). Too large and too small, the State and the family are not suited to the new and difficult task of generating "moral milieux" and reglementation for the industrialized masses. Durkheim here reiterated the basic problem facing us in egoistic suicide.

Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is not sufficiently integrated at all points to keep all its members under control... It is because society, weak and disturbed, lets too many persons escape too completely from its influence. Thus, the only remedy for the ill is to restore enough consistency to social groups for them to obtain a firmer grip on the individual, and for him to feel himself bound to them. He must feel himself bound to them. He must feel himself more solidary with a collective existence which precedes him in time, which survives him, and which encompasses him at all points. If this occurs, he will no longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself, he will see that he is the instrument of a purpose greater than himself, he will see that he is not without significance. Life will resume meaning in his eyes, because it will recover its natural aim and orientation (S:373).

As always, Anthony Giddens sums up Durkheim's position well:

In Durkheim's conception, the State must play a moral role as well as an economic role; and the alleviation of the malaise of the modern world must be sought in measures which are in general moral rather than economic. The dominant position of the authority of religion in former times provided religious strata with a horizon for their aspirations, counselling the poor to accept their lot and instructing the rich in their duty to care for the less privileged. While this order was repressive, containing human actions and potentialities within narrow bounds, it nevertheless gave a formal unity to society. The characteristic problem facing the modern age is to reconcile the individual freedoms which have sprung from the maintenance of the moral control upon which the very existence of society depends (1971a:99).
Now, what groups, Durkheim asked, are best suited today to take on the task of "reimpressing on man this salutary sentiment of solidarity?" He first examined, but rejected, political society as too big and distant from everyday experience.

... Our great modern states are too far removed from the individual to effect him uninterruptedly and with sufficient force. Whatever connection between our daily tasks and the whole of public life, it is too indirect for us to feel it keenly and constantly. Only when matters of serious import are at stake do we feel our dependence on the body politic strongly (S:374).

... It remains true that the State itself has important functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose the sentiment of general utility and the need for organic equilibrium to the particularism of each corporation. But we know that its action can be useful only if a whole system of secondary organs exist to diversify their action. These secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384).

Durkheim then considered the family, but concluded that its functions have been fundamentally altered by the change in the size or scale of modern organizations.

Changes have occurred in the constitution of the family which no longer allow it to have the same preservative influence as formerly. While it once kept most of its members within its orbit from birth to death and formed a compact mass, indivisible and endowed with a quality of permanence, its duration is now brief. As soon as the children's first growth is over, they often leave to complete their education away from home; moreover, it is almost the rule that as soon as they are adult they establish themselves away from their parents and the hearth is deserted. For most of the time, at present, the family can be said to be reduced to the married couple alone, and we know that this union acts feebly against suicide. Consequently, since it plays a smaller role in life, it no longer suffices as an object for life. Not, certainly, that we care less for our children; but that they are intertwined less closely and continuously with our existence and so this existence need some other basis for being. Since we have to live without them, we also have to attach our thoughts and acts to other objects (S:376).

Indeed, not only is the family now unsuited to the new task of moral discipline on the societal level, but it is precisely the breakdown of such intermediate organs of public life that has intensified the contemporary crisis of anomie and
egoisme.

But it is especially the family as a collective being which this periodic dispersion reduces to non-entity. Formerly, domestic society was not just a number of individuals united by bonds of mutual affection; but the group itself, in its abstract and impersonal unity. It was the hereditary name together with all the memories it recalled, the family house, the ancestral field, the traditional situation and reputation, etc. All this is tending to disappear. A society momentarily dissolving, only to reform elsewhere but under wholly new conditions and with quite new elements, has not sufficient continuity to acquire a personal aspect, a history of its own, to which its members may feel attachment. If men do not replace this age-old objective of their activity, as it little by little disappears from among them, a great void must inevitably appear in existence.... Once when each local environment was more or less closed to others by usages, traditions, the scarcity of communications, each generation remained in its place of origin, or at least could not move far from it. But as these barriers vanish, as these small environments are levelled and blended with one another, the individuals inevitably disperse in accordance with their ambitions and to further their interests into the wider spaces now open to them. No scheme can therefore offset this inevitable swarming of the bees and restore the indivisibility which was once the family's strength (5:377-78).

Having set aside both political and domestic society as too large and too small, respectively, to cope with the problem of moral discipline of the anomic ego on a massive societal scale, Durkheim continued searching for a group of appropriate scale, closeness to economic life, and interactional intensity. In short, he sought intermediate groups between the central State and the isolated and demoralized ego. "Is this evil incurable?" Durkheim asked:

... While religion, the family, and the nation are preservatives against egoistic suicide, the cause of this does not lie in the special sort of sentiments encouraged by each. Rather, they all owe this virtue to the general fact that they are societies, and they possess it only in so far as they are well-integrated societies (5:378).

The essential problem here, then, was what type of intermediate group shall be the most interactionally cohesive, and hence the most effective in constantly resocializing and moralizing egos.
... Nothing but a moral power can set a law for men, but this must also be sufficiently associated with affairs of this world to be able to estimate them at their value. The occupational group has just this two-fold character. Being a group, it sufficiently dominates individuals to set limits to their greed; but sees too much of their life not to sympathize with their needs. Of course, it remains true that the State itself has important functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose the sentiment of general utility and the need for organic equilibrium to the particularism of each corporation. But we know that its action can be useful only if a whole system of secondary organs exist to diversify the action. These secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384).

In his political sociology (see especially Professional Ethics and Civic Morals), Durkheim expounded his perception of the void created by the disappearance of traditional intermediary groups between State and family. Of course, the growth of the modern state and the modern economy are closely intertwined (see Karl Polanyi, 1944) on the one hand, and inversely related to the shrinkage of familial functions on the other. In Moral Education, Durkheim offered a brief summary of this development.

... We are living under quite special conditions. Indeed, with the exception of the school, there is no longer in this country any society intermediate between the family and the state—a society that is not merely artificial or superficial. All the groups of this kind, which at one time ranged from domestic society and political society—provinces, communes, guilds—have been totally abolished or at least survive only in very attenuated form. The provinces and the guild are only memories; communal life is very impoverished and now holds a secondary place on our consciousness (ME:232).

Durkheim further observed that it was the two-fold thrust of the French Revolution—the collectivist state-oriented drive on the one hand, and the individualist drive on the other—that actively worked to root out the traditional intermediate groups. In this historical process, the men of the Revolution only completed the work begun by the French monarchy.

The causes of this situation are well-known. In order to achieve political and moral unity, the monarchy fought all forms of moral particularism; it strove to reduce the autonomy of towns and provinces, to weaken their moral individuality so as to fuse them more easily and completely into the great collective personality
of France. In this regard, the Revolution continued and completed the work of the monarchy. All groupings that were opposed to this great movement of national consolidation—which was the essence of the revolutionary movement—anything that was an obstacle to the unity and indivisibility of the Republic was broken. Moreover, the spirit that animated the men of the Revolution became quite hostile toward intermediate groupings (ME:232-3).

Surely Rousseau expressed both the collectivist and individualist antipathy toward traditional intermediary groupings like parish, guild, commune, etc. In other words, what Durkheim's linkage of intermediary groups in European societies showed was that the old anchors of social life in which both individual personality and collective norm were simultaneously embedded needed to be reconstituted on the national level. Here, Durkheim always held in the back of his mind the specific historical situation in the France he knew so well—namely, the disappearance of local intermediate groups as viable factors in social organization.

Now this state of affairs constitutes a serious crisis. For morality to have a sound basis, the citizen must have an inclination toward collective life. It is only on this condition that he can become attached to collective aims that are moral aims par excellence. This does not happen automatically; above all, this inclination toward collective life can only become strong enough to shape behavior by the most continuous practice. To appreciate social life to the point where one cannot do without it, one must have developed the habit of acting and thinking in common.... If, on the contrary, we are used only infrequently to acting like social beings, it is impossible to be very interested in an existence to which we can adapt ourselves only imperfectly (ME:233).

The remoteness of the central, bureaucratic State, the lack of intermediate groups, the smallness of the family, all these factors and more converged toward the same end—namely, the modern type of individualism, leaving us "inclined to a more suspicious isolation," "to acting like lone wolves."

If, then, with the exception of the family, there is no collective life in which we participate, if in all the forms of human activity—scientific, artistic, professional, and so on, in other words, all that constitutes the core of our existence—we are in the habit of
acting like lone wolves, our social temperament has only rare opportunities to strengthen and develop itself. Consequently, we are inevitably inclined to a more or less suspicious isolation. Indeed, the weakness of the spirit of association is one of the characteristics of our national temperament. We have a marked inclination toward a fierce individualism, which makes the obligations of social life appear intolerable to us.* (ME: 233-34).

It is worthy to note, once again, that when Durkheim began to reflect upon the actual cultural-historical situation in Europe, inevitably he acknowledged that extreme individualism is itself normatively sanctioned in the modern world. Although it accompanied, and even accelerated, the passing of traditional intermediate groups and moral order, by no stretch of the historical imagination can this sanctification of individualism and economic growth be portrayed simply as the mechanical result of the breakdown of social integration and the release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Once again, we see the structure of Durkheim's first schema beginning to breakdown from within, especially whenever he considered the actual cultural logics involved and historical evidence.

Let us next turn to consider his first explicit proposals which appeared in Suicide, concerning the virtues of national political enfranchisement of professional groups as the remedy for the contemporary crisis of anomie and egoisme.

E. The "Moral Mechanics" of Professional Groups as the National Solution to the Crisis of Anomie and Egoisme

Having first put Durkheim's proposals for the reconstitution of occupational groups in his own theoretical and historical perspective, let us now briefly examine his first outline of reform proposals which appeared in Suicide. Durkheim began here by observing that because of the closeness of of the occupational group to the daily tasks of people, it is ideally suited as an intermediary group to take on the massive task of moral reconstruction. Because it is already a life lived in common, it also acts as a ready-made "moral
Since it consists of individuals devoted to the same tasks, with solidary or even combined interests, no soil is better calculated to bear social ideas and sentiments. Identity of origin, culture, and occupation makes occupational activity the richest sort of material for a common life. Moreover, in the past the corporation has proved that it could form a collective personality, jealous, even excessively so, of its autonomy and its authority over its members; so there is no doubt of its capacity to be a moral environment for them. There is no reason for the corporative interest not acquiring in its worker's eyes the respectable character and supremacy always possessed by social interests, as contrasted with private interest, in a well-organized society.

From another point of view, the occupational group has the three-fold advantage over all others that it is omnipresent, ubiquitous, and its control extends to the greatest part of life (S:378-79).

In contrast to the great centralized, bureaucratic states of the modern era, Durkheim suggested, occupational groups' influence is continuous and deep. The corporation is the intermediate association most likely to be able to successfully draw "the ego out of his state of moral isolation."

Its influence on individuals is not intermittent, like that of political society, but it is always in contact with them by the constant exercise of the function of which it is the organ and in which they collaborate. It follows the workers everywhere they go; which the family cannot. Wherever they are, they find it enveloping them, recalling them to their duties, supporting them at need. Finally, since occupational life is almost the whole of life, corporative action makes itself felt in every detail of our occupations, which are thus given a collective orientation. Thus, the corporation has everything needed to give the individual a setting, to draw him out of his state of moral isolation, and faced by the actual inadequacy of the other groups, it alone can fulfill this indispensable office * (S:379).

Durkheim then proposed that, in order to have this beneficial influence, corporations must be given a regular and legitimate role in national political life.

But for it to have this influence, it must be organized on wholly different bases from those of today. First, it is essential that it become a definite and recognized organ of our public life, instead of remaining a private group, legally permitted, but politically ignored. By this we mean that it must necessarily be made obligatory, but it must be so constituted as to play a social
role instead of expressing only various combinations of particular interests. This is not all. For the frame not to remain empty, all the germs of life of such a nature as to flourish there must find their place in it. For this grouping to remain no mere label, it must be given definite functions, and there are some which it can fulfill better than any other agency (S:379).

Durkheim was highly critical of the meaninglessness of the frequent oscillations in French society during the past few centuries in swinging back and forth between its two modern poles—between authoritarian, collectivistic, bureaucratic "Caesaristic" regimes (e.g. Napoleon), and the anarchy of "fierce French individualism." In effect, Durkheim asked: how should economic life be regulated? Instead of a top-down control of the anarchy of economic life, Durkheim characteristically sought a via media between these two extremes, by opting for the regulation of economic life from within the professional groups themselves.

At present, European societies have the alternative of leaving occupational life unregulated, or of regulating it through the State's mediation, since no other organ exists which can play this role of moderator. But the State is too far removed from these complex manifestations to find the special form appropriate to each of them. It is a cumbersome machine, made only for general and clear-cut tasks. Its ever-uniform action cannot adjust itself to the infinite variety of special circumstances. It is therefore compressive and levelling in its action. On the other hand, we feel how impossible it is to leave unorganized all the life thus unattached. In so doing, by an endless series of oscillations we alternately pass from authoritarian regulation made ineptent by its excessive severity to systematic abstention which cannot last forever because it breeds anarchy. Whether the question is one of hours of work, or health or wages, or social insurance and assistance, men of good will constantly encounter the same difficulties. As soon as they try to set up some rules, they prove inapplicable to experience because they lack plausibility; or at least, they apply to the matter for which they are made only by doing violence to it. The only way to resolve this antinomy is set up a cluster of collective forces outside the State, though subject to its action, whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater variety (S:379-80).

Now, these newly reconstituted "corporations" would become an extended family, as it were, within the bosom of mod-
ern economic life, for they would take on the old "caritative" functions of the kinship community and the neighborhood.

To them falls the duty of presiding over companies of insurance, benevolent aid and pensions, the needs of which are felt by so many good minds but which we rightly hesitate to place in the hands of the State, already powerful and awkward; theirs it should be likewise to preside over the disputes constantly arising between branches of the same occupation, to fix conditions with which contracts must agree in order to be valid, in the name of the common interest to prevent the strong from exploiting the weak, etc.... Here, in broad outlines, is what corporations should be in order to render the services rightly expected of them. When their present state is considered, of course, it is hard to conceive of their ever being elevated to the dignity of moral powers. Indeed, they are made up of individuals attached to one another by no bond, with only superficial and intermittent relations, even inclined to treat each other as rivals and enemies rather than as cooperators. But when once they have so many things in common, when the relations between themselves and the group to which they belong are thus close and continuous, sentiments of solidarity as yet almost unknown will spring up, and the present cold moral temperature of the occupational environment, still so external to its members, would necessarily rise.... Thus, the social fabric, the meshes of which are so dangerously relaxed, would tighten and be strengthened throughout its entire extent (S:380-1).

However, Durkheim observed, his proposals for the restoration of professional groups on the national level ran into long-standing prejudices, stemming especially from the Revolution's antipathy toward guilds and other traditional intermediary groups. But Durkheim argued that the very universality of intermediate groups throughout Western history confirms their present necessity. Now, the key limitation to the old guilds was their predominantly urban base. Durkheim then proposed that this be overcome by making them an integral part of the national political organization. The following passage sums up many of his theses here:

This restoration, the need of which is universally felt, unfortunately has to contend with the bad name left in history by the corporation of the ancien régime. Yet is there not proof of their indispensability in the fact that they have lasted not merely since the
the Middle Ages but since Greco-Roman antiquity, than of their uselessness in the fact of their recent abro-
gation? If occupational activity has been corporatively organized, except for a single century (the nineteenth), is it not probable that such organization is necessary, and that if it was no longer equal to its role a hun-
dred years ago, the remedy was to restore and improve, not radically to suppress it? Certainly, it had finally become an obstacle to the most urgent progress. The old, narrowly local corporation, closed to all outside influ-
ence, had become an anomaly in a morally and politically unified nation; the excessive autonomy it enjoyed, making it a state within a state, could not be retained while the governmental organ, ramifying itself in all direc-
tions, was more and more subordinating all secondary or-
gans of society to itself. So the base on which the in-
stitutions rested had to be enlarged, and the institu-
tion itself reconnected with the whole national life. But if similar corporations of different localities had been connected with one another, instead of remaining isolated, so as to form a ... single system, if all these systems had been subject to the general influence of the state, and thus kept in constant awareness of their solidarity, bureaucratic despotism and occupation-
al egoism would have been kept within proper limits.... But by overthrowing existing order without putting any-
thing in its place, corporative egoism has only been re-
placed by a still more corrosive individual egoism.... By dispersing the only groups which could persistently unite individual wills, we ourselves have broken the appointed instrument of our moral reorganization * (S:361-2).

Contrary to symbolic equations current among contemporary liberals, Durkheim rightly saw that suicide and our modern malaise does not spring wholly from the difficulties of con-
temporary existence. Rather, anomie and egoisme are often embraced; this acedia or moral alienation is self-chosen.

... Just as suicide does not proceed from man's diffi-
culties in maintaining his existence, so the means of arresting its progress is not to make the struggle less difficult and life easier. If more suicides occur today than formerly, this is not because, to maintain ourselves we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our legit-
imate needs are less satisfied, but because we no longer know the limits of legitimate needs nor perceive the direction of our efforts. Competition is of course becom-
ing keener every day, because the greater ease of com-
munication sets a constantly increasing number of com-
petitors at logger heads. On the other hand, a more per-
fected division of labor and its accompanying more com-
plex cooperation, by multiplying and infinitely varying
the occupations by which men can make themselves useful to other men, multiplies the means of existence, and places them within reach of a greater variety of persons. The most inferior aptitudes may find a place here. At the same time, the more intense production resulting from this subtler cooperation, by increasing humanity's total resources, assures each worker an ampler pay and so achieves a balance between the greater wear on vital strength and its recuperation. Indeed, it is certain that average comfort has increased on all levels of the social hierarchy, although not perhaps always in equal proportions. The maladjustment from which we suffer does not exist because the objective causes of suffering have increased in number or intensity; it bears witness not to greater economic poverty, but to an alarming poverty of morality *(S:386-7).*

Accordingly, Durkheim argued that these structural reforms to alleviate our "alarming poverty of morality" are not only urgent but, indeed, required by the whole sweep of our historical development.

The latter's chief characteristic is to have swept cleanly away all the older social forms of organization. One after another, they have disappeared either through the slow usury of time, or through great disturbances, but without being replaced. Society was originally organized on the family basis; it was formed by the union of a number of smaller societies, clans, all of whose members were or considered themselves kin. This organization seems not to have remained long in a pure state. The family quite soon ceases to be a political division and becomes the center of private life. Territorial grouping then succeeds the old family groupings. Individuals occupying the same area gradually, then independently of consanguinity, contract common ideas and customs which are not to the same extent those of their neighbors who live farther away. Thus, little aggregations come to exist with no other material foundations than neighborhood and its resultant relations; each one, however, with its own distinct physiognomy; we have the village, or better, the city-state and its dependent territory. They become confederated, combine under various forms and thus develop more complex societies which they enter however without sacrificing their personalities. They remain the elemental segments of which the whole society is merely an enlarged reproduction. But bit by bit, as these confederations become tighter, the territorial surroundings blend with one another and lose their former moral individuality. From one city or district to another, the differences decrease. The great change brought about by the French Revolution was precisely to carry this levelling to a point hitherto unknown. Not that it improvised this change; the latter
had long since been prepared by the progressive centralization to which the ancient regime had advanced. But the legal suppression of the former provinces and the creation of new, purely artificial and nominal divisions definitely made it permanent. Since then the development of means of communications, by mixing the populations, has almost eliminated the last traces of the old dispensation. And since what remained of occupational organization was violently destroyed at the same time, all secondary organs of social life were done away with (S:388-89).

Durkheim's general evolutionary thinking comes through clearly here. After the Revolution, he observed, only the central State survived and grew stronger. Collective life was then caught between these two opposing forces--the central bureaucratic State and the anomic, dispersed ego. And these opposing poles of modern life "fed off each other" as it were. Only one collective form survived the tempest: the State. By the nature of things this therefore tended to absorb all forms of activity which had a social character, and was henceforth confronted by nothing but an unstable flux of individuals. But then, by this very fact, it was compelled to assume functions for which it was unfitted, and which it has not been able to discharge satisfactorily. It has often been said that the State is as intrusive as it is impotent. It makes a sickly attempt to extend itself over all sorts of things which do not belong to it, or which it grasps only by doing them violence. Thence the expenditure of energy which the State is reproached, and which is truly out of proportion with the results obtained. On the other hand, individuals are no longer subjected to any other collective control but the State's, since it is the sole organized collectivity. Individuals are made aware of their society and of their dependence upon it only through the State. But since it is far from them, it can exert only a discontinuous influence over them; which is why this feeling has neither the necessary constancy of strength. For most of their lives, nothing about them draws them out of themselves and imposes restraint on them. Thus, they inevitably lapse back into egoism or anarchy. Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free him from all social pressure is to abandon him to himself and demoralize him. These are really the two characteristics of our moral situation. While the State becomes inflated and hypertrophied in order to obtain a firm enough grip upon individuals, but without succeeding, the latter, without mutual relationships, tumble over one another like so many liquid molecules, encountering no central energy to retain, fix, and organize them * (S:389).
The vacuity of the modern organizing principle has seldom been portrayed in such compelling images.

As always, Durkheim's overriding concern was to find a workable, historically and philosophically grounded, via media, a way of reconciling the antimonies of modern collectivism and individualism. Whether he succeeded or whether the forces of bureaucratic despotism and anomic egoism have proved too strong, the only true measure of Durkheim's greatness was the difficulty of the task he undertook. Indeed, I believe his historical argument concerning the disappearance of intermediary groups, the need to restore their role in economic life, and the portrait of the oscillations between the two opposing poles of modern life to be far more profound and compelling than his abstract, theoretical argument concerning the spontaneous "moral mechanics" of occupational groups.

Many would agree with Durkheim that the scale of modern economic and political life has grown so large that decentralization is necessary. But Durkheim was careful to argue that the only useful kind of decentralization would be "one which would simultaneously produce a greater concentration of social energies." Hence, the theoretical model we explored in Book One always underlies Durkheim's specific reforms.

To remedy this evil, the restitution to local groups of something of their old autonomy is suggested. This is called decentralization. But the only useful decentralization is one which would simultaneously produce a greater concentration of social energies. Without loosening the bonds uniting each part of society with the State, moral powers must be created with an influence, which the State cannot have, over the multitude of individuals. Today, neither the commune, nor the department nor the province has enough ascendancy over us to exert this influence, as we see in them conventional labels without meaning.... We may regret the past, but in vain. It is impossible to resuscitate a particularist spirit which no longer has any foundation.... The only decentralization making possible this multiplication of centers of communal life without weakening unity is occupational decentralization. For, as each of these cadres would be the only focus of a special limited activity, they would be inseparable from one another and the individual could form attachments without becoming
solidary with the whole. Social life can be divided, while retaining its unity, only if each of these divisions represents a function.... The corporation must become more than an assemblage of individuals who meet on election day without any common bond. It can fulfill its destined role only if, in place of being a creature of convention, it becomes a definite institution, a collective personality, with its customs and traditions, its rights and duties, its unity. The great difficulty is not to decree that the representatives shall be selected by occupation and what each occupations share shall be, but to make each corporation become a moral individuality. Otherwise, only another external and artificial subdivision will be added to the existing ones which we wish to supplant *(S:390-1).

Characteristically (and this is what many have missed), beneath his model of "moral mechanics" and his proposals for structural and moral reform, lay Durkheim's image of man as homo duplex, and the organic ego as inherently egocentric and even insatiable. The disappearance of secondary groups, the hypertrophy of the State and the release of the desires of the organic ego, and the consequent breakdown of social cohesion--all this is ultimately important only because together they lead to "moral anarchy," to the "morbid fevers" of anomie and egoisme in modern society.

... The chief role of corporations, in the future as well as in the past, would be to govern social functions, especially economic functions, and thus to extricate them from their present state of disorganization. Whenever excited appetites tended to excel all limits, the corporation would have then to decide the share that should equitably revert to each of the cooperative parts. Standing above its members, it would have all necessary authority to demand indispensable sacrifices and concessions and impose order upon them. By forcing the strongest to use their strength with moderation, by preventing the weakest from endlessly multiplying their protests, by recalling both to the sense of their reciprocal duties and the general interest, and by regulating production in certain cases so that it does not degenerate into a morbid fever, it would moderate one set of passions by another, and permit their appeasement by assigning them limits. Thus, a new sort of moral discipline would be established, without which all the scientific discoveries and economic progress in the world could produce only malcontents *(S:382-83).

Of course, Durkheim's explanation of suicide was intended as an objective examination of the results of this
breakdown of secondary groups; for suicide offered an external sign which objectively revealed the internal moral change. Suicides were thus portrayed as indices of the "cold moral temperature" of contemporary societies. And, therefore, the only real "way of checking the current of collective sadness is by lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign and result."

The abnormal development of suicide and the general unrest of contemporary societies spring from the same causes. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths manifest the state of deep disturbance from which civilized societies are suffering, and bears witness to its gravity. It may even be said that this measures it.... The only possible way, then, to check this current of collective sadness is by at least lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign and a result. We have shown that it is not necessary, in order to accomplish this, to restore, artificially, social forms which are outworn and which could be endowed with only an appearance of life, or to create out of whole cloth entirely new forms without historical analogies. We must seek in the past new germs of life which it contained, and hasten their development (S:391).

At the conclusion to Suicide, however, Durkheim purposely did not go into great detail concerning the shape of the past history of professional or occupational groups, nor into the shape of their possible futures. "Only after a special study of the corporative regime would it be possible to make the conclusions more precise" (S:391).

Once the existence of the evil is proved, its nature and its source, and we consequently know the general features of the remedy and its point of application, the important thing is not to draw up in advance a plan anticipating everything, but rather to set resolutely to work (S: (S:391-2).

And "set resolutely to work" Durkheim did, with his lectures on Socialism and Saint-Simon, and his lectures Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. But the culmination of this effort—the analysis of the historical nature of the corporation and its possible future—appeared only in 1902 with Durkheim's preface to the second edition of The Division of Labor in Society, to which we now turn.
F. "Quelques Remarques sur les Groupements Professionels"

Durkheim's classic preface--translated by Simpson as "Notes on Occupational Groups"--to the second edition of The Division of Labor is important for a number of reasons. First, he elaborated there the nature and historical development of professional groups, which fulfilled his promise at the conclusion of Suicide. Moreover, he admitted certain limitations in the theoretical outlines of his earlier argument. Not only must intermediate groups be brought together on a sustained basis, Durkheim now argued, but if moral rules are to work effectively to regulate anomic economic activity they must be considered as morally legitimate and binding by collective authority. Thus, his emphasis shifted from the "latent" benefits of "moral mechanics" to questions of the centrality of legitimate moral authority. Here, too, as with his historical analyses, Durkheim moved closer to Weber.

He began by noting that his basic "theodicy" and "therapeutic" had developed since the first edition of The Division of Labor.

There is an idea undeveloped in the first edition, which it will be useful to bring into light and further determine, for it will clarify certain parts of the present work. It is the question of the role that occupational groups are destined to play in the contemporary order (DL:1).

He recalled to our attention the fact that modern economic life is afflicted by a "state of juridical and moral anomie." No occupational ethics govern economic life; thus, the insatiable desires of the amoral ego are released from moral discipline and direction. In terms reminiscent of Veblen (see Merton, 1949), Durkheim noted the ambiguity of the great stress placed upon individual success.

We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon the state of juridical and moral anomie in which economic life actually is found. Indeed, in the economic order, occupational ethics exist only in the most rudimentary state.... The most blameworthy acts are so often absolved by success that the boundary between what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is just and what is unjust, has nothing fixed about it, but seems susceptible to almost arbitrary change by individuals. An
ethic so imprecise and inconstant cannot constitute a discipline. The result is that all this sphere of collective life is, in large part, freed from the moderating action of regulation. It is this anomic state that is the cause ... of the incessantly recurrent conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle. For, as nothing restrains the active forces and assigns them limits they are bound to respect, they tend to develop haphazardly, and come into collision with one another, battling and weakening themselves (DL:1-2).

In contrast to his earlier summary formula in Suicide, Durkheim now observed that greater social cohesion alone is not sufficient. To restrain human passions the moral rules that emerge with structural integration must also become legitimate, that is, they must be accepted as the bases of moral authority.

Human passions stop only before a moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails, and latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic. That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evident, since it runs counter to the aim of society, which is to suppress, or at least moderate, war among men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a higher law. To justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise its encouragement of individual liberty. Quite on the contrary, liberty ... is itself the product of regulation. I can be free only to the extent that others are forbidden to profit from their physical, economic, or other superiority to the detriment of my liberty. But only social rules can prevent abuse of power. It is now known what complicated regulation is needed to assure individuals the economic independence without which their liberty is only nominal * (DL:3).

In historical terms, one of the most striking things to note about this "Hobbesian" war of "each against all" is that this type of "moral anarchy," rather than being ancient or generic, is actually rather recent. It is not so much a generic flaw of human nature; one cannot simply blame that old standby, the organic ego, for the "social costs" of the modern economic and political order, for these are unique in cultural evolution. Hobbes, for instance, took the easy way out, blaming generic human nature for the aftermath of the Puritan Civil War in England, as did Durkheim after the
... What brings about the exceptional gravity of this state ... is the heretofore unknown development that economic functions have experienced for about two centuries. Whereas formerly they played only a secondary role, they are now of first importance. We are far from the time when they were disdainfully abandoned to the inferior classes. In the face of the economic, the administrative, military and religious functions have become steadily less important. Only the scientific functions seem to dispute their place, and even science has scarcely any prestige save to the extent that it can serve practical occupations, which are largely economic.

... Society is [now] ... essentially industrial (DL:3).

Since economic life has gravitated to the very center of modern society, the crisis resulting from its anomic deregulation deepens.

A form of activity which has assumed such a place in social life evidently cannot remain in this unruly state without resulting in the most profound disasters. For, precisely because the economic functions today concern the greatest number of citizens, there are a multitude of individuals whose lives are passed almost entirely in the industrial and commercial world. From this it follows that as that world is only feebly ruled by morality, the greatest part of their existence takes place outside the moral sphere (DL:3-4).

Once again, it is evident that Durkheim had been so taken by his virtual identification of moral and social processes that wherever he perceived the lack of the former, it could only have been due to the paucity of the latter. Perhaps Durkheim had become fixed on the second process subsequent to the breakthrough of the individualistic, vocationally ascetic, functionally rational ethos of modern capitalism. In many ways, his lack of insight into the first (Weberian) process obviated his discovery of the full implications of the second schema of suicide which I have outlined, and shall soon explore. His commitment to affixing the burden on homo duplex barred recognition of the variability and historical uniqueness of our modern moral and sociocultural dilemmas.

Naturally, we are not inclined to thwart and restrain ourselves; if then, we are not invited, at each moment, to exercise this restraint without which there is no ethic, how can we learn the habit? If in the task that occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule
than that of our well-understood interest, how can we learn to depend upon disinterestedness, on self-forgetfulness, on sacrifice? In this way, the absence of all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects beyond the economic world, and consequently, weaken public morality (DL:4).

Durkheim next admitted a crucial limitation in his earlier core argument in the first edition of The Division of Labor. Group moral discipline only becomes effective if it is consecrated with the moral authority of the group, which must be embraced as legitimate.

... We have especially insisted upon showing that the division of labor cannot be held responsible—that it does not necessarily produce dispersion and incoherence, but that functions, when they are sufficiently in contact with one another, tend to stabilize, and regulate themselves. But this explanation is incomplete. For, if it is true that social functions spontaneously seek to adapt themselves to one another, provided they are regularly in relationship, nevertheless, this mode of adaptation becomes a rule of conduct only if the group consecrates it with its authority.... Only a constituted society enjoys the moral and material supremacy indispensable in making law for individuals, for the only moral personality above particular personalities is the one formed by collective life (DL:4-5).

But, in the last analysis, Durkheim's notion of "moral mechanics"—that moral rules spontaneously emerge from sustained patterns of social interaction—proved too strong for him to break away from. Integrate the amoral ego into social groups, and moral reglementation will inevitably emerge—this was Durkheim's unshakable belief, and the basis of his hope for social and moral reconstruction in the modern age.

... If anomie is an evil, it is above all because society suffers from it, being unable to live without cohesion and regularity.... For anomie to end, there must then exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed. Neither political society in its entirety, nor the State can take over this function; economic life, because it is specialized and grows more specialized everyday, escapes their competence and their action. An occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs, and able to follow all their variations. The only one that could answer all these conditions is the one formed by all the agents of the same industry, uni-
ted and organized into a single body ... the corpora-
tion or occupational group (DL:4).

G. The Nature and History of Professional Groups in
European Society

The only way to fully understand Durkheim's reform pro-
possals for the national political enfranchisement of profes-
sional groups is to put these notions into their historical
context. The usual symbolic equation of the Enlightenment,
for example, was that guilds and other such intermediary
groups could only be retrogressive, that is, stand against
the mainline of social and economic progress.

For the establishment of an occupational ethic and law
in the different economic occupations, the corporation,
instead of remaining a confused aggregate, without uni-
ty, would have to become again a defined, organized
group; in a word, a public institution. But any project
of this sort runs afoot of a certain number of prejudi-
ces which must be forestalled or dissipated (DL:7).

But Durkheim never proposed to "resuscitate the old corpora-
tion of the Middle Ages." For the old guilds were city based,
while, on the contrary, the new economic and political organ-
izations of the modern age are national and international in
scope. The municipal guilds were fiercely autonomous, inde-
pendent organizations, while the modern world is highly in-
terdependent. Hence, there were some basic changes to be
made in the form of professional groups before they could
become reconstituted as vital public institutions.

Now, in the economic order, the occupational group does
not exist any more than occupational ethics. Since the
eighteenth century rightfully suppressed the old corpor-
ations, only fragmentary and incomplete attempts have
been made to bring them back with new foundations
(DL:5).

Durkheim next considered the history of the profession-
al group as a secondary institution in the life of European
societies. Noting its existence in both the ancient socie-
ties of Greece and Rome, and throughout much of the Middle
Ages and the modern world up until the late eighteenth cen-
tury, Durkheim once again argued from the apparent univer-
sality of an institution to its present necessity: "So persistent an institution cannot depend upon a contingent and accidental existence" (DL:9). "If from the origin of the city up to the zenith of the Empire, from the dawn of Christian societies up to modern times, they have been necessary, it is because they answer durable and profound needs" (DL:9).

But, as always, Durkheim took care to point out that the economic services rendered by such corporations as regularly constituted loci of social interaction and, thus, as a moralizing milieux that they are most important.

If it is indispensable, it is not because of the economic services it renders, but because of the moral influence it can have. What we especially see in the occupational group is a moral power capable of containing individual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common solidarity in the consciousness of all workers, of preventing the law of the strongest from being brutally applied to industrial and commercial relations* (DL:10).

In outlining the historical "multifunctionality" of the Roman corporations, as not only economic and occupational associations, but also religious and mutual aid societies, Durkheim observed that once such groups are formed, inevitably moral rules grow up to encompass the whole of the social microcosm.

Once the group is formed, a moral life appears naturally carrying the mark of the particular conditions in which it has developed. For it is impossible for men to live together, associating in industry, without acquiring a sentiment of the whole formed by their union, without attaching themselves to that whole, preoccupying themselves with its interests, and taking account of that in their conduct, This attachment has in it something surpassing the individual. This subordination to the general interest is, indeed, the source of all moral activity. As this sentiment grows more precise and determined, applying itself to the most ordinary and the most important circumstances of life, it is translated into definitive formula, and thus, a body of moral rules is in process of establishment (DL:14-15).

Durkheim argued that the corporations of guilds of the medieval commune also constituted a moral milieu for their members. In evolutionary terms, Durkheim argued that the "corporation has been an heir to the family" (DL:17). This is a most impor-
tant insight, complementing (as noted earlier) Weber's emphasis on the medieval city as an oath-bound confederation. It was a crucial phase in widening out the structures of fraternization in the West. In short, with the emergence of the voluntary medieval commune, a new community of occupational interests took the place of older communities of "blood and soil" as the base of social organization; in short, it represents a momentous extension of the social bond.

... Trades demand cities, and cities have always been formed and recruited principally from the ranks of immigrants, individuals who have left their native homes. A new form of activity was thus constituted which burst from the old familial form ... it substituted for the family in the exercise of a function which had first been domestic, but which carried no longer this character.... Just as the family has elaborated domestic ethics and law, the corporation is now the source of occupational ethics and law (DL:17-18).

But how should corporations be transformed to fit contemporary conditions? Essentially, Durkheim observed that, since the medieval guild was municipal--that is, based on city trade--now occupational groups should be enfranchised on the national political level since economic life has become, to such a great extent, national and international in scope. Since the internationalization of the market is the dominant trend, it follows that the old system of territorial representation should give way to national occupational representation as the base of the political process.

But to succeed in getting rid of all the prejudices, to show that the corporative system is not solely an institution of the past, it would be necessary to see what transformation it must and can submit to in order to adapt itself to modern societies, for evidently it cannot exist as it did in the Middle Ages (DL:18).

Looking back, Durkheim noted that in Rome, the corporations eventually were annexed to municipal administration, and thus lost their independence. However, in the Middle Ages, the independent, voluntaristic commune and guild were the economic anchors of the new rising bourgeoisie. Citoyen and citizen were synonymous. Durkheim's convergence with Weber on the
question of the importance of the medieval commune as a key intermediate step in the progressive evolutionary extension of the social bond is most significant.

... Their place in the Middle Ages is quite another matter. There as soon as the corporation appears, it is as the normal mould for that part of the population called to play such a considerable role in the State: the bourgeoisie or the third estate. Indeed, for a long time, the bourgeoisie and tradespeople are one and the same.

.... The organization of trades and commerce seems to have been the primitive organization of the European bourgeoisie. When the cities freed themselves from the seigneurial power, when the commune was formed, the body of trades which had preceded and prepared this movement became the foundation of the communal constitution.... We know from the history of our societies that the commune has become their cornerstone.... Since it was a combination of corporations, and was formed on the style of a corporation, it is the latter, in the last analysis, which has served as foundation for all the political system which has issued from the communal movement (DL:20-1).

The reason that the medieval corporation could not survive the birth throes of the modern world, Durkheim reasoned, was that it was too narrowly based, too closely bound to the peculiar economic structure of the independent city. As national industry grew, and the scope of the trading market internationalized, the guild or corporation as the prime secondary organ became outmoded, retrogressive. Although the scale had changed, the guild lingered on, fiercely trying to retain its former autonomy. But because its municipal anchor no longer fit the new scale of economic and political action, the guild was rightly suppressed by national monarchies and revolutionaries alike.

In the Middle Ages, it was narrowly bound to the organization of the commune. This solidarity was without inconvenience as long as the trades themselves had a communal character.... But it was no longer the same once great industry was born ... its field of action is limited to no determined region; its clientele is recruited everywhere. An institution so entirely wrapped up in the commune as was the old corporation could not then be used to encompass and regulate a form of collective activity which was so completely foreign to the communal life.... But if the corporation, as it then existed, could not be adapted to this new form of industry, and if the State could not replace the old corporative dis-
cipline, it does not follow that all discipline would
be useless thenceforward. It simply meant that the old
corporation had to be transformed to continue to fill
its role in the new conditions of economic life
(DL:22-3).

The key to the future of the professional corporation, then,
argued Durkheim, is that it must simultaneously have both
constant relations with economic life and with the political
and administrative apparatus of the modern nation-state.

What the experience of the past proves above all, is
that the ... framework of the occupational group must
always have relations with the framework of occupation-
al life. It is because of this lack of relationship that
the corporative regime disappeared. Since the market,
formerly municipal, became national and international,
the corporations must assume the same extension. Instead
of being limited only to the workers of a city, it must
enlarge in such a way as to include all the members of
the occupation scattered over the territory, for in what-
ever region they are found, whether they live in the
city or in the country, they are all solidary, and par-
ticipate in a common life. Since this common life is,
in certain respects, independent of all territorial de-
terminations, the appropriate organ must be created that
expresses and regularizes its function. Because of these
dimensions, such an organ would necessarily be in direct
contact with the central organ of the collective life
(DL:24).

State regulation of economic activity and occupational
self-regulation must remain separate, Durkheim contended.
For only the occupational association is itself close enough
to the problems and details of occupational life to know them
intimately, and thus, choose the appropriate remedies.

If the function of making general principles of indus-
trial regulation belongs to the governmental assemblies,
they are incapable of diversifying them according to the
different industries. It is this diversification which
constitutes the proper task of the corporation. [Foonote:
This specialization could be made only with the aid of
elected assemblies charged to represent the corporation.
...] Economic life would thus be regulated and determin-
ed without losing any of its diversity (DL:24-5).

Instead of annexing the professional association to the
State, as both the old regime and the socialists wished to do,
Durkheim argued that its insertion into national political
life as a linked network of independent secondary organs is
not only possible but necessary. The new scale of socioeco-
nomic life demands a new corresponding countervailing force;
and the proposed transformation of the occupational group
and its national political enfranchisement removes the old
objections to its retrogressive behavior, which Durkheim ar-
gued was merely a reflection of its earlier municipal ori-
gins.

For that very reason, the corporative regime would be
protected against that tendency towards immobility that
it has often been charged with in the past, for it is
a fault which is rooted in the narrowly communal char-
acter of the corporation. As long as it was limited to
the city, it was inevitable for it to become a prisoner
of tradition as the city itself. As, in a group so re-
stricted, the conditions of life are almost invariable,
habit exercises a terrific effect upon people, and even
innovations are dreaded. The traditionalism of the cor-
porations was thus only an aspect of the communal tra-
ditionalism, and had the same qualities. Then once it
was ingrained in the mores, it survived the causes which
had produced and originally justified it. That is why,
when the material and moral concentration of the coun-
try, and great industry which is its consequence, had o-
pened minds to new desires, awakened new needs, intro-
duced into the tastes and fashions a mobility heretofore
unknown, the corporation, which was obstinately attached
to its old customs, was unable to satisfy these new exi-
gencies. But national corporations, by virtue of their
dimension and complexity, would not be exposed to this
danger (DL:25).

Durkheim went even farther, and suggested that the "or-
ganized occupation or corporation should be the essential or-
gan of public life" in the future. In this way, "organic sol-
idarity" would become fully institutionalized, and the tran-
sitional crisis finally overcome.

There is even reason to suppose that the corporation
will become the foundation of one of the essential ba-
es of our political organization.... Now that the com-
mune, heretofore an autonomous organism, has lost its
place in the State, as the municipal market did in the
national market, is it not fair to suppose that the cor-
poration also will have to experience a corresponding
transformation, becoming the elementary division of the
State, the fundamental political unity? Society, instead
of remaining what it is today, an aggregate of juxtapos-
ed territorial districts, would become a vast system of
national corporations. From various quarters it is asked
that elective assemblies be formed by occupations, and
not by territorial divisions; and certainly, in this way, political assemblies would more exactly express the diversity of social interests and their relations....

But to say that the nation, in becoming aware of itself, must be grouped into occupations--does this not mean that the organized occupation or corporation should be the essential organ of public life (DL:27)?

And, of course, Durkheim saw this massive and integral institutionalization of the logic of "organic" or occupational solidarity at the very heart of modern social organization to be demanded by our very history: "Thus, the great gap in European societies ... would be filled. It will be seen, indeed, how as advances are made in history, the organization which has territorial groups as its base (village, city, district, province, etc.) has become steadily effaced" (DL:27). Thus, attempting to deal realistically and historically with the modern crisis of anomie and egoisme, Durkheim, as a positivist moral philosopher, issued a call for us to embrace a new type of extended social bond, a new form of "universal brotherhood." The basic question remains, however: was this solution adequate to the moral crisis of anomie and egoisme? For many reasons, I think not.

To the end, Durkheim believed that his solution was adequate because it created moral milieu for the undisciplined organic ego. And, to the end, he believed that it was the generic ego--man as homo duplex--that lay at the heart of our problems. Can we today allow ourselves to be similarly misled?

... it must not be thought that the entire function of the corporation is to make rules and apply them. To be sure, where a group is formed, a moral discipline is formed too. But the institution of this discipline is only one of the many ways through which collective activity is manifested. A group is not only a moral authority which dominates the life of its members; it is also a source of life sui generis. From it comes warmth which animates its members, making them intensely human, destroying their egotisms (DL:26).
FOOTNOTES

BOOK TWO

#1, pg. 543—I shall focus exclusively on Durkheim's rationales here, rather than on his statistics, in contrast to W. Pope (1976).

#1, pg. 630—Barclay Johnson has discovered other apparent references to fatalisme (1965:887, #14); see also Cashion (1970).
SYNOPSIS. In this Book, we shall critically reexamine the underlying presuppositions of Durkheim's first schema of suicide by comparing and contrasting them with the evolving structure of Durkheim's thought which we delineated in Book One; then, on the basis of this reexamination, we shall move to his second schema of suicide.

In Part I, we shall first criticize Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex in terms of the location of egoism and insatiability. I propose that Durkheim's early image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was a mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, historically, and culturally. Even Durkheim himself shifted away from this inadequate image in later years.

Then we shall review several shifts in Durkheim's causal model away from his early positivistic notions of mechanistic, one-way causality toward the autonomization of collective representations. When this double task is completed, I propose that we shall conclude that the first schema of suicide, implicitly resting on these early notions of homo duplex and abstracted, mechanistic causality, should be set aside not only because such premises are logically flawed, but also because they were later abandoned or modified by Durkheim himself.

Next, we shall explore various transitions in Durkheim's work which reveal a progressive shift toward "cultural realism" which are directly relevant to the second schema. Further, because of the lack of historical specificity in
Durkheim's abstracted general evolutionism, we shall explore possible complementarities and convergences between his work and that of Max Weber. Hence, we shall assume a synthetic Durkheimian-Weberian analytical perspective before we begin to address the second schema. Then, we shall outline some criteria for a more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide. Finally, we shall explore other observers' insights into Durkheim's second schema.

In Part II of Book Three, we shall explore all four types of suicide as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both historical sets proceed from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression. In traditional societies, the common content of altruisme and fatalisme is absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule of satisfaction. Altruisme represents the active acceptance of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice for the welfare of the group. Fatalisme represents the opposite role of passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate.

Now, in modern societies caught up in the transitional crisis (pre-organic solidarity), both anomie and egoisme proceed from common sources—absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiability—precisely the reverse of the values of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and unending drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie—the "infinity of desires"—and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I call the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition.

When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme—the "infinity of dreams"—and collapse of the will and imagination in isolation and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals, etc. This ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior" in which suicide becomes a vocation is sanctioned by what I shall call
the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition.

Together, these twin expressions of some of our highest callings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" which represent the two halves of the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "golden mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our prime vices.
PART I
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S KEY PREMISES

CHAPTER ONE
THE LOCATION OF EGOISM AND INSATIABILITY: A CRITIQUE
OF DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF HOMO DUPLEX

Preface. The problem of the location of egoism and insatiability, "le mal de l'infini," which Durkheim empirically encountered on such a massive scale in the modern world, is central to his schema of suicide. As we discovered in Book One, the doctrine of homo duplex—the generic opposition between ego and person, between sensual appetites and moral rules, between percepts and concepts—lies at the very heart of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology of morality and religion, and his sociology of knowledge (see also Lukes, 1973:10). Clearly, in his first schema of suicide Durkheim grounded egoistic individualism and insatiable desires in the pre-socialized half of human nature—the organic ego. But, as we have discovered in Book Two, at various points Durkheim's theses also ambiguously suggest that egoism and insatiability derive as much from the presence of modern cultural sanctions as from the absence of traditional moral controls over the pre-social ego in the modern era. Let us now explore the irretrievable flaws in Durkheim's early image of the dualism of human nature as these informed his first schema of suicide.

Logically, how does Durkheim's notion of the supposed insatiable passions of the organic half of that strange and divided creature—homo duplex—stand up? Can we accept this part of Durkheim's explanatory model underlying his first schema in Suicide? I think not. I propose that Durkheim's image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable sensual pas-
visions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules—his rhetorically inspired "brittle synthesis" as Giddens (1971b:22) terms it—was a mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, historically, and culturally. Even Durkheim shifted away from this inadequate image in his later years. Let us now critically explore these limitations in Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex as a prelude to our reformulation of his schemas of suicide.

However, let me first limit the potential scope of my criticism here. I do not wish, for instance, to deny the self-evident fact that man is a creature composed of multiple realities—for we are simultaneously physical, biological, psychological, sociocultural, moral-intellectual, and spiritual beings. Man is inherently ambiguous; man is a mystery. Certainly, in these and other related terms I would agree with Durkheim, and a whole tradition of thought, that man is, indeed, homo duplex or multiplex. Yet, I find Durkheim's early postulate of the inherent insatiability of the organic ego unacceptable. And, therefore, his corresponding schema portraying anomie and egoisme as the release of the ego from traditional social control, while still very insightful as a description of a secondary phase process, needs to be reformulated.

Finally, I do consider Durkheim's later shift from the anomic to the alogic ego acceptable and even profound. For it means that, instead of assigning the presence of self-destructive drives to the generic organic ego, Durkheim merely imputed to it the absence of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts. Indeed, the reversal of the presence/absence polarity is crucial to the reformulation of these two very different schemas. In any case, I simply wish to put the reader on notice that my criticisms directed toward the underlying postulate of schema one do not alter my conviction that Durkheim's distinction between ego and person remains a foundation theorem for the human sciences.
A. Homo Duplex as a Rhetorical Mistake

To my mind, Durkheim should never have incorporated, at the very heart of his first schema, key images and premises of his opponents. While it is true (see, for example, R:121-4) that Durkheim took pains to distance himself from both the Utilitarians like Hobbes and Romantic pioneers such as Rousseau, nonetheless, he retained certain crucial aspects of their view of the pre-socialized, generic human ego. I believe, therefore, that Anthony Giddens is quite right when he states:

... Although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from methodological individualism is much more subtle and profound than has been assumed by many of his critics, what results is a brittle synthesis and essentially an unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and the very serious deficiencies which run throughout his works, however, have to be understood in the light of this attempt. As so often happens with a writer whose works are so strongly polemical in tone, ultimately he was unable to abandon certain of the very premises of which he was most critical in the writings of his opponents (1971b:222).

Let us next briefly explore the prime example of this mistaken rhetorical incorporation—namely, Durkheim's view of the economy as the prime arena for egoistic and amoral activity.

1. Economic Deregulation as Anomic Norm: Durkheim's Devaluation of the Utilitarian Economy

The rhetorical incorporation and denial of value to the essential premises of his opponents was especially damaging to Durkheim's implicit sociology of economic life. Although ambiguous at several points, in the main Durkheim himself greatly neglected analysis of economic action, and treated it as the very paradigm of egoistic and amoral activity. This might seem surprising in light of Durkheim's sanguine view of the benefits of the organic division of social labor. But we must remember that even here Durkheim's central interest was not with the technological and economic aspects of the progressive division of labor. Rather, his prime con-
cern lay always with the beneficent effects of "moral mechanics" for occupational groups, and with the progressive extension, universalization, and rationalization of the social bond on the civilizational level. Durkheim was no social economist like Weber.

But why did Durkheim anathematize economic action as the very prototype of egoistic amorality? Because, as we discovered in Book One, as a moral philosopher Durkheim seized upon the ancient doctrine of man as *homo duplex* for his own special purposes. In so doing, he infused the two halves of this dichotomy with his own sociological and the individualist Utilitarian doctrines, respectively. Here Durkheim's tacit rhetorical strategy apparently was to invert the high valuation of that abstract, self-interested, calculating ego known as "economic man" in Utilitarian moral theory and political economy by identifying it with the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego. By uncritically incorporating this apotheosis of the secularized ascetic, the post-Reformation "New Model Man"—the isolated ego floating in the mechanical world of the self-equilibrating market—Durkheim accepted the historically unique Utilitarian image of economic action as a universal norm, much as the classical theorists themselves proclaimed. However, Weber's achievement lay in revealing the historical uniqueness of the ethos of market capitalism, and in revealing its unique normative presuppositions.

For example, in *Socialism* (53-4), Durkheim took the historically unique separation of the economy from polity and society as a generic given. But as Weber, Polanyi (1944, 1968), Nelson (1969a), and others have shown, this segregation of the different aspects of sociocultural process from one another is not universal, and thus not to be presumed but to be explained. Further, while Durkheim was certainly familiar with the works of many French, English, German and other economists, in *Socialism* he justified his neglect of economic categories and processes in these terms:
We may speak of "economic things or functions" without having previously said what they consist of, or by what external sign one may recognize them. The fault is due to the science of economics, which has not clarified its own fundamental concepts better (Soc:57).

This neglect of economic action is more understandable if we recognize that by his rhetorical incorporation and inversion of the Utilitarian ego into his positivist moral sociology, Durkheim effectively banished it from the social and moral life. Due to his own peculiar polemical and cultural commitments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with social norms and the moralized person, and the profane with dispersed egos engaged in mundane, self-centered, and purely utilitarian tasks. In The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different worlds of human experience: ordinary days spent by self-calculating egos in dispersed practical activity, versus the extraordinary feast days spent by moralized persons in concentrated "collectively effervescent" ceremonial.

On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual vocations which take the greater part of the attention. Everyone attends to his own personal business; for most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the exigencies of material life, and the principal incentive to economic activity has always been private interest.... On feast days, on the contrary, these preoccupations are necessarily eclipsed; being essentially profane, they are excluded from these sacred periods. At this time, their thoughts are centered upon their common beliefs, their common traditions, the memory of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of which they are the incarnation; in a word, upon social things (EF:389-90).

Now, I propose that Durkheim made a basic rhetorical mistake when he equated the ego and economic action, which thus banished common, practical, economic action from the all-important sphere of the moral and social. One of the few secondary interpreters who has clearly seen this problem is Gianfranco Poggi, who contends:

Durkheim's view of labor as wholly profane, individual, and non-social, and his distaste for the materiality characteristic of the non-social realm --these
two tendencies bias even his approach to what he con-
iders the proper social realm by making it difficult
to deal adequately with social objects (1971:248).
Of the portion deleted from the preceding passage (EF:390),
Poggi says:

It appears from this passage that for Durkheim, la-
bor, i.e. productive activity, is inherently preso-
cial and antisocial; it is socialized only margin-
ally, through the inertia of associations and habits
acquired in the properly social realm, which, how-
ever, have in principle no direct bearing on econo-

Further, Poggi rightly sees that Durkheim's master equation
governing these symbolic alignments is his polar opposition
between the sacred and the profane. The essence of the dual-
ism of human nature (to Durkheim) is this sacred/profane di-
chotomy--ego is to person as body was to soul. Poggi sees
that homo duplex was a rhetorical mistake:

... Durkheim puts individual behavior per se on a
wholly different plane from the social plane on which
institutions function; it appears as a destructive or
at best disruptive element in that functioning. Only
by transcending his own individuality, by surrender-
ing to the superiority of the norm and of society, can
the individual correctly confront the social (norma-
tive) realm.... Since he has equated the social with
the normative, whatever opposes norms must be anti-
social or non-social.... In fact, Durkheim is compel-
led to argue, albeit mostly implicitly, that anomic
behavior is ... mindless, expressing the blind vorac-
ity of "the flesh." Noncompliance issues, in the
last analysis, from the extent to which that ultimate
embodiment of individuality, the physical organism,
breaks through the layer of social/moral representa-
tions laid over it by society. In deviance ... the
beast within man bares his teeth, the lowest, vilest
part of man attacks and negates the benevolent and
austere authority of society.... Durkheim contemplates
this subversion of the proper order of things with a
moralistic shudder, and is led at times to speak of
society's mission as that of freeing man from the hold
of natural forces, of delivering him from the mindless
greed of his senses. A kind of Cartesian mind/body
dualism seems to lie behind this imagery.... An impli-
cit naturalistic monism thus struggles in his thought
with an implicit dualism, or perhaps even an implicit
spiritualistic monism (1971:246-7-8).

Indeed, not only is Poggi's general critique well taken, but
also his concluding characterization of Durkheim's basic philosophical position reveals clearly the multiplicity of perspectives from which Durkheim's doctrine may be judged, and the difficulty of finally placing him in any useful category except perhaps that of master moral dialectician.

Unfortunately, Durkheim's polemical overstatement led him to tacitly embrace theses running directly counter to some of his own basic premises. Surely his unjustified remark that "The principal incentive to economic activity has always been private interest" (EF:390) serves as a prime illustration. Such a thesis is acceptable only if economic action is to be primarily regarded from the biological or purely Utilitarian perspective. Even in biological terms it may be too reductionistic and mechanistic, as ethologists begin to systematically report on the complex structures underlying animal societies (see, for example, Wynne-Edwards, 1968). I believe that Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation of the apotheosized image of economic individualism as first developed by the Utilitarian wing of the Scottish moral philosophers and English non-conformists to have been a fundamental mistake. Instead of incorporating their moralization of atomistic and mechanistic images of economy and society, and thus far too easily serving his own polemical purposes by banishing everyday practical activity from the realm of the moral, Durkheim should have developed a fully sociological position which would have rejected both the premises and the valuation of egocentric economic activity as forwarded by the Utilitarian reformers. Durkheim would then have found himself in the position to re-incorporate the economic individual into society, culture, and history. In sum, instead of accepting the Utilitarians' apotheosis of modern economic deregulation as anomic norm, Durkheim should have moved to a fully sociological view of economic action. LaCapra has criticized Durkheim's infusion of his doctrine of man as homo duplex into economic action in these memorable terms:
... in Durkheim's conception of economics, the mind-body dualism functioned to relegate economic activity to the sphere of the literally material and the individual. By the end of his life, Durkheim considered economic activity to be the profane par excellence. His entire conception of the problem not only failed to offer insight into the nature of economic institutions; it also ignored the moral and religious aspects of modern economic activity which Max Weber treated in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1972:83).

2. A Properly Durkheimian View of the Economy

It is significant that those members of the *Anee* school who worked as economic sociologists—I mean Francois Simiand, Maurice Halbwachs, and even Marcel Mauss—did not do their best work under the influence of Durkheim's early doctrine of *homo duplex*. For economic sociology simply becomes impossible if one brands economic action as inherently egotistic, utilitarian, and generically asocial—in a word, profane. Durkheim's mistaken rhetorical tactic unfortunately thus banished the economy from cultural and moral influence. However, had Durkheim followed consistently his own methodological postulates, he might have helped build a better theory of social economics (eg. see Neyer, 1960: 65). Again, it is important that those French economic sociologists such as Simiand and Halbwachs were mainly influenced by Durkheim's seminal remarks that economic wants and value are ultimately determined by public opinion—that is, culture.

But even Durkheim's occasional remarks on the social and cultural foundations of economic norms ran into considerable opposition from economists. And, in contrast to frequent pronouncements on the need for rapprochement between history and sociology, it is striking that Durkheim made few overtures to economics as a discipline. Lukes reports on one unhappy exchange in 1908:

The economists, still largely hostile to the intrusive claims of sociology, were equally critical of Durkheim's methodological views. At a meeting of the
Societe d'Economique Politique in 1908, Durkheim advanced his views concerning the nature of economic phenomena and the relation of economics to the other social sciences. It was clear, he argued, that the scientific study of morality, of law, of religion, and art, were concerned with ideas. Was political economy any different: did it deal with phenomena "independent of opinion?" He maintained that economic facts could also be considered as matters of opinion, though this did not mean that they did not operate according to laws. The value of things depended not only on their objective properties but also on the opinion held concerning them. For example, religious opinion could affect the exchange value of certain goods, as could changes in taste. Again, wage-rates were a function of a basic standard of living, but this standard itself varied from period to period as a function of opinion. And certain forms of production (for instance, cooperation), expanded not because of their objective productivity but because of certain moral values ascribed to them by opinion. Thus, economics lost its preponderance and took its place beside the other social sciences and in close relation to them (1973:499-500).

Needless to say, Durkheim's reception was not enthusiastic, with some economists objecting that the "eternal laws of supply and demand" were not swayed by mere "public opinion."

In addition, in The Elementary Forms, after the summation that "... nearly all the great institutions have been born in religion," Durkheim appended a famous footnote containing seminal research suggestions:

Only one form of social activity has not yet been expressly attached to religion: that is economic activity.... Economic value is a sort of power or efficacy, and we know the religious origins of the idea of power. Also, richness can confer mana; therefore, it has it. Hence, it is seen that the ideas of economic value and of religious value are not without connection. But the question of the nature of these connections has not yet been studied (EF:466, #4).

At least one member of the Annee school, however, followed up on this seminal footnote. In his justly famous Annee monograph, The Gift, Marcel Mauss (1967) specifically referred to this suggestive footnote in proferring his work as "... an answer to the question already posed by Durkheim concerning the religious origin of the notions of economic value" (1967:..."
70). And Durkheim himself, in the same Elementary Forms, proposed what I believe to be a properly sociological view of economic activity:

Even the material interests which these great religious ceremonials are designed to satisfy concern the public order and are therefore social. Society as a whole is interested that the harvest be abundant, that the rain fall at the right time and not excessively, that the animals reproduce regularly. So it is society that is in the foreground of every consciousness; it dominates and directs all conduct; that it is more living and active, and consequently more real, than in profane times (EF:390).

And Neyer (1960:76) rightly notes that in one of his last papers, "Judgements of Reality and Judgements of Fact," Durkheim explicitly suggested that the social (normative) foundations of economic value become one of the main fields for future sociological development. "In one of Durkheim's last papers ... economic value takes its place as one form of the "ideal" whose investigation constitutes the chief business of sociology, along with other systems of "value"--religious, moral, legal, and aesthetic." Neyer further observes that reconciling some of Durkheim's early and later views on the roots of economic value might prove difficult.

But perhaps the most explicit and useful of Durkheim's theses on the sociocultural roots of economic value and action can be discovered as early as Suicide (1897). Strangely, Durkheim's significant insights here have been largely ignored (except see the work of Simiand, Halbwachs, and Mauss), even by contemporary sympathetic sociologists interested in the normative foundations of economic action and theory (see, for example, Parsons, 1949; and Parsons and Smelser, 1955). As I argued earlier (see Book Two), Durkheim's thesis of the SocioEconomic Schedule of Satisfaction (see S:248-50) holds great unexplored potential significance for fundamental theory in economic sociology and comparative social systems.

The key passages in Suicide represent a crucial transition in Durkheim's argument concerning the source and operation of anomie and the insatiable passions of the pre-social-
ized ego, for there he translated his abstract premises about the need for "reglementation" into a basic sociological rule. In moralizing the ego, and directing the desires of the socially constructed person, society and culture generate parameters for potential satisfaction. Basically, Durkheim proposed that every society utilizes some sort of mechanism, accepted as legitimate, to regulate the ratios of satisfaction of individuals in terms of a socioeconomic schedule of want satisfaction. This social schedule is stratified for various groups and occupations depending upon relative degrees of functional contribution and/or cultural honor. This socioeconomic schedule of the generation and regulation of desires is, in a relatively stable society, accepted generally by each person as legitimate, and each is comparatively adjusted to their scheduled ratio of satisfaction. In contemporary society, the workings of the socioeconomic schedule are made clearer by the universality of credit and automatic, electronic accounting; for example, each month an employee may have his paycheck automatically deposited in his bank account. The amount received represents a more or less standard allocation of purchasing power to a worker in that occupation, skill level, and so forth. Thus, each station in life receives approximately the rewards considered legitimate, both by the larger society and by the group itself.

Now, the thesis of the importance of the Social Schedule is one of the key sociocultural foundations of the distribution phase of economic process; it is a prime, generic socioeconomic institution just as much as markets. If we ask, for example, how are the productive, distributive, and consumptive phases of economic process to be coordinated? How are they to be directed? And, how are ratios and sequences between different classes, groups, institutions, and sectors to be negotiated? How is such agreement reached and conflict resolved on a regular basis? To answer, as Utilitarian economists did for many years, in terms of homogenizing supply/demand price mechanisms in ideally competitive markets is
to give no real, empirical answer at all. Economic sociologists should instinctively connect the legitimacy of wages and prices to institutions, to governing socioeconomic rationales, and ultimately, to long range cultural values. In short, the SocioEconomic Schedule is the generic price and income making institution.

Further, the social schedule can be viewed as a key variable mediating between various spheres of economic action and their societal bases. In essence, between the economic system and the cultural value system stands the stratification system. The social schedule serves to translate values into prices, and then, in turn, feedsback prices and production/distribution ratios into values. Price and income are based in Durkheim's theory of the social schedule on the degree of functional contribution of various groups, on their differential social and cultural status, on the belief in the legitimacy of these invidious ranks and the appropriate reward due each, and so on and so forth. If, in general, one grants the fact that wants are, in part, based upon socioculturally generated desires, and the values of goods and services rest upon group preferences, then at some point we must turn to explore the social schedules in which these desires and legitimizing values are embodied.

Space does not allow us to consider here such important questions as the degree of implicitness or explicitness of the social schedule, the bases of relative legitimacy (past, present, future), specialization and monopolies as ways of raising one's own groups percentage of the schedule, the economy as a symbolic process, and so forth. In regard to our present concerns, it is sufficient to note the crucial historical variations in the content of the social schedule, for as we noted in Book Two, Durkheim's four types of suicide are rooted in two very different types of social schedules in different societies at the two ends of history.
3. **Ego and History: Parsons' Mistaken Image of Durkheim as a Communist Theorist**

Even so brilliant an analytical theorist as Talcott Parsons was unwittingly tripped by complications stemming from Durkheim's doctrine of *homo duplex*. In his magisterial *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons asserted that Durkheim was best considered "... a communist [theorist] rather than socialist" (1949:341). Parsons' portrayal of Durkheim as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist like himself, possessed by a negative image of human nature, and searching for the eternal essence of human society (Parsons' Central Value System), led him to identify Durkheim as a communist theorist. Curiously, Parsons' misportrayal of Durkheim as a communist and the popular misperception of Durkheim as a conservative (e.g. see John Horton, 1964; Lewis Coser, 1960) are intimately related.

But clearly, Parsons' assertion is mistaken, as Melvin Richter (1960:208, #77) and Giddens (1971c:511) have insisted. But what misled Parsons, and others after him? At root, what is wrong here is that Durkheim's anti-individualist polemic has not been explicitly connected with his doctrine of man as *homo duplex*, and his evolutionary perspective. Remember first that Parsons had portrayed Durkheim primarily as a social theorist like himself—that is, concerned with "social statics," not "dynamics;" one who searched for the generic bases of social order and control (see also the appendix). Since Durkheim viewed communist utopias, as distinct from the historically specific critiques of industrial societies by socialist theorists, as an eternal response to the egoism inherent in human nature, Parsons naturally slipped over into the misportrayal of Durkheim as standing theoretically with the communist camp.

An additional factor which led Parsons astray was that Durkheim apparently agreed with communist theorists that the root problem underlying economic anarchy (see Book Two) is the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego. But what
Parsons apparently did not see was the extent to which Durkheim tried to transcend both the communist and socialist theorists, on the one hand, and the Utilitarian individualists on the other. As a positivist moral philosopher working sociologically, Durkheim's prime intention was to dialectically resolve impasses between opposing polarities in a new and compelling synthesis. Now, while Parsons did see that Durkheim rejected the doctrinal claims of both the Utilitarian economists and the socialists on the grounds that they similarly apotheosized the very moral anarchy to which he was so opposed, Parsons neglected to see that Durkheim agreed with the socialists that our present transitional crisis was historically specific, and derived basically from the modern separation of the economy from the polity. Durkheim spent many pages, as we have in part two of Book Two, comparing and contrasting communist and socialist theory, and specifically set aside communist "theodicies" and "therapeutics" as unsuited to the historical specifics of our modern crisis. So, misled by his neglect of Durkheim's historical perspective, Parsons seized upon Durkheim's generic doctrine of homo duplex, failed to see its genetic framework, and then mistakenly insisted that Durkheim embraced an ethical and political position which Durkheim himself explicitly rejected. But, as we have discovered, the fault does not lie with Parsons alone, for Durkheim's doctrine of the insatiability of the sensual appetites of the organic ego was also fundamentally flawed.

4. Conclusion

In truth, Durkheim's polemics against opposing cultural traditions were incomplete—I mean he simply did not go far enough in rejecting their shared images of the pre-socialized ego. Instead of acquiescing in the rhetorical bifurcation of man into egoistic organic and moral-social halves, Durkheim's dialectical sociologism should have led him to reject this cornerstone of modern thought altogether. But,
here as elsewhere, Durkheim's inherited Cartesian dualism was reenforced by the oppositions between individual and society embraced by Utilitarian and Romantic alike. And back of these common oppositions may be detected the gnostic gulf between Geist and Welt which permeates almost all these discussions. Unfortunately, Durkheim took over the notion of the pre-socialized individual of his opponents, and simply inverted the valuation.

Now, we would do well to recall that the intimate linkage between "Reason" and the "Individual" in Utilitarian and Rationalist philosophy, and between the "Individual" and the subjectivity and emotional inner feeling of angst in Romantic and Idealistic philosophy, both placed enormous emphasis upon the generic elements of the abstracted, generic individual. This was also true of French philosophy--Durkheim spoke of his countrymen sometimes as "lone wolves," given to a suspicious isolation and "fierce individualism"; this was especially true of the radical wing of the Enlightenment philosophes. But what these cultural traditions, in their common opposition to the social organicism and inter-personal ethics of the lingering Catholic cultural tradition, had raised so high, Durkheim placed low. Yet, like them, Durkheim retained the "cult of the (moralized) person" as the prime source of value integration in modern "organic solidarity." Instead of the pre-socialized individual as the prime carrier of modern values, Durkheim polemicized against the generic ego, the lower and lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amoral, egoistic, driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly destructive. As noted earlier, in this process Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of derivation of autonomous individualism from "realistic" rather than "nominalist" premises.

However, in the last analysis, it is generally a prime rhetorical mistake, especially when engaged in as significant a civilizational debate as Durkheim was, to tacitly incorporate crucial premises of your opponents. For then the very same premises one seeks to destroy in one's opponents come
back to haunt you also. Rhetorical incorporation is thus a two-edged sword. The only real alternative is to refuse to even to begin to enter into the other's closed conceptual world, to reject crucial misleading premises altogether, and to start to build up another world independently. I propose that it only undermined Durkheim's radical new start to incorporate the notion of the organic ego as the crucial category, even if he did invert his opponents valuation by assigning it demonic qualities. Ultimately, even though it was a clever but misconceived rhetorical device, Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation of a negative image of the pre-socialized ego admitted in the backdoor some of the very elements against which he had so resolutely taken up arms in the first place. As a consequence, Durkheim's highly significant attempt at dialectical resolution failed on its own terms. Unfortunately, much of the rest of Durkheim's system suffered as a result; especially his first explanation of the sources of egoism and insatiability underlying modern forms of suicide.
B. Homo Duplex as a Biological Mistake

Everyone recognizes that the needs of the body are limited ... physical pleasure cannot increase indefinitely (DL:238).

Although his doctrine was not unambiguous, Durkheim often equated the pre-socialized individual with the organic ego, with the bio-psychological level of existence. As has often been said, man's inheritance is double--both biological and cultural. But Durkheim hypothesized (eg. see Soc:242) that the source of limitless desires is the organic ego. At various points (see Moral Education), Durkheim characterized the infant, driven by passionate and egotistic desires, as an undisciplined being, almost an animal. Durkheim's two-storied image of man tended to locate our dark and self-destructive drives in the lower story, in the organic ego. Thus, Durkheim often tended to revert back to the very position which his own sociologistic logics had previously confuted--namely, that the source of this crucial "infinity of dreams and desires" was biological. In short, Durkheim's positivist analogy with the older moral notions of sin and evil anchored the latter in the sensual appetites.

However, clearly this notion of a pre-socialized individual is as much an abstraction as the more virtuous Enlightenment images of the generic individual in the "state of nature." Indeed, Durkheim's polemics against the Utilitarian and Romantic individualists apply equally to his own first image of man as homo duplex. And if this deeply negative and accusatory image of human nature was a rhetorical mistake, it is also a biological mistake as well. Why? First, because this doctrine assumes that the organic ego is generic--that is, it is the same across all forms of life. But if the ego is the organic entity which seeks first and foremost the survival of the organism, how can it be self-destructive? Is life itself destructive, unharmonious? In general, I see little to be gained by anchoring explanations of
our present troubles retroactively in the self-destructiveness of either human or organic nature. Moreover, I see little to be gained in anchoring explanations of specifically human action in lower biological categories, largely because biological phenomena are not specific to man. Generally speaking, biology is a constant for man. One cannot then hope to explain specifically human action in non-human terms; this would be illogical. For what would be one's previous differentia specifica of man-as-man?

If pressed, I would propose that the defining characteristic of man as an evolutionary species is culture. Man is the cultural animal; man is the creature who dwells in his own images. To uncritically identify the human ego, much less the human person, with animal egos, with the generic biological ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself, advances our understanding of ourselves and our rather unique predicaments very little. How can we ignore the evident evolutionary fact that if, indeed, man is a separate, highly complex, and powerful species, then this multiple bio-psycho-socio-cultural achievement must necessarily have radically changed our organic egos? Even our organic constitutions have been changed in this evolutionary process. In sum, reductionism must be set aside, here and elsewhere. I repeat: man's essence cannot be equated with the biological ego as such, for such a symbolic equation does little or nothing to explain the uniqueness of man himself.

In truth, reductionistic explanations are largely pseudo-answers, for they are too easy; instead of illuminating, they merely explain away problems. One has the answer before one begins; it is not necessary to penetrate the actual details if one already possesses (or is possessed by) THE ANSWER. Biological reductionism is so illogical because it is so univocal—all the diversity of reality is forced into one mold. Moreover, reductionism is non-empirical (under the guise of a radical empiricism) because it simply ignores the evidence; it constantly makes unwarranted jumps
from lower levels to higher levels and back again. Is it not ironic that biological reductionism crept in the backdoor, unseen, in one of the pioneering works of the very sociological theorist who insisted that we recognize the emergent and *sui generis* nature of society and culture?

Most important for our present purposes, however, is the fact that Durkheim *himself* acknowledged that biological needs are capable of being satisfied. Indeed, the instinctually based sensual appetites, whether for food, sex, or whatever, are the very model of satiability.

Among animals this limitation comes of itself because the animal's life is essentially instinctive. Every instinct, in fact, is part of a chain of connected movements which unfolds its links under the impulse of a determinate stimulant, but which stops when it comes to an end. All instinct is bounded because it responds to purely organic needs and because these organic needs are rigorously defined. It is always a matter either of eliminating a definite quantity of useless or harmful substances which encumber the organism, or of introducing a definite quantity of substances which repair what the functioning of the organs has destroyed. The power of assimilation of a living body is limited and this limits the corresponding needs. This limitation is therefore built into the organism and controls its behavior. Moreover, the animal has no way of evading this pattern. The power of reflection is not yet developed enough to symbolize what is or what was and to set new goals for activity beyond those spontaneously achieved. This is why excesses are rare. When beasts have eaten enough to satisfy hunger, they seek no more. When sexual desire is met, they are in repose (Soc:240-1).

In the same vein, Durkheim repeatedly observed (eg. S:246) that the organic needs of animals are physiologically and ecologically limited. That is, needs on the level of the organic ego are both formed and constrained by the amount of resources available in any given environment, and by the inherent limitations in processing ability of any given organism. Thus, Durkheim rightly observed that animals live in a state of equilibrium or relative balance both in terms of their own built-in limitations, and the possible resources or "carrying capacity" of their supporting habitats. There-
fore, I oppose one of Durkheim's theses to another, and propose that the disruptive element of insatiable desires cannot legitimately be blamed upon the organic ego and its sensual appetites, since they are doubly restricted.

Moreover, Durkheim noted that it is only when sensual appetites become morbid that they become insatiable. In the normal case, when needs are met, they become temporarily extinguished, as the rat psychologists say. How much, for example, can anyone of us eat? (It makes little sense to argue that since eating is a regularly recurring need, that it is therefore potentially insatiable). Now, those who eat beyond all reason (satiation) are soon faced with illness; they are treated medically in terms of glandular deficiencies, and so on. In the popular vernacular, the rhetorical question is: "ya got a tapeworm in there, buddy?" Those who pursue sexual stimulation beyond normal limits are also suspected of psychobiological imbalance, Durkheim argued:

It is well-known that insatiability is a sign of morbidity. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has taken a certain amount of nourishment; it is the glutton who cannot be satisfied. Healthy people, motion, but at the end of a period of exercise they like to rest. The demabulatory maniac experiences the need of perpetually moving about without stop or rest; nothing satisfies him. In its normal state sexual desire is aroused for a time, then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there are no limits (Soc:240).

As the "marginalists" in psychology and the theory of economic wants noted in the late nineteenth century, in the normal case each additional increment of "pleasure units" further extinguishes desire, so that one may plot a curve of rising and then rapidly falling economic "want." Influenced by the analogy with biological and psychological morbidity—that is, the lack of satiability or "marginal incrementalism" of wants—when Durkheim encountered an ethos of insatiable desires on such a massive scale in the modern world, his deep affinity with biological analogies led him to mistakenly assume that modern "moral anarchy" must be due to the same order of cause. But, if insatiability is indeed a sign of morbidity, can this legitimately be considered as due to the
insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego breaking through the upper-level of social constraint and moral discipline? Or, on the contrary, is the only legitimate socio-cultural mode of explanation to explore the historically specific sources of the presence of cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and a legitimized "infinity of dreams and desires?"
C. Homo Duplex as a Sociological Mistake

Preface. Not only was Durkheim's first installment of his doctrine of man as homo duplex a rhetorical and biological mistake, but I believe it to have been a basic sociological mistake as well. Why? Because if human conscience is basically different from animal instinct, then we ought to search for the sources of egoism and insatiability in varying cultural mandates rather than in terms of a residual hangover from the biological order. Because sociologists ought to reverse the causal order, and instead of acquiescing in the old notion of the determination of human action by biology and psyche, we should be demonstrating instead the ways culture impinges on biological structure and processes. Because we ought to generate a sociological way of looking at the generation of needs and desires, especially as these underpin economic action. Because the progress of social science depends upon the substitution of sociocultural explanations for psychological and biological reductions. And because Durkheim himself later shifted his emphasis from the insatiability of the ego to its privatized autistic existence. We shall explore this critical shift from anomos to alogos in the following chapter. Let us now briefly explore the sociological flaws in Durkheim's early doctrine of man as homo duplex.

1. Animal Instinct Versus Human Conscience

At various points in Suicide and other works, Durkheim contended that man is not governed by the automatic, built-in, limitations of animals' instinctually-based needs. While the organic appetites of animals are constrained by internal physiological or ecological equilibrium, the socially and culturally generated desires of human beings are, because they move in the realm of the ideal, potentially unlimited. The relations of man to his environment are, for the most part, socially and culturally defined, and thus, without built-in
automatic, natural limits. Even though we are part animal, we are also part persons at the same time, and the major part of our personality, as opposed to the privatized desires of the organic ego, is composed of those impersonal and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture. Sociocultural desires thus enjoy a freedom unknown to nature, for to a great extent, man defines his own world.

In a particularly cogent series of passages in Socialism, representative of his oft-repeated statements, Durkheim observed that man was not limited in the same way as animals because instinct does not play such an overweening role in man's life. Rather, the "awakening of reflection," of conscience, means that human desires are generated on another level—the sociocultural historical level.

But it is not the same with man, precisely because instincts play a lesser role in him. Strictly speaking, the quantity of material nourishment absolutely necessary for the physical sustenance of human life could be considered definite and determinable, although its determination is less precise than in the preceding cases and there is more room for a free combination of desires. For beyond this indispensable minimum—which satisfies the need on the instinctive level—reflection, more alert, glimpses better conditions which appear as desirable ends and which invite activity. Yet it is clear that appetites of this kind sooner or later meet a boundary they cannot overstep. But how to fix the quantity of well-being, comfort, luxury, that a human being ought not to pass? Nothing is found either in the organic or psychological constitution of man which sets a limit to such needs. The functioning of an individual life requires only that he halt here rather than there, that he satisfy himself at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that such needs have continued to develop in the course of history, and have found increasingly complete satisfaction, and nevertheless, the average state of health has not diminished. But as there is nothing within an individual which constrains these appetites, they must surely be contained by some force exterior to him, or else they would become insatiable—that is, morbid. Either knowing no limits, they become a source of torment for man, irritating and plaguing him in a pursuit without possible end, or there must be outside the individual some power capable of stopping them, disciplining them, fixing a limit that nature does not (Soc:241).
Further, Durkheim observed that in man's world, because it is not physically limited, the goals we embrace are potentially limitless. One of the hidden problems here, of course, is that if society is the only possible constraining force, it is equally true that society and culture are also the very source of the potentially insatiable desires in the first place! For through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, as we discovered in Book One, man "ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom."

In short, society, through the moral regulation it institutes and applies, plays, as far as supraorganic life is concerned, the same role that instinct fills with respect to physical existence. It determines and it rules what is left undetermined. The system of instincts is the discipline of the organism, just as moral discipline is the instinctive system of social life.

(Soc: 244)

Our basic problem then becomes: what is the nature and source of these needs? If these are said to be biological in nature, they are relatively unproblematic; and in any case, we have already set this possibility aside. For organic needs are the very paradigm of satiability, of "marginal incrementalism." Alternatively, was it Durkheim's main view that because of man's higher level moral and intellectual existence, potentially insatiable organic needs are released from lower level instinctual controls? But this premise ("since in our hypothesis these needs are limitless"--Soc:242) simply presumes that organic needs are also potentially insatiable. But we have just seen that they are not; only in a morbid state can organic needs become limitless. Then did Durkheim's guiding premise become that it is not organic needs after all erupting from lower levels that is the problem, but rather that the root of our problem is an entirely new set of needs, not biological at all, but sociocultural in origin? Durkheim himself never made his position entirely consistent or clear. For example, he stated:

But in reality all needs exceeding simply physical necessities are unlimited, for there is nothing within the organism that imposes a boundary. Therefore, in order for them not to be without end—that is, so that
they are not forever unsatisfied—there must be forces outside of the individual, in society, which hold them in check, and, with authority acknowledged by all, indicate what is the proper standard *(Soc:275).

But, again, why are all needs exceeding physical necessities unlimited? I repeat: what is the source of this insatiability? Is it because organic needs, freed from strict instinctual and ecological control in man, erupt and disorient human egos? Or is it because there is an entirely new set of supraorganic (sociocultural) desires, which overlay and redirect human strivings? Only the second possibility is sociologically significant.

Only the second possibility makes real sense if we remember that Durkheim himself insisted on grounding his argument on the level of man's generic species essence—that is, man-as-man, in contrast to lower biological forms, is characterized by an "awakened reflection," the growth of conscience and consciousness, the striving for higher ideals than mere survival, in short, all that marks the intense new sociocultural life of this distinctive species. I wish to emphasize that by first theoretically grounding his argument on the level of society and culture as general evolutionary emergents, Durkheim indicates that these potentially insatiable desires are not to be reduced to lower level organic needs. Rather, the "awakening of conscience" signifies that such desires are not idiosyncratic but are culturally generated, that is, they are generally mandated aspirations. After all, man is the cultural animal.

In sum, how can we hope to reconcile the social and moral origins of the human individual with its supposed insatiability? How can Durkheim legitimately seek to maintain his stark dichotomy between the individual (as the amoral source) and the social (as the source of moral rules), when he himself argued that the very foundations of the human individual emerges in evolutionary terms only from sociocultural processes? Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways, and indeed, his opposition is much more consistent when he spoke
as if the amoral passions derived from the organic ego, that the pre-socialized child is little better than an animal.
In that case, however, as noted earlier, I see little virtue in identifying the human ego with the biological ego as such, and thus pursuing the limited idea that our modern troubles are really endemic to the human condition itself. Let us next cast the explanatory problem in better terms.

2. Which Way the Causal Arrow: From Biology to Culture or From Culture to Biology?

Durkheim's ascetic preoccupation with repressing the inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recognition of potentially more significant wider conceptual horizons. Given the logic of his theoretical grounding of man's evolutionary status as the first and only sociocultural historical animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and biology is hereafter subject to critical review by the crucial fact that, by definition, man's sociocultural achievement has changed the very structure of his organic inheritance. What we perhaps sometimes forget when we repeat the old formula that man's inheritance is double—both biological and cultural—is the critical fact that the sociocultural level of man's achievement feeds back down and alters even his psycho-biological makeup and processes.

In other words, the proper sociological procedure should be to reverse the causal arrow traditionally leading from biology to culture, for higher levels do influence lower levels. Thus, even in terms of his biological constitution, man is not simply an organism like any other, for even his organic form and internal processes have been socioculturally altered. Unlike the many plants and animals which man has bred, however, man has made himself. It used to be assumed, for example, that the autonomic nervous system functioned independently of the central nervous system, which is why it was so named. But we now know that mental concentration can alter and bring under the control of the subject his heart beat rate, blood
pressure, even brain rhythms, and so on. But the spiritual technologies first worked out by "other-worldly ascetics" such as the Hindu yogis might have better alerted us to the empirical fact that culture does influence biology. If man is, by definition, the sociocultural animal, then we ought to search for the ways in which our culturalness impinges upon our naturalness; in short, the varied ways in which culture redirects biological form and processes. Not only does culture and society restrict the immediate satiation of organic needs, but it also generates myriad other desires and activities that tend to crowd out simply organic acts from the center stage of human experience. In large part, these same organic needs, while their imperiousness is weakened (rather than being intensified by being released from previous instinctual controls), are redirected and rearticulated by specific social conditions and changing cultural aspirations. To maintain Durkheim's two level model of man, with insatiable and egoistic passions erupting from lower organic levels, and either controlled or released on higher sociocultural levels, is simply sociologically untenable. Rather, the true sociocultural position would be to reverse the causal flow and specify the social and symbolic mechanisms which feedback down and reorient lower psychological and biological processes. Mauss's work, for example, on techniques of the body (1973) is a largely ignored pioneering work in this direction, as is the well known study by Zborowski-- "Cultural Components in Responses to Pain" (1951). On a theoretical level, McCluhan (1962, 1964) has offered some important insights into the cultural and historical patterning of sensory ratios, and on the impacts of changing technological media on society and the image of man. And, of course, Weber, in his Sociology of Religion (1963, 1968), and his classic article "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Direction" (1946) provides invaluable leads along these lines. Further, much valuable information can be found in the ethnological reports of anthropologists on the social pat-
terning of organic activities, as well as from the phenomenological philosophers and social scientists.

In retrospect, we need not feign surprise that, even as a pioneer sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts be explained socially, Durkheim's other concurrent role as a positivist moral philosopher led him to surreptitiously contravene the very basic methodological rules that he himself laid down as the foundation of the Durkheimian school. For, by a sort of covert operation in the underground of his thought, Durkheim's positivism led him here (however much he may have rejected the religious identification) to link in his system the source of modern human suffering to the "original sin" of our biological inheritance embodied in the inordinate desires expressed in the sensual appetites (the "world" and the "flesh"). What is surprising is that so few have noticed how inconsistent, especially in terms of his own methodological strictures, Durkheim was in regularly assigning some of the most dynamic elements of human action to that very abstraction --the lone, isolated, organic ego--which he had so powerfully criticized in the contract theorists and Utilitarian individualists. Indeed, Durkheim's early dark doctrine got him into the serious bind, as it does to all social thinkers who unwittingly insist on basing society and culture on biological reductions, of proposing that the most significant and generative sources of human action are to be derived primarily from such lower, non-human, or non-sociocultural levels. Besides running directly counter to his own notion of society as an evolutionary emergent, and social facts as sui generis phenomena irreducible to lower levels of reality, Durkheim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as darkly destructive, egoistic, and insatiable, implicitly reduced society to the relatively passive role of constraining or redirecting the really critical biologically innate desires.

Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here--extending a key Cartesian logic embedded in his own cultural tradi-
tion, and rhetorically inverting the high valuation of the lone individual so insistently proclaimed by his constant polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of positivist moral science—barred complete and unconditional embrace of the fully sociological position. The only fully sociological position consistent with Durkheim's own stated methodology is that society and culture are to be considered as the crucially important generative and directive sources of the most significant aspects of human action. In sum, despite the evident cultural and polemical functions served by this doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknowledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of "root dichotomies," originally anchored in the same image, nonetheless, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher intruded too strongly here for us to follow him in his fundamental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as inherently insatiable.

3. A Brief Sociological Look at the Generation of Needs and Desires

Since man "ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see Book One) through the "hyper-spiritual" genetic medium of symbolic culture, we make ourselves, in part, by constructing social schedules of the satisfaction of wants. Every society is engaged in negotiating a variable ratio in terms of available resources and the legitimacy of stratified wants, between organically generated needs (e.g., food) and socioculturally generated desires (e.g., status honor or charisma). For example, economic psychologies should become more sociocultural by contrasting two aspects of the general category of wants—I mean needs and desires. In general, needs can be considered "givens," which are relatively constant, and thus comparatively fixed in their origins and potential limits, while desires are socioculturally generated and, therefore, more variable from one society to another. Further, the character of the motivation behind each of these
types of wants differs markedly—for wants in relation to survival needs may be viewed as stemming from "because of" motives, while sociocultural desires should be seen as "in order to motives" (see Alfred Schutz, 1962). Thus, with needs we act "because of" some antecedent condition depriving us or forcing us, while with desires we act intentionally "in order to" consummate some future wish. Figure 5 graphically depicts these possibilities:

The squiggly line drawn between needs and desires indicates that every society is constantly engaged in negotiating a variable ratio between the "given," relatively constant, and limited subsistence needs, and its own self-generated, special, and comparatively limitless cultural and social desires. It is this multivalency of human motivation that creates so much of the mystifying complexity of human action. In many societies, for example, much economic effort is directed not only toward subsistence needs but also toward the achievement of differential status and prestige. Even simple societies, supported by little more than subsistence economies, regularly find enough surplus to devote to religious and ritual sacrifice, and even agonistic display (eg. the Northwest Coast Indian "Potlatch"). Indeed, many have suggested over the years (eg. see Norman O. Brown, 1959, or Gerhard Lenski, 1974) that the authority of the sacred was necessary for the accumulation of economic surpluses. On the other hand, even in our affluent economy, dominated as we are by the almost unlimited and instantaneous gratification of desires, at least one quarter of our population lives precariously on the subsistence margin. For the rest, perennial problems such as food shortages, energy crises, inflation, and other unpleasantries of international market capitalism, rudely intrude, sometimes disastrously, upon the reveries of the American Dream. In sum, the central proposition here again is that all societies are continuously engaged in negotiating a variable ratio between organic needs.
and sociocultural desires. Our sociocultural problem then becomes explaining the differential ways in which different types of societies through history have negotiated these ratios, and the differential evolutionary outcomes.

4. **The Progress of Social Science Depends on the Substitution of SocioCultural Explanations for Biological and Psychological Reductions of Human Action**

As the first to teach a sociology course in France, as the founder of the first modern school of sociology, as the one who rightly insisted on the *sui generis* nature of social facts, as one of the pioneers who rightly rejected biological, psychological, and philosophical claims on human action so successfully as to help establish sociology as a fundamental discipline, should we not have expected Durkheim to have been among the first to recognize that sociology cannot progress by being untrue to its main task? This is especially true in regard to Durkheim's failure to bring full clarity to the uncertain relation between his doctrine of *homo duplex* and his schema of anomic and egoisic suicides in the modern world. Indeed, this irony is compounded if we recall that the concept of anomie in *Suicide* was hailed, along with the book itself, as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration of the autonomy of social facts. The irony is trebled if we remember that several decades later Merton used Durkheim's anomie (or at least his own minimally related version) to wage, once again, polemical battle against biological and psychological reductions of social behavior; especially against the Utilitarians, the instinct theorists and the behaviorists, and even the Freudians (see the appendix to this dissertation). The concept of anomie has been repeatedly employed in the cause of attaining disciplinary autonomy by sharply criticizing the non-sociological and "transparently defective" explanations of social action. The great hidden irony, of course, is that anomie itself has so often been based on either a biological or psychological reduction!
Indeed, was it not one of Parsons' essential theses in his great *The Structure of Social Action* that the advance of social science depends upon the progressive over-coming of "naturalistic" (i.e. physical, biological, psychological, geographical, etc.) reductions of human action? Instead of invoking easy answers that ignore more than they illumine, social science only truly grows through explanations drawn properly in terms of specific sociocultural elements. Strangely, Durkheim's concept of anomie has become thoroughly psychologized. Should we not, on the contrary, follow Durkheim's own advice to "explain the social socially," and thus attempt to account for anomie and egoisme in sociocultural terms, rather than smuggling in subterranean biological and psychological categories?

This need to explain the social socially is especially great in terms of economic theory. Consider, for example, the almost universal presumption that economic action depends upon material scarcity, and the corresponding inability to satisfy many basic needs. Although most economists include scarcity of resources of material goods in their basic definitions of economic processes, many unfortunately seem to miss some of the deeper relations between scarcity and affluence, between natural conditions and social "givens." It is not a law of nature that economically desirable goods must be scarce, for as we have discovered, the Scientific Techno-Cultural Revolution of the twentieth century (see Nelson, 1968; Daniel Bell, 1973, among others) has changed, to a great extent, this so-called "iron law." In an interesting article "Nature, Culture, and Scarcity," Manfred Stanley observes:

If one were to ask for an expression, in a single sentence, of the main accomplishment and direction of the social sciences to date, a fair answer would be the progressive substitution of sociocultural explanations for those stressing the determinative influence of physical nature. It is thus ironic that so much of the explicit discussion of scarcity should still rest on the physical notion of natural resource deficiencies (1968: 855).
Even where material affluence abounds, socially desired and culturally valued goods and symbols shall probably be scarce. That is, socioculturally generated and directed desires, as opposed to organically given needs, precisely because they are "ideal" and thus potentially unlimited, work in various ways to limit and make scarce these potent values and symbols. Inevitably, there are varying degrees of social participation in the collective "sacred fount of being." In short, it is in the very nature of social values and cultural symbols to be more or less scarce, to imply invidious distinctions, and thus to be differentially distributed.

Indeed, there are two basic ways any group may attempt to raise their schedule of rewards: specialization and monopolization. The former concerns moral legitimacy, the latter structural position and material leverage. The first has to do with "social stocks of knowledge," and control of social "territories," while the second concerns control over natural resources and physical territories. Indeed, specialization and monopolization can be considered as two phases of the same overall socioeconomic process—namely, the resolution of competition and conflict in terms of the creation of material, "human capital," or symbolic scarcity. Through specialization one attempts to make "human capital" (knowledge and skills) scarce, while through monopolization one attempts to make natural environmental or technological resources, especially key communications and transportation nets, scarce. And, of course, one of the prime "latent functions" of social hierarchy or stratification systems is to make symbolically validated deeds or even one's own "being" "sacred."

Therefore, the notion of perennial economic scarcity must shift—for it does not seem quite as necessary that material goods and services be as scarce as constitutive symbols and values. In other words, above the level of needs as generic biological givens, one major function of material goods and even some services is to satisfy higher-level desires, to symbolically validate one's "pipeline to charisma."
Of course, when certain material goods and privileges come to symbolize key values, then they too shall probably undergo forced or artificial scarcity. Herein lies an important key to an in-depth understanding not only of primitive and archaic economies, but also to the great progress of modern economic systems. Hopefully, this shift in perspective concerning the deeper origins of scarcity should help to remove us from the humanly constructed "iron cages" of the reduct-ionistic determinism plied by both the critical radicals (Marxists) and the Utilitarians. As Stanley suggests "... any shift away from nature to culture in mode of explanation involves a retreat from the assumption of "iron determinism" toward that of relative freedom of choice" (1968:855-6).

The economy may thus be viewed as a key nexus between the material and symbolic spheres of society. In sum, every economy is simultaneously engaged in the production and distribution of desired goods, services, privileges, and valued symbols. All economies thus have dual functions, for through the economy we witness the allocation of desired material and symbolic resources. In these ways, societies create scarcity of various sorts, and so intensify mandated desires that may feedback and even take on the imperative psychophysical status of organic needs. Therein lies a key to the second schema of suicide as sanctioned by extreme cultural values.
D. Durkheim's Shift From Anomos to Alogos

My discovery of Durkheim's shift from a schema of anomie and egoisme as caused by the absence of social constraint toward one based on the presence of cultural sanctions, is paralleled by the discovery of Durkheim's shift in emphasis in his doctrine of homo duplex away from the presence of insatiable desires in the pre-socialized ego to simply the absence of moral rules and rational concepts. In terms of the doctrine of homo duplex, then, the organic ego is more significant for Durkheim's suicide schemas not so much as the source of the crucial disorganizing insatiable drives, but rather as merely representing the absence of universalizable moral rules and abstract concepts. The latter premise is more acceptable to my mind, and, indeed, this is the direction in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop. Thus, there is an inverted correlation between these two parallel polarities of presence and absence of insatiable desires and cultural sanctions; for as Durkheim moved away from locating insatiable desires in the organic ego, the way was opened to locate them in cultural values themselves.

As we discovered in Book One, while Durkheim originally grounded insatiability in the pre-socialized ego, later he tended to argue that the suffering inherent in the human condition derives mostly from the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the desires of both halves of human nature. While egocentricity represented a constant negative factor in both Durkheim's early and later notions of the dualism of human nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or alogical factor differed basically in the two versions. In his early formulation, Durkheim anchored insatiability—as the absence of determinate form and natural limit (the sine qua non of morality)—in the dark and destructive desires of the organic or pre-socialized ego. Whereas the earlier notion implied the overcoming of the demonic drives of the isolated organic ego, Durkheim's later doctrine (see DHN) grew more pessimistic, tracing the source of the endemic
dis-ease of the human condition to the two warring halves of human nature. Further, in the early doctrine, the insatiable passions represent a chaotically expansive force, while in the latter version the purely idiosyncratic ego represented an inward turning, privatized existence, which can only be pulled from its localized orbit by the intensely powerful and impersonal energies of society and culture.

Now, in the first installment of this crucial doctrine, the anomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contradiction of all morality" (DL:431). It seemed that sociocultural nomos was actively opposed by anarchic, anti-nomian forces bubbling up from the organic ego. In the latter formulation, the relatively passive alogic of the pre-socialized individual is opposed not so much to sociocultural nomos as to the universal logos. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding metaphors early in his career were order and chaos, or more precisely, his root analogy was society is to the individual as order is to chaos. As so often happens, however, the very process of unfolding new applications of a guiding analogy leads, by the very nature of the ever-more diverse empirical properties encountered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or metaphorical "load." Toward the end of his career, especially in terms of The Elementary Forms and "The Dualism of Human Nature," Durkheim's guiding rhetorical polarity seemed to have shifted on its metaphorical axes from order versus chaos to universality versus particularity; or, in other words, from nomos versus anomos, to logos versus alogos. Thus, instead of the anomic ego, in the latter version we may speak of the alogic ego.

In the process of extending his root dichotomies (see Book One), Durkheim's model shifted slightly but significantly on its rhetorical axes. One of the first consequences relevant to our present interests is that insatiability was no longer the simple characteristic product of the inherently insatiable inordinate desires of the pre-socialized ego. Rather than acting as the source of destructive desires, the
organic ego came to be portrayed primarily as circumscribed by its own inherent limitations, which are insurmountable without the intense fusion with society and energization by symbolic culture. The antagonism between the two halves of human nature was, of course, still present and even heightened. Now, rather than the insatiability of the non-social half of human nature being the cause of man's endemic inner torment, however, it was instead the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the conflicting demands of both the physically privatized organic ego and the claims of society on the moralized and rationalized person. These deepening oppositions between the privatized physical sensations and sensual appetites of the autistic experience of the organic ego versus publicly communicable collective representations, expressed in terms of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts, moved to the center stage of Durkheim's thought. While his earlier concern with the insatiability of the pre-socialized ego faded in the background, it was portrayed instead as simply fatally circumscribed in its own private orbit.

To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites are necessarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting particularity meant that they cannot, by definition, thereby rise above their purely private sensational level to wider and higher validity. By contrast, since intellectual concepts and moral rules are collective both in their origin and nature, they tend to become universalized. Note that Durkheim specifically acknowledged that biological needs—thirst, hunger, etc.—can be satisfied; yet by virtue of their purely physical base, such need satisfactions remain egocentric and thus irrefrangibly privatized.

Thus, the outlines of Durkheim's later tragic vision of the human condition emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to the earlier emphasis on insatiability, but now directed instead to the inevitable discord between the two warring halves of our own nature. Rather than portraying the ego and the person, the physical and the moral, the private and the
public, the concrete and the universal halves of our beings as complementary, Durkheim saw these forces as waging an eternal struggle for ascendancy over our inner lives. As Durkheim deepened the tension in man's inner life by insisting that the this antinomy is irreconcilable, he came round again to the problem of insatiability, though in a different way.

For now man's predicament is that he is caught in almost a fatal "double bind." Now man's inner torment comes from his inability to simultaneously satisfy both the biological and cultural halves of our inheritance. The only path from the eros of the autistic ego to the universal logos is to transcend our isolated and limited physical existence through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, culture, and history. I must emphasize, once again, that the earlier key problem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was rooted in the later installment of Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex in the eternal contradiction and inner division between the two halves of our natures, rather than, as formerly, in simply one side--the organic.
CHAPTER TWO

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL

Preface. Besides critically reviewing Durkheim's early notion of anomic insatiability as stemming from the release of the appetites of the organic half of homo duplex, we shall next submit Durkheim's explanatory or causal model to critical scrutiny. When this double task is completed, I suggest that we shall conclude that the first schema of suicide, which implicitly rested on these early parallel notions of homo duplex and abstracted, general evolutionary mechanistic causality, should be set aside not only because these premises were logically flawed, but also because they were later abandoned or modified by Durkheim himself. In Book One, I constructed a new and viable portrait of Durkheim's evolving model, which was couched primarily in terms of the elementary forms. Whereas I concentrated there on elucidating his theory of generic symbolic process, now I wish to focus attention primarily upon his causal model in its more general aspects.

Now, no less a leading light than William Runciman (1969) contends that Durkheim's causal model, in contrast to that utilized by Weber in his sociology of religion for example, was "fundamentally misconceived." While I remain unconvinced that Runciman and others have perceived precisely what Durkheim's causal model actually implied (see Book One), nonetheless, both the general confusion and perennial criticism lead me to agree with Durkheim himself that such universality of opinion cannot be wholly mistaken.

In terms of the causal model underlying Durkheim's first schema of anomie and egoisme, what I find most flawed are the mechanistic and anti-phenomenological premises, and the lack of historical specificity. Indeed, as we shall discover, these
perspectives are related. While not rent by the serious errors so often attributed to him, nevertheless, Durkheim's early dominant notion of a rather one-way causality running from material substructure to symbolic superstructure, his positivistic slighting of phenomenological processes, his general evolutionary abstractness and neglect of specific types of historical breakthroughs and transformations, irretrievably flawed his first implicit causal explanation of anomic and egoismic suicides as he described them in the modern world.

Let us first briefly outline Durkheim's causal model in its more general and evolutionary aspects which are relevant to our reconstruction of his specific schemas of suicide. Let us also compare and contrast Durkheim's model with others in his own day—I mean those of Levy-Bruhl, Marx, and Simmel. Then we shall critically review an interrelated set of three theses which held Durkheim back in 1897 from breaking through to full and clear recognition of the revolutionary theoretical and historical significance of his second schema for the human sciences.

A. A Brief Review of Durkheim's Causal Model

1. Substructural Social Morphological Processes Linked With Superstructual Cultural Processes

   Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as Platonicizing or hypostatizing "social realist," one of the basic methodological rules of Durkheim's school was always to anchor analysis of social facts in a geographically determinable substratum.

   One of the rules we follow is that, in studying social phenomena .... we take care not to leave them up in the air, but always to relate them to a definite substratum—to a human group occupying a determinate portion of geographically representable space (1971:809). In Book One, we explored at considerable length how Durkheim undertook to link social morphological processes with collectively symbolic processes. We saw that Durkheim posited social
energies and moral implosions as key intervening variables between "material" substructures and "ideal" superstructures. We saw that Durkheim sequentially proposed that social morphological implosions moralize egos, that social life tends to become organized around the two different communal and economic or individualist phases. Then this regular alternation of sociocultural "currents" of energy generates fundamental tensions in the whole symbolic and phenomenological fields between the sacred and the profane which serve to further organize and energize life in terms of a mounting series of classificatory polarities. Then, Durkheim suggested, we discover that these sacred and profane polarities become extended to all spheres of life in a multi-levelled system of resonating symbolic equations. Finally, Durkheim suggested that regular transformations between these two opposed spheres occur in terms of rituals which serve to restore harmony to a divided and suffering microcosm.

Now, Durkheim's dialectical genius in over-coming long-standing dichotomies led him here to embrace both a "materialistic" factor (the social morphological base) and an "idealistic" factor (the focus on moral and symbolic processes). While he anchored his analyses of social facts in an empirically verifiable material social body, much of the ambiguity in Durkheim's causal model comes because his central concern was clearly always with the "second level" moral and symbolic processes. In this regard, Lukes observes:

Durkheim's view of religion as socially determined led him to seek to establish causal connections between (morphological) features of the social structure and the content of religious beliefs and ritual practices--an attempt seen most clearly in his account of the alleged social determination of the fundamental categories and forms of classification (1973:463-4).

Durkheim's later seminal works--such as Primitive Classification and The Elementary Forms--clearly reveal Durkheim's emerging causal model of the generic relations between social and cultural processes. We would do well to
remember, in addition, that these generic links were also primarily genetic and evolutionary ones. Thus, the specific relations between structural and cultural phenomena changed in the course of societal evolution. Aware that he had been called a "materialist", as well as the "idealist" which others like Parsons later would make of him, Durkheim himself responded in these terms:

... in order for collective representations to be intelligible, it is certainly necessary that they should originate from something, and since they cannot form a closed circle upon itself, the source from which they derive must be outside of them. Either the conscience collective floats in a void, a kind of indescribable absolute, or else it is connected to the rest of the world by a substratum upon which, consequently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of society, as they are combined socially (in Giddens, 1972a:159).

2. **Generic and Genetic-Evolutionary Relations Between Sub-Structure and Superstructure**

In addition to his fundamental causal sequence of generic sociocultural process, it is absolutely critical to recognize that Durkheim's social morphological/collectively representational model was simultaneously anchored in a world-historical perspective which was both genetic and evolutionary. Durkheim himself justified his genetic investigations (likening them to Descartes' "first circle" of certainty) because he thought they were the only empirical way to reveal the fundamental generic and evolutionary relations between society, culture, and personality. Only in terms of the most elementary forms could we discover the generic sociocultural factors fused with the genetic factors.

Every time that we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given moment in history—be it a religious belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an aesthetic style or an economic system—it is necessary to commence by going back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characteristics by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed, and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question (EF:15).
Cartesian in influence, we should see Durkheim's genetic method of investigation as the sociological equivalent of that most potent weapon of modern philosophy—systematic doubt as the sure road to certainty.

Further, we should not fail to recognize that by fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations, Durkheim sought to find a paradigmatic case-study in which there would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were, between symbolic forms and social forms, between the material substratum and the ideal superstructure. Where collective representations are deeply fused with the very structures of the group itself, Durkheim felt that he had found the "mono-cellular" form of sociocultural life, the template, as it were, which all subsequent forms merely elaborated. As always, biological analogies were very important to Durkheim (see Bellah, 1959; also Paul Hirst, 1973).

Finally, in the broad, macro-evolutionary passages from "mechanical" to "organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a whole series of fundamental sociocultural shifts, more or less corresponding to the underlying social morphological differentiations, in the content, form, and direction of development of collective symbolic forms. As early as 1893 in The Division of Labor, Durkheim postulated a progressive transformation of the fused, primitive, collective "sacro-magical" consciousness into ever-more differentiated, autonomous, abstract, universalistic, and rational collective symbolic forms.

I must insist that those who persist in reading Durkheim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional propositions, must ignore Durkheim's insistence that the intimate relations between society, culture, and the person are genetically and historically constructed. Giddens rightly points out in this regard:

... Durkheim takes some pains to emphasize that the theory set out in The Elementary Forms is not to be
regarded as merely another version of "mechanical materialism," in which ideas are treated as "reflections" of social reality and hence are mere epiphenomena. There is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is contingent upon the level of advancement of society* (1972a:26-7).

Seen another way, Durkheim's causal model was processual through and through; it rested upon a complex series of sequential equations. Durkheim was always primarily concerned with the relations between long-term changes, and their short-term consequences, between social morphological processes and symbolic and moral processes. This processual approach was couched on both the micro and macro levels. Now, Durkheim's concern with the emergence of collectively symbolic representations out of social morphological implosions on the micro social psychological level led him to postulate, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and continuing parallel between social morphological differentiation and the differentiation of symbolic forms. These parallel and spreading evolutionary differentiations out of the primitive sacral complex—which served as the womb of society and culture—implied a series of key processual transformations in symbolic culture. These included the progressive movement from concrete to abstract symbolism, from particularistic, parochial or "tribal brotherhoods" toward ever-widening structures of fraternization, toward the extension of the social bond and universalizable symbolic forms which became the basis of the civilizational bond, etc.

This movement also implies a shift from the fused embeddedness of symbols and persons in the primitive sacral complex to their progressive autonomization and differentiation in complex societies, and so forth. In short, just as Durkheim postulated a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less fluid to crystallized (institutionalized) representations, so too he postulated a vertical or evolutionary continuum of sociocultural progress ranging from the most elementary, micro-level, fused, primitive, "sacral-magical" collective
representations to the most differentiated, universalizable, autonomous, and rational symbolic forms on the world-historical level.

3. **Durkheim Versus Levy-Bruhl**

It is instructive to compare Durkheim's fusion of his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations in his causal model with another classic paradigm emerging from the same school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's characterization of the gap between primitive and modern mentality. Rather than contrasting and dichotomizing primitive (or tribal) and modern (or civilizational) thought and morality, as we might have expected him to do, and as his learned colleague Levy-Bruhl did, instead Durkheim emphasized their evolutionary continuity! As always, Durkheim sought to reconcile logical unity and historical diversity through the evolutionary notions of differentiation and universalization.

For example, in a little known passage in *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim argued of the relations between primitive and modern symbolic forms:

> It is far from true that this mentality has no connection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic... between the logic of religious thought and the logic of scientific thought there is no abyss. The two are made up of the same elements, though inequally and differently developed*(EF:270-1)*.

Almost alone among contemporary sociocultural thinkers, Robin Horton has begun to properly emphasize this crucial aspect of Durkheim's thought. Speaking of a most important review by Durkheim, in the 1912 *L'année sociologique*, of Levy-Bruhl's book *Les Fonctions mentales dans les societés inferieures*, and comparing it to the formers' own *Elementary Forms*, issued in the same year, Horton suggests:

> Durkheim notes that both Levy-Bruhl and himself are concerned to explore the sense of the distinction commonly made between "primitive" and "modern" thought. Both are in agreement about the social determinants of all thought; and about the essentially religious nature of "primitive" thought. Beyond this point, however, they part company. Thus Levy-Bruhl sees "primi-
tive" and "modern" thought as antithetical, and the movement from one to the other as the replacement of one pattern by its opposite. Durkheim, on the other hand, sees "primitive" and "modern" thought as two stages in a single, evolutionary process, the latter developing out of the former. At many points, where Levy-Bruhl finds contrast and discontinuity, Durkheim claims that a closer look would reveal a fundamental continuity (1973:267-8).

Horton further suggests the following generalizable terms for comparing Durkheim's model with Levy-Bruhl's -- the latter entertained a contrast/inversion schema, while the former postulated a continuity/evolution schema.

To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation between "primitive" and "modern" in terms of contrast, and the transition between them as a process of inversion, whilst Durkheim sees the relation in terms of continuity, and the transition as a process of evolution (1973:270).

Significantly, Horton echoes my criticism (and that of others) that Durkheim's causal model lacks historical specification: "It is surprising to find that Les Formes Elementaires includes no clear suggestion as to the broad determinants of the transition from the religious to the scientific consciousness" (1973:266).

Happily, we have just recently been provided with a translation of Durkheim's review of Levy-Bruhl's book by Anthony Giddens. Since this represents a most illuminating confrontation between two giants of French sociology, I shall now cite key sections in extenso.

There is no need to state that there are fundamental principles which we share in common with Levy-Bruhl. Like him, we believe that different types of mentality have succeeded each other in history. We also accept--and we have tried to establish this through factual analysis--that primitive mentality is essentially religious; that is to say, that the notions which dominate the movement of ideas are created in the very midst of religion. Moreover, since the main objective of the book is to show that the origins of religion are social, it follows that these notions and the corresponding logic have the same origin. This is what we strove to demonstrate in detail ....

However, our point of view is somewhat different from that taken by Levy-Bruhl. Since the latter is above all occupied with differentiating this mentality from
ours, he has gone so far as to sometimes present these
differences in the form of a real antithesis. Reli-
gious thought on the one hand, and scientific and mo-
dern thought, on the other, are contrasted as oppo-
sites. In one, the principle of identity and the sov-
ereignty of experience are seen as unquestioned; in
the other, there appears to hold sway an almost com-
plete indifference to the lessons of experience and
to contradictions.

We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of hu-
man mentality, however different they may be, far from
deriving from different sources, are created one by the
other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We
have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential
ideas of the human mind—ideas of time, space, type,
and form, force and causality, and personality—those
in short, to which philosophers have given the name
of "categories," and which dominate all logical acti-
vity, were elaborated within the very center of reli-
gion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There
is no gulf between these two stages in the intellect-
ual life of mankind.

At the same time as we established the religious ori-
gins of the categories, we showed that they were impreg-
nated with social elements, that they were, indeed,
created in the image of social phenomena. Physical
space was originally constructed on the model of social
space, that is to say, the territory occupied by the so-
 ciety, such as it is represented by society; time ex-
presses the rhythm of collective life; the idea of type
was at first only another aspect of the idea of the hu-
man group; the collective force and its power over minds
served as the prototype of the notion of force and cau-
sality, etc. It might appear, it is true, that, because
of these origins, these fundamental representations ne-
cessarily lack all objective validity, and can only con-
sist in artificial constructions which have no founda-
tion in reality. For society is generally seen as an a-
logical or illogical entity, which is in no way capable
of satisfying conceptual needs. Thus, it is not at first
apparent how ideas which are the product of society,
and which express it, could be qualified to play such
a preponderant role in the history of thought and sci-
ence.

But we endeavored to show that, contrary to how it may
appear, logical life has had its initial source in so-
ciety. The distinguishing feature of the concept, as
compared to a sensation or an image, is its impersonal-
ity: it is a representation which, to the degree to which
it preserves its identity, is common and communicable.
It can pass from one mind to another; it is by means of
concepts that intellects communicate. Now a representa-
tion can only be common to all the members of a single group if it was elaborated by them in common, if it is the work of the community. And if conceptual thought has a very special value for us, it is precisely because, being collective, it is replete with all the experience and science that has been accumulated by the community over the course of the centuries. The intellectual capacity of society is infinitely greater than that of the individual, for the sole reason that it is the result of the convergence and collaboration of a vast number of intellects, and even of generations.... It is society which has taught man there was another point of view than that of the individual, and which made him see things from the perspective of the whole.

Although, therefore, human mentality has changed and evolved over the centuries in relation to society, the different types which it has successively manifested have each given rise to the other. The higher and more recent forms are not opposed to the lower and more primitive forms but are created out of the latter. Indeed, certain of the contrasts which have been pointed out need to be toned down. We have shown, by the use of examples, that if the primitive mind tends towards confusion, it nonetheless recognizes defined antitheses, and often applies the principle of contradiction in an extremely definite way. Conversely, the law of participation is not specific to primitive mentality: today as in other ages, our ideas share common characteristics. This is the very condition of all logical activity. The difference is above all the way in which the participation takes place *(from L'Annee sociologique, 1912:33-7; translated by Giddens, 1972a: 247-9).

In sum, Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema emphasized an important evolutionary point, but fundamentally misconceived the generic relations between society and symbol. Further, Durkheim's continuity/evolution schema is basically correct, but its importance is limited because of lack of historical specification. Therefore, it is logical to turn to Weber's work in order to retain both Levy-Bruhl's contrast insights, and to further complement Durkheim's correct theoretical insights with descriptions of key evolutionary breakthroughs, such as Weber provided at every turn in his Sociology of Religion (1963). We shall return to discuss convergences between Durkheim and Weber later in this section.
B. **Autonomization of Collective Symbolism**

When individual minds are not isolated, but enter into close relation with, and act upon each other, from their synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life (SP:91).

Even in his early phase, one of Durkheim's most insistent methodological rules was that social relationships and cultural symbols are *sui generis* and autonomous products emerging from the fusion of egos into moralized persons. As we discovered in Book One in terms of Durkheim's penetration of the Australian materials, in generic sociocultural process symbols always tend to grow autonomous. Although it was not until *The Elementary Forms* that Durkheim took care to empirically specify these processes, let us now briefly explore the parallel logic pervading Durkheim's early methodological proclamations.

Now, although the fundamental rule of the Durkheimian school was to always ground analyses of collective representations in a material social body, instead of in some supposed notions of the human mind and nature, Durkheim's sociology meant that the links were to be drawn primarily, not from individual mind to symbol, but between symbols and society (see Evans-Pritchard, 1965). However, the relationships postulated between symbolic superstructures and material substructures were neither simple nor direct. It would be misleading, for instance, to claim that in Durkheim's sociology of knowledge cultural symbols are merely one-to-one projections of their generating substratum. For Durkheim's causal model is rather more complex. And before I proceed to extensively criticize fundamental limitations in Durkheim's explanatory model as it underlay his first schema of suicide, I believe we have a responsibility to articulate more clearly what Durkheim did and did not propose.

Durkheim's explanatory model, while always linking "social physiological processes" to "social morphological processes," nonetheless, tended increasingly to grant collect-
ive symbols at least partial autonomy, with feedback power. He further recognized their changing character in terms of social and cultural evolution. In any but the most elementary case, one cannot simply draw a connecting line from social morphological states to social physiological representations, for as Durkheim himself proposed:

... it is easy to foresee that the latter must be more numerous than the former, for the vital manifestations are by far more varied and complex than are the morphological conditions which are their fundamental conditions (1960:362-3).

Once the sociocultural process is underway, Durkheim's causal model suggests, a certain incommensurability between these two sets of facts ensues. For although collective representations are originally generated and sustained by specific types of social morphological conditions, nevertheless, collective symbolizings are not limited to their generating conditions. Rather, they autonomize—that is, they increasingly develop according to their own related but different laws. Perhaps Durkheim would have agreed with Weber that "... we are inserted into separate spheres of existence, each with their own laws" (1946:123). Inevitably, cultural symbolic forms proliferate far beyond the constraints of their original foundations. As always, Steven Lukes provides a concise summary of this aspect of Durkheim's doctrine:

... "once a primary basis of representations has been formed," they become "partially autonomous realities which live their own life," with the "power to attract and repel one another and form syntheses of all kinds" and engender new representations. Hence, for instance, the "luxuriant growth of myths and legends, theogonic, and cosmological systems, etc." and hence the "ways in which religious ideas ... combine and separate and are transformed into one another, giving rise to contradictory complexes." There should be, Durkheim argued, a special branch of sociology (he called it "social psychology") devoted to studying the "laws of collective ideation," investigating "by the comparison of mythical themes, popular legends and traditions, and languages the ways in which social representations attract and exclude one another, how they fuse together or become distinct, etc" (1973:8).
Let us now briefly compare Durkheim's causal model with that of Marx, and then explore in more detail the actual elements of Durkheim's doctrine of synthesis and the autonomization of collective representations.

1. Durkheim "versus" Marx

It can hardly have escaped attention that Durkheim's early explanatory model shares certain similarities with that of Marx—or at least what passes for Marx's model among his contemporary epigoni. One essential similarity is that both shared the general explanatory causal logic of a material substructure and an ideal or projected symbolic superstructure. But, as Durkheim himself pointed out, this same explanatory logic was widely prevalent in the nineteenth century, and cannot be exclusively claimed by either Marxian or Durkheimian doctrine. Can Durkheim's model then legitimately be termed "Marxist"? I believe not. Contrary to actual differences between these theorists, and to Durkheim's correct observation that this same logic was "in the air," however, some with radical inclinations still put forward claims for and against Durkheim's identification with Marxist causal logic.

For instance, largely under the influence of Parsons' mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as an abstracted theorist concerned with ahistorical problems of generic social order and control, John Horton (1964) attempted to polarize Durkheim's supposed conservatism to Marx's supposed radicalism. And over the years, the question of the relations between Marx and Durkheim have been raised repeatedly by Georges Kagan (1938) and Armand Cuvillier (1948), who compared and contrasted their doctrines. More recently, Anthony Giddens (1971a: 96-98, 196-205, 216-223) in an excellent work has compared and contrasted their views, as does Lukes more briefly (1973:231-2, 246, 314, 319, 343). Giddens rightly notes:

Durkheim dissociated himself from a theory of knowledge which specifies a unilateral relationship between ideas and their social base. This has to be
placed in the forefront when considering how far Durkheim's thesis does in fact differ from that established in Marx's writings (1971a:218).

Lukes adds:

The socialist historian of German thought, Charles Andler, objected to Durkheim's social realism (calling it "mysticism"), observing that it was just a sociological version of the mistaken economic choisme of Marx. [Footnote: Durkheim replied in 1896—where he rejected "absolutely the ideas which M. Andler attributes to me"] (1973:314).

Now, although we cannot ignore certain similarities between the causal logics of Durkheim and Marx, there are also so many points of difference between them that it would take powerful alchemies indeed to transmute Durkheim into a Marxist. For Durkheim's prime concern was not with forms of domination, but with morality, with structures of conscience and consciousness. I believe that Giddens was right when he said that for both Durkheim and Weber the fundamental sociological problem was the changing grounds of legitimate moral authority. Durkheim differed, of course, from Weber in that he wished to construct a new positive science of morality out of his systematic study of moral facts, an endeavor which Weber emphatically rejected in his famous "vocational addresses" (1946).

As primarily a moral philosopher who worked sociologically and "positively," Durkheim criticized repeatedly the "materialist" socialists for reenforcing the very moral evil that caused our modern travail in the first place. For Durkheim rightly perceived that the "critical radicals" shared certain fundamental ideological premises (eg. materialism, the labor theory of value, technological progress, Ricardoian economic theory, etc.) with their prime opponents, the "philosophical radicals" (see Halevy, 1955) from whom they emerged as a heretical offshoot. Durkheim's "laic" positivism led him both to seek to anchor moral life in an empirically verifiable material substratum and to train his powerful analytical focus on the symbolic and moral processes emerging from this material substratum. I prefer to consider
Durkheim, in terms of his allegiance to his own cultural tradition, as an "unrepentant rationalist," a French positivist who devoted his life-work to building a new "laic" or secular morality. As with all positivist moral reformers, he sought moral reconstruction based upon rationally organized evidence and "laic" rational (that is, non-metaphysical and thus non-hierocratic) principles and premises. Indeed, isn't it clear that if one of his prime historical cultural opponents was the Catholic Hierocratic-Metaphysical Cultural Tradition, that Durkheim could not base his critical analyses and programs for moral and social reconstruction on super-empirical revelation or purely personal inspiration? His model had to be simultaneously material and moral if it was to serve his special multiple purposes.

While Durkheim's differences with Marx involved the problem of "latency" or unintended functions of cultural phenomena, I cannot here devote sufficient space to deal with the complex ways in which Durkheim and Marx proposed to encode and decode various levels of symbolic equations. I merely wish to emphasize now that one key difference between them lay in the degree of autonomy granted to collective representations, and the lack of unilateral and direct relations between sub- and superstructure. As noted earlier, it may come as a surprise to some sociologists who, following Parsons, have consistently idealized Durkheim's Elementary Forms, that Durkheim felt constrained there to defend himself against the possible charge of "historical materialism"!

... it is necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of religion a simple restatement of historical materialism: that would be misunderstanding our thought to an extreme degree. In showing that religion is something essentially social, we do not mean to say that it confines itself to translating into another language the material forms of society and its immediate vital necessities. It is true that we take it was evident that social life depends upon its material foundation and bears its mark, just as the mental life of an individual depends upon his nervous system. In order that the former may appear, a synthesis sui generis of
particular consciousnesses is required. Now this synthesis has the effect of disengaging a whole world of sentiments, ideas and images, which once born, obey laws all their own. They attract each other, repel each other, unite, divide themselves, and multiply, though these combinations are not commanded and necessitated by the condition of the underlying reality. The life thus brought into being even enjoys so great an independence that it sometimes indulges in manifestations with no purpose or utility of any sort, for the mere pleasure of affirming itself *(EF:471).*

But perhaps the most direct and definitive statement of the differences which Durkheim himself drew between his own causal model and that of Marx is to be found in his review of Antonio Labriola's exposition of historical materialism--*Essais sur la conception materialiste de l'histoire*--which appeared in the *Revue Philosophique* in 1897. Fortunately, Anthony Giddens has again recently provided us with an excellent translation of key parts of this review, which I again cite in extenso, because of its theoretical significance and lack of previous recognition.

We believe it to be a fruitful idea that social life should be explained, not in terms of the conception which its participants hold of it, but by reference to underlying causes which escape consciousness; and we also think that these causes have to be sought principally in the way in which associated individuals are grouped.

It seems to us that it is indeed on this condition, and on this condition alone, that history can become a science and, in consequence, that sociology can exist. For in order for collective representations to be intelligible, it is certainly necessary that they should originate from something, and since they cannot form a closed circle upon itself, the source from which they derive must be outside them.

Either the conscience collective floats in a void, a kind of indescribable absolute, or else it is connected to the rest of the world by a substratum upon which, consequently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of society, as they are combined socially? The proposition seems to us to be obvious. But we see no reason to link this, as the author does, to the socialist movement; it is totally independent of it.

We ourselves arrived at it before knowing Marx, who has not influenced us in any way. The fact is that this con-
ception is the logical end-result of all the developments in history and psychology over these last fifty years. Historians have long perceived that social evolution has causes which the authors of the historical events in question were not aware of. It is under the influence of these ideas that the role of great men either tends to be denied or to be limited, and that, in developments in literature, law, etc. there is a search to express collective thought which no definite individual embodies completely.

At the same time, and above all, individual psychology has recently taught us that the consciousness of the individual is often no more than a reflection of the underlying state of the organism; that the cause of our ideas is determined by causes which are not known to the subject.

It was natural that, from there, this conception became extended to collective psychology. But it is impossible for us to see what part the unhappy conflict of classes which we witness today can have had in the elaboration or the development of this idea. No doubt this idea appeared at its given time and when the necessary conditions for its emergence were established. It was not always possible.... When Labriola asserts that it was called forth "by the full, conscious, and continuous development of modern technology" ... he states as evident a thesis for which there is no proof. Socialism has been able to make use of this idea for its own profit; but it has not created it and, most importantly, acceptance of it does not imply acceptance of socialism.

It is true that if this objective conception of history were necessarily bound to the doctrine of economic materialism, as our author asserts, one could accept that the former was established under the same influence and inspired by the same spirit, as the latter certainly has socialist origins.

But this assimilation is completely without foundation; and it is important to put an end to it. These two theories are completely independent, and their scientific value is singularly different. Just as much as it seems to us to be that the cause of social phenomena must be sought outside of individual ideas, so it seems to us to be false that they derive ultimately from the state of industrial technology; and that the economic factor is the source of progress.... Not only is the Marxist hypothesis unproven, but it is contrary to facts which seem to be established. Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement that religion is the most primitive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of collective activity--law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc.--
have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. In the beginning everything is religious. Now we know of no way of reducing religion to the economy, nor of any real attempt which has been made to effect this reduction. No one has yet shown under what economic influences naturalism developed out of totemism, by what series of changes in technology it became in one place the abstract monotheism of Jahwe, and in another Graeco-Latin polytheism, and we strongly doubt that anyone could ever succeed in such an enterprise. More generally, it is indisputable that at the outset, the economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life is by contrast, luxuriant, and all-pervading. Why could it not follow from this, and is it not probable that the economy depends much more upon religion than the former does on the latter?

There would be no need, moreover, to push the preceding ideas to such an extreme that they lose all validity. Psycho-physiology, after having drawn attention to the foundation of psychic life in the organic substratum, often made the mistake of denying any reality to the latter. This was the source of the theory which reduces consciousness to nothing more than an epiphenomenon. The fact was lost sight of, that if ideas depend originally upon organic states, once they are formed they are, by that token, realities sui generis; they are autonomous, capable of being causes in their turn, and of producing new phenomena.

Sociology must take care to avoid the same error. If the different forms of collective activity also have a substratum from which, in the last instance, they derive, they become in turn original sources of action, with their own specific effects, and they react upon the very causes which they stem from. We are thus far from holding that the economic factor is simply an epiphenomenon; once it exists, it has its own particular influence, and can partially modify the very substratum from which it results.

But this is not reason to confuse it in any way with this substratum, in order to make of it something especially fundamental. Everything leads us to believe, on the contrary, that it is secondary and derived. From which it follows that the economic changes which have taken place during the course of the century, the substitution of large-scale for small-scale industry in no way necessitates a disruption and radical reorganization of the social order; and indeed that the malaise from which European societies may be suffering does not originate in these changes (in Giddens, 1972a:159-162).

Let us now explore Durkheim's definitive statement of this position in 1898.
2. The Autonomization of Cultural Forms as Synthesis and Synergetic Emergence

It is not widely enough understood that Durkheim's drive for the autonomy of sociology as a separate science depended, in large part, on his parallel insistence upon the autonomy of collective representations as prime social facts. Only if socially generated symbols, concepts, moral rules, etc. are irreducible to individual psyches could sociology gain a separate and significant subject matter for itself. Indeed, Durkheim's campaign against biological and psychological reductionism depended on the proposition that social and cultural process is a synthesis, that this sociocultural synthesis is synergetic, and that the emergents are sui generis, irreducible, autonomous products. Durkheim's biographers regularly attribute this notion of levels and emergents to the influence of Durkheim's teacher, Emile Boutroux, although some add Renouvier's name to the list also. It is not our task here to trace the genealogy of this idea; it is sufficient here to note that a similar movement was going on in biology at about the same time. Philosophically inclined biologists such as C. Lloyd Morgan, Hans Driesch, Jan Smuts, Samuel Alexander, and so on, all elaborated the logic of biological levels, "holism," and "emergent evolution." In addition, the breakdown of the atomistic-mechanistic Newtonian world-view at about the same time, and its reconstruction in terms of the Romantically and Idealistically inspired organic and processual view of reality, reenforced the same general trend.

It is interesting to note that one of Durkheim's ardent defenders, Celestin Bougle, took pains to absolve Durkheim of the attacks of both materialist and idealist social philosophers in his introduction to Sociology and Philosophy. There is no doubt that in his earlier works Durkheim took pleasure in insisting upon the close relationship that appeared between the beliefs and the actual form of their social milieu. According as the size of the group, the density and mobility of the component individual minds varies and the
beliefs which the former sanctify become less effective and finish by giving place to the cult of individualism. Thus, "social morphology" helps us to understand this process of evolution. Once formed, collective representations combine, attract, and repel each other according to their own particular ... laws. Durkheim is very concerned to point out that men's religious ideas ... and scientific notions, are very far from being simple reflections of the social forms themselves. He was thus very far from wishing to impose upon sociology explanations of a materialistic tendency (1953:xxxvii-xxxviii).

In addition, Giddens claims to have discovered a certain relationship between Durkheim's notion of autonomization, synergetic synthesis, and emergent social products with Weber's more multivalent ideas concerning "cause and effect" (1970:182, #50). Giddens also provides a useful summary of Durkheim's doctrine here as we approach his first definitive statement in 1898.

We must not fall into the trap of treating ideas as mere epiphenomena, however much it is true that they are causally influenced by basic characteristics of social organization. Once ideas and beliefs are established, "they are, in virtue of this, realities sui generis, autonomous, capable of being causes in their turn and of producing new phenomena" (1970:182).

Now, as is well-known, the first definitive statement of Durkheim's doctrine of emergent, synergetic, autonomizing symbolic cultural forms was contained in his highly controversial article "Individual and Collective Representations," published in 1898. Durkheim took pains there to criticize in detail the illogic of associationist psychology, which derived from the atomistic and mechanistic premises of the Anglo Cultural Tradition. Especially absurd was the rather extreme notion that ideas were attached to cells, as if "Mom" was here, "the flag" over there, and "apple pie" there. Today, after much search, neurophysiologists recognize that, as with all other phenomena, mental life is a field of relationships through time; perhaps it is even governed by the so-called "law of mass action." Just as mind is not brain, Durkheim argued, so too culture and society, and the impersonal concepts and universalizable moral rules which emerge
are not products of isolated minds. Rather, these crucial human products are emergents, they are new *sui generis* sociocultural products resulting from the synergetic, inter-generational symbolic interaction of individuals. Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's analogy between the irreducibility of mental and cultural representations.

Durkheim observed:

Society has for its substratum the mass of associated individuals. The system which they form by uniting together, and which varies according to their geographical disposition, and the nature and the number of their channels of communication, is the base from which social life is raised. The representations which form the network of social life arise from the relations between the individuals thus combined or the secondary groups that are between the individuals and the total society. If there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that individual representations, produced by the action and reaction between neural elements, are not inherent in these elements, there is nothing surprising in the fact that collective representations, produced by the action and reaction between individual minds that form the society, do not derive directly from the latter and consequently surpass them. The conception of the relationship which unites the social substratum and social life is at every point analogous to that which undeniably exists between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of individuals (SP:24).

Now, when Durkheim argued that among the defining criteria by which distinctively social "facts" can be discovered is "externality," he referred to this special notion of social synthesis. At no time did "externality" mean that symbols were spatially and physically separate entities from individuals. Clearly, such a position would have necessitated the very Platonic, hypostatized *deus ex machina* so often laid (mistakenly) at his door. Rather, sociocultural process must be simultaneously "internal" as well as "external," for the social bond is based on collective, public symbols which are internalized in conscience and consciousness. "Externality" simply meant that the explanatory line was not to be drawn primarily from individual mind to public symbol, but rather in terms of the intervening social process; symbolization is inherently a collectively representational process, in both
senses of this term. This is what Alpert meant when he rightly argued that Durkheim was actually only a "moderate Durkheimian," a "relational social realist"; for social reality is not to be grasped in either the individual parts alone or in some hypostatized entity floating in sociological space. Rather, social life is only to be found in a complex, compounding series of interpersonal and intergenerational relationships.

If one can say that, to a certain extent, collective representations are exterior to individual minds, it means that they do not derive from them as such but from the association of minds, which is a very different thing. No doubt in the making of the whole each contributes his part, but private sentiments do not become social except by combination under the action of the sui generis forces developed in association. In such a combination, with the mutual alterations involved, they become something else. A chemical synthesis results which concentrates and unifies the synthesized elements and by that transforms them. Since this synthesis is the work of the whole, its sphere is the whole. The resultant surpasses the individual as the whole the part. It is in the whole as it is by the whole. In this sense, it is exterior to the individuals (SP:25).

Durkheim's instinct led him rightly, for cultural symbols are phenomenological relationships through time. Symbols are not things, but those who would deny their reality or significance, Durkheim argued, would do better to grant them an equivalent existential status as they grant so easily to physical objects. This was Durkheim's point when he insisted that "social facts" be treated as if they were choises (see Peter Berger & T. Luckmann, 1966). It should be noted that Kenneth Burke's "symbolic realism" also argues that man is best interpreted as a symbolic animal. In sum, Durkheim was quite right, in my judgement, when he argued that the social whole, especially in terms of symbols, is greater than the sum of its parts, that, social and cultural reality is to be found in relationships through time. Indeed, social science is simply not possible if these facts are not accredited!

The prime focus, then, of the nascent science of sociology was to be these "total social facts," as Mauss later call-
ed them. Although some might think that Durkheim argued too closely from lower level analogies, I believe that he correctly seized upon the essential principle of "relational realism" and "emergent evolutionism" which informs all these different levels. Today in physical theory, for instance, an atom—the very image of irreducible reality to nineteenth century materialists—is viewed not as a thing, a hard, irreducible rock, but rather is seen as an event in a time-space continuum (see Capek, 1961). Durkheim himself felt constrained to reject the specious objections of those who accused him of hyostatizing la Societe.

Those, then, who accuse us of leaving social life in the air because we refuse to reduce it to the individual mind have not, perhaps, recognized all the consequences of their objection. If it were justified it would apply just as well to the relations between brain and mind, for in order to be logical they must reduce the mind to the cell and deny mental life all specificity (SP:28).

Durkheim then argued that such "relational social realism" necessarily implied that the synergetic cultural emergents are sui generis autonomous processes, generated not by isolated "social atoms" bouncing off one another as in the atomistic and mechanistic world-view, but by the long-term interactions of the whole sociocultural field. Collective representations, once created, tend to take on a life of their own. Indeed, Durkheim even suggested, at the end of the following passage, a kind of Mertonian multi-functionality.

... as the association is formed, it gives birth to phenomena which do not derive directly from the nature of the associated elements, and the more elements involved and the more powerful their synthesis, then the more marked is this partial independence. No doubt it is this that accounts for the flexibility, freedom, and contingency the superior forms of reality show in comparison with the lower forms in which they are rooted.... When a way of doing or being depends upon a whole without depending immediately upon the parts which compose that whole, it enjoys, as a result of this diffusion, a ubiquity which to a certain extent frees it. As it is not fixed to a particular point in space, it is not bound by too narrowly limited conditions of existence. If some cause induces
a variation, that variation will encounter less resistance and will come into existence more easily because it has, in a way, a greater scope for movement. If certain of the parts reject it, certain others will form the basis necessary for the new arrangement without, for all that, being obliged to rearrange themselves. That at least is how one can conceive how it is that one organ is able to perform different functions, different parts of the brain can substitute for each other, and one social institution can successively further the most varied ends (SP:30).

In The Division of Labor (page 333), Durkheim also remarked upon the flexibility of organic process, and the autonomization of function from structure.

In one of the most succinct summaries of his thesis that relations between social substructure and symbolic superstructure become progressively more autonomous, Durkheim insistently argued:

... while it is through the collective substratum that collective life is connected to the rest of the world, it is not absorbed in it. It is at the same time dependent on and distinct from it.... As it is born of the collective substratum the forms which it manifests at the time of its origin, and which are consequently fundamental, naturally bear the marks of their origin. For this reason the basic matter of social consciousness is in close relation with the number of social elements and the way in which they are grouped and distributed—that is to say, with the nature of the substratum. But once a basic number of representations has been created, they become ... partially autonomous realities with their own way of life. They have the power to attract and repel each other and to form amongst themselves various syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities, and not by the conditions of their matrix * (SP:30-31).

As with his criticism of the Marxist model, it is most significant for our present purposes that Durkheim took his stand on the autonomous nature of religious symbols.

As a consequence, the new representations born of these syntheses have the same nature; they are immediately caused by other collective representations and not by this or that characteristic of the social structure. The evolution of religion provides us with the most striking examples of this phenomenon. It is perhaps impossible to understand how the Greek or Roman pantheon came into existence unless we go into the constitution of the city, the way in which the primitive
clans slowly emerged, the organization of the patriarchal family, etc. Nevertheless, the luxuriant growth of myths and legends, theogonic and cosmological systems, etc. which grew out of religious thought, is not directly related to the particular features of the social morphology—thus, it is that the social nature of religion has so often been misunderstood. It has often been believed that it is formed to a great extent by extr sosial forces because the immediate link between the greater part of religious beliefs and the organization of society has not been perceived *(SP:31).

Now, as we discovered in Book Two, in Suicide in 1897 Durkheim was still unclear on these problems; thus his wavering between a structural and a cultural explanation of suicide. In contrast to his earlier assertion that suicide varies inversely with the degree of structural integration of individuals into groups, later in the book Durkheim often seemed to be saying that the source lay not simply in lack of integration but in the belief system of society. In short, cultural values predisposed some to suicide. For Durkheim then observed:

The social environment is fundamentally one of common ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them to impart themselves thus to individuals, they must somehow exist independently of individuals; and this approaches the solution we suggested. For thus its implicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective inclination to suicide from which individual inclinations are derived, and our whole problem is to know of what it consists and how it acts (S:302).

In 1902, in his preface to the second edition of The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim again sounded the keynote to his program for sociology. It is interesting to note that even though he was most concerned there with establishing the logical canons governing the new science of sociology, and thus justifying its existence as an autonomous field, he did not couch his argument in the first edition of 1895 in terms of synergetic emergence. Clearly, however, this perspective, which emerged only after 1897, provided a powerful reinforcement for his anti-reductionistic polemic. Indeed, I shall soon criticize Durkheim's first schema of suicide, in 1897, as not fully incorporating his growing recog-
nition of the autonomizing nature of sociocultural processes. Even in 1902, Durkheim was still taken by the analogy with life emerging from certain chemical syntheses; the profound "just-so story" (as Evans-Pritchard, 1965, calls it) in The Elementary Forms was still a long way away.

... the common sense view still holds that sociology is a superstructure built upon the substratum of the individual consciousnesses and that otherwise it would be suspended in a social vacuum.... What is so readily judged inadmissible in the matter of social facts is freely admitted in the other realms of nature. Whenever certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these phenomena reside not in the original elements but in the totality formed by their union.
The living cell contains nothing but mineral particles, as society contains nothing but individuals. Yet it is patently impossible for the phenomena characteristic of life to reside in the atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen. How could the properties of life exist in inanimate elements? How would the biological properties be divided among these elements? These properties could not exist equally in all the elements because the latter are dissimilar by nature.... It is equally inadmissible that each of the principal characteristics of life be resident in a certain group of atoms. Life could not be thus separated into discrete parts; it is a unit, and consequently its substratum can be only the living substance in its totality and not the element parts of which it is composed. The inanimate particles of the cell do not assimilate food, reproduce, and in a word, live; only the cell itself as a unit can achieve these functions (R:xlvii--xlviii).

Surely Durkheim was right to insist that life is irreducible to the component elements which go to make it up, for life can only really be understood as a series of relationships through time, not a self-contained atom floating in absolute Newtonian space. I wish that contemporary biologists, for instance, would more consistently apply these established relational and processual principles, and stop repeating the old formula that the cell is the basic unit of life. This can be true only in the case of unicellular organisms. Clearly, the cell is not the basic unit of life in terms of more complex organisms having a multi-cellular division of labor; it is most certainly not true of man. On the contrary,
the organism is itself the only irreducible unit of life, and the organism is perhaps best understood, as the structuralists suggest, as a pattern that endures, "a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations" (Piaget, 1971:44). Further, if we wished to more fully apply relational and processual principles, we would say that a set of organisms in relation to a set of environments is the minimum unit of life. For how else could these exist, reproduce, perdure, and evolve without being situated in a complex series of relationships through time and space? Indeed, defining life, like defining society, would require ecological and evolutionary perspectives. In short, life, whether organic or sociocultural, is always relational and processual—a complex series of emergent relationships through time and space.

Durkheim applied these basic rules of synergetic emergence to society. He rightly insisted that even though the levels of complexity are different in the great breakthrough from bio-chemical to sociocultural phenomena, nonetheless, the same principle of emergence applies.

Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as we may say, this synthesis constituting every society yields new phenomena, differing from those which take place in individual consciousness, we must indeed, admit that these facts reside exclusively in the very society itself which produces them, and not in its parts, i.e. its members.... These new phenomena cannot be reduced to their elements without contradiction in terms, since, by definition, they presuppose something different from the properties of these elements. Thus we have a new justification for the separation which we have established between psychology, which is properly the science of the mind of the individual and sociology. Social facts do not differ from psychological facts in quality only: they have a different substratum; they evolve in a different milieu; and they depend on different conditions. This does not mean that they are not also mental after a fashion, since they all consist of ways of thinking or behaving. But the states of the collective consciousness are different in nature from the states of the individual consciousness; they are "representations" of another type. The mentality of groups is not the same as that of individuals; it has its own laws. The two sciences are thus as clearly distinct as two sciences can be (R:xlvi-xlix).
Durkheim then defined collective representations as "... the ways in which the group conceives of itself in relation to objects which affect it."

That the substance of social life cannot be explained by purely psychological factors, i.e. by the states of the individual consciousness, seems to us to be most evident. Indeed, what the collective representations convey is the way in which the group conceives itself in relation to objects which affect it. The group differs from the individual in its constitution, and the things which affect it are therefore of a different nature. Representations or concepts that reflect neither the same objects nor the same subjects cannot be traced to the same causes. To understand the way in which a society thinks of itself and of its environment one must consider the nature of the society and not that of individuals. Even the symbols which express these conceptions change according to the type of society.

If, for example, it claims descent from a totemic animal, it is conceived as one of those special groups called "clans." If the animal is replaced by a human, but equally mythical, ancestor, this concept of the clan must also be modified. If, over and above local or family deities, it postulates others on which it believes itself to be dependent, it follows that the local and family groups of which it is composed have tended to concentrate and unite, and the degree of unity which the deities present corresponds to the degree of unity attained at the same moment by the society. If the clan condemns certain modes of conduct, it is because they violate certain of its fundamental sentiments which are derived from its constitution, as those of the individual derive from his physical temperament and his mental organization. Thus, even if individual psychology has no more secrets for us, it could not give us the solution for any of these problems, since they relate to orders of facts concerning which it can have nothing to offer (R:xlix-l).

Now, clearly for our present purposes Durkheim's focal emphasis was shifting from external indices and social morphology to the problematics of social physiology in terms of the autonomizing of collective representations. For Durkheim's 1902 preface to the second edition of The Rules was immediately followed in 1903 with Durkheim's first systematic exploration of a specific category of collective representations—namely, his seminal Année monograph, written with Mauss, "De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribution à l'étude des représentations collectives."
Classification, translated under Evans-Pritchard's inspiration by Rodney Needham, presages the classic Elementary Forms, which, as Alpert reminds us, was:

... originally entitled the "The Elementary Forms of Thought and Religious Life".... The introduction to Les Formes Elementaires which ... first appeared in 1909, was the Declaration of Principles of the sociological theory of knowledge, and, along with other sections of the volume, outlined specific analyses of such concepts as space, time, genus, force, totality, personality, and causality. And shortly before the publication of the volume itself, Durkheim offered a sociological explanation of the origin of values and ideals in a paper read before the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy at Bologna (1939:55,56-7).

In Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss began to speak of the feedback power of collective representations in these terms:

... in many cases where these classifications are not immediately apparent they are nevertheless found, but in a different form from that which we have described. Changes have taken place in the social structure which have altered the economy of these systems, but not the point of making it completely unrecognizable. Moreover, these changes are due in part to the classifications themselves, and might thus even reveal them.

What characterizes the latter is that the ideas are organized on a model which is furnished by the society. But once this organization of the collective mind exists, it is capable of reacting against its cause and of contributing to its change. We have seen how species of things, classed in a clan, serve it as secondary or sub-totems; i.e. within a clan or particular group of individuals, under the influence of causes which are unknown to us, comes to feel more specially related to certain things which are attributed, in a general way, to the whole clan. The latter, when it becomes too large, then tends to segment, and this segmentation takes place along the lines laid down by the classification. We must beware of thinking, in fact, that these secessions are necessarily the products of revolutionary or tumultuous movements. More often ... it seems that, in a large number of cases, the moieties were formed and then split into clans (PC:31-2).

Now, in a sense, the whole of The Elementary Forms was devoted to analyzing the processes by which collective representations not only emerge from society, but most importantly, come to constitute society in the first place.
In his last great book, Durkheim enunciated the famous proposition concerning the autonomization of symbols which led Parsons to portray him as an idealist in his later phase.

There is one division of nature where the formula of idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is the social kingdom. Here, more than anywhere else, the idea is the reality. Even in this case, of course, idealism is not without modification. We can never escape the duality of our nature and free ourselves completely from physical necessities: in order to express our own ideas to ourselves, it is necessary that we fix them upon material things which symbolize them. But here the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object serving as support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal superstructure, beneath which it disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the superstructure (EF:260).

On the same page, in a footnote Durkheim took care to distance his causal model, once again, from the reductionist materialist models of political geography and political economy.

... Thus we see how erroneous those theories are which, like the geographical materialism of Ratzel seek to derive all social life from its material foundation (either economic or territorial). They commit an error precisely similar to the one committed by Maudsley in individual psychology. Just as this latter reduced all the psychical life of the individual to a mere epiphenomenon of his physiological basis, they seek to reduce the whole psychical life of the group to its physical basis. But they forget that ideas are realities and forces, and that collective representations are forces even more powerful and active than individual representations (EF:260).

In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim summed up his notion of the autonomization of collective symbolic forms in terms of the great ascent "from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see also Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Symbolic culture, which moralizes and directs egos, is the genetic medium and energizing source for this great ascent of man out of the biological cage.

There really is a part of ourselves which is not placed in immediate dependence upon the organic factor: this is all that which represents society in us. The general ideas which religion or science fix in our minds, the mental operations which these ideas suppose, the beliefs and sentiments which are at the basis of our moral life, and all these superior forms
of psychical activity which society awakens in us, these do not follow in the trail of our bodily states, as our sensations and our general bodily consciousness do.... This is because the world of representations in which social life passes is superimposed upon its material substratum, far from arising from it; the determinism which reigns there is much more supple than the one whose roots are in the constitution of our tissues and it leaves with the actor a justified impression of the greatest liberty. The medium in which we thus move is less opaque and less resistant: we feel ourselves to be, and we are, more at our ease there. In a word, the only way we have of freeing ourselves from physical forces is to oppose them with collective forces (EF:307).

Changing structures of conscience and consciousness are, of course, the self-made instruments of man's sociocultural liberation from the organic cage. The ascent of man is self-propelled. Therefore, one key to understanding cultural transformations are crucial shifts in the anchors of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Would, then, Weber or Durkheim have blinked at the suggestion that our modern self-imprisonment in an "iron cage" and the resulting forms of suicide are intimately related to modern culturally sanctioned forms of conscience and consciousness? We shall explore this possibility in the second half of this book.
CHAPTER THREE

TRANSITIONS: DURKHEIM'S GROWING CULTURAL REALISM

Preface. The key transitions in Durkheim's work supporting the second rather than the first schema of suicide can all be summed up in terms of a progressive shift toward the autonomization of cultural symbolic forms. This transition was first anatomized by Parsons (1937) as a shift away from positivism toward idealism; and even though he was largely mistaken about the content and dating of Durkheim's stages, there is now emerging general agreement that Durkheim's thought increasingly focussed on superstructural symbolic processes, and the autonomization of collective representations (e.g. Giddens, 1971a, 1972a; Lukes, 1973:10, 233-6; Wallwork, 1972:48,113; Parsons, 1975a:106; Whitney Pope, 1973: 410, 1975a:112,114). This same shift has been described as Durkheim's deepening "social realism" by Jack Douglas (eg. 1967:45). Indeed, almost any serious observer who reads Durkheim deeply and systematically can hardly fail to be struck by the widening and deepening exploration of collective representations in the latter phases of Durkheim's career. Acknowledgement of the growing autonomy and significance of the "ideal" factors—that is, symbolically real—represents the mainline of Durkheim's later development. I term this fundamental shift in focus Durkheim's growing "cultural realism."

Some key elements in Durkheim's work constituting this massive and sustained shift which are relevant to our present reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide include:

(1) His notion in Suicide that anomie and egoisme are generated, or at least carried by "social currents" or "pools of meaning," as J. Douglas (1967) suggests. These modern forms of "moral anarchy" are seen as culturally sanctioned just as much as altruisme and
fatalisme are sanctioned in primitive "mechanical solidarity."

(2) His notion that a "marginal leaven of anomie," as La-Capra (1972) terms it, is a necessary creative factor in sociocultural progress.

Combining points one and two, then, we may surmise that modern anomie and egoisme might be culturally sanctioned by modern progressive ideals and concepts.

(3) His growing emphasis on the importance of religion as the prime cultural form and evolutionary matrix, which we have traced from his early interests to the self-acknowledged "breakthrough" of 1895, to the seminal section in Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, to the Annee preface and monograph of 1899, and so on.

(4) Durkheim's repeated acknowledgement of the cultural and institutional creativity of Christianity, especially in terms of its Protestant and rationalist varieties, as a prime source of modern values, especially individualism.

Indeed, with our critical analysis of Durkheim's first schema and causal model, and our recognition of his seminal thesis of the emergence of the person through history, coupled with the compounding shifts outlined above, the question of the historical relations between Christianity, and especially Protestant forms of individualism, and modern egoisme and anomie as culturally sanctioned becomes critical.

(5) Durkheim's fine, but little known, history of education in France, which, as Lukes (1973) notes, emphasized cultural influences, especially "collective aspirations, values, beliefs, and ideals."

(6) Durkheim's seminal Annee "Note," written with Mauss, on the significance of civilizations as the macro-level of sociocultural processes.

One might be tempted to cite occasional comments, and other details, or even the mainline of the subsequent, post-Durkheimian development of the Annee school. But for our present purposes, these shifts in emphasis and content should suffice to demonstrate that Durkheim was indeed progressively moving toward a broad and sustained new program in granting collective symbolic forms and meanings independent causal significance. And I believe, as Parsons did in another way, that the implicit schemas in Suicide played an important role in
in this inner transformation of his thought. Let us now explore some of these progressive shifts.

A. "Social Currents" as Energetic Carriers of Modern Anomie and Egoisme

In Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, Durkheim began to speak of "suicidal currents" as causing suicides. These "social currents," akin to thermodynamic processes on the physical level (as Halbwachs suggested, see Douglas, 1967:21), raise or lower the "moral temperature" of society. It is striking that this new metaphor, which later came to prominence in The Elementary Forms where Durkheim spoke of the sacred as a sort of "charismatic electricity" which flows in and out of things, emerged here when Durkheim insisted: "Collective tendencies have an existence of their own; they are forces as real as cosmic forces" (S:309). One recent observer, missing the significance of these metaphorical shifts away from the more mechanistic images of The Division of Labor toward thermodynamic images, went so far as to lamely satirize Durkheim's notion of "suicidogenetic currents" in these unfortunate terms: "Individuals were felled by "suicidogenic" social forces acting like some fantastic death ray" (LaCapra, 1972:149).

Now, it is significant for our present purposes that Jack Douglas (1967), in searching Durkheim's classic for a sense of "shared meanings" as phenomenological causes of suicide, cited these "suicidogenetic currents" as examples of "pools of meaning" crucial to Durkheim's growing "social realism." However one wishes to express this important fact, it is generally established that the shift occurred. Since I shall anchor the second schema, in part, on this notion of "social currents" as energetic carriers of modern anomie and egoisme, and because space is limited and others have provided useful reviews, hereafter I shall simply hold it as established that this metaphorical shift occurred and is most significant for our reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide.
B. A "Marginal Leaven of Anomie," Charismatic and Creative Deviants, and SocioCultural Progress

To dare to shake off the yoke of traditional discipline, one should not feel authority too strongly (ME:53).

LaCapra (1972:158, 240, 295, etc.) repeatedly employs the useful phrase "a marginal leaven of anomie" to describe Durkheim's important qualification of his seemingly authoritarian sociologicistic doctrine. Some might be as surprised by Durkheim's statement that "one should not feel authority too strongly" as by his qualification of his abstracted doctrine of *homo duplex*: "The entire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable from a certain amount of anomie" (S:364). Although one might suppose that Durkheim's root dichotomy--normality/pathology--would lead us to treat the first as good and general, and the latter as bad and exceptional, this relation was neither exclusive nor wholly abstract. Rather, Durkheim's opposition had an evolutionary dimension as well, and this evolutionism sometimes necessarily implied the inversion of the normal notion of *homo duplex*. LaCapra had some insight into this seemingly paradoxical situation when he suggested that this dichotomy and the evolutionary tree of social life served as Durkheim's key guiding metaphors. Progress, says LaCapra, "... required a certain measure of change which corresponded to the destructive and creative margin of anomie" (1972:295). Indeed, a certain balance of anomie and egoisme is indispensable not only for normal stability (e.g., see J. Douglas, 1967), but also for progressive moral evolution.

Given the contrast between Durkheim's general evolutionism and his seemingly abstract opposition between the normal and the pathological, this aspect of Durkheim's thesis might seem paradoxical to some. But his notion of the necessity of a creative "marginal leaven of anomie" served Durkheim as a crucial *deus ex machina* helping him escape the horns of this dilemma. For while anomie and egoisme clearly remain pathological, nevertheless, they are still seen as necessary, in
small doses, for general evolutionary progress. Perhaps the appearance of such a deus ex machina was inevitable, given the weakness of Durkheim's canons (see The Rules) for distinguishing between the normal and the pathological. Indeed, little has come of this curious dichotomy, even though it was central to much of Durkheim's work. However, LaCapra, Douglas, and others rightly observe that Durkheim's notion of a normal society implies a certain amount of anomie. Indeed, we might have expected this proposition, for in this dichotomy, as with sacred/profane and all the others, the terms are relational--I mean one term has meaning only in relation to the other pole.

The normal society would also contain a dynamic leaven of anomie.... But anomie would be limited to a marginal aspect of personality and to marginal groups in society. Either extreme of the bell-shaped curve of moral practice would reveal marginal categories of culture-bearing idealists (or perfectionist deviants) at one end, and of criminal deviants at the other. In the normal society, deviants presenting ideological challenges to the existing order might attain ritual status, and, invested with ambivalent sacred values, become the object of dangerous fascination (LaCapra, 1972:242).

Let us next explore some of Durkheim's theses in this regard.

In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim noted that the intensity of collective life must be in balance with the "state of the social organism, if health is not to be compromised" (DL:340). But this state of wholeness or health is not static, for as Durkheim himself once said, "structure itself is always encountered in becoming." Durkheim, therefore, acknowledged:

... if the ideal is always definite, it is never definitive. Since progress is a consequence of changes in the social milieu, there is no reason for supposing that it must never end. For it to have a limit, it would be necessary for the milieu to become stationary at some given moment (DL:341).

Since collective ideals and men change because of varying milieu (DL:344), there are some whose present deviance might become basic to the future shape of society, indeed, to progressive moral evolution and the education of mankind.
... among peoples where progress is and should be rapid, rules restraining individuals must be sufficiently pliable and malleable; if they preserved all the rigidity they possess in primitive societies, evolution thus impeded could not take place promptly enough (S:364).

Indeed, Durkheim saw an enlarging role for a "creative leaven of anomie" to play in sociocultural evolution as we move more rapidly away from the repressive stereotyping of thought and behavior in primitive "mechanical solidarity" where the prescriptive etiquettes demanded rigid adherence to the taboos and sanctions of what Nelson (1973a) calls the "sacro-magical collective conscience." Here, LaCapra suggests:

A measure of anomie corresponds to an element of "free play" in society and personality: anomic indeterminacy and daring risk were conditions of progress and prerequisites of an ability to respond creatively to changes in relevant conditions of existence (1972:158).

While Durkheim himself observed:

We are not obliged to bow to the force of moral opinion. We are even in certain cases justified in rebelling against it. It may, in fact, happen that ... we shall feel it our duty to combat moral ideas that we know to be out of date and nothing more than survivals the best way of doing this will be to oppose these ideas not only theoretically, but also in action (in Giddens, 1972a:122).

It is helpful, as LaCapra suggests (1972:242), to distinguish between different forms of crime and deviance. What Durkheim had in mind, LaCapra suggests, was something akin to a bell-shaped curve of moral practice, with "marginal categories of culture-bearing idealists at one end, and criminal deviants at the other." The former possibility will constitute another important anchor of the second schema of suicide. Nisbet (1974) has also fruitfully explored the "vital relations" which Durkheim posited between certain forms of deviance and progress. Morally creative deviance, Durkheim contended, play an important "latent" role not only in static functioning, but also in energizing and directing moral evolution. Instead of an all-powerful conscience collective, there must be an on-going renegotiation of the self-society equilibrium as society differentiates and the complex relations of
the division of labor continue to ramify. Nisbet (1974:219) draws attention to some key passages in this regard in *The Rules*. Durkheim's "philosophy of human finitude" led him to insist that even the moral authority of society must itself be restricted and held in a kind of dynamic balance.

Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent. The authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive, otherwise none would dare criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form (R:71).

Indeed, as LaCapra notes, Durkheim here assigned a fundamental, but little noticed, role to exceptional individuals in advancing the cause of moral progress; for the challenges of charismatic leaders to the inherited structures of conscience and consciousness cannot be explained merely in terms of abstract "moral mechanics."

Durkheim seemed to attribute a greater causal importance to the exceptional individual in the normal state of society, for in this context his hybris would correspond to the element of possibly creative anomie in experience (1972:240).

Durkheim himself remarked:

To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall also be possible. One does not occur without the other (R:71).

This general perspective led to Durkheim's famous thesis that "crime" is necessary.

... it happens that crime itself plays a useful role in this evolution. Crime implies not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently to take on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine the form they will take. How many times, indeed, is it only an anticipation of future morality—a step toward what will be (R:71)!

Like so many others, Durkheim took Socrates as the ideal typical illustration of the morally creative deviant—namely, as one who is ideologically, rather than egotistically, motivated,
and thus, one who seeks a wider and deeper way of life and of social being.

According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal, and his condemnation was no more than just. However, his crime, namely, the independence of this thought, rendered a service not only to humanity, but also to his country. It served to prepare a new morality and faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditions by which they lived until then were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life. Nor is the case of Socrates unique; it is reproduced periodically in history. It would never have been possible to establish the freedom of thought we now enjoy if the regulations prohibiting it had not been violated before being solemnly abrogated. At that time, however, the violation was a crime, since it was an offense against sentiments still very keen in the average conscience. And yet this crime was useful as a prelude to reforms which daily became more necessary. Liberal philosophy had as its precursors the heretics of all kinds who were justly punished by secular authorities during the course of the Middle Ages and until the eve of modern times (R:71-2).

In Moral Education, Durkheim elaborated the same argument, emphasizing the creative deviance of individual persons who take us farther along the road to a universalizable and rational perception of reality—in other words, the mainline of sociocultural evolution. In Weberian terms, "charismatic" leaders (eg. prophets) proclaim a "new and mighty objective certainty and subjective certitude" which leads to a new and more compelling "rationalization" of daily existence. As noted before, Durkheim's essential thesis, here illuminated by categories from Weberian sociology of religion, that the parallel autonomization of collective representations and of the morally autonomous person is accompanied, on the world-historical level, by a progressive rationalization and universalization in the constitutive grounds of moral and intellectual discourse (eg. see E. Leites, 1974; B. Nelson, 1973a) is a most significant interpretive perspective in the human sciences. In short, Durkheim proposed that progressive moral evolution depended upon morally creative deviance leading to greater rationality and respect for moral personage.

In primitive societies, Durkheim noted, moral solidari-
ty is mechanical—that is, taboos and prescriptive etiquettes are automatically enforced by society much as an automatic mechanism carries out its foreordained task. But as sociocultural existence becomes more complex, ever-wider spheres of action are opened up to the reflective rationality, growing intellectual autonomy, and moral responsibility of the person. Indeed, the very complexity of fast-paced modern life would prove impossible without this rational flexibility of moral rules.

The more societies become complex, the more difficult for morality to operate as a purely automatic mechanism. Circumstances are never quite the same, and as a result the rules of morality require intelligence in their application. Society is continually evolving; morality itself must be sufficiently flexible to change gradually as proves necessary. But this requires that morality need not be internalized in such a way as to be beyond criticism or reflection, the agents par excellence of all change. Individuals, while conforming, must take account of what they are doing—thus, it does not follow from a belief in the need for discipline must involve blind and slavish submission. Moral rules must be invested with that authority without which they would be ineffective. However, since a certain point in history it has not been necessary to remove authority from the realm of discussion, converting it to icons to which man dare not, so to speak, lift his eyes (ME:52-3).

Thus, did the positivist moral reformer Durkheim reconcile the generic need for moral discipline with the genetic-evolutionary need for progressive enfranchisement of independent and critical reflection. Here Durkheim invoked his deus ex machina—the morally creative and exceptional deviant who foreshadows the future forms and rules necessary for the emerging society.

We have contended that the erratic, the undisciplined, are morally incomplete. Do they not, nevertheless, play a useful part in society? Was not Christ such a deviant, as well as Socrates? And is it not thus with all the historical figures through which humanity has passed? Had their feeling of respect for the moral rules characteristic of their day been too lively, they would not have undertaken to alter them. To dare to shake off the yoke of traditional discipline, one should not feel authority too strongly (ME:53).
Granting Durkheim his qualifying thesis, it is legitimate, however, to ask as Nisbet did: "How do we distinguish between the creative deviant—the Socrates and the Christ—and those for whom deviance is no more than a form of assault on social order (1974:220)? In answering in terms of the opposition between, striving for higher morality (more universal and rational) of the morally creative deviant, and the criminal whose action is egoistic or regressive, Durkheim was forced to subdivide his first category. He further distinguished between those moral reformers whose action leads to new and more creative kinds of universalizable moral rules, and those who may start out as moral reformers but whose only real consequence is to release egoistic desires and to enshrine moral anarchy. This opposition between two kinds of moral reformers is the closest Durkheim came to Weber's distinction between the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of ultimate disposition."

However, if in critical and abnormal circumstances the feeling for the rule and for discipline must be weakened, it does not follow that such impairment is normal. Furthermore, we must take care not to confuse two very different feelings: the need to substitute a new regulation for an old one; and the impatience with all rules, with the abhorrence of all discipline. Under orderly conditions, the former is natural, healthy, and fruitful; the latter is always abnormal since it prompts us to alienate ourselves from the basic conditions of life. Doubtless, with some of the great moral innovators, a legitimate need for change has degenerated into something like anarchy. Because the rules prevailing in their time offended them deeply, their sense of the evil led them to blame, not this or that particular and transient form of moral discipline, but the principle itself of all discipline (ME:53).

As noted in Book One, Durkheim's points here are well taken, for from at least the Enlightenment on, we moderns have so often conceived of freedom in wholly negative terms—as the release of the individual from all previous irrational constraints and servitudes—that there comes a time in many movements when this opposition to specific forms and rules imperceptibly slides over into a generic and permanent protest against all forms in general, against definition itself. Ro-
mantic egoism, cultural and political nihilism, and so on, are but a few of the forms taken by such generic protest (ultimately gnostic), which is based upon a largely negative view of freedom as release from control rather than harmony with the generative and directive sources of being and becoming.

The morally creative deviant, Durkheim continued, neither seeks things for himself, as the criminal does, nor does he embrace infinite horizons under the specious mask of a metaphysical pathos of cosmic oppression (gnostic or Romantic dualism). Rather, the morally creative deviant personally embraces a more rational, more universalizable, impersonal ideal. He acts in the name of a higher goal, which points toward the future mainline of moral evolution.

... because society is beyond us it constitutes the only possible goal of individual conduct. For precisely because this goal is beyond our individual goals, we cannot seek to achieve it without elevating ourselves in the same measure beyond ourselves--without surpassing our individual nature, which is the highest ambition that man can pursue or ever has pursued. That is why the major historical figures, those who seem to us infinitely greater than all the others, are not the great artists, or the men of profound wisdom, or statesmen, but those who have achieved--or are thought to have achieved--the greatest moral triumphs: Moses, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Christ, Mohammed, and Luther, to mention only a few of the greatest names.... In our minds they identify themselves with the impersonal ideal that they embodied and the great human groupings that they personified, we see them as raised beyond the condition of human beings and transfigured (ME:93).

Indeed, selfless devotion to a supra-personal ideal--was this not the ethic of both Durkheim and Weber? Both demanded that eros and ego give way to logos and the universalistic morality of the self-disciplining person. The very necessity of their prophetic calls (eg. the "The Dualism of Human Nature" and Weber's "vocational addresses"), however, demonstrates that rationalization and autonomization ultimately depended upon human reflection and intentions. Therefore, as we observed earlier, this enlargement of the basic structures of conscience and consciousness--the sine qua non of progressive
moral evolution--is a basic phenomenological process on the
world-historical level.

If we pull together Durkheim's insight that modern sui-
cides may be caused by "social currents," and that a "margin-
al leaven of anomie" and egoisme among morally creative char-
ismatic leaders who proclaim a new and universalistic ideal
is necessary for progressive moral evolution, are we not then
justified in further speculating that anomie and egoisme may
be culturally sanctioned by progressive modern forms of con-
science and consciousness? Indeed, Durkheim himself suggest-
ed this possibility when he acknowledged: "The entire moral-
ity of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a
certain amount of anomie" (S:364).

C. Durkheim's Growing Emphasis on Religion

Having already explored Durkheim's sociology of reli-
gion at great length (see Book One especially), I now merely
note: close to the core of Durkheim's growing "cultural real-
ism" was his ramifying analysis of religion as society's
prime constitutive symbolic mode. Indeed, as we have seen,
Durkheim's thesis of the progressive autonomization of collect-
ively symbolic representations often cited as its prime
exhibit the growing multivalency of religious images and doc-
trines (see his review of Labriola cited earlier). Durkheim
himself acknowledged, as is generally known, that one of the
key turning points in his intellectual career came after
reading the British anthropologists of religion, especially
Robertson Smith, around 1895. This rare biographical reflect-
ion came in response to a charge that his doctrine was sim-
ply imported from Germany. Of his lecture course on religion
in 1895, Lukes tells us that Durkheim himself reflected:

It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view
of the essential role played by religion in social
life. It was in that year that, for the first time,
I found the means of tackling the study of religion
sociologically. This was a revelation to me. That
course of 1895 marked a dividing line in the devel-
opment of my thought, to such an extent that all my
previous researches had to be taken up afresh in or-
der to be made to harmonize with these new insights.... (This reorientation) was entirely due to the studies of religious history which I had just undertaken, and notably to the reading of the works of Robertson Smith and his school (Lukes, 1973:237).

Lukes (1973:240) suggests that there are two main stages in Durkheim's developing sociology of religion--marked by the essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena" (1899) and by The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912). As I did in Book One, I wish to note the existence of a third stage, in which the course of 1895 and the seminal section in Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide (1897) are among the most notable statements. Further, is is highly significant for our present purposes that, when in 1897 in Suicide, Durkheim began to speak of "social" or "suicidogenetic currents" as causing suicides, this is placed in the context of his emerging "cultural realism," and this occurs also when his seminal theses on religion appear for the first time in print. Thereafter, beginning with his Annee preface and article of 1899, Durkheim further proposed not only that religion is the fundamental form in which society conceives of itself, but also that religion served as the prime matrix--the cultural-genetic medium--from which all other basic symbolic forms progressively emerged. Religious representations thus came eventually to constitute the central substantive core of Durkheim's causal model.

Now, since the awakening and guidance of conscience and consciousness--as prime phenomenological processes--came to be seen by Durkheim as dependent upon religious symbolic forms, should we not, then, seek out the changing foundations of structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority in changing religious sanctions? Further, should we not look to specific religious variables as potentially causal factors in the cultural sanctioning of modern anomie and egoisme as extreme individualistic drives for "progress and perfection" as these were led by the descendants of charismatic founders of the modern world?
D. Durkheim's Emphasis on the Civilizational Significance of Christian Culture

One of Durkheim's more important historical observations was his repeated emphasis on the civilizational significance of the moral creativity of Christian culture (see also Chapter Eight, Book One). It is also striking that Durkheim made little effort to explain the origin and impact of Christian culture in the West from within the framework of his general evolutionary mechanical-morphological model. Perhaps he did not do so because it is obvious that there was no real mechanical-evolutionary necessity forcing the emergence of this particular religious doctrine and ethos out of specific social morphological contexts in the ancient world, which Christianity might then symbolize. In both content and origin, then, Christian individualism should be viewed as a volitional doctrine, a moral and spiritual orientation only remotely connected with evolutionary necessity.

Although it cannot be explained in terms of his only explicit causal model, Durkheim's emphasis on the moral creativity of Christian culture, and especially Protestant individualism, reenforces his general thesis of the evolutionary emergence of the person through history (see Book One). In cultural and phenomenological terms, Christian individualism was a powerful, even decisive, force in sanctioning an autonomous sphere for the individual person, over against the traditional collective claims of "blood and soil." For, as Nelson (1973a) observed, the world-historical significance of Christianity was that it broke decisively through the tribal sacral-magical collective conscience of the archaic "sacral complex," and extended the socio-religious bond to all "brothers" in the faith. It is striking that both Durkheim and Weber converged in their estimate of the significance of this awakening of new depths of conscience. The deepening of personal obligation, in regard to both abstract impersonal ideals and to inter-personal obligations, was seen to be of prime importance in the construction of new in-depth person-
ality structures. Indeed, Weber emphasized that "... the in-
creased importance of an ethical attachment of individuals to
a cosmos of obligations, making it possible to calculate what
the conduct of a given person may be ... has the greatest im-
portance" (1963:35-6). The progressive awakening of con-
escience, the deepening internalization of moral and ethical
obligations, and the growing centrality of a more or less sys-
tematic phenomenology of intentions (especially from Abelard
on, see Luscombe, 1971, Nelson, 1973a, Leites, 1974), were
all of critical significance in the evolutionary construction
of the moral individualism so revered by Durkheim.

Now, if we rotate our analytical matrix slightly, what
we see here is another facet of the master process of ration-
alization so central to Weber's historical sociology. Through
the progressive internalization of ethical-legal norms in so-
cialization, the personality structure becomes more integral,
more consistent, and, hence, more predictable and reliable.
Further, in identifying the emergence of the individual con-
science with the construction of a new level of in-depth in-
tegrated personality structures, Weber also included, as a
corollary process, the growing autonomization of facts and
individuals, and the greater degree of calculability and thus
universalizability which emerges from these simultaneous pro-
cesses. This represents a significant convergence between
Durkheim and Weber, for Durkheim also believed that the auto-
nomization of the person and rationalization and universal-
ization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse
proceeded together on the world-historical level. Recently,
Edmund Leites has described this crucial double dialectical
process with particular cogence:

... two of the most decisive advances in the philoso-
phic and theoretical development of the norm of moral
and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an ex-
traordinary extension (in moral and religious matters)
of "universalities in terms of reference and communities
of discourse"... Major advances in the articulation of
the norm of autonomy have gone along with rejections of
moralities and modes or argumentation are believed to
be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cultures
and traditions. What is sought are ways of deciding moral and religious matters which all reasonable men, whatever their history and culture, would accept and would have to accept, given the correctness of the procedures. ... There are important cultural and civilizational linkages between: (1) the struggle for universalities in terms of reference, and argumentation in moral and religious matters, and (2) the development of norms of individual autonomy (1974:97-8).

Indeed, didn't the positivist Durkheim himself link rationalism and individualism in evolutionary terms?

Rationalism is only one of the aspects of individualism: it is the intellectual aspect of it. We are not dealing here with two states of mind; each is the converse of the other. When one feels the need of liberating individual thought, it is because in a general way, one feels the need of liberating the individual. Intellectual servitude is only one of the servitudes that individualism combats. All development of individualism has the effect of opening moral consciousness to new ideas and rendering it more demanding. Since every advance that it makes results in a higher conception, a more delicate sense of the dignity of man, individualism cannot be developed without making apparent to us, as contrary to human dignity, as unjust, social relations that at one time did not seem unjust at all. Conversely, rationalistic faith reacts on individualistic sentiments and stimulates it. For injustice is unreasonable and absurd, and, consequently, we are the more sensitive to it as we are more sensitive to the rights of reason. Consequently, a given advance in moral education in the direction of greater rationality cannot occur without also bringing to light new moral tendencies, without inducing a greater thirst for justice, without stirring the public conscience by latent aspirations (ME:12).

Let us explore a few representative passages which illustrate Durkheim's growing emphasis on the civilizational significance of Christian culture, especially its rationalism and individualism. For instance, early in his career, even though he was critically disposed to treat religion as repressive and thus regressive, nonetheless, the positivist Durkheim had a few kind words to say for the evolutionary progressiveness of Christianity vis-à-vis other archaic religions.

Christianity has often been reproached for its intolerance. From this point of view, however, it realized considerable progress over preceding religions.... Everybody knows that the Christian religion is the most i-
idealistic that has ever existed. Thus, it is made up of articles of faith which are very broad and very general, rather than of particular beliefs and practices. That is how it came about that the dawn of free thought under Christianity [especially Abelard, see Durkheim's L'Evolution pedagogique en France] was relatively precocious. Since its origin, schools have been founded, and even opposing sects. Hardly had Christian societies begun to organize themselves in the Middle Ages than scholasticism appeared, the first systematic effort of free thought, the first source of differences. The rights of discussion were from the first recognized (DL: 163-4).

Indeed, this idealistic and individualistic character of Christianity was the source, as Durkheim observed, of the second great transformation in the structures of conscience and consciousness which Nelson (1973a) has described as the transition from "faith structures" to "rational structures of consciousness." And, as Durkheim noted, it was the scholastic philosophers, especially with Abelard, that successfully rationalized the contents of faith, and made personal intentionality the new logical and evidential basis for sin and responsibility, a momentous shift in cultural evolution.

Further, in his lectures on the evolution of Western education, the creative correlation of the culture of Christian inwardness, classical rationalism, and increasingly universalistic frames of reference are clearly implied as Durkheim summarized much of his earlier writings on religious evolution.

The religions of Antiquity are, above all, systems of rites, the essential objective of which is to assure the regular working of the universe. For the wheat to spring up and yield an abundant harvest, the gods of the river, and the gods of the stars must subsist, and it is the rites which allow them to do so. If they ceased to take place on the established days, and in the prescribed manner, the life of the universe would come to an end. It is understandable that the attention of the Greek should be entirely directed towards the outside, where, according to him, the principle of existence is to be found. By contrast, Christian religion is centered in man himself, in the soul of man. An essentially idealistic religion, its godaspires to reign over the world of ideas, over the spiritual world and not that of the body. To worship the gods of Antiquity was to maintain their material life with the help of
offerings and sacrifices, since their life depended on that of the world; the god of the Christians, on the other hand, wishes to be worshipped, as the phrase expresses it, in spirit and in truth. For him, to be is to be believed, to be thought, to be loved.

Harmony with the Christian God, then, is an interior relationship.

Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit. ... The most common rite is prayer; and prayer is an internal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue and piety do not consist in material acts, but in internal states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a perpetual surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged to perpetually examine his conscience, he must learn to question himself, to analyze himself and scrutinize his intentions: in short, to reflect upon himself. Thus, of the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one hand, and man on the other, it is necessarily around the second that the thought of the Christian societies, and also consequently their system of education, has come to gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a:239-40).

In addition, Wallwork speaks of Durkheim's reliance on the differential content of religious doctrines to explain the differences in pedagogical ideals in Western culture, and then cites the following passage from Durkheim's *L'Evolution pedagogique en France*.

If Greek reflection was first and exclusively directed toward the world, this was because the world was then, in the esteem of public opinion, an excellent and holy thing. The world, in fact, was considered divine, or rather the domain of the gods. The gods were not outside the world, they were in things, and there was nothing in which they did not reside.... It is man, the human spirit, which was then considered as profane and of little value; this is what Socrates himself teaches and it is upon this profane character that he lays claim to the right to speculate with complete independence; here, he says, thought ought not to be expressed with complete liberty, for it does not risk encroaching upon the domain of the gods. For Christianity, on the contrary, it is the mind, the conscience of man, that is the sacred and peerless thing: for the soul, the principle of our interior life, is a direct emanation of the divine. Between the mind and things, there is all the difference which separates the spiritual from the temporal. Thus God has disdainfully abandoned the world to the free utilization of men, traditit mundum hominum disputationi (1972:140).
Lukes gives the latter passage a slightly different sense:

For Christianity ... it is the mind, the conscience of man which is sacred and incomparable; for the soul is ... a direct emanation of divinity.... With Christianity the world loses the confused unity it had prim­itively; there is, on the one hand, the world of thought, of the conscience, of morality, of religion; and, on the other hand, the world of matter, unthinking, amoral, and areligious (1973:387,#39).

Thus did Durkheim pursue these matters of the differential influence of Christian culture, vis-a-vis other preceding religious traditions, which lay at the creative core of the emerging European civilization from about the eleventh century onward.

Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nascent conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than adherence to the religious cultures of Antiquity.

In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective of communicating to the child a certain number of defined talents. These were either considered as a sort of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic value of the individual, or else they were seen, as was the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools which an individual needed in order to play his role in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating into the pupil certain habits and items of knowledge .... It was not a question of influencing the personality in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity, but in clothing it in a sort of external framework, the different parts of which could be created independently .... Christianity, by contrast, very early on acquired the conception that there is in each of us an underlying mode of being from which forms of intelligence and sensibility derive, and in which they find their unity; and that it is this underlying mode of being which has to be reached if one really wants to carry out the work of the educationalist and to produce a lasting effect. According to Christian belief, to shape a man is not to embellish his mind with certain ideas or to allow him to acquire certain specific habits, but to create in him a general attitude of the mind and the will which makes him see reality in general in a definite perspective. And it is easy to understand how Christianity came to hold this view. It is because ... in order to be a Christian, it is not enough to have learnt this or that particular item, to know how to
discriminate between certain rites or pronounce certain formulas, or to know certain traditional beliefs. Christianity consists essentially in a certain attitude of soul, in a certain habitus of our moral being. To foster this attitude in the child is thus the essential goal of education (in Giddens, 1972a:206-07).

This "certain habitus of the entire moral being," this commitment to influencing the total personality, was based upon the Christian notion of "the unity and intrinsic moral value of the self" (Wallwork, 1972:132).

... the goal of Christian education always involved directing the basic orientation of the self as a unified whole.... The important thing was the general disposition of the mind and the will of the whole personality. In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian concept of training the total personality distinguishes the whole of Western pedagogical instruction (Wallwork, 1972:132).

Modern Western education, though now largely secularized, Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on the total personality, and on penetrating with value and moral habits the "inner, deep recesses of the soul."

For us the principal object of education is not to provide the child with a greater or lesser degree of items of knowledge, but to create within him a deep-lying disposition, a kind of perspective of the soul which orients him in a definite direction, not only during childhood, but for life.... Our conception of the goal has become secularized; consequently, the means employed must themselves change. But the abstract schema of the educational process has not altered. It is still a matter of descending into depths of the soul which Antiquity was unconscious of (in Giddens, 1972:207-8).

Similarly, in terms of the second schema of suicide, we might wonder whether, and to what extent, a certain form of Christian individualism became secularized into extreme sanctions which became unbearable to many.

Indeed, the religio-cultural sanction of individualism and the interior life which came with Christianity served as an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral individualism" which Durkheim and other Enlightenment liberals and positivists held dear.

Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, is the immediate source from which modern moral indivi-
dualism is derived.... Christian ethics provided the moral principles upon which the "cult of the individual" is founded, but now Christianity is becoming supplanted by sacred symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, in the events of the French Revolution, where freedom and reason were glorified.... The French Revolution gave the most decisive impetus to the growth of moral individualism in modern times (Giddens, 1971a:115-16).

At the height of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to defend the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, he rhetorically invoked the origins of western individualism from Christian doctrine to invert the attacks of Catholic conservatives against the "laic" Third Republic intellectuals and moral reformers.

Are we to ignore the fact that the originality of Christianity consisted precisely in a remarkable development of the individualistic spirit? Whereas the religion of the ancient city-state was quite entirely made up of external practices, from which the spiritual was absent, Christianity demonstrated its inner faith, in the personal conviction of the individual, the essential condition of piety. First, it taught that the moral value of acts had to be measured according to the intention, a preeminently inward thing which by its very nature escapes all external judgments and which only the agent could competently appraise. The very center of moral life was thus transported from the external to the internal, and the individual thus elevated to be sovereign of his own conduct, accountable only to himself and to his God.... If this restrained individualism which is Christianity was necessary eighteen centuries ago, there is a good chance that a more fully developed individualism is indispensable today.... It is therefore a singular error to present the individualist ethic as the antagonist of Christian morality. Quite the contrary ... the former derived from the latter. By attaching ourselves to the first, we do not deny our past; we only continue it (in Bellah, 1973:52-3).

Similarly, in Moral Education, Durkheim suggested that in the world-historical evolution of morality, Christian inwardness, the shedding of externality, the enshrinement of individual subjectivity, and thus, Christianity's resulting nature as "an essentially human religion," played an important role in the autonomization and secularization of the world (see also Bellah, 1973:52-3).
Gradually things change. Gradually human duties are multiplied, become more precise, and pass to the first rank of importance; while others, on the contrary, tend to become diminished. One might say that Christianity itself has contributed most to the acceleration of this result. It is an essentially human religion, since its God dies for the salvation of humanity. Christianity teaches that the principle duty of man toward God is to love his neighbor. Although there are religious duties--rites addressed only to divinity--the place they occupy and the importance attributed to them continually diminish.... Thenceforth, our duties become independent, in large measure, of the religious notions that guarantee them but do not form their foundation. With Protestantism, the autonomy of morality is still more accentuated by the fact that ritual itself diminishes. The moral functions of divinity becomes its sole raison d'être. It is the only argument brought forward to demonstrate its existence. Spiritualistic philosophy continues the work of Protestantism. But among the philosophers who believe in the necessity of supernatural sanctions, there are none who do not admit that morality could be constructed quite independent of any theological conception. Thus, the bond that originally united and even merged the two systems has become looser and looser. It is therefore certain that when we broke that bond definitively we were following in the mainstream of history. If ever a revolution has been a long time the making, this is it (ME:6, 7).

Finally, we see Durkheim, like Weber, attributing to Protestant thought an important role in scientific education, and, in general, revaluing the "this-worldly" aspect of religion and moral action.

It was in Protestant circles, and particularly in Germany, that this new pedagogical conception emerged for the first time; it is in the German countries, moreover, that it has remained widespread.... The fact is that there was in Protestantism a sense of the lay society and its temporal interests which Catholicism did not, and would not, possess (in Giddens, 1972a:214).

In sum, if, as Durkheim emphasized, our modern ethos of individualism is ultimately derived from the belief system and continuing phenomenological sanctions of Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular, then how can we accept his earlier contention that social morphological evolution is the prime cause of the modern individualism which underlays anomie and egoisme? Can we still accept the
implicit causal model underlying Durkheim's thesis that the growth of moral individualism is an "unceasing development in history"? How can these be more or less automatic reflections of the underlying social morphological differentiation? Contrary to the implications of Durkheim's early theses, and in line with his latter theses which we are exploring in this section, hereafter I shall hold it as established for our present purposes that Christian-Protestant culture represents an independent and perhaps crucial contribution to the modern ethos of individualism and the drives for "progress and perfection" which characterize modern culture.
E. Durkheim's Cultural Account of the History of Education in France

Having repeatedly criticized Durkheim's methodology for its abstracted general evolutionism, and having pointed out the need for it to be supplemented by Weberian notions of specific evolution and breakthroughs, it is significant for our present purposes that Durkheim came closest to analyzing Western society in these terms in a series of lectures; I refer especially to Durkheim's lectures on Socialism and Saint-Simon, and to his analysis of the development of Western civilization in his lecture course, repeated annually at the Ecole Normale Superieure from 1904 to 1913, which was published in French under the title *L'Evolution pedagogique en France* (for secondary accounts, see J. Floud, 1965; Wallwork, 1972; Lukes, 1973). This specific historical account of pedagogical institutions and "Western Pedagogical Ideals" in terms of the changing "moral milieu" of Western culture is important for our present purposes. For here Durkheim's general evolutionary morphological model faded in terms of causal significance in the face of the actual cultural complexes directing the shape of Western education. Halbwachs called this cultural history "a vast and bold fresco covering ten centuries of history ... a sort of continuous discourse on the progress of the human mind in France" (in Lukes, 1973:379, #2). Wallwork also observes:

Durkheim writes on an extremely broad canvas. Starting with an analysis of Christian pedagogical ideals in the early Middle Ages, he traces these ideals through the High Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment to the modern period. In the process, Durkheim sketches not only the historical development of pedagogical ideals, but also the historical evolution of the differing concepts of man and his environment with which these ideals have been inexorably linked since the emergence of Western culture from the chrysalis of the Christian Weltanschauung (1972:130).

Indeed, in *L'Evolution pedagogique en France* Durkheim entertained multiple themes and variable ways of interpreting
the causes and courses of complex social and cultural change.

Wallwork again provides a useful summary:

The Christian Weltanschauung that emerged during the early Middle Ages was an intellectual synthesis sui generis; the concepts of man and his environment enshrined in this unique religious world-view have decisively molded all Western moral values, including the secular moral concepts of contemporary culture; the history of Western pedagogical ideals cannot be understood apart from this cultural framework and historical variations within it, for pedagogical ideals invariably derive from fundamental beliefs regarding the nature of man and his environment; and, as pedagogical ideals emerge from altered beliefs about man and nature, educational institutions, and practices are created or altered in conformity with these ideological innovations. In short, the history of pedagogical ideals is inseparable from the history of comprehensive religious or philosophical beliefs and values (Wallwork, 1972:130-31).

Thus, beyond the often brilliant cascade of insights, Durkheim's cultural historical account here is valuable because his encounter with the actual empirical details of the development of his own civilization led Durkheim to a many-sided mode of explanation. Clearly, in terms of the varied details of Western evolution, at least from 1904 on Durkheim recognized, at least tacitly, that his earlier, more dogmatic, quasi-mechanical and rather one-way model of explanation would no longer suffice. Lukes summarizes the shift in Durkheim's explanatory logics for us in these terms:

Durkheim's method was "historical and sociological" in that it went beyond the analysis of successive educational institutions and practices, and the exposition of educational doctrines: he continually sought to explain why particular ideas and ideals, practices, and institutions arose, survived during certain periods, disappeared, and, in some cases, reappeared. His explanatory scheme was neither mono-causal nor one-sided; the explanations advanced were always complex and stresses different factors at different points. Sometimes the main factors were cultural, or "representational", at others geographical, or political, or economic (1973:381).

Here Durkheim came the closest to letting the actual historical constellations of events, conditions, and intentions determine the ruling explanatory principles. Indeed, it is
highly significant for our present purposes that Lukes goes so far as to suggest:

If there is an explanatory bias, it is perhaps in the direction of the cultural, the factors he tended to find especially fruitful in the explanation of educational developments were collective aspirations, values, beliefs, and ideals (1973:386).

F. Durkheim's Move Toward Civilizational Analysis

It is significant for our present purposes that Durkheim moved increasingly toward the notion of civilizations and inter-civilizational process as a necessary interpretive strategy in the human sciences. Although from his first to his last great book Durkheim was concerned with the broad evolutionary passages from the simplest levels of sociocultural process to modern complex levels, it was only toward the end of his life that he felt compelled to spell out the need for the analytical perspective of civilizations, which appeared in L'année sociologique in 1913; the article was co-authored by Marcel Mauss.

We should first note that, in the preceding year in his magnum opus, Durkheim had considerably widened out his basic explanatory model to include only morphological but institutional and even cultural variables as intimate parts of a deeper causal structure.

If ... the categories are ... essentially collective representations ... they should show the mental states of the group; they should depend on the way in which this is founded and organized, upon its morphology, upon its religious, moral and economic institutions, etc. (EF:28).

Further, we might note that Durkheim's macro-processual or evolutionary sensitivity to society as not only an interactional but also an intergenerational, and thus historical, phenomena, led him to emphasize the progressive "sedimentation" or layering down and incorporation of collectively symbolic representations into the complex evolving "tree of social life." At various points in various works, Durkheim
referred to key constitutive collective representations such as, for example, Christian individualism, the spirit of the medieval scholastic university, Cartesian rationalism, the spirit of the French Revolution, and so forth, which had become historically sedimented into Western civilization. This notion of progressive sedimentation was already implied in the multilineal overtones of his root metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life (see Book One). In *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim referred to inter-generational or historical-cultural sedimentation of cultural elements into a new, working civilizational complex in these terms:

Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united, and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge.

And in *L'Evolution pedagogique en France* Durkheim spoke in the following terms of the way in which the educational creativity of the Middle Ages, especially in the scholastic culture of the Universities, came to be incorporated and sedimented into Western educational and cultural life:

And although all of these specific institutions originally stemmed directly from conditions specific to medieval life, they became so firmly hardened at that time that they have continued up to our day. Certainly, we do not regard them in the same way as our forebears: we have infused them with a different spirit.... (Although) our educational life has been transformed ... it continues to flow in the channels which were created by the Middle Ages (in Giddens, 1972a:210).

In short, just as Durkheim posited a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less fluid to crystallized or institutionalized collective representations, so too he came to posit a vertical continuum of sociocultural process ranging from the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive collective representations to the most differentiated, autonomous, and universalizable constitutive cultural symbolic forms on the
Having just completed detailed analyses of the key intra-societal origins and functions of collective representations in *The Elementary Forms*, and having there only briefly sketched the emergence of increasingly abstract, autonomous, rational, and universalizable symbolic forms, Durkheim turned his attention in the following year to a fuller elaboration of the inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal horizons involved in the passage toward modernity. With this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level of generic sociocultural process, the growing recognition of the importance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural forms marks a new and most important phase in Durkheim's continuing intellectual development.

For instance, Durkheim and Mauss began their important, yet little known, "Note on the Notion of Civilization" by observing that if their general causal theorem of linking symbols to specific social bodies was applied too narrowly, then the crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic symbols may be lost to view.

There are ... phenomena which do not have such well-defined limits; they pass beyond the political frontiers and extend over less easily determinable spaces. Although their complexity renders their study difficult, it nonetheless behooves us to acknowledge their existence and to indicate their place within the bounds of sociology.... Social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a determinate social organization do exist: they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or they develop over periods of time that exceed the history of a single society. They have a life of their own which is in some ways supranational (1971:809-10).

In other words, the Durkheimian's previous insistence on linking every social process with a specific social body located in geographical space began to break down under the growing pressure of their evolutionary concerns. But this important recognition of potential limitations in the basic explanatory rule of their school represented not so much an abandonment of this rule as a crucial turning point, an inspir-
ed extension of their basic interpretive logics to new and highly significant levels of complexity. In essence, the problem was to find some more specific links between micro-
societal, macro-societal, and evolutionary processes. Now, Durkheim had previously prepared the way for this important extension by his earlier insistence that increasingly ab-
stract, universalizable, and rationalizable collective sym-
bols take on greater significance in sociocultural evolution precisely because they come to symbolize the new internation-
al life which progressively emerges. In short, universaliza-
ble symbols constitute the foundation of the extended or civ-
ilizational social bond.

Using the world-wide spread of Indo-European languages as a prime illustration of these processes, Durkheim and Mauss assigned the designation "civilizational" to these cru-
cial higher order trans-local and trans-temporal "social facts." They defined it in this way: "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole" (1971:811). However, I believe the inclusion of nation-
al cultures as the component elements making up the "moral milieu" of a civilization to have been a mistake. First, it is by no means certain that modern political and national boundaries reproduce societal and cultural differences and unities. Thus, identifying civilizational "moral milieu" with those of modern nation states does little to address these problems since the latter is merely a convenient unit drawn for interests often unrelated to our present concerns. More-
over, the gap between so-called "national culture" and civi-
lizations neglects the crucial fact, which first compelled Durkheim and Mauss to seek a higher level interpretive per-
spective in which to anchor long-term, complex sociocultural processes, and which they had just themselves emphasized as absolutely crucial to their own emerging civilizational per-
spective—namely, the inter-societal, inter-national, inter-
temporal, inter-cultural exchange, sedimentation, and pro-
gressive universalization of cultural symbolic forms. If, indeed, civilizations result from these supra-national, supra-societal symbolic interactions, then how can modern nation states remain our basic analytical unit? Once again, these are merely political units, while we are primarily interested in sustained cross-cultural interactions. Even Mauss and Durkheim themselves recognized this fact when they remarked upon the differential susceptibility of various structural and cultural elements to incorporation and sedimentation into sociocultural process on the civilizational level (1971: 812). They rightly noted that political institutions are "... part of the specific character of each people," and, as such, do not lend themselves as easily to diffusion as do cultural symbolic forms. Indeed, it is precisely the power of certain cultural forms such as, for example, the Arabic-Hindu decimal system, or modern Western science and technology, to rise above political confines and tribal boundaries which is significant for us. These prime symbolic forms come to collectively represent this transcendence and dialectical emergence of new universal "symbolic frontiers." The extended social bond of complex civilizations--of "organic solidarity" in Durkheim's earlier terms--is possible only if this universalizability and symbolic transcendence is also possible.

Therefore, I suggest that we set aside national-political boundaries as our key analytical unit, and seek instead to fashion a hermeneutical strategy more appropriate to describing these massive and sustained supra-personal, supra-tribal, supra-national, inter-generational symbolic interactions. It is these interactions themselves which must be considered the basic units of civilizations. A key mediating variable intervening between living societies and those complex symbolic matrices called civilizations are cultural-historical traditions. If Durkheim's theory of civilizational process is not to merely "float in the air," as is so often mistakenly charged against his notion of "social facts," it
must be complemented by the notion of cultural traditions.

In sum, we should strive to anchor our analyses not in terms of things or material social bodies but rather in terms of sociocultural processes. Or is our current philosophy of science still too dominated by latent materialist and mechanist premises?

With the notion of cultural traditions as the key constitutive elements of civilizations, we can then more fully utilize Durkheim's notion (after Ratzel) of widening "symbolic frontiers," and the degree of sedimentation and universalizability of symbolic forms across these ever-widening frontiers. Those cultural forms that rise to the civilizational level, then, are carried by dynamic cultural traditions, by active "dialogues across the centuries" as Nelson (1965a) poetically suggests. Those cultural traditions competing for civilizational ascendancy, as Nelson (1973a) reminds us, do so by successfully extending their spatial and temporal generality (eg. see EF:482), while simultaneously attempting to universalize the scope and significance of their prime symbolic forms. The extension of the social bond in ever-widening degrees of universalism requires cultural traditions actively elaborating and rationalizing universalizable symbolic forms. This differential ability of cultural traditions to extend and universalize their prime collective representations, and to incorporate and sediment these symbolic forms into civilizational processes, represents an analytical key to understanding the differential rates of acceleration in sociocultural evolution. In the succeeding chapter, I shall utilize this notion of cultural traditions to illuminate some of the differences between Durkheim and Weber's work. In Chapter Ten we shall further explore this crucial interpretive perspective of cultural traditions to illuminate some possible ways in which anomie and egoisme are influenced by dominant cultural traditions in the modern world.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN DURKHEIM AND WEBER

Preface. Throughout this dissertation I have repeatedly compared and contrasted Durkheim and Weber's explanatory logics, especially concerning extreme cultural sanctions in the modern world as they might influence suicides. As a prelude to the second schema which integrates Durkheim's insights into modern suicide and Weber's insights into the secularization of religious sanctions, I wish first to more systematically explore some basic complementarities and convergences between Durkheim and Weber's causal models and historical cultural analyses.

Two recurrent interpretive problems stand in our way. First, it is important to distinguish between a summary of a pioneer's thought in some area and an in-depth interpretive exegesis of a thinker's fundamental premises as these informed all his work. The difference here is between "topographic" inquiry and "stratigraphic" exegesis of the paradigmatic or "nuclear structure" of a great thinker's life-work. Far too often we perform a summary exegesis (e.g. Marks, 1974), but neglect to systematically understand the deep or "nuclear structure" of Durkheim or Weber's work. Second, a related problem is the common failure to adequately distinguish between a thinker's methodological prescriptions and his actual evolving "logics in use." It is a common observation that one is better advised to follow what a great thinker did rather than what he may have said or set out in terms of "prescriptive logics." Unfortunately, this is as true of Durkheim as of Weber, for neither the former (despite The Rules) nor the latter (despite the preface to Economy and Society and Parsons' best efforts in The Theory of Economic
and Social Organization) developed systematically and explicitly methodological statements which adequately described their own complex theoretical and historical investigations. Neither fully described their own rapidly evolving interpretive "logics-in-use." Simply opposing prescriptions from The Rules or Economy and Society as Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg (1975c) do, will not suffice. The real question is: how, in actual fact, did Durkheim and Weber carry out their respective programs? Many surprises abound here.

Now, surely one of Parsons' greatest contributions to sociological theory has been his steadfast attempt to unify our heritage by demonstrating significant methodological and theoretical convergences in the paradigms of our founding fathers. I believe this represents a legitimate attempt to "consolidate" sociological theory, an effort which Robert K. Merton has advocated for years. The unwary reader of Pope and friends' (1973,1975a,b,c) often successful three-pronged attack on Parsons' charter for American sociology may be led to conclude that, since the foremost attempt at synthesizing Durkheim's and Weber's work seems to have broken down, these two pioneers cannot be said to have converged on any significant substantive matters. Whether or not, however, their general complementarity and specific convergence are to be illuminated under Parsons' aegis can now be separated from the still more important question: can we unify our heritage, and generate more powerful paradigms, or must we stand forever "two souls in one body twain?"

Although much of the evidence forces me to agree with Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg that: (a) Parsons' account of Durkheim (see also the appendix to this dissertation) is often rent by serious errors, and (b) that Parsons' account of Weber is often highly selective, nevertheless, I must part company with these critics' unfortunate conclusion that "... the vast difference in basic perspective separating Durkheim from Weber belies the thesis that they converged upon any single explanation of social behavior" (1975c:426). Why is it
that we suspect that this was Pope et al's premise as well as their conclusion? Is the attack here not so much on the Durkheim-Weber convergence thesis as upon Parsons' preeminence itself? Indeed, why we must we continue to forego wholeness, a more unified socio-logic, as Bendix (1971) counsels us? Setting aside the possibility of "absorption" of Weber into the supposed Durkheim-Parsons axis, does the position assumed by Bendix, Roth, and Pope and his collaborators necessarily mean that a forever divisive kind of "cognitive dissonance" is built into the growth of scientific knowledge? That we are as much chained to a neurotic cycle of collective monologue and mutual impenetrability as to the "wheel of progress" of which Bendix (1971) speaks? Given communally shared paradigms and discipline, which alone bestow conceptual unity on empirical diversity, how is it possible to carry out our chosen life-tasks in any coherent way if our inherited models, our prime symbolic guidance systems irretrievably conflict? I propose that it is unacceptable for the rightful demands of autonomy and the necessary distrust of received authority to bar access to the unification of our heritage, and thus, to subsidize dualistic philosophies.

Now, one way of viewing the present dissertation is as an attempt to rewrite The Structure of Social Action--that is, by returning to a systematic, in-depth exegesis of the same paradigmatic sources, to reorient some of our crucial substantive questions and methodological presumptions. By returning to a detailed exegesis of Durkheim's work, I hope to simultaneously build upon and recast Parsons' charter for contemporary sociological theory. Once again, the questions of the relations, past and potential, between these two giants of classical sociology--Durkheim and Weber--becomes central to our quest. Specifically, I suggest that their mature causal models be treated as complementary. Further, Durkheim's linkage of suicides with modern sanctions for individualism and drives for infinite "progress and perfection" and with...
Protestantism, is as significant for our present purposes as was Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the most dynamic characteristics of the modern world. Finally, in their later work, both sadly interrupted, Durkheim and Weber tended to substantively converge in their concern with universalizing, rationalizing, and autonomizing processes on the world-historical level. Let us now briefly explore some convergences between Durkheim and Weber.

A. Tiryakian's Mystery Problem: The Mutual Unawareness of Durkheim and Weber

Why did Emile Durkheim and Max Weber ignore each other? This is the intriguing question posed by Edward Tiryakian in his "A Problem for the Sociology of Knowledge: The Mutual Unawareness of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber" (1966). It is strange that Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope should have ignored this important "mystery problem" (which Bendix, 1971:283 did not fail to cite) which would have appeared to greatly strengthen their case against Parsons' thesis of convergence. Himself one of Parsons' students, perhaps Tiryakian was led by what had become Parsonian orthodoxy on the question of convergence to wonder out loud: if it is so clearly established that Weber's and Durkheim's work converged in such an epochal synthesis, then how was it possible that these twin pioneers of sociological theory remained so unconcerned with each other's work? Not only is this a puzzle in light of Parsons' famous claims, but it also raises a generic problem in the paradigmatic history of any intellectual discipline, or, indeed, any major cultural form based upon multiple and shifting installments of "charisma on deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974).

First, we should note some uncertainty in the literature concerning Tiryakian's claim that Durkheim and Weber totally ignored each other in print. In response to Tiryakian's "mystery problem," Lukes (1973:397) contended that Durkheim did refer to Weber in a three page report on "Le premier congrès allemand de sociologie" in the 1913 edition of L'année
sociologique. But, in an exchange with Tiryakian (1974), Lukes acknowledged that the note in question was unsigned. And Lukes (1973:397) tells us that Georges Davy told him that Durkheim "... connaissait tres mal les oeuvres de Weber." Conversely, while Weber never acknowledged Durkheim's work in print, Raymond Aron, noting the similarities between parts of Weber's and Durkheim's sociology of religion, recalled the following anecdote from Marcel Mauss: "When I went to see Max Weber (in Heidelberg), I found a complete set of L'Annee sociologique in his study" (1967:271). And Tiryakian himself reports that Mauss had claimed (to Aron) that "Weber had borrowed many ideas from Durkheim and his students" (1966:332, #7). Even granting Mauss's partisanship, surely this is an astounding claim for the intellectual heir of Durkheim to make! If, as Bendix, Pope and friends seem to assert, there is no real basis for either methodological convergence between Durkheim and Weber, then what would have prompted the leader of the Durkheim school to claim that Weber had "borrowed" his sociology of religion from the Durkheimians? If no meaningful comparisons are possible, then why should Mauss, who knew the literature on primitive religions as well as Durkheim and better than Weber, forward such a surprising claim? The plot thickens. Tiryakian cites a few other tantalizing indirect connections, such as Durkheim's review of a book by Weber's wife, but these serve only to intensify the mystery: why did Durkheim and Weber, who certainly knew of each others existence, so persistently slight each others work? Tiryakian's question is still significant, and the challenge remains.

B. Conflicts Over Comparisons and Contrasts Between Durkheim and Weber

Comparing and contrasting the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim has become one of the favorite pastimes in the history of sociological theory. The list, by no means exclusive, includes Parsons (1949) of course, who has been
joined by Raymond Aron (1967), S. Fenton (1968), Giddens (1971a), Bendix (1971), LaCapra (1972), Wallwork (1972), Nelson (1972a, 1973a), Whitney Pope (1973, 1975a), and so on. From the critical side, Bendix and Pope especially have attempted to refute Parsons' account and his claim for convergence. Let us first begin, however, with Tiryakian's summary of some of the common denominators between Durkheim and Weber.

There are some striking biographical parallels to be noted. For Durkheim and Weber were contemporaries in adjacent countries, both edited major social science journals in their respective nations, both were professors at major universities, and "both achieved a national reputation in intellectual circles." And "... each in his own way (was) a victim of World War I" (Tiryakian, 1966:330). There are, of course, also some important biographical differences. Obviously, one was French, the other German—two groups at war twice within their own lifetimes. Durkheim was a laicized Alsatian Jew of rabbinical parentage, while Weber was an anguished "religiously unmusical" virtuoso caught between his Lutheran and Calvinistic heritages (Mitzman, 1971; Marianne Weber, 1975). "Durkheim worked his way through an outwardly uneventful academic career in France, finishing with the attainment of the ambition of all French academic people, a professorship at the University of Paris" (Parsons, 1949:301), while Weber's life was often politically engaged and fraught with emotional torment and psychic crisis so disabling that for years he was forced to live the life of a private scholar. Durkheim built a school around himself in the *Annee sociologique* (see especially Terry Clark, 1973), while Weber worked alone, founded no school, fell out of intellectual favor in his own country after his death, and had to be imported later from America, largely through Parsons re-interpretation. In short, using terms borrowed from the sociology of religion, which seems appropriate in characterizing these pioneers, Durkheim may be seen as a secular "priest," while Weber acted as a lone
virtuoso, a "prophetic" figure committed to a "metaphysic of human heroism" (Mitzman, 1971).

Now, in regard to comparing and contrasting the work of Durkheim and Weber, it is striking to note that two giants of contemporary sociology have chosen to oppose each other on precisely the question of the degree of significant convergence between our classical founding fathers— I refer to Parsons on one side and Bendix on the other. Bendix (1971a) and Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg (1975c) have been the most insistently critical of Parsons' claim for convergence. Whereas Parsons claimed methodological convergence, Bendix and Pope draw the contrast between Durkheim and Weber very sharply indeed. So sharply, in fact, that Parsons was moved to rebuke Bendix's (1971a) characterization as "a caricature of Durkheim" (Parsons, 1972b:200; see also 1973:177). I am inclined to agree with Parsons on this score. For Bendix presumes that the key difference between these pioneers is their attitude toward functional analysis; yet Bendix failed to cite Albert Pierce's (1960) attempt to dissolve the retroactive claims of the functionalists on Durkheim. Bendix generally fails to illumine the differences between these pioneers because he tacitly uses Durkheim as a rhetorical foil to attack Parsons' hegemony. Indeed, Bendix's thinly-veiled polemic simply makes Durkheim the tool of his invidious comparison of the supposed Weber-Bendix versus Durkheim-Parsons alignment. Ironically, one of the reasons Bendix's brief review fails to illumine is that his attack on Parsonian functionalism (using Durkheim as a symbolic third term) unwittingly presumes Parsons' own very special interpretation of Durkheim in the first place! Had Bendix's real purpose been to illumine the past and potential relations between the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, he might have begun by questioning Parsons' orthodox account, instead of tacitly embracing it, and merely inverting the valuation as so many of Parsons' rhetorical opponents are wont to do (eg. see John Horton, 1964). Had Bendix undertaken an independent, full-scale, in-depth com-
parison and contrast, he could not have failed to note the very real convergence between Durkheim and Weber on Bendix's own ground—namely, historical sociology! Had they posed the question in these open terms, rather than accepting Parsons' account, Bendix and Pope and friends might have spared us their unfortunate conclusion that sociological theory must remain forever sundered between these two giants and their contemporary epigoni (e.g. see Bendix, 1971:298; Pope et al, 1975c:426).

Undoubtedly, the fundamental source of the very real and numerous differences between Durkheim and Weber, which cannot be attributed primarily to "temperament and circumstance" as Bendix suggests, must be sought in some notion of two different traditions. Although I differ from both of their conceptions of precisely how to characterize these differing traditions, both Bendix and Parsons agree that Durkheim and Weber came from two different traditions. But exactly to what types of traditions should we attribute "une opposition sourde" of Durkheim and Weber, their mutual unawareness? To national-political traditions? But we have already criticized this common and questionable practice in the preceding chapter. To intellectual traditions? This is what Bendix and Parsons seem to propose, albeit in different ways. A second important question is: even granting these crucial differences of experience, orientation, and purpose, do such loyalties to variant traditions necessarily preclude significant methodological and substantive complementarity and convergence crucial to the re-unification of sociocultural theory?

Perhaps we would do well, first, to recall Tiryakian's delicate rephrasing of our present problem. "One way we could interpret their mutual unawareness as judged from their writings is that this may have been not so much a case of mutual ignorance as a case of ignoring each other" (1966:334-5). It does not really suffice here to suggest that Weber was not really considered a sociologist at the time that
Durkheim was so regarded, for Durkheim was extremely wide read, and his *L'Année sociologique* contained reviews of many different types of literature in the human sciences.

No, the problem is best posed sociologically—it is not a question of the lack of knowledge, but rather a tacit silence in which both parties apparently conspired. Now, while plausible, neither Tiryakian's nor Bendix's conjectures about background factors of "temperament and circumstances" mitigating against direct acknowledgement are sufficient.

Our solution to Tiryakian's mystery problem, and our resolution of the Parsons-Bendix debate, should be based upon deeper reasons, upon sociological reasons. Even though neither Durkheim nor Weber shied away from controversy, neither even attempted to engage the other in open critical review or debate. For instance, as Lukes observes, Durkheim "... offered abundant argumentative refutations of general sociological approaches and methods that differed from his own—such as those of Marx, J. S. Mill, Espinas, Tarde, Simmel, Giddings, Albion Small, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Alfred Vierkandt, Gaston Richard, and very many others—in fact, those of all his contemporaries" (1973:404-5)—with the single exception of the greatest of them all, Max Weber. For his own part, Weber's combativeness is well-known. However illuminating such a clash might have been, we are left only with the fact that such a confrontation never took place. Whether it never occurred because nothing was felt to be at stake, or whether too much, remains pure speculation. Thus, as Tiryakian himself acknowledges, Durkheim and Weber's non-relationship should be assigned a different meaning from the revealing antagonisms between, say, Leibnitz and Newton.

Still, the question remains: to what types of traditions should we attribute Durkheim and Weber's "une opposition sourde?" Tiryakian first speculates that "nationalism" and a kind of "Olympian aloofness" may have been at the heart of their apparent duet of silence. Raising again the question of the sociological salience of silence, Tiryakian asks, if
we encounter unexpected massive and sustained silence, is this not due:

... to the fact that mental products are so related to their sociocultural setting that even the towering figures of the same social science may operate from sufficiently different presuppositions concerning social reality, and concerning what is socially relevant, that they will know of each other without knowing each other (1966:336)?

Yes, of course, generally that is the question here. But precisely what mental products are related to what elements in the sociocultural setting, and to what types of presuppositions, so that silence shades over into ignorance? Let us briefly explore Parsons and Bendix's opposing answers.

Parsons, of course, portrayed Durkheim and Weber as moving inexorably toward Parsons' own general systems synthesis, as each pioneer overcame the limitations in their respective traditions--positivism and idealism (see also H.S. Hughes, 1958). While much truth remains in this claim, unfortunately Parsons, like Robert Merton (see B. Nelson, 1972b), seldom returned to develop some of the profound themes of his youth. Had he returned to a full-scale revision, Parsons would have had to acknowledge that the dialectical tensions in Durkheim's thought came from his being rhetorically involved on multiple polemical fronts simultaneously against three major opposing cultural traditions (see also Giddens, 1972a; Lukes, 1973). And almost no one has yet adequately clarified the opposition between Durkheim's own tradition--the Franco-Latin Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition--and the preceding Catholic Hierarchical-Metaphysical Cultural Tradition. One does not adequately describe this tradition simply by calling it "Cartesian" as Parsons does (see also 1968a). Consequently, Parsons would have had to reconstruct the very crux of his story--namely, the misportrayal of positivism as synonymous with modern science. (This identification seriously misled Pope, 1973, who only compounded Parsons' error when the former denied that Durkheim was a positivist).
Bendix, in opposition to Parsons, and what they have both taken to be Durkheim's doctrine, argued that Durkheim and Weber belonged to two different intellectual traditions -- the Baconian or Saint-Simonian, on the one hand, and the Burckhardtian or Tocquevillian, respectively. But it is unclear from Bendix's association whether these earlier thinkers directly and fundamentally influenced our twin sociological pioneers, or merely whether they can be usefully classified, for certain purposes, as independently following in the same general stream of thought. Since the latter appears to be the case, I do not find the classification very revealing.

C. **Dialogues Across the Centuries: Durkheim and Weber's Cultural Traditions**

In contrast to both Parsons and Bendix, I propose that we both explain sociologically the differences between Durkheim and Weber, and then use sociologically this analytical tool to illumine their prime points of convergence and their lasting significance. I suggest that structures of consciousness as deeply rooted and felt as those of Durkheim and Weber's are generally intimately related to structures of conscience. Therefore, I propose that we first seek out the fundamental roots of these twin structures of conscience and consciousness in religio-cultural, rather than purely intellectual, traditions. Specifically, I propose that we connect Weber and Durkheim to partially opposing cultural traditions.

I shall view cultural historical traditions as a basic explanatory unit, comparable to classes or socio-economic status. As such, macro cultural traditions cross-cut national boundaries, time periods, and cultural spheres, on the one hand, and act as key links between societies and civilizations on the other. As one observer suggested about the relations between Marx and Weber: "... they need to be understood in the light of the universes of meaning from which they drew their sustenance and to the progress of which they
hoped to make lasting contributions" (B. Nelson, 1965:150). These deep loyalties to culturally assigned life-tasks are perhaps best understood as "dialogues across the centuries," as Nelson suggests.

Now, Durkheim embraced his life-task within the context of the Franco-Latin Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition. Perhaps Durkheim is best characterized, therefore, as a positivist moral philosopher who worked sociologically, as a "laic" intellectual reformer who sought to construct sociologically a new base for secular morality, an "unrepentant rationalist" who dreamed of dialectically resolving the evolutionary dilemmas (see Giddens, 1971a, 1972a) of modern man in a transitional era, and so on and so forth. The origins, sanctions, and continued moral and intellectual sustenance of the former's structure of conscience and consciousness can be found in the continuing and mounting "laic" reaction to the lingering medieval hierocratic control of European life by the Catholic Cultural Tradition. Its preparatory phase dates from Abelard on (eg. see B. Nelson, 1973a,b), and the successful scholastic sedimentation of rationality and a kind of autonomy of the individual intellect and conscience into European and especially French life. This was followed much later by a late medieval and Renaissance interlude (eg. with the varied efforts of Rabelais, Montaigne, Bodin, etc.) The second and early modern stage begins, of course, with Descartes, as the founder of the modern rationalist stream, and with Pascal (a Jansenist—a kind of Calvinistic Catholicism), as the model of the ascetic and mystic strains of "laic morality" and existentialism in French culture. The enigmatic Pierre Bayle stands as a paradoxical, but in many ways paradigmatic, transitional figure from the earlier religious stress on conscience to the emerging emphasis on the independent critical, rational intellect. This interlude was succeeded by the first fully modern phase—that brilliant, massive, and sustained series of Enlightenment generations of French "laic" intellectualistic moral reformers—
refer to men such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau (a seminal figure because he was a direct link between the progressive Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction), Diderot, Turgot, Condorcet, and so on, a list far too long for this page. Then came another crucial phase, with the turn away from the critical or negative thrust of the Enlightenment and the excesses of the French Revolution, with the emergence of "positivism" with Saint-Simon as the prescient prophet of social and moral reconstruction. The pioneer of positivism was followed, of course, by his more systematic disciple Comte, who combined in characteristic fashion (to the puzzlement of many purely intellectual historians) both the scientific and moral reformist strains so pervasive in French culture. This great second phase was accompanied by the brilliant incisiveness of the nostalgic realist Tocqueville, the right-wing, fully nostalgic, but even themselves curiously empirical Catholic reactionaries such as de Bonald and de Maistre, and the left-wing realists and positivists, among whom were Balzac, Renan, Taine, Tarde, and so on.

In sum, Durkheim, coming with the following generation, can be considered as a brilliant and almost ideal-typical representation of these uniquely contending "collective representations" in French culture--the rationalist, individualist, and intellectualist streams on the one hand, and the "laic" moral reformist stream on the other. This deeply embedded strategem of the non-religious laity arguing critically and anti-metaphysically for the moral reform of both the hierocracy and the nation's morals is a phenomenon peculiar to what I have come to call the Franco Positivist (anti-metaphysical, yet rational) "Laic" (secular moral reformist) Cultural Tradition. It is curious that few have noticed that positivism is a "dis-ease" most often emerging in Catholic culture areas. It is even more curious that positivism, defined basically as a world-view rooted in a split between faith and reason or between reason and experience, was first first constructed by the hierocracy itself (nominalism,
"fictionalism," "probabilism," --see Kolakowski, 1968) in an attempt to secure the "deposit of faith" by walling it off from doubt and wayward attack. As so often happens, however, ideas get away from their pioneers. For centuries, the French moral and intellectual reformers were engaged in an epic struggle with the hierocracy over the legitimate foundations of moral authority and intellectual decision. Positive science served as a tool in their struggle to disengage from traditional claims on man, and as the tool by which they sought to construct a "laic" morality. Transcendental truth claims had to be rejected out of hand, for such "essentialist" appeals blocked the reformers' "laic" drive to construct "existentially" rooted structures of conscience and consciousness. Against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," to use Weber's term, the French and Latin "prophets" and "laic" moral reformers, whether from left or right, raised the counter-claims of "Individual Conscience" and "Reason," both based upon the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" embedded deep within each individual, and upon the "Book of Nature." The dual insistence on science and moral reform was not an anomaly in Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim, for it was precisely this insistent linkage which lay at the heart of this particular cultural tradition. Indeed, how else are we to understand Durkheim's drive to construct a "science of the moral life," his key role in "laic" educational training in the Third Republic, and his assiduous pursuit of sociology as the modern form of societal self-consciousness destined to replace religion itself?

Weber, on the other hand, emerged out of a "dialogue across the centuries" within the last major modern tradition to crystallize--namely, the Romantic-Idealist ("mystic") Cultural Tradition. Perhaps Weber is best characterized as a tragic existential world-historical anatomist of the dilemmas of the opposing forces of charisma and rationalization, as an intellectualistic, "religiously unmusical," virtuoso, caught between Romantic-Lutheran and Calvinist religio-cul-
tural streams, a "Sisyphean hero of an age of ultimate trials" (Nelson, 1965a:163), a moral realist committed to "meeting the demands of the day" with a "metaphysic of human heroism" (Mitzman, 1971) and so on and so forth. Weber's subjectivity, his sense of "utmost inwardness," combined with his rigorous ascetic rational intellectualism, his opposition to the fragmentation of man and the lack of integral wholeness in the modern world stemming from the latent hoped for Faustian universality, his Pauline-Lutheran-Romantic opposition between Geist and Welt, between Spirit and Mechanism, Life and Death, his virtuoso encyclopedic personal knowledge, and his ransacking of the universe of human history for illumination on dilemmas posed by these generic polarities these and other traits mark Max Weber, with a character indelibilis, as an ambivalent member of what I have come to call the Romantic-Idealist Cultural Tradition. As Benjamin Nelson has suggested: "However they may oppose one another, both Weber and Marx are the heirs, executors, and gravediggers of the German Idealist Tradition" (1965a: 153). Further, Nelson notes: "Weber's Pauline accents present the sharpest contrast to Marx's Johanne vision" (1965a: 163). And again, "... Weber reminds one of Luther's reluctant heirs .... He is a faithful helmsman remaining at his post though the landmarks are gone. His ultimate antagonists are the confident paragons of the everyday world" (Nelson, 1965a:163). In short, the very structure of Weber's work is ironic and cautionary in a prophetic mode, while that of Durkheim's work is dialectical in a priestly and positivist mode.

Just as the prime rhetorical opponent of Durkheim's tradition was the preceding Catholic tradition, so too the clearest opponent of Weber's cultural tradition was (is) what I have come to call the Anglo Utilitarian-Empiricist ("ascetic") Cultural Tradition. Thus, Durkheim's notion of the intimate intertwining of structures of conscience and consciousness and their sociocultural bases, and Weber's opposition
between "priests" and "prophets" together with the "laity" on the one hand, and between "mystics" and "ascetics" on the other, serve as my prime analytical anchors by which to classify modern cultural traditions.

Now, clearly the prehistory of this tradition goes back at least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before that to the late medieval mystics, to thinkers such as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, to the tertiary urban sects, especially the brotherhoods and sisterhoods scattered along the Rhine and the Low Countries. This religio-cultural stream accompanied the proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian structures of conscience in the Lutheran Reformation, especially in terms of its central experience of the angst and deep inner anguish of the "faith-crisis." This aspect of the Reformation was accompanied by a half-invisible, but critically important stream--the intellectualistic and pietistic mysticism of "utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of Sebastian Franck, Schwelenfeld, Valentin Weigel, and especially that ideal-typical representative of the "personal charisma" of an "inner-worldly mystic"--I mean Jacob Boehme. This religio-cultural stream was continued and redirected later by the full-blown Pietism of Spener, Frank, Count Zinzendorf, etc. and a host of similar "world-retreating" Protestant sects. Now, this cultural tradition enjoyed its early prime philosophical expression in the classically influenced Leibnitz, the outstanding polymath of his day. Leibnitz delivered the first fundamental critique of the Anglo atomistic and mechanistic tradition as embodied in Newton's world-vision; but, Newton's philosophy won the day, Leibnitz died almost unnoticed, only to gain final victory three centuries later when German thinkers revolutionized modern physical theory and restricted Newtonian physics. This religio-cultural tradition reached its first classical phase with the Enlightenment generation of Pietists such as Kant, Hamann, and the great Herder. It then exploded in its definitive form of conscience and consciousness with the succeeding generations...
of Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schliermacher, Schelling, the von Humboldt, and so forth. Indeed, it is striking that this massive intellectual and artistic outpouring, in many ways even greater than that of the key generations of the French Enlightenment, was so delayed. Yet, when it finally came, the German reaction to the progressive and disruptive tendencies of the French and Scotch-English cultures was so massive and so rapid, that the Romantic reaction followed the German Enlightenment (i.e. Lessing, Kant, Herder, etc.) so closely as to be almost simultaneous with it rather than sequential. The generation of Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and so on, was followed by that of Dilthey, F. Brentano, Wundt, Hartmann, Nietzsche, Windelband, and so forth. Next came the generation of Toennies, Husserl, Weber, Simmel, Troeltsch, etc., which was followed by Cassirer, Spengler, Scheler, and later Mannheim. In sum, emerging first in Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and then spreading across Europe and America, the Romantic cultural tradition crystallized out of the progressive secularization of the continuing mysticism of the "spiritual radicals" and their descendants, the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith crisis," assorted oriental and gnostic theosopies, Leibnitzian rationalism, and the later pietistic cult of inwardness and anguished subjectivity as these ethical and experiential orientations were secularized or translated into art, poetry, music, philosophy, and social thought. The Romantic reaction against the "progressive" trends of the modern world continues to inform countercultural movements to this very day.

Seen in this way, Durkheim embraced a very different cultural and historical task than did Weber. This is why, as Carl Becker observed in his classic *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*:

... it is true of ideas, as of men, that they cannot fight unless they occupy the same ground: ideas that rush toward each other on different levels of apprehension will pass without conflict or mutual injury because they never establish contact, never collide (1932:122-23).
With this brief review (see Part II of this Book also), I believe that we can more adequately address and resolve a legitimate and most intriguing question in the history of sociology: namely, why did the two most significant pioneers of modern sociological theory not make contact, much less collide? Now, is this lack of paradigmatic contact among our pioneers one reason why today we still lack a unified doctrine? That our discipline is still split between seemingly closed contending factions? Peace treaties, such as Bendix counsels, which hermetically seal off one aspect of reality will not suffice. For if the goal of science is integrated truth and in-depth, universal significance, then how has it been possible for both contemporary and classical sociologists to sustain such massive "ignorance"? Ultimately, the mystery lies, of course, in man himself. Such questions are fundamental and the problem is eternal. It is the sociocultural counterpart to the perennial problem of "theodicy" in religion. If God is good, then why does He allow evil to pervade our lives—why do the good die young, why is life a veil of tears, how are we to distinguish good from evil when they are so often bound up together? Here we ask: if the explanatory principles of our human science are universal, and generic human and historical experience comparable, they why cannot we agree on its meaning? In both cases, we must explain why unity and harmony has not been attained; what are the obstacles blocking our path? How was it possible for highly sophisticated sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber, who roamed the world of history and philosophy, to entertain evidential canons so incommensurable that they permitted themselves to ignore each others work? How could their "relevancy of knowledge" structures, their "root metaphors" and "dictionaries," their procedural and applicability canons be so different? In short, how could their paradigms differ so radically?

No such easy answers, which conceal more than they reveal, such as "temperament and circumstance," will suffice.
For such differences are not superficial or idiosyncratic; rather, they are fundamental. Only loyalties and orientations concerning the most basic meanings of existence can have this wide, deep, and sustained effect. Only "collective representations" which constitute the very foundations of conscience and consciousness can be this important. Only their deep and abiding loyalties to their own religio-cultural traditions begins to explain why our founding fathers spoke so directly and meaningfully to us, but managed to ignore each other.

Therefore, my first answer to Tiryakian's "mystery problem"—what explains the "mutual unawareness" of Durkheim and Weber—is that they worked out of fundamentally different (though related) cultural historical traditions. They embraced very different life-tasks; thus, their basic perceptions, analytical oppositions, problems, case-studies, intentions, and so on stood apart. Indeed, perhaps their clear and strong commitments to their culturally inherited prime tasks helps explain why both Durkheim and Weber continue to appeal so strongly to us today. For these thinkers provided us with a series of classical statements conveying many of the crucial insights generated by their respective religio-cultural traditions into the dilemmas of social existence and the significance of the curious turnings taken by sociocultural evolution. In other words, both Durkheim and Weber can be taken as almost ideal-typical representatives of the best their respective cultural traditions have to offer the sciences of man. Perhaps this is why Durkheim and Weber have become constitutive symbols, veritable "collective representations," for modern sociology.

Now, the second, and even more compelling reason why both Durkheim and Weber continue to exercise such a hold over the sociological imagination is precisely because they offer us a way beyond the partialities of rhetoric to the unifying universalities of dialectic. For while serving as ideal typical representations of the best insights of their
cultural traditions into the dilemmas of modern existence, their personal acknowledgement (see Michael Polanyi, 1958) of the truths they discovered inevitably transcended the limitations of their very different heritages. Although Durkheim and Weber worked out of different cultural traditions, both made it their central life's work to address apparent antinomies and historical ironies. And both of them pursued these dilemmas so assiduously that inevitably they broke through the restrictive definitions placed upon these received problems by their own cultural traditions. In this way, the work of both Durkheim and Weber rose to a new level of universal significance and truth. In short, the same faithfulness to resolving fundamental dilemmas that revealed them as exemplars of the best of their respective cultural traditions, also led them, by the very logic of their quest, to transcend the limitations of their cultural inheritance by rising to a new level of universal significance. It is this profound achievement which ultimately makes both Durkheim and Weber so significant for the future of the human sciences.

D. A Partial Inventory of Important Complementarities and Convergences in the Work of Durkheim and Weber

One of the first problems we face in this regard is the lack of systematic and deeply informed comparisons and contrasts of the special sociologies of Durkheim and Weber; for example, their sociologies of religion or law. In addition, the complexity of both pioneer's thought, their devotion to empirical truth, the multitude of topics each successively addressed, and their commitment to irony or resolving traditional antinomies, meant that both the work of Durkheim and Weber is literally bursting with apparent contradictions, inconsistencies, "loose ends," apparent dilemmas. Indeed, as Lukes (1973) notes, today there abound "many different Durkheims," as there are "many Webers." Sometimes it seems as if any set of claims on either Durkheim or Weber can be more or less effectively countered by textual evidence
to the contrary. As with Scripture, each pioneer's "charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974) can be cited for everyman's own special purpose. But, after all, is this not the ironic fate of all exemplars, all guiding paradigms? While we may wish that universality should be the prime characteristic of all constitutive models, the very same ability to encompass ever-more diverse aspects means that, often as not, paradigms almost necessarily become protean, capable of eliciting myriad meanings. Might we not call this phase of the eternal dialectic of "merger and division" (K. Burke, 1969) the "proteanization of paradigms?"

Now, instead of tacitly accepting Parsonian orthodoxy on Durkheim, and then resolutely polemicizing against the former's convergence thesis, as has been Bendix's and Pope and friends' rhetorical ploy, I would argue, on the contrary, that Parsons' special generic focus held him back from making his claim for convergence as strong as it might have been. In the final analysis, Parsons must be given his due, for the work of Weber and Durkheim did converge in many significant ways. Tronically, as suggested earlier, the strongest basis of convergence is in terms of historical and cultural sociology, Bendix's own grounds. Doubtless, there are many differences between Durkheim and Weber, as Bendix, Pope, and others have informed us. But let us next explore some of the unrecognized ways in which they came to fit together.

1. Some Important Methodological Complementarities Between Durkheim and Weber

Let us first inventory some of the points of methodological complementarity between Durkheim and Weber. Complementarity is here regarded as a relationship in which one part completes or fills out the other. Each perspective thus mutually supplies what is lacking in the other, so that an integral whole emerges. Out of this mutuality a complete and adequate interpretive model may emerge.
a. Durkheim's general evolutionism is complemented by Weber's concern with specific evolution. The former's focus on continuity is complemented by Weber's focus on transformations and difference. More specifically:

i. Durkheim's general evolutionary perspective allows us to set aside Weber's professed nominalism (which Weber didn't allow to severely restrict him, see Gerth and Mills, 1946). For when Weber came to give his work an explicit theoretical framework, he unfortunately took over the Simmelian interaction paradigm (Nelson, 1969a). This micro-interactional perspective blocked Weber off from recognizing the significance of his own developing "logics in use," as he came to pioneer an "in-depth comparative and historical differential sociology of sociocultural process." Specially important for our present purposes is their growing use of the civilizational perspective as a necessary tool in their wide-ranging investigations.

ii. Durkheim's generic and genetic-evolutionary emphasis on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and the person serves as a much-needed complement to Weber's slighting of ethnographic evidence, and his almost exclusive concern with civilizational scale morphologies (eg. the world-religions).

iii. Durkheim's emphasis on the continuity of sociocultural process between primitive and modern societies (eg. versus Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema), provides a much-needed complement to Weber's almost exclusive emphasis on the major evolutionary differentiations and breakthroughs from one morphological type to the next.

iv. Conversely, Weber's proper and profound concern with specific evolution, with actual historical breakthroughs, involving the specific complex of transformations that led from one type to the next on the main, secondary, and even stable peripheral lines of sociocultural evolution, complements Durkheim's far more limited general evolutionism. Even though Durkheim's metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life was multiinelineal in that it implied lower branches and survivals, nonetheless, Durkheim maintained an abstracted "birds eye view" of general evolutionary processes and the resulting mainline. Many have criticized Durkheim's lack of historical specification.

While Durkheim provides us with a processual or general evolutionary perspective, Weber provides us with untold analytical insights into breakthroughs and de-
velopmental polarities—in short, a differential sociology of sociocultural process.

It was precisely this lack of comparison cases, this lack of comparative and differential sociology, which led William Runciman to flatly declare that Durkheim's sociology of religion was "fundamentally misconceived." It was not, however, for Runciman simply did not perceive Durkheim's logic of returning to the primitive sacral womb. But Durkheim's model is incomplete, and it is only when we combine both Durkheim and Weber's interpretive frameworks in this regard that we may approach a necessary and sufficient model.

b. Weber's phenomenological approach provides a much needed complement to Durkheim's rather positivistic, early mechanistic model of one-way causality. Conversely, Durkheim's concern with the elaboration of generic symbolic processes as deeply embedded "structures" (as in the structuralists, eg. see Piaget, 1971) complements Weber's typological morphologies. Further, the multi-valency of Weber's "logics-in-use" complement Durkheim's less complex analytical approaches. Weber's constant rotating of his analytical matrix supplements Durkheim's more straightforward analyses. Durkheim's careful preliminary philosophical posing of his problems supplements Weber's reluctance (eg. see opening pages of his Sociology of Religion) to enter into definitional problems. Finally, Weber's ironic view of unintended consequences of sociocultural processes complements Durkheim's dialectical view of history.

2. In terms of historical process, Durkheim and Weber substantively converged in a number of ways, including:

a. Their central concern with the changing grounds of legitimate moral authority. Both Durkheim and Weber believed that the origin and transformation of moral rules and intellectual concepts were linked with the structure and process of collectivities. Both believed that changes in the structures of conscience generally preceded changes in the structures of consciousness.

b. Both were basically concerned with the long-term de-collectivization of the ruling legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness, especially in terms of the passage from traditional to modern forms.
c. Both were fundamentally concerned with ever-widen-
ing structures of social fraternization, and the ex-
tension of the tribal bond to more universalistic
brotherhoods. The progressive extension of the social
bond as it increasingly cross-cut previously closed
or restrictive in and out-groups constitutes a basic
focus in both Durkheim's and Weber's work.

d. As a corollary, both perceived that the progressive
extension of the social bond depended upon the univer-
salization of collective symbolic forms. Both Durkheim
and Weber thus saw a progressive passage in cultural
evolution from concrete, tribal, fused collective sym-
bolism toward increasingly abstract, universalizable,
internally consistent, and rational symbolic forms.
In short, universalizable and rationalizable symbols
constitute the basis of complex civilizational bonds.
As societies evolve, so too must their prime symbolic
guidance systems.

e. Durkheim's insights into the importance of the "col-
lective conscience" and "mechanical solidarity" in
terms of what I have called the "primitive sacral
complex" is complemented by Weber's insights into
sacral-magical stereotyping in the "enchanted garden"
of primitive and archaic societies. Recently, Benjamin
Nelson (1973a) has combined the mutually reinforcing
insights of Durkheim and Weber in this regard in
terms of what he calls the first basic world-histori-
cal structure of consciousness--the "sacral-magical
collective conscience."

f. In evolutionary terms, one of the prime points of con-
verging interest between Durkheim and Weber was their
powerful emphasis on the formative influence of reli-
gious ethical-legal systems on the construction of
an in-depth integration of personality structures
through a progressively deepening attachment of the
individual to an ever-growing "cosmos of obligations."

g. Both Durkheim and Weber had equally significant in-
sights into the intimate relationships between the
evolving autonomy of the person, and progressive uni-
versalization and rationalization in the grounds of
"moral discourse" (see Leites, 1974; Nelson, 1973a).
The development of the intellectually and morally au-
tonomous personage on the world-historical level de-
pends upon a corresponding autonomization, rational-
ization, and universalization in the legitimate
grounds of moral and intellectual authority on the
civilizational and inter-civilizational level.

h. Therefore, Durkheim and Weber both focussed much of
their analytical energy on the significance of chang-
ing rates and lines of development of major cultural forms—especially law and religion (see Nelson, 1972a, 1973a; Parsons, 1975b). Both of these pioneers were concerned throughout much of their work with unraveling the complex and changing interconnections between these collective moral and intellectual normative structures and personality, institutional, and cultural processes.

i. Further, we should not fail to recognize their joint emphasis on the world-historical significance of Christianity in these terms as it transformed Western European civilization. Especially important here was their estimate of the uniquely powerful impact of Calvinism, and its later secularized forms.

j. Finally, in the face of the impending doom of World War I in Europe, both Durkheim and Weber, from opposite sides of the conflict, issued urgent calls in their own ways for the sacrifice of ego and eros and the imperative need for universal logos if our civilization was to survive.

E. Durkheim and Weber, Anomie and Protestantism

Although almost forty years ago Parsons based his reputation on the convergence between Durkheim and Weber—focusing especially on what he called the epochal significance of his discovery of the inner links between the internalization of moral sanctions and anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos—it is curious that few others have pursued this line of thought. Perhaps we haven't pursued the question of the degree of significant historical and cultural relations between anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos because of the pervasive nominalism of our own culture.

Although many secondary observers have compared and contrasted various aspects of the work of Durkheim and Weber, few have noted the general convergences just enumerated. Fewer still have realized the potential significance of these links between anomie and Protestantism. For our own purposes Durkheim's linkage of modern suicides with Protestant individualism and modern drives for progress and perfection is as important as Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the most dynamic and stressful features of the modern world. In
contrast especially to Durkheim's uncritical incorporation of the abstracted pre-socialized ego of the Anglo Utilitarians and the Romantics alike, however, Weber's achievement here lies precisely in first having shown the historical and cultural uniqueness of the ethos of market capitalism, and in revealing its fundamental normative presuppositions. Clearly, Weber penetrated far deeper into the inner heart of Protestantism and its cultural impact on the modern world, into Western development generally, and into the comparative-historical differential sociology of the world-religions, problems hardly addressed by Durkheim.

Because of my high expectations engendered by his generally excellent work, one of the more disappointing failures to me was Anthony Giddens' 1971(a) book *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*. Giddens' excellent reviews of Durkheim's thought, and his illuminating comparative exegesis of Durkheim, Marx, and Weber prepared the way, but this particular pay-off never came. Satori never dawned; the "starry winged messenger" present at creation never visited. To my mind, a young intellectual historian, with whom I might often disagree, has come closer than most to recognizing the significance of the potential convergence between Durkheim and Weber in terms of anomie and the Protestant Ethos. Dominick LaCapra was a student of H. Stuart Hughes, the Harvard intellectual historian who followed Parsons in his well-known study of the reorientation of turn-of-the-century European thought, *Consciousness and Society* (1958). Led by these direct, seminal background relations, LaCapra seized upon these potential relations between our pioneers. In speaking of Durkheim and Weber, LaCapra rightly observes:

If asked to name the sociological classic par excellence, most sociologists would hesitate between *Suicide* and *The Protestant Ethic*. But the extent to which these two books are complementary as contributions to the analysis of modern social and cultural history has been little recognized (1972:177).

Now, in reviewing Tiryakian's mystery problem, itself probably suggested by the curious lack of development of what
was claimed to be the Parsonian consensus, and noting the contrasts in their style of their work, LaCapra reflects: "The apparent paradox ... is that on the basis of such antithetical assumptions, Durkheim and Weber arrived at largely complementary research interests and specific analyses in their investigation of culture and society" (1972:179). This is especially true of Weber's observations on "the unprecedented inner loneliness of the individual" in the "Protestant Era," for as LaCapra, after many others, notes: "Protestantism reduced to a minimum the nexus between the symbolic cult and the existential community which Durkheim was later to present as the essence of the religious phenomena" (1972:179).

Where Durkheim stressed the role of anomie in modern history, Weber emphasized the birth of a new nomos or ethic. But Weber himself tended to situate the new "nomie" on the formally rational level of the adjustment of means to ends; and he perceived a certain type of institutionalized anomie on the level of ends in modern society (LaCapra, 1972:181).

I believe that LaCapra is right, and the ambiguous combination of two different types of anomie begins to indicate the nature of the inner relations between anomie and the Protestant Ethos. It was the final and irremovable snapping of the once-intimate links between microcosm and macrocosm that relegated post-Protestant man to substantive irrationality or purely faith-structures of consciousness when faced with ultimate questions. The inner connection here is between the "... element of institutionalized anomie or limitlessness on the level of ends which, according to Durkheim, was the negation of substantive rationality" and the "... combination of institutionalized limitlessness on the level of ends and the fundamentally rational discipline on the level of means which seemed to be the truly distinctive criterion of the Capitalist ethos in Weber's mind" (LaCapra, 1972: 182).

Further, we should notice that, in terms of Durkheim's suicide schemas, Weber's insights into the substantive irrationality of Utilitarian ethical dogma, the very paradigm of
functional irrationality, whose calculus can be more or
less mechanically applied to any goal whatsoever, closely
complements Durkheim's view that such a cultural logic san­
tioning an "infinity of dreams and desires" is anomic. Some­
how, just as we have lost a sense of balance or proportion
in the scale and speed of our everyday lives, so too have
we "disenchanted" modern men, having repudiated tele­
logy and metaphysics as necessarily a part of the "enchanted
garden" we have heroically forsworn, lost a clear and com­
pelling sense of substantive rationality. To what purpose,
to what end do we direct our lives? That is the agonized
question which both Durkheim and Weber raised. Who else
but Weber explained how our religiously and culturally
sanctioned "infinity of dreams and desires," sedimented
into the structure and phenomenology of everyday life,
could come to this—I mean the "unprecedented inner lonli­
ness of the individual," and finally, the "iron cage" which
lies at the heart of the closed, infinite world of suicide?
In short, the lack of proportion in our desires and daily
lives, and the loss of substantive rationality are two key
underlying links between anomie and the secularization of
the Protestant Ethos.

Finally, I wish to emphasize again that it has not
yet been sufficiently recognized that Durkheim's prime point
of departure in Suicide was always a deep concern with the
"infinity sickness" of the modern world. Thus, Durkheim's
"philosophy of human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972), and his
classically inspired notion of the "golden mean" as the
source of health, wholeness, and well-being served as coun­
terweights to what he perceived to be modern "moral anar­
chy." Indeed, after criticizing Durkheim's doctrine of homo
duplex, I find his concern with anomie and egoisme as the
"infinity of dreams and desires" culturally and historical­
ly inexplicable without reference to Weber's notion of the
crucial importance of Protestant ascetics and mystics em­
brace of infinite tasks within the world.
CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA

Preface. Granting certain ambiguities and flaws in Durkheim's first schema, and granting crucial shifts in the general grounds of his argument, how shall we now set about reconstructing his schema of suicide? Now, almost everyone who has explored his classic work, *Suicide*, has recognized that Durkheim's theses require extensive interpretation. Indeed, interpreting and reconstructing Durkheim's schemas of suicide has become a minor sociological industry (see the appendix to the present dissertation).

Yet, there is little agreement concerning the meaning of anomie and egoisme (see appendix). Present research utilizing so-called anomia scales is not only severely flawed, but hardly related to Durkheim's original ideas (see McCloskey, 1974). Let us, then, first explore Durkheim's schema of suicide as a paradigm in crisis from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We shall look at the process underlying this breakdown in terms of the "routinization of charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974). Then, out of both these philosophical reflections and a detailed examination of alternative competing reconstructions of the meaning of anomie and egoisme found in the appendix, I shall briefly outline certain general and specific criteria for a more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Next, I shall very briefly lodge some further historical objections against Durkheim's first schema which we examined in Book Two. Fourth, I shall briefly explore other observers' insights into Durkheim's second schema. Fifth, I shall explore rather extensively Durkheim's argument regarding the social element in suicide, especially in terms of cultural "suicidogenetic cur-
rents." Finally, I shall conclude by outlining the essential logics underlying the second schema of suicide.

A. A Paradigm in Crisis: Which Way Out?

What does anomie mean, precisely? Is anomie synonymous with normlessness? And what does normlessness mean, anyway? Is anomie equivalent to anarchy, to the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma?" Does anomie refer to a psychological, a structural, or cultural condition? Or to all three? What are the relations between anomie and egoisme? Between these and altruisme and fatalisme? If anomie especially has become a protean word (see appendix), conjuring up what we will, can we restore its significance by giving it truer form and definition, by assigning it a "name and local habitation?" If anomie and egoisme truly constitute one of the fundamental paradigms in modern sociology, then how is it possible that we still struggle so to bring them into clear and consistent focus?

Further, is there a way out of the crisis of conflicting interpretations of the logic and meaning of Suicide? How are we to successfully reconcile the ever-mounting plethora of diverse and even opposing secondary interpretations? Is there a way we could bring together, for example, both those who wish to reduce Durkheim's typology down to one lowest common denominator, and those, on the other hand, who wish to rescue the distinctness of all four types of suicide (see appendix)?

Now, clearly the uncertain fate of anomie (and egoisme) serves as prime examples of a paradigm in crisis. But which way out? As always, the question of an appropriate "therapeutic" rests upon some prior "theodicy,"--an explanation of how we "got into the mess in the first place." In this case, I suggest we explain the source of our paradigmatic crisis in terms of the "routinization of charisma on deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974; also appendix). This means that as Durkheim's fundamental notion of anomie was accepted, incorporated into mainline sociology, and then extended, it underwent various...
metamorphoses in meaning, until it became routinized into the practice of everyday social science in terms of successive anomia scales. In this process of progressive routinization or running down, however, Durkheim's original meanings became trivialized or lost.

Now, those who would engage in "normal science" should stand ready, at all times, to respond to a fundamental question. Can you effectively demonstrate that your conceptualization and testing of the "founding father's" paradigm, on which you base your research and claim our attention, is legitimate? There appear here to be two acceptable responses: either set the question aside by constructing one's own new independent paradigm, or justify one's own new version of the famous paradigm in terms of a systematic, and historically informed exegesis?

There is, of course, a third alternative unfortunately favored by a seeming majority of "scientific sociologists" these days. Perhaps the tacit canons of this expression of "normal science" favor this option because it is less arduous, affords a guaranteed legitimacy, and insures an immediate claim on our attention. Here, the unwritten strategy for gaining instant legitimacy, without doing the real work, is disarmingly simple, and so universally practiced these days as to now constitute an unquestioned canon of "normal science" in sociology. First, simply begin by usurping some "founding father's" mantle of charisma for one's own efforts, thereby gaining immediate access to our attention. Then, pay one's respects in brief ritual obeisance, and cursorily review the more or less questionable secondary literature. Next, fasten upon some measuring instrument (itself derived from the secondary or even tertiary literature). And then proceed to the "real" task of "scientific sociology" as "normal science"—extending and criticizing others' empirical results through the favored tools of surveys and other statistical methodologies. Seldom do these so-called "scientific sociologists" explicitly and systematically justify
the conceptual foundations of their version of the borrowed paradigm. Nor do they often place the claimed significance of their results in terms of the intentions or intellectual and historical context generating the original paradigm. Nor do they often pause to recognize the critical historical processes on which the original paradigm rested. Far too often we bandy about the terms Protestant and Catholic, for instance, as if they were eternally fixed entities, immune to change. In short, the micro, social psychological, ahistorical, abstracted, largely atheoretical, positivistic biases of contemporary survey research make it almost impossible to recognize the crucial large-scale sociocultural, historical, and phenomenological differences intervening between a founding theorist's original formulations and the complex realities of the present day.

Now, it is important to recognize that the traditional philosophy of science does little to help us understand these processes and find an acceptable way out of the crisis in anomie theory. For our present crisis concerning the original meaning and potential significance of anomie was not the outcome of a systematic "testing of hypotheses," as traditional positivist philosophies of science seem to suggest. Nor was it caused by the accumulation of "anomalies" by "puzzle solving normal scientists" as even the now classic account by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) suggests. On the contrary, fundamental scientific models are neither born nor die because of minor empirical error; many scientists would simply reaffirm their faith in their doctrine, and say with Durkheim, as one story goes, "well, then the facts are wrong." Rather, the Weberian forces of charisma and rationalization are at work in scientific processes as well as others. Thus, if scientific revolutions are based upon the charisma of some cultural model, then the dissatisfaction with the aimless drift and trivialization of these once compelling paradigms in normal science is an initial prerequisite for the re-charismatization of a new scientific
revolution. Equally important is a fundamental critique of the postulates of the depreciated paradigm.

Indeed, conventional wisdom in the philosophy of science dominated by positivist prejudices has persistently mis-portrayed the process of the growth of science in terms of the slow, aggregative notion of "consolidation" and "codification" (ala Merton) of "practical reason," as suggested by their underlying formalistic "hypothetic-deductive" model (eg. see Norman Campbell, 1920). It was against this gradual building block image of the growth of science that Kuhn originally directed his notion of scientific revolutions, and the distinction between "normal" and "revolutionary science." Yet, Kuhn has recently been forced to minimize the sharp earlier contrasts between the two phases (see especially Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). As far as the history of sociology is concerned, the picture is far from clear, especially because we lack detailed case-studies of how revolutions in theory and practice come about.

Fortunately, however, today we possess at least two complementary studies related to the origin and fate of Durkheim's work on anomie--Toby Huff's (1974, 1975) review of the logic of Durkheim's discoveries in Suicide, and my detailed review of the shifts in the paradigm of anomie, especially Merton's version, in the section appended to the present dissertation. Huff demonstrates that Durkheim's achievement in Suicide rested neither on the inductive and multivariate use of statistics, nor upon deduction from abstract principles. Rather, there is a third kind of logic operating at the root of scientific discoveries--namely, abduction or retroduction (see also N.R. Hanson, and the works of C.S. Pierce). As Huff rightly argues, the problem faced by Durkheim was not theory testing, but theory finding; in short, the process of discovery which involves a "gestalt switch" as Hanson suggests. Durkheim's great innovation in Suicide was thus first theoretical, not statistical, for it was a series of theoretical innovations of the
Huff's account is extremely valuable for our present purposes in that he provides us with the first systematic theoretical review of the underlying logic of Durkheim's discovery, which was, of course, very different than that often implied. The common portrayal of the significance of Durkheim's *Suicide* is as the first real breakthrough to scientific (i.e. positivist) sociology (see, for example, John Madge, 1962, Hanan Selvin, 1965). Indeed, Merton himself suggests that Durkheim was led to his theory through examination of suicide statistics. Selvin and others would have us suppose that Durkheim constructed his paradigms through the inherent virtues of multivariate statistical inductive analysis. But Huff rightly notes: "In none of these accounts ... is Durkheim's innovation treated as an abductive inference" (1974:2). All such accounts "... run the risk," Huff argues, "of substituting the logic of proof (or justification) for the logic of discovery." On the contrary, Huff suggests that:

"... if all the crucial variations in the rates of suicide were known to Durkheim (and others) long before 1897 ... then it seems doubtful that the innovative quality of Durkheim's work stems from multivariate analysis or induction by enumeration (1974:3)."

Instead, Huff argues correctly, it seems to me, that:

Durkheim began with puzzling and problematic data and he proceeded abductively, not inductively, to find in them a new pattern and order which would suggest the conditions responsible for the variations in rates of suicide.... What Durkheim sought to discover was a set of social factors of a higher degree of generality and simplicity, which would give a greater order to the data at hand, and thereby provide a more compelling explanation (1974:3).

Now, as I have demonstrated in my detailed review of Durkheim's first schema (see Book Two), Huff is probably correct in arguing against Douglas' (1967:25) thesis that Durkheim began with, and worked within, a preconceived framework. Rather, it should be clear that Durkheim's own theoretic reorganization of puzzling data was often shifting and ambig-
uous. An additional reason for characterizing Durkheim's achievement as one of abduction or theoretical discovery in terms of a kind of gestalt switch is precisely because his theory was in the process of being discovered, constructed, and reconstructed again. That is why we find it shifting grounds at so many points, for Durkheim had not really settled upon one pat answer to explaining the underlying reasons for patterns in suicide rates. It is only our secondary summaries of Durkheim's theories which are clear and neatly consistent.

Indeed, this process of cleaning up or repackaging, or even bowderlizing difficult, inconsistent, or potentially embarrassing paradigms is a constant and seemingly inevitable sociocultural process characteristic of the "routinization of charisma on deposit." Today Durkheim's suicide paradigms have become institutionalized in sociological normal science, and as they are drained of meaning, they are made acceptable for public consumption and to neophytes entering the brotherhood. Yet, ideology, situated power positions, and the pressure of cultural traditions play a greater role in these processes than most textbooks on the history and philosophy of science might care to admit. Indeed, as Kuhn (1962), Huff (1975), Nelson (1967), M. Polanyi (1958), among others, have rightly argued, the history of scientific development is so often falsified (knowingly or not) that one must make it a basic rule to always return to a systematic exegesis of the pioneer's work. We must return to his generating life-context, in order to begin to understand precisely what the problems perceived were, the logics in use, the gestalt switches leading to discoveries and breakthroughs, and thus wherein lies the founding father's lasting significance. This is why I have eschewed yet another neat summary of Durkheim's doctrine in Suicide in terms of some fallacious formula, and have opted instead for an exhaustive review of the texts in question.
I maintain a way out of the morass of collective monologue and amnesia concerning interpretation of the meaning of anomie and Durkheim's suicide paradigms shall not come through more rigorous statistical testing of Durkheim's theory. The way out of the crisis confronting anomie theory does not depend upon the development of a more adequate scaling technique. Nor shall it come about through a superficial criticism of the reliability of Durkheim's official sources of suicide statistics (e.g. see Douglas, 1967). In sum, none of the commonly approved methods of "puzzle solving" in "normal science" will help rescue us from our present predicament. Why? Largely because it was these very same routinizations which got anomie theory in such a bind in the first place! I repeat: the theoretical crisis confronting the profession in terms of one of our root paradigms has not been precipitated by anomalous empirical findings, but by the ever-widening gap between Durkheim's own original paradigm and the conflicting interpretations and sloppy research operationalizations of his explanatory model. Rather, it is a crisis of drift, of theoretical entropy, of the "routinization of charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974).

Now, conflicts in interpretation of a doctrine so complex and multivalent as Durkheim's can only be resolved in terms of a basic conceptual breakthrough in understanding the fundamental "nuclear structure" of his thought. Accordingly, my strategy has been to systematically compare and contrast an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's fundamental paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" of his thought with a systematic review of his special sociology of suicide. Thus, my stratigraphic inquiry in Book One was extended with my topographic inquiry in Book Two. Further, in the first part of Book Three, we reviewed changes in Durkheim's basic premises, and now are about to bring these two overlapping explorations together by reconstructing Durkheim's schema of suicide. By these painstaking means, I have sought to re-enact the process of abduction or ges-
talt switching which Durkheim may have himself experienced as he discovered, constructed, and reshaped his arguments in the first place. Hopefully, our outcomes shall be more consistent, clearer, and at least as profound as his.
C. Some Criteria for a More Adequate Reconstruction of Durkheim's Schema of Suicide

While many have noted that Durkheim's typology in *Suicide* is far from unambiguous (e.g., see Giddens, 1965, 1971b:215; Dohrenwend, 1959:467; Lukes, 1973:218), nevertheless, it continues to command attention to this day. Sociologists of varying persuasions persist in attempts to clarify, reformulate, extend, and operationalize Durkheim's schema of suicide. Others attempt to distill the essential meaning and significance of his pioneering efforts for the philosophy of science (e.g., see Huff, 1975). However, the famous paradigm of anomie has become a protean concept, capable of meaning almost anything, allowing us to conjure up what we will. Today anomie is utilized almost as a world metaphor, and, consequently, has become incredibly elastic, devoid of scientific precision. Anomie—the first sociological concept irrefutably demonstrating the autonomy and significance of "social facts"—is beset by crisis.

One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those who might wish to review the evidence and enter the debate in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of science, the secret key by which we rise above the divisiveness of partisan rhetoric and endemic conflict and then move to the unities of dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigorous standards of logic and evidence can we hope to successfully resolve the cacophany of competing claims and counter-claims or refutations. Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963), the growth of science is fundamentally structured in terms of claims and refutations, ascending through ever-more rigorous agreed-upon rules or canons for resolving conflict. Without these governing norms, the ascent of science proves impossible. The very cumulative nature of science, as opposed to other cultural forms, lies precisely in such unifying norms that
all parties to the debate consent on constantly "raising the ante" to ever-higher levels of universality of evidence and principle. Indeed, as we discovered in Book One, Durkheim himself pioneered analysis of the essentials of this process of universalization and rationalization on the world-historical level.

At the outset, I feel bound to sound the following cautions. I must insist that the following conventional errors in reconstructing Durkheim's typology of suicide simply will not suffice; they should be set aside, once and for all. Anomie cannot be simply equated with "normlessness" (whatever that means, precisely). Nor can anomie be translated baldly as structural-cultural "malintegration," nor as "strain in the relational system of society," nor as so-called "alienation," a feeling of lostness, generalized despair, or a whole host of other "states of mind." Anomie cannot be simply collapsed to "social disorganization," the "lack of structural integration," or "lack of social participation."

Egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered virtuous, ala Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot be justifiably collapsed down into one category, nor can anomie and egoisme be accurately located as two extremes on two continua of integration—structural and normative. Nor can altruisme and fatalisme be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical referents. Such partial accounts slight both Durkheim's doctrine of human nature as homo duplex, and his image of historical development, two crucial factors which we have critically reviewed in the preceding section in so far as they underlay Durkheim's first schema of suicide. In all these versions (see especially the appendix), Durkheim's discussion of the source of insatiable and egoistic passions, and his critical assessment of the broad world-historical processes transforming the basic relations between society, culture, and the person simply drop from view. In short, no egoism and insatiability, and no transforming historical processes,
Let us now move to outline some canons or prerequisites for a more adequate re-interpretation of Durkheim's typology in *Suicide*. First, anyone wishing to enter the lists should meet, or at least revise or challenge, the general hermeneutical canons outlined in the appendix. For our immediate purposes, we may distinguish between general and specific requirements. Besides some truly general canons of science such as consistency, symmetry, truth, significance, and so forth, we may now enumerate the following general requirements forced upon us by our systematic exegesis of the underlying logic of Durkheim's paradigmatic or "nuclear structure."

1. **General Paradigmatic Requirements**

   Any more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's underlying schema of suicide must focus on several key problems, including:

   a. **The source of egoism and insatiability**--the prime sources of these key destructive forces must be explored. Especially important is a critical review of Durkheim's early doctrine of *homo duplex*--his notion of the inherent egoism and insatiability of the pre-socialized individual or the organic ego.

   b. **Durkheim's causal model**--flaws and shifts in Durkheim's early model as it underlay his first schema of suicide. Transitions in Durkheim's work should then be brought to bear on reconstructing the schema of suicide.

   c. **The evolutionary-historical matrix**--since Durkheim's thought was evolutionary to the core, reconstructed typologies must be inherently evolutionary, not abstracted and formal. Thus, comparisons and contrasts of the dominant "ideal types" of morality, and the specific types of suicide associated with them in societies at the two ends of history must serve as anchors of a reconstructed schema.
d. All four types--none of Durkheim's four types can be ignored. Successful reconstructions should attempt to resolve the contradictions between various "reductions" and "rescues" (see appendix) by simultaneously interrelating the four types, yet maintaining their distinctness. In other words, a new adequate schema must reveal both a fundamental unity and an empirical-historical diversity. The four types should remain distinct, yet linked together in a meaningful gestalt or evolutionary pattern.

e. Durkheim's polemical thrust--Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust, which was ubiquitous in his work, and which lay behind his choice of suicide as a battleground, must be included. Especially important as an anchor for his two modern types was his life-long polemic against opposing dominant cultural traditions in the modern world.

Now, we have already met the first three requirements, and will add the last two to our reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide.

2. Specific Requirements for A New Schema of Suicide

a. Parsons' insights--Talcott Parsons' very real insights (see appendix) that egoisme and altruisme are generated by the presence of strong cultural sanctions for individualism and collectivism respectively should be included. Almost alone among contemporary sociologists, Parsons has rightly recognized that Durkheim emphasized the positive relation between egoisme and Protestant norms as sanctioning the new model man—that is, the inner-worldly ascetic and mystic who is totally self-reliant and devoted to unending service in the name of an infinite, super-personal ideal.

b. Protestantism and anomie and egoisme--as Parsons and others (eg. LaCapra) have recognized, but left undeveloped, both Durkheim and Weber linked Protestantism with some of the most dynamic and significant features of the modern world, including suicide. Indeed, Parsons (1975a:106) recounts how
he was struck by Durkheim's statistics on the puzzling relation between Protestantism and suicide while also "deep in study of Weber's work." Indeed, this striking convergence, unaccountably unexplored by Parsons, serves as a key to the reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide. Therefore, any adequate reinterpretation of Durkheim's schema of suicide should attempt to systematically and explicitly link these two famous paradigms of classical sociocultural theory.

c. Giddens' exegesis--reconstructions should pay close attention, as we did in the second section of Book Two, to Anthony Giddens' important review of Durkheim's notion of anomie and its causes in historical perspective, especially in terms of structural problems (see also appendix).

d. Merton's insights into American culture--any adequate reconstruction should take into account Robert Merton's very important insights (see appendix) into the inordinate emphasis placed upon individual success ideologies in modern society, especially in the economic arena of American culture.

e. Egoisme and the Romantic artists--new schemas should contain reference to the other sources of Durkheim's second notion of egoisme, especially the Romantic artists and poets. This important cultural and historical kinship has been seen, for example, by Giddens, 1965, Jack Douglas, 1967, and by Grana, 1967. In other words, any adequate reconstruction should also seek to explain the sociocultural historical sources of modern suicide among the "literatürducible" where suicide is treated as a vocation (see Alvarez, 1972).

Let us next turn to consider other observers' insights which approximate mine into the foundations and outlines of the second schema.
D. Other Observers' Insights into Durkheim's Second Schema of Suicide

In the recent renaissance of Durkheim studies, several observers have recorded insights similar to mine in regard to ambiguities or multivalencies in meaning of Durkheim's explanation of the relations between suicidal tensions and sociocultural sanctions. I consider it a striking convergence that different observers, possessed of very different casts of mind and perspectives on Durkheim, should nonetheless, within a span of about five years or so, have independently discovered that Durkheim also suggested that the four suicidal types could be generated by the presence of extreme cultural sanctions. This insight is especially applicable to the relations between anomie and egoisme and modern values concerning individualism and autonomy.

Let us, by way of preface, briefly review what we learned in the concluding sections of the first part of this book. "Social currents" were considered to be carriers of suicidal tensions. Further, since we acknowledge that a "marginal leaven of anomie" is necessary for drives for "progress and perfection," we may initially conclude that there is some real possibility that anomie and egoisme may be culturally sanctioned by some of the most progressive ideals and callings in the modern world. Further, since, in general, religious sanctions are often important in informing historical development, and since, more specifically, in Western civilization Christianity and especially Protestantism have played key roles in sanctioning morally autonomous individualism, we may speculate, therefore, that there is a strong probability that anomie and egoisme are religiously and culturally sanctioned. With these preliminary speculations in mind, let us explore some others' insights into the emerging logic of the second schema.
First, Anthony Giddens notes that the ambiguities in the relations posited by Durkheim between moral individualism and anomie parallel, in effect, the two very different logics of the two distinct schemas I am outlining.

The positive connections between the conceptions of moral individualism and anomie, apart from the early formulation in The Division of Labor, were nowhere explicitly stated in any detail by Durkheim and thus tended to be among the most frequently misunderstood parts of his writings (1971b:215).

He (Durkheim) clearly recognizes that what the (concrete) individual is depends upon "internalized norms" which are, in part, the condition of freedom of action. But his treatment of this matter involves definite inconsistencies. This can be seen quite clearly in his various discussions of egoism. In his earlier writings, egoisme has reference to the utilitarian model of self-interest. In Durkheim's view, this presupposed a "pre-social" man, and his critique of this conception in Les Regles takes this as its foil. But he evidently soon came to perceive that, according to the position which he had taken in criticizing utilitarian individualism, egoisme itself must be a product of society... there can be socially created self-interest....

Moral individualism, he emphasizes, does not derive from egoism; but the growth of moral individualism nonetheless produces, as an offshoot, an expansion in the range of egoistic inclinations: "even our egoism is in large part a product of society" *(1971b:220).

But Giddens goes on to observe that elsewhere, when Durkheim spoke of individualism, he reverted to the first notion that egoism is due to the pre-social half of homo duplex.

Yet, in other writings, Durkheim reverts to a conception of egoisme which counterposes it in a direct way to social learning, as if the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. Man, he argues, everywhere conceives of himself as homo duplex, as being composed of two beings, which are usually represented in religious thought as the body and the soul. This corresponds to a psychological division between sensations, on the one side, and concepts and moral activity on the other. Sensations and sensory needs, according to Durkheim, are necessarily egoistic because they originate from, and refer to, conditions of the biological organism. Conceptual thought and moral activity are impersonal, they are social products, and do not belong to any particular person who uses them. These, therefore, are two opposed aspects of person-
ality. They are not merely separate from one another, but are in constant conflict. Egoisme is thus identified solely with the "pre-social" and is portrayed as wholly foreign to the "penetration of the individual by society" (1971b:220-1).

Thus, did Durkheim confute these two very different notions of the "individual"—one as "pre-social," as the organic ego, and the other as socially and culturally constructed. Giddens further notes how these two underlying schemas diverge in Durkheim's work.

The individual in society is not simply a passive imprint of social forms, but an active agent. But, even while he recognizes this, he relies upon the holistic standpoint in working out his critique of utilitarian individualism. From each of these two aspects, historical and methodological, this rests upon the proposition that society is not a creation of the (pre-social) individual, but exists prior to him and molds him. How, then, is it possible that the (concrete) individual is an active agent? It is at this point that the two dimensions, the historical and the methodological, diverge in Durkheim's thought. The answer which he reaches via his study of the evolution of solidarity, and his analysis of moral conduct more generally, is that it is possible because the cognitive and motivational structure of the personality is shaped by social learning. He is not just molded by society; the active orientation of his conduct is framed by internalized moral norms.

But there is a second answer, to which his thought constantly tends to revert, and which is undoubtedly a derivative of his preoccupation with utilitarianism. This is what is actively willed by the individual is a "pre-social" impulsion. In other words, in seeking to reject utilitarianism, Durkheim tends to deal with it in its own terms. Society cannot be conceived as the outcome of pre-formed individual wills because society makes, and must make, demands upon the individual which are foreign to his own wishes! Hence we reach the position that there is an irreremediable conflict between the egoistic inclinations of the individual, and the moral demands which society enjoins upon us. Durkheim never managed adequately to reconcile these two stands of his thought * (1971b:223).

I agree with Giddens in this regard, and accordingly divided these seemingly irreconcilable strands of thought into two different schemas of suicide.

Steven Lukes follows up the same line of thought. In
exploring Durkheim's root dichotomy of *homo duplex*, Lukes observes that Durkheim's concern for the development of moral individualism led him in quite another direction.

Durkheim saw that autonomy was itself socially generated and correlative with the development of the individual personality, social differentiation, and the morality of individualism or the "cult of the individual." But this, given his extreme social determinism, led him towards the position that the individual's personal, spontaneous private or egoistic desires and activities are, themselves, socially generated, rather than "rooted in the organism." This issue arises especially clearly in the discussion of anomie in *Suicide*, where Durkheim maintains that the individual's anarchic and unrestrained passions are rooted in his organism, but also half-sees that they are social or cultural premises of a particular type of society. And, in the same work, does egoisme result from the absence, or the presence of social causes? (1973:23)?

This raises my question precisely: can we view anomie and egoisme as resulting from the presence as well as the absence of social causes? Since Durkheim seems to answer both ways, I have divided these two different answers into two different schemas of suicide. The clear implication of the second possibility is that both anomie and egoisme, as well as primitive and traditional altruisme and fatalisme, emerge as unanticipated consequences of different, though related, types of extreme moral obligation in societies at the two ends of history. Reviewing these very same pages in Lukes' book, Giddens aptly observes: "But his (Durkheim's) very sociological analysis of moral individualism forced him to recognize that egoistic desires are themselves socially conditioned or socially generated" (1974:158).

In addition, Robert Nisbet has remarked about the differences between the two notions of individualism in Durkheim's doctrine.

It is interesting to note an apparent contradiction in Durkheim's concept of individualism. At times individualism is made to appear as non-society, as the mode of behavior or thought that ensues when man is divorced from society. It is, in this view, the very opposite of social.
But there is another view of the matter, one that arises from his sweeping insistence that everything above the level of physiology derives from society. And in this second view, individualism becomes along with the collective conscience itself, something social in origin. Individualism, Durkheim maintains, is ... the result of society: of society's substitution of what he calls the cult of the individual for the traditional religious cult leading to an attribution to man of qualities that were formerly vested in religion. It is the second view that is more consistently Durkheimian ... that is, consistent not only with his premise but also with the full body of his work (1974:123-4).

Again, my comparison and contrast of Durkheim's "nuclear structure" with a topographic exegesis of his sociology of suicide has demonstrated that Nisbet is correct when he says that it is the second view which more adequately represents Durkheim's more profound line of development. Nisbet goes on to add an important historical and cultural dimension to this more consistently Durkheimian and more significant view.

... Ages of history, or societies, overwhelmingly characterized by cultural emphasis upon the self, the ego, and these states of mind in philosophy, literature, and art which are recurrently associated with such emphasis, are invariably ages, Durkheim concludes, of sharp rises in suicide rates (1974:231).

The suicide who, at first glance, seems to have broken by his act from society ... Durkheim tells us, has simply become obedient to those social currents which have put high, even extreme value, upon individualism, upon the "cult of the individual" (1974:212).

All of these important observations shall be incorporated into our second schema of suicide.

Further, as noted in the conclusion to the preceding section of this book, Dominick LaCapra offers us several insightful observations on the nature of anomie and its relation to the Protestant Ethos. LaCapra rightly sees anomie as limitlessness, and clearly sees that these extreme types of individualism and insatiability are culturally sanctioned in the modern world.

Anomie signified the absence of an institutionally grounded and ideologically legitimated sense of substantive limits in society and the personality....
Egoisme referred ... to a state in which the principle of individuation was carried to the extreme of particularistic and self-centered atomistic individualism.... Egoisme in modern societies was an excessive development of the cardinal emphasis on individual rights and personal responsibility (1972:156-7,8).

LaCapra further observes:

... a little noticed aspect of Durkheim's argument was crucial. He went beyond the ideas of structural contradictions and gaps to a notion of institutionalized or ideological anomie. Where institutional and ideological anomie existed, limitless assertion was actually prescribed or lauded ... he saw this form of "le mal de l'infini" in numerous aspects of modern culture (1972:162).

Besides Romantic literature, LaCapra goes on to cite the "dogma of economic materialism" legitimating "ruthless and rapid progress" as paradigm cases of "institutionalized and ideological anomie."

Further, Alvin Gouldner has noted that certain norms may act as both stabilizing and disruptive forces, depending upon the context. This is an important which we shall also incorporate at the heart of the second schema.

In his ... Suicide, Durkheim stresses that Protestant norms actually induce a higher rate of suicide. He stresses that normlessness (or anomie) is not the only source of social disorganization or the only stimulant to a high suicide rate. A commitment to Protestant beliefs may also induce a disorganizing egoisme, Durkheim argues. And he regards anomie and egoisme as having a close connection, a "peculiar affinity" for each other (1958:16).

It is a clear lesson from the historical sociology of religion, for instance, that religious conflict can and often has led to social disorganization. Perhaps the classic case, upon which so much modern social and political theory rests was, of course, the Puritan Civil War in England during the 1640's. Just as clearly, the descendants of the Puritan sects, the ascetic branches of Protestantism, were among the prime carriers of the modern ethos of individualism (eg. Quakers).

Finally, this implicit, ambivalent critique of Protestantism in Durkheim's doctrine led some members of the Année circle to rebel against Durkheim.
This is especially true of Gaston Richard, one of the leading sociological thinkers of the time in France.

The evolution of Richard's ideas indicated that the Année school had its internal critics. Richard in time became one of the most hostile critics of Durkheim, and a source of the idea that his thought was riddled with contradictions. The key issue that antagonized Richard (himself a Protestant) was the increasingly critical edge in Durkheim's sociology of religion which came down most negatively upon Protestantism (LaCapra, 1972:146,#1).

While other testimony could be cited, I trust that this brief inventory of some other observers' insights into the emerging logic of Durkheim's second schema has shown: (a) that others have also recognized the ambiguities in Durkheim's doctrine of anomie and egoisme and their relation to moral individualism, (b) that anomie and egoisme may also be generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions, and (c) that there is a high probability that Protestantism, as the basis of the modern value system, bears some important relation to anomie and egoisme, as yet largely unspecified. With these observers' insights in mind, let us next turn to explore Durkheim's growing sociocultural realism in terms of his insistence that suicide is generated by the presence of "social currents."
E. The Social Element of Suicide: Durkheim’s Growing Socio-Cultural Realism and the Causal Significance of "Suicidogenetic Currents"

The conclusion from all these facts is that the social suicide-rate can be explained only sociologically. At any given moment the moral constitution of society establishes the contingent of voluntary deaths. There is, therefore, for each people a collective force of a definite amount of energy, impelling men to self-destruction. The victim's acts which at first seem to express only his personal temperament are really the supplement and prolongation of a social condition which they express externally (S:299).

Preface. In Book Three, chapter one of Suicide, Durkheim left his formidable array of statistics behind, and turned to elaborate the guiding rationales underlying his earlier explanations of modern suicide rates. The very heart of Durkheim's argument that suicide, seemingly the most isolated of human actions and the very negation of society, is socially caused, was the cultural and symbolic significance of society, of "moral mechanics." Since it is the "moral life" which matters first, last, and always, then the most significant aspects of this higher inter-generational social life were cultural symbolic patterns providing meaning and directive systems to persons and groups. Now, the "social currents" which acted as the energetic carriers of modern suicidal tensions were not merely structural—that is, the lack of organizational or normative integration into a warm and cohesive group. For these causes were cultural and symbolic—phenomenological—as well. This important insight meant that, whatever the original sanction for suicidal tensions, these "social currents" also served as core constitutive "pools of meaning", as Douglas (1967) suggests, which orient and guide behavior which may lead up to suicidal actions. This does not necessarily imply, however, that these symbolically validated and culturally carried "pools of meaning" directly recommended suicide as an answer to human prob-
lems, but rather simply that certain extreme cultural sanctions which, generating overwhelming tensions, may lead to suicidal consequences.

Therefore, I suggest that we should search for certain "social currents" and symbolically carried cultural "pools of meaning" which had suicide, not as their prime focus, but as their ironic or unanticipated outcome. And as we search for cultural sanctions underlying these powerful and ironically destructive "pools of meaning," we would do well to recall Durkheim's seminal thesis that even "the features of our immorality are also the features of our morality." This basic proposition should be combined with the ancient wisdom which guided Durkheim himself—namely, the notion that health, harmony, happiness, and virtue rest on a "golden mean," and thus, that vices are virtues pushed to extreme.

Once again setting aside any necessary correlation between suicide rates and cosmic or biological phenomena, Durkheim insisted that "the social rate of suicide corresponds to a collective tendency." Precisely what is the nature of this collective tendency, however? Now, on the basis of his extensive comparative statistical arrays, Durkheim first explored the differential susceptibility of different groups to suicidal actions. He even remarked that it was "... no mere metaphor to say of each society that it has a greater or lesser aptitude for suicide." Then Durkheim continued:

Each social group really has a collective inclination for the act, quite its own, and the source of all individual inclination, rather than their result. It is made up of the currents of egoisme, altruisme, or anomie running through the society under consideration with the tendencies to languorous melancholy, active renunciation or exasperated weariness, derivative from these currents. These tendencies of the whole social body, by affecting individuals, cause them to commit suicide. The private experiences usually thought to be the proximate causes of suicide have only the influence borrowed from the victim's moral predisposition, itself an echo of the moral state of society.... His sadness comes to him from without in one sense, however not from one or another incident of his career, but from the group to which he belongs * (S:299-300).
Through cultural symbolic processes, society informs conscience and consciousness. Thus, suicide cannot be caused merely by the absence of some important social element, for as soon as Durkheim stated his underlying rationale this early and over-simple answer must be set aside. It now becomes clear that the problem is precisely reversed. For it now becomes not so much the question of the absence but rather the presence of sociocultural sanctions which generates group differentials in suicide rates. To some extent, egoism and anomic, like altruism and fatalism, must be caused somehow by some extreme tension inducing modern cultural sanctions which submit conscience and consciousness to great stress. The lack of collective moral discipline underlying the first schema now shifts to the problem of too much collective discipline of a very different sort. Absence/presence, too little/too much—these are the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's theory of suicide revolved. And, as we discovered in part one of this book in our critical review of Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex, when it is no longer a question of the presence of egoistic and insatiable desires in the organic ego in the face of the absence of collective moral discipline, then we are left only with the more significant notion that these destructive desires are anchored in society and culture itself.

Durkheim hammered away at this crucial thesis that the statistical differentials in suicide rates of groups through time can only be explained socially. Thus, each group was distinguished by a more or less marked aptitude toward suicide, and this aptitude must be correlated somehow to the "moral constitution of the group." Collective, rather than individual, causation implies that:

There must be some force in their common environment inclining them all in the same direction, whose greater or lesser strength causes the greater or lesser number of individual suicides. Now the effects revealing this force vary not according to organic and cosmic environments but solely according to the state
of the social environment. This force must then be collective.... Each people has collectively an inclination of its own to suicide upon which the size of its contribution to voluntary deaths depends * (S:305).

Against individualistic explanations which fly in the face of the compelling implications of group differentials in the suicide rates, Durkheim addressed the following question:

How does it happen that a given, supposedly stable, society always has the same number of disunited families, of economic catastrophes, etc.? This regular recurrence of identical events in proportions constant within the same population but very inconstant from one population to another would be inexplicable had not each society definite currents impelling its inhabitants with a definite force to commercial and industrial ventures, to behavior of every sort likely to involve families in trouble, etc. (S:306).

Durkheim went so far as to reject the nominalistic notion that when collectivities are spoken of, this reference remains metaphorical, and does not rest upon any system of real relationships. Indeed, if only parts are real and not relationships, how can society and culture be anything more than mere metaphor? But Durkheim's emergent relational realism led him to insist that these collective tendencies are "forces as real as cosmic forces," (but working, of course, in a different way).

Usually when collective tendencies or passions are spoken of, we tend to regard these expressions as mere metaphors and manners of speech with no real signification but a sort of average among a certain number of individual states. They are not considered as things, forces sui generis which dominate the consciousness of single individuals. Nonetheless, this is their nature, as is brilliantly shown by statistics of suicide. The individuals making up a society change from year to year, yet the number of suicides is the same so long as the society itself does not change (S:307).

Brilliantly developing the implications of his systematic statistical evidence, Durkheim next suggested that since these suicidal rates are historical phenomena, it is reasonable to suppose that these "collective tendencies" must also be traditional in some way. Although we shall save consid-
eration of Durkheim's reflections on cultural traditions for the next book, clearly such long-term collective tendencies must be closely connected with the historical "pools of meaning" of the group.

The causes which thus fix the contingent of voluntary deaths for a given society or one part of it must then be independent of individuals, since they retain the same intensity no matter what particular persons they operate on. One would think that an unchanging manner of life would produce unchanging effects. This is true, but a way of life is something and its unchanging character requires explanation. If a way of life is unchanged while changes occur constantly among those who practice it, it cannot derive its entire reality from them (S:307).

Therefore, we may begin to speak of a national or cultural physiognomy—that is, a traditional and distinctive way of life which predisposes its members to greater or lesser suicidal tensions.

From this point of view there is no longer anything mysterious about the stability of the suicide rate, any more than its individual manifestations. For since each society has its own temperament, unchangeable within brief periods, and since this inclination to suicide has its source in the moral constitution of groups, it must differ from group to group, and in each of them remain for long periods practically the same. It is one of the essential elements of social coenesthesia. Now this coenaesthetic state, among collective existences as well as among individuals, is their most personal and unchangeable quality, because nothing is more fundamental. But then the effects which spring from it must have both the same personality and the same stability (S:305).

Since the distinctive way of life of each society is obviously intergenerational as well as interactional, then this historical aspect means that something like cultural traditions may be among the crucial carriers of this long-term "moral milieu."

Although Durkheim spoke constantly of the "moral life" in The Division of Labor, he approached it indirectly through analysis of changing juridical obligations as external indices. Now, perhaps for the first time, Durkheim directly argued:
The social environment is fundamentally one of common ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them to impart themselves thus to individuals, they must somehow exist independently of individuals; and this approaches the solution we suggested. For thus is implicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective inclination to suicide from which individual inclinations are derived, and our whole problem is to know what it consists of and how it acts (S:302).

Thus, Durkheim's main problem, and ours after him, is to understand the nature of these collective tendencies, these "social currents," how they are carried, how they affect conscience and consciousness, and so forth. And in Book One, of course, we discovered the precise directions in which his developing interest in the "social physiology of the moral life", in "collective representations," led him by The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Criticizing Tarde's notion of simple "social imitation," Durkheim began here to define the nature of these internalized normative sanctions and energies. Such sociocultural and intergenerational factors, Durkheim insisted, are as real in their origins and consequences as physical forces.

Collective tendencies have an existence of their own; they are forces as real as cosmic forces, though of a different sort; they likewise affect the individual from without, though through different channels. The proof that the reality of collective tendencies is no less than that of cosmic forces is that this reality is demonstrated in the same way by the uniformity of effects (S:309).

Remember that these collective tendencies, though resting on "social morphological" bases, are first and foremost "moral realities." Although resting on material factors, however (see Book One and Two), the "mechanics of the moral life" move in the realm of the ideal, of the symbolic, of the phenomenological. This is the province not of population statistics alone, but most importantly of shifts in the legitimate collective anchors of conscience and consciousness.

Since ... moral acts such as suicide are reproduced not merely with an equal but a greater uniformity, we must likewise admit that they depend on moral forces external to individuals. Only, since these forces
must be of a moral order and since, except for individual men, there is no other moral order of existence in the world but society, they must be social. But whatever they are called, the important thing is to recognize their reality and conceive of them as a totality of forces which cause us to act from without, like the physico-chemical forces to which we react. So truly are they things sui generis and not mere verbal entities they may be measured.... Thus, the basic proposition that social facts are objective, a proposition we have had the opportunity to prove in another work (Rules) and which we consider the fundamental principle of the sociological method, finds a new and especially conclusive proof in moral statistics and above all in the statistics of suicide (S:309-10).

Indeed, after Kenneth Burke and Robert Bellah (1970), might we not term Durkheim's growing sociocultural realism a move toward "symbolic realism" (see also Book One & Three)? Durkheim himself here contended that this "... world is nothing if not a system of realities" (S:310). And he further defined this "moral world" as made up of "collective representations."

... it is clear that essentially social life is made up of representations. Only these collective representations are of quite another character from those of the individual. We see no objection to calling sociology a variety of psychology, if we carefully add that social psychology has its own laws which are not those of individual psychology (S:312).

And, of course, the prime type of "collective representation" upon which Durkheim so often based his argument for the autonomous causal significance of symbolic reality was none other than religion (see part one of this book). On page 312 of Suicide, Durkheim outlined his new sociological theory of religion (see also Book One) which was later to form the basis of The Elementary Forms. It is important for our present purposes to explicitly recognize that all these arguments appeared together for the first time here: I mean the emergent nature of social and cultural reality, the causal nature of "social currents" and long-term "suicidogenetic forces," and the nature of religion as the prime cultural symbolic form informing structures of conscience and consciousness.

Durkheim proceeded to spell out further his emerging theory of culture which was, as we saw in Book One, to move
to the center stage of his later thought. Here, he observed, for instance, that technologies are culturally influenced, that the "social fact" is "materialized and made an element of the external world" (S:313). For example, a "definite type of architecture is a social phenomenon; but it is partially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once constructed, become autonomous realities, independent of individuals" (S:313-14).

It is the same with the avenues of communication and transportation, with instruments and machines used in industry or private life, which express the state of technology at any given moment in history, of written language, etc. Social life, which is thus crystallized and fixed upon material supports, is by so much externalized and acts upon us from without (S:314).

The process of "crystallization" of cultural forms is, of course, historical or intergenerational by its very nature. And the fate of "routinized" "crystallizations" is also intimately involved with historical processes—witness the prime illustrations of cultural charisma losing significance and legitimacy, and then being retrieved and revitalized by later generations far removed from the original generating contexts.

A child's taste is formed as he comes in contact with the monuments of national taste bequeathed by previous generations. At times such monuments even disappear and are forgotten for centuries, then, one day when the nations which reared them are long since extinct, (they) reappear and begin a new existence in the midst of new societies. This is the character of those very social phenomena called Renaissances. A Renaissance is a portion of social life which, after being, so to speak, deposited in material things and remained long latent there, suddenly reawakens and alters the intellectual and moral orientation of peoples who had had no share in its construction (S:314).

In these ways, key elements constituting cultural traditions are constructed, diffused, and sedimented into civilizational processes.

Indeed, a special significance should be attached to the historical and sedimented nature of these highly crystallized symbolic cultural forms, especially those naturally
distinguished by high degrees of potential universalizability (see also Book One).

The same remark applies to the definite formula into which the dogmas of faith are precipitated, or legal precepts when they become fixed externally in a consecrated form. However well digested, they would of course remain dead letters if there were no one to conceive their significance and put them into practice. But though they are not self-sufficient, they are nonetheless in their own ways factors of social activity. They have a manner of action of their own. Juridical relations are widely different depending on whether or not the law is written. Where there is a constituted code, jurisprudence is more regular but less flexible, legislation more uniform but also more rigid. Legislation adapts itself less readily to a variety of individual cases, and resists innovations more strongly. The material forms it assumes are thus not merely ineffective verbal combinations but active realities, since they produce effects which could not occur without their existence. They are not only external to individual consciousness, but this very externality establishes their specific qualities. Because these forms are less at the disposal of individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to circumstances and this very situation makes them more resistant to change (5:314-15).

Thus did Durkheim begin to spell out his theory of institutionalization and sociocultural process.

Now, in addition to these more "crystallized" or institutionalized forms, Durkheim remarks that there are also highly fluid sociocultural forms, or rather processes.

... not all social consciousness achieves such externalization and materialization. Not all the aesthetic spirit of a nation is embodied in the works it inspires; not all morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater part is diffused. There is a large collective life which is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate everywhere, cross, and mingle, in a thousand ways, and just because they are constantly mobile are never crystallized in an objective form.... And all these eddies, all these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single modification of the main legal and moral precepts, immobilized in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these very precepts merely express a whole subjacent life of which they partake; they spring from it but do not supplant it. Beneath all these maxims are actual, living sentiments, summed up by these formula but only as in a superficial envelope. The formula would
awaken no echo if they did not correspond to definite emotions and impressions scattered through society. If, then, we ascribe a kind of morality to them, we do not dream of supposing them to be the whole of moral reality. That would be to take the sign for the thing signified (S:315).

Thus, as we saw in Book One, collective representations can be sub-divided into fluid and crystallized forms. And these fluid social or suicidogenetic currents are the prime carriers of anomic and egoismic tensions which may generate the ultimate act of suicide. Such collective representations precede and exceed their individual manifestations.

Because this part of collective life has not enough consistency to become fixed, it nonetheless has the same character as the formulated precepts.... It is external to each average individual taken singly.... There is not one of all the single centers of consciousness who make up the great body of the nation, to whom the collective current is not almost wholly exterior, since each consciousness contains only a spark of it* (S:315-16).

Having shifted his guiding metaphors from mechanics to thermodynamics (see also Book One) in speaking of "social currents," energetic "social forces," "sparks," and so on, Durkheim next utilized another significant analogy to drive home his point with greater emphasis. Switching from physical to biological phenomena, Durkheim suggested a bold and stimulating cross-level analogy between the genetic and directive systems of biological organisms and the "social currents" which culture persons in human society. Thus, Durkheim has to be credited with being one of the first, as far as I know, to suggest that culture acts as a kind of social DNA (see also Book One). Parsons also saw this important cross-level analogy (1973), but supposed that Durkheim did not hit upon the connection until 1912 in The Elementary Forms.

Such a way of considering the individual's relation to society also recalls the idea assigned the individual's relation with the species or the race by contemporary zoologists. The very simple theory has been increasingly abandoned that the species is only the individual perpetuated chronologically and gener-
alized spatially.... The distinctive characteristics of the race change in the individual only as they change in the race in general. The race has some reality whence comes the various shapes it assumes among individual beings, far from it consisting simply of a generalization of these beings.... It is enough for us to show that our sociological conceptions, without being borrowed from another order of research, are indeed not without analogy to the most positive sciences (S:320).

Just as the gene pool of the species is the real locus of genetic-evolutionary change, thus, so too is society and culture the real locus of societal and phenomenological evolution. Viewing culture as social DNA is helpful because it directs our attention to the ways in which crucial programs of information are encoded and decoded on various levels of phenomena.

Durkheim next extended this insight even further. Durkheim suggested that, if one follows out consistently the logic of this position, then perhaps society and culture feed back down to the organismic level, as when, for example, culturally generated desires take on the imperative status of organic needs. Obviously, such feedback power may vitally affect health, not only in terms of wholeness and harmony, but even of the nervous system and physiology themselves.

... the causes determining the social currents affect individuals simultaneously and predispose them to receive the collective influence. Between these two sorts of factors there is a natural affinity, from the very fact that they are dependent on, and expressive of, the same cause: this makes them combine and become mutually adapted. The hypercivilization which breeds the anomic tendency and the egolistic tendency also refines nervous systems, making them excessively delicate; through this very fact they are less capable of firm attachment to a definite object, more impatient of any sort of discipline, more accessible both to violent irritation and to exaggerated depression. Inversely, the crude, rough culture implicit in the excessive altruism of primitive man develops a lack of sensitivity which favors renunciation. In short, just as society largely forms the individual, it forms him to the same extent in its image. Society cannot lack the material for its needs, for it has kneaded it with its own hands*(S:323).
To all students of suicide, Durkheim began here to outline a potentially profound medical culturology, for the fatal dis-ease known as suicide can now be seen as due to the internalization of extreme cultural sanctions and social norms that become destructive. Stress, anxiety, and self-destruction may be socially and culturally, as well as organically, induced.

Moving from the group level to that of the individual, how shall we explain why some individuals within groups with differential susceptibilities to suicidal tensions are more susceptible to such tendencies than others in the same group? Obviously, even within groups with high rates not everyone commits suicide. Setting aside the clinician's notion of individual pathology (eg. nervousness, insanity, etc.), Durkheim spoke of a "collective inclination," a cultural tradition, in effect, which predisposed members of a group to a greater or lesser extent toward engaging in the kind of activities and embracing those aspirations which may generate suicidal anxieties. Put one way, differentially located individuals vary in their ability to resist the destructive energies carried by these "suicidogenetic currents." Or put another way, differentially located individuals vary in their depth of internalization of potentially self-destructive extreme cultural sanctions.

The role of individual factors in the origin of suicide can now be more precisely put. If, in a given moral environment, for example, in the same religious faith or in the same body of troops, or in the same occupation, certain individuals are affected and certain others not, this is undoubtedly, in great part, because the affected individuals' mental constitution, as elaborated by nature and events, offers less resistance to the suicidogenetic current. But though these conditions may share in determining the particular persons in whom this current becomes embodied, neither the special qualities nor the intensity of the current depends upon these conditions. A given number of suicides is not found annually in a social group just because it contains a number of neuropathic persons. Neuropathic conditions only cause the suicides to succumb with greater readiness to the current. Whence comes the great difference between the clinician's point of
view and the sociologist's. The former confronts exclusively particular cases, isolated from one another. He established, very often, that the victim was either nervous or an alcoholic, and explains the act by one or the other of these psychopathic states. In a sense he is right.... But in a general sense this motive does not cause people to kill themselves, nor, especially cause a definite number to kill themselves in each society in a definite period of time. The productive cause of the phenomenon naturally escapes the observation of individuals only; for it lies outside individuals. To discover it, one must raise his point of view above individual suicides and perceive what gives them unity. Only certain ones are called.... These are the ones who through circumstances have been nearer the pessimistic currents and who consequently have felt their influence more completely (S:323-4).

Finally, as Jack Douglas (1967), among others, has rightly noted, Durkheim proposed that egoisme, altruisme, and anomie are involved in a complex balance in each society. Indeed, in each society they are intimately related to the predominant morality of the group.

No moral idea exists which does not combine in proportions varying with the society involved, egoisme, altruisme, and a certain anomie. For social life assumes both the individual has a certain personality, that he is ready to surrender it if the community requires, and finally, that he is to a certain degree sensitive to the ideas of progress. This is why there is no people among whom these three currents of opinion do not co-exist, bending men's inclinations in three different and even opposing directions. Where they offset one another, the moral agent is in a state of equilibrium which shelters him against any thought of suicide. But let one of them exceed a certain strength to the detriment of others, and as it becomes individualized, it also becomes suicidogenetic (S:321).

Therefore, assuming that these "currents of opinion" are in some way connected with social norms and cultural sanctions, our next task becomes to seek out the ways in which a healthy balance is disrupted by a pervasive and powerful culturally sanctioned counter-thrust. In primitive societies, therefore, we should look for the ways in which egoisme and anomie are overcome by the overwhelming strength of sacro-magical collective rationales. In modern societies, conversely, we should look for the ways in which altruisme (and
by implication, fatalisme) are overcome by the powerfully pervasive sanctions for absolute individualism and unending drives for "progress and perfection." Let us now turn to consider these new and potentially powerful considerations.
PART II

DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA: SUICIDE AS GENERATED BY THE PRESENCE OF CULTURAL SANCTIONS

"Every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue."

(Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*: 240)
Preface

Durkheim's Second Schema: All Four Suicidal Types as Generated by the Presence of Extreme Cultural Sanctions

If the essence of Durkheim's first implicit schema was that anomie and egoisme are caused by the absence of moral control over the organic ego in the modern transitional crisis, the essence of his second implicit schema is that all four suicidal types are generated by the presence of extreme cultural sanctions. Thus, the essential problem is reversed in the two schemas: for the lack of collective moral discipline leading to modern anomie and egoisme (in schema one), now becomes precisely the opposite problem— I mean the presence of too much collective self-discipline of quite another sort. I repeat: absence/presence, too little/too much, these are the analytical axes around which schemas number one and two revolve.

Let me briefly summarize some of the specific shifts in the logic of argument which prepare the way for Durkheim's second schema. First, he recognized a long-term shift away from extreme emphasis on the traditionally assigned satisfactions of one's special status group and the sacro-magical collective conscience to a modern legitimation of the potentially infinite desires of individuals. Second, we see that Durkheim rather ambiguously recognized (see Book Two) that the modern economy did not simply emerge as a new socioeconomic order through the breakdown of the past, but also rested on new, and powerfully unique, models of legitimate authority. Hence, we detect another subterranean shift corresponding to the first—namely, from the moral legitimacy
of desires and scheduled rewards based on traditional collective regulation to an international market economy based on "laissez faire," which not only leaves the individual alone in determining his desires but also positively rejects collective intervention in regulation, and positively enjoins insatiable consumer demand to match the unlimited international extension of the market. Third, Durkheim began to shift the location of insatiability and egoism (as we have seen in Book One and the first part of this Book) from the organic half of homo duplex. For his key insight here was that the modern "infinity of dreams and desires" is supported by a new and different morality, and thus a new type of culturally shaped conscience and consciousness. Therefore, the source of insatiability and egoism is now to be located primarily in a historically specific society and culture, instead of in the generic qualities of some abstract image of human nature. Thus, these shifts from the historical emphasis on the collectivity to the individual, from the legitimacy of traditional constraint to the legitimacy of laissez-faire, and the conceptual shift from human nature to culture as the source of insatiability, constitute some of the crucial foundations of Durkheim's emerging explanation of sociocultural causation of suicide in evolutionary perspective.

For a number of reasons, schema two is demonstrably more consistent, and more profound than schema one. For we can set aside Durkheim's misleading early image of man as homo duplex which underlies his first schema. As a corollary, we have widened out Durkheim's causal model, as his growing sociocultural realism demands. Third, we shall pull together the same historical types in the same historical set (i.e. instead of the opposition being egoisme versus altruisme, anomie versus fatalisme, we shall shift to altruisme and fatalisme versus anomie and egoisme). Fourth, now all four types—primitive and modern—are seen to be causally related to culturally induced tensions. In other words, all four
suicidal types are ultimately generated by overwhelmingly strong cultural sanctions. "Every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue" (S:240).

Now, although the content and direction of expression of these cultural norms differ in the primitive and modern case and, in turn, within each of these sets, nevertheless, all four types are generated by the presence of exceedingly strong sanctions which disrupt the necessary human balance—I refer to the Aristotelian "golden mean" as norm of health and virtue which Durkheim embraced. Durkheim's "philosophy of human finitude," instead of being directed at the organic element of human nature as before, now becomes a truly important sociocultural insight into the exceedingly powerful sanctions which different cultures place on their members so that a healthy and creative balance is lost. A special virtue or goal is elevated above else and becomes, in truth, absolutized. Human proportion is then lost in daily life, and substantive rationality, which attempts to integrate contrary virtues and conflicting claims toward a united and meaningful goal, is similarly lost to view. Specifically, this means that Durkheim's important, but previously ignored, notion of the social schedule of rewards and satisfactions comes to underlie all four suicidal types. The importance of this sociocultural underpinning is clearly recognized if, instead of classifying these types primarily in terms of abstract oppositions, we classify them in terms of their prime evolutionary anchor. Thus, the related but opposite types in "mechanical solidarity" are altruisme and fatalisme, while the related but opposing types in modern society are anomie and egoisme. Each set is supported by the same general type of modern cultural sanctions. The newly orchestrated relations between these four types are set out in the following chart.

Thus, in the second schema all four suicidal types are the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both historical sets proceed from common sources; they differ
Figure 6. Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions

Axis I: The Generic Power of Cultural Sanctions (a) in Sociocultural Evolution (b)

Axis IIa: Mechanical Solidarity (Traditional Societies)

Axis IIIa:
- a. Common Cultural Content
- b. Different Modes of Expression

Axis IVa: Dominant Suicidal Types

Axis IIb: The Modern Transitional Crisis

Axis IIIb:
- a. Common Cultural Content
- b. Different Cultural Traditions
- c. Different Modes of Expression

Axis IVb: Dominant Suicidal Types

Axis IIc: The Future: Organic Solidarity via Cultural Shifts

Absolutizing Individualism and Legitimized Insatiability
- Anglo Cultural Tradition
  - Active, External "The Infinity of Desires"
- Romantic Cultural Tradition
  - Passive, Internal "The Infinity of Dreams"

Absolutizing Collectivism and The Traditional Social Schedule of Satisfaction
- Active
- Passive

Altruisme
Fatalisme

The "Golden Mean"
in their prime mode of expression. In traditional societies, the common content of altruism and fatalism is absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule of satisfaction. Altruism represents the active acceptance of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice for the group. Fatalism represents the opposite pole of passive resignation to one's collectively assigned oppressive, traditional fate. Now, in modern societies, caught up in the transitional crisis, both anomie and egoism proceed from common sources—absolutizing individualism and legitimated insatiability, precisely the inverse of the values of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoism passive. When extreme individualism and unending drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie—the "infinity of desires"—and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition. When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoism—the "infinity of dreams"—and collapse of the will and imagination in isolation and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals, and so forth. This ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I call the Romantic Cultural Tradition. Together these twin expressions of some of our highest callings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anarchy" which and "dis-eases of the infinite" represent two halves of the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "golden mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our prime vices.
CHAPTER SIX

ALTRUISME, FATALISME, AND ABSOLUTIZING COLLECTIVISM
AND THE TRADITIONAL SCHEDULE OF SATISFACTION

The individual kills himself at the command of his conscience; he submits to an imperative. The dominant note of his act is the serene conviction derived from the feeling of duty accomplished (S:283).

Preface. One of the keys to reconstructing Durkheim's schema is that extremes of human experience leading to suicide in primitive societies were already recognized as proceeding ultimately from cultural sanctions. Even in the first schema, altruisme and fatalisme were portrayed as the result of overwhelmingly strong emphasis on group loyalties; these types of suicide occurred wherever the group took precedence over the individual. In the second schema, I shall deliberately heighten the contrast between primitive and modern societies, as did Durkheim, by saying that the first key determinant of both altruisme and fatalisme was the presence of a strong "sacro-magical collective conscience" (Nelson, 1973a). Here, traditional tribal rationales, embedded in magic and religion, are absolutized. Thus, noting Durkheim's notion of a sense of balance in the healthy individual and society, we may speak, conversely, of an absolutizing individualism underlying modern suicides.

In both historical sets, we may view destructive tensions as paradoxically proceeding from prime cultural values which become so sacred that they take on the character of all-consuming absolutes. Like the snake in Oriental mythology, they come to devour themselves. Further, since primitive and archaic societies were supposed to be mired in the "thick cake of custom," as early observers remarked, for heuristic
purposes we may heighten again the contrast between primitive and modern by noting that in the former type the attainment of such desires—these cultural virtues which become absolutized—is governed by what we shall call a "traditional social schedule of satisfaction." This implies that a person's access to these prime or constitutive sacred values is often largely determined by his ascribed status. How much may one hope for? As much as your father before you, comes back the answer, and no more. On the contrary, in modern societies, not only are such traditional ascribed schedules of legitimate aspirations set aside, but all men, regardless of their origin or station in life, are positively enjoined to seek the heights of perfection. Modern culture is universalistic in its norms (if not its actions). And it is this notion that we are all "inoculated with the precepts of progress and perfection," that all are called, but few are chosen, which lay behind Merton's rewriting of Durkheim's notion of anomie.

Let us now turn to briefly explore the two types of suicide characteristic of overwhelmingly strong cultural mandates in "mechanical solidarity." Since we have already reviewed these types at length in Book Two, and since they have not greatly changed their content from schema one to schema two, and as our main concern now is explaining the problematic origins of the sanctions for anomie and egoisme in the modern world, I shall only briefly indicate the normative structure of these early types here.
A. Altruisme as the Active Acceptance of the Overwhelming Mandates of the Primitive Sacro-Magical Collective Conscience

I have designated altruisme as the prime example of the active acceptance of overwhelmingly strong cultural mandates toward self-abnegation in primitive "mechanical solidarity." It must be emphasized that Durkheim attached specific historical importance to these typological designations. For altruisme was not only the abstract valuational pole of egoisme, but its historical opposite as well. Altruisme implied that many individuals in primitive and archaic societies with a low degree of segmentation, and governed by traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to sacrifice themselves for the group as both a duty and a desirable end. Self-sacrifice for the good of one's tribe or kinship group was considered an honor; it granted the martyr a special "pipeline to charisma" as Weber (1963) suggested. Indeed, even after the tragedy of the Vietnam War, was it still not said that self-sacrifice for one's country should be honored?

Now, in primitive society, or so Durkheim thought, the individual is more or less submerged in the group, especially in the kinship group. Thus, the traditional collective conscience takes precedence over the rudimentarily individuated conscience and consciousness. The individual who is constantly counseled to sacrifice self for the primary good of his own special groups' survival will meet with a similar end (suicide), but differently expressed, as the modern person who is constantly counseled self-sacrifice for suprapersonal, universalistic ideals which lie at the heart of the modern world (eg. the capitalist ethos or revolutionary socialism). In the former case, the individual, by virtue of the structural location of his cultural "charismatic" endowment, may become so penetrated by the collective conscience that if tradition demands self-sacrifice (triggered
of course, by specific events), the altruistic suicide may enthusiastically embrace self-homicide as a justifiable act, even an honor granting virtue. While the altruist believes self-sacrifice for his group to be both an obligation and a good in itself, the modern egoistic suicide does not directly embrace self-homicide as a duty in the way his earlier counterpart does. Rather, the egoist comes to his last end by so deeply internalizing the self-reliant mandates that these special sanctions create, as Weber saw, such weighty burdens and unbearable tensions that despair becomes our lot. Both altruisme and egoisme are considered moral duties and goods which fulfill in the deepest way possible our real human natures.

Whereas egoisme is due to excessive individuation the former is caused by too rudimentary individuation. One occurs because society allows the individual to escape it ... The other because society holds him in too strict tutelage. Having given the name of egoisme to the state of the ego living its own life and obeying itself alone, that of altruisme adequately expresses the opposite state, where the ego is not its own property, where it is blended with something not itself, where the goal of conduct is exterior to itself (5:221).

The moral obligation in such societies leading to altruistic suicides is intensified by the general repressiveness of the rootedness of the sacro-magical collective conscience in what I have called the "primitive sacral complex" (see Book One). Conversely, the modern obligation to build, direct, maintain, and alter oneself in accordance with extreme supra-personal ends, must then also be sanctioned by an equally strong, though reversed, force. Speaking of a type of altruistic suicide in which this psychological extreme can be seen, Durkheim observed:

When altruisme is at a high pitch ... the impulse is more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and enthusiasm carries the man to his death. The enthusiasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on the conception of death as a means of union with a beloved deity, or as an expiatory sacrifice, to appease some terrible hostile power. There is no resemblance between the religious fervor of the fanatic
who hurls himself joyously beneath the chariot of his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia, or the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to his days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these superficially different appearances, the essential features of these phenomena are the same. This is an active suicide, contrasting it with the depressed suicide (i.e. egoisme) (S:283).

Of course, the type of religion having simultaneously the greatest impact on the development and direction of the modern west, and unalterably opposed to the sacral-magical ruling rationales of the "primitive sacral complex" is the type of ascetic Protestantism investigated by Max Weber.

Thus, I have proposed that both primitive altruisme and modern egoisme are culturally sanctioned by their respective cultures at the two ends of history. Both altruisme and egoisme (and fatalisme and anomie, too, as I shall soon show), proceed from the presence of extreme cultural sanctions leading directly or indirectly to self-homicide. In both, focus on the self, whether denying it or developing the true self, is seen as duty and virtue.

Suicide in lower societies ... is not an act of despair, but of abnegation.... If the widow of the Indian did not survive her husband, nor the Gaul the chief of his clan, if the Buddhist has himself torn on the wheels of the carriage carrying his idol, it is because moral or religious prescriptions demand it. In all these circumstances, man kills himself, not because he judges life bad, but because the ideal to which he is attached demands the sacrifice. These voluntary deaths are therefore no more suicides, in the common sense of the word, than the death of a soldier or a doctor exposing himself knowingly because of duty (DL:246).

Durkheim used as additional illustrations of altruistic suicide various customs from archaic societies in which old men, women on the funerals of their husbands, warriors, mystical virtuosos, and so forth, are required by ancient and venerable custom to sacrifice their own lives, to "give the full measure of devotion," for their group.

Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails
in this obligation, he is dishonored, also punished, usually by religious sanction.... If such a person insists on living, he loses public respect (S:219).

Because altruistic suicides are positively enjoined by primitive cultures in custom, and sometimes even by rudimentary legal and spiritual codes, altruistic suicide was utilized by Durkheim as a visible or objective index revealing the inner structure of the type of social body specific to primitive or archaic societies—that is, to all societies still rooted in the ruling rationales of "blood and soil."

Precisely because the strict subordination of the individual to the group is the principle on which they rest, altruistic suicide is there ... an indispensable procedure of their collective discipline.... There is a close connection between this sort of suicide and the moral organization of this sort of suicide (S:363).

Thus, true to his positivist methodology, altruistic suicide served Durkheim as a visible symbol of the interdependence needed in "mechanical solidarity." If, for example, the social bond is snapped by some irretrievable event like unforeseen death, then at certain times the remaining relatives obligation may be to maintain the former social bond as far as possible by themselves joining immediately with the deceased. In death as in life, the same bond continues.

Durkheim continued developing the socially obligatory character of primitive altruistic suicide by showing that such an extreme duty is possible only where the individual is submerged in the traditional "collective conscience."

For society to be able thus to compel some of its members to kill themselves, the individual personality can have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it.... But there can only be one cause of this feeble individuation itself. For the individual to occupy so little place in collective life he must be almost completely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a compact, continuous mass.... As they consist of few elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, because of the small size of the group it is close to every-
one and loses no one from sight; consequently, collective supervision is constant, extending to everything, and thus more readily prevents divergences (S:220-1).

Altruistic suicide is thus the ultimate expression, albeit an "exaggerated" one, of the cultural mandates found in "mechanical solidarity." The individual who really enjoys little of an independent existence of his own sacrifices himself for the well-being and wholeness of his group. This overriding sense of moral obligation is due not only to the very real survival constraints put upon the group by difficult economic and ecological conditions, but also to the deep penetration of the collective conscience by sacral and magical rationales. In Durkheim's doctrine, for the individual to emerge as a full-fledged entity in his own right—that is, as an intellectually responsible and morally autonomous person—the sacral-magical traditional prescriptive etiquettes must recede.

The individual has no way to set up an environment of his own in the shelter of which he may develop his own nature and form a physiognomy that is his exclusively. To all intents and purposes indistinct from his companions, he is only an inseparable part of the whole without personal value. His person has so little value that attacks upon it by individuals receive only relatively weak restraint. It is thus natural for him to be yet less protected against collective necessities and that society should not hesitate... to bid him end a life it values so little (S:221).

Even though Durkheim acknowledged that altruistic suicide is "... a species with several varieties," in each it is the "pantheistic" organization of society and religious culture which determines the lack of individual resistance to obligatory self-sacrifice, whether actually considered as suicide or not. Since religion is, to Durkheim, essentially the symbolic way in which society collectively represents its collective existence to itself (see Book One), then religion was interpreted as the way in which societies first attained self-consciousness. It follows, then, that "mechanically integrated" societies, in which the indivi-
dual counts for little and the group for all, should express these social and cultural realities in terms of pantheistic religious projections. When the individual counted for little in society, so too did the ego count for little in religious culture. Here, salvation was not deliverance or redemption, but the transcendence of individual suffering through the eradication of the ego, the prime source of disharmony and evil. Durkheim's insights suggest that societies that have not extended their social bond sufficiently to overcome the sacral and magical ruling rationales of their segmental structural base and the tribal structures of fraternization might never breakthrough to modern notions of the autonomous person. Conversely, we might expect that societies and cultures which have moved farthest beyond the segmental base and universalized their logics of social fraternization, will also be those having the least pantheistically and most atomistically and mechanically organized cultures. Once again, all analytical roads lead to the same fateful historical destination—namely, the very special type of ascetic Protestantism so powerfully anatomized by Max Weber in his Sociology of Religion (1963, 1968), and his special studies on The Religion of China (1964), The Religion of India (1958b), and Ancient Judaism (1952).

Durkheim himself noted the uniqueness of Christianity (see also the first section of this Book) in its aversion to suicide, which was ultimately interpreted as a lack of charity to oneself and society, and also as a usurpation of divine authority.

... The aversion to suicide professed and inspired by Christianity is well known. The reason is that Christian societies accord the individual a more important role than earlier ones. They assign to him personal duties which he is forbidden to evade; only insofar as he has acquitted himself of the role incumbent upon him here on earth is he admitted or not to the joys of the hereafter, and these joys are as personal as the works which make them his heritage. Thus, the moderate individualism in the
spirit of Christianity prevents it from favoring suicide, despite its theories concerning man and his destiny (S:226).

Further, archaic religions acted to hold down individual aspirations, to direct them into formal and public ritual expression. When this restraining collective "lid" was lifted, especially by the displacement of Catholicism by Protestantism in the most progressive and dynamic sectors of the modern world, it meant not only that the traditional ceiling was taken off individual aspirations, but, more importantly, that new and potentially infinite supra-personal aspirations were positively enjoined. Of the type of collective moral discipline which represses individual desires in primitive societies dominated by "Consciousness I", Durkheim remarks:

This is precisely the role played in ancient society by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint-Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be content with their situation, at the same time that it taught them that the social order is providential, that it is God himself who has determined each one's share, and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of another world where everything will be balanced, whose prospect made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped them from feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, precisely because it held economic functions under its dominance, contained and limited them (Soc:243).

Now, the power of cultures to inculcate, repress, direct, and alter individual aspirations is a fascinating and complex subject. In this regard, we should recall that Durkheim proposed (see especially S:249-251) that each society regulates individual want satisfactions through the mechanism of a social schedule. Such a social schedule of satisfaction of wants, and the allocation of material rewards and cultural honors, is stratified in terms of individual contributions, class level, and status group. When each individual is relatively adjusted to his scheduled ratio of reward, then there is relative calm, social harmony, and individual health. When the scheduled ratios of reward are thrown out of kilter, or when individuals are placed either
under the oppressive weight of their meager rewards, or when they are so stimulated by the cultural ideals to seek reward or honor beyond all hope of reasonable satisfaction, then tensions so extreme may be set up that self-sacrifice becomes imperative or, perhaps, the only way out. Further, Durkheim observed that there are two fundamentally different types of social schedules at the two ends of history. In primitive society, the portion allocated each is traditional, meager, and stratified in terms of ascribed status or inherited or claimed charisma; the social schedule is, in short, rather repressive. "Primitive peoples live in a stationary state from which they do not even think of emerging. They aspire to nothing new" (DL:252). In modern societies, on the contrary, the social schedule counsels individual rather than collective priorities, and legitimizes insatiability rather than resignation to one's traditionally assigned portion. Indeed, throughout Suicide, Socialism and Saint-Simon, Moral Education, The Division of Social Labor, and The Elementary Forms, Durkheim continued to note how wants seem to expand in history. For the Australian aboriginal Arunta, the level of needs and aspirations is rather rudimentary.

... the Australian, while leading a miserable existence as compared with other civilized peoples, demands so little of life that he is easily contented. All that he asks is that nature follows its natural course, that the seasons succeed one another, that the rain fall at the ordinary times, in abundance and without excess (EF:452).

Given this rudimentary ecological base-line, Durkheim recognized that human wants have continued to increase with the division of social labor. He posited a kind of feedback cycle in the generation and satisfaction of wants.

If we have an ever-more compelling need for various activities, if we are less and less satisfied with the rather slow and dull life that man leads in less developed societies, it is because our society requires more and more intensive labors, and more and industry so that it has become habitual, and, through time, habit has become a need. But there is nothing
elemental in us that incites us to this continual and painful effort (ME:70-1).

Thus, habit becomes need. Modern expanding economies require constantly expanding levels of wants, and to simultaneously fuel and satisfy these expanding wants, we must constantly work harder and specialize more. As we "progress" more and become increasingly affluent, and less worried about traditional subsistence, the greater the burdens we daily assume and the greater the tensions we must live with. Life becomes harder, not easier, as one might expect. One might term this the paradox of affluence and progress. "If the savage knows nothing of the pleasures of bustling life, he is (also) immune to boredom, that monster of cultivated minds" (DL:242). As always, the Garden of Eden was innocent. As Durkheim established, there is so simple and direct correlation between increase in per capita income and education and happiness; for did not poverty protect against suicide? Here is another paradox of progress, for Durkheim himself sadly reflected: "Suicide has been called the ransom money of civilization" (S:367).

The historical anchors of these polar suicidal types always lay in the background of Durkheim's schema. Different levels of societal complexity, and the corresponding systems of conscience and consciousness, influence the common content and different mode of expression of the dominant cultural mandates in societies at the two ends of history. Of altruisme and egoisme, Durkheim remarked:

One is related to the crude morality which disregards everything relating solely to the individual; the other is closely associated with the refined ethics which sets the human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything. Between the two is, therefore, all the difference between primitive peoples and the most civilized nations (S:227).

We see, therefore, the truth of Durkheim's incisive reflection that "Every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue" (S:240). Thus, viewed as polar members of the same evolutionary set, altruisme and fa-
talisme proceed from a common source— the absolutizing of collective rationales and the traditionalism of the social schedule of the satisfaction of wants. These two types differ in their prime mode of expression and perhaps the structural and cultural locations of individuals fatally exposed to these powerful mandates and resulting tensions. For the altruist actively embraces his destiny, while the fatalist, as the name clearly implies, becomes passively resigned to his pitiable fate. One is great, the other sad; the first serves to inspire people to excel in the approved virtues and to stand steadfast by their collectively assigned moral obligations; the second serves to remind us of the frailties of man and the darkness of our arbitrarily assigned fates. Thus, just as we discovered that the key axes of anomie and egoisme in the first and second schema were absence/presence, too little/too much, so now we discover that the key analytical axes of altruisme and fatalisme in both the first and second schema are active/passive, and perhaps even inspirational/cautionary. Let us next briefly consider fatalisme as the other category of suicides in primitive societies.

B. Fatalisme as Passive Resignation to Oppressive Reglementation by the Collective Consciences and the Traditional Social Schedule

Fatalisme is the valuational opposite of anomie, as altruisme is of egoisme. In historical terms, fatalisme can also be considered a polar category to altruisme in proceeding from the same cultural source but, for various reasons, manifesting itself in an opposed mode. If anomie implies an externalized "infinity sickness," then fatalisme clearly implies a pervasive sense of passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate. Historically considered, anomie versus fatalisme represents the evolutionary contrast between the insatiable passions either released or sanctioned in our
In his famous footnote, that "neglected stepchild" fatalisme is described in these terms:

It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. .... It might be said to have historical interest. Do not the suicides of slaves ... belong to this type, or all suicides attributed to excessive physical or moral despotism? To bring out the ineluctable and inflexible nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression anomie, we might call it fatalistic suicide (S:275).

In explaining his relative lack of concern with fatalisme, Durkheim remarked that it is of "little contemporary importance," presumably because there are few sociocultural sites in the modern world where the ego is over-regulated. Since Durkheim did not directly compare fatalisme with altruisme or even anomie, we shall have to look for indirect comparisons. For example, in the chapter on "The Individual Forms of the Different Types of Suicide," Durkheim compared the characteristic psychological consequences of these types:

They (the characteristics of altruisme) are the opposite of those characterizing egoistic suicide, as different as altruisme itself from its opposite. The egoistic suicide is characterized by a general depression, in the form either of melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic suicide, on the contrary, involves a certain expenditure of energy, since its source is a violent emotion. In the case of obligatory suicide, this energy is controlled by the reason and the will. The individual kills himself at the command of his conscience; he submits to an imperative. Thus, the dominant note of his act is the serene conviction derived from the feeling of duty accomplished; the deaths of Cato and of Commander Beaurepaire are historical types of this. When altruisme is at a high pitch, on the other hand, the impulse is more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and enthusiasm carries the man to his death. This enthusiasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on the conception of death as a means of union with some terrible, probably hostile power. There is
no resemblance between the religious fervor of the fanatic who hurls himself joyously beneath the chariot of his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia, or the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to his days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these superficially different appearances, the essential features of the phenomenon are the same. This is an active suicide, contrasting, accordingly, with the depressed suicide discussed above (S:283).

Therefore, as the altruistic type is an active form of suicide, involving "... energy of passion or will: with calm feeling of duty, mystic enthusiasm, peaceful courage" (S:293), so the fatalistic suicide must represent the passive and apathetic pole like the egoistic type, and yet irritated and disgusted like the anomic type. Both altruism and anomie are active types, while both fatalism and egoism are passive types. And, of course, altruism and fatalism are twins, though expressed in opposite modes, for they are merely different expressions of the same cultural dominance of the repressive traditional sacro-magical collective conscience. The fatalistic suicide does not sacrifice himself directly for the good of the group; it is true, nonetheless, his despair indicates the strength and elevation in which the sacro-magical collective traditional conscience is held. Here, such cultural power is so strong for those oppressively regulated by it, especially those in structurally disadvantaged positions, there may simply be no other alternative, no other way out. Thus, as with modern suicides, fatalism is the indirect result of the overwhelming strength of certain ruling rationales. And, of course, in all four types in the second schema, the lack of balance and proportion between the multiple values results in one mode becoming absolutized, leading to potential self-destruction.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND MODERN CULTURAL SANCTIONS FOR
ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY

Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. We know that they are usually two different aspects of one social state (S:288).

Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition, and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity.... Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture (S:247).

Suicides of both types suffer from ... diseases of the infinite. But the disease does not assume the same form in both cases. In one, reflective intelligence is affected and immoderately overnourished; in the other, emotion is over-excited and freed from all restraint. In one, thought, by dint of falling back upon itself, has no object left; in the other, passion, no longer recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The former [egoisme] is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second [anomie], in the infinity of desires (S:287).

Now, anomie and egoisme are polar opposites, historically as well as generically, of altruisme and fatalisme. And if the latter both proceed from a common source--namely, absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule of satisfaction--then is it not reasonable to conclude that the former set also proceeds from a common, though inverted, cultural source? I propose, therefore, that the common cultural elements underlying anomie and egoisme, as but "two different aspects of the same social state," are absolute individualism and legitimized insatiability. Just as altruisme and fatalisme proceed from a common source, so too do anomie and egoisme both proceed from extreme cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism and legitimate a socioeconomic schedule of potentially infinite expectations.
Pulling together the suicidal types into the same historical set (i.e. altruisme and fatalisme versus anomie and egoisme), rather than leaving them mere abstract oppositions, helps to emphasize their deeper evolutionary meanings. Further, we now see the location of insatiability shifting from the organic half of homo duplex to modern culture itself.

As was true of the powerfully repressive culture of primitive societies, so too must this energizing power characteristic of the path-breaking cultures of the modern world have been capable of driving masses of people to feats and tensions wholly undreamed by any lone, isolated ego. The wholly unique achievement of man in primitive society, and in modern complex society, could only have come from within society and culture itself. The very logic of comparison and contrast, as Durkheim's statistics and Weber's universal historical searches reveal, suggests that the second schema is more consistent and potentially more profound. If these cross-cutting sets are thus placed in their proper evolutionary contexts, then we may preliminarily conclude that: (1) all four types are culturally sanctioned, and (2) that the two modern types invert the two primitive types.

Following out the notion that anomie and egoisme proceed from similar cultural sanctions in the modern world—namely, absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability—then the major differences between them may be discovered in the typical social locations most vulnerable to these tensions. Differences in mode of expression most probably result from these different locational susceptibilities. With anomie, or the "infinity of desires," absolute individualism and insatiability are externalized and actively turned against the world. Men are "inoculated with precepts of progress and perfection." With egoisme, or the "infinity of dreams," culturally sanctioned streams of individualism and insatiability are turned inward against the self. Here, "consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man ... it poses as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself" (S:280).
Sharing "kindred ties" based upon the same extreme cultural sanctions, these tension inducing streams affect different structural locations. When absolute individualism is actively embraced, we witness the "infinity of desires" of those involved in commerce, industry, technology, and so forth. When absolutizing individualism and culturally sanctioned "longing for the infinite" are internalized and turned against the self, and the self becomes passive, almost paralyzed, we witness the "infinity of dreams" and suicidal tensions most often seen in artists, poets, intellectuals, and so on.

Now, the above combination of common sources and different modes of expression has the additional virtue of reconciling the two opposing camps concerning the "right" interpretation (see the appendix) of Durkheim's typology of suicide. Of course, generally I have sided with the "rescuers" rather than the "reductionists." Schema two reconciles the problem of conceptual unity and historical diversity in one integrated and significant schema. In sum, the commonality of all four types is that they are culturally sanctioned; the mid-point of balance is that both the primitive and modern sets are based upon different opposing cultural historical sanctions. And finally, all four types are wholly different from the others in their specific mode of expression. In short, the four types are doubly cross-matrixed—generically and historically.

For example, Durkheim took pains throughout the latter part of Suicide to reconcile the differences and establish similarities between the modern types of anomie and egoisme. Setting aside his insistence in Book Two of Suicide upon the absence of moral constraint, we find Durkheim suggesting:

Certainly, this (anomic) and egoistic suicides have kindred ties. Both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence is not the same in both cases. In egoistic suicide, it is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depri-
ving the latter of object and meaning. In anomic suicide, society's influence is lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the two types are independent of each other. We may offer society everything social in us, and still be able to control our desires; one may live in an anomic state without being egoistic, and vice versa. These sorts of suicide, therefore, do not draw their chief recruits from the same social environments; one has its principal field among intellectual careers, the world of thought; the other, the industrial or commercial world.

Thus, both anomie and egoisme proceed from the same source, whether it be due to absence or presence of social norms. But they are independent of each other because they affect different strata and occupational sites. As a corollary, they differ from each other in their prime mode of expression and phenomenological outlook. Durkheim also suggested in addition that with egoisme the person lacks an "object and meaning" beyond himself, while the anomic individual lacks a "check-rein" to his appetites (see also Giddens, 1966, 1971b). Durkheim later clarified further these diverging psychological manifestations.

Anomie partially results from the same state of disaggregation from which the egoistic currents also springs. But this identical cause produces different effects, depending on its point of incidence and whether it influences active and practical functions, or functions which are representational.... The former it agitates and exasperates; the latter it disorients and disconcerts. In both cases, the remedy is the same (S:382).

Noting that there are "mixed types of suicides," where "widely different fevers may coexist in one person and contribute each in its own way to raising the temperature of the body," Durkheim further suggested:

Two factors of suicide have a peculiar affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. We know that they are merely two different aspects of one social state; thus it is not surprising that they should be found in the same individual. It is almost inevitable that the egoist should have some tendency to non-regulation; for since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him. If,
nevertheless, his desires are not usually excited because he is wholly introverted, and not attracted by the world outside. But he may be neither a complete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation... he may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations; he applies... less ardor than the passionate temperament... but he also weary sooner and this weariness casts him back upon himself, thus reinforcing his original melancholy. Inversely, an unregulated temperament does not lack a spark of egoism; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social restraint. Only this spark cannot develop in cases where the action of anomie is preponderant; for by casting its possessor outside himself it prevents him from retiring into himself (S:288).

Further, on page 293 of Suicide, Durkheim provided one of his few schematic summaries, a "morphological classification of the individual forms assumed by the basic social types," to supplement his earlier causal or "aetiological" explanations of his statistics. Here he observed that the fundamental psychological character of egoistic suicide is "apathy, with an indolent melancholy and self-complacency" or the "sceptics' disillusioned sangfroid" as secondary varieties. The basic psychological character of altruistic suicide is thus "energy of passion or will," with "calm feelings of duty," and "mystic enthusiasm" or "peaceful courage" as secondary varieties. The basic character of anomic suicide is "irritation and disgust," and "violent recriminations against life in general," or "violent recriminations against one person" (homicide-suicide). The "mixed types" include: (1) the egoistic-anomic suicide characterized by a "mixture of agitation and apathy;" (2) the anomic-altruistic suicide is characterized by an "exasperated effervescence;" while (3) the egoistic-altruistic suicide is marked by a "melancholy tempered with moral fortitude" (S:293).

In addition, Durkheim concluded that the actual forms of death chosen by the suicide are not essential or revealing. My schema and his summary table suggest instead that the general characteristics and common cultural sources be
established before the idiosyncracies of each event are reviewed.

Such are the general characteristics of suicide, that is, those which result directly from social causes. Individualized in particular cases, they are complicated by various nuances depending on the personal temperament of the victim and the special circumstances in which he finds himself. But beneath the variety of combinations thus produced, these fundamental forms are always discoverable (S:294).

Finally, I prefer, as a summary passage, Durkheim's following description of the fundamental sources of unity and difference between modern egoisme and anomie.

Suicides of both types suffer from ... the disease of the infinite. But the disease does not assume the same form in both cases. In one, reflective intelligence is affected and immoderately overnourished; in the other, emotion is over-excited and freed from all restraint. In one, thought, by dint of falling back upon itself, has no object left; in the other, passion, no longer recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The former is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second in the infinity of desires * (S:287).

In sum, when those who live by virtue of their own inner creative powers--artists, intellectuals, poets, and so on--develop their own subjectivity to an extreme by introjecting an "infinity of dreams," there results an egoisme so strong and destructive that it may result in suicide. When those who live through their managerial or manipulative powers, such as businessmen, technologists, industrialists, and so forth, develop their objective rationalizing powers to an extreme by releasing an "infinity of desires" upon the external world, there results an anomie so strong and destructive that it may result in suicide as well as ecocide.

Moreover, Durkheim's resolution of unity and difference in terms of the second schema is significant for our present purposes because we do not usually connect such seemingly opposed states of mind as anomie and egoisme. Indeed, in everyday thought, what do states of extreme

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energy and extreme paralysis of the will and imagination have in common? Durkheim's method and powerful insight allow us to answer confidently: everything. Extreme energy and lack of energy, extreme willfulness and the paralysis of the will, almost neurotic fixation or lack of imagination and the revelling in inner fantasies, hope in hope and the lack of hope or despair—these and other apparent opposites may actually be intimately related. Perhaps, in terms of different expressions of the same underlying tensions resulting from peculiar warps of conscience and consciousness, endless willing and endless waiting, wishing for everything and wishing for nothing, the instantaneous and the endless are but two faces of the same gnostic coin, the base of modern symbolic "currency." Both anomie and egoisme are, thus, two faces of the modern "dis-eases of the infinite" which plague our lives. As Josef Pieper (1963) wisely observes, idleness and the incapacity for leisure are twins in causing human despair. In such cultures where, for whatever reasons, "dis-eases of the infinite" rage, where hope becomes counterfeit, unfulfilled infinite expectations lie at the root of despair, angst, revolt and even suicide.

It shall be our task to here explore more fully Durkheim's descriptions of these two faces of the modern soul. We shall then turn, finally, to explore the cultural and historical anchors of this modern "infinity sickness." We shall then attempt to discover whether these two forms, being analogous, are homologous as well.
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

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CHAPTER EIGHT
ANOMIE AS THE ACTIVE EXTERNALIZATION OF ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY

As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them accept resignation; so the number of malcontented and disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomie (S:364).

... Human conduct ... loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the specious label of the infinite (ME:48).

Insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering (Soc:240).

Preface. Marked by "exasperation and irritated weariness" (S:357), anomie is generated by the active externalized embrace of absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiability. When culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfection," daily represented as virtue, are externalized and turned against the world, we see the "infinity of desires" characteristic of the commercial and industrial world. Noting that "poverty protects against suicide," but that anomie is chronic in the most progressive sectors of modern economy and society, Durkheim criticized this "moral anarchy" as endemic to the modern world. From the perspective of his "philosophy of human finitude," and health and virtue as the "golden mean," Durkheim insisted that "unlimited need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), that "insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering" (Soc:240), and therefore, such "insatiability is a sign of morbidity" (Soc:240).

Now, if anomie is culturally sanctioned, then what are some of the inner historical connections between this particular form of modern insatiability and the economic
arena? Unfortunately, up to this point we have slighted an important initial clue which Durkheim himself offered—namely, his notion of the social schedule of wants. In traditional societies, marked by a "segmental" social structure, and the dominance of the "sacro-magical collective conscience," satisfaction of needs and desires is determined by ascribed status. How, then, was this traditional schedule inverted? How did economic rationality, utility and efficiency, high productivity and consumption displace their traditional opposites? If insatiability cannot be adequately explained in terms of the organic ego, and if altruisme and fatalisme imply the historical uniqueness of our modern "infinity of desires," how did men then become "inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress" and drive toward perfection? How did the "longing for the infinite" become a "veritable mark of moral distinction?" How was this new "demand" factor generated? And once started, how was it so massively sustained?

Clearly, such a dynamic ethos had to be morally sanctioned. The prime modes of expression of this ethos were, of course, democratic individualism and free market capitalism. Durkheim himself recognized the importance of this egalitarian ethos.

Above all, in democratic societies like ours, it is essential to teach the child this wholesome self-control. For, since in some measure the conventional restraints are no longer effective—barriers which in societies differently organized rigorously restrict people's desires and ambitions—there remains only moral discipline to provide the necessary regulatory influence. Because, in principle, all vocations are available to everybody, the drive to get ahead is more readily stimulated and inflamed beyond all measure to the point of knowing almost no limits*(ME:49).

Durkheim's notions here echo Tocqueville's insights into the levelling effect of democratic release of individualism, which accompanied the modern "revolution of rising expectations," the "restlessness amidst prosperity."

More specifically, the prime intellectual carriers of
this new economic and social ethos were the Utilitarian moralists. Indeed, Durkheim took special care to refute the Utilitarian doctrines sanctioning this new anomic ethos of extreme individualist drives for "progress and perfection."
The multiple links between anomie, the stimulation of new and insatiable desires, the ethos of market capitalism, the doctrines of the Utilitarian moralists, and the tensions and restlessness of modern man, especially in regard to the economic arena of contemporary life, constitute a clear and significant connection between Durkheim's theory of anomie and Weber's work on the Protestant Ethos. Let us now explore some of these themes and potential linkages.

A. The Psychological Characteristics of Anomie

Anomie results, Durkheim said, from "... man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings" (S:258). Lack of regulation and suffering is, in turn, a consequence of the active externalization of extreme individualism and an "infinity of desires." It is this sense of the lack of normative limits which makes economic anomie "one of the springs from which the annual contingent of suicides feeds."

Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent feeds. So we have a new type to distinguish from the others. It differs from them in its dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis appears to man situated beyond life itself. The third sort of suicide (anomie) ... results from man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we shall assign this last variety the name of anomic suicide (S:258).

In psychological terms, this active externalization of absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiable desires begets a "state of exasperation and irritated weariness" (S: 357). The externalizing thrust of anomic desire is blocked by some obstacle; frustration, anger, and ultimately, the collapse of the perpetually taut will ensues.
There is, finally, a third sort of persons who commit suicide, contrasting with the first variety in that their action is essentially passionate, and with the second (altruisme) because this inspiring passion which dominates their last moment is of a wholly different nature. It is neither enthusiasm, religious, moral or political faith, nor any of the military virtues; it is anger, and all the emotions customarily associated with disappointment.... Very many expressed primarily irritation and exasperated weariness.... Sometimes they contain blasphemes, violent recriminations against life in general, sometimes threats and accusations against a particular person to whom the responsibility for the suicide's unhappiness is imputed (S:284).

Thus, the suicide due to frustration of anomic strivings turned against the external world is marked by a collapse of the will in isolation and exhaustion. In his war time tract "Germany Above All," Durkheim spoke of the spiritual state underlying Germany's drive for European hegemony as "... a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-mania" (1915:44). He further observed:

> But it is not possible to subdue the world. When the will refuses to recognize the limitations and restrictions from which nothing human is exempt, it is inevitable that it should be carried away by excesses which exhaust it, and that sooner or later it should dash itself against superior forces which will shatter it (1915:46-7).

Since it is derived from active virtues, such a moral deformation expresses itself actively and externally, in sharp contrast, for instance, to the suicide due to the extreme introspection known as egoisme.

The suicidal egoist never yields to such displays of violence. He too at times regrets life, but mournfully. It oppresses him, but does not irritate him by sharp conflicts. It seems empty rather than painful to him. It does not interest him, but it also does not impose positive suffering upon him. His state of depression does not even permit excitement. As for altruistic suicides, they are quite different. Almost by definition, the altruistic suicide sacrifices himself and not his fellows (S:285).

We find, Durkheim proposed, a third psychological form of suicide, distinct from the others, in that it proceeds from the love of power or progress gone mad.
Lacking proportion between achievement and infinite expectation, an individual beset by anomic desires, when faced with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, may find the necessary vista of an infinite horizon interrupted by a door of reality rudely slammed in his face.

Unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one another, nor to the conditions they are supposed to meet; they must therefore conflict with one another most painfully. Anomie, whether progressive or regressive, by allowing requirement to exceed appropriate limits, throws open the door to disillusionment and consequently to disappointment. A man abruptly cast down below his accustomed status cannot avoid exasperation, at feeling a situation escape him of which he thought himself master, and his exasperation naturally revolts against the cause, whether real or imaginary, to which he attributes his ruin. If he recognizes himself as to blame for the catastrophe, he takes it out on himself; otherwise, on someone else....

It is precisely the same whenever ... a person is impelled in the reverse direction, constantly to surpass himself, but without rule or moderation. Sometimes he misses the goal he thought he could reach, but which was really beyond his powers; his is the suicide of the man misunderstood, very common in days when no recognized social classification is left. Sometimes, after having temporarily succeeded in satisfying all his desires and craving for change, he suddenly dashes against an invincible obstacle, and impatiently renounces an existence henceforth too restrictive for him. This is the case of Werther, the turbulent heart he calls himself, enamored of infinity, killing himself from disappointed love (S:285-6).

The same anomic ambitions to be freed from all mundane restraints, to instantaneously consummate one's infinite dreams or desires, may lead to varying phenomenological manifestations. The "... vain excitement of the hopeless pursuit" of an infinitely receding goal leads to a sort of "melancholy exhaustion."

There are yet others who, having no complaint to make of men or circumstances, automatically weary of a palpably hopeless pursuit, which only irritates rather than appeases their desires. They then turn against life in general and accuse it of having deceived them. But the vain excitement to which they are prey leaves in its wake a sort of exhaustion which prevents their disappointed passions from displaying themselves with a
violence equal to that of the preceding cases. They are wearied, at the end of a long course, and thus become incapable of energetic reaction. The person lapses into a sort of melancholy resembling somewhat that of the intellectual egoist but without its languorous charm. The dominating note is more or less disgust with life. This state of soul was already observed by Seneca: "The evil which assails us ... is not in the localities we inhabit but in ourselves. How many invoke death when, after having tired of every sort of change, they find themselves reverting to the same sensations, unable to discover any new experience."

In our own day one of the types which perhaps best incarnates this sort of spirit is Chateaubriand's Rene. While Raphael is a creature of meditation who finds his ruin within himself, Rene is the insatiate type "Is it my fault if I find everywhere limits, if everything once experienced has no value for me" (S:286-7)?

Seneca's ancient wisdom could not more perfectly express the ironic point of Durkheim's second schema, for truly "the evil which assails us is not in the localities which we inhabit, but in ourselves." For anomic and egoistic aspirations are culturally sanctioned. Tensions deriving from such values are not simply imposed mechanically by the external world, as if it were some natural necessity that alienates man from creation. Rather, our anomie and alienation result from extreme duties which we impose on ourselves.

As we discovered earlier, anomic and egoistic strivings share many similarities, and in the preceding passage, Durkheim shaded over into common points of phenomenological convergence with egoisme. Chateaubriand's writings, some of the earliest French Romantic literature, contain both types, that is, Raphael "...a creature (egoist) of meditation who finds his ruin within himself" is complemented by the anomic Rene who externalizes his insatiability. In both cases, alienation is self-generated. It is the same with one of the leading heroes of contemporary fiction--namely, Herman Hesse's Harry Hillier in Steppenwolf. And Durkheim himself cited the following "mixed" possibility.

If anomie is less intense, however, it may permit egoisme to produce certain characteristic effects. The obstacle, against which the victim of insatiable desires dashes may cause himself to fall back
upon himself and seek an outlet for his disappointed passions in an inner life. Finding there nothing to which he can attach himself, however, the melancholy inspired by this thought can only drive him to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides, where depression alternates with agitation, dream with action, transports of desires with reflective sadness (S:288).

Since we have already cited other illuminating passages, and shall soon cite more in this regard, I trust we have begun to established the psychological character of the suicidal tensions resulting from anomic strivings. I propose that in Suicide Durkheim, over and above his path-breaking use of statistical inference, provided us with one of the most profound phenomenological portraits of the two halves of the modern soul. Indeed, anomie and egoisme should be seen as Weberian "ideal types" of the two seemingly heroic faces of modern man: extreme agitation and extreme depression, inner dream and exterior action, desire and sadness, an "infinity of dreams and desires." As Parsons would say, the problem here lies with the internalization of norms so extreme that they may end up driving us to despair and self-destruction because we cannot live up to the perfectionistic standards of "visible saints." The problem here is with the inner nature of these tension inducing motivations, or as the phenomenologists would say, with the nature and unanticipated consequences of our intentions. Anomie and egoisme are, therefore, in phenomenological terms, the ironic outcomes of extreme tensions induced by the peculiar structures of modern conscience and consciousness. For just as Weber spoke of the "unprecedented inner loneliness of the individual" in the modern world, so too did Durkheim describe the phenomenological consequences of the "iron cage" in which we unwittingly imprison ourselves.
B. The Prime Modern SocioCultural Sites of Anomic Desires

In one sphere of social life--trade and industry--anomie is actually in a chronic state (S:254).

Contrary to common presumptions, suicidal tensions and outward objective suffering are not directly related, according to Durkheim. Rather, in contrast to the promise of the Utilitarians and other harbingers of modern rationalistic progress, Durkheim argued that "Poverty protects against suicide." Indeed, the higher, more successful classes, are also those most susceptible to anomic strivings, to a culturally enjoined "infinity of desires." "Industrial and commercial functions are really among the occupations which furnish the greater number of suicides" (S:257).

Against those who argued that we choose rationally to progress in order to increase our standard of living (see also The Division of Labor), and thus, become happier, Durkheim introduced what may appear, at first, to be a cruel paradox.

... we have shown that those who suffer most are not those who kill themselves most. Rather, it is too great comfort which turns a man against himself. Life is most easily renounced at the time and among the classes where it is least harsh (S:298).

Thus, anomie affects those relatively well-placed persons who "... having no (objective) complaint to make of men or circumstances," weary of chasing an infinitely elusive goal. "Anomie occurs in large numbers only at special points, where industrial and commercial activity are very great" (S:358).

In short, the "moral anarchy" of anomie is chronic in the more progressive sectors of the modern world.

Now, contrary to the Utilitarians' and other "Enlightened" doctrines of rationalistic progress, those who are less progressive are also those apparently least affected by these self-destructive currents of collective sadness, according to Durkheim's turn-of-the-century statistics. Para-
doxically, poverty protects against anomie and suicide because it provides an objective restraint against potentially limitless ambitions.

Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired to. So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, it prepares us to accept collective discipline with equanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source of immorality. This is, of course, no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten *

(S:254)

If anomie and egoisme are but two faces of the same underlying modern pathology, then Suicide can be viewed as Durkheim's "cautionary tale" or even "epistle" to the modern world. Our highest aspirations, our culturally mandated drives for "progress and perfection," our daily "longing for the infinite"—in short, our virtues are also the paradoxical source of our vices, of our collective unhappiness. Durkheim as a positivist moralist invoked the ancient wisdom of many religious and cultural tradition when he suggested that poverty and self-denial have virtue in themselves, for they caution the individual to remember his small status as only a limited point in creation, only a part of the whole. Would Durkheim have blinked at the suggestion, however, that it was a very rigoristic kind of sustained self-denial which landed us in this crisis in the first place?

The solution to the modern chronic "moral anarchy" of the "infinity of desires" is, certainly, not to make life
easier, to blindly accelerate economic and industrial "pro-
gress," not to promise, for the millionth time, affluence
for all forever. Rather, we ought to turn toward a new type
of balanced goal which may be humanly satisfying. Instead
of appeasing some modern deus absconditus, instead of throw-
ing ourselves upon some invisible "pyramids of sacrifice"
(Peter Berger, 1974), we should strive to regain a certain
necessary proportion and harmony in our daily lives.

... Just as suicide does not proceed from man's dif-
ficulties in maintaining his existence, so the means
of arresting its progress is not to make the struggle
less difficult and life easier. If more suicides oc-
cur today, this is not because, to maintain ourselves,
we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our le-
gitimate needs are less satisfied, but because we no-
longer know the limits of legitimate needs nor per-
cieve the direction of our efforts. Competition is be-
coming keener every day, because the greater ease of
communication sets a constantly increasing number of
competitors at loggerheads.... The maladjustment from
which we suffer does not exist because the objective
causes of suffering have increased in number or inten-
sity; it bears witness not to greater economic po-
verty, but to an alarming poverty of morality (S:386).

Is it not ironic, then, that the once-ascetic Protestant
Ethos should metamorphose, especially after the Depression
in America and the Keynesian revolution, into its opposite
—a positive ethos of high consumption, reenforcing
an "infinity of desires?" Indeed, was it not most unusual,
in terms of traditional religious attitudes toward wealth
and the moral virtue of poverty, that those who were among
the first to systematically preach the gospel of the modern
expanding economy, the economic doctrine of material pro-
gress, were themselves Scottish Presbyterian Calvinists?
I refer, of course, to the Scottish Moralists such as
Hutcheson, Ferguson, Smith, and so on, who, to further
compound the irony, preached this new seemingly anti-asce-
tic gospel of economic progress for what, I believe after
Weber, were primarily moral, ascetic, disciplinary reasons.
What could be more outwardly mystifying than the ascetic
Bentham legislating a morality based on pleasure and pain
for all mankind? Indeed, with the revolutionary emergence of international market capitalism in the nineteenth century, the universalistic, homogenizing, self-regulating market mechanism became the prime means of moral discipline of the self, and mass discipline for society, replacing the older forms of social control such as the community and church.

Alas, economic progress has not led to the millenium, but to ecocide and suicide! The Utilitarians argued that free markets make free men; is it not ironic, then, that the instrument of liberation of the rising middle classes should become the impersonal instrument of mass discipline of the modern age, so that we are all now imprisoned in this "iron cage?" Clearly, after the "twin revolutions"—the Industrial and the French—Durkheim's statistics showed that the suicide rate increased two, three, even four times within the nineteenth century. Observing that "Suicide is most widespread everywhere in the most cultivated regions" (S: 367), Durkheim noted that "It (suicide) has been called the ransom money of civilization. Certainly, it is general in Europe and more pronounced the higher the culture of the European nations" (S:367). But Durkheim also noted that "... suicide had developed only slightly until the eighteenth century" (S:368). What is the meaning of this precipitous rise in collective sadness? As a "laic" moral reformer himself, Durkheim insisted that "progress (itself) was not the cause of so much bloodshed"(S:368). Instead of blaming the "tremendous aggravation during the nineteenth century" (S:367), and the "moral pathology" this represents in terms of the rationalistic idea of progress, Durkheim rhetoricized: "Is it not probable, then, that the course of our civilization and that of suicide do not logically involve one another, and that suicide may accordingly be checked without stopping progress simultaneously" (S:368)?

Thus, we may believe that this aggravation springs not from the intrinsic nature of progress but from the special conditions under which it occurs in our day
and nothing assures us that these conditions are normal. For we must not be dazzled by the brilliant developments of sciences, the arts and industry of which we are the witnesses; this development is altogether certainly taking place in the midst of a morbid effervescence, the grievous repercussions of which each one of us feels. It is, then, very possible and even probable that the rising tide of suicide originates in a pathological state just now accompanying the march of civilization without being its necessary condition. The rapidity of the growth of suicides really permits no other hypothesis; in less than fifty years, they have tripled, quadrupled, even quintupled depending on the country (S:368).

Perhaps a viable balance could be reached; indeed, is this not what all reasonable men hope for today? But if we are truly to reach a viable balance, must we not also begin to recognize, as Durkheim himself realized, that "... the entire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable from a certain amount of anomie"?

For our present purposes, it is intriguing to note that as early as The Division of Labor, when Durkheim began to counter the doctrine of the economic progressives with his own philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the "golden mean," he observed, in a memorable passage, that the "... the true suicide, the sad suicide, is in an endemic state with civilized peoples."

He is even distributed geographically like civilization. On the charts of suicide, there is seen a dark spot over all the central region of Europe between forty-seven and fifty-seven degrees latitude, and twenty and forty degrees longitude. That space is the favorite place for suicide; according to Morselli's expression, it is the suicidogenous zone of Europe. There are also found the countries where scientific, artistic, economic activities are carried to their maximum: Germany and France. On the contrary, Spain, Portugal, Russia, the Slav peoples of the south are relatively immune. Italy, born only yesterday, is still somewhat safe, but its immunity is lost as it advances. England alone is an exception.... Everywhere suicide rages more fiercely in the cities than in the country. Civilization is concentrated in the great cities, suicide likewise. It has even been viewed sometimes as a contagious disease which has as its sources of irradiation the capitals and important cities, and which, from there, spreads over the rest
of the country. The proofs could be multiplied. The classes of the population furnish a quota proportionate to their degree of civilization. Everywhere the liberal professions are the hardest hit, and agriculture the least. It is the same with the sexes (DL:247).

As a "moral statistician," Durkheim seized upon this massive and striking evidence of a paradoxical inversion of our highest aspirations, for instead of leading to utopia, the modern "moral milieu" turns out to be pathological.

One observes it everywhere.... Agriculture is less affected than industry, but the quota it furnishes to suicide is always increasing. Thus, we are before a phenomenon which is linked not to some local and particular circumstances, but to a general state of the social milieu. This state is diversely refracted by special milieu (eg. provinces, occupations, religious confessions, etc.). That is why its action cannot be felt everywhere with the same intensity, but its nature does not change on that account.... What the mounting tide of voluntary death proves ... (is) that the general happiness of society is decreasing.... What statistician would hesitate to see in the progress of general mortality in the midst of a determined society a sure symptom of the weakening of public health (DL:249)?

Thus, the general unhappiness accompanying rationalistic economic progress, Durkheim concluded, is due to the weakening of the several moral milieus which have traditionally nourished European society (see especially part II, Book Two of this dissertation). And these main currents of anomie and egoisme are "diversely refracted by special milieu." The special milieu most susceptible to the pleasure and pain of an "infinity of dreams and desires" are the more progressive sectors of modern society. Indeed, in general, the higher the educational level, per capita income, Protestant, intellectual or artistic, urbanized, professional, and so on, the greater the tendency toward inclusion in the "suicidogenous zone" of Europe where the "suicidogenetic currents" of anomie and egoisme flow deepest and strongest.
C. Insatiability: Modern Man's Dis-ease of the Infinite

The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate, instead of filling needs (S:248).

One does not advance when one walks toward no goal--or what is the same--when his goal is infinity (S:248).

To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness (S:248).

Objectively measured in terms of "moral statistics," the "moral anarchy" chronic in the more progressive sectors of the modern world signifies that anomic passions or insatiable expectations reign as legitimate in modern economies and societies. Indeed, from the Industrial Revolution on, our modern, constantly expanding economies depend upon the presumption that wants in the form of consumer demand will continue to expand to absorb the constantly expanding technological productivity. Constantly expanding productive capacity requires greater markets; greater markets, in turn, demand greater mass consumption, and so on and so forth, in a self-accelerating feedback cycle. Thus, a kind of insatiability is built into the institutional apparatus of the modern world. And, as we are discovering to our chagrin, ecocide is one result, as was suicide when Durkheim wrote.

Perhaps the true lesson of the world's interdependence and finiteness, coupled with man's own finiteness, does not really come home to us unless we first begin to recognize that infiniteness is itself a moral virtue in the modern world! In contrast to the utopian promises held out to us, especially by the Utilitarian moralists and political economists--namely, a golden land of high productivity and consumption, a democracy of small entrepreneurs equitably exchanging goods through a self-regulating market mechanism where reward was to be directly proportional to effort and thus, to virtue, the notion that free markets make free men, and so forth--it seems a cruel lesson that suicide and ecocide should be the unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome.
But, as Durkheim counseled us, it is a lesson we must learn.

Again and again, Durkheim sounded the same moral refrain: "One does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or what is the same, when his goal is infinity" (S:248).

One might not expect a seemingly hard-line positivist like Durkheim to be concerned with the ravages of these "marches to infinity." Nonetheless, Durkheim should be given full credit for deep insight into the phenomenology of these extreme socioculturally generated "dis-eases of the infinite."

Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feelings of pride at the distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfaction, since the remaining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness (S:248).

Pinning our age in one fundamentally revealing epigram, Durkheim continued exploring the modern "dis-ease of the infinite," as expressed in the progressive economic arena of Europe.

The more one has the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall such action be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly, for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half-veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which it entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever encountered. Our thread of life on these conditions is pretty thin, breakable at any instant * (S:248).

Is it not curious that although such an "infinity of desires" must surely be actively embraced, it serves no reasonable, even useful purpose? Where a substantively irrational "dis-ease of the infinite" enjoys moral subsidy, and a unique kind of "moral anarchy" ensues, then hope becomes counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue us precisely when all reason for hope is gone (see Lynch, 1966). Indeed, when both the world and our own imaginations
seem to conspire to deprive us of some reasonable advance toward our goals, then we are forced to fall back upon the plaintive homilies of "hope in hope," of the strange certainty that comes "beyond belief."

Of course, man may hope, contrary to all reason, and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may sustain him for a time, but it cannot survive the repeated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What more can the future offer him than the past, since he can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal (S:248)?

Here hope is cruelly, almost obscenely satirized, for at the very time we need it most, this virtue is transformed, as if by some powerful inner alchemy, into its opposite. The extremity of our values turns hope into hopelessness, and delivers us, not into utopia, but into the "slough of despond and despair." Did not Durkheim himself suggest that the features of our immorality are also the prime features of our morality?

... There is nothing surprising in the alikeness we observe in the features of morals and of immorality. Indeed, we know that they are facts of the same nature and that they throw light one on the other. Immorality is not the opposite of morality any other than sickness is the opposite of health, both being forms of one and the same state--two forms of the moral life, two forms of physical life (PECM:119).

Thus, if our values become so absolutized that we destroy ourselves and our world, whom have we to blame? If hope is not for the humanly possible, for the humanly desirable, if our spirits continue to expire on "pyramids of sacrifice," then whom have we to blame? If our perpetual restlessness without purpose leads to acedia, then whom have we to blame? If we continue to strive for an elusive moral perfectionism meant to appease some deus absconditus, as Weber should have spoken of Benjamin Franklin's scheme for moral perfection in his Autobiography, must we not be willing to pay the price? How can we any longer fail to recognize the ironic relation between our prime constitutive values, and our own peculiar dis-eases? In short, if we cannot imagine
the real, if we persist in distorting analogical relations between all levels of reality by pursuing destructive values under the specious aegis of "longing for the infinite," if we continue to absolutize fragments of human experience, and if we forget the essential purposefulness of existence, then hope cannot play its central role in human affairs. **Unfulfilled expectations lie at the heart of modern despair.**

There is no more potent recipe for the despair of modern suicide than the feeling of extreme isolation, of being abandoned and absolutely alone, coupled with the burden of being faced with an impossible, unending, Sisyphean task. Although Durkheim the "laicized" Jew, the ascetic moral philosopher, seemed himself largely immune to the modern dis-eases of the infinite (eg. see his treatment of the Jews in *Suicide*, also see part I of Book Two of this dissertation), another pioneer sociologist learned through personal tragedy what it meant to live in the modern "iron cage" of our own making--I mean Max Weber. Weber explored, both personally and historically, the phenomenological prison of conscience in which one's own consciousness collaborates with one's cultural inheritance to seal all exits, and tighten inexorably certain excruciating "double binds." Weber, who sat for hours on end as if paralyzed, learned, in his worst moments of "scientific and moral acedia" (see Zetterberg, 1967), what it meant to grapple with the "inner demons which hold the very fibers of our lives." Weber knew what it meant, because of the conflicting mandates of his Pauline-Lutheran and Calvinist heritages, to attempt to both "meet the demands of the day" and the demands of "utmost inwardness" (Marianne Weber, 1975; Mitzman, 1971).

Indeed, Mitzman rightly speculates that Weber's own Prometheus labors can be interpreted as a self-imposed ascetic therapeutic by which he began to rescue himself from the "iron cage" unwittingly bequeathed by his forebears.

Now, the moral restlessness which Durkheim's statistics documented, and which Weber tragically experienced
and historically anatomized in *The Protestant Ethic* as a way to exorcise his own inner demons, is very similar to that "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville often spoke in his reflections on America (see especially Nisbet, 1966, 1974). This acedia was a general condition of the modern age, which many early sociological thinkers tried to come to terms with in one way or another. Durkheim and Weber, from different sides, both came to see this "disease of the infinite" as culturally sanctioned, and further, as substantively irrational. "Durkheim saw the unlimited desires for worldly goods as a prominent instance of modern social pathology" (LaCapra, 1972:83). This pervasive sense of restlessness, this lack of fit between our ever-rising levels of expectations and actual rewards, leads us to perceive such anomic strivings, since they are not substantively rational, as supported by some tacit yet powerfully sanctioned cultural commitments. Perhaps what has happened here, as Weber saw in a slightly different connection, is that the original moral sanction remains strong, even though it has fundamentally shifted from its original sphere of intended application. Such a "displacement of goals" is a common sociocultural process, one that affects institutions and personality structures as well as styles of life. Indeed, this is precisely the thesis which I have embraced here, with Weber's inspiration, to help explain Durkheim's notion of anomie and egoisme as a curious type of "moral anarchy" which is, paradoxically, the outcome of an extreme type of moral discipline. I find Durkheim's notion of an "infinity of dreams and desires" historically and culturally inexplicable without reference to Weber's insights into the powerful and unprecedented consequences of Protestant ascetics' and mystics' embrace of infinite tasks within the world. Thus, our chronic modern "diseases of the infinite," our endemic struggle with our selves, our lack of harmony with society, with the past, and with the natural world, is deeply embedded, not so much in our generic organic
ego, as in our peculiar modern cultural traditions. For the individual cannot be, as Durkheim first supposed, accurately described as an insatiable ego driven by proportionless passions. Rather, at most, the individual, by virtue of his inter-generational passage, is simply an historical amnesiac.

Many more passages have been, and will be, cited to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Durkheim's central concern with anomie was always with insatiable desires externalized in terms of economic processes. How can there be any question that anomie refers primarily not to Parsonian and Mertonian "normlessness," whatever that means precisely, but to infinite normative expectations? Again and again, Durkheim insisted that these modern desires fueling economic progress were only half-constituted needs, for a "complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will and a certain object" (DL:255). To Durkheim, "unlimited need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), "insatiability is a sign of morbidity" (Soc:240), and finally, "inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture" (S:247).

D. Durkheim's Philosophy of Human Finitude: Health and Virtue as Coming From a "Golden Mean"

All excess is bad as well as all insufficiency (DL:340). Health consists in a mean activity (DL:237).

It is not without reason that human experience sees the condition of happiness in the "golden mean" (DL:237).

Dominick LaCapra rightly observes that "... the elementary postulate of Durkheim's philosophy was the finite nature of all life" (1972:243). Indeed, the notion of virtue (arete) as the "golden mean" stems largely from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle defined the essence of his moral theory in these terms: "Evil belongs to the indeterminate, good to the determinate.... Excess and deficiency characterize vice, while the mean characterizes virtue (eg.
1962:43). LaCapra saw this crucial rootedness of Durkheim's notion of anomie and his philosophy of "human finitude" in classical Greek moral philosophy.

For Durkheim, as for Aristotle, a vice was... an excessive development of a virtue. In fact, the concept of anomie in its primary meaning of an absence of a sense of legitimate limits recalls the notion of hybris. And implicit in Suicide and its typology was an optimal point of intersection of Durkheim's variables which corresponded to the Greek idea of a golden mean. Nowhere else was Durkheim's indebtedness to the classical tradition of Western philosophy more telling. And nowhere else was the vision of his own France—with its insistence on mesure—as the guardian of what was valid in this tradition more apposite. In the normal society, the golden mean—incarnated in the conscience collective—would restrict hybris to the exceptional individual or the extraordinary feat (1972:158).

For the normal person in the normally evolving society, the "golden mean" implies that there is a satisfying degree of "goodness of fit" between effort and reward, between level of aspiration and level of achievement. The mutual proportion between goals and means is thus substantively rational. Now, as we discovered earlier (see Part I of this Book), Durkheim believed that a creative "marginal leaven of anomie," as LaCapra nicely puts it, was necessary for progressive moral evolution. Indeed, this is the meaning of his somewhat puzzling acknowledgement that the "entire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable from anomie." In the section on the "forced division of labor" in his first great book, for instance, Durkheim reflected:

> It will be said that it is not always sufficient to make men content, that there are some men whose desires go beyond their faculties. This is true, but these are exceptional and... morbid cases. Normally, man finds happiness in realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to his means (DL:376).

And earlier in the same book, Durkheim observed:

> There are, to be sure, individuals whose need for the new attains exceptional intensity. Nothing existent satisfies them, they thirst for the impossible. They would like to put in the place of imposed reality another. But these incorrigible grumblers are unhealthy,
and their pathological character only confirms what we have just said.... We must not forget that this need is intrinsically indeterminate. It attaches us to nothing precise, since it is a need of something which does not exist. It is then only half-constituted, for a complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will, and a certain object. As the object is not given without, it can have no other reality than that which imagination lends it (DL:254-5).

And, in terms that apply equally well to egoisme as to anomie, Durkheim continued:

This process is half-representational. It consists more in combinations of images, in a sort of intimate poetry, than in an effective movement of the will. It does not take us out of ourselves; it is scarcely more than an internal agitation seeking a way out not yet found. We dream of new sensations, but it is a bodyless desire floating about. Consequently, even where it is most energetic, it cannot have the force of firm and defined needs ... directing the will always in the same direction and by well-beaten paths (DL:255).

By definition, a "marginal leaven of anomie" is localized and contained, for it is abnormal, pathological, in a word, "profane." On the other hand, by definition, health is based upon balance among the many competing claims to human virtue. Health, the baseline of all comparisons of "insatiable morbidity" and pathological excess, is anchored in the "golden mean."

Health consists in a mean activity. It implies ... a harmonious development of all functions, and functions can develop harmoniously only by virtue of moderating one another, by being mutually contained within limits beyond which sickness begins and pleasure ceases (DL:237).

Conversely:

... An inability to restrict one's self within determinate limits is a sign of disease--with respect to all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for all kinds of biological behavior. With a certain amount of nourishment a normal man is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be satisfied (ME:38).

Now, Durkheim's vision of all aspects of the modern world as dominated by the omnipresence of extremes is reflected negatively in cases as widely divergent as war-time
Germany's "will mania" (see Germany Above All, 1915), and even in the intricacies of philosophical and sociological method. In his Rules, for example, Durkheim went so far as to equate the anomie of the modern will and imagination with Bacon's notion of "idols of the mind."

... (these) ideas are those notiones vulgares or prenotiones which he points out to be the basic ideas of all sciences, where they take the place of facts. These idola, which are illusions that distort the real aspect of things, are nevertheless mistaken for the things themselves. Therefore, the mind, encountering no resistance in this imaginary world and conscious of no restraint, gives itself up to boundless ambitions and comes to believe in the possibility of reconstructing the world by virtue of its own resources exclusively and at the whim of its desires* (R:17).

While Descartes was not an idealist, surely this founder of Durkheim's own cultural tradition cannot be absolved from a degree of complicity in this fundamental enshrinement of modern subjectivity. For almost all the pioneers of the modern world--Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Leibnitz, Locke, among others--each in his own way, institutionalized subjectivity as the foundation of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Had any great Western philosopher before Descartes, for example (and herein we glimpse the epochal nature of his achievement), dared to doubt all received truth and, in beginning de novo, attempted to ground the existence of reality and even of God Himself in his own indubitable "inner certitude"?

By contrast, the objectivism of Durkheim's own sociological methodology was grounded precisely in his insistence on the objective nature of "social facts," and on the limitations of unrestrained subjectivity. Whatever its flaws, in The Rules Durkheim sought to give both a legitimate object and defined limit to sociological investigation, a charter that has remained valid, in its general outlines, to this very day. Against the extreme nominalism of the Utilitarian's moral and mental calculus of efficiency, Durkheim argued
for a rather different notion of conscience and consciousness.

Our method, however, has the advantage of regulating action at the same time as thought. If the social values are not subjects of observation but can and must be determined by a sort of mental calculus, no limit, so to speak, can be set for the free inventions of the imagination in search of the best. For how can one assign perfection a limit? It escapes all limitation, by definition. The goal of humanity recedes into infinity, discouraging some by its very remoteness, and arousing others who, in order to draw a little nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into revolutions. This practical dilemma may be escaped if the desirable is defined in the same way as is health and normality, and if health is something that is defined as inherent in things. For then the object of our efforts is both given and defined at the same time. It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that retreats as one advances, but of working with steady perseverance to maintain the normal state, of reestablishing it if it is threatened, and of rediscovering its conditions if they have changed. The duty of the statesman is no longer to push society toward an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of illnesses by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they have appeared (R:75).

Now, as we discovered in Book One, in Moral Education Durkheim most fully spelled out his philosophy of "human finitude" in terms of the nature of society as moral discipline. Since we have explored many of these passages at great length earlier, now we merely recall their significance. There, Durkheim observed that energy, whether it be physical, social or cultural, naturally tends to indefinitely expand its radius of movement. In the first schema of suicide, social norms became the containers, as it were, of the vital but always potentially explosive energies and passions of the pre-socialized organic ego. In the second schema, however, cultural norms themselves become the prime sources of this energy. If legitimization, and if previous traditional constraints fade, then new socioculturally sanctioned desires may explode massively and rapidly. And if expectations soar far beyond what is possible, then des-
struction may result. With the coming of market capitalism, in particular, this is precisely what happened. For the internationalization of the trading market, and the corresponding expansion of the range of desires and culturally sanctioned expectations, meant that the radius of energies potentially destructive of self, society, and world was chronically released from legitimate control. In *Moral Education*, for example, Durkheim argued:

A need, a desire, freed from all restraint, and all rules, no longer geared to some determinate objective, and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it. What gratification, indeed, can such desires yield, since by definition, it is incapable of being satisfied? An insatiable thirst cannot be slaked. If certain actions are to give us pleasure, we must feel that they serve some purpose, that is to say, bring us progressively closer to the goal we seek (ME:39-40).

Man can only hope to be happy when there is a mutual and meaningful proportion between means and ends; when substantive, instead of formal and functional, rationality prevails. Freedom and hope, as with so much else in the modern world, suffer from being conceived of primarily in negative terms.

In order to have a full sense of self-realization, man, far from needing to see limitless horizons unravelling before him, in reality finds nothing as unhappy as the indeterminate reach of such a prospect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career without any definite terminus, he can only be happy when involved in definite and specific tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however, that man must arrive at some fixed position where ultimately he finds tranquility. In intermittent stages one can pass from one special task to others equally specific, without drowning in the dissolving sense of limitlessness. The important thing is that behavior have a clear-cut objective, which may be grasped and which limits and determines it (ME:40).

Indeed, LaCapra tells us that Durkheim's philosophy of health and virtue as the "golden mean" appeared in one of his earliest (1887) publications:
How I prefer the words of the old sages who recommend before all else the full and tranquil possession of oneself. No doubt, the spirit as it develops needs to have before it vaster horizons; but for all that it does not change its nature and remains finite (LaCapra: 1972:170).

Further, LaCapra rightly remarks:

Durkheim's concept of achievement cannot be identified with a generalized performance principle in society. Limitless competitive striving was for him a conspicuous case of anomie. Achievement in Durkheim's normal society had the very classical meaning of fulfilling one's nature in ways complementary to the self-fulfillment of others. Limitless striving would be restricted to a marginal aspect of the average personality, and to marginal groups of exceptional individuals (1972:140).

Now, the key to Durkheim's philosophy of "human finitude," that "all excess is bad as well as all insufficiency," rested on the premise that "life itself is a complex equilibrium."

In order to live, we have to confront the multiple requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital energy. The amount of energy that we can and should devote to achieving each particular goal is necessarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of the strength at our disposal, and the relative significance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a complex equilibrium whose various elements limit one another; this balance cannot be disrupted without producing unhappiness or illness. Moreover, these activities in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupted become a cause of pain to the person—and for the same reason: the disproportionate development accorded them (ME:39-40).

Indeed, Durkheim proposed that: "Man ... is made for life in a determinate, limited environment, however extended it may be." All of this derived from his "relational realism."

To live is to put ourselves in harmony with the physical world surrounding us and with the social world of which we are members; however extended their realms, they are nevertheless limited. The goals we normally seek are equally delimited, and we are not free to transcend the limits without placing ourselves at odds with nature. At each moment of time, our hopes, our feelings of all sorts must be within bounds. The function of discipline is to guarantee such restraint. If such necessary limits are lacking, if the moral forces
surrounding us no longer contain or moderate our passions, human conduct—being no longer constrained—loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the specious label of the infinite (ME:48).

Durkheim never wavered from this philosophy of finitude. Indeed, when he came to criticize Germany's "will mania," he grounded his opposition in his country's enemies violation of the very structure and logic of the world. The normal healthy will, however vigorous, accepts the necessary relationship of dependence inherent in the nature of things. Man is part of the physical system which supports, but at the same time limits him, and keeps him in a state of dependence. He therefore submits to the laws of this system, for he cannot change them; he obeys them, even when he makes them serve his ends. For to free himself entirely of these limitations and resistances, he would have to make a vacuum around him, to place himself ... outside the conditions of life (1915:44).

The finitude of nature is matched internally, for "... there are limits based on the nature of things, that is to say, in the nature of each of us" (ME:49). Thus:

... the way to be happy is to set proximate and realizable goals, corresponding to the nature of each person, and not to attempt to reach objectives by straining neurotically and unhappily toward infinitely distant and consequently inaccessible goals (ME:49).

If we are not to invest ourselves in self-destruction, how can one disagree with Durkheim's philosophy of health and virtue as the "golden mean?" LaCapra sums up this philosophy in these terms:

Society and personality as complementary integrated wholes whose finite fullness was activated and agitated by a marginal leaven of anomie: this was Durkheim's essential vision throughout his life (1972:171).
E. Marginalism and Regression to the "Golden Mean"

Our capacity for happiness is very limited (DL:235). Pleasure loses its intensity through repetition. If it becomes too continuous, it disappears completely (DL:252). Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent (R:71).

It is interesting to note that Durkheim's philosophy of the "golden mean" found reinforcement in the theory of "marginalism" developed in economics and psychology in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The revolution in psychological theory led by men such as Fechner and Weber, and in economic psychology by Gossen and others, was basically simple, but very significant. These men finally recognized that one can describe a curve of increasing and then decreasing want or pleasure, that each additional increment of stimulus or pleasure beyond a certain point of satiation or sensitivity becomes, in the same proportion, less effective as motivation. Hence the term "marginalism," for beyond the margin of satiation, each additional increment or "pleasure unit" becomes decreasingly, or marginally, effective.

Now, it is striking that Durkheim's resurrection of the ancient wisdom of the "golden mean" as the basis of health and virtue also emphasized this crucial psychological fact. Durkheim's philosophy of "human finitude" and his notion of life as "a complex equilibrium," led him to propose that "our capacity for happiness is very limited." In other words, there are definite parameters, minimums and maximums, beyond which both pleasure and pain cannot pass.

Indeed, it is a truth generally recognized today that pleasure accompanies neither the very intense states of consciousness, nor those of the very feeble. There is pain when the functional activity is insufficient, but excessive activity produces the same effects.... Pleasure is, then, situated between these two extremes. This proposition is, besides, a
corollary of the law of Weber and Fechner.... They have removed doubt from at least one point. It is that the variations of intensity through which a sensation can pass are comprised within two limits. If the stimulus is too feeble, it is not felt; but if it surpasses a certain degree, the increase produces less and less effect, until they cease to be felt. Now, this law is equally true of the quality of sensation called pleasure. It was even formulated for pleasure and pain long before it was for other elements of sensation. Bernoulli applied it directly to the most complex sentiments, and Laplace, interpreting it in the same sense, gave it the form of a relation between physical fortune and moral fortune. The gamut of variations through which the intensity the same pleasure can run is thus limited (DL:235-6).

Instead of the absoluteness of constantly expanding wants tacitly presumed by the Utilitarian economists, Durkheim, along with the marginal theorists, observed that the standard of value is relative to the level of aspiration, and historically to the degree of sociocultural and moral evolution.

... If the states of conscience whose intensity is moderated are generally agreeable, they do not all present conditions equally favorable to the production of pleasure. In the region of the lower limit, the changes through which agreeable activity passes are too small in absolute value to determine sentiments of pleasure of great energy. On the other hand, when it approaches the point of indifference, that is, its maximum, the magnitude developed has too feeble a relative value. A man who has very little capital cannot easily increase it in proportions significant to change his condition perceptibly. That is why economies carry too little joy with them; they are too petty to improve the situation. The insignificant advantages procure do not compensate for the privations they have cost. In the same way, a man whose fortune is excessive finds pleasure only in exceptional beneficence, for he measures its importance by what he already has. It is quite otherwise with average fortunes. Here, both the absolute size and the relative size of the variations are in best condition for production of pleasure, for they are sufficiently important, and yet it is not necessary for them to be extraordinary to be estimated at their worth. The standard measuring their value is not yet so high as to result in strong depreciation. The intensity of an agreeable stimulus can then increase usefully only between limits still more closely related than we first said,
for it can only produce its full effect in the interval which corresponds to the average part of the agreeable activity. Above and below that, pleasure still exists, but it is not proportional to the cause producing it, whereas, in the limited zone, the least oscillations are felt and appreciated. Nothing of the energy of the stimulus converted to pleasure is lost (DL:236).

The two main variables of stimuli—intensity and repetition—are both contained within parameters, within the "golden mean."

What we have just said of the intensity of each stimulus could be repeated of their number. They cease to be agreeable when they are too many or too few, as when they surpass or do not attain a certain degree of vivacity. It is not without reason that human experience sees the condition of happiness in the golden mean (DL:236-7).

Durkheim's philosophy of finitude and the "golden mean" thus flew in the face of the Utilitarian ethos which assumed that "more is better," that functional efficiency, high productivity, high consumption, in short, "progress," would not only have few ill side-effects, but that it was both possible and desirable. But was Durkheim not closer to the truth when he suggested:

... pleasure ... loses its intensity through repetition. If it becomes too continuous, it disappears completely.... To the extent that we accustom ourselves to a certain type of happiness, it flees from us, and we are obliged to throw ourselves into new undertakings to recapture it. We must bring the extinguished pleasure to life again by means of more energetic stimuli, that is, multiply or render those which we have more intense. But that is possible only if work becomes more productive and, consequently, more divided. Thus, each realized advance in art, science, industry, would necessitate new advances, so as not to lose the fruits of the new preceding advance (DL:252).

Hence, we embark upon the treadmill of modern existence, where one must advance simply to keep from falling back. If this really represented generic human experience, one might be tempted to agree with Norman O. Brown's dictum that "Man is a disease of history"!

The equilibrium time destroys cannot be reestablished, nor can happiness be maintained at a constant level
without attempts which are the more disagreeable as they approach the higher limit of pleasure, for in the region adjoining the maximum point the increases are steadily lower than the corresponding stimuli. More trouble must be taken for the same reward. What is gained on one side is lost on the other, and loss is avoided only through new expenditure. Consequently, for the operation to be profitable, this loss would at least have to be important, and the need for reparation strongly felt. But, in fact, it has only a very mediocre energy, because simple repetition brings nothing essential to pleasure (DL:253).

Nor, as some suggest, does constant novelty substitute for the marginality of repetition of pleasure. Indeed, Durkheim took pains to point out that it is "... necessary not to confuse the claim of variety with that of novelty."

The first is the necessary condition of pleasure, since an uninterrupted enjoyment disappears or is changed into pain. But time alone does not suppress variety; continuity must be added to it. A state often repeated, but in discontinuous manner, can remain agreeable, for, if continuity destroys pleasure, it is either because it makes it unwitting, or because the play of each function demands an outlay which, prolonged without interruption, is exhausting and becomes painful. If, then, the act, in becoming habitual, returns only at separated intervals, it will continue to be felt, and the expenditures will be replaced in the intervals. That is why a healthy adult always sleeps, eats, drinks, every day. It is the same with the needs of the spirit, which are, also, periodic as the psychical functions to which they correspond. The pleasures that music brings, or the arts, or sciences, are integrally maintained provided they alternate (DL:253).

By no means can the periodicity of regular needs be considered a source of potential insatiability. Time simply demands that regular needs shall be more or less regularly satisfied; but these needs are largely determinate, as are the satisfactions.

If continuity can do what repetition cannot, it does not inspire us with a need for new and unforeseen stimuli. For, if it totally abolishes the consciousness of the agreeable state, we cannot discover that the pleasure attached to it has vanished at the same time. It is replaced by the general feeling of well-being accompanying the regular exercise of functions normally continued which is not their least worth....
There is, then, nothing in the way in which time affects the fundamental element of pleasure that can provoke us to some sort of progress. It is true that it is otherwise with novelty, whose attraction is not durable. But if it gives greater freshness to pleasure, it does not constitute it. It is only one of its secondary and accessory qualities (DL:253).

Now, what is really striking about these notions that the standard of value is relative, and that there is no absolute beckoning us on to progress through constant increase of wants, and that the schedule of wants is socially constructed, is not the painfully obvious fact of the satiability or "marginality" of wants, but rather: how could the Utilitarians have tacitly presumed that the opposite was true? The question is analogous to my incredulity at the naivete of the famous Hawthorne experiments, for instead of enshrining this case as a classic, my question is: how could the original experimenters have been so blind? In both cases, we should invert the meaning of the so-called "revolution" in theory which supposedly resulted, for what truly requires explanation is the original hidden biases which held these "pioneers" back! As always, it was their materialist and atomist predispositions which led the Utilitarians astray. In terms of the materialist account of the origins and expression of human economic wants, for instance, we are left helpless to explain the insatiability of the drives dominating so much of economic action. For on the physical level, as Durkheim himself established, wants are relatively fixed and constant; indeed, organic needs serve as the very paradigm of satiability (see part I of this Book). The really curious fact, then, is how the Utilitarian theorists could blithely ignore such an obvious fact when their own root rationale of "common sense" might have immediately revealed that organic wants are inherently limited. For if economic wants are primarily material, then they are also limited. On the other hand, if one recognizes that not nature alone but society too is the source of economic motivations, then the symbolic nature and
imperative character of so many such economically expressed desires becomes more understandable. Since the economy is the nexus between the natural and cultural spheres, the "ideal" or potentially insatiable character of economic desires, as opposed to fixed and limited organic needs, becomes clear.

In this manner, the Utilitarians unwittingly placed a difficult obstacle in the path of progress of their own economic theory. For if one presumes materialism and atomism, after each has satisfied his own individual material survival needs, isn't our continued and seemingly unending quest for material satisfaction substantively irrational? But this is, in effect, precisely what classical economic theory presumed, since labor was the fount of all economic value, and unending methodical work was the visible character of an upright character structure (eg. see Parsons, 1949 on Marshall), men would continue to constantly strive to increase the technical efficiency of production and, thus, indirectly but almost automatically increase the scale of consumption. For wouldn't more material goods make us happier? The Utilitarians' implicit assumption of the absoluteness of material wants and their potentially infinite satiability, was a fatal flaw that had to be resolved before economic theory could progress (eg. the Austrian school, Walras, Pareto, and many others developed the implications of the basic insights of "marginalism"). Further, I believe, after Weber and Parsons, that these insistent claims can only be fully understood, in the last analysis, as a symbolic assertion of over-riding ethical demands. Indeed, was this not Parsons' purpose in examining Marshall's notion of the insatiability of wants in relation to character structure (eg. see Parsons, 1949: 514)?

Now, "marginalism" in economic theory was important not only because it helped to resolve formal theoretical problems in relating so-called "exchange values" to "use values," as Parsons (1949:130) suggests, but also because
for the first time the stubborn and incontrovertible fact was finally explicitly and systematically recognized that each additional increment beyond a certain point diminished, rather than increased, further desire. The significance of this finally obvious conclusion could not be evaded forever. Indeed, I believe that it was only ethically driven desires for "progress and perfection," originally moral and spiritual but now displaced, that could have sanctioned this massive and sustained irrationality at the very heart of economic rationality. It is no surprise that Gossen's discovery was first known as "the law of satiability of wants." The simple and obvious law of diminishing returns on effort and stimulation counteracts the tacit ethically driven presumption that wants and stimulation are potentially infinite, that the more we have, the more we want, and that this infinite stairway upward can continue forever. Thus, "marginalism" has come to be considered a major revolution in economic and psychological theory in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

But, clearly, Durkheim, still largely unaffected by the Utilitarian biases, had little trouble in independently recognizing the importance of the "marginal" perspective and regression to the "golden mean."

Indeed, when placed in proper historical perspective, what is so striking is that we could have resolutely forgotten the ancient moral wisdom which counsels that health, virtue, and happiness are rooted in the "golden mean." For it was this classical insight, so conspicuous by its absence from the ethics of the modern era, which led Durkheim and other moral philosophers, such as Camus, to see that human life and health, while swept up in a constantly progressing equilibrium, is, nonetheless, always anchored in a dialectical relationship or "golden mean" between all opposites.
What is needed if social order is to reign is that the mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content, is not that they have more or less, but that they are convinced they have no right to more (Soc:242).

In contrast to the Utilitarian notion that economically expressed wants are materially based and atomistic (random), Durkheim's sociological perspective led him to propose that desires are culturally generated and socially scheduled. Assuming that "life is a complex equilibrium," and that "no living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are proportioned to his means" (S:246), Durkheim made the crucial suggestion that such desires must be legitimate if they are to be entertained as candidates for satisfaction in the social schedule of the ascending scale of wants. Thus, in moving from his first to his second schema, we shall retain his philosophy of human finitude, and the notion of the social schedule, and intensify the sociocultural significance of these premises by shifting the location of insatiability from homo duplex to modern society and culture. Further, we shall see that these insatiable desires are legitimized in the modern ethos of market capitalism. Because they are legitimized virtues through the mechanism of the market, the "moral anarchy" of anomie reigns.

For purposes of comparison, it is clear that the dominant Utilitarian stream of economic theorizing, which constitutes both the historical and logical baseline against which almost all other alternative schools of economic thought have reacted, entertained a very specific type of psychology. Indeed, behind the program of the "philosophic radicals" and their predecessors (reaching back at least to Hobbes, Wm. Petty, Locke, Adam Smith, etc.) for moral...
reconstruction of society and man lay an "associationist" psychology (see especially Halevy, 1955). In the hands of Bentham and his followers, of course, the associationist psychology became cast in terms of the famous "hedonistic calculus" of pain and pleasure. In later economic theory, still largely rooted in analogous presuppositions concerning man's "innate propensities," the once vibrant ethical postulates receded farther into the background. However, the nominalistic emphasis on the inner psychological nature of economic motivation as the supposed paradigm of rationality itself--essentially an "economizing" type of calculation of "efficiency" (see K. Polanyi, 1968)--remained solid throughout.

Consider, for example, contemporary post-Marshallian micro-economic theory. I simply do not find it very enlightening to think that wants, in generic terms, as the basis of consumer demand, are ultimately rooted in idiosyncratic individual "tastes." This seemingly empirical, but misleading, premise implies that individual "tastes," and the underlying "drives," are prime motivational categories, and thus, the key to consumer demand. But I suggest that "tastes" are not prime analytical categories, analogous to tracing a specific need to a specific location in the organism. Even the most rudimentary sociological perspective suggests that societies, not isolated individual atoms floating in the void of the international market, generate personality structures, motivations, desires, self-images, and so on. For these are primarily sociocultural phenomenological processes. In addition, the term "tastes" implies a certain arbitrariness or pervading "randomness of ends" (see Parsons, 1949) concerning the origin and structure of human desires, which suggests that these are largely incommensurable from one person to another. By contrast, a sociocultural view suggests that instead of random, autonomous, and idiosyncratic "tastes," socially and culturally generated and directed desires are often fairly standarized. Further,
by assuming that these supposedly random individual "tastes" are physically generated, and thus expressed in terms of physical goods, the Utilitarian economic theorists tended to encircle themselves in a kind of self-fulfilling tautology—physical wants for physical goods for physical wants, and so on and so forth.

On the contrary, we must inevitably recognize that there are a multiplicity of reasons for participating in economic action. We must recognize that economic wants may be divided into "needs" which are organically generated, and thus comparatively fixed in their nature and standard of satiability, on the one hand, and on the other we see "desires" which are socioculturally generated, and thus comparatively variable in their object and standard of satiability. In this dialectical combination of "needs" and "desires," the first emerging from the organism and the second from society, there lies the truth of Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex. Therefore, the fully sociocultural perspective on economic action suggests that the economy is the nexus between the material and symbolic spheres of society. All economic systems have dual functions—the allocation of both material and symbolic resources. Every economy is simultaneously engaged in the production and distribution of goods, services, privileges, and desired symbols.

Therefore, in Durkheimian and sociological terms, every society is faced with similar sociocultural and economic problems of negotiating a variable ratio, in terms of available resources and the legitimacy of the schedule of satisfaction of wants, between organically generated "needs" (eg. food) and socioculturally generated "desires" (eg. honor or the demands of charisma). The dual nature of economic wants, the simultaneity of economic motivations, shifts in the legitimacy of wants and in the historical schedules of satisfaction, these and other crucial factors
make not only for the great complexity of human economic action, but for its potential insatiability as well.

Since we have already pursued some of these notions pertaining to the social schedule of satisfaction (see especially part I of Book Two), let us now briefly look at Durkheim's perception that both wants themselves and their schedule must be accepted as legitimate if society and economy are to work. Since human hearts and minds cannot be restrained or directed by external, physical forces, only Durkheimian moral forces, sociocultural forces, are capable of touching the "awakened human conscience." In shifting from schema one to schema two, we see that society not only moralizes egos, but also that culture is the energizing and directing force of the socially constructed person. Socially constructed and directed "desires" are legitimate, those beyond and below are proscribed. This is what Durkheim tried to say, albeit unsuccessfully, with his early notion of man as homo duplex. Therefore, as with Max Weber, the basic category in Durkheim's doctrine was legitimate moral authority.

For the socioeconomic order to work properly, for the person to be properly motivated and directed, for culture to regulate and energize "desires," certain ratios of satisfaction, between a person and his station, and between his desires and resources, must be considered more or less legitimate by all.

... in every society and in all ages there exists a vague but lively sense of the value of the various services used in society, and of the values, too, of the things that are the subject of exchange. Although neither of these factors is regulated by tariff, there is, however, in every social group a state of opinion that fixes its normal value at least roughly. There is an average figure that is considered as the true price, as the one that expresses the true value of a thing at a given moment (PECM:209).

Many things contribute, besides scarcity, to the determination of the "fair price":

"... in every society and in all ages there exists a vague but lively sense of the value of the various services used in society, and of the values, too, of the things that are the subject of exchange. Although neither of these factors is regulated by tariff, there is, however, in every social group a state of opinion that fixes its normal value at least roughly. There is an average figure that is considered as the true price, as the one that expresses the true value of a thing at a given moment (PECM:209)."
All sorts of causes enter into the way it has evolved: that is, a sense of the true usefulness of things and services, of the labor they have cost, of the relative ease or difficulty in producing them, traditions and prejudices of every kind, and so on.... This scale is certainly a real one, and it is the touchstone by which the equity of exchanges is to be judged (PECM: 209-210).

Further, we saw that in schema one Durkheim spoke of the social schedule served to constrain individual desires.

... It is absolutely essential that there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge and which tells them what is right. For an individual committed only to the pressure of his needs will never admit that he has reached the extreme limits of his rightful portion. If he is not conscious of a force above him which he respects, which stops him and tells him with authority that the compensation due him is fulfilled, then inevitably he will expect as due all that his needs demand. And since in our hypothesis these needs are limitless, their exigency is necessarily without limit (Soc:242-3).

But having already set aside Durkheim's hypothesis, based upon the image of man as homo duplex, that these needs are inherently insatiable, we see that in schema two the modern social schedule itself acts to generate and legitimize these potentially infinite social and cultural desires.

At the base of Durkheim's theory of the social schedule was the notion that economic value is socially, not individualistically, determined.

... it is not the amount of labor put into a thing which makes its value; it is the way in which the value of this thing is assessed by the society, and this valuation depends, not so much on the amount of energy expended, as on the useful results it produces, such as they are felt to be by the collectivity, for there is a subjective factor there which cannot be ruled out (PECM:216).

In addition, a crucial observation is that the social schedule of price and income changes through history (on all of this see S:249-51).

This normal price is, of course, an ideal price only: it very rarely coincides with the real price which naturally varies according to circumstances; there is no official price list to apply to every individual case. It is only a fixed point, around which
there must inevitably be many fluctuations; but these cannot go beyond a certain range in any direction without seeming abnormal. We might even say that the more societies evolve the more does this structure of values become stable and regulated and unaffected by any local conditions or special circumstances, so that they come to assume an objective form. When every farm and almost every village had its own market, the price scale varied according to the locality; each had the scale and tariff that suited it. These variations left far more lee-way to a shrewd personal ingenuity and calculation. This is why bargaining and individual prices are one of the characteristic features of petty trading and small scale industry.

The more we advance, on the other hand, the more do prices come to have an international basis: and this through the system of stock exchanges and controlled markets whose action covers a whole continent. Formerly, under the system of local markets, there had to be negotiating and a battle of wits, to know on what terms an object could be had; today, we only have to open a well-informed journal. We are becoming increasingly used to the idea that the true price of things exchanged should be fixed previous to the contract and be in no way governed by it (PECM:210).

Durkheim here provided us with a series of seminal suggestions concerning the evolution of the social schedule and the delegitimation of traditional ones rooted in the small scale life of the village. Let us pursue these clues.

Now, in general, for the traditional social schedule to have broken down so irretrievably, and for absolutizing individualism and legitimate insatiability to have been enshrined in its place, there must have been a delegitimization of the old norms of tribe and neighborhood which accompanied the extension of the international market. Indeed, delegitimization of old norms and legitimation of new and unlimited individual aspirations probably went hand in hand. Again and again, Durkheim emphasized the critical element of moral legitimacy which underpins shifts in all socioeconomic schedules. Whereas before in history the potential insatiability of culturally generated desires absolutized society and tradition, today very different types of desires, precisely because of their moral sanctions, absolutize the individual and the "tradition of the new." Where-
as before it was legitimate to desire only as much as one's father received, and his father before him, today it is legitimate, nay expected, to peg one's hopes for a beginning salary higher than one's father ever received!

... it would be of little use for everyone to recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established by public opinion, if he did not also consider the distribution of these functions just. The workman is not in harmony with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his desserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has could not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more precise rule must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit (S:250-1).

We may preliminarily conclude, therefore, that the shift to a stratification system based upon individual achievement accompanied the breakdown of the traditional, small scale social schedule and the release of insatiable demands. In the reversal of the traditional social schedule in terms of the enthronement of legitimized insatiability and the "cult of the individual," we see that both sets of suicidal types, altruisme/fatalisme and anomie/egoisme, demonstrate the extremes to which societies and cultures can go in absolutizing one or another element of the complex human equation (see also ME:49). In both cases, Durkheim suggested there must be a rebalancing of the books, a new and more human equilibrium, with less tyranny of these warring and destroying absolutes.

Now, it is not sufficient to explain this revolution in the social schedule as Durkheim was tempted to do in his first schema merely in terms of the erosion of the traditional "collective conscience" by the progressive division of labor. Indeed, in The Division of Labor itself, Durkheim came very close to the Weberian notions of economic tradi-
tionalism of archaic societies, and the obstacles that had to be overcome by certain crucial world-historical break­throughs.

Indeed, a change of existence, whether it be sudden or prepared, always brings forth a painful crisis, for it does violence to acquired instincts which oppose it. All the past holds us back, even though the most beautiful vistas appear before us. It is always a laborious operation to pull up the roots of habits that time has fixed and organized in us.... A generation is not enough to cast aside the work of generations, to put a new man in the place of the old.... Those who find pleasure in regular and persistent work are still few and far between. For most men, it is still an insupportable servitude. The idleness of primitive times has lost its old attractions for them. These metamorphoses then cost a great deal for a long time without accomplishing anything. The generations inaugurating them do not receive the fruits, if there are any because they come late. They have only the pain. Consequently, it is not the expectation of greater happiness that draws them into such enterprises. But, in fact, is it true that the happiness of the individual increases as man advances? Nothing is more doubtful (DL:241).

As I suggested in part I of this Book, it is most helpful here to think in terms of the normative preconditions for such painful breaks with the past, and for breakthroughs to more powerful future social organizations, especially when we attempt to explain the emergence of modern societies, modern personality structures, and modern desires. The modern economic cosmos is possible, for example, only if the highly restrictive bonds of social fraternization of primitive and traditional societies are set aside. The social bond must be progressively extended to include more universalistic exchanges. However, as the social bond is more widely extended, as Tocqueville, Maine, Toennies, and Weber among classical writers, and Benjamin Nelson (1973a) among contemporary observers, have noted, the "brotherhood" or "neighborhood ethic" also becomes increasingly attenuated, and a sort of impersonal "universal otherhood" reigns in its place. In short, as the social bond is extended, its intensity lessens.
Therefore, in order to adequately explain the breakdown of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, we must simultaneously explain the power of the forces that broke through this heavy and massively legitimized system of authority. We must try to account not merely for the release of the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," as Durkheim's early doctrine of *homo duplex* tried to do, but also, and more importantly, for the stimulation and legitimation of these new desires. In other words, we should try to explain the origin and continuing sanction of this modern "revolution of rising expectations." If we complete the shift from the analytical axis of *absence* to the *presence* of cultural sanctions, may we not then conclude that the generation and sustenance of such desires, far from being due to the release of the organic ego from moral control, might itself be the unanticipated result of a peculiar form of extreme moral discipline pervasive in the modern world?
G. The Origin and Continuing Sanction for Our Modern
Revolution of Rising Expectations

In contrast to traditional moral philosophies, the
dominant note of the modern economic ethos has been unlim­
ited aspirations, a veritable "infinity of dreams and de­
sires." This utopian image of a cornucopia of plenty is,
of course, the core of the American Dream as it is lived
out today. Clearly, some basic shift must have occurred in
the axis of the modern moral universe for drives for unend­
ing "progress and perfection," daily represented as virtues,
to have been translated into economic action. But where did
these drives and desires come from? And how have they come
to be so massively legitimated?

Delegitimation and relegitimation, conflicting moral
challenges and moral claims, the competition of one charisma
against another--surely these are most complex sociocultural
processes. In the second schema, the refusal to acquiesce in
the face of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, and
the moral sanctioning of a new and absolute sphere for the
autonomous individual, and the legitimizing of a "longing
for the infinite," can only have emerged from a long series
of challenges and conflicts between competing systems of
moral authority, of competing rationales for informing and
directing structures of conscience and consciousness. There­
fore, it behooves us now, instead of explaining away these
processes as "mechanically generated", as Durkheim allowed
himself to do in the first schema and in The Division of
Labor, to enter more closely into the nature of these chal­
lenges, and their sometimes ironic outcomes. This story
shall be explored in greater detail in Chapter Ten.

In general, in Suicide Durkheim followed the line of
thought earlier established in The Division of Labor concern­
ing the generation of new needs through history. It is the
progress of civilization itself, Durkheim seemed to say,
which generates new needs.
Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of the changes which are produced in the volume and density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity which is imposed upon men. It is because there is, for them, no other way of living in the new conditions in which they have been placed. From the time that the number of individuals among whom social relations are established begins to increase, they can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, harder work, and intensification of their faculties. From this general stimulation, there inevitably results a much higher degree of culture.... Civilization develops because it cannot fail to develop. Once effectuated, this development is found to be generally useful.... It responds to needs formed at the same time because they depend on the same causes. But this is an adjustment after the fact. Yet, we must notice that the good it renders in this direction is not a positive enrichment, a growth in our stock of happiness, but only repairs the losses that it has itself caused. It is because this superactivity of general life fatigues and weakens our nervous system that it needs reparations proportionate to its expenditures, that is to say, more varied and complex satisfactions (DL:336-7).

Thus, we see that Durkheim, involved on one rhetorical front in an argument against the Utilitarians, was not wholly sanguine about the progressive division of labor. Yet, as we discovered in Book Two and especially part I of this Book, Durkheim's thesis was posed on the general evolutionary level, and largely ignored specific historical breakthroughs.

Therefore, Durkheim's early answer in The Division of Labor that "everything happens mechanically" cannot really hope to explain this modern explosion of desires. Now, it is striking for our present purposes that at one point in this book, Durkheim himself stopped to reflect upon the complex relations between greater production and consumption.

A function can become specialized only if this new specialization corresponds to some need of society. But all new specialization results in increasing and improving production.... Therefore, advance can be established in permanent form only if individuals really feel the need of more abundant products, or
products of better quality.... For it to become a specialty, however, men had to cease being satisfied with what had, until then, satisfied them and become more exacting. But whence could these new demands come (DL:272)?

At this point, Durkheim still seemed to think that the feedback cycle of the division of social labor itself sufficed as an answer--namely, that the greater competition that served as the initial spur for specialization also led to greater stress and fatigue, which thus required greater "reparation" and psychic compensation. Although the wish for material progress was not itself an adequate explanation, Durkheim seemed to assume that greater demand was itself an outgrowth of the progressive division of labor. Thus, rising desires were an unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome of this basically mechanical social evolutionary process.

They are an effect of the same causes which determines the progress of the division of labor. We have just seen that such progress is due to the greater acuteness of the struggle. But a more violent struggle does not proceed without greater depletion of forces, and reparation must be proportionate to the expenditure. That is why the dispensations, until then sufficient to restore organic equilibrium, are insufficient from then on. There must be a more abundant and choicer sustenance.... It is especially the nervous system that supports all these burdens, for it must devise ingenious methods to keep them up with the struggle, to create new specialities, to acclimatize them, etc. In general, the more subject to change the environment is, the greater the part intelligence plays in life, for it alone can have new conditions of equilibrium continually broken, and yet restore it. Cerebral life develops then, at the same time as competition becomes keener, and to the same degree. These advances are observed not only among the elite, but in all classes of society....

Besides, it is not without cause that mental diseases keep pace with civilization, nor that they rage in cities rather than in the country, and in large cities more than in small ones. Now, a more voluminous and more delicate brain makes greater demands than a less refined one. Difficulties and privations the latter does not even feel painfully disturb the former. For the same reason, more complex stimulants are needed to affect this organ agreeably once it is refined, and there is greater necessity for them, because it has
been developing at the same time. Finally, more than all the others, needs properly intellectual increase; rough explanations no longer satisfy more perspicacious minds. Fresh insights are needed and science holds these aspirations together at the same time that it satisfies them. All these changes are, then, mechanically produced by necessary causes. If our intelligence and sensibility develop and become keener, it is because we exercise them more, and if we exercise them more, it is because we are forced to by the greater violence of the struggle we have to live through. That is how, without having desired it, humanity is found apt to receive a more intense and varied culture (DL:272-3).

But Durkheim himself then acknowledged that these simple predispositions are not only necessary, not sufficient to explain the advancing desires in modern expanding economies. Rather, he said that the new desires, especially for constant novelty, are awakened and satisfied through the progressive division of labor itself, Durkheim's early deus ex machina.

If another factor did not intervene, however, this simple predisposition would not of itself rear the means for satisfaction, for it constitutes only an aptitude for enjoyment.... Simple aptitudes for enjoyment do not necessarily provoke desire.... Besides, these indeterminate aspirations can rather easily deviate from their natural ends and their normal direction. But, at the very moment when a man is in position to taste these new enjoyments and calls for them, even unconsciously, he finds them within reach, because the division of labor has developed at the same time, and furnishes them to him. Without there having been the least pre-established harmony, these two orders of fact meet, simply because they are effects of the same cause (DL:273-4).

But surely this is a weak explanation; for how could these two very different orders of fact simply converge? In the early stages Weber also relied on weaker explanatory links such as the most troublesome, poetic, notion of "elective affinities."

Here is how the meeting can be conceived. The attraction of novelty would be sufficient to impel man to taste these pleasures. It naturally follows that the greater richness and complexity of these stimulants
would cause him to find those with which he had been content more mediocre. He can, besides, adapt himself to them mentally before having tried them, and as, in reality, they correspond to changes in his constitution he hastens to benefit from them. Experience thus comes to confirm these presentiments; needs which were sleeping awaken, are determined, become aware of themselves, and are organized. This is not to say that this adjustment may be in all cases perfect, that each new product due to new advances in the division of labor always correspond to a real need of our nature. It is, on the contrary, likely that rather often needs are contracted only because one has become accustomed to the object to which they are related. This object was neither necessary nor useful, but it has been experienced several times, and it has been so well enjoyed that it cannot be denied. Harmonies resulting from quite mechanical causes can never be anything but imperfect and proximate, but they are sufficient to maintain order in general. That is what happens to the division of labor. The advances it makes are, not in all cases, but generally, in harmony with changes in man, and this is what permits them to last (DL:274-5).

This was, in essence, Durkheim's mechanical explanation of the generation of new desires and consumer demand through the progressive division of labor.

From the production side, Durkheim argued that the greater efficiency and productivity of labor also gets caught up in a kind of self-stimulating feedback loop. Indeed, Durkheim suggested that this is yet another reason why the progressive division of labor "... is a source of social cohesion, not only because it limits the activity of each, but also because it increases it" (DL:395).

... The same causes that oblige us to specialize more also oblige us to work more. When the number of competitors becomes greater in society, it also becomes greater in each particular profession. The struggle becomes more lively, and, consequently, more efforts are necessary to sustain it.... Labor becomes more continuous as it is more divided.... In societies which are exclusively agricultural and pastoral, labor is almost entirely suspended during the season of bad weather. In Rome, it was interrupted by a multitude of holidays and days of rest. As we go forward, however, work becomes a permanent occupation, a habit, and indeed, if this habit is sufficiently strengthened, a need (DL:393-4).
Is it legitimate to wonder whether, beyond the structural and "mechanical" causes, there might have been something special about the moral values of the Middle Ages which made work into a permanent occupation, perhaps even a need. We might do well to remember Weber's insight that the monks and ascetic orders were among the first groups to systematically live out a consciously chosen and rationally regulated vocation. Indeed, when one examines that era, one is struck by the extraordinarily high estimation in which the monastics, and later, the scholastic philosophers, were held.

Finally, Durkheim hastened to admonish us, however, that this constant increase in productive capacity and consumer demand did not, as a net outcome, make us happier. We did not rationally choose to become vocational ascetics, to work harder and harder, for that is what we must do in order to satisfy our insatiable demands.

But, to repeat, we are not happier for that. To be sure, once these needs are excited, they cannot be suspended without pain. But our happiness is no greater because they are excited. The point at which we measure the relative intensity of our pleasures is displaced. A subversion of all gradation results. But this confusion of classes of pleasures does not imply an increase. Because the environment is no longer the same, we have to change, and these changes have determined others in our manner of being happy, but changes do not necessarily imply progress (DL:275).

Later, in Suicide, Durkheim made the notion of intrasocietal competition the driving force behind the generation of new needs more specific. There he suggested that since the ratio of scheduled rewards is relational—that is, one want pitted against another, one group or class against another—relative deprivation may be a key to the constant escalation of desires. The ever-escalating demands of favorably situated groups leads others not similarly favored to resent the formers' advances. Competition intensifies the struggle. "... The struggle grows more violent and painful, both from being less controlled and because competition is greater. All classes contend among themselves be-
cause no established classification exists" (S:253).

If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the principles controlling the distribution of means among various occupations. Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion, become disoriented, and no longer recognize the limits proper to them. Besides, they are at the same time seized by a sort of natural eretheism simply by the greater intensity of public life. With increased prosperity, desires increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of deregulation or anomie is thus further heightened by passions being less disciplined, precisely when they need more disciplining (S:253).

Now, Durkheim's discovery of relative deprivation as a potent force fueling the fires of inflation in modern expanding economies is an important insight into the sociocultural forces underlying the upward wage-price spiral. This unending competition of collective egoisms is an independent variable contributing to the inflation which we now grudgingly accept as the cost of a constantly rising standard of living. The natural status competition in any society was intensified and even apotheosized as legitimate norm by the Utilitarian ethos of the "war of each against all," of "nature red in tooth and claw," of the potent fiction of the "natural identity of interests," and so forth (see especially E. Halevy, 1955). What resulted, of course, was a kind of culturally sanctioned "moral anarchy," a form of legitimate socio-economic civil war in which each group practiced a kind of covert extortion against others through the neutralizing mechanism of the international market.

And in Socialism, Durkheim spoke in the following terms of this rather peculiar war of "collective egoisms," this unending sanctioned spiral of status competition and inflation.
Picture the most productive organization possible, and a distribution of wealth which assures abundance to even the humblest—perhaps such a transformation, at the very moment it was constituted, would produce an instant of gratification. But this gratification could only be temporary. For desires, though calmed for an instant, will quickly acquire new exigencies. Unless it is admitted that each individual is equally compensated ... there will always be some workers who will receive more and others less. So it is inevitable that at the end of a short time the latter find their share meager with what goes to the others, and as a result new desires arise, for all levels of the social scale. And besides, even apart from any feeling of envy, excited desires will tend naturally to keep outrunning their goals, for the very reason that there will be nothing before them which stops them. And they will call all the more imperiously for a new satisfaction, since those already secured will have given them more strength and vitality (Soc:242).

Thus, the treadmill of modern, progressive existence speeds up. As we have often discovered to our consternation, it is often when things are getting better that greater demands are lodged, that revolutions break forth. When things are bad, aspirations are scaled down to meet the restricted resources. When things are opened up, instead of banking the fires, demands are accelerated. Indeed, those who are endemically faced with a marginal subsistence life style come to be possessed by what one observer (Richard Ball, 1968) has accurately called "an analgesic subculture."

Therefore, as we observed earlier, the standard relations in economic theory between scarcity and society need perhaps to be reversed. Normally, it is assumed that scarcity is primarily a natural phenomenon; indeed, some definitions of economic action couched in terms of rationalizing decisions concerning the efficient utilization of scarce resources incorporate this notion at their very core. But as Stanley (1968) rightly points out, it is far more likely that scarcity is socially created. Indeed, I went even further than Stanley by suggesting that monopolization and specialization are two basic ways which every group uses to increase their share of the social schedule of reward. With
the former, one attempts to make natural environmental or infrastructural resources artificially scarce, while with the latter one attempts to make human capital (skills, knowledge) increasingly scarce or diversified. Thus, *scarcity is far more a social necessity than a natural given.* Nowhere is this ironic development more clear than in the ever-ascending desires seen in various forms of status competition. While it is true that all societies entertain agonistic displays (e.g. the "Potlatch" of the Northwest Coast Indians), nonetheless, it was only with the breakdown of the corporative structure of society that the modern economy could emerge. Dominick LaCapra has noted this important relationship between socially generated scarcity and "institutionalized anomie" in modern economies. The gap between expectation and resources, between one's previously assigned level of satisfaction and that of one's neighbor constantly accelerates.

... the problem of the relation of scarcity to aggression and conflict was basic to Durkheim's notion of anomie.... A second type of scarcity was a form that depended on the cultural definition of scarcity, as well as on the institutional creation or social conditioning of scarcity effected by the apportionment of things or social and cultural value and, of course, of any economic surplus. The problem of social order and solidarity was concerned with the dialectical relation of these two types of scarcity, for instance, the ability of the second to shape or distort the first—an ability which in certain ways might increase with the development of science and technology (1972:167).

LaCapra rightly sees that there are two types of scarcity—natural and social. And he saw that Durkheim's notion of anomie concerned the latter; he further recognized the substantive irrationality of culturally enforced scarcity even when technological advances render general affluence possible, and subsistence marginality unnecessary.

Moreover, LaCapra also sees that this problem of the generation of new desires, this ever-escalating status competition, mounting feelings of relative deprivation, and
the specter of culturally generated and socially enforced scarcity, changes from one historical period to the next.

Definitions of what constitutes legitimate expectations and need, beyond the requirements of biological survival, vary according to social type. One of Durkheim's contentions was that the relative poverty of traditional societies was itself often a basis for the limitation of desires and expectations to a level at which they could be institutionally satisfied with available resources. This was the basis for the correlation of poverty, in certain societies, with low suicide rates. And especially in archaic societies, the institutional definition of legitimate needs was often assumed to be consensually accepted by all interested groups (1972:163).

The building up of permanent surpluses, the erosion of the segmental type of society, the transcendence of the repressive collective conscience, increasing occupational and released status competition, all led to the modern revolution of rising expectations. What resulted was the lifting of the traditional ceiling on legitimate aspirations, and the modern worship of an "infinity of dreams and desires."

The elementary and reiterated point of Durkheim's argument was that anomie, including its institutionalized variety, made the problem of solidarity and social order insoluble, because it both maximized scarcity and eliminated the possibility of reciprocity in social relations. In a state of society in which desires were perpetually stimulated, and status always in doubt, mutually invasive and aggressive relations were always inevitable. A society which combined achievement values and anomie faced devastating problems, for it gave rise to the type of man who was constrained to be pre-emptively rapacious in his dealings with others and anxiously uncertain in his every action.... In the absence of consensually accepted norms which defined within flexible limits an optimal set of compatible alternatives in the just allocation of resources, any surplus--however greater it might be in absolute terms--would be psychologically experienced in terms of uncooperative competition for scarce values (LaCapra, 1972:169-70).

Now, the first time that I heard anyone emphasize that Durkheim's notion of anomie implied insatiability of desires was Benjamin Nelson's lectures at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social
Research in the school year 1969-70. Like Durkheim, Nelson proposed that every society is engaged in the production and distribution of desired values. Every culture is a value enterprise whose primary resources and net outcomes are symbols of varied worths. Society constitutes a network of institutions which produce and allocate an inevitably scarce supply of coveted symbols. Further, Nelson also distinguishes between organic needs and socioculturally generated desires. Relative to desires (not basic subsistence needs), almost any resource may be considered scarce. Because such desires are socially created and culturally apportioned, they may expand indefinitely. In other words, since society sanctifies an ideal as "sacred," desires for consummation of these cultural values may become, in effect, insatiable. At the same time, society may move to protect the sacredness of these values from becoming mere "common currency," by making them more scarce. Almost inevitably, we witness the problem of the allocation of scarce symbolic resources.

Nelson clearly sees that Durkheim's central concern was with the insatiability of desires, especially in the modern world. Durkheim saw the seemingly unlimited expansion of desires through the mechanism of the expansive international market. People's expectations rose accordingly, and if, perchance, their hopes were dashed, or if, by some good fortune, their desires were immediately consummated, then people tended to see themselves as relatively deprived. The egalitarianism which Tocqueville anatomized only intensified this problem. Thus, Nelson concludes, when private ownership came about on a massive scale, then people became, in effect, insatiable, wanting more than they could possibly have or even use. And the constant moral disequilibrium led to suicide. Thus, Nelson's insights stand as a bridge between the first and second schemas.

Finally, Nelson observes that Weber's focus on "rationalization" complemented Durkheim's concerns here. For one of Weber's key analytical concerns was the degree to which so-
cieties are capable of maximizing the satisfaction of wants by the scheduled allocation of scarce resources to highly valued ends by putting premiums on idealized or charismatic values. This represents yet another convergence between Durkheim and Weber significant for our present purposes.

Finally, let us turn to consider what may be regarded as one of Durkheim's fullest explorations of the origins of the modern revolution of rising expectations. Strangely, this statement is not to be found in Suicide. Rather, it comes indirectly in a review in Socialism of the early nineteenth century French-Swiss historian and political economist Sismondi de Sismondi's explanation of the origins of the modern socioeconomic order. Although a secondary account, Durkheim clearly offered a sympathetic treatment of Sismondi's insights. Indeed, Sismondi is granted a whole chapter to himself in Socialism, second only to Saint-Simon. Originally a disciple of Adam Smith, Sismondi later moved away as he became more critical and independent. In Socialism we discover that Sismondi offered us original and striking insights into the ironic process of the development of market capitalism which are still relevant to our contemporary travail. In addition, he was also one of the first to understand the theory which later became known as "marginalism."

Focussing on the question of the supposed self-equilibrating and beneficent "invisible hand" of Utilitarian dogma, Sismondi raised many vexing questions. "The modern economic system surely presents us with a magnificent spectacle, says Sismondi. Never has the productive capacity of man been carried to such heights" (Soc:109). But Sismondi was one of the first political economists to ask: "But do all these apparent signs of prosperity correspond to real prosperity" (Soc:109)? While witnessing the "triumph of things" in the early nineteenth century, Sismondi concluded that "Man seemed to be more badly off than before" (Soc:110). Who, in the last analysis, really benefits from this new found abundance? Certainly not the workers, says Sismondi, and not even the
entrepeneurs as a group can be considered wholly blessed by new competition.

Necessarily limited in number, this group shrinks every day as a result of the increasing concentration of commerce and industry. Further, the possibility—always approved—of new inventions, or of unforeseen rivalries which ruin them, the fear of bankruptcy always on the horizon, especially in industries which develop rapidly—keep these in a state of perpetual anxiety and prevent them from truly enjoying this nstable prosperity (Soc:110).

Consumers gain a greater volume and variety of material goods from this "industrial hyperactivity," but while the gains should good to those who need them most, the masses generally benefit less. "Thus there would be an increase in want and misery at the very time a plethora of wealth was produced, at the very time when there ought to be ... a widespread abundance" (Soc:110). "This paradox," Durkheim noted, "rests on the new conditions of economic organization" (Soc:110), which he then proceeded to explore. It is important to note not only that Durkheim agreed with Sismondi's analysis, but that this secondary account was far more extensive than any provided by Durkheim himself.

Now, at the very heart of Sismondi's critical insight was the notion of a necessary balance between society and economy, a viable equilibrium or "golden mean." Sismondi's entire argument, Durkheim proposed, rested on two propositions: (a) Collective well-being implies that production and consumption balance exactly, and (b) The new industrial regime prevents this balance from being established in a regular manner (Soc:110). The lack of a viable balance between production and consumption Sismondi saw as the root of the unanticipated problems of modern economic expansion. And for Durkheim, Sismondi's insights provided important historical checks for his own notion of anomie. Viewing economic action in a substantively rational manner, Sismondi noted that in the ideal case a person would produce just as much as needed for personal consumption (i.e. use value) plus a reasonable surplus, as a hedge against the future.
After having provided a supply for use and a fund for reserve, he will stop, even though he could increase his consummable wealth further. He will prefer to rest than produce things he cannot use. Society as a whole is precisely like this individual.... After these two sets of wants are provided, anything more is useless and ceases to have value. To the degree that accumulated wealth exceeds the needs of consumption, it ceases being wealth. The products of his labor enrich the worker unless he finds a consumer to buy them. It is the purchaser who makes their value; therefore, if he is lacking it is nil (Soc:111).

Then Sismondi criticized the Utilitarian notion of an automatic self-balancing mechanism intervening between production and consumption, between supply and demand.

... according to Say, Ricardo, and their followers, this necessary balance between consumption and production is self-establishing, and inevitably, without anyone's trying to concern himself with it, production cannot increase without consumption increasing at the same time. Were commodities able to multiply themselves indefinitely, they would always find markets.... An increase in commodities will always increase the pleasure of those who produce more (Soc:111-112).

But Sismondi, and Durkheim, of course, questioned the implicit premise that the desire for material goods was potentially infinite. Indeed, Sismondi argued in marginal terms that there can be no infinite elasticity of consumer demand. If there is greater surplus available, he argued, people will first shift from questions of quantity to quality, and then, when they have had enough, their desires will cease to motivate further.

But, replies Sismondi, this is to attribute to human needs an elasticity they do not possess. In reality the clothier does not have a better appetite because he weaves more fabric.... There is a limit that comes from being satisfied, and no one will indefinitely enlarge his reserve of clothing merely because his income increases. What will happen? Instead of demanding more clothes, he will get better ones. He will give up those he is accustomed to and demand finer ones.... Thus it is necessary that all surpluses balance and be exchangeable, and in relationship, if they are to raise consumption accordingly. They no longer serve one another mutually as markets from the moment they are increased beyond a certain point. They tend, on
the contrary, to repel and suppress one another in order to give way to commodities of new and better quality—which they call into being. These latter do not add further to the old but substitute for them. The farmer who produces more than in the past does not utilize, in exchange for this surplus, the excess fabrics which at the same time, the manufacturer, by exertion, is able to make. On the contrary, he leaves the latter without work. He will dispose manufacturers, by the very pressure he exerts on them and the prospect of remuneration he offers them, to change their machinery and replace their surplus by products of higher price, and in this way equilibrium will at length reestablish itself (Soc:112-L3).

But this complex reestablishing of equilibrium, Sismondi and Durkheim noted, between supply and demand, productive efficiency and rising consumer demand, will not emerge automatically and without internal "friction," as it were.

But this transformation is not made ipso facto. It constitutes a more or less grave crisis since it implies losses, new expenses, and a whole series of working rearrangements. In fact, it supposes that excess commodities have remained unused and lost all value, that the capital engaged in the tools employed to produce them has been destroyed, that workers have remained without employment or had to go into new jobs, that all the losses entailed by the change of work have been undergone by industry, etc. So we are already far from the perfect harmony which would establish itself automatically--according to the English school--between consumption and production (Soc: 113).

The business cycle, manufacturer retooling and changeover, cyclical unemployment, retraining, geographical dislocation, etc., these and more are merely some of the first inventory of the hidden costs of economic and technological progress. And certainly these dislocations are not automatically healed by some beneficent "invisible hand," automatically reestablishing harmony, a veritable deus ex machina.

Now, while the classical Utilitarian economic moralists were primarily concerned with touting the beneficial social effects of greater individual production, Sismondi and Durkheim were more concerned with the unanticipated negative social consequences of infinitely expanding consumption. Indeed, Sismondi wondered, in effect, where is this constant-
ly accelerating demand going to come from? Even the substitu-
tion of quality for quantity, Sismondi argued, will have
increasingly less effect on regenerating demand.

Balance can establish itself in this manner only by
the substitution of luxury enterprises for former
undertakings. But this substitution is not possible
indefinitely, for the need of luxury items is not
itself unlimited. The life of luxury is the life of
leisure.... So the necessities of life constitute in
this way also a limit which cannot be determined pre-
cisely but which always is present. It is not there-
fore true that production can increase indefinitely
while remaining in balance with consumption, for the
latter, at a given state of civilization, cannot rise
above a certain level. The quantity of objects neces-
sary to life has very narrow limits for certain items
and the producer cannot go beyond them with impunity.
When that comes he must himself improve quality--but
even the perfecting of quality itself has limits. The
need for superfluities--like the need for necessites--
has a limit (Soc:113-114).

Again and again, Durkheim, after Sismondi, emphasized
that there is a certain incommensurability between greater
production and greater consumption--for an increase in the
former does not necessitate a corresponding increase in the
latter. Indeed, while productive capacity may increase in-
definitely, given resources, both Sismondi and Durkheim de-
clared that consumption is relatively fixed, certainly on
the level of needs, and even demand for luxury goods reach-
es a point of marginality. While this marginal boundary is
not fixed, and may expand with higher standards of living,
nevertheless, at each point in history societies seek to
establish some kind of workable and reasonable equilibrium
between expanding production, available resources, and con-
sumption.

At each point in history there is a point which pro-
duction cannot pass without disrupting the balance
with consumption, and this disruption cannot occur
without serious disturbances resulting. For either
this useless surplus stays without a buyer--and con-
sequently without value--constituting a kind of caput
mortuum which will decrease as much as the returns
of the producers--or else to sell this excess, the
producers will offer it a low price. But to do so
with the least possible injury, they will be forced
Durkheim and Sismondi then asked us to imagine what would happen if the utopia promised by the Utilitarian reformers actually materialized.

Imagine general overproduction, and it will be a struggle of all against all, a violent, grievous struggle from which the victors themselves will not really profit. For in order that production may safely free itself from its surplus by letting it go cheap, it must diminish the income of all its associates. But it is by his income that each regulates his expenditures ... his consumption. If he lowers one, the other diminishes. He is therefore at an impasse. One cannot succeed in artifically elevating the level of consumption in one way except by lowering it in another.... One flounders endlessly in a situation without solution (Soc:114).

What a powerful epigrammatic description of both the dilemmas of the modern economy and anomic desires, and the closed world of suicide: "One flounders endlessly, helplessly, in a situation without solution." And, of course, we drown.

These are just a few of the unanticipated consequences we have discovered on the road to the Utilitarians' utopia. Viable relations between society and economy, between self and culture, are only possible if there is a generative and meaningful balance between technological expansion of productive capacity and the more problematic growth of consumer desires. Health, remember, has been defined here as balance, as resting on the "golden mean." In other words, health means wholeness, mutual proportion, just as meaning is the relation of part to whole. Since the intimate and necessary inner link between expansion of production and growth of consumer demand has been almost irretrievably snapped in the modern economic world, we are all caught up in a constantly expanding technological-economic machine that no one can shut off, that no one has control of, that no one can submit to a substantively rational rule. In short, we have entrapped ourselves in an ever-tightening "iron cage," fit subjects for a Gothic horror novel. The "moral
anarchy" of anomie chronic in precisely those liberal sectors of the modern world which have insisted on the great moral and social benefits of "market capitalism," and its correlate of constantly accelerating appetites. Ecocide and suicide are the public and private unanticipated traumatic outcomes of this utopian disaster.

Today, it is especially the infinite expansion of the market, the rationalization of economic and social process, and the resulting insatiable appetites of this planetary behemoth, this Frankenstein, which we have built, which throws everything so fundamentally out of human scale.

The equilibrium between production and consumption--far from being inevitable--is on the contrary very unstable and easy to disturb. According to Sismondi, our new conditions of economic life make this imbalance chronic. Formerly, when the market was very limited, when it did not extend beyond the village, the small market town, or the immediate neighborhood, each producer could make a careful computation of the needs he had to supply and limit his work accordingly. But today, when the market has become almost limitless, this useful check has disappeared. No longer can one judge precisely the extent of the demand he must supply. The industrialist, the farmer, believe that they have infinite markets spread before them and tend to spread themselves to meet them. These limitless prospects arouse limitless ambitions, and to satisfy the appetites thus stirred each produces as much as he can *(Soc:114-15).

Thus, rather than the creation of a utopia, Durkheim and Sismondi argued, the impersonal world-wide "universal otherhood (Nelson, 1969a) of the Utilitarian moral reformers bequeathed us a fear-ridden war of collective egoisms, which leads to ecocide and suicide. Rather than a promised heaven on earth, both the Utilitarians and their heretical heirs (that is, the philosophic and critical radicals), have instead willed us a hell on earth, where one is condemned, by the very structure of society and everyday life, to "flounder helplessly, alone, in a situation without solution."

Or, to shift the image, we are forced, like Sisyphus, up yet another ascent of the mountain, to assume another spirit...
crushing burden (see also Weber, 1958a). The treadmill grinds on, and on and on.

Even to be sure of holding onto an acquired position, one is often obliged to try to extend it. For, as one feels himself surrounded by rivals—whom he does not even know—he always fears that a surplus from a more or less distant enterprise will be thrown on the market he now supplies, and he will be dispossessed from it. To prevent an invasion one gets ahead of it by himself invading and one attacks in order to avoid having to defend himself. He increases his own production in order to prevent over-production elsewhere from becoming a threat. It is because individual interests are discordant and unleashed, without restraint today, that the community's interest in a regulated production, in harmony with the needs of consumption, is lost sight of. It is a fight unto death which has imposed itself on those who have engendered this fever, this hyperactivity, which exhausts individuals and societies. And this is why the production of wealth, when it has—as today—no regulation, and no planning, causes pain and misery instead of abundance *(Soc:115).

Durkheim and Sismondi conclude thus their ironic lesson:

It is not true that the struggle of individual interests promotes the greatest good of all. Just as prosperity within a family requires the head to adjust expenditures in proportion to income, so in advancing the public welfare the sovereign authority must supervise and restrain individual interests so as to have them work for the general good (Soc:115).

Now, assuming that some crucial historical shift occurred to sanction insatiable desires in the form of unending drives for progress and perfection, we should note that the constant stimulation of such demand is a cornerstone of modern expanding economies. We might recall that Keynes's diagnosis of the underlying ills of the Great Depression was that the problem lay mainly on the demand side of the equation. That is, insufficient demand was being generated to soak up the productive capacity of the constantly accelerating economic machine. Hence, the "Great Transformation" of which Polanyi (1944) spoke so profoundly. Apparently, the traditionally high levels of demand of the small but conspicuously consuming elite circles could not sustain the new economic imperative if their insatiability did not
also spread to the masses. (Perhaps the mass production of images of royalty in egalitarian American played an important, if subterranean, symbolic role in this transformation).

Clearly, the old middle classes still largely directed by the Puritan ethos of thrift (low consumption) and hard work (high production) contributed to the problem, for the economic machinery was gearing up to new heights of productive scale and efficiency, with little expanding markets to absorb the coming cascade of goods. And just as clearly, the classes (eg. farmers, other immigrants, etc.) still dominated by a traditional social schedule of satisfaction could not supply the necessary demand. Thus, as Bensman and Vidich (1971) have seen, the New American Society created out of the Depression, the New Deal, and the "Keynesian revolution" rested on an inversion of the old supply-demand equation. What we see, then, is a metamorphosis of the Protestant Ethos from the duty to save to the compulsion to consume.

Given such obstacles to stimulating higher consumer desires (see especially the cogent article by Parsons, 1934), the Keynesian revolution in sociocultural terms capitalized on the latent ethic of "impersonal service directed toward super-personal ends" while bending it to an entirely different expression than originally intended. I repeat: one of the hidden meanings of post-Keynesian economic intervention by the central political authority is that the traditional relations between supply and demand have been inverted. And, I submit, just as market capitalism itself could not have been born without a specific normative underpinning, so too this inversion of the traditional social schedule of supply and demand, of the socioeconomic equations between production and consumption, could not have occurred without another major metamorphosis in the cultural underpinnings. If the first breakthrough described by Weber and Polanyi rested on the old Protestant Ethos, then the second breakthrough to central intervention and amelioration of the plight of the masses (in order to raise consumption on a mass level) was
legitimated by a second installment of the Protestant Ethos, the liberal ethos of "social service" (see Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975). Indeed, in a curious twist of fate, it was just this liberal "New Deal" ethos which Mertonian "anomie theory" served (see appendix).
H. The Moral Legitimation of Absolute Individualism and Insatiability in Modern Economies: The Utilitarian Ethos

The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith (S:257).

Today the market has become almost limitless.... The industrialist, the farmer, believe that they have infinite markets before them.... These limitless prospects arouse limitless ambitions (Soc:115).

It is because individual interests are discordant and unleashed, without restraint today, that the community's interest in a regulated production, in harmony with the needs of consumption, is lost sight of. It is a fight unto death which has imposed itself on those who engendered this fever, this hyperactivity, which exhausts individuals and society (Soc:115).

We will not succeed in pacifying roused appetites, because they will acquire new force in the measure they are appeased. There are no limits possible to their requirements. To undertake to appease them by satisfying them is to hope to fill the vessel of the Danai-des (Soc:93).

To review: in his first schema, Durkheim portrayed the insatiable desires constituting modern anomie as the result of the release and moral deregulation accompanying the modern transitional crisis. But we have also discovered that with the great transformation that accompanied the birth of market capitalism, a fundamental metamorphosis from traditional to modern society, the "moral anarchy" of anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors of the modern world. Indeed, Durkheim himself acknowledged that this "longing for the infinite" is "daily represented as a mark of moral distinction," and that "when men are inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them accept resignation, so the number of malcontented and disquieted is bound to increase." Thus, the traditional social schedule of satisfaction that counseled only the maintenance of one's long-standing standard of living in an assigned occupation and cultural status has been chronically upset. Whereas earlier deviations from the traditional schedule were considered illegitimate,
today absolute individualism and insatiability are considered legitimate; regulation of the unencumbered individual is bad. Or as James Russell Lowell put it in a quintessential expression: "Not failure but low aim is the only crime."

As we conclude this section on Durkheim's notion of anomie as culturally sanctioned, let us recall his contrast between the traditionalism of the social schedule in societies dominated by a sacrosanct magical collective conscience, and modern societies which sanction absolute individualism and infinite strivings on a Utilitarian basis. Durkheim observed that in traditional societies several social institutions regulated satisfaction of individual desires through the economic sphere. For example, in medieval and early modern Europe, various levels of government, religious institutions, and occupational groups such as guilds restrained deadly competition, and thus regulated desires in a more corporative direction. However, in modern societies religious and guild-like groups have lost much of their regulatory power over economic life. Indeed, in the first phase of market capitalism even the government's role assigned by Utilitarian doctrine was merely to support and stimulate the market, but not to regulate it or constrain it. As Halevy (1955) pointed out, the political and economic demands of the Utilitarians were based upon opposing principles.

For a whole century, economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation. Until very recently, it was the function of a whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline. First, the influence of religion was felt alike by workers and masters, the poor and the rich. It consoled the former and taught them contentment with their lot by informing them of the providential nature of the social order, that the share of each class was assigned by God himself, and by holding out the hope for just compensation in a world to come for the inequalities of this world. It governed the latter, recalling that worldly interests are not man's entire lot, that they must be subordinate to other and higher interests, and that they should therefore not be pursued without rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over them and by the
relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products, and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income on which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances (S:255).

But in the modern era no traditional social institution or cultural norm serves to regulate economically expressed desires. Indeed, not only has there been a release from traditional controls, but more importantly, the anomic insatiability implied in permanent drives for "progress and perfection" have been culturally mandated. Both liberal Utilitarianists and Marxian socialists alike worship at the altar of material progress. "The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith" (S:257). Whether the England of Dickens and Owens, or Russia under Lenin and Stalin, or China under Mao, industrialization is a traumatic experience which alters almost every aspect of society.

Actually, religion has lost much of its power. And government, instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue, and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On both sides nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the implication of the dogma of economic materialism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems. And as these theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike (S:255).

Now, the contrast between the ruling rationales of social organization under the traditional schedule of maintenance and the modern apotheosis of well-being is instructive. As Karl Polanyi (1968) has observed, in tribal or "reciprocal" economies, the economic system was embedded in the
ruling rationales of another social institution—namely, the kinship system. In archaic or "redistributive" econom­ies, socioeconomic action was largely directed by a coalit­ion of political, military, and religious elites. Now, in world-historical terms, one of the unique features of mar­ket capitalism was that, for the first time, the economy was freed from traditional corporative constraints and from being bent to non-economic ruling rationales. The "tribal brotherhood" of traditional society was forever dissolved. Individualistic and non-traditional Utilitarian rationales, through the mechanism of the global markets' "invisible hand," began to dominate all previous cultural rules and all other social institutions. All aspects of life were now to be subordinated to the so-called "natural" or "iron laws" of the self-equilibrating market. The Puritans' deus absconditus became reincarnated as the deus ex machina of the new international market mechanism. The self-regulating market itself, in replacing God as a primal rhetorical prin­ciple (see the work of Kenneth Burke) became the prime in­strument of mass moral discipline in the modern "disenchant­ed" age. Thus, since release and control are often ironi­cally bound to one another, we may catch a glimpse of how it came to be that the instrument of liberation of the ri­sing middle classes, and such political parties as the Whigs and the Federalist-Republicans in the United States, came to enslave us all.

I cannot emphasize too much the importance of this great reversal in economic rationales. The individual dis­placed the collectivity, and insatiability or a legitimized "infinity of dreams and desires" replaced the resignation to the traditional social schedule; these elements go togeth­er. And, I must further emphasize that this double displace­ment cannot adequately be ascribed to the simple release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline, as in Durkheim's first schema. For this "Brave New World" could only emerge from the imposition of a new and rather differ­
ent type of mass moral discipline. Today we are disciplin­
ed to insatiability, to infinite "progress and perfection." Durkheim himself saw that the Utilitarian moralists enshrin­ed the self-regulating market as the chief means of imper­sonal mass social control.

... the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege.... Ultimately, this liberation of de­sires has been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the mar­ket. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted a­mount of possible gain could not overexcite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their form­er confinement in the face of such limitless prospects (S:255-6)?

Today, of course, since to consummate our ever-expand­ing desires we must worker harder, the ever-expanding imper­sonal international market mechanism imposes an ever more resolute discipline on us all. Just as it constantly escal­ates demands for productive efficiency, and the correspond­ing specialization and "vocational asceticism" this demands of each of us, so too the market also demands that we con­stantly increase our level of consumption, even though we may not have time to enjoy the fruits of our labor. Indeed, it has become almost as much a duty to entertain constant­ly rising aspirations and expectations as it has always been a duty, at least in American culture, to stand alone as a hard-working self-reliant Yankee. Certainly, the inflation­ary spiral we have come to accept as the price of constant progress presumes constantly accelerating sales and wage and salary levels. Since the self-regulating market has re­placed all former ethical principles in working to regulate and generate desires through individualistic competition, the infinite expansion of the market implies that infinite desires must also be sanctioned and constantly regenerated. Otherwise, we could be charged, as Merton noted, with a weak­ness of character--lack of "moral stamina."
Such is the source of the excitement predominating in this part of society, and which has thence extended to other parts. There, the state of crisis and anomie is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn becomes reality. A thirst for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth, one has no strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and the sterility of the tumult is apparent, and it is seen that all these new sensations in their infinite quantity cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without having constantly to replace them with others, finds in them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived with his eyes fixed on it, has nothing in the past as a comfort against the present's afflictions, for the past was nothing to him but a series of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his expectation always to find further on the happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or ahead to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the end escape the futility of an endless pursuit *(S:256).

Is this not the essence of our contemporary moral malaise?

When we couple Durkheim's keen phenomenological insight into the ravages of the modern "infinity of dreams and desires" with the actual historical ethical supports for market capitalism, especially in the secularization of Calvinistic ethics in the Anglo Enlightenment led by the Scottish moral philosophers, the evidence becomes compelling--modern anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of still strong ethical and cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and drives for infinite "progress and perfection." The Utilitarian moral philosophers, only partially disguised as neutral "political economists," presumed endless striving, as Parsons went to great pains to demonstrate in the work of Marshall (1949). The Utilitarians
apotheosized the chronic imbalance so brilliantly anatomized by Sismondi and Durkheim. Indeed, Durkheim remarked that "... the themes that celebrate the beneficence of unrestricted liberties are apologies for a diseased state" (ME:54).

We are living precisely in one of those critical revolutionary periods when authority is usually weakened through the loss of traditional discipline—a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy. This is the source of the anarchic passions that, whether consciously or not, are emerging today, not only in the particular sects bearing the name, but in the very different doctrines that, although opposed on other points, join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regulation (ME:54).

... human conduct ... loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the spurious label of the infinite (ME:48).

Further, in Moral Education, while speaking of how his notion of the necessity of moral discipline and the dangers of anomic passions seems to "affront a widespread sentiment," Durkheim mentioned the leading Utilitarian theorist—Jeremy Bentham, by name.

... to limit, to restrain—this is to deny, to impede the process of living and thus partially destroy; and all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it be good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits, that it cannot overcome?... Does not all constraint, by definition, do violence to the nature of things? It was just reasoning that led Bentham to see in law an evil scarcely tolerable, which could only be reasonably justified when it was clearly indispensable. However, because a person's continuing activities involve those of others, and because in the encounter there is the danger of conflict, it becomes necessary to specify fair limits of conduct that must not be transgressed. But such limitation is in itself an abnormal thing. For Bentham, morality, like law, involved a kind of pathology. Most of the classical economists were of the same view (ME:35-6).

Indeed, when constraint "is hateful in itself," then we see the apotheosis of the infinite expansion of the international market, the infinite expansion of dreams and desires in a finite world. Clearly, the Utilitarian ethos shifted the grounds of legitimate moral authority from the group to the individual, from tradition to culturally sanctioned drives
for "progress and perfection."

These dispositions are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is accustomed to think of them as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction (S:257).

Clearly, if this "eternal dissatisfaction" is represented as "a mark of moral distinction," it cannot be considered as due simply to the release of the pre-social ego from traditional moral controls, but rather was and is preached as a new gospel. If the "longing for infinity is daily represented" as virtuous, then how can we escape the conclusion that anomie and egoisme are themselves the unanticipated negative results of extreme moral obligations? Of a peculiar type of modern moral discipline that leads to self-destruction?

Thus, one is led to enjoin man to develop not a preference for balance and moderation, some feeling for moral limits--and which is only another aspect of the source of moral authority--but to an altogether contradictory view, that is, impatience with all restraint and limitation, the desire to encourage unrestrained and infinite appetites. Man, it seems, is cribbed and confined when he has not a limitless horizon before him. Doubtless we know very well that we shall never be in a position to achieve such a goal: but apparently such a perspective is essential, since it alone can provide us with a sense of the fullness of life. From such reasoning derives the veneration that so many nineteenth-century writers accorded the notion of the infinite. Here we see the lofty sentiment par excellence, since by means of it man elevates himself beyond all the limits imposed by nature and liberates himself, at least ideally, from all restrictions that might diminish him (ME:35-6).

Thus, we see that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion of absence to presence of cultural sanctions when he recognize that the "notion of the infinite" was the ideal for Utilitarian and Romantic alike. One might ambiguously consider that the daily "longing for the infinite" comes only from "unregulated consciences," but, if so, it must be emphasized that these are new types of self-regulated consciences who, in imposing "vocational asceticism or mysticism" on themselves, "elevate to a rule the very lack
of rule from which they suffer." This dual rejection of traditional moral control and the elevation of the autonomous individual and his infinite drives for "progress and perfection" to the center of the moral stage heralds a new type of conscience, a "New Model Man" for a "Brave New World."

Alas, the "New Man" commits suicide and ecocide. We have to learn, once again, the wisdom of the ancient moral philosophy of the "golden mean," for when we push our virtues to extreme, they invert, ironically, into our characteristic vices.

In Chapter Ten of this Book, we shall explore the religious and ethical roots of anomie and egoisme and their respective cultural traditions.
CHAPTER NINE

EGOISME, THE INFINITY OF DREAMS, AND THE MODERN ANGUISHED JOURNEY INTO THE INTERIOR

Our very egoisme is in large part a product of society (S:360).

One cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism (DL:239).

Excessive individualism not only results in favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself ... but creates this inclination out of whole cloth, and thus gives birth to a special suicide which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood (S:210).

Preface. If anomie implies an externalized "infinity of desires," egoisme implies an inward turning "infinity of dreams." Both anomie and egoisme proceed from similar sources--the absolutizing of the individual, and the assignment to him of an infinite task. Both anomie and egoisme are socially carried and culturally sanctioned. However, in the first case, the absolutizing of the lone individual and his infinite task is turned outward against the external world, while in the second case, the angst of the isolated social atom is introjected, and ultimately, this "journey into the interior" and "infinity of dreams" is turned against the self. Durkheim himself noted:

Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. We know that they are usually two different aspects of one social state; thus, it is not surprising that they should be found in the same individual. It is, indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have some tendency to non-regulation; for since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him. If, nevertheless, his desires
are not usually excited, it is because in his case the life of the passions languishes, because he is wholly introverted and not attracted to the world outside (S:288).

Further, the pathology of "infinity sickness" is manifested in different ways in these two two modern forms of "moral anarchy."

Anomie partially results from the same state of disaggregation from which the egoistic current also springs. But this individual cause produces different effects, depending on its point of incidence and whether it influences active and practical functions, or functions that are representational. The former it agitates and exasperates; the latter it disorients and disconcerts. In both cases, the remedy is the same (S:382).

In psychological terms, anomie affects the "practical and active functions," and in sociological terms, the businessman and the industrialist, while egoism, in psychological terms, affects the imaginative or "representative" functions, and is found most clearly among artists, intellectuals, and so on. Among other observers, LaCapra has seen these similarities and differences between anomie and egoism in Durkheim's Suicide.

Egoism, in the sense of atomistic individualism, obviously had a large area of analytical and empirical overlapping with individualistic forms of anomie, and both might be institutionally or ideologically justified.... Anomie referred to a pathology of practical reason and egoism to a pathology of theoretical reason.... Anomie was related to the "practical," appetitive, and active faculties: desire, passion and will, especially the will to power. Egoism was related to the imaginative, intellectual, cognitive, and "theoretical" faculties (1972:165-6).

But Durkheim himself provided us with the consummate description of the points of convergence and divergence between these two dominant forms of the "moral anarchy" emerging from our contemporary "dis-eases of the infinite."

Suicides of both types suffer from ... diseases of the infinite. But the disease does not assume the same form in both cases. In one reflective intelligence is affected and immoderately overnourished [egoisme]; in the other, emotion is over-excited and freed from all restraint [anomie]. In one,
thought, by dint of falling back upon itself, has no object left; in the other, passion, no longer recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The former is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second in the infinity of desires *(5:287).

In both anomie and egoisme, we drown, "floundering helplessly in a situation without solution." Why? Perhaps because it is religious sanctions which mandate our infinite strivings in a finite world. Later, we shall explore how our highest aspirations came to encircle us in an "iron cage."

Here, let us first look into some of the psychological characteristics of egoisme as the fourth and final major historical type of suicide. We shall note that egoistic suicides, in contrast to anomie, are passive and apathetic. Comparing egoisme to altruisme, in the second schema we see not only the passive/active contrast, but the double opposition between fundamentally opposed cultural sanctions relating the individual to society at the two ends of history. We shall then consider Durkheim's second thesis that even "Our egoisme is in large part a product of society." Although the "cult of the moralized person" is coterminous, in Durkheim's view, with the universalistic or extended civilizational bond of the modern era, we also discover that all prime cultural values tend to become absolutized and thus, almost inevitably deflected from their original proportions and meanings. Therefore, we see that in modern society, while the "cult of the individual" and egoistic tensions resulting in suicide are not exactly logically and historically congruent, because of the fundamental principle just enunciated "the one cannot be stimulated without the other being enlarged" *(S:364). Indeed, "one cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism."

Finally, we shall discover that the tensions induced by the modern "dis-eases of the infinite," and the Romantic "journey into the interior" and the ethos of angst and anguished subjectivity accompanying these, are really only
the "... deflected or exaggerated forms of a virtue." Indeed, the cultural sanctioning of "utmost inwardness" and, thus, of egoisme, results in "... creating nothingness within by creating it without, and thus has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own misery" (S:279).

A. The Psychology of Egoisme: Passive Introversion and The Litany of Modern Angst

Sadness does not inhere in things.... It is a product of our own thought (S:280).
Extremely refined nervous systems live in pain, and end by attaching themselves to it (DL:242-3).
If consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man, it is only by achieving a morbid development in which, revolting against its own nature, it poses as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself (S:280).

In contrast to anomie, which has become enshrined as "... one of the few truly central concepts in sociological theory" (Parsons), egoisme has fallen into sociological darkness. Would it, then, surprise us to learn that Durkheim thought egoisme actually to be the more chronic problem in the modern world?

The type of suicide actually the most widespread and which contributes most to raise the annual total of voluntary deaths is egoistic suicide. It is characterized by a state of depression and apathy produced by exaggerated individuation. The individual no longer cares to live because he no longer cares enough for the only medium which attaches him to reality, that is to say, for society. Having too keen a feeling for himself and his own value, he wishes to be his own only goal, and as such an objective cannot satisfy him, drags out languidly and indifferently an existence which henceforth seems meaningless to him (S:356).

Now, egoisme, like fatalisme, is a passive form of suicide, in contrast to both anomie and altruisme; an inward turning pathology in contrast to anomie; and a self-centering and self-destroying "dis-ease of the infinite" in contrast to the sacrifice of self for the group seen in primitive altruisme. Thus, the prime psychological characteris-
tics of egoisme in the second schema include: apathy, passive introversion, "indolent melancholy," or "disillusioned sangfroid" (S:293), extreme subjectivity, and a deep depression or despondency coming from an "infinity of dreams" and the consequent exhaustion of the imagination and corresponding paralysis of the will. As with all human tensions which reach a suicidal crescendo, egoisme is simultaneously the result of both too much and too little. Too little proportion in one's daily life, too little help and human support--thus, the individual is either left alone or perhaps even compelled to isolate himself. On the contrary, with altruisme, the individual is completely depersonalized and submerged in a socio-cosmic ocean, as it were. Too much, because the overwhelming cultural emphases on the "cult of the individual" and the corresponding cult of "utmost inwardness" become absolutized. This deflection from mutual proportion in everyday life and exaggeration of the significance of only one virtue over against all the others bidding legitimately for our attention inevitably ends in torturing the person and, ultimately, consuming his soul.1

Therefore, Durkheim gave the name "egoisme" to "... the state of the ego living its own life and obeying itself alone" (S:221).

If we agree to call this state of egoism, in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego, and at its expense, we may call egoistic the special type of suicide springing from excessive individualism (S:209).

In contrasting egoisme and altruisme, Durkheim observed that they are opposed psychological forms. "The egoistic suicide is characterized by a general depression in the form of a melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic suicide, on the contrary, involves an expenditure of energy. ... Altruisme is an active suicide, contrasting with the depressed suicide" (S:283).

While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing real in the world but the individual, the intemperate altruist's sadness, on the contrary, springs from
the individual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One is deflected from life, because seeing no goal to which he may attach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless; the other because he has a goal but one outside this life, which henceforth seems merely an obstacle to him. Thus, the difference of the causes reappears in their effects, and the melancholy of the one is quite different from that of the other. That of the former [egoisme] consists of a feeling of incurable weariness and sad depression; it expresses a complete relaxation of activity, which, unable to find useful employment, collapses. That of the former [altruisme], on the contrary, springs from hope; for it depends on the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life. It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith eagerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of extreme energy (S:225-26).

Now, we should remember that altruisme and egoisme are doubly opposite; their opposing valuational content served Durkheim as both a significant index of the ruling cultural rationales and dominant modes of social organization of societies at the two ends of history.

One [altruisme] is related to the crude morality which disregards everything relating solely to the individual; the other is closely related to the refined ethics which set human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything. Between the two is all the difference between primitive peoples and the most civilized nations (S:227).

Both altruisme and egoisme are ethically sanctioned by their respective cultures at the two poles of sociocultural evolution. As noted earlier, Durkheim acknowledged however, that at times we may find some "mixed" forms of egoisme and altruisme.

... egoisme and altruisme, themselves, contraries as they are, may combine their influence. At certain epochs, when disaggregated society can no longer serve as an objective for individual activities, individuals or groups will nevertheless be found who, while experiencing the influence of this general condition of egoisme, aspire to other things. Feeling, however, that a passage from one egoistic pleasure to another is a poor method of escaping themselves, and that fugitive joys, even though constantly renewed could never quiet their unrest, they seek some durable object to which they attach themselves permanently and which shall give
meaning to their lives. Since they are contented with nothing real, however, they find satisfaction only in creating out of whole cloth some ideal reality to play this role. So in thought they create an imaginary being whose slaves they become and to which they devote themselves the more exclusively the more they are detached from everything else, themselves included. To it they assign all the attachment to existence which they ascribe to themselves, since all else is valueless in their eyes. So they live a two-fold existence: individualists so far as the real world is concerned, they are immoderate altruists in everything that concerns this ideal objective. Both dispositions lead to suicide *(S:289)*.

Surely this description of the "mixed" possibility of egoisme and altruisme aptly characterizes many political and social reformers today. But Durkheim turns back in history to offer Stoic philosophy as a prime illustration.

Though the Stoic professes absolute indifference to everything beyond the range of the individual personality, though he exhorts the individual to be self-sufficient, he simultaneously assigns the individual a close dependence on universal reason, and even reduces him to nothing more than the instrument through which this reason is realized. He thus combines two antagonistic conceptions: the most radical moral individualism and an immoderate pantheism. The suicide he commits is thus both apathetic like that of the egoist, and performed as a duty like the altruist. The former's melancholy and the active energy of the latter appear in this form of suicide; egoisme here mingles with mysticism. This same combination also distinguishes the mysticism characteristic of periods of decadence, which contrary to appearances, is so different from that observed among young, formative peoples. The latter springs from the collective enthusiasm which carries individual wills along with it on its way, from the self-abnegation with which citizens forget themselves to share in the common work; the former [egoistic-altruistic mysticism] is a mere self-conscious egoisme, conscious also of its own nothingness, striving to surpass itself but succeeding only in artificiality and in appearance *(S:289)*.

Durkheim's disdain for the modern egoist cloaking himself in quasi-religious images calls to mind Weber's equally powerful refusal to endorse any of the myriad competing therapeutics of his day which counseled "jumping out of one's skin." Both Durkheim and Weber were moral realists.
Finally, Durkheim noted that egoisme and anomie may mix their separate but intimately related types of despair. But he be neither a complete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation. In such cases he may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations, he applies, to be sure, less ardour than the passionate temperament so called, but he also wearies sooner and this weariness casts him back upon himself, thus reenforcing his original melancholy. Inversely, a regulated temperament does not lack a spark of egoisme; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social restraint. Only, this spark cannot develop in cases where the action of anomie is preponderant; for, by casting its possessor outside himself, it prevents him from retiring into himself. If anomie is less intense, however, it may permit egoisme to produce certain characteristic effects. The obstacle, for example, against which the victim of insatiate desires dashes may cause him to fall back upon himself in an inner life. Finding there nothing to which he can attach himself, however, the melancholy inspired by this thought can only drive him to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides where depression alternates with agitation, dream with action, transports of desire with reflective sadness (S:288).

In exploring some individual forms of egoistic suicide, Durkheim took "Raphael," one of the heroes of the early French Romantic writer Lamartine, as an "ideal type." In our own day, Proust's reveries and other instances of the "Romantic agony," especially among the Symbolist poets and other artists of the dark underside would serve just as well.

One form of suicide ... has widely developed in our day: Lamartine's Raphael offers us its ideal type. Its characteristic is a condition of melancholic languor which relaxes all the springs of action. Business, public affairs, useful work, even domestic duties inspire the person only with indifference and aversion. He is unwilling to emerge from himself. On the other hand, what is lost in activity is made up for in thought and inner life. In revulsion from its surroundings consciousness becomes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-observation and self-analysis. But by this extreme concentration it merely deepens the chasm separating it from the rest of
of the universe. The moment the individual becomes so enamored of himself, inevitably he increasingly detaches himself from everything external and emphasizes the isolation in which he lives, to the point of worship *(S:278-79).

It is interesting to recall here that Rimbaud, that superannuated voyager into hell, spoke of himself and his kind as "litteratiuricides."

Self-absorption is not a good method of attaching one's self to others. All movement is, in a sense, altruistic in that it is centrifugal and disperses existence beyond its own limitations. Reflection, on the other hand, has about it something personal and egoistic, for it is only possible as a person becomes detached from the outside world, and retreats from it into himself. And reflection is the more intense the more complete this retreat. Action without mixing with people is impossible; to think, on the contrary, we must cease to have connection with them in order to consider them objectively—the more so, in order to think about oneself. So the man whose sole activity is diverted to inner meditation becomes insensible to all his surroundings. If he loves, it is not to give himself, to blend in fecund union with another being, but to meditate on his love. His passions are mere appearances, being sterile. They are dissipated in futile imaginings, producing nothing external to themselves *(S:279).

Does this passage not perfectly describe, for instance, the fevered false love felt by Kierkegaard, the arch Romantic lyricist and theologian, for Regina in Fear and Trembling? Indeed, the distinguished literary and moral philosopher Kenneth Burke seized upon the brooding Dane's "dialectical lyric" as "... Kierkegaardian dialectic for changing finite species into the currency of the infinite" (1969:244). Posing first as a scoundrel, then the "knight of infinite resignation," Kierkegaard, says Burke, offers us:

... the currency of the infinite, but brought down to earth like a god incarnate, a spirit that henceforth infuses all things with its essence, bathes all things in its unitary light, subordinating the disparate facts of the world of contingencies to one transcendent unitary principle, ironically called the Absurd. This transformation is also called
a "leap" across the "incommensurable" (1950:245).

As a quintessential representative of moral egoisme, Kierkegaard, this "knight of faith," courted "infinite resignation." He sanctified his own introversion, embraced despair and the curious hope of the "Absurd," the faith beyond hope, "beyond belief."

... if this "knight of faith" would court in terms of the infinite, it follows that he would court eternally, in perpetual repetition.... But if one would court forever, whereas the object of one's courtship is not only willing to yield, but even becomes importunate in yielding, then the goodly dialectician must supply resistance of his own, from within himself, out of his own "inner check," and by setting up a situation, both emotional and practical, that would restore the necessary distance. First, in somewhat of a panic, he would even act like a "scoundrel" if necessary. For he would do anything to retain the purity of his motives, being an individualist of integrity. However, once he had got away from her, and she had become married to another, since they were both highly proper he had again the objective situation necessary to his nature: he could now court here in terms of eternity, that is, in eternal repetition. The dilemma was solved. On firm moral and legalistic grounds, their union was impossible. Hence, he could safely become her knight again. To gallantly make amends for his affront, he could psychologically amend the Bible. Everything was now in order—and with her marriage as the "objective correlative" that matched his own subjective "inner check," he could now court her in terms of the infinite, the incommensurable, the absurd, the faith that will somehow bring about the impossible (1950:249-50).

But, not to be fooled by Kierkegaard's brilliant moral dialectics, Burke rightly insists that the former has amended the justificatory Bible story of Abraham and Issac, for he "... starts by putting in a strategic addition to a Biblical text.... Needing the story to motivate the leap, he himself puts the leap into the story" (1950:250-1). That is, Kierkegaard fabricated his own story to suit his own special psychological needs. Kierkegaard embraced the infinite as his life-focus, he embraced egoisme as his vocation. On observer said of him that he has been characterized as "an unregenerate romantic who could not abandon the pleasures of the 'une-happy conscience'" (B. Nelson, 1962c:xiv). This "Master of Irony," however, "burdened by the compulsion to practice mor-
dant reflection and double agency" (Nelson, 1962c:xii), really wished to be whole.

So turbulent a spirit as Kierkegaard's was not to win the peace he prized without an exhausting civil war against his inner demons. To think of himself as an "Extraordinary One" in the religious sense was at once his temptation and his dread.... In the end, however, he forged for himself the fate he craved. Instead of succumbing to destructive afflictions and excesses as did a number of others, notably Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche, he let no day go by without struggling to hold himself in readiness to be a "witness." He rededicated himself and his gifts continually to the Life which was for him the Light, the Truth, and the Way (Nelson, 1962c:xii).

Indeed, if we view Durkheim's ironic insights into the self-destructive "longing for the infinite" of Romantic moralists and artists from a Weberian perspective, then Kierkegaard's own testimony serves to confirm that egoisme flows through the Romantic Cultural Tradition from the secularized angst of Lutheranism.

When the infinite requirement is heard and upheld, heard and upheld in all its infinitude, then grace is offered. ... But surely it is not an exaggeration when (in the interest of grace itself) the requirement of infinity, the "infinite requirement," is presented infinitely. Exaggeration occurs only when, in an entirely different way, the requirement is presented and grace is not even alluded to (1962:154).

Yes, what then? What happens when "an infinite requirement," once religious, now becomes merely cultural, but is yet presented as an infinite task, yet "grace is not even alluded to"? Durkheim gave the fatal answer in Suicide.

To return, Durkheim continued with his counter-argument, stressing the relational or "intentional" structure of consciousness.

... all internal life draws its primary material from without. All we can think of is objects or our conceptions of them. We cannot reflect our own consciousness in a purely undetermined state; in this shape it is inconceivable. Now, consciousness becomes determined only when affected by something not itself. Therefore, if it individualizes beyond a certain point, it separates itself too radically from other beings. Men or things, it finds itself unable to communicate with the very source of its normal nourishment and no longer has anything to which it can apply itself. It creates nothing-
ness within by creating it without, and has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own wretched misery (S:279). The Romantics' inflation of the ego's infinite task leads, then, to "wretched misery," to morbid melancholy, to self-destruction.

Its only remaining object of thought is its own inner nothingness and the resulting melancholy. It becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of morbid joy which Lamartine, himself familiar with it, describes well in the words of his hero: 'the languor of all my surroundings was in marvellous harmony with my own languor. It increased this languor in its charm. I plunged into the depths of melancholy. But it was a lively melancholy, full of thoughts, impressions, communings with the infinite, half-obscurities of my own soul, so that I had no wish to abandon it. A human disease, but one the experience of which attracts rather than pains, where death resembles a voluptuous lapse into the infinite. I resolved to abandon myself to it wholly henceforth; to avoid all distracting society and to wrap myself in silence, solitude, and frigidity in the midst of whatever company I should encounter; my spiritual isolation was a shroud through which I desired no longer see men, but only nature and God' (S:280).

However pure the ardent wayfarer's motives, the result of his actions is ironic. For instead of empowering us, the pursuit of "infinite horizons," portrayed insistently as the truly heroic alternative to the mundane or profane existence in which most mankind is daily mired, leads inevitably, not to the consummation of the hero's life-giving vision but rather to despair and self-destruction.

One cannot long remain so absorbed in contemplation of emptiness without becoming increasingly attracted to it. In vain one bestows on it the name of infinity; this does not change its nature. When one feels such pleasure in non-existence, one's inclinations can be completely satisfied only by completely ceasing to exist. This is the element of truth in the parallelism Hartmann claims to observe between the development of consciousness and the weakening of the will to live. Ideation and movement are really two hostile forces, advancing in inverse direction, and movement is life. To think, it is said, is to abstain from action; in the same degree, therefore, it is to abstain from living. This is why the absolute reign of idea cannot be achieved and especially continue, for this is death.
But this does not mean, as Hartmann believes, that reality itself is intolerable unless veiled by illusion. Sadness does not inhere in things, it does not reach us from the world and through mere contemplation of the world. It is a product of our own thought. We create it out of whole cloth; but to create it our thought must be abnormal. If consciousness sometimes constitutes unhappiness for man, it is only by achieving a morbid development in which, revolting against its own nature, it poses as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself (S:280).

b. The Main Sociocultural Sites of the Egoistic "Infinity of Dreams"

The suicidal tendency is great in educated circles (S:168). A mind that questions everything, unless strong enough to bear the weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning itself and being engulfed in doubt (S:282).

If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, everything becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it (S:213).

Through his statistical arrays, Durkheim first found that the following factors were linked in egoistic suicides: Protestantism, individualism, free inquiry, higher educational levels, the liberal professions, and so on. We should always remember that such concrete social factors served as the original point of departure for Durkheim's moral concern with the "infinity sickness" of the modern world.

Durkheim first assumed that these factors were all outwardly associated (see Part I, Book Two) because they were all results of the same root transformation—negatively, the weakening of traditional beliefs, and positively, through the sanctioning of the Individual, Reason, and subjectivity in modern culture. This was especially true in terms of liberal Protestant cultures, where these virtues bloomed most vigorously. Now, it is striking that one of the leading American spokesman for liberal Protestantism, Talcott Parsons, has from the beginning emphasized that egoisme was sanctioned by Protestant norms (see Appendix). Egoisme, or as Parsons translates it "institutionalized individualism," which implies the injunction to guide oneself by one's own "inner light," re-
sulted from the historically rooted "social pressure in Protestant norms toward a higher order of individualized religious responsibility." Indeed, Parsons proposed that Durkheim's breakthrough to the discovery of the internalization of norms in terms of egoistic suicide constituted a solution to what Parsons had supposed to be Durkheim's original problem in *The Division of Labor*—namely, the content and obligatory force of the collective conscience governing contractual obligations in the modern organic division of labor. Against the common, but mistaken, notion that the roots of the modern crisis can be adequately explained simply as the result of the release of the individual ego from traditional controls (as in Durkheim's first schema), Parsons, following Weber, correctly insisted that egoism, as a culturally sanctioned form of individualism, could only be fully understood as the outcome of the secularizing thrusts of Protestantism. This insight represents an important convergence with Weber's work. Hence, we shall look for the breakthrough to a new system of moral and spiritual direction, and the internalization of new and more rigorous forms of self-discipline and life-tasks. And, as Parsons adds, echoing Rousseau, sometimes this new, socially enforced freedom may become too great a burden to bear.

This identification is not, however, without its hidden ironies for Parsons' own doctrine. For, by ignoring Durkheim's historical and highly critical thrust, Parsons felt little compunction in rendering egoism as a highly virtuous product of Protestantism. What Durkheim described as "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness," Parsons transmutes into moral or "institutionalized individualism." Hence, Parsons' biased reconstruction gets him into the following bind: if egoism as "institutionalized individualism" and its correlate of "organic solidarity" is tacitly and historically supported by Protestant religious and cultural norms, then how can Parsons account for the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," the destructive egocentricity which so disturbed Durkheim? Is
this "moral anarchy" to be considered simply the lapse from the heroic demands of Protestant norms, or, on the contrary, as Durkheim's second implicit schema suggests, as the unanticipated consequences of living out these norms? In terms of his own reconstruction and splitting of schemas one and two (see Appendix), must not Parsons accordingly admit that the fundamental sources of egoistic insatiability also find their origins and continuing sanctions in an exaggeration or deflection of Protestant norms? That Protestant norms are the ultimate source of both the positive aspects of modern "institutionalized individualism" and drives for "progress and perfection" and the egoistic and anomic insatiability seen by Durkheim as underlying the "moral anarchy" and "le mal de l'infini" of the modern world, would most probably prove a surprising and perhaps even repugnant suggestion to some. What would Parsons himself say to the inevitable conclusion that our very Central Value System is itself egoistic and anomic? The very logic of Parsons', Durkheim's, and Weber's arguments, taken together, leads inevitably to the ironic conclusion: our virtues become our vices!

Now, Durkheim held it as almost axiomatic that the higher the intellectual life, the more professionalized and progressive the standard of living, the greater the probability of being afflicted by "infinity sickness."

The liberal professions, and in a wider sense, the well-to-do classes, are certainly those with the liveliest taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual life. ... [suicide] is undeniably frequent in the higher classes (S:165).

But, having made the profound link between education and the extremes of introspection and self-scrutiny that accompany it, the Enlightenment liberal in Durkheim made him shrink from equating the apotheosis of the Individual and Reason with the modern intellect and modern despair (eg. see S:162-4; see also Part I, Book Two). But even so, Durkheim acknowledged that the exercise of individual reason acts as a further solvent of traditional mores and thereby increases the
need for further education and heightened reflection, in a sort of self-reinforcing psycho-socio-cultural feedback process. Indeed, Durkheim insisted that rather than individualism and learning being the pathological agents, they are, on the contrary, the only means of remedying European "moral anarchy."

... we see why as a rule suicide increases with knowledge. Knowledge does not determine this progress. It is innocent, nothing is more unjust than to accuse it, and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively. But these two facts result simultaneously from a single state which they translate into different forms. Man seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss of cohesion in his religious society; he does not kill himself because of his learning.... Far from knowledge being the source of the evil, it is its remedy, the only remedy we have (S:168-9).

It is striking that Durkheim drew his main illustrations for egoisme as a suicidal type from intellectuals or Romantic literature and art. For instance:

... the intellectual and meditative nature of suicides of this sort is readily explained if we recall that egoistic suicide is necessarily accompanied by a high development of knowledge and reflective intelligence. Indeed, it is clear that in a society where consciousness is morally compelled to extend its field of action, it is also in more danger of transgressing the normal limits which shelter it from self-destruction. A mind that questions everything, unless strong enough to bear the weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning itself, and being engulfed in doubt. If it cannot discover the claim to existence of the objects of its questioning—and it would be miraculous if it so soon succeeded in solving so many mysteries—it will deny them all reality; the mere formulation of the problem already implying an inclination to negative solutions. But, in so doing, it will become void of all positive content, and finding nothing which offers it resistance, will launch itself perforce into the emptiness of inner revery (S:281).

Durkheim emphasized that launching the ego into infinite orbit, into the "emptiness of inner revery," serves to dissolve solid ties to society.

The more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a real participant in the religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself, the more the family and the community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mys-
tery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose (S:212)?

c. Egoisme as the Ironic Result of the Modern "Cult of Moral Individualism"

One cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism (DL:239).

Individualism is, of course, not necessarily egoism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stimulated without the other being enlarged. Thus, egoistic suicide arises (S:364).

[Egoisme] is closely associated with the refined ethics which set human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything (S:227).

The moment the individual becomes so enamored of himself, inevitably he detaches himself from everything external and emphasizes the isolation in which he lives, to the point of worship (S:278).

Every sort of suicide is the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue (S:240).

In Durkheim's second schema of suicide, egoisme is culturally sanctioned in the modern world; it is the ironic outcome of the modern "cult of the individual." Conversely, egoisme's first polar opposite--altruisme--is the result of traditional cultures' "cult of collectivity." Indeed, Durkheim observed that if altruisme is culturally sanctioned as a moral duty, so, too, egoisme is the deflected outcome of a certain type of moral obligation:

The fact is stressed that the motives of certain altruistic suicides reappear in slightly different forms as the basis of actions regarded by everyone as moral. But is egoistic suicide any different? Has not the sentiment of individual autonomy its own morality as well as the opposite sentiment?... Every sort of suicide is then merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue * (S:240).

Thus, every society has an ideal of man, which tends to become absolutized over time. This inevitable extension or exaggeration destroys the necessary mutual proportion between multiple human virtues. Primitive societies thus absolutize
devotion to tradition and the group; hence, their suicides take the form of altruisme and fatalisme. Modern societies, on the other hand, tend to absolutize the self, and devotion to the "tradition of the new;" hence, our virtues are the self-destructive vices of anomie and egoisme. Or, as Durkheim once said, even the features of our immorality are features of our morality. LaCapra has seen this inner irony to the central values of modern culture:

Egoisme referred ... to a state in which the principle of individualization was carried to the extreme of particularistic and self-centered atomistic individualism. Egoisme in modern societies was an excessive development of the cardinal emphasis on individual rights and personal responsibility (1972:157-8).

As Merton observed in his famous essay "Social Structure and Anomie" (see Appendix), it is the overwhelming emphasis on cultural mandates that leads to the exaggeration or deflection of what had been our highest virtues into our most vexatious failings. Clearly, it is a generic sociocultural process afflicting all peoples at all times, though in different degrees. Perhaps what is unique about the modern syndrome, apart from its specific content, is its relentless pressure.

Excessive individualism not only results in favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth.... This must be clearly understood * (S:210).

But "what is there in individualism which explains this result," Durkheim asks? In other places in Suicide, Durkheim himself replied that the cult of the individual is morally sanctioned in the modern world. It is a product of progressive moral evolution, of which Protestantism and Positivism are the modern culminations.

... in societies and environments where the dignity of the person is the supreme end of conduct, where man is a God to mankind, the individual is readily inclined to consider the man in himself as a God and to regard himself as the object of his own cult. When morality consists primarily in giving one a very high idea of one's self, certain combinations of circumstances readily suffice to make man unable to perceive anything above him-
himself. Individualism is, of course, not necessarily egoism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stimulated without the other being enlarged. Thus, egoistic suicide arises. (S:364).

A year later, in one of his political writings—"Individualism and the Intellectuals" (1898)—delivered at the height of the Dreyfus Affair against the Catholic conservative forces, Durkheim reiterated the same theme. This time the earlier connection between Protestantism and extreme, egoistic individualism becomes clearer, for the following passage was surrounded by others acknowledging the Christian sanction for modern individualism (see also Chapter Eight, Book One, and Chapter Three, Part I of this Book).

The communion of spirits can no longer be based on definite rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices are overcome by the course of events. Consequently, nothing remains which men can love and honor in common if not man himself. That is how man has become a god for man, and why he can no longer create other gods without lying to himself. And since each of us incarnates something of humanity, each individual consciousness contains something divine and thus finds itself marked with a character which renders it sacred and inviolable to others. Therein lies all individualism; and that is what makes it a necessary doctrine (in Bellah, 1973:52).

And in his address "The Determination of Moral Facts" (1906), Durkheim again acknowledged that the sacredness with which the human person in the modern world is endowed is socially and culturally created.

... the human being is becoming the pivot of social conscience among European peoples and has acquired an incomparable value. It is society that has consecrated him. Man has no innate right to this aura that surrounds and protects him against sacrilegious trespass. It is merely the way in which society thinks of him, the high esteem that it has of him at the moment, projected and objectified. Thus very far from there being the antagonism between the individual and society which is often claimed, moral individualism, the cult of the individual, is in fact the product of society itself. It is society that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant it is (SP:52-3).

In the same address, in reply to a criticism of this doctrine by Brunschwig, Durkheim argued:

Society has consecrated the individual and made him
preeminently worthy of respect. His progressive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a transformation of social bonds. The individual does not tear himself away from society but is joined to it in a new manner, and this is because society sees him in a new manner and wishes this change to take place. The individual submits to society and this submission is the condition of his liberation (SP:72).

Further, it is significant for our present purposes that Durkheim's philosophy of the "golden mean" and his notion of the "normality" of deviance led him into the second schema of suicide. For instance, in The Division of Labor, Durkheim set up the "virtues to vices" syndrome with this insistence that even the highest ideals of a culture must be kept in mutual proportion.

Each people has its morality which is determined by the conditions in which it lives.... But the morality of each society, taken in of itself, does it not allow an indefinite development of its charged virtues? Not at all. To act morally is to do one's duty, and all duty is limited. It is limited by other duties. One cannot give oneself too completely to others without abandoning oneself. One cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism *(DL:239).

And in his vibrant defense of the modern equation of the Individual and Reason, Durkheim explicitly acknowledged that one virtue may shade over into a vice by going to extreme.

Without doubt, it can happen that individualism is practiced in a completely different spirit. Some use it for their personal ends, as a means of disguising their egoism and of more easily escaping their duties to society (in Bellah, 1973:49). 1

Egoistic tensions of suicidal strength, then, are not due to the frustration of the naturally insatiable passions of the organic ego; rather, they are the unanticipated consequences of the extreme modern religio-cultural emphasis on the "cult of individualism" and the Romantic cult of "utmost inwardness." Almost imperceptibly, one sanction metamorphoses into another; ironically, what started out as a leading virtue becomes, through constant elimination and refinement, a leading vice. When extreme rhetoric or prophetic calls destroy the human scale, the necessary proportion between virtues, then the life-giving balance can only be restored through
letting go, through a healing dialectic that restores the distorted and self-tortured part to a harmonious relationship with the whole. For healing means "making whole."

d. Egoism, Modern Angst, and the Romantic Ethos of the Infinite "Journey into the Interior"

Today neurasthenia is considered a mark of distinction rather than a mark of weakness. In our refined societies, enamored of things intellectual, nervous members constitute almost a nobility (S:181).

In revulsion from its surroundings, consciousness becomes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-observation and self-analysis (S:278).

... the man whose sole activity is diverted to inner meditation becomes insensible to all his surroundings. If he loves, it is not to give himself, to blend in fecund union with another being, but to meditate on his love. His passions are mere appearances, being sterile (S:279).

[Egoism] creates nothingness within by creating it without, and thus has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own wretched misery (S:279).

[The egotist's] only remaining object of thought is his own inner nothingness, and the resulting melancholy. He becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of morbid joy (S:279).

Now, Durkheim's polemical target with egoism was the Romantic ethos of anguished subjectivity. Here we see a high moral calling transmuted into immoderate intellectual and artistic aspirations; the resulting angst drowns the individual in an "infinity of dreams." Indeed, the inflation of the ego, the apotheosis of the artists' "journey into the interior" (E. Heller, 1968) has been a hallmark of the Romantic Cultural Tradition. In our own day, at least three major poets--who accepted this heroic plunge, who danced on the edge, who lived out a kind of cosmic brinkmanship--have taken their own lives within a few years of each other; I refer to Sylvia Plath, John Berryman, and Anne Sexton. In an illuminating study of literature and suicide, The Savage God (1972), A.
Alvarez noted that spreading out from this dramatic ethos "... the closed world of suicide has penetrated Western culture like a dye that cannot be washed" (1972:206). Perhaps this is what Rimbaud, that superannuated explorer of the self-tormenting hell of the Romantics, meant when he called himself and his fellow voyagers of the infinite ocean within litteraturicides. Indeed, because egoisme is willingly embraced as an ideal fulfilling one's deepest inner nature, because it is presented as one of our highest possible callings, it has become a veritable "vocation," as Alvarez suggests, among modern Romantic artists and thinkers.

Others have also noted that Durkheim's critical illustrations of egoisme were often drawn from the works and lives of Romantics. LaCapra, for instance, suggests: "Although Durkheim referred to Chateaubriand, a magnificent anatomy of anomie--indeed, a myth of the time--was provided by Balzac in Le Peau de Chagrin" (1972:166-7). Perhaps the contemporary observer who has most clearly recognized Durkheim's intellectual debt to the Romantics has been Jack Douglas. He notes, for example, how "... Rimbaud spent his adult life destroying himself" (1967:357).

Death, especially suicide, was a favorite theme in the literature of the romantic movement. Indeed, the most important contribution of this literary tradition to the developing sociology of nineteenth century Europe was that it helped focus attention on suicide. Largely because of its treatment in literature, suicide was seen by the educated public as a fundamental social problem. Nineteenth century Europeans, especially the French, were frightened of "la manie du suicide."

But the literary concern with suicide also provided the core of certain very important, specific "theoretical" explanations. Of fundamental importance was the prime romantic symbol of an isolated, lonely hero of a poetic (or intellectual bent), who wanders far from human society in search of the impossible, and, failing of the impossible, becomes increasingly melancholy and enamored of eternity. The idea that self-imposed isolation produces melancholy and hence, suicide, was hardly novel; indeed, Robert Burton's seventeenth century treatise, The Anatomy of Melancholy, had carefully documented its classical sources. But this prime symbol of romanticism contained the most unclassical ideas of both
egoïsme and anomie. Indeed, the romantic image of suicide seems to have been so much the mythical model which the sociologists of suicide had in mind that both Morselli (1879) and Durkheim (1897) had a strong tendency to treat egoïsme and anomie as almost identical. It is even possible to specify the work of Chateaubriand, especially as treated by de Boissmont, as the major source of Durkheim's idea of anomic suicide (1968:366-67).

Another observer, Cesar Grana, notes how Durkheim of egoïsme reflected the Romantic Ethos of deliberately embracing angst, mordant subjectivity, and suicide. The Paris "Suicide Club" and other necrophiliac displays of Bohemia were, of course, linked to the fatuously masochistic side of romanticism. But they remind us all the same of Lammenais's observation that self-killing was essentially an act of self-worship, and as such, was one of the chief signs of modern decay (1967:80-81).

Referring to one of Durkheim's statements (see S:169), Grana echoes my own discovery of the cultural sanctioning of egoïsme:

"Durkheim's statement, however, is only part of Durkheim's theory of suicide as a product of the moral watering-down of institutions of modern society. He comes close to the relationship between suicidal ideas and the ailments of the modern literati when he points out that it was precisely the utopian intensity of their aesthetic and intellectual dreams that led to bitterness and demoralization.... it is only with Durkheim's description of suicide egoïste that we step into the atmosphere of modern literary motivations*(1967:80-81)."

Grana continues, citing George Sand's sardonic estimate of the Romantic Ethos, which spread from its origins in Germany in the last half of the eighteenth century to England about the turn of the century, to France about a generation later, and finally to America around the 1840's.

For George Sand, looking at the same state of mind, saw it as the spectacle of the anguish and fatigue created by a self-centered intellectual ambition "grown and stretched beyond measure." Durkheim, in speaking of "vanishing phantasamagorias" and the "artificial combination of illusory images" suggests that the tour ironie was also a tour de force which literary self-will could in the end sustain. Rationalism had seen the emancipation of man from faith as a victory. The Romantics may also have seen faith as de-
fenseless before the analytic mind. But for them the consequence was self-defeat (1967:213).

Indeed, so complete was the Romantic influence, in this regard, on Durkheim that in The Division of Labor he made the mistake of according art and the imagination the special status of being free from all constraints, the very message so often proclaimed by the Romantics themselves. "Art is absolutely refractory to all that resembles obligations, for it is the domain of liberty" (DL:51). Thus, on both sides, Durkheim allowed himself to be too strongly influenced by the premises of his polemical opponents. On the one side, he mistakenly accepted the Utilitarian apotheosis of individualistic economic competition through the mechanism of the market (see Chapter One of this Book); while on the other hand he unfortunately incorporated the opposite pole—namely, the Romantics' insistence that art and imagination be freed from all constraint; or as Levi-Strauss once said, be granted the special status of a "national park, wild and free." Thus, at certain points, Durkheim was unfortunately tempted to exclude both economic and artistic activity from the all-important realm of the moral and the social.

But, as we have discovered, Durkheim also proposed that art and aesthetic activity must follow the same rule of the "golden mean" or human proportion between mutual human obligations.

The aesthetic-moral activity seems freed from all control and limitation because it is not regulated. But, as a matter of fact, it is narrowly circumscribed by activity properly moral, for it can surpass a certain standard only to the detriment of morality.... When the place of the imagination in morality is made too great, obligatory tasks are unnecessarily neglected. All discipline appears intolerable when one is used to acting only under rules of one's own making. Too much idealism and moral elevation often deprives a man of the taste to fulfill his daily duties.

In general, the same may be said of all aesthetic activity; it is healthy only if moderated.... To great an artistic sensibility is a sickly phenomenon which cannot become general without danger to society. The limit beyond which excess begins is, of course, varia-
ble, according to the people or the social environment (DL:239-40).

In conclusion, Durkheim himself alluded to one of the leading symbols or "collective representations" of the Romantic ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior"—namely, Goethe's Faust.

One cannot bring some objective nearer that, by definition, is infinitely far away. The remaining distance is always the same, whatever route we take. What could be more disillusioning than to proceed toward a terminal point that is nonexistent, since it recedes in the measure that one advances? Such futile effort is simply marching in place; it cannot fail to leave behind frustration and discouragement. This is why historical periods like ours, which have known the malady of infinite aspirations, are necessarily touched with pessimism. Pessimism always accompanies unlimited aspirations. Goethe's Faust may be regarded as representing par excellence this view of the infinite. And it is not without reason that the poet portrayed him as laboring in continual anguish (ME:40).

In sum, having established from Durkheim's own work that both anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the modern world—the first by the Utilitarian Ethos and the latter by the Romantic Ethos—let us now turn, briefly, to investigate the religious foundations of these modern cultural traditions.
CHAPTER TEN
ANOMIE AND EGOISME, MODERN CULTURAL TRADITIONS,
AND THE FIRST AND SECOND PROTESTANT ETHOS

Preface. How shall we explain the origins of, and continuing sanctions for, anomie and egoisme in the modern world? The same insight that led to the second schema of suicide also leads us to search for better ways to conceptualize the mediating contexts in which to anchor anomie and egoisme. As noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, the notion of cultural traditions suggests itself as a potent analytical perspective.

Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, development, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiability in the modern world, we look to the interface between religion and culture. Accordingly, we shall now ask: what are the prime terms of translation between modern religions and contemporary culture and psyche, especially anomie and egoisme? Thus, our Durkheimian problem becomes a Weberian one—whether, and to what extent, various ethical sanctions coming from Protestantism have become sedimented at the heart of modern structures of conscience and consciousness?

Let us review our essential findings so far in this regard. Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One we linked the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism with two dominant contemporary cultural traditions. In Book Two, we explored the problematic relations between Protestantism and suicide. In the second part of Book Three which we have just concluded, we connected anomie and egoisme as absolutized forms of individualism and legitimized insatia-
abilities to two dominant modern cultural traditions.

How, then, did anomie and egoisme come to be culturally sanctioned? That is, having linked the second schema of suicide to modern cultural traditions, it is now time to link these latter, in turn, to their originating religious sanctions. Therefore, we ask: what are the specific moral and spiritual foundations of the Utilitarian Ethos and the Romantic Ethos? In both cases, we shall search for ethical premiums placed by secularizing religious drives on nominalism, atomism, or the absolute immediacy and autonomy of the individual's experience, and his infinite life-task. Specifically, we shall now move to link anomie to the secularization of Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheranism. In sum, we propose the following essential psycho-socio-cultural-historical linkages. As the active externalization of absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability, anomie is connected with the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Calvinistic ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original and continuing source. In addition, as the "infinity of dreams" seen, for instance, in the modern artist's "journey into the interior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition, and then, ultimately, with the Lutherans' and spiritual radicals' ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its original and continuing source. Thus, anomie and egoisme serve as critical anatomies of two halves of the modern soul, of the ironic outcomes of the first and second Protestant Ethos.
A. Cultural Traditions as an Interpretive Perspective

Cultural traditions of more or less complexity may be found in all societies. This is so because society is an inter-generational as well as an inter-actional process. On the universal level, a cultural tradition may be most simply defined as an institutionalized series of interpretations. A cultural tradition is built up out of a "dialogue across the centuries" (B. Nelson, 1965a). A cultural tradition is a community of memories and shared aspirations. A cultural tradition is formed by handing down from generation structures of conscience and consciousness—of right and wrong, of truth and error. Thus, a cultural tradition is a moral and cognitive community bound together through time and space by shared symbols, common values, and fields of meaning.

Cultural traditions are here regarded as the prime historical contexts in which questions of meaning and value, truth and error, are worked out. Cultural traditions mediate between us, as moral agents and intellectual subjects situated in specific "heres and nows" in which we constantly have to choose and act, and earlier models of compelling moral agency and satisfying intellectual achievement to which we turn, time and again, for guidance. Cultural traditions may be regarded as prime symbolic guidance and classificatory systems which we, the present, share with past generations and, perhaps, future ones as well.

A fuller, more formal definition might be: a cultural tradition is a series of temporally linked cultures engaged in applying analogous and progressive variations on the same basic inherited and appropriated themes and models to specific problems within the sphere of their own immediate and prospective experience. Each group within a common cultural tradition contributes to relatively persistent and evolving efforts to developing and making explicit the implications of inherited norms, and extending analogous applications of inherited and appropriated models, reinterpreting their original, current, and potential meanings, and reemphasizing
or devaluing certain elements or logics to fit their own specific situations, present interests, past histories, and probable futures.

Since cultural traditions as they are lived through by their participants serve as crucial symbolic frames of reference, so, too, thinkers in the human sciences might better collaborate if we used these lived frames of reference, these actual evolving "logics in use," as our prime analytical units, rather than abiding by the standard disciplinary restraints of domains and genres, periods, and national societies. As an integrative interpretive perspective, cultural traditions cuts across a series of analytically separable dimensions, including:

(a) geo-political boundaries--cities, regions, kingdoms, nation-states, empires, etc.;
(b) temporal demarcations such as decades and centuries;
(c) cultural boundaries such as the domains of religion, law, philosophy, science, literature, language, art, and so on.

Our real challenge here, then, is to more deeply grasp the embeddedness, the interrelations, the multiple and resonating links between different groups, cultural spheres, levels of experience, and historical phases.

Further, cultural traditions act as an intermediary level of sociocultural complexity between specific societies and larger civilizational complexes; that is, civilizations are composed of several related but often competing cultural traditions. In sum, as basic interpretive units, cultural traditions cross-cut national boundaries, time-periods, and cultural spheres, on the one hand, and act as key links between societies and civilizations on the other.

In analyzing the evolution of cultural traditions, one cannot hope to trace a simple, straight line of development from the earliest through the latest phases. Rather, the construction of any cultural tradition is due to an extraordinary interplay of many factors over time to form a cultural complex. Hence, we should look for various strands, sometimes
competing, sometimes reinforcing, which converge to have similar net effects.

In analyzing the internal structure of cultural traditions, we focus primarily on the anchors of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Proceeding from what we learned in Book One (see the summary in the first part of Chapter Eight), we shall assume that structures of conscience—rules for determining right from wrong, for allocating moral responsibility—are always and everywhere intimately linked with structures of consciousness—rules for determining truth from error, for determining intellectual integrity, and, in turn, these are linked with the structure and process of collectivities. The logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellectual judgment are often deeply intertwined. Hence, we are especially interested in understanding the complex interrelations between religious and ethical systems and other major cultural forms, societal institutions, and personality types. Therefore when seeking to understand crucial cultural transformations, we ask: what are the fundamental shifts in the collective grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority?

Further, we shall assume that: (a) there are a series of dynamic tensions energizing and eroding cultural traditions, and (b) cultural traditions are constituted through the layering or sedimentation of crucial transformations based on various resolutions of conflicting polarities. We shall focus, then, on the cumulative series of struggles and resolutions which constitute and change cultural traditions. In terms of polarities, we shall look for opposing claims on the structures of conscience and consciousness. We shall attempt to trace central rhetorical conflicts over the legitimate grounds of moral and intellectual authority. Then, in terms of transformations, we look to the major resolutions of these opposing polarities which fundamentally shift the grounds of conscience and consciousness from one anchor to another. Such rhetorical struggles are resolved in one direc-
tion or another at one point in time, thus transforming the cultural structure. When a cumulative series of tensions converge or build to an exploding point, there is often a breakthrough (or breakdown) from one cultural system to another. We then see the grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority permanently shifted. There is, then, a fundamental reorientation of the structures of conscience and consciousness; and a new tradition emerges.

At the center of our hermeneutic or interpretive strategy are the notions of symbolic equations or transformations. Interpretation means, first, looking for "what goes with what" (Burke, 1973:38); that is, a set of symbolic equations linking diverse levels and spheres together. Second, interpretation means looking for "from what to what" (Burke, 1973:38); that is, a series of transformations linking different processes and phases together. Hence, we shall search for the basic series of unifying equational and transformational processes which constitute and change cultural traditions.

In analyzing cultural traditions, then, the first task is to unravel the central series of symbolic equations which link different spheres and levels of human action together through the progressive extension of analogies from one set of experiences to another. Correspondingly, in terms of the historical axis of traditions, we seek to unravel the complex series of sequential equations or transformation terms linking diverse historical phenomena with their common origins. We have, then, two complementary interpretive strategies for moving from empirical diversity to conceptual unity.

In sum, this interpretive perspective assumes that:

(1) cultural traditions are long-term symbolic systems of meaning and value shared by many generations;

(2) all people are informed--individually and collectively--by cultural traditions (they are universals);

(3) the internal structure of cultural traditions differ from one society to another (they are variable also);
(4) cultural traditions are the most important contexts in which questions concerning meaning and value are addressed;

(5) the core of cultural traditions centers around moralities and logics, on questions of integrity, belief, and judgment;

(6) cultural symbolic patterns—especially the prime moralities of thought and logics of action—are closely connected to social processes;

(7) there are often internal conflicts in a tradition over what is right and wrong, true and false, good and bad, and since such polarities are universal to human action, conflicting claims based on these polarities tend to resurface again and again, today as in the past;

(8) hence, it is crucial to understand these specific rhetorical contexts and, thus, the series of dynamic tensions energizing and changing cultural traditions;

(9) these sociocultural tensions are resolved in one direction or another at various times, and these series of cultural transformations build up a cultural tradition;

(10) when a cumulative series of conflicts builds to a breaking point, there is either an acute cultural breakdown, or a cultural revolution, a time of breakthrough from one symbolic system to another; then we witness a fundamental reorientation in the structures of conscience and consciousness—that is, shifts in the basic legitimate models anchoring morality, thought, belief, and feeling.
B. Outline of Four Major Western Cultural Traditions

Each tradition has been defined primarily in terms of its most distinctive cultural logics. Hence, we shall preliminarily distinguish between polar pairs of dominant Western cultural traditions in terms of basic ethical and epistemological oppositions (drawn mainly from Weber's sociology of religion)—namely, "priests" versus "prophets" (and laity), on the one hand, and "ascetics" and "mystics" on the other. Space limitations permit only a schematic outline of these traditions and their historical development.¹

First, the cultural tradition which emerged as dominant in the formative period of European civilization was the Catholic tradition. The Catholic Hierocratic-Rational Cultural Tradition was (is) a unique and powerful fusion of Greco-Roman, Germanic, and Arabic cultural elements with a special form of Judaeo-Christianity. The third great phase of this tradition was coterminous with the emergence of a distinctive Western civilization from about the eleventh century onward. Not only did tradition serve as the matrix of European civilization, but it was against this tradition that the three major modern traditions reacted. Space limitations preclude "excavation" of the Catholic tradition; moreover, our central concern lies with the modern traditions. In short, anomie and egoisme pertain to the modern traditions.²

If we are to comprehend the origins of the modern world, we should strive to understand how the medieval organizational, theological, and ethical syntheses came to seem problematic to many. Among the critical shifts in the late medieval-Reformation period are a series of decisive shifts from "office charisma" and institutional authority to "personal charisma" (see Weber, 1968) and the "inner light"; the rejection of the medieval triangulated system of conscience, casuistry, and the cure of souls (eg. see Nelson, 1969a); the overcoming of invidious dualisms of "Religion" and "World" in the outlawing of the possibility of "two lives"
and thus the double standard of moral perfection; the rejection of scholastic rationalism for skepticism, nominalism, fideism, and mysticism, and so on.

Here, the tensions between priest and institutionalized "office charisma," and the prophetic, ascetic, and mystic rooted in "personal charisma" became especially acute during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe. When, finally, in the Reformation, prophets set aside priests, and ascetics and mystics felt compelled to live within the world, a series of momentous cultural changes resulted. For their powerful religious energies transformed the medieval world.

For example, with his notion of a Christian "calling" or vocation with the world, Luther broke through the medieval contrast between clergy and laity by proclaiming the "priesthood of all believers." And, whereas the Catholic tradition had joined faith and reason (through the medium of Greek philosophy), many reformers demanded that we live by the truth of revelation alone, and insisted that we are not saved by the Church, but only through faith in God. The Bible and St. Paul, not Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, were to be the sole guides for human action.

During that time which Huizanga called "the waning of the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed the "Counter-Renaissance," many people were haunted by questions such as: "How shall I know if I am saved? How do we know anything to be true? How shall we gain certainty?" Against this background of crisis, seen in skepticism, fideism, probabilism, fictionalism, etc., certain prophetic figures rose up to proclaim new bases for belief and action, new and mighty objective certainties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certainty in the human subject, such pioneers of early modern culture as Luther, Calvin, the spiritual radicals and mystics, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, and so on (whatever their other differences), all came to anchor moral and intellectual authority in a deeply interior faith, or feeling, in the inherent rationality of the human mind--in
short, in the Self or Subject. Authority became internalized; the Protestant principle of self-reliance became extended to all aspects of life. The religion of the "inner light" was raised to center stage. Hence, ethics and knowledge in all three modern traditions rest on a new and compelling sense of individual moral agency and intellectual autonomy.

Since Catholicism was allied with the "center" (eg. see Shils, 1975), a parallel movement was the rising demand for the autonomy of the peripheries and the secular world. This movement was seen in the rise of the national monarchies and their drives for autonomous national churches, the growing desires of many lay people to live sanctified lives within the world, and the emergence of modern natural science governed by its own special laws. "This world" began to free itself from traditional constraints imposed in the name of the "other world."

We shall look, then, to the main sociocultural transformations stemming from three types of Reformations--a Catholic "prophetic" reaction against the dominance of the Catholic Church, and two forms of Protestant asceticism and mysticism working within the world. These drives toward reform and autonomy took different forms in the different political and institutional contexts of France, England, and Germany. Having a common opponent, and sharing a common anchor in "personal charisma," these three drives--the prophetic, ascetic, and mystic--became differentiated by national context. Thus, while in Anglo-American society Calvinistic Protestantism contributed an "inner-worldly ascetical" cast to secular culture and personality, and Lutheran, mystical, and pietistic Protestantism contributed an "inner-worldly mystical" cast to German and Romantic culture, in France the anti-clerical drives for moral, intellectual, and socio-legal reform contributed a "laic" and "positivist" cast to the mainlines of modern French culture.
C. The Franco-Latin "Laic"-Positivist Cultural Tradition

What does an educated, lay Catholic, rising middle class, committed to living a moral life within the world, do when it is confronted with a powerful and wayward Church which is, in turn, allied with a corrupt aristocracy and monarchy? Now, the first modern cultural tradition--the "laic"-positivist cultural tradition--stemmed from a kind of Catholic "prophetism" or protestantism, especially in France. This tradition was "laic" because it derived primarily from the laity, who strove to live a life of high moral standards within the world. And it became positivist because spokesman for the educated laity gradually felt compelled to declare that Individual Reason and Natural Science were the only certain ways of gaining positive, valid knowledge.

Over against the dominance of the Catholic metaphysical or "essentialist" tradition, the positivist stream sought to construct an "existential" conscience and consciousness. Against the pervasive claims stemming from the "Book of Revelation," whose authoritative interpretation was monopolized by the Latin hierocracy, they appealed to the "Book of Nature." This latter was also the "work of God's hand," and it was an open book which could be read by any man who learned to read its special language, for it was a work written in numbers (hence, the importance of mathematics in early modern science).

Whereas the ruling philosophy in the Catholic tradition had been metaphysical, this new tradition became positivist--for it denied that ultimate reality is knowable through human reason. At root, positivism rests on a radical split between faith and reason. Ironically, the first to institutionalize this gulf (besides nominalists), were fideist members of the Church establishment. They separated things that are knowable only through revelation and faith off from things of this world that are positively knowable through the senses and reason in order to safeguard the sacred deposit of faith from skeptical attack.
However, as tensions deepened, there was a significant shift as later "laic" reformers came to set aside the importance and then even the possibility of a metaphysical, other-worldly half of the dichotomy. Thus, the two worlds were further split into two separate truths—reason had little or nothing to do with faith, while established religion was increasingly put on the defensive by Individual Reason and Natural Science. Like those who rejected reason for faith and Scripture alone, then, the positivists—who came to live by Reason alone—radically split off faith from reason, revelation from nature, this world from the other world.

From the beginning, the central thrust of the Franco Cultural Tradition was to separate morality from its traditional hierocratic and metaphysical foundations. Metaphysics was attacked as the anchor pin of the legitimacy of hierocratic control of society and individuals, and as a bulwark shielding the waywardness of the incumbents of "office charisma." Thus, the French moral and intellectual reformers were engaged in an epic struggle with the hierocracy over many centuries concerning the legitimate foundations of moral and intellectual decision. Positive science came in later stages as a prime tool in their struggle to disengage from traditional claims on man, and as the prime tool by which to construct a "laic" morality. Remember that an educated laity had little role to play in the Church, just as the middle class was blocked by the restrictions of the old feudal-aristocratic regime. Anti-clericalism, as in many hierocratically dominated cultures, whether from left (eg. the philosophes) or right (eg. Pascal and the Jansensists), fueled the mounting drive for a new "laic" morality. The opposition to the dominant Catholic Cultural Tradition led them to embrace the following rhetorical series: priests are to metaphysics as laity is to positivism and science, and as aristocracy and monarchy is to middle class, and as the old feudal regime is to progress, Enlightenment, and the modern world. In sum, against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," the
French and Latin moral and intellectual reformers raised the counter-claims of "Individual Conscience" and "Reason" based on the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" and the "Book of Nature." The dual insistence on science coupled with social critique and moral reform was not an anomaly (eg. with Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim), for it was precisely this emphatic linkage which lay at the very heart of the powerful dynamic of the "laic"-positivist cultural tradition.

From the late medieval period on, some of the most dynamic streams in French culture may seen as part of a growing tradition of opposition to the dominant tradition. And, although opposed in certain ways, their critique had the converging effect of delegitimizing the ancien regime. For it was a continuing stream of evangelical monks and lesser clergy (eg. the satires of Rabelais, d. 1553), disgruntled or displaced nobleman (eg. the world-weary fideistic skepticism of Montaigne, d. 1592, the critical relativism of Montesquieu, d. 1755, the atheistic materialism of Holbach, the utopian positivism of Saint-Simon, d. 1825), Calvinists (eg. the Huguenots, the radical skeptical fideism of Pierre Bayle, d. 1706), French Catholic Calvinists (eg. the Jansenists, or the fideistic skepticism of Pascal, d. 1662), rising bourgeoisie (eg. the dualistic critical rationalism of Descartes, d. 1650, or many of the Jesuit-educated philosophes of the Enlightenment, eg. Voltaire, d. 1778), who, among others, fueled this rising tide of cultural opposition, the radical critique of tradition and all forms of servitude, and accelerated the "laic" drive for moral and intellectual autonomy and social reconstruction. The successive waves of fideism, nominalism, skepticism, critical rationalism, positivism, existentialism, Marxism, and so forth, which have washed over French culture, should be understood in terms of their common opposition to the Catholic Cultural Tradition.

Perhaps one of the critical factors here was that, unlike England which enjoyed a peaceful Reformation in the
the 1520's and a violent political-social Revolution in the 1640's, and in contrast to Germany which enjoyed a Reformation in the 1530's but never experienced a comparable socio-political revolution, France had no successful Reformation, yet experienced the most violent political-social Revolution in 1789, which, nonetheless, proved to be abortive in several ways. The deepening split in France between reformist and monarchical-hierocratic elements was to plague French society, politics, and culture for centuries after. Indeed, nowhere else did the oppositions become so deep, so mounting and irrevocable as between the monarchical/middle-class, cleric/lay, metaphysical/positivist factions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And it was because of these historical alignments that the two series of dichotomies became such compelling symbolic equations in the minds of reformer and traditionalist alike.

Main phases in the development of this tradition include:

(1) the late medieval background: the rise of the new national monarchies, and their struggle with the Roman papacy over control of the Church in their realms; the resulting "Babylonian Captivity" of the Church at Avignon, the Western Schism, and the rise of the conciliar movement; the establishment of the persistent claims for the "liberties of the Gallican Church," all represent crucial background for the Reformation phase in France;

(2) Reformation: the Reformation phase runs basically from the opening of the Wars of Religion in the mid-sixteenth century to the Edict of Nantes in 1598 which granted the Huguenots toleration. However, the prolongation of this struggle, and the fact that neither side decisively triumphed until the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, with the mass expulsion of the Huguenots, proved decisive for the subsequent history of French society, polity, and culture;

(3) the growing absolutism and centralization of French government in the monarchy, the suppression of independence of the regional aristocracy, and the increasing identification of the Church with the absolutistic regime (eg. the cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin as prime ministers) was critical. When coupled with the extraordinary longevity of the Kings Louis XIII, XIV, and XV (1610-1774), and the suppression of dissent by the Baroque monarchies, only served to in-
crease the drive for reform;

(4) the rise of critical rationalism, especially in the early seventeenth century, with Descartes and the Cartesians, which was to constitute the most distinctive secular and early modern thrust of French philosophy;

(5) the rise of Jansenism as a rigoristic morality and philosophy of opposition to the compromises and laxity of the French Catholic Church, and of the critical rationalism of Descartes which anchored certainty in Individual Reason, and opened the way for a mechanistic universe devoid of God. Drawing on the dissatisfaction of upper-middle class lawyers (the noblesse de robe), the Jansensists, as a type of pietist French Catholic Calvinism rooted in Augustine, continued to have an influence in French culture far out of proportion to their small numbers;

(6) the Enlightenment, the great explosion of cultural critiques that came with the generations born in the last decade of the seventeenth century and the first two decades of the eighteenth century was the crucial transition to the modern, "secular" era of French culture. Their drive for moral and social reform, for a "natural religion" and a "natural morality," was directed both against the ancien regime and the Catholic Church of their youth. So great were the consequences of this massive outpouring that these generations came to be regarded as representing a crucial phase in the secularization of European civilization generally;

(7) the French Revolution, with its optimistic prelude, the engagement of successive class resentments against the old regime (the aristocracy, middle class, and lower class in turn took the lead) the unexpected violence, its rapid passage through many phases, the radical moralism of the Reign of Terror and Virtue, etc., and ultimately, its abortive and unfinished program of social reconstruction which would remain throughout the nineteenth century;

(8) the Restoration, the Napoleonic Empire, and the Conservative Reaction against the excesses of the Revolution of 1789, the resurgence of the Catholic right-wing and the rise of ultramontanism, and the subsequent alternation in French political culture between "caesaristic" leaders and laic-bourgeois Republics;

(9) the rise of Utopian positivism, with Saint-Simon, Comte, and their followers (akin to the Benthamite Utilitarians in England at about the same time), formulating the unfinished program of social, intellectual, and moral reconstruction. Also, we see the emergence of French social science outside the academy as the heir to the long tradition of social criticism, drives for positive reform, Science, and social organicism (in contrast to the social nominalism
of the English reformers);

(10) the rise of nineteenth century literary realism (eg. Balzac, d. 1850), literary positivism (eg. Taine, d. 1893), and critical rationalism not only in literature and literary criticism but also in philosophy (eg. Renan, d. 1892), and the philosophy of science (eg. Duhem, Poincare, d. 1912);

(11) the Third Republic, and its attempt to construct a "laic" morality (eg. the expulsion of the Jesuits from public education), bourgeois rationalism, the Dreyfus Case, Zola, and so on;

(12) twentieth century movements, attendant on the two world-wars and France's loss of world-position, eg. existentialism, Marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, and so on.

Indeed, it seems as if these struggles for moral, social, and intellectual reform are never completed; as the French say, "The more things change, the more things stay the same."

Yet, in a number of ways, the French reformers remained sons and daughters of the tradition against which they so relentlessly struggled for centuries, especially in their emphasis on Reason, natural law, high moral standards, the good of the whole society, social organicism, and so forth. As was noted in Chapter Four, this was Durkheim's cultural tradition. And it was for these and similar other reasons that Durkheim himself was immune to self-destructive individualisms and an "infinity of dreams and desires." Especially it was his social organicism, his positivistic rationalism, his typically French concern with mesure, proportion, and good order, and the classical notion of the "golden mean" as the norm for health and happiness, that led Durkheim to become such an incisive critic of the anomie and egoisme which plagued the Anglo-American and German-Romantic traditions. For in the last analysis, Durkheim's Suicide should be seen in terms of its rhetorical opposition to the heart of two other competing cultural traditions in the modern world.
D. The Anglo-American Empiricist-Utilitarian Cultural Tradition

The first fully modern tradition is the Empiricist-Utilitarian ("ascetic") cultural tradition which emerged primarily in England and then America from at least the seventeenth century onward. The central motifs in this tradition are individualism (atomism, nominalism) and mechanism. Empiricism is the central morality of thought; utilitarianism is the central logic of action. Our thesis, following Max Weber, is that these cultural logics emerged from the secularization and translation of Calvinistic theology and ethics into highly dynamic cultural and institutional forms during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and America.

Some of the key background events which allowed this tradition to emerge in England include: the dynastic struggles, English Erasmianism, and the peaceful Reformation of Henry VIII, the establishment of a national Church in the early sixteenth century, the alternation of Tudor Reformation and Tudor repression (eg. "Bloody Mary"), the growth of English Calvinism and the stormy Puritan Revolution and English Civil War during the mid-seventeenth century, and, after the Restoration, the permanent establishment of Protestant, Parliamentary, and middle-class principles in the Whig Revolution of 1688, the waning of religious enthusiasm and displacement of energies into non-political channels in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the rise of Methodism in the mid-eighteenth centuries, and so on.

Structurally, it was England's isolation and independence from continental Europe, her greater internal unification than many other countries, her successful national Reformation, the parliamentary system of shared power, a permeable class structure which allowed the rising middle class upward mobility, a state church which gradually granted toleration for many competing Protestant denominations, the emergence of new types of voluntary associations (eg. the dis-
senting academies, Royal Society, Lunar Society, etc.), the inclusionary thrust (begun in the Army during the Civil War and concluded only in the twentieth century) to include more citizens in the political process in the continuing democratic revolution, the market capitalism and scientific-industrial revolutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, among other things, which proved crucial for the development of this cultural tradition.

Major organizing polarities (variations of center/periphery tensions) and major phases include the following. In the first phase, approximately late fifteenth century to 1588, the major organizing polarity was "Court" (including both Puritan and Anglican in the sixteenth century) versus "Country" (Catholic). The end of this phase came with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588; no longer did international Catholicism divide the country. Rather, from this point on, nationalism superseded religious differences. Thus, the "Court" party represented the rights of the "periphery," that is, a national religion, England, and the crown in the person especially of Henry VIII versus the continent, Catholicism, the Roman papacy, and so on. In the second phase, roughly 1588 to 1688, that is, during the Stuart period especially, "Court" versus "Country" meant Puritans versus Anglican-Conformists. During this period after the defeat of the Armada, international Catholicism lost its power as a divisive symbolic force, and the Puritan party shifted toward the "Country" position vis-a-vis the "Court." These two opposing forces cut across social classes. During the Civil War in the 1640's (under Cromwell), the Country party was victorious over the crown. However, the Puritans failed to fully legitimize their rule, and there was a peaceful Restoration in 1660. However, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 represented the ultimate victory of the Country, Parliamentary, and Whig principles; thus, this phase ends in 1688.

In the third phase, roughly 1688 to the mid-eighteenth century, the primary polarity is "Establishment" versus
"Dissent." During the later Stuart period and under the Hanoverian kings, the Whig oligarchy grew conservative, reached a common understanding with the Anglican establishment, and enforced civil disabilities on religious dissenters. It was during this period, then, that liberal and radical Calvinist reformist drives were forced into non-political and non-religious forms, especially science, economics, and technology. It is during the latter half of the seventeenth century that we first see Calvinistic ethics being translated in a massive and sustained way into secular forms.

In the fourth phase, the main polarities were "Establishment" versus the emerging "Empiricist-Utilitarian Cultural Tradition;" this phase extended roughly from the middle of the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. During this phase, the alignments solidify--on the one hand, we see Anglican, Tory, the old landed aristocracy, while on the other hand, we see Whig, individualism, the Industrial Revolution, Market Capitalism, Utilitarian science and technology, and so on. The establishment was overcome, among other reasons, because they were static, while the other tradition transformed the economic, social, and cultural structure. Here, the rise of Methodism played a crucial role in bringing a form of Calvinism to the masses, and in reenergizing the secularizing thrust of Calvinism which had been running down and into other channels for the past century.

In the fifth and final (in this schema) phase, the major polarities were "Conservative" versus "Liberal;" it runs from the first reform acts of the early eighteen hundreds through the early 1900's. Here, we see the reaction against both irrational traditionalism and the incipient negative effects of the industrial revolution and market capitalism. Perhaps one of the most significant changes was the metamorphosis of Utilitarian individualism into Benthamite collectivism and state interventionism. The culmination of this phase is the transformation of the laissez-faire market society into a welfare state in the twentieth century (see al-
Let us next briefly explore the two dominant logics of this cultural tradition—empiricism and utilitarianism. Empiricism is a form of philosophic individualism, which emphasizes immediate experience, experiment, and induction from direct experience and experiment. It directs the individual to believe only the demonstrable evidence of one's own senses, including the innate "common sense." Empiricism rests on a sensationist and associationist psychology. Empiricism opposes both scholasticism and various other forms of rationalism, including idealism (e.g., Bacon versus late medieval scholasticism and the "Idols of the Mind," and Locke's tabula rasa versus Descartes' "innate ideas"). Empiricism starts inductively from direct experience; from the part it reasons to a wider inference, to the whole. English and American culture has always had a characteristic emphasis on what is plain, simple, immediate; toward what is directly knowable by the senses; toward what is practical and useful.

This commitment to individualism, of which empiricist philosophy is one prime expression, has a series of reinforcing roots deeply embedded in English culture. One may cite the following symbolic equations for Anglo-American individualism:

(1) periphery versus center relations—that fact that England is an island, faced with a huge, populous Continent, is one perennial source of the drive for autonomy, both moral and intellectual. For, in general, the periphery stands for the rights of the part, while the center necessarily stands for the interests of the whole. Thus, England was faced successively by Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, France, Spain, Germany, and so on.

(2) personal charisma versus office charisma—a pervasive influence in building Anglo-Saxon culture was the influence of monastic orders such as the Benedictines and later the Franciscans. Here we see the inner equation working itself out between the personal charisma of mysticism and empirical,
experimental philosophy (eg. as in the Franciscan monk Roger Bacon, d. 1292, an early advocate of experimental science).

(3) nominalism versus realism, via moderna versus via antiqua—for instance, in the fourteenth century Franciscan monk William of Ockham's logical nominalism (stemming from his fideism, which denied the necessary interdependence of existential facts to place them instead in direct dependence on God) which helped dissolve medieval Thomistic realism. With Ockham the connection between the periphery and nominalism ("only parts are real") is clearly evident in the link between his logical thought and his ethical thought—namely, his struggle with the nationalists and rigorists against the hegemony of the international Roman papacy.

(4) Calvinism versus Catholic scholasticism—the radical individualism stemming from the Protestant principle, Calvinistic predestination, and the sects' extension of "inner light" asceticism and mysticism became secularized and translated into general culture in the form of Enlightenment empiricism and other forms of individualism. Ockham's nominalism lingered at Oxford through Bacon and Hobbes' time; and when fused with the empiricist residues of "inner light" Protestantism through John Locke and the "common sense" of the Scottish philosophers, generated the epistemological anchors of this cultural tradition.

Nominalism and religious individualism became translated or secularized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into many different institutional and cultural forms. For instance, there is a well-recognized connection between the Calvinist drive toward self-governing congregations and the English concern with voluntary associations and political democratic individualism (eg. see Lindsay, 1947); for the latter gained their ethical sanction from the former. While the Puritan foundations (especially in the "Army Debates") of Anglo-American democracy and the rights of the middle class individual are commonly recognized, it should be noted that empiricism also rests on a similar ethical
sanctioning of the individual in terms of his "inner light" --the natural, inherent, "light of reason." Thus, empiricist epistemology is the natural correlate of democratic individualism; they go together, there is a deep inner symbolic equation and historical transformation linking them.

Other expressions (or "equations") of this same individualism include: social contract theories and the notion of "civil society" (eg. as found in Locke, Ferguson, etc.), liberalism and the economic individualism which is at the root of free market capitalism (under the notion that "free markets make free men"), associationist psychology, atomistic and mechanistic Newtonian physics (ie. the "corpuscular theory" or the billiard ball image of the universe in which atoms bounce into each other), Dalton's atomic theory in chemistry, individual competition, natural selection, and the "survival of the fittest" in Darwinian evolutionary biology, Social Darwinism, judge-made case law, reductionism in medicine and science, and so on, which continue ramifying to this day.

Because of the strong continuing ethical sanction for absolute individualism and self-reliance, one of the most deeply embedded symbolic equations in this tradition is the insistence on a necessary and natural, inner link between reductionism (ie. always reduce higher levels to lower ones, the complex to the simple, the "nothing but" formula), or methodological nominalism, on the one hand, and the drive for moral autonomy, individualism, and political liberty on the other. Hence, organic or holistic or systemic images are condemned as totalitarian.

In addition, Utilitarianism is the characteristic moral philosophy, or logic of action, of this cultural tradition (its cousin is Pragmatism in America). Utilitarianism is an impersonal and objective calculus of efficiency; its prime value is functional rationality. Here, the grounds of ethical judgment become shifted to practical outcomes; whether it works or not becomes the chief criterion of value. Utilitar-
ianism shifts questions of value from essential goals and ultimate ends (substantive rationality) to operating means, to means-ends efficiency (functional rationality). Notions of value rooted in tradition, the community, nature, cosmol­ogy, God, etc., are sacrificed to notions of productivity and efficiency.

All actions, then, come to be judged by a statistical collective calculus of pain and pleasure, by "cost/benefit" analysis. The ruling ethical norm then becomes the "greatest good of the greatest number;" today, we have become an "ac­tuarial society" in which public decisions have to be ground­ed in an impersonal trade-off of cost/benefit ratios. In this way, Utilitarianism builds on atomism or individualism, since the individual is taken as the basic unit and his preferences are statistically aggregated, and the result projected as the "common good." This "logic of action" is seen in contemporary life, for instance, in the method of taxing land in the Uni­ted States in terms of its so-called "highest and best use," which is presumed to be whatever possible function which pro­duce the most money if sold on the market.

This ethos constitutes the single most crucial step in what Weber (after the poet Schiller) called the "disenchant­ment of the world," for the world is no longer something mys­terious, an "enchanted garden" or the "playground of the Gods." For God has abandoned the world (deus absconditus), and thus, the world has fallen merely to the status of some­thing to be mastered and used to help build the "Kingdom of God" here on earth.

Now, the linkage between the growth of English liberal­ism, free market capitalism, the development of Utilitarian moral and political economic theory, the scientific and techn­nocultural revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen­turies, and the Industrial Revolution and international ex­tension of the market and the Pax Britannica in the nine­teenth century, proved to be one of the most powerful and fateful convergences in world-history. These multiple and
reinforcing revolutions, all stemming from England, represented the high pressure area of the European world, and swept all before it as they colonized much of the rest of the world. Only the Catholic Cultural Tradition, and perhaps the Franco Cultural Tradition in its revolutionary movements, have had such a powerful and sustained outward thrust. No other cultural tradition in history can claim credit, or accept blame, for the Industrial Revolution, the international spread of market capitalism, and colonialism, and, thus, the change not only of their own way of life, but of every other society.

It is my thesis here (following Weber) that a number of key elements in Calvinism (eg. the devaulation of the world as wholly separate, of nature as completely fallen, radical religious individualism, predestinarianism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, the drive to build the Kingdom of God here on earth, etc.), combined in a decisive and highly dynamic way. In opposition to the priestly and hierarchical system of both Catholicism and Anglicanism, Calvinism represents the first and foremost expression of an "inner-worldly," "inner-light," vocational asceticism, of the personal charisma of the monk condemned to live in this world, but to be neither of or for the world. The drive of the ascetic toward systematic and methodical self-discipline, toward mastery of the flesh and the world to the greater glory of God is continued and even intensified in the Protestant ascetic, especially in the Puritan. The "visible saints" were a "salvation aristocracy," a rigoristic "saving remnant," committed, as in the theocracies of Geneva, Massachusetts Bay, and Cromwell's England, to building a "Godly Commonwealth," a "New Jerusalem," a "City on the Hill."

When secularized, "inner-worldly asceticism" and the drive toward impersonal service toward a supra-personal goal led to the Utilitarian culture. Now, whole it must be acknowledged that these outlooks developed from a number of sources over a series of generations marked by crucial dis-
placements and transformations in ethical sanctions, nonetheless, one may detect the emergence of a secular impersonal ethic of service directed toward supra-personal goals couched in terms of a calculus of efficiency and productivity and the norm of the "greatest good of the greatest number" as early as the late seventeenth century (after religious "enthusiasm" waned). Again, one should not try to read back into early reformers what their descendants did with their doctrines. Yet, we see such groups as the "moral statisticians" and the rise of the notion of "political arithmetick" among individuals in public life such as William Petty (who surveyed the confiscated Irish estates for the invading Cromwell, and against whom Swift directed his satire in "A Modest Proposal"). Utilitarian theory emerged with the strongest program in the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment (eg. in the work of Hume, Hutcheson, Priestly, Ferguson, Smith, etc., see Halevy, 1955), as central to the attempt to build a "Newtonian moral science," with its own special laws, whether these be the "association of ideas," the "law of supply and demand," or similar notions. The development of the notion of "civil society" in which the basis of the social bond was declared neither to be kinship nor personal allegiance to a patriarch or king but rather impersonal and individualistic participation in the economy, on the one hand, and the notion of a society organized in terms of the market on the other hand, went hand in hand. Markets were common before then, of course, but, as both Weber and Polanyi saw, England was the first nation in history to organize itself internally primarily in terms of a market society, and these "moral scientists" worked out the legitimating and directive theory. The idea of a society governed by a self-regulating market, free from governmental influence, in which prices would be set impersonally through the "law of supply and demand," was revolutionary, as was the idea that the market was self-balancing because it was governed by nature, automatically, as if by an "invisible hand."
It was with doctrines such as these (which, along with Locke's political theory of 1688, formed the theoretical basis of American society and our Constitution), that we moved irrevocably from traditional to modern society, from the "tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a). For ethics became individualized and rationalized, that is, impersonal and calculating. This tradition was the first in history to state the moral doctrine that egoism, regulated only by the impersonal competition of the marketplace, is really altruistic because it would inevitably lead to greater productivity and efficiency, and these, in turn are closely linked to the common good (eg. see Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees" in which "private vices become public virtues").

Now, given our interpretive perspective, it is significant that many of the leading pioneers of the Utilitarian perspective were Scottish moral philosophers, and that many of these and the English were either sons of ministers or themselves "dissenting divines," especially of Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Quaker, or Unitarian denominations.

Here, the development of a "New Model Man" and the "New Model Society" (to borrow a phrase from the Puritan "New Model Army") went hand in hand. And, although he was largely unaware of it, these transmuted ethical drives can still be seen in the legal, social, economic, and political reforms of the "Hermit of Queen's Square Place"--Jeremy Bentham, son of dissenters, and the very prototype of an "inner worldly ascetic" and "philosophical radical" (see Halevy, 1955). John Stuart Mill's touching account of his breakdown in his Autobiography, and his turn toward romantic poetry is a most revealing chapter in the later history of this tradition, for it is the most dramatic instance of a leading spokesman finding he cannot live within this tradition alone; the tradition here begins to breakdown from within.

With the turn toward social reform from a Benthamite liberal perspective, toward socialism and Idealism, Fabianism, and Labor governments in England, and the Social Gospel
movement in America, we see a metamorphosis in the old Protestant Ethic from prime concern with individual success to the central concern of contemporary liberal Protestantism—namely, social service and amelioration of poverty and oppression (e.g. see Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975).

For our present purposes, it is the absolute individualism and "inner-worldly asceticism" of Calvinism as it became secularized in England and America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that constitutes the crucial cultural-historical sanctions for anomie. Here, we see the displacement of powerful religious energies into secular pursuits. Here, see "the unprecedented inner loneliness of the individual," as Weber remarked. Here, we find that embrace of an "infinite task"—building the "Kingdom of God" here on earth;" and thus, we find the vocation of the "monk within the world." Here, we find that functional rationality which positively enjoins limitlessness, because there is no goal in sight (see also LaCapra, 1972). We have discovered, in short, in secularized Calvinism the necessary cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and a legitimate "infinity of desires," which are turned against the external world in economics, science, technology, and so on. Hence, finally, we have discovered ourselves, and how our central values unintentionally metamorphose into our vices.
E. The Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition

The last major modern tradition to crystallize was the Romantic-Idealistic ("mystic") Cultural Tradition. Just as the prime rhetorical opponent of the Catholic Cultural Tradition was the Franco-Positivist Tradition, so, too, the sharpest critics of the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural Tradition were found among the Romantics. Emerging first in Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and then spreading across Europe and America, the Romantic Tradition emerged out of the progressive secularization of the "inner light" fideistic mysticism of the late medieval German mystics, and that of the "spiritual radicals" of the late Reformation period, the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith-crisis," assorted oriental and gnostic theosopies, neo-Platonism, and Leibnitzian rationalism, and the later pietistic cults of inwardness andanguished subjectivity, as these orientations were fused and progressively translated into modern art, poetry, music, philosophy, the social sciences, and so on. Although Weber himself never pursued these connections, clearly "inner-worldly mysticism" is as significant a force in the modern world as "inner-worldly asceticism." Thus, we shall focus here on a second, and rather different, "Protestant Ethos."

Now, the political and religious background was decisively different in Germany. First, Germany was not a homogeneous, internally unified nation-state like England or France; rather, Germany was a region of small competing states in central Europe. There was a continuous oscillation between the international, universalistic Holy Roman Empire and the Latin Church, on the one hand, and the small, localized, particularistic states and principalities on the other, with little ground as in the nation-states of Western Europe. Thus, the essential political background conditions were German princes competing simultaneously against both the Habsburg Empire and the universalistic claims of the Roman Catholic Church.
As might be expected during this era, the initial key to these struggles was the conflict between center and periphery. Thus, the key to the outcome of the Reformation in Germany was the alliance between the Lutheran Reformation and political regionalism. Lutheranism took on the character of a national revolt against both Rome and Empire. Luther, of course, depended for protection on the German princes against both Rome and the German peasant uprising. On this basis, Lutheranism built up a clergy and a territorial Church system. After Germany fell into prolonged struggle between Catholic and Protestant states, the Peace of Augsburg signified a victory for the rights of the princely states by temporarily resolving the civil strife according to the formula "cuius regio eius religio." Later, the Peace of Westphalia (1648), ending the devastation of the Thirty Years War, meant a checkmate to the Counter-Reformation in Germany, the turning aside of the domination of Europe by the empire of the Catholic Habsburgs, the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in fact if not in name, and the de facto religious pluralism of Europe as a permanent fact of life. While France, England, and other Western European powers were centralizing and consolidating into modern nation-states, Germany remained politically a region of many small competing states, relatively backward economically, and penetrated by feudal socio-economic organization.

Now, one cannot hope to trace the institutional history underlying this cultural tradition in the same manner as with the other traditions. For one of the peculiar characteristics of this tradition is the split between culture and polity, between the "inner" and "outer" world. Indeed, this stems from the basic Lutheran opposition between "Religion" and "World," his notion of two truths, and especially his Pauline handing over of the direction of the external world to the state. In contrast to Anglo-American Calvinism, Lutheranism never legitimized a strong, external, collectivist organizational thrust. Moreover, this Lutheran split o-
pened the way for a unique symbiosis in German political culture—namely, in the most powerful of the emerging German states, Prussia, the Hohenzollern rulers were predominantly Calvinist, while the subjects were predominantly Lutheran (see Parsons, 1977:162). One can hardly conceive of a better fit between religion and politics—namely, disciplined, activist, authoritarian, collectivist Calvinist rulers paired with submissive Lutheran subjects.

It was against the background of a decisive religious Reformation coupled with political and economic backwardness in Germany that we should seek to understand the rise of the Romantic cultural tradition. For Romanticism first emerged as a reaction against the progressive trends of the modern world in society, economics, science, technology, art, and so on. Indeed, Germany's weak Enlightenment phase was followed almost simultaneously by the massive and brilliant Romantic reaction; here, Herder was a key link. Germany's cultural isolation and the central role of the universities in the rise of German culture (in contrast to the extra-university roles of reformers in Britain and France), are also important factors. Being in revolt against the homogenizing and geometrizing rationalism of the Enlightenment, the Romantics naturally reacted against the excesses of the French Revolution and Napoleon's hegemony over Europe. In the early nineteenth century, this symbolic equation between culture and politics led to an association of German nationalism with cultural ideals opposed to the rationality of the Enlightenment, and especially the obsession with utility at the heart of Anglo market capitalism. Thus, when Germany acted for almost the first time as a political unity against Western Europe, German thinkers and cultural spokesman also set themselves against Western European Enlightenment thought, a pattern which was to have fateful consequences for the future of the West.

Clearly, the prehistory of this tradition goes back at least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before to the late medieval mystics such as Eckhart, Suso, Tauler, and
others (of the *Theologica Germanica*), to the fideistic mysticism, nominalism, and conciliarism of thinkers such as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, to the *devotio moderna* of the urban tertiary sects, especially the brotherhoods and sisterhoods scattered along the Rhine, Flanders, and the Low Countries such as The Brethren of the Common Life, the Friends of God, the canons regular, and so on. These religio-cultural streams accompanied the proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian structures of conscience in the Lutheran Reformation, especially in terms of the angst and deep inner anguish of the paradigmatic Lutheran "faith crisis." Indeed, Luther served as a key conduit for both the Pauline-Augustinian structures of feeling and thought and Ockham's and Biel's nominalism (the *via moderna*), and for the mysticism of the late medieval German mystics and the pietistic fideism of the *devotio moderna*. Indeed, as Panofsky (1957) notes, nominalism and mysticism shared an "elective affinity" (or symbolic equation) during this period in that both reinforced the primacy of the experience of the individual. These aspects of the Reformation prehistory were reinforced by the intellectualistic (often neo-Platonic) and pietistic mysticism seen in the ethic of "utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of the spiritual radicals and men such as Sebastian Franck, Caspar Schwekenfeld, Sebastian Castellio, Valentin Weigel, and others. Weigel has been honored on occasion as the original father of German Idealism.

Perhaps one of the most revealing figures, standing as he did between converging strands of earlier Christian and Protestant mysticism, and various oriental and neo-Platonic and gnostic theosophies, was the humble cobbler of Gorlitz—Jacob Boehme. Living in the last quarter of the sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Boehme had ecstatic visions, and was persecuted by the now-staid and orthodox Lutheran Church authorities. As a transitional figure in the interlude between the Reformation phase and the emergence of the dominant secularized cultural tradition
(like Pascal in France), the shoemaker from Silesia is an "ideal typical" example of an "inner-worldly mystic."

Approximately a century and a half after the Reformation, and after Lutheranism had hardened into a state supported Church and orthodoxy, the original spirit of the reformers was revitalized by the Pietist renewal led by men such as Spener, A.H. Francke, Count Zinzendorf, the Moravians, and a host of other "world-retreating" Protestant sects which followed. Methodism in England and America several generations later stemmed directly from the model of the Moravian pietists and brotherhoods, and both forms paved the way for the "cult of feeling" in Romanticism. Lutheran Pietism, especially, was an important and pervasive background influence in the orientation of early Romantics such as Hamann and Herder.

During this same period, this cultural tradition enjoyed its earliest prime philosophical expression in the work of Leibnitz, the "German Plato" of his time, the outstanding polymath of his day, and a thinker given to mystical inclinations and sympathies. Leibnitz delivered the first fundamental critique of the classical formulation of the Newtonian atomistic and mechanistic world-view. Further, it is significant that he developed the calculus as the same time as Newton; however, in assuming that fields and processes were primary (rather than atoms), he approached the invention of the calculus from the point of view of the differential, while Newton worked primarily on the integral calculus (see C. Boyer, 1939). But Newton's physics and world-view won the day; Leibnitz died almost unnoticed, his critique of Newtonian physics and Locke's Essays almost forgotten. Yet, his outlook gained final vindication almost three centuries later when the generation of German thinkers led by Einstein revolutionized classical physics, and substituted a processual, field theory. It was no surprise that only these thinkers (rather than the pioneering J.C. Maxwell) were able to draw upon their cultural tradition for the organic and processual
premises needed to fundamentally reorient physical theory.

Now, this developing religio-cultural tradition emerged in its first secularized modern phase with the Enlightenment generations of Lessing, Hamann, Herder, and Kant. It then exploded in its classical and definitive form of conscience and consciousness with the succeeding generations led by Goethe, Fichte, Schiller, Novalis, Savigny, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Schelling, the Schlegels, the von Humboldts, and so on. It is here that history is portrayed as the "unfolding of the Absolute Spirit," emphasis is placed on the primacy of the "Transcendental Ego," that we see the first of many modern "journeys into the interior" (Heller, 1968). Indeed, it is striking that this massive intellectual and artistic outpouring, in many ways even greater than that produced by the core generations of the French Enlightenment, was so delayed. Yet, when it finally came, the German reaction to the progressive and disruptive tendencies of the Franco and Anglo-Scottish cultures was so massive and so rapid, that the Romantic reaction followed the weak German Enlightenment so closely as to be almost simultaneous with it rather than sequential. Although senior to Herder and his compatriots, much of Kant's Idealistic Rationalism may be viewed as a kind of anticipatory reaction against the incipient Romanticism of Herder and especially Hegel and his later generation.

Now, space has not permitted us here to chart representative figures of these leading traditions in other societies than those in which they were first born. However, since the Romantic tradition is the most international, let us look at the way in which this cultural tradition came to be detached from its homeland and came to cut across modern society. Remember that this ability to cross national frontiers is essential to a cultural tradition (rather than a national intellectual tradition). Dating roughly from the last quarter of the eighteenth century in Germany, the Romantic movement (excepting Rousseau) appeared approximately a generation later in England, another generation still in France, and, then,
another generation still in America (c. 1840's).

In England, the Romantics' reaction against the cold, abstract, Utilitarianism expressed in the leading economic, scientific, and technological streams of the day was prepared by the rise of Methodism. The intense inwardness and evangelical emotionalism of this—one of the first modern Protestant—mass revivalistic movements helped transform the predominantly "ascetic" Anglo personal and cultural styles. The first and most prescient English Romantic was William Blake (d. 1827), clearly a radical descendant of Protestant "inner light, inner-worldly mysticism." Blake prophesied against the incipient Industrial Revolution ("dark satanic mills") and apotheosized the individual Imagination. Along with others such as Swedenborg, Blake, with his mixture of mysticism, pietistic inwardness, ecstatic vision, and radical democratic individualism, remains one of the most powerful figures in the background of early English Romanticism.

A step removed from the religious fervor of these early mystic-Romantics was Wordsworth's spiritual, moral, and aesthetic intoxication with nature; his lyrical poetry is a kind of affirmative "inner-worldly nature mysticism." In his early writings (eg. the "Lyrical Ballads"), Wordsworth attempted to counter in direct, personal experience of nature the dominant thrust of Anglo culture—the drive of "instrumental activism" for mastery of the external world. Moreover, it is no coincidence, that Wordsworth friend, S.T. Coleridge, the first theoretician in English Romanticism and one of its finest critics, drew inspiration from both the German Idealists and from a common "spiritual technology" of mystics the world over—namely, psychoactive drugs (eg. in his case, opium). English Romanticism then exploded in the subsequent generations of Byron, Keats, Shelley, Ruskin, Morris, and so on; indeed, as Williams notes, it is striking that the very development of the term "culture" in the English language stems from the Romantics reaction against the disintegrating effect of the industrial and market capitalist revolutions on English society.
Similarly, many of the early French Catholic and/or Aristocratic Romantics (except Rousseau) such as Chateaubriand, Lamennais, du Musset, Lamartine, and so forth, also turned away from the cold, abstract, geometrizing and homogenizing rationalism of the Enlightenment to warmly embrace either a romanticized nature or mankind (the cult of the "people"). Both alternatives placed great stress on the natural emotions and subjective feelings in opposition to the strictures of French classicism; this, in turn, helped bring certain strands of French Catholicism closer to a Schillerian (or perhaps Pascalian) pietism. Since society, as developed in French utopian positivism, was a keynote of the French Romantics, advances made against the rationalistic metaphysics, on the one hand, and the indulgence in sentimentality and emotion served to turn religion into morality, and thence to identify morality and social norms. This new ethical religion of society and mankind also retained the social organicism of earlier Catholic philosophy, which now rested on a new basis. This fusion of new and old alternatives pointed out a mainstream of French cultural development centered around the identification of morale and morals that was to occupy many of the great public moralists and early sociologists such as Saint-Simon, Comte, and, above all, Emile Durkheim. Gradually, as Romanticism metamorphosed into Realism, and then successively into Symbolism (eg. Baudelaire, Rimbaud), Dadaism, and Existentialism, the egoistic and "demonic" or gnostic, alienated underside of French Romanticism increasingly came to the surface.

Finally, in the "American Renaissance" of literature and thought, there is the clear influence of Unitarians, Universalists, and Quakers on the American transcendentalists and Romantics of the early and mid-nineteenth century. What is significant for the cultural historian here is the metamorphosis of liberal Calvinism into Romanticism, a path that had already been blazed by Rousseau. Thus, we see in Emerson
and Thoreau the metamorphosis of "inner-light, inner-worldly asceticism" into Romantic "inner-worldly mysticism" focused on Nature and Self. Other major figures in this emerging American branch of the Romantic tradition include Walt Whitman, and especially that "Empress of Calvary," the hermit of Amherst, Miss Emily Dickinson. Although a minor figure in terms of literature, the life of John Muir (d. 1912) is paradigmatic here for the historian of cultural traditions. For Muir, born in Scotland and oppressed by a dour, Puritan father, moved directly away from the old-line Calvinism of his youth to inner-worldly Romantic nature mysticism. Indeed, as founder and first president of the powerful conservation organization, the Sierra Club, Muir institutionalized a public expression of the Romantics' concern for Nature; thus, he was one who translated the Calvinist drive for service into a new form of stewardship of the earth, one which is paradigmatic for the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Now, in terms of our special purposes here, it is the absolute individualism and "inner-worldly mysticism" of Lutheranism, fideistic pietism, and the subjective idealism of the spiritual radicals as these became secularized first in Germany and then in other countries from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries which provides the required cultural-historical sanction for Durkheimian egoisme. In the Romantic cultural tradition, we see the extreme subjectivity, the inflation of the ego, the fascination with heroic angst, that is central to egoisme. Here, we find that "infinity of dreams," the "journey into the interior" which issues in egoisme. Here, we discover suicide as a "vocation" among Romantic artists. In short, we discover in secularized Lutheranism the necessary cultural sanctioning for the Romantic ethos of absolute individualism, anguished subjectivity, and an "infinity of dreams" which are turned inward against the self, and which find their foremost expression in modern Romantic literature, art, music, and philosophy. In sum, in this cultural sanctioning of egoisme, we discover the other half of
the modern soul.

FOOTNOTES

BOOK THREE

#1, p. 877--In order to perform this task, we need systematic exegeses of their special sociologies; for instance, I have prepared an exegesis of the first three chapters of Weber's Sociology of Religion, unexplored territory to this day.

#1, 1024--In The Division of Labor, Durkheim had this to say about the understanding and the "golden mean" in history: "But understanding is only one of our faculties. It can increase beyond a certain point only to the detriment of the practical faculties, disrupting sentiments, beliefs, customs, with which we live, and such a rupture of equilibrium cannot take place without troublesome consequences.... At each moment of history and in consequence of each individual, there is a determined place for clear ideas, reflected opinions, in short, for science, beyond which it cannot normally extend" (DL:238).

#1, 1039--But Durkheim's additional statement that ".. this abusive exploitation of individualism proves nothing against it," fails to catch the true thrust of his own insight into the "exception proving the rule" (as with, for example, the Jews and higher learning). For it is not those who shirk their duties to the modern "infinity of dreams" and the cult of "utmost inwardness" who are beset by egoistic tensions and suicide. Rather, it is those who live out these values to the fullest! The problem is not with some sinking to the sub-human level of animal drives or organic egoism, but, rather, of rising to super-human heights, and then failing. What Durkheim often observed but could not admit systematically was this crucial process of the routinization and deflection of modern charisma.

#1, 1052--As originally planned, a separate fourth book on cultural traditions was projected. Yet, this dissertation had grown so large that it became impossible to include much of this material. A detailed and systematic introduction to the methodology of interpreting cultural traditions has been worked out.

#2, 1052--A long paper on the evolution of the Catholic Cultural Tradition is being prepared.
APPENDIX

WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO ANOMIE?

Synopsis. As is true of all paradigmatic notions, anomie has become a protean concept, and, therefore, devoid of specific and profound meaning. And Durkheim's typology has both distorted and neglected.

In Part I of the following appendix, we shall explore the vast literature which has grown up around Durkheim's notion of anomie; we shall divide these into various streams of development. We shall explore, first, the Parsonian stream which may be considered basically normative, then the Halbwachian stream which is structural, while the Mertonian stream of development mediates between these two in focusing on the conflict between cultural mandates and structural opportunities. The Srolian stream reflects these other streams, especially the Mertonian and Parsonian, in psychologizing anomie. Finally, we shall explore a miscellaneous category of development.

What Parsons, Halbwachs, Merton, and others did to Durkheim's anomie, and what others did, in turn, to their theories, can be understood as a typical illustration of the breakthrough and subsequent breakdown of central paradigms used in the "normal science" of any discipline. Perhaps a hidden law of intellectual and cultural entropy is at work here—the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit."

In Part II, we shall explore various confusions over Durkheim's typology of suicide. Despite the paradigmatic status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide remains underdeveloped and confused in the sociological literature. While anomie has been applied to theories of deviance and despair, the other three types have been largely ignored.
Thus, Durkheim's classic *Suicide* has experienced a doubly sad fate--for not only has anomie undergone routine and progressive distortion, but, at the same time, the rest of his complementary typology has been routinely ignored and distorted.

Fortunately, over the years several observers have attempted to rescue Durkheim's typology from obscurity. We shall explore their widely diverging reinterpretations. These attempts to restore or reinterpret Durkheim's schema of suicide will be divided into "reductions" and "rescues." Reductions refer to those reinterpretations which argue that Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues" refer to those interpretations which seek to distinguish the four interrelated types.

We shall first consider several representative reductions of Durkheim's typology, and then move to consider several rescues which serve as a bridge to my second schema of suicide as developed in Book Three. Our guiding assumptions here are that any adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide should: (a) take seriously the reductionists' attempts to elucidate an underlying unity to the four types, and (b) follow the rescuers in their attempt to elucidate the distinctness of the four types. Hence, we seek to reconcile this conflict by simultaneously interrelating the four types, and, at the same time, maintaining their distinctness. In sum, we seek a coherent unity-in-diversity.
PART I

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE MAIN STREAMS OF DEVELOPMENT
OF ANOMIE IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

Introduction. Anomie: A Protean Concept

All paradigmatic concepts suggest varying degrees of
generality and specificity. For while being comprehensive
and covering the greatest number of cases, they must also
yield specific, testable propositions about concrete situa­
tions, and do so in the most explicit, elegant, and economi­
cal manner possible. It is precisely this dialectical ten­
sion between polarities that constitutes the potency of fun­
damental concepts. However, at the same time, generality and
specificity have their negative "flip-sides." For extreme
generality tends to degenerate into diffuseness and amor­
phous ideas, while striving for specificity tends to lead us
into rigid and narrow preconceptions. Therefore, if "anomie
constitutes one of the truly central concepts of sociology"
(Parsons, 1968a), then how has it fared in escaping the twin
conceptual evils of diffuseness and narrowness?

When embarking upon a systematic review of the litera­
ture on anomie, one cannot help but observe that anomie has
become a protean concept. Asked to associate synonyms for a­
nomie, most American sociologists might reply with a long
list, including: normlessness, malintegration, normative
breakdown, social disorganization, social anarchy, sociocul­
tural chaos, social isolation, confusion--personal and norm­
ative, meaninglessness, alienation, social estangement, lack
of opportunity, apathy, despair, extreme passivity, resigna­
tion, and so on and so forth. All of these factors imply the
absence of some crucial social factor.
Yet, taking only the most common connotation of anomie as normlessness (an identification most sociologists have probably embraced through the osmotic medium of textbooks and introductory courses), one may ask: what does normlessness mean, precisely? Does it refer to situations where no viable norms yet exist, a sort of cultural void, or, rather, does it refer to the breakdown of existing norms? In a perceptive comment, the psycho-historian Erik Erikson suggested, in contrast to Merton, that "... the breakdown of normless itself is becoming a problem" (in Merton, 1956:43). What types of norms are breaking down? What is the scope of the normative breakdown? Whose norms are breaking down? Everyone? Simultaneously? Or is there some standard sequence involved? What are the key elements in the process of normative breakdown? What are the causes of this breakdown? Is it primarily or even exclusively the stress between cultural mandates and the lack of structural opportunities (Mertonian malintegration)? What do we mean by normative breakdown, anyway? Does it mean weakening, confusion, conflict, diffusion, routinization, or destruction? Is cultural or value or class conflict roughly synonymous with normlessness? Is pluralism synonymous with normlessness? How long do these factors have to last to qualify as normlessness? How does one distinguish between normlessness, deviancy, and moral innovation? The fact that we could almost indefinitely extend this list of questions reveals that anomie-as-normlessness is devoid of almost any specific meaning.

Unfortunately, anomie has become "a word to conjure with," as Yinger (1964) remarks; it has become a protean concept. As with other paradigmatic notions such as Marx's "alienation" (see J. Horton, 1964) or Weber's "Protestant Ethic," anomie has lost all specific meaning as it has become stretched to mean almost anything we desire. Anomie has come to signify almost anything, and therefore, too much, and therefore, nothing in particular. We shall call this progressive routinization, extension, distortion, and emptying out
of meaning the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974).

It is significant, however, that the founders of these fundamental sociological concepts conveyed both specific and general meanings. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber proposed their paradigmatic concepts of alienation, anomie and egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos to explain specific historical realities relating to the causes of the crisis of modern society. Yet, at the same time, these specific insights into the causes of crucial transformations carried generic meanings about man-in-society. In a curious way, the natural history of the career of these concepts reveals that both the original historical specificity and the generic thrust have been altered or lost. Each is a paradigm in crisis (Kuhn, 1962).

Reflection on these sad inevitabilities should lead us to revalue the present tenuous connection between history and theory in our disciplines. For what the routinization and distortion of these paradigms reveals is that our own theorizing might more closely approximate the potency of these seminal concepts of the founding fathers when we proceed, not abstractly, formally, or deductively, but, rather, from a deep and systematic reflection concerning the fundamental processes transforming our own lives, considered in comparative and historical perspective. Indeed, it is only when we both situate ourselves in our time and within a guiding cultural tradition that we gain sufficient perspective to build theoretical paradigms worth pursuing. It is only an apparent paradox that universally valid ideas gain their applicability by emerging from a comparative analysis of historical phenomena, not from being posited in vacuo.

Truly, anomie has become a protean concept, "a word to conjure with," for each of the different streams of development of anomie lays claim to legitimate kinship with Durkheim's original concepts. Each lay claim to the still-resonant halo of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit." Yet, as with religion, it is all too easy to selectively quote "scripture"
to one's own special purpose. As George Simpson observed: "What a thinker said and what his too ardent followers say he meant not uncommonly turn out to be different things" (1963:1x). Thus, one our additional tasks here will be to determine the actual degree and depth of continuity between these various streams of development of anomie and Durkheim's original ideas.
CHAPTER ONE
PARSONIAN ANOMIE

Talcott Parsons' analytical discussion of anomie in his magisterial *The Structure of Social Action* remains the single most influential source concerning Durkheim interpretation in American sociology. Parsons' pioneering analysis is significant for our present purposes in at least three other respects. First, it represented one of the first big theoretical breakthroughs in American sociology, but one which was founded on European theory. Parsons' rescue of Durkheim, along with the pioneering efforts of Alpert (1939) and Foskett (1939), helped raise Durkheim's social realism and scientific sociology to a new and more acceptable light in the eyes of many American sociologists (see R. Hinkle, 1960; Radcliffe-Brown's visit to Chicago was also important, see Nisbet, 1965). Second, almost all of the subsequent development of the notion of anomie, and many other basic Durkheimian ideas, was filtered through Parsons and his colleague Robert K. Merton (although in time, Merton's variant on anomie became more influential). Finally, Parsons' analysis even today remains the most influential account which has only recently been effectively challenged (eg. see Pope, 1973, 1975a; almost all of Giddens' work).

Here we shall only briefly review the structure of Parsons' argument concerning anomie, saving exploration in greater detail of Parsons' interpretation of the entire typology of suicide until Part II of this appendix. Now, by focussing on the "meaningfulness of goals" or "strains in the relational system," Parsons is the prime architect of the normative stream of development of the idea of anomie. In an absolutely crucial, yet subtle, shift in meaning, Parsons switched Durkheim's constant and over-riding concern with the infinite-
ness of expectations created by cultural goals in modern society to an abstracted, formalistic concern with the "indefiniteness" or "lack of clarity" in the normative system.

As is his custom, Parsons starts his reconstruction of Durkheim's ideas, not in terms of Durkheim's own work or intentions, but wholly within Parsons' own, very different, interpretive framework. Now, in The Structure of Social Action Parsons was haunted by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"—namely, how to modulate the anarchy of egoistic passions and generate a stable society. By displacing this concern onto Durkheim (who was not centrally concerned with it but rather with his own positivistic dilemma concerning the scientific foundations of morality and the corresponding synthesis of traditional polarities to deal with), and by repeatedly insisting that Durkheim's central theoretical problem was the generic bases of social order and control, Parsons appeared to find the very answer embedded at the heart of Durkheim's sociology for which he so desperately searched. The solution to the Hobbesian dilemma which Parsons would have us believe that he found in Durkheim was this: stable social equilibrium can only ultimately be based on internalized moral obligation founded on an over-arching value consensus which is, in turn, rooted in a religiously grounded "ultimate value system" anchored in "non-empirical reality."

In light of his insistent search for the grounds of internalized moral obligation and a religiously sanctioned value consensus on which such obligation and moral rules rest, Parsons first placed great stress upon Durkheim's conception of egoisme, and then subsequently even greater stress upon anomie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's notion of egoisme, Parsons identifies egoisme with the "higher order of individualized moral obligation in Protestantism." In contrast to his negative valuation of altruisme which subordinates the individual to the collective conscience, Parsons renders egoisme virtuous, and not as implying the sacrifice of the collective conscience to the individual ego, but as implying the elevation of the individual's conscience
in Protestantism to a life-principle of the first order. But Parsons' virtuous translation of egoisme ignores Durkheim's critical views and confuses his first and second schemas (see Books Two and Three). In his 1968 summary, Parsons distinguishes between egoisme and altruisme in terms of self versus collective orientation, which is partly correct, and between anomie and fatalisme in terms of the absence and presence of normative regulation. However, such abstract distinctions confuse Durkheim's intentions, for Parsons takes egoisme from the second schema as being an expression of cultural values, yet puts a positive coloration on it, and then reinserted this positive image of egoisme back into Durkheim's first schema. Further, by deemphasizing Durkheim's crucial doctrine of human nature, Parsons turned Durkheim's image of the presence of generic drives in the pre-social individual ego into a generalized image of the generic absence of social control.

After discovering egoisme as his first virtuous anchor, Parsons turned to analyze anomie as the key to his search, for he now possessed explanations of both the sources of social stability (internalized moral obligation) and the source of the breakdown of effective moral obligations and motivations. Anomie is the key to societal disorder; anomie is the Hobbesian dilemma. Hence, we may term Parsonian anomie a normative theory, in contrast to Mertonian anomie, which is largely a structural theory. As the opposite pole of internalized moral obligation, Parsons considers anomie to express the lack of normative clarity leading to a generalized normative breakdown. "[With anomie]... the problem is the definiteness of expectations" (1968a:316).

Having posited internalized moral obligation (ie. Protestant egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability, Parsons explained social instability in terms of normative confusion. In a subtle shift in meaning, Parsons shifted Durkheimian anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." While indefiniteness might sometimes imply infiniteness, one need hardly be a linguist to decide that lack of clarity is
not synonymous with insatiability. Yet of such tiny mountains, great molehills are made. Whereas Durkheim was fundamentally concerned with the sources of insatiability and the personal and societal ravages of the "infinity of dreams and desires," Parsons, for his own special purposes, basically shifted Durkheim's meanings by fitting both egoisme and anomie into his own very different interpretive framework.

In his later summary, Parsons observed:

... anomie is that state of a social system which makes a particular class of members consider exertion for success meaningless, not because they lack capacity or opportunity to achieve what is wanted, but because they lack a clear definition of what is desirable. It is a pathology not of the instrumental but of the collective normative system (1968a:316).

But Parsons himself has here shifted the connotations he has bestowed on anomie. For instead of anomie serving as a synonym for the chaos of the "Hobbesian dilemma," now Parsons seems to place greater emphasis on the internalization of clear moral obligation, and thus anomie has come to carry the additional meaning, for Parsons, of withdrawal of motivation or "affect" or moral support from confusing cultural mandates. In addition, we ought to note a paradox involved here in Parsons' abstracted quest for generic social theory: although the first line of the preceding passages couches anomie in terms of the generic Social System, the next line concerning the refusal to conform to dominant achievement values in modern society is surely largely culture bound. Further, Parsons hinted here at the distinguishing characteristic between his anomie and Merton's --for he sees the problem not as lack of opportunity and thus anomie is not primarily a structural problem as with Merton, but rather it is basically a problem of confusion in the relational system, or the lack of adequate perception of the real significance of cultural values and goals.

Can we accept the generalized terms of Parsons' contrast between anomie and consensus as a valid translation of Durkheim's concerns? One of the most perceptive of contemporary interpreters of Durkheim, Anthony Giddens, has criticized Par-
sons on these and other related points.

By abstractly contrasting moral consensus (the existence of "common values") with anomie (the dearth of such values), Parsons' account blankets out Durkheim's overriding concern with the distinctions between the moral and institutional structure of the modern social order and that found in traditional forms. The problem of anomie cannot be separated from the effects of the transformation of the division of labor.... The polarity is not primarily between the existence of moral consensus and its absence, but between the rigid moral conformity of the traditional conscience collective and the looser, more institutionally complex structure of organic societies are still in a transitional phase (1972a:42).

Thus, if Parsons wished to construct his own terms for normative breakdown, okay, but when he claims that his own translation of anomie fairly and sufficiently represent Durkheim's meaning, then he must be called to task, for the evidence proves that such a claim is ill-founded.

Although Parsons' notion of anomie as malintegration in the "relational system" has filtered into the mainstream of American sociology, partly through Merton's translation, most attention has been focussed on the Mertonian development of anomie or Srolian anomia, and surprisingly few have subsequently taken up Parsons' definitions and pursued them. Robin Williams (1951) a student of Parsons, applied anomie to the American context. In addition, two well known articles interpreting Durkheim's types fall within this same stream of development of anomie. Although they take diametrically opposed positions on the question of whether Durkheim's types can be distinguished or are reducible, both Barclay Johnson (1965) and Bruce Dohrenwend (1959) seem to agree that normative integration or regulation is the key underlying dimension, and Whitney Pope (1976) largely follows Johnson in this matter.

Whatever the independent validity of his own theory, by insisting that Durkheim's anomie refers not to insatiable and (negatively) egoistic drives located either in human nature or culture, but to a pathological lack of clarity in the normative-relational sector of society (whatever that means, precisely), Parsons has not only ignored and subverted Durkheim's central intentions but also got himself into some
difficult binds of his own (see Chapter Ten, Part II of this appendix).

In sum, by forcing Durkheim into his framework, Parsons arrived at a unique combination of egoisme and anomie. From his own abstracted, ahistorical, normatively oriented frame of reference, anomie meant confusion or lack of clarity resulting from malintegration in the cultural system. In clear contrast to Durkheim, Parsons' central concern with anomie is not with the infiniteness but rather with the indefiniteness of expectations. In contrast to Mertonian anomie, to which we shall turn presently, Parsonian anomie is concerned more with the cultural-relational system than with the structural-instrumental system. Only in a highly ambiguous sense can either Parsons' or its descendant Mertonian anomie, be identified with Durkheimian anomie. Further, Parsons' claim to have accurately interpreted the essence of Durkheim's major ideas, and his claims to be a legitimate heir of Durkheim's sociological charisma must be set aside.

Finally, the development of anomie in American sociology seemingly all filters through Parsons. The change in the connotational "load" of anomie from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton is a two-step process involving the predilections of the Master and the second-in-command. Parsons acted as a crucial "gate" through which anomie passed on its way to the oblivion and trivialization of success. If a key founder's ideas often convey fruitful ambiguity to prove successful, then perhaps one of the crucial phases in the loss or critical reappropriation of the founders' "charisma-on-deposit" is accomplished by disciples from other groups, times, and places who fundamentally alter the original meanings to fit their own purposes and problems. Doubtless, at its best such cross-fertilization between different groups generates new vitality for both--the first receives a new continuity and fresh lease on life, while the second receives both a new point of departure and a surrounding aura of legitimacy. Yet, at the same time, something precious is lost in such exchanges.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HALBWACHIAN STREAM

The Halbwachian stream of development of Durkheim's ideas of anomie and egoisme centers around the notion of breakdown of social integration or social isolation. Deriving from Maurice Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide (1930), this stream focusses on Durkheim's early explicit formula that the suicide rate is inversely related to the degree of social integration. Thus thinkers in this stream tend to reduce Durkheim's various types down to what they consider the fundamental type—namely, egoisme. This stream has recently received its most precise formulation in Gibbs and Martin's (1964) well-known study Status Integration and Suicide. In contrast to Parsons who emphasized egoisme as a postive condition of individual normative self-direction, the Halbwachian stream emphasizes egoisme as a breakdown of social relationships, statuses, and so on. In contrast to both the Parsonsian and Mertonian streams, the Halbwachian sub-tradition focusses almost exclusively on structural integration and the consequences of its weakening, inconsistency, or breakdown. Hence, we witness the emergence of the first three major possible permutations of Durkheim's anomie: from one side comes Parsons' normative thesis concerning the lack of cultural integration, from the other side emerges Halbwach's thesis concerning the breakdown of social structural integration, while Merton's thesis mediates between these two possibilities by focussing on the breakdown of consistent relations between structure and culture.

Now, Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide represents both an extension and revision of Durkheim's earlier analyses. Halbwachs' statistical analysis generally supports Durkheim's
earlier work. But there are a number of differences. Split between statistical and social phenomenological approaches, Halbwachs analyzed altruistic motives further, and distinguished between self-sacrifice and suicide. In addition, he placed greater emphasis on psychological intentions and the suicidal context. But beyond these and other differences perhaps the greatest divergence between the master and one of his closest disciples was that Halbwachs, perhaps because of his drive toward statistical measurability, seized upon Durkheim's early formula and reduced all the suicidal types down to the lack of integration of the individual into a stable group (see also Jack Gibbs, 1957:94-95; Giddens, 1965:6-7; Jack Douglas, 1967).

In American sociology, one of the most sophisticated studies extending the Halbwachian thesis is the well-known exploration of the relations between Status Integration and Suicide (1964) by Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin. Proceeding from demographic interests like Halbwachs, and from Gibbs' doctoral dissertation written under the direction of Martin, they took as their key proposition (ala Halbwachs) Durkheim's first and only explicit summary that "Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of social groups" (S:208-9). Their positivistic proclivities lead them to reject much of Durkheim's own analysis as untestable, yet, taking what they perceive to be the essence of Durkheim's theory, they postulate a deductive series of more precise propositions which yielded their major theorem: "The suicide rate varies inversely with the degree of status integration in the population."

Since the major virtue of the status integration thesis is that it can be measured and subjected to systematic testing, it is, perhaps, not unwarranted to surmise that their chain of deductions is prompted as much by the need to work through Durkheim's theories down to a more localized level which permits the use of demographic statistics as by any abstract desire for greater clarity. Such a development is not unusual in social science where the exigencies of research demand alterations in theory, and the empirical cart ends up
directing the theoretical horse. However, the need to distill, fragment, or reduce significant theories down to their component parts to better fit or utilize existing data is generally felt, even though the significance of the theory changes from a perspective which touches the very depths of crucial transformations to a theory which is important because it can be tested. In this vein, the response to Gibbs and Martin's work appears to have been enthusiastic. In the relatively short time since it was proposed, a rather large literature has grown up around it, some of it critical for various reasons (eg. J. Douglas, 1967; B. Segal, 1969; C. Bagley, 1972).

In contrast to Durkheim's multiple sociocultural, historical, and philosophical concerns, Gibbs and Martin's effort appears as a radical truncation, an interest in a simple proposition amenable to statistical testing rather than an interest in Durkheim's deeper propositions. Their theory is an ahistorical, formalistic, demographically inspired approach. Their theory is different from Durkheim's notions in that it doesn't even address the problem of the "infinity of dreams and desires" as the key intervening variable between social structural breakdown and individual suicide. Their theory is different from Durkheim's in that it is primarily microsociological in focussing on status malintegration, and not societal structures or cultural-historical traditions.

But, in contrast to most contemporary survey research (eg. utilizing Srolian anomia), Gibbs and Martin's approach is refreshingly different in that it is at least truly sociological, utilizing objective indices of inconsistent statuses; it is not mass psychological interviewing masquerading as sociological research. Another virtue of their exploration is that in this stream theoretical formulations and empirical testing are closely intertwined. Finally, their effort is significant because, by returning directly to the original text and elucidating its key propositions, their independent initiative bypassed Parsons and Merton, thus breaking the almost
unquestioned hegemony of the leading structural-functional theorists' orthodox interpretation of anomie.

Halbwachs' reformulation of Durkheim's work carries additional significance here since it is one of the few major studies in this area which undeniably lie in a direct line of continuity with Durkheim himself. In contrast to Parsons' reconstruction of Durkheim's ideas (which remaining Durkheimians seem to have ignored), Halbwachs' work was intimately associated for years with Durkheim. Halbwachs was a key member of the circle gathered around *L'Année sociologique*. But while providing greater balance and extension, what disciples do with their master's ideas cannot always be accredited. Halbwachs' reduction and simplification represents another chapter in the on-going story of the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" of Durkheim's anomie. In order to "live" beyond himself, a founder's ideas must become institutionalized; yet in that very process they are often disassembled, and the integralness of vision, and the multiplicity of resonating levels of meaning which made the original breakthrough so compelling, and which constitutes its revolutionary and lasting significance, ebb away.

In sum, the Halbwachians (including Gibbs and Martin, among others), rightly criticized the rampant ambiguity of many of Durkheim's basic concepts. But rather than attempt to sort through these complexities, they chose instead to settle upon simpler, ahistorical, formalizable propositions promising to yield testable indices. In the sense that they have returned directly to parts of Durkheim's theory itself, those working in this stream can lay claim to represent a legitimate reformulation of an important set of elements in Durkheim's complex thought. However, because they slight so much of the complexity, subtlety, and historical, sociocultural, and phenomenological depths of Durkheim's ideas, this sub-tradition cannot really claim, any more than the other streams, to represent the legitimate development of Durkheim's notions concerning suicide, especially anomie.
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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CHAPTER THREE

MERTONIAN ANOMIE: STRUCTURAL-CULTURAL MALINTEGRATION

Preface. Since Robert K. Merton's notion of anomie remains the most widely known contemporary version, I shall assume intimate knowledge of this essay in the following examination. First, I shall state my basic objections to Merton's version of anomie, especially as they relate to Durkheim's. Next, I shall indicate some of the historical reasons for the success of Merton's schema. Then, I shall outline some of the textual difficulties encountered in a full-scale, systematic exploration of the inner logic and development of Merton's model. Finally, we shall examine in detail the major theses of the paradigm.

Now, Merton's version of anomie mediates between Parsons' purely normative notion and the Halbwachs-Gibbs and Martin structural focus. Proceeding from the Parsonian notion of "strain in The Social System," Merton came to emphasize the "malintegration of goals and means;" or in other words, conflict between cultural mandates and structural opportunities. Hence, the maladjustment of structural means to cultural goals lies at the heart of Mertonian anomie. It should be noted, however, that although Merton seems closer to Durkheim in emphasizing the "infiniteness" of the goals counseled by the American value system, nowhere does Merton fundamentally question the legitimacy of these goals themselves. Certainly, he never portrayed the American success ethic as a sign of the endemic "moral anarchy" of the modern world as did Durkheim. Nor would Merton have admitted, it can be surmised, that our Central Value System is itself anomie! How both Parsons and Merton were able to sidestep these and other critical implications of the very paradigm they borrowed forms a fascinating story, albeit one which we cannot pursue here. Our main con-
cern here is with the inner and shifting logic of Merton's schema, and its relation to Durkheim's original notions.

Now, Dubin (1959), Cloward (1959), and Harary (1966), among others, have offered extensions and elaborations of Merton's anomie schema. Mizruchi (1967), Cohen (1965), Thio (1975), among others, have offered criticisms of Merton's theorizing and empirical support (see chapters four and five of this appendix). In addition to these extensions and criticisms, I shall offer the following essential criticisms:

(a) In terms of the legitimacy of the Mertonians' claim on Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit," I note that Merton's anomie diverges from Durkheim's at many points. Merton is faithful to Durkheim mainly in terms of the anti-reductionistic polemic, the notion in Division of Labor that anomie has to do with structural inequalities, and that the dominant modern value system counsels eternal striving which is destructive. At other critical points, Merton's version runs directly counter to Durkheim's;

(b) More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Merton should have recognized the convergence between his own theorizing on anomie, Durkheim's second schema in which anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned, and Weber's historical insights into the Protestant Ethos. Why Merton did not make these connections remains a great mystery in the history of American sociological theory;

(c) In terms of the internal logic of his schema, Merton's notion of malintegration of goals and means really conceals three different dimensions: integration, legitimacy, and historical position;

(d) In terms of the internal logic of his major category-innovation--Merton's typology actually contains two very different propositions applying to different classes, aspirations, and restraining conditions;

(e) The other categories in Merton's typology rest on eclectic, ad hoc hypotheses, invoked as needed, and unsupported by the theory supposedly anchoring the first two types of responses;

(f) Therefore, not only must Mertonian anomie be sharply distinguished from Durkheim's and the others, but Merton's theory should be set aside as a paradigm of American sociological theorizing. Further, the uncertain fate of Merton's program of anomie serves as a case study refuting his own program and philosophy of science.
A. Merton's Anomie: The Theory and Its Significance

1. The Historical Importance of Merton's Model in American Sociology

Robert King Merton's now classic essay "Social Structure and Anomie," first published in 1938, constitutes the original source from which most contemporary research and theory on anomie flows. If we accept the testimony of Talcott Parsons that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly central concepts of contemporary social science" (1968a:316), then Merton's special theory is surely one of the discipline's most prestigious and imitated works. As one of the principal architects of contemporary American sociology, Merton's extension of his original essay on anomie, incorporated in his prestigious and often reprinted Social Theory and Social Structure, stands almost alone alongside Parsons' "pattern variables" and The Structure of Social Action as classics of contemporary sociological theory, comparable to such continental classics as Durkheim's Suicide and Weber's The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism.

The significance of Merton's pioneering effort may be interpreted on a number of different levels. In a discipline rent by contending factions, Merton's theory of anomie and opportunity structures took on the higher function of serving as an example, perhaps the prototypical illustration in American sociology, of a unifying paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). When sociologists wish to display their wares favorably to wider publics or uninitiated students, there is often a tendency to choose "Social Structure and Anomie" as the example of the best of American sociological theorizing. Thus, Merton's oft-revised essay has gradually attained an honored status beyond that bestowed on common sociology; his model has become a symbol, a true "collective representation" of the sociological enterprise.

The preeminent symbolic status granted Merton's famous essay provides a clue to understand its larger significance. For on this level Merton's schema is significant because it
mid-century sociologists with a dual model: both an explanation, a master hypothesis, a paradigm in the sense of content, and a manner of theorizing, a stylistic mode, a paradigm of a paradigm in the sense of a form to be emulated. Those familiar with Merton's theory of anomie commonly retain two "after-images." The first memory is that of content—a specific theory based on the image of strain in the social system resulting when opportunity structures restrict access to mandated cultural achievement. The second image retained is that of a certain style of sociological theorizing which appeared to convey clarity, consistency, and a degree of logical elegance and power previously rare in the discipline. American sociological theory around mid-century stood desperately in need of cogently articulated, yet simple, master hypotheses, and Merton's essay seemed to answer this need. One observer suggests that the response of American social scientists was "quick and enthusiastic, sociology was now new born" (B. Nelson, 1964:138).

In addition, Merton's theory offered remedies to sociologists on a number of other levels. First, as a theory concerned with normative and structural breakdowns and resulting deviance, it claimed to offer a basic explanation of the critical social problems confronting an America beset by the Depression crisis. Since American sociology grew out of pragmatically oriented social reform movements, Merton's paradigm not only resonated with these feelings but also seemed to offer a theoretical crystallization and justification of efforts toward social amelioration. Second, as a preeminent example of "middle-range" theory, Merton's schema served to link the relatively isolated micro-sociological and pragmatic point of view of American sociology with the deeper, more abstract and more historical theories of continental sociological theorists, especially Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The nascent American sociological tradition with its heavy emphasis on pragmatic social action and relatively primitive development of theory, now seemed doubly reborn by its new and seemingly intimate links with the best of continental sociological theory. All in all, Merton's schema seemed, both at the time and in re-
trospect, to constitute a major breakthrough in sociological theory and practice, and thus a minor revolution in social scientific thought (Kuhn, 1962).

While affirming its historical significance, can we today grant Merton's theory the same high honor as before? Can Merton's theory stand up under close critical scrutiny? How and why did "Social Structure and Anomie" come to be accepted so widely and implicitly as a prototype of sociological theorizing? Does the structure and logic of Merton's propositions deserve such fame? Can it be legitimately maintained that Merton's theory of anomie stands directly in the mainline of the tradition stemming from Durkheim? And, finally, what does the development of Mertonian anomie in terms of his own elaborations, revisions, various extensions by others, critiques, and Merton's responses, empirical applications and testing, reveal about the viability of Merton's own program for sociological theory and his philosophy of science? We shall explore these and other related questions in the following sections on Merton's anomie.

2. Textual Problems in Interpreting Merton's Anomie

Anyone attempting to systematically analyze the internal structure of Merton's famous paradigm will encounter various textual problems. The first major problem barring a single simple interpretation is that one is confronted with numerous additions and variations on the central theme coming from the hand of Merton himself. Once one begins to immerse oneself in these documents one discovers a bewildering plethora of installments of "Social Structure and Anomie." As Stephen Cole (1975) remarks, Merton's efforts are better considered as a "research program" than a single article. Therefore, these documents may be divided into primary and secondary materials.

First among the primary documents is Merton's original essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which appeared in 1938 in the fledgling American Sociological Review. Then comes his 1949 extension and revision of the same article which first appeared in Merton's equally famous collection of essays So-
cial Theory and Social Structure. The third well-known primary document is Merton's supplementary essay "Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie" which first appeared in a revised edition of Merton's book in 1957. But even among primary materials there are additional but lesser known productions which should be consulted. In chronological order they are: transcripts of a talk and discussion on juvenile delinquency in which Merton participated in 1955 and which was published in 1956; Merton's review in 1959 of criticisms and extensions by Cloward and Dubin entitled "Social Conformity, Deviation, and Opportunity Structures;" and finally his 1964 review essay "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction: Contexts of Deviant Behavior."

In addition, the following must be listed among secondary materials in Merton's writings which are directly relevant to issues raised here: a short section in Merton's essay on "Sociological Theory" in his collected essays Social Theory and Social Structure summarizing what Merton took to be the essence of Durkheim's paradigm in Suicide; Merton's introduction to Part One of the same book; and his lengthy and often revised essay on "Social Problems and Sociological Theory," written as an epilogue to the volume on Contemporary Social Problems (1960, 1966, 1971, 1976) which Merton co-edited with Robert Nisbet.

Thus any serious investigator is faced not with just one short article, but rather with at least six primary installments of the same basic theme, and in addition, a number of secondary materials directly relevant which could be supplemented by a host of peripheral references scattered throughout the rest of Merton's works. Undertaking analysis of Merton's evolving theory of anomie and social structure is no simple task. One must be especially sensitive to different emphases, corrections, gaps, and shifts in the grounds of argument.

But the difficulties due to the bewildering assortment of Merton's writings relating to anomie (which reveal Merton, appearances to the contrary, as perhaps not the best example
of a systematic theorist but rather as a talented essayist) carry a redeeming virtue. The evident advantage afforded the sociological public by Merton's variations on his theme is that we are here presented with an opportunity of studying in-depth a central sociological schema as it evolved over four decades. We can watch, for example, as Merton continually reworked his essay, attempting to fill in gaps, and iron out the inconsistencies in response to critics. This unique opportunity to plumb the inner workings and changes of Merton's theory of anomie should lead to an important case-study in the development of theory and the history of social science, and serve as a test case for various hypotheses about the growth of science.

A second problem faced by explorers in these regions concerns certain evident gaps in Merton's various installments of his theory. Merton himself in his reply (1959:188) to Cloward and Dubin acknowledged that "blind spots" occasionally plague his attempts at systematic theorizing. Further, Cohen observes that a number of the more serious gaps in the theory of "Social Structure and Anomie" could be remedied by borrowing insights and concepts from other parts of Merton's own writings. In addition to any scholarly obligations to perform a complete survey, another reason for familiarity with the rest of Merton's work is to help correct the misleading impressions inevitably given by close readings of Merton's schema, since he could have himself corrected several gaps by simply drawing upon insights from other parts of his own work. Instead of asserting that Merton did not perceive these crucial factors which might have been omitted from his famous theory, it is perhaps better to say that Merton did not perceive them in this present context at least, for whatever reason. In any case, such "blind spots" do exist.

A third major problem concerns related inconsistencies in Merton's schema. Perhaps no intellectual, even those who propose their work as paradigms of systematic theory, can flawlessly fashion his work without gaps and internal incon-
sistencies. Yet this endemic problem is exacerbated by the relatively non-systematic character of Merton's theorizing, appearances aside. For as we shall soon discover, Merton's famous theory contains not one simple proposition but rather two! Essentially, the first proposition suggests that inordinate emphasis on culturally mandated success goals swamps out legitimate institutional means of achievement. The second is the more famous proposition—namely, that differential access of different groups to legitimate institutional channels of upward mobility generates anomie, in the sense of normative confusion, and leads to deviancy. And the remaining categories in Merton's typology are based upon still different, and often eclectic, series of propositions. The fact that Merton never systematically distinguished between his two basic propositions, or recognized that he had introduced ad hoc hypotheses to cover the rest of the typology complicates matters further.

Among additional problems facing us here is the curious fact that Merton so rarely explicitly defined anomie, nor did he explicitly review Durkheim's usage. To apologize for Merton's "under-citation" of Durkheim, as Stephen Cole (1975:187) does, because Suicide is so well known that it was not necessary is unacceptable. For it is simply not true that Durkheim's suicide typology was well known to American sociologists when Merton published in 1938 and 1949 his original and revised versions of "Social Structure and Anomie." How could it be since Suicide was not even translated until 1951, and we are still debating its meaning and significance? The truth of the matter is that most American sociologists came to view Durkheim and anomie through Parsons' and Merton's eyes; and Parsons' distortion and Merton's undercitation were essential strategies in this transfer of charisma. At best, Merton appears to have indirectly derived his first proposition on innovative deviancy from Durkheim's emphasis on modern drives for progress and perfection and the discussion of the anomie division of labor and structured inequalities in The Division of Labor. The general theoretical framework, however, came
not from Durkheim, but from Parsons' functional theory, with the constant addition of large doses of Merton's own characteristic insight and style. There are, of course, great differences between Durkheim's anomie and Merton's, for the former was not so much interested in cross-pressures or malintegration of the social system as he was concerned with the ravages of absolutizing individualism and insatiability. Parsons was far more concerned than Durkheim with anomie as confusion in the relational sector of The Social System. And even Parsons rejected (1968:317) sole identification of anomie with Merton's notion of problems with the "instrumental system" of society and culture.

Hence, if anomie generally has become a protean concept, then Merton's shifting development of his own theory of anomie is just as difficult to keep in clear and constant focus. It appears that Merton's schema conveys at once too much or too little. If his theory rests on the fairly simple thesis that certain groups' lack of access to structures of opportunity contributes to frustration and perhaps deviance, then it might prove less troublesome, with certain qualifications. But surely in that case one need not elaborate an entire typology and complex theory, nor claim that this schema explains all sorts of rule-breaking and other behaviors. This is far too much. On the other hand, if, as Merton has often claimed, his key proposition is not the specific one about blocked opportunity but rather the more general, abstract thesis about malintegration of cultural goals and structural means, then his schema is far too sketchy to explain all it claims. Even Merton has acknowledged that his theory is incomplete as a systematic explanation of all rule-breaking behaviors. Either way Merton appears in a bind, presenting us with too much or too little. Perhaps without undue irony we might call this the bind of the middle-range theorist.
3. The Mertonians' Claim to Durkheim's Charisma-on-Deposit

Let us briefly consider here the genealogy of anomie and try to evaluate the claim of the Mertonians to legitimate derivation of their anomie from Durkheim. The first basic fact to recall is that Merton's theory of malintegration of means and ends was fundamentally influenced by Parsons' generalized theory of malintegration in The Social System. In the 1930's, Merton was a student and then a colleague of Parsons at Harvard. Parsons had just finished his own classic The Structure of Social Action, and he acknowledged Merton's assistance in reviewing the manuscript. And now through his interpretation of Durkheim and anomie, Parsons influenced another classic--Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie."

In addition, Merton appears to have derived some influence directly from Durkheim's work itself. For Merton published two independent studies on Durkheim in 1934: a critical analysis of "Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society" (1934a), and an essay on "Recent French Sociology" (1934b). In retrospect, Merton appears to have derived more influence from Durkheim's views on the anomic and forced divisions of labor in The Division of Labor than from Durkheim's usage of anomie in Suicide. Perhaps Merton took his lead here from Durkheim's suggestion in The Division of Labor that the anomic and forced divisions of labor depends on the elimination of social inequalities in the distribution and inheritance of occupational opportunities, and from Durkheim's description in The Rules of the "... cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation" (Merton, 1938:673,#3). Blending these diverse intellectual sources, then, Merton presented a highly original schema of his own which was destined to become one of the foundation paradigms of contemporary sociology.

Now, let us briefly consider the claims of Mertonians to legitimate development of Durkheim's notion of anomie. While Merton does not explicitly claim this as either his intention or achievement, there are numerous passages in the various installments of his essay which implicitly suggest that
"this" was indeed what Durkheim had in mind. In his 1964 review of the present state of anomie research, Merton briefly traced the history of the concept from Durkheim through himself to others. In addition, the appendix to that same volume, prepared by Merton's then students Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman, explicitly linked Durkheim's anomie with Merton as his successor (see also S. Cole, 1975). The general image presented by Merton and his followers in works on social theory, on anomie and deviance, in textbooks and readers, and so forth, is an unquestioned confidence that Merton has legitimately developed the essence of Durkheim's ideas. In a typical essay, Richard Cloward claims that his well-known essay: 

... represents an attempt to consolidate two major sociological traditions of thought about the problem of deviant behavior. The first, exemplified by the work of Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton, may be called the anomie tradition.... The theory of anomie has undergone two major phases of development. Durkheim first used the concept to explain deviant behavior. He focussed on the way in which various social conditions lead to "overweening" ambition," and how, in turn, unlimited aspirations ultimately produce a breakdown in regulatory norms.... While Durkheim confined his application of anomie chiefly to suicide, Merton sought to explain not only suicide but crime, delinquency, mental disorder, alcoholism, drug addiction, and many other phenomena (1959:164-5).

On the other hand, more than one observer has noted divergence between Durkheim's notion of anomie and Merton's usage of the concept. Cloward's remarks also indicate a growing sensitivity to some of the important differences between Durkheim's and Merton's ideas.

Unlike Durkheim, Merton did not consider man's biological nature to be important in explaining deviation; what Durkheim considered the innate drives of man, such as ambition to achieve unattainable objectives, Merton felt were induced by the social structure (1959:165).

Here Cloward notes some crucial transitions from Durkheim to Merton: Durkheim had an image of human nature which was central to his theory of anomie but which disappears in Merton's revision; and whereas Durkheim located insatiability in the organic ego, Merton located insatiable ambitions in social pressures.
Merton himself later acknowledged in an off-hand way that here was a crucial difference between his ideas about anomie and Durkheim's. In 1968, in a discussion of the pressure on prize winners in science to outstrip their previous achievements, Merton downgrades the notion that it is "... their own Faustian aspirations [which] are ever-escalating that keeps eminent scientists at work." Merton admits: "This process of a socially reinforced rise in aspirations, as distinct from Durkheim's concept of the "insatiability of wants" is examined" (in Merton, 1973:442, #12) in Merton's 1964 essay. And in that 1964 essay Merton remarked:

Social pressures do not easily permit those who have climbed the rugged mountains of success to remain content; there is no rest for the weary. In short, it is not only that their own Faustian aspirations are ever-escalating, becoming unlimited and insatiable, and so, even when achieved, landing them no nearer to heaven (the point Durkheim seized upon). It is also that ... more and more is expected of these men by others and this creates its own measure of stress. Less often than one might believe, is there room for repose at the top (1964:221).

Thus, we now have Merton's own word that his notion of anomie as generated by social pressures is different from Durkheim's where insatiability was generated by the release of the passions of the organic ego from social constraint in the modern era. Now, in a sense, in this dissertation we are making a move similar to Merton's by shifting the location of Durkheimian insatiability from the organic ego (schema one) to the very social and cultural structure (schema two) which Merton so brilliantly anatomized.

Besides this growing acknowledgment from the Mertonian camp that Merton's anomie is different from Durkheim's, other observers have also registered their recognition of this important divergence. Here we cite only a few representative objections. For instance, in an insightful but highly polemical article, John Horton argued that the critical thrust of Durkheim's notion of anomie has been lost.

Contemporary definitions of anomie and alienation have confused, obscured and changed the classical meanings of these concepts. Alienation for Marx and anomie for
Durkheim were metaphors for a radical attack on the dominant institutions and values of industrial society.... The politically and essentially conservative content of his [Merton's] definition is apparent when it is compared with that of Durkheim. Anomie, defined as a disjunction between the success goal and legitimate opportunities to achieve success, may very well be a socially structured discontent in American society, yet Merton's anomie differs from that of Durkheim's in one crucial respect—in its identification with the very groups and values which Durkheim saw as the prime source of anomie in industrial societies. For Durkheim, anomie was endemic in such societies not only because of inequality in the conditions of competition, but, more importantly, because self-interested striving had been raised to social ends. The institutionalization of self-interest meant the legitimization of anarchy and amorality.... To maximize opportunities for achieving success would in no way end anomie. Durkheim questioned the very values which Merton holds constant (1964:283, 294-5).

In an equally tendentious article, Turner and Scott (1965) offer the ingenious yet unconvincing argument that Mertonian anomie bears more resemblance to Weber's basic types of social action than to Durkheim's anomie. "As used by Merton, 'anomie,' we believe, has little resemblance to Durkheim's concept; rather, Merton's formulation is best understood as a continuation of Weber's work" (1965:233). "Merton's essay ... bears scant relevance to Durkheim" (1965:236). In contrast to Durkheim's notion of the sudden disharmony of expectations and fulfillment, they argue that Merton's anomie rests on an enduring condition—the unending pursuit of success. "A fundamental difference between Merton's and Durkheim's conception of anomie emerges: Merton conceives of anomie as a chronic condition; Durkheim, as an acute fracturing in the social world" (1965:234).

The similarity between Durkheim's long-run conception of anomie and Merton's conception is superficial. Durkheim pictured long-term changes in social life leaving individuals unsure of where they stood or how to proceed, whereas Merton is postulating social actors who internalize on the one hand values, and on the other, norms relating to their achievement only to find that they do not have a matching set (1965:235, #6).

Also in 1965, McClosky and Schaar observed:

Discarding Durkheim's concept of man as a bundle of passions which can be tamed only by social restraints, he examines the actual social pressures upon persons to vio-
late the accepted codes. He retains Durkheim's definition of relative normlessness in a society, but offers a revised statement of its causes. Whereas Durkheim held specifically that anomie was produced by an economic ethic which removed all limits from greed, Merton sees anomie as the result of "a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of the members to act in accord with them" (1965:15).

In a reflective and useful article, Ephraim Mizruchi (1967) argues that there are basic differences between Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie.

A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie suggests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's and that this difference leads to varying hypotheses. Merton's conception of anomie is one of a condition in society in which there is a disjunction between socially mandated goals and the means by which these goals are pursued. Durkheim's emphasis, however, in his theory of anomie was on the unrealizable goals which characterized periods of prosperity and upward mobility (1967:439-40).

G. Duncan Mitchell, in his Dictionary of Sociology (1968) distinguishes the following connotations of anomie:

[Anomie refers to] any state where there are unclear, conflicting, or unintegrated norms in which the individual had no morally significant relations with others or in which there were no limits set to the attainment of pleasure.... R. Merton uses the term to refer to a state in which socially prescribed goals and the norms governing their attainment are incompatible.... In most attempts to make anomie measurable (eg. Srole), emphasis is placed on lack of clarity in goals and norms or upon the absence of social ties. All such attempts involve a more restricted use of the concept than Durkheim's which was related to a philosophical conception of human nature.

Further, it is most significant that in his definitive intellectual biography of Durkheim, Steven Lukes mentions Merton's name only once in passing. Lukes' comprehensive bibliography of writings on Durkheim contains Merton's two 1934 articles, but does not refer to Merton's famous "Social Structure and Anomie" (Lukes, 1973:608).

Alex Thio (1975) remarks of the difference between Durkheim and Merton:

Contrary to many sociologists' belief, Merton's theory is not a pure reformulation of Durkheim's concept of ano-
mety. In examining Merton's analysis, one is hard put to find any genuine resemblance between Merton's and Durkheim's concepts of anomie. In fact, Merton's concept of anomie is a perversion of Durkheim's; Merton sees the poor as more likely to suffer from anomie while Durkheim views the rich as more likely to be victims of anomie (1975:156).

Concerned with the class bias in theories of deviance (Thio, 1972), he seriously questions Merton's assertion that lower-class persons are more likely than upper-class persons to suffer from an aspiration-opportunity disjunction and therefore are more subject to greater pressure toward deviation.

Teevan (1975) suggests that we develop different questions on scales to test for Durkheimian as contrasted with Mertonian anomie (eg. 1975:169). Simon and Gagnon (1976) observe both that Merton's anomie differs from Durkheim's, and that the latter's rested on an image of human nature as inherently insatiable.

It is important to point out that there is, in fact, only a limited intellectual continuity between the majority of the modern users of the concept of anomie and Durkheim. Both Parsons and Merton, who share responsibility for introducing the idea into American sociology, do severe violence to the integrity of the original ideas expressed by Durkheim by selectively abstracting elements from the original text (1976:358).

That a number have questioned, from various theoretical and empirical perspectives, the relation of Mertonian anomie to Durkheimian anomie, and further, that the definitive intellectual biography of Durkheim contains no bibliographical reference to Merton's essays, should suffice to raise the critical question of the degree of legitimacy of the claim of Merton and the structural-functional school to the proper title of Durkheim's heirs. The problem of ascertaining the legitimacy of Merton's claims is exacerbated by a number of other factors due to Merton himself. First, Merton never explicitly defined anomie, offering only indirect synonyms such as "mal-integration," "disjunction," or "cultural chaos," and so on. Indeed, Merton never explicitly discussed Durkheim's concept or usage of anomie. Incredibly, Merton never even mentioned The Division of Labor or Suicide in his essays on anomie!
In the original 1938 installment of "Social Structure and Anomie," Merton simply introduced the term "anomie," without explanation or reference to Durkheim's ideas or writings, or even Parsons' interpretations which were published the previous year. At this time Merton didn't even use quotation marks to denote a special or unfamiliar term, but took it for granted that all understood the intended connotation. Since Durkheim's *Suicide* had not yet been translated, this left most American sociologists dependent on Parsons' or Merton's secondary accounts and usages. In the later 1949 revision, Merton added "normlessness" in parentheses as an apparent, but vague, synonym for what Durkheim called "anomie." Besides these omissions, Merton later added the following curious footnote:

Durkheim's resurrection of the term "anomie" which, so far as I know, first appears in approximately the same sense in the late sixteenth century, might well become the object of an investigation by a student interested in the historical filiation of ideas.... The word "anomie" (or anomy or anomia) has lately come into frequent use, once it was reintroduced by Durkheim. Why the resonance in contemporary society (1957:135, #6)?

Coupled with the curious fact that Durkheim's specific usages of anomie in *Suicide* were never formally acknowledged, we next see Merton recommending that someone else undertake a study of the historical philology of the term "anomie"! Should not Merton himself have at least aided such an important exploration by systematically and explicitly relating his version of anomie to the thinker from whom he borrowed it?

In his follow-up essay of 1957, Merton mentioned, for the first time, what he thinks Durkheim meant by anomie.

As initially developed by Durkheim, the concept of anomie referred to a condition of relative normlessness in a society or group. Durkheim made it clear that this concept referred to a property of the social and cultural structure, not to a property of individuals confronting that structure. Nevertheless, as the utility of the concept for understanding diverse forms of deviant behavior became evident, it was extended to refer to a condition of individuals rather than of their environment (1957:161).

Here we see Merton invoking Durkheim's charisma only to put down the psychological interpretations of anomie. Merton ne-
ther analyzes Durkheim's ideas, nor spends much time on them. Doesn't it seem strange that Merton, so careful a historical scholar, who just recommended a study on the historical semantics of this famous concept of anomie which he borrowed, should give so little attention himself to Durkheim's real ideas?

Now, there is one other passage by Merton, buried in an essay on sociological theory written in 1945, and reprinted in his Social Theory and Social Structure as "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research" in which he attempts to lay out in paradigmatic form the essential model underlying Durkheim's notion of anomie. As far as I have been able to determine, this passage represents Merton's most explicit and systematic statement of his interpretation of the meaning of Durkheim's schemas.

To exhibit the relations of empirical generalizations to theory, and to set forth the functions of theory, it may be useful to examine a familiar case in which such generalizations were incorporated into a body of substantive theory. Thus, it has long been established as a statistical uniformity that in a variety of populations, Catholics had a lower suicide rate than Protestants. In this form, the uniformities posed a theoretical problem. It merely constituted an empirical regularity which would become significant for theory only if it could be derived from a set of other propositions, a task which Durkheim set for himself. If we restate his theoretic analysis in formal fashion, the paradigm of his theoretic analysis becomes clear:

(1) Social cohesion provides psychic support to group members subjected to acute stress and anxieties;

(2) Suicide rates are functions of unrelieved anxieties and stresses to which persons are subjected;

(3) Catholics have greater social cohesion than Protestants;

(4) Therefore, lower suicide rates should be anticipated among Catholics than among Protestants (1957:92-3).

Even though the theory outlined here is offered only as an illustration, it is interesting to compare its "thinness" with the rich and multi-layered exegesis which we have set out in Books One, Two, and Three in this dissertation. Here, Merton's logic is simply structural condition favors and represses a psychological condition. One could question the usefulness of
such a simple model; in any case, it should be clear that Merton's brief reconstruction of the logic underlying Durkheim's schemas in Suicide bears little resemblance to the actual logics-in-use. Even the image of greater or less structural integration, seized upon mainly by the Halbwachian stream, represents a radical truncation of Durkheim's theses. One could question, in addition, the tacit notion that Catholics and Protestants are universally subjected to the same stresses and unrelieved anxieties; that Durkheim started out puzzling over certain statistical regularities in suicide rates, and then constructed a theory to fit them, and so on.

Even the image projected by Merton that his theory represents the epitome of a social structural theory, like Durkheim's, is partially misleading. For Merton's anomie is a crucial stage in the social psychologization of anomie. Although his basic paradigm includes all three basic elements—culture, social structure, and personality—Merton's central concern has often been with the boundaries between social structure and personality (see B. Nelson, 1972b). Although Merton claims to be following in Durkheim's footsteps in offering a social structural explanation of deviance, he seemed to irretrievably gravitate toward his own natural level of interest—the abstracted micro-level latent functional theory of status and role. It is not surprising, therefore, that post-Mertonian anomie (see the following chapters) has shifted even farther down the theoretical scale, and has gradually become synonymous with a subjective psychological condition of individuals. The additional irony in this untoward development is that Merton is generally less concerned with subjective psychological and phenomenological notions than he is with latent structural functions for individuals. Merton himself noted this shift in levels in anomie theory and research:

... as the utility of the concept for understanding diverse forms of deviant behavior became evident, it was extended to refer to a condition of individuals rather than of their environment. This psychological concep-
tion of anomie has been simultaneously formulated by R.M. MacIver and David Riesman.... "Anomy is a state of mind in which the individual's sense of social cohesion--the mainspring of his morale--is broken or fatally weakened" [MacIver].... But the psychological concept is nevertheless a counterpart of the sociological concept of anomie, and not a substitute for it (1957:161-2).

(See also the following section on Merton's responses to criticism and extensions of anomie). Merton then continues:

An effort has been made to catch up the psychological and sociological concepts in a distinction between "simple" and "acute" anomie [eg. S. deGrazia]. Simple anomie refers to a state of confusion in a group of society which is subject to conflict between value-systems, resulting in some degree of uneasiness and a sense of separation from the group; acute anomie, to the deterioration and, at the extreme, the disintegration of value systems, which result in marked anxieties. This has the merit of terminologically ear-marking the often stated but sometimes neglected fact that, like other conditions of society, anomie differs in degree and perhaps in kind (1957:163).

Teevan (1975), noting this distinction, proposed that we develop scales to test for an individual's perception of his own anomie, as contrasted with his perception of the anomie of the larger society. The curious fact about this is that Merton has done, perhaps, more than any other thinker to advance the social psychologization of anomie.

Although certain diffuse relations can be discerned between Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie, Merton fundamentally shifts the ground of argument. Mertonian anomie leads not only to different hypotheses than found in Durkheim's work, but in a number of significant ways fundamentally reverses Durkheim's meanings, and stands in direct contradiction to Durkheim's theory. This is seen most clearly in terms of Merton and Durkheim's differing views on the relations between anomie and poverty. Whereas Durkheim considered poverty as protection against anomie and suicide because it restrained insatiable ambitions, Merton proposes that anomie as blocked aspirations on the part of the lower classes leads to deviance. One considers poverty as protection against anomie strivings, the other considers poverty and blocked aspir-
ations to be the cause of anomie! Specifically, Durkheim always conceived of anomie as implying egoism and insatiability, whatever its causes. The opposite of anomie in Durkheim's typology was fatalisme— a type of traditional passive resignation to one's assigned fate. In other words, many contemporary sociologists have come to use the term anomie to refer to the precisely opposite condition which Durkheim labelled fatalisme. Characteristically, Durkheim considered poverty to be protection against anomie—that is, against the insatiable ambitions of the drives for "progress and perfection."

Mizruchi especially (see also Thio, 1975, among others) has observed this glaring difference between Durkheim and Merton as they conceptualized the relations between anomie, aspiration, poverty, and suicide.

According to Durkheim, poverty is a restraining force in relation to anomie. It is the lifting of limitations on aspirations which reflects Durkheim's major concern with anomie rather than the utilization of illegitimate means for the achievement of given ends (1967:440).

Comparing the "infinity of dreams and desires" of progressive classes with the lesser aspirations of lower classes, Durkheim himself proposed:

Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent... So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, it prepares us to accept collective discipline with equanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten (S:254).
In sum, even though Merton starts out at roughly the same place as Durkheim—namely, emphasizing the insatiability of the dominant cultural values—his development of the notion of anomie quickly diverges from Durkheim's. Merton rarely questions the moral legitimacy of these values, as did Durkheim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber. Both Durkheim and Weber took up highly critical stances toward the very values which Merton appears to have taken for granted. Merton accepts these goals as givens, and then shifts attention from ends to means, from cultural values to structural opportunities. In a phrase, what is anomie to Durkheim, and an "iron cage" to Max Weber, signifies the normal moral consensus to Merton!

Thus, we must not fail to notice that the force of Merton's essay derives as much from the historical background as from the abstracted typology. For Merton emphasizes that cultural goals may grow so overwhelming that their force swamps out the restraining action of legitimate means of achievement, resulting in his type of anomic innovation. The historically specific application of this drama of malintegration is, of course, American society and culture, where the content of our cultural goals (i.e. the American Dream) convey such an exaggerated and inordinate emphasis on the individual "cult of success." Remember that Durkheim was concerned with this cult of the individual and the corresponding cult of "progress and perfection," and Merton begins where Durkheim ends. Yet it seems that Merton implicitly accepts the egoism and insatiability inherent in the standard American value system. He gives us a "Social Structure and Anomie," and a Social Theory and Social Structure, but what we also desperately need is a Cultural Theory and Cultural Structure building on Durkheim and Weber. Nowhere does Merton indicate the possibility that these dominant cultural values and goals may be illegitimate in themselves. The only possibility presented by Merton is legitimate goals vis-a-vis legitimate and non-legitimate means. Yet the deeper question of the moral legitimacy of the dominant goals of the modern world was precisely the problem over
which Durkheim and Weber agonized. In Merton's world, as in Parsons', however, it seems that since whatever cultural goals are given are legitimate almost by functional definition, little can go wrong with that society as long as the means to those ends are also legitimate and approved, and the goals retain their clarity and compellingness. The pathology of anomie for Merton represents problems of social mechanics and not, as with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central cultural goals and basic institutions of the modern world.

Hence, we witness the narrowness of Merton's social psychological framework in contrast to the scope of the progenitors of the ideas with which he worked. For Durkheim and Weber argued both from inside a deeply historical and comparative sociocultural framework, and from the perspective of a view of human nature. The ultimate force of Durkheim's *Suicide* and Weber's *Protestant Ethic* ... theses rest on their perceptions of the destructive modern psycho-socio-cultural demands made upon human nature. Using these tacit, embedded images of human nature as their anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot stand up alone under an "infinity of dreams and desires" (suicide and ecocide being the inevitable result), while Weber argued that attempts by self-proclaimed "visible saints" to master world, self, and society for God's glory and to build His Kingdom here on earth, now, binds all of us in an inexorably tightening "iron cage." Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the very hearts and souls of modern men.

What Merton did to Durkheim's anomie, and then what other sociologists have done in turn to Merton's anomie can perhaps be best described as a rather typical illustration of the general process characterizing the breakthrough and subsequent breakdown of central paradigms used in the "normal science" of any discipline. In sum, the critical historical shifts in the routinization and trivialization of the "charisma on deposit" represented by Durkheim's anomie in the context of American sociological theory came in two main phases. First, we see a shift from a macro level sociocultural histori-
ical and comparative analysis and critique to a micro ahistorical social psychological level of analysis. Second, we witness a shift away from a fundamental critique of the very social and cultural foundations of the modern world to a remedial, ameliorist perspective in sociology and in the politics of the welfare state.

For these and other reasons found herein, it is my judgment that there are compelling reasons for rejecting claims associating the names of Merton or Parsons or the structural-functional school as the legitimate heirs of Durkheimian anomie and Durkheimian sociology.


In the first part of "Social Structure and Anomie," after announcing his program of discovering social pressures toward deviance, Merton sets out his central theme of the malintegration of culturally mandated goals and operating institutional means. Although Merton offered us an elaborate typology, it is interesting to note that his first real concern was not with abstracted possibilities but with the specific pressures put upon individuals in the context of American society. These pressures to achieve individual success become so absolutized that eventually some may be tempted to use any technically efficient means to achieve the culturally mandated end. Here Merton thought he had detected a key flaw, a "fault" in the social system—a structurally induced pressure toward the erosion of legitimate operating norms, and a relapse into purely individualistic and Utilitarian-pragmatic moralities of thought and logics of action. In other words, when the "strain" between cultural and structural systems becomes too great, some individuals lapse back into the egoisms and insatiabilities of the Hobbesian state of nature.

One of the problems facing such an interpretive perspective may be that such a situation represents not so much a generic possibility (for one must entertain a Utilitarian image of man in that case), as a situation historically most preva-
lent in Anglo-American society. Despite its appealing reason-
ableness, surely such a proposition is misleading as an ex-
planation of social action, anomie and deviance in a society
where Utilitarian or Pragmatic "moralties of thought and lo-
gics of action" are dominant in the first place.

To say that cultural goals and institutionalized norms
operate jointly to shape prevailing practices is not to
say that they bear a constant relation to one another.
The cultural emphasis placed upon certain goals varies
independently of the degree of emphasis upon institu-
tionalized means. There may develop a very heavy, at
times a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of
particular goals, involving comparatively little con-
cern with the institutionally prescribed means of stri-
ing toward these goals. The limiting case of this type
is reached when the range of alternative procedures is
governed only by technical rather than by institutional
norms. Any and all procedures which promise attainment
of the all-important goal would be permitted in this hy-
pothetical polar case. This constitutes one type of mal-
integrated culture (1957:133).

Of course, Merton's first pole of cultural-structural malin-
tegration representing the purely personal and pragmatic pur-
suit of success can be seen as a translation of the "Hobbesian
problem" into the context of American society. But there's a
twist involved here apparently unperceived by Merton and oth-
ers; for Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or absence of
restraining norms in the context of the Puritan rebellion and
the English Civil War, while Merton's anomic context is the
consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms.

Now, Merton assumes that, in his abstractly defined so-
ciety, the generic "normal" case is that goals and means are
well integrated. He further assumes that if the operating means
come to be seen solely in terms of self-interested calculations
of technical efficiency that this constitutes one type of so-
ciocultural malintegration. Then what shall we say of our own
society, where the dominant values are themselves Utilitarian,
Pragmatic, and individualist? By Merton's definition, it would
seem that this state of "malintegration" would be both "normal"
and "abnormal." How could this be? This inconsistency means,
in turn, either that Merton's abstracted theoretical assump-
tions are incorrect, or his empirical reflections misleading.
But this apparent inconsistency raises a paradoxical question: are certain types of malintegration in certain societies to be considered "normal"? Remember, Durkheim used the idea of anomie as he agonized over the "moral anarchy" of the modern world, a type of anarchy which he saw as "chronic." Can certain types of anarchy be normal?

It is important to recognize that Merton's focus on the extraordinary emphasis placed upon success goals in American society directly corresponds to Durkheim's concern with the modern drives for "progress and perfection" which are "daily represented as virtues," and which lead to the "infinity of dreams and desires" lying at the heart of the chronic "moral anarchy" plaguing the modern world. However, it is significant that Merton nowhere explicitly draws the connection. For instance, after the preceding passage, Merton refers not to Durkheim but to Andre Siegfried.

Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in this direction (see Andre Siegfried, America Comes of Age). The alleged (?) extreme emphasis on goals of monetary success and material prosperity leads to dominant concern with technological and social instruments designed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institutional controls become of secondary importance. In such a situation, innovation flourishes as the range of means employed is broadened.... There occurs the paradoxical emergence of "materialists" from an "idealistic" orientation. Cf. Durkheim's analysis of the cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms.... See Les Regles... (1938:673, #3).

Besides noting that this passage was deleted in the revision, we are led to wonder why Merton would use double emphasis to question Siegfried's (and others) description of the American drive for success by using the word "alleged" (as if it signified the accusation of a crime, not yet proven, about which Merton wishes to retain innocence until overwhelming evidence established guilt), and then add a question mark after it. Is not the very crux of Merton's own thesis also that Americans put such overwhelming emphasis on individual success that the legitimate avenues of achievement are ever-widened and sanctions attenuated?
In addition, we should not fail to notice that Merton admits into the discussion an important historical insight into American society, properly coming from Weber, when he speaks of the "paradoxical emergence of 'individualists' from an 'idealistic' orientation." Recognition of this historical paradox underlying the foundations of American morality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of the historical origins and constitutive processes of Durkheim's anomie and egoisme, as they relate to Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis. Even Merton himself tacitly suggests that this dominant pragmatic attitude of functional rationality, seemingly devoid of visible ethical foundation, could have had its origin in a deeply idealistic orientation demanding absolute individualism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, insatiable or unending drives for progress and perfection in this world, and the active, consensual mastery of the natural givenness of world, self, and society for God's glory; in short, the basic elements of the Protestant ethos. The resonances in these passages with Weber's themes are certainly striking. For Merton has just defined a state of sociocultural malintegration which is synonymous with a culture dominated by Utilitarian logics and cultural operating rationales! Merton himself had just finished his Weberian analysis of the Utilitarian culture of early modern English science (1936, 1972). Yet, as with Durkheim, Merton nowhere explicitly linked his insights in this regard to Weber's. It is most surprising, due either to conceptual "blind spots" or ideological defensiveness, that both Merton and Parsons, though close at many points, somehow neglected or refused to connect Durkheim's explanation of anomie and egoisme as proceeding from modern sanctions for "progress and perfection" with the never-ending functional rationalization of the world described and explained by Weber.
5. The Underlying Schematic Structure of Merton's Typology

After indicating the pragmatic, individualist pole of sociocultural malintegration, Merton outlines the opposite pole which he terms "ritualism."

A second polar type is found in groups where activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. Stability is largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of alternative behaviors is severely limited. There develops a tradition bound, sacred society characterized by neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat is a case in point (1938:673).

Now, what Merton has done here is to begin to outline the underlying schemas of cultural and institutional integration. At the polar extremes of these continuums we find: (a) Merton's first type of anomie where the ends are strong and the means weak, (b) ritualism, where the ends are weak and the means strong. Merton's first implicit continuum also suggests a mid-point where the integration of means and ends are at an optimum level of integration. Since Merton's typology probably evolved through a series of elaboration of these dichotomies, it is possible that he was so intrigued by the logical appearance of the final product that he neglected to mention the original points of departure or the process of development. Merton's first continuum of integration may be schematically represented in the following manner:

![Figure 7: Merton's Initial Schema](image)

Integration of Ends and Means

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<thead>
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<th>Integration of Ends and Means</th>
<th>Merton's Initial Schema</th>
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<tr>
<td>optimum high/low balance low/high</td>
<td>(eg. anomie) (eg. ritualism)</td>
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In short, there are at least three positions in Merton's initial theoretical formulation: (a) the optimum point of integration (ie. "conformity"), (b) the pole where ends predominate over means (ie. the first type of anomie in innovative deviancy), (c) the opposite pole (ritualism" where means overcome ends).
Actually, even this far into Merton's emerging typology things are more complex. For Merton's paradigm rests on two other implicit continuums—one abstracted and one historical. The second hidden dimension is not primarily concerned with technical questions and integration but with moral perceptions and legitimacy. At the center of this continuum of sociocultural legitimacy is again the mid-point or optimum locus of high legitimacy of both cultural goals and institutional means. At one extreme we discover a situation of low legitimacy of means (eg. "retreatism"); at the other pole we find low legitimacy of existing institutional means (what Merton later called the "nonconforming idealist" (1971:829-31), or if both means and ends are rejected we see "rebellion." Recasting the graphic presentation, Merton's underlying schemas may be represented in the following manner (see Figure 8—Merton's full schema; see also Harary, 1966).

Finally, the third major implicit continuum in Merton's schema concerns the fundamentally opposed attitudes of modal societies at the two ends of history toward change and the "corrigibility" of social reality and social problems. In various installments of his later essay on "Social Problems and Sociological Theory" (eg. 1971), Merton explicitly distinguished between "fatalist" and "activist" societies. In cross-cut-
Figure 8: Merton's Full Schema

1. Integration of Means and Ends
   (ends over means -- eg. innovation)  
   (means over ends -- eg. ritualism)

2. Legitimacy of Means and Ends
   (legitimacy of ends eg. retreatism)  
   (legitimacy of means eg. rebellion)
ting the two dimensions just outlined, ritualism refers not only to the state of malintegration where operating means and institutional norms predominate over cultural goals, but also to the type of traditional society deeply entrenched in that thick "cake of custom" of which anthropologists used to speak. And innovation refers not just to an abstracted continuum of integration but also to societies which actively intervene in their lives and try to possess their own histories and direct their own fates. And this, in turn, implies that the continuum of legitimacy refers also to the attitudes of "rightness" and "wrongness" toward stability, rational innovation, and change among different societies at different ends of societal evolution. Of course, behind these implicit distinctions lay not only Durkheim's distinctions between "mechanical" and "organic societies," but also Weber's evolutionary dichotomy between traditional social orders dominated by custom and magical-ritual stereotyping, on the one hand, and modern rational, innovative social orders on the other. In sum, it is important to recognize that Merton's typology of adaptations rests on these three underlying continuums: integration, legitimacy, and historical type.
B. Merton's First Type of Anomie

1. Extreme Emphasis on Success Attenuates the Legitimacy of Institutional Channels (Upper and Middle Class Deviancy)

The source of the original pathology underlying Merton's first type of anomie is, of course, the insatiable drives demanded for individual success by the cultural goals themselves. However, after establishing this foundation, Merton takes the origin of this cultural pathology for granted, and shifts main focus to its secondary consequences—namely, the inaccessibility of institutional means to given ends.

Of the type of societies which result from independent variation of cultural goals and institutionalized means, we shall be primarily concerned with the first—a society in which there is an exceptionally strong emphasis upon specific goals without a corresponding emphasis upon institutional procedures (1957:134).

Then Merton qualified this important initial insight.

No society lacks norms governing conduct. But societies do differ in the degree to which the folkways, mores and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the goals which stand high in the hierarchy of cultural values (1957:134).

Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support from the culturally defined implementation of these ends .... Certain aspects of the social structure may generate countermores and anti-social behavior precisely because of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the extreme case, the latter may be so vitiated by the goals emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by considerations of technical expediency. The sole significant question then becomes: which available means is most efficient in netting the socially approved value? The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues, the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues (1938:674).

Now, Merton's important suggestion that extreme emphasis on cultural goals of success may lead over time to the emergence of purely Utilitarian mores concerning the achievement of individual success is apparently in his mind one of the key connecting links between his first and second propositions concerning anomie and innovative deviancy. But, as we shall see, this common link cannot be left to obscure a series of
hidden presumptions—for example, that lower class deviants actually perceive and act out their dilemmas in pragmatic terms, or that there are not critical class differences in these two types of anomic deviancy. We are primarily interested in this section in upper and middle class deviancy, where the extreme emphasis on individual success attenuates the legitimacy of institutional channels of achievement.

It is interesting that Merton follows up the preceding passage with this footnote:

In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton Mayo's paraphrase of the title of Tawney's well-known book. "Actually the problem is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society; it is the acquisitiveness of a sick society" (Human Problems of an Industrial Society, 1933). Mayo deals with the process through which wealth comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering the unintegrated monetary success goal as an element in producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both phases of this system of interdependent variables (1938: 674, #5).

Here Durkheim's anomie is introduced through Mayo. Correspondingly, Merton appears to recognize that the original pathology lay with the overweening desires generated by the cultural goals themselves. Yet, beyond a few such references and hints in the various versions of SS&A, Merton never returned to complete his suggested analysis of both variables. This omission leaves a large gap in the development of American sociological theory, especially as it relates to the application of Durkheim's anomie and Weber's Protestant Ethos to the American scene.

Now, ambiguity is as rampant in Merton's discussion of anomie as in Durkheim's. For Merton slides back and forth between two different propositions about different classes and deviancy without sufficiently differentiating between them. On the one hand, we see Merton in his 1957 "Continuities..." essay repeating his essential and general idea of anomie:

Anomie is conceived as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them. In this concep-
tion, cultural values may help to produce behavior which is at odds with the mandates of the values themselves. On this view, the social structure strains the cultural values. The social structure acts as a barrier or as an open door to the acting out of the cultural mandates. When the cultural and the social structure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior and attitudes which the second precludes, there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms or normlessness *(1957:162-3).

But is it not equally true to say that the extreme cultural values strain the institutional structure? That extreme cultural emphasis on individual success goals attenuates the legitimacy of institutional channels? This is what happens to upper and upper-middle classes who are under great pressure to succeed at any cost; certainly, these groups are not disadvantaged or "locked out." On the other hand, in the same "Continuities..." essay, we see that Merton still was not clearly discriminating between the various shades and meanings of anomie.

It will be remembered that we have considered the emphasis on monetary success as one dominant theme in American culture, and have traced the strains which it differentially imposes upon those variously located in the social structure. This was not to say, of course, as was repeatedly indicated, that the disjunction between cultural goals and institutionally legitimate means derives only from this extreme goal emphasis. The theory holds that any extreme emphasis upon achievement—whether this be scientific productivity, accumulation of personal wealth, or, by a small stretch of the imagination, the conquests of a Don Juan—attenuate conformity to the institutional norms governing behavior designed to achieve the particular form of "success," especially among those who are socially disadvantaged in the competitive race. It is the conflict between the cultural goals and the availability of using institutional means, whatever the character of the goals, which produces a strain toward anomie (1957:166).

It seems redundant to speak, as Merton does in his last sentence, of a "strain toward anomie," for anomie has been defined by Merton himself as the condition of sociocultural strain. More importantly, Merton hits upon both of his propositions concerning anomie and innovative deviancy in the immediately preceding sentence where he speaks of extreme emphasis on cultural success goals attenuating conformity to
legitimate means as the general case, which is then applied specifically to the lack of structural access on the part of disadvantaged groups. In the first case, which constitutes the original core of Merton's thesis, the cultural goals themselves are the cause of conflict and are pathological in their extremity. In the second situation, the independent cause is the lack of structural access. Thus, although in Merton's own mind the two cases may proceed from the same general over-arching thesis of malintegration and strain, in actual fact the two are so different, both structurally and phenomenologically, that it is inconsistent to lump them together. For the key sequences in the two cases are reversed: In the first type of anomie, cultural values strain the social and personality structures, while in the second type of anomie the social structure strains the cultural structure. Surely no beginning student in a methodology class would confuse independent and dependent variables in this manner, unless the schema was inherently ambiguous, even to its creator.

Let us next briefly explore the first type of anomie in which extreme emphasis on individual success swamps out the legitimacy of institutional channels, a type of adaptation found primarily in upper and middle classes.

2. Moral Alchemies and the American Cult of Success

Merton discusses the power of images of the "cult of success" in the American Dream without central reference to Weber's ideas. It is significant to note that, although Merton's description of the American ethos corresponds closely with the standard connotation of the Protestant Ethic (eg. hard work, personal achievement, money, success, etc.), nowhere does Merton refer to Weber's theses, their popular deformations, or their potential meaning for his discussion. Rather, Merton here explores American culture as one polar type of social-cultural malintegration where there is high emphasis on goals coupled with low emphasis on legitimate institutional means.

Although the 1938 paper proceeds directly from introduct-
ory reflections into Merton's typology, the revised version spends much more time exploring these culturally sanctioned drives for progress and success. We start here from the short passage in the original edition (which doesn't appear to be paraphrased in the revision, one of the notable exceptions).

The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success in our society militates against the completely effective control of institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune. Fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on the culturally induced success goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis (1938:675-76).

Then Merton briefly reintroduces his original polemical intent and also his Parsonian background.

This observation is of crucial theoretical importance in examining the doctrine that anti-social behavior most frequently derives from biological drives breaking through restraints imposed by society. The difference is one between a strictly utilitarian interpretation which conceives man's ends as random and an analysis which finds these ends deriving from the basic values of the culture (1938:676).

In contrast to the biological and psychological reductions against which he polemicized, Merton's seemingly paradoxical thesis of the social generation of anti-social behavior was much more sophisticated and complex. We should note, however, the inherent difficulties in conceiving the former type as purely Utilitarian, and the latter as cultural, as if these were necessarily opposed; for American culture is Utilitarian, individualist, Pragmatic.

Merton's revision, interestingly enough, recaptures some of Durkheim's original emphases on egoistic insatiability.

Contemporary American culture appears to approximate the polar type in which great emphasis upon certain success goals occurs without equivalent emphasis upon institutional means.... Money has been consecrated as a value in itself, over and above its expenditure for articles of consumption, or its use for the enhancement of power.... Moreover, in the American Dream there is no final stopping point. The measure of "monetary success" is conveniently indefinite and relative. At each income level ... Americans want just about twenty-five percent more (but of course this "just a little bit
more" continues to operate once it is obtained). In this flux of shifting standards, there is no stable resting point, or rather, it is the point which manages always to be "just ahead." An observer of a community [Hollywood] in which annual salaries in six figures are not uncommon, reports the anguished words of one victim of the American Dream. "In this town, I'm socially snubbed because I only get a thousand a week. That hurts" (1957: 136).

This insightful passage literally calls out for quotes from Durkheim (see Books Two and Three). However, Merton's comments are directed mainly to "relative deprivation" which was a subsidiary phenomenon to Durkheim. But Merton does offer incisive comments on these matters--where the lack of a reasonable or fixed standard for satisfaction and expectation lead one to forget whatever one really needs for a comfortable margin of survival, and instead helps generates that "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville spoke so insightfully. Merton focusses on status competition where, especially without the aid of accepted traditional signs and symbols, even the achievement of success sours in one's mouth as one continues to measure one's happiness not by what goals one has won nor by what one possesses, but rather only by what others have and you lack. Using Durkheim's conception of the social schedule, and coupled with a minimum inventory of the dimensions of relative deprivation, these insights possess great potential for a sociologically rooted explanation of inflation. The tragedy implicit, of course, in this never-ending cycle of other-directedness, self-doubt, envy, monopoly, etc., is the simple fact that nothing can be imagined which, when achieved, gives true satisfaction. For no matter how much one gains, one can always feel deprived relative to the fortunes of others.

Merton's lengthy excursus into the cultural socialization of Americans into an "infinity of dreams and desires" is most welcome, and leads me to wonder again why: (a) these observations were not linked to Durkheim's anomie as insatiability, and (b) these elements seem to fade in and out of Merton's analysis. For instance, the following passage comes from the revised version:
To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched in American culture is only to say that Americans are bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the right, or often, the duty of retaining the goal even in the face of repeated frustration. Prestigious representatives of the society reinforce the cultural emphasis. The family, the school, and the workplace—the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans—join to provide the intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be motivated by the promise of a gratification which is not redeemed*(1957:136-7).

These insightful observations reveal that Merton, especially in his later revisions, recaptured some of the tone of Durkheim's profound anatomies of modern culture. However, even here, Merton's focus seems to be different, for his main thrust concerns the discipline needed to retain intact impossibly accelerating goals. One of the functions of the central socializing agencies of American society, Merton adds, is purely inspirational—to continue to call out to us to "hold fast" to the cultural goals of unlimited success forevermore for Everyman, "even in the face of repeated frustration." And as we shall see, if any acknowledge the limitations of reality, we are then faced with what Merton, with a touch of genius, once called "moral alchemies."

Surely Merton's emphasis on the inspirational function of American culture in calling out to us to hold fast to the American Dream, even when evidence demands that such a reality demeaning image be set aside, echoes Durkheim's main themes. Yet, if we accept the importance of Merton's insights here, doesn't the real significance of his theme differ from its common presentation in American sociology? For Merton's first proposition concerning innovative deviance and anomie is implicitly related to Durkheim's anguished analyses. Mertonian anomie rests, then, not so much on the abstracted disjunction between institutional means and cultural goals as on the unique vagaries of the American social and cultural structure in which the cultural goals of unlimited success for all are so overwhelmingly exaggerated and endlessly reiterated that this inordinate emphasis swamps out the legitimacy of the normal in-
institutional channels of achieving success. This internal contradiction is exacerbated by the peculiar fact that these culturally sanctioned goals are continually reemphasized; perhaps most strongly at the very moments when frustration impedes the achievements of large segments of the society. Hence, a peculiar form of culturally sanctioned "moral amnesia" is constantly invoked. Observers from Tocqueville on have commented on the Americans lack of a past; in his important study The American Adam, R.W.B. Lewis calls us a "one generation people." Contrary to common opinion, then, the original pathological source of anomie even in Merton's version lies not with the vagaries of inadequate social structuring (and, therefore, not at root a question of social mechanics and societal engineering), but rather with the inordinate and passionate and insatiable and idealistic totalism of American cultural goals in themselves.

Merton goes on to consider some prototypical carriers of the "American Dream," thereby uncovering the ideology behind the inspirational functions of "business class culture."

Central to this process of disciplining people to maintain their unfulfilled aspirations are the central prototypes of success, the living documents testifying that the American Dream can be realized if one but has the requisite abilities (1957:137).

Then quoting from a prominent business magazine, Merton offers the following examples and his own sociological translation of their latent, inspirational functions.

"You have to be born to those jobs, buddy, or else have a good pull."

Here is a heretical opinion, possibly born of continued frustration, which rejects the worth of retaining an apparently unrealizable goal, and, moreover, questions the legitimacy of a social structure which provides differential access to this goal (1957:137).

"That's an old sedative to ambition."

The counterattack, explicitly asserting the cultural value of retaining one's aspirations intact, of not losing "ambition" (1957:137).

So far, Merton has analyzed two sides of the same coin--doubts about the "worth of retaining an unrealizable goal," and the
reassurance that one must "keep the faith" even in the face of chronic doubt and perpetual frustration. One wonders if American society has not embedded here within itself a myth or archetype similar to the myth of Sisyphus, yet without recognizing the implicit tragedy of a life condemned to eternal willing, effort, energy expended, and so forth, which yet, by its own inner nature, can only end in eternal frustration. It's as if we took over the joke, but forgot the punch line.

Merton continues:

"Before listening to its seduction, ask these men:"

A clear statement of the function to be served by the ensuing list of "successes." These men are living testimony that the social structure is such as to permit these aspirations to be achieved, if one is worthy. Failure to reach these goals testifies only to one's own personal shortcomings. Aggression provoked by failure should therefore be directed inward and not outward, against oneself and not against a social structure which provides free and equal access to opportunity (1957:137).

Here Merton explores a series of crucial insights into the therapeutic logics of our peculiar "moral alchemies" which, in the case of individual and seemingly isolated failure, serve to deflect criticism away from society and culture and back onto the individual himself, who is then encouraged to internalize the guilt at his own failure to reach the contemporary American state of perfection.

This leads naturally to the subsidiary theme that success or failure are results wholly of personal qualities; that he who fails has only himself to blame, for the corollary to the concept of the self-made man is the self-unmade man.... Failure represents a double defeat: the manifest defeat of remaining far behind in the race for success and the implicit defeat of not having the capacities and moral stamina needed for success * (1957:168).

What beautiful phrases--the "self-unmade man" and "moral stamina"! Not only has Merton reminded us of the disciplinary and inspirational functions of our socializing agencies, but he also reminds us that the American Dream of unlimited success for all is itself predicated on an ethical base--namely, whether one demonstrates that one is morally worthy of success in this land. Weakness in required character traits, or
unusual or long-term delictions from duty, bring down that disapprobation normally evoked by real and symbolic violations of what Durkheim called the "collective conscience."

Merton points to the critical modes in which such individual failure is dealt with—since success is predicated upon intense, unending desire, effort, personal worthiness and sincerity, then failure must be due either to lack of will power or some other inherent ethical flaw in one's character. Consequently, since failure is internalized, on top of the tension generated by the constant acceleration of demands upon one's time, energy, will, and strength of character—in short, upon one's "moral stamina"—there looms the ever-present free-floating anxiety that if one lets up one's failure is then publicly defined as one's own. The alternative possibility is seldom presented to the imagination that the goals in themselves are wrong, or inhuman, or impossible, or destructive; not even that the opportunities for success were lacking as Merton argues. The only conclusion possible is that one lost desire or nerve. In Merton's own terminology, these embedded dysfunctions of the American Dream are displaced from the society back onto the individual himself, who is then forced to accept his lonely guilt for his failure. Remember that success comes only if one is "worthy," as Merton emphasizes. For as many have learned to their double sorrow, the hazards of unemployment in American society are not merely economic; rather, the more devastating aspects of the experience are psychic and social strain. One loses self-respect, and then defines and accepts oneself as a failure; and then in another turn of this vicious cycle of moral alchemy, one is defined and treated as a failure by one's peers. One recurrent question: why is Weber's thesis that modern economic culture has an ethical foundation not mentioned here?

Merton next outlines three success typologies.

I. All may properly have the same lofty ambitions, for however lowly the starting point, true talent can reach the very heights. Aspirations must be retained intact.

II. Whatever the present results of one's strivings, the future is large with promise; for the common man may yet
become a king. Gratifications may seem forever deferred, but they will finally be realized as one's enterprise becomes the "biggest of its kind."

III. ... No matter what one's present situation, messenger boy or clerk, one's gaze should be fixed at the top.

The first success prototype suggests the legitimacy of unlimited aspirations for all. Such an "infinity of dreams and desires" is culturally sanctioned, not merely as possibilities, but as moral duties. By contrast, in the past most societies governed themselves with a traditional social schedule of satisfaction (see Books Two and Three) in which one's own individual level of satiety was largely dependent upon a relatively stable standard assigned to one's group on the basis of their social status and cultural honor. The second success prototype enjoins each person to reject precisely these traditional valuations of one's worth by ascribed social statuses, and beckons him on to unlimited individual achievement, regardless of the past or his native group. Moreover, not only must every individual, without exception, actively reject the traditional standard of satiation ascribed to the status of his inherited group, but each must keep on striving without cease, for this ethos positively excludes any set standard of satiation for the future. This is remarkably close to Durkheimian anomie. Further, since one must be self-reliant to achieve these successes in a competitive society, one must also make it on his own. This emphasis on individual uniqueness and progress and perfection is further testified to by the reassurance given a person by being proclaimed "Number One" in any field of endeavor. Competitive sports clearly express these drives—to be a world-record breaker, to do what no man has done before, to be the champion, always achieving new heights of perfection and glory. Such drives toward uniqueness, progress and perfection through extreme specialization are certainly one expression of what Spengler (1922) called "Faustian man."

Merton's illustrations point up another key element in the American attitude toward time. If one must forever strive,
yet forever wait, forever defer gratification, then one's goal never comes closer, and hope becomes its own counterfeit. When American culture issues inspirational calls and exhortations for us to have faith in faith, to hope in hope, is this not really a mask for some deeply embedded sense of hopelessness, of final estrangement? In this case, hope becomes a desperation virtue, an "emergency virtue" as William Lynch (1966) has called it. Such counterfeiting of hope reveals a deeply rooted ambivalence toward time and process in our culture. Time, especially in terms of generic, natural processes such as our life-sequences, is not generally perceived as inherently generative, as leading to fulfillment by its own inner nature. Perhaps some of the obscenity of death in American society can be understood in this light, for it is my conviction that people do not fear too much reality, as the poet says. Rather, we fear too much unreality, especially at the most real times in our lives; we do not fear death as much as we fear the prospect of dying in the American way—that is, alone, isolated, exhausted, with an unfinished life-project that no one can ever complete. Our attitude toward the future is endless willing and endless waiting. Our attitude toward the past is amnesia. We cannot wait, we cannot remember. We believe that life is constituted through will and imagination, but we cannot will the real, the finite, nor can we imagine a point at which we would find true satisfaction. Consequently, this sense of constant, endless, restless, aimless urgency about our lives and the future, coupled with the amnesiac's sense of floating in an isolated instant, the American Adam as the American atom, unrelated to any other phase in time, paradoxically entraps us into the endless and repetitious patterns of the past, our national neurosis. For Lynch reminds us that a culture's primal attitudes in conflict with human nature may inform neurosis.

The other side of this "gnostic" failure of the imagination to imagine the humanly possible is seen in our apocalyptic drives to leap out of time. Our culture is now saturated with myriad forms of instant gratification—instant food,
instant photographs, instant sex, instant salvation, instant destruction, instant everything and anything at the push of a button. Since we are primarily a pragmatic, progressive people, we do not see the dialectic involved between these two polarities of time and natural process. For if we did we might come to recognize that domination by the endless and the instantaneous are actually only two sides of the gnostic coin.

Merton mentions another facet of similar themes in the symbolism of royalty in an egalitarian culture.

The symbolism of the commoner rising to the estate of economic royalty is woven deep in the texture of the American culture pattern, finding what is perhaps its ultimate expression in the words of one who knew whereof he spoke, Andrew Carnegie: "Be a king in your dreams. Say to yourself: 'My place is at the top' " (1957:138).

Merton's parade of cultural exhortations reveals again the relentless emphasis on these images of striving and success. Yet, is it not also paradoxical that in our supposedly egalitarian society, our culture is so permeated with almost ritual obeisance for high station that even common goods, places, foods, etc., cloak themselves in images of royalty? What other nation has so intimately bound these contraries together, and undertaken to elect an emperor every four years? Perhaps we should count this among those small revenges of history that the heirs of those who overthrew hierocratic and aristocratic feudal social organization in the west should also be the ones to find themselves furtively substituting new aristocracies of wealth, new meritocracies of brains, new celebrities as national heroes, new litanies of visible saints, and the ones to mass produce images of royalty!

Merton continues:

Coupled with this positive emphasis upon the obligation to maintain lofty goals is a correlative emphasis upon the penalizing of those who draw in their ambitions. Americans are admonished "not to be a quitter," for in the dictionary of American culture, as in the lexicon of youth, "there is no such word as fail." The cultural manifesto is clear: one must not quit, must not cease striving; must not lessen his goals, for "not failure, but low aim is crime" (1957:138-9).
Personality warps induced by the peculiar twists of these moral alchemies should be seen in their cultural and historical specificity, and as representing the inverse of most traditional economic motivations. James Russell Lowell's famous aphorism, in perfectly capturing our dilemma, demonstrates that at bottom, an individual's failure to achieve in any sphere reveals an ethical failure, a failure of moral stamina, and thus, moral character. A cultural system in which the real crime is to entertain balanced aspirations, and the real virtue to be possessed by an "infinity of dreams and desires," and never to falter from that high, exalted and difficult path to perfection, and never to yield to anxiety or give in to doubt, frustration, or exhaustion--surely such a unique, powerful, and destructive system of values has tacit ethical foundations. Are we not justified in asking: if American and modern economic and status strivings represent secularized translations of a religiously sanctioned moral system and "civil religion," then why didn't Merton, like the Weber he knew so well, explore or even refer to the historical, sociocultural foundations of these pervasive and powerful ethical demands? That Merton did not turn in this direction, but rather in an abstracted micro-social psychological direction by looking at individual adaptations to anomie, serves as a key to the rest of our story on Merton's anomie.

Returning to the text, Merton summarizes thus far:

Thus the culture enjoins acceptance of three cultural axioms: first, all should strive for the same lofty goals since these are open to everyone; second, present seeming failure is but a way station to ultimate success; and third, genuine failure consists only in the lessening or withdrawal of ambition (1957:139).

In sociological paraphrase, these axioms represent, first, the deflection of criticism of the social structure onto one's self among those so situated in the society that they do not have full and equal access to opportunity; second, the preservation of a structure of social power by having individuals in the lower social strata identify themselves, not with their compeers, but with those at the top (whom they will ultimately join); third, providing pressures for conformity with the cultural dic-
ates of unslackened ambition for those who fail to conform (1957:139).

As in the later sections on anomie and poverty, here we see Merton tacitly using Marx and the notion of internal contradictions (eg. see Gouldner, 1970) to "pry open" Durkheim's anomie in the context of American society. Surely Merton's observations here stand as one of the more insightful anatomies of the dilemmas generated by our cultural logics and curious "moral alchemies."

3. Upper and Middle Class Deviancy: Pragmatism, Achievement, and Legality

While exploring his logically derived category of "innovative deviancy," Merton switches from his first to his second proposition concerning anomie. Much of the revised version on "innovation" is concerned with the effect of the American ethic of success in attenuating legitimate institutional channels of achievement. The crucial shift from the first to the second theory comes when Merton begins to consider the case of lower-class individuals who are chronically blocked in their institutional access to achievement of cultural goals. Perhaps this ambiguous combination was due to an embedded flaw in Merton's mode of formal theorizing, in which he began with logically derived, abstracted and empty categories, and then attempted to fit diverse empirical cases into these formal, conceptual pigeonholes.

Now, it is certain that upper and middle class business and legal "shenanigans" are just as much deviations from the formal legal codes as lower-class "criminality." However, the sociologist must take additional factors into account—namely, that the perception and "labelling" of these different types of deviance of different classes are treated very differently in our culture, and even by the legal apparatus itself. As Merton made clear with the quote from Charles Dickens, our social perception of upper and middle class deviance is that of respectful indulgence for the successful cheat. On the other hand, the social perception of the dominant middle class...
class majority is that the "criminality" of the lower-classes constitutes a potentially dangerous threat to the established order, to the social and economic virtues, especially those regarding the legitimate means of "getting ahead."

Merton restated the basic problem of the first type of upper-class deviancy with characteristic cogence:

Great cultural emphasis upon the success goal invites this mode of adaptation through the use institutionally proscribed but often effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of success-wealth and power. This response occurs when the individual has assimilated cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internalizing the institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment.... From the standpoint of sociology, the question arises which features of our social structure predispose toward this type of adaptation, thus producing greater frequencies of deviant behavior in one social stratum than in another (1957:141)?

We should note, however, that the "induced" pressure toward "innovative deviancy" is not, in the first place, structurally generated. Rather, the primary cause is the inordinate cultural emphasis on individual success; it is more that the cultural structure strains the social structure than vice versa. Like many functional theorists, Merton here is a causal theorist in search of an effect. His basic question becomes restated in this fashion: Given a cultural system which counsels absolute individualism, unending drives for progress and perfection, and unlimited individual success, what differential features of social structuring predispose different social strata toward different modes and possibilities of acting out these overwhelming cultural mandates?

Merton starts at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and works his way down. His second thesis—that lack of opportunity of disadvantaged strata to legitimate institutional access to channels of upward social mobility generates deviancy—is found only toward the end of this section.

On the top economic levels, the pressure toward innovation not infrequently erases the distinction between business-like strivings this side of the mores and sharp practices beyond the mores. As Veblen observed, "It is not easy in any given case, indeed it at times impossible until the courts have spoken, to say whether it is an in-
stance of praiseworthy salesmanship or a penitentiary offense (1957:141).

Illustrating his theme with choice satirical quotes, Merton explores his first sub-category of upper-class "innovative deviancy"—namely, the "cheat." The "cheat" is one who publicly accepts the goals, while covertly indulging in purely pragmatic considerations concerning observance of the "rules of the game." As Huizanga noted in his famous book on the play element in culture (1955), precisely because of his public acquiescence and the private nature of his deviance, the "cheat" is always treated more indulgently than the "spoil-sport" or "rebel."

The history of the great American fortunes is threaded with strains toward institutionally dubious innovation as is attested to many tributes to the Robber Barons. The reluctant admiration expressed privately, and not seldom publicly, of these "shrewd, smart, and successful" men is a product of a cultural structure in which the sacrosanct goal virtually consecrates the means (1957:141-2).

Thus, in his first type of anomie, Merton suggests that the cultural mandates are so extreme in themselves as to border on pathology. In effect, it is culturally legitimate to desire success so much that institutional norms may be conveniently set aside in actual practice. In America its "OK" if drives toward overweening cultural goals override legitimate institutional restraints. Dicken's caricature of our conflicting values reveals this situation perfectly: "... and he is utterly dishonorable, debased, and profligate? Yes sir. In the name of wonder, then, what is his merit? Well sir, he is a smart man" (1957:142). Ambrose Bierce adds: "The American public will be plundered as long as the American character ... is tolerant of successful knaves" (Merton, 1957:143). In a very real sense, then, such types of upper and middle class deviancy are hardly deviancy at all; rather these simply are American values "writ large." Being a pragmatic people, devoted to individual success and unlimited horizons, we can hardly condemn too much those among us who follow out our most sacred precepts more enthusiastically than
the rest; at most, we might consider this a case of more or less "pathological overconformity" as Parsons and Merton somewhere later suggest.

Extreme individualism, Pragmatic or Utilitarian ethics, success at any cost—some theorists might wish to term this a sign of malintegration of "goals and means." However, we should not forget that Durkheim considered this a sign of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the modern world. But here the paradox begins. For, as noted earlier, if this anomie is a sign of malintegration or "moral anarchy," it is one which is rooted deeply in our traditional values. This type of anomie is not simply due to the release of the ego from all previous constraints, but rather is itself constructed and constantly reinforced by our most precious cultural sanctions. The reluctant admiration we grant to such rogues, cheats, and other assorted "connivers" comes from the fact that we value their over-enthusiasm more than we condemn their more or less momentary lapse from legal consciousness. The conflicting values here are not simply the success ethic and the respect for legal order; rather, the conflict is really between laws as institutional norms and the American emphasis on Pragmatism as our basic operating logic. If it works, why be concerned with legal niceties, with outworn mores? Indeed, since Pragmatic individualism is itself one of our prime norms of "right conduct," when our conscience is thus formed, how else can our consciousness be directed?

After this consideration of strains imposed upon upper and middle class strata by the tremendous pressure of the American success ethic, Merton turned to his second thesis concerning other strata. Here, the concern is mostly with the "locked out status" of the American lower class, especially ethnic minorities. But these two empirical cases of "innovative deviancy" are socio-logically incompatible. Merton's key underlying distinction between manifest and latent functions glosses over some of these differences. For it is precisely the different definitions, "labels," and differential
societal responses between upper and lower class "deviancy" that mark their incompatibility. Phenomenologically, they are very different cases. Structurally, they represent different cases also, for the problem with the first is that the institutional restraints are too weak, but too strong in the second case. Can we really hope to understand the usurpation of power and "criminal" conduct that led to "Watergate" and the resignation of a President of the United States in disgrace by including it in the same category as the ghetto youth who steals to support his narcotic habit? Upper class deviations from institutional norms (e.g. price fixing, cartels, monopolies, white-collar crime, etc.) are seldom branded as "criminal" in the same way that highly visible crimes against persons (e.g. armed robbery), even though the number of people affected and the total amount extorted may be many times greater in the first instance than in the second.

Let us now turn to consider Merton's typology, and his second case of anomic deviancy.  

Now, as Merton prepares for the transition from the theoretical to the typological parts of his work, we should notice a number of basic shifts in the level and focus of his argument. One basic shift is from the pathology of cultural goals to inadequacies of social structure. A second shift is from the historical-cultural level down to the social psychological level. Merton poses the key questions as he came to perceive them in these terms:

... contemporary American culture continues to be characterized by a heavy emphasis on wealth as a basic symbol of success, without a corresponding emphasis upon the legitimate avenues on which to march toward this goal. How do individuals living in this cultural context respond? And do our observations bear upon the doctrine that deviant behavior typically derives from biological impulses breaking through the restraints imposed by culture? What, in short, are the consequences for the behavior of people variously situated in a social structure of a culture in which the emphasis on dominant success goals has become increasingly separated from an equivalent emphasis on institutionalized procedures for seeking these goals (1957:139)?
Now, as we have discovered, there is an inherent ambiguity concerning the case of high-emphasis on goals and low emphasis on operating means. For it contains both of Merton's two separate propositions about anomie: (a) that extreme emphasis on success goals leads to an attenuation of legitimate institutional means, and (b) where the goals are universally accepted but the means of achievement are differentially distributed, individual deviance depends upon the social structural situation. In Merton's first type of anomie and innovative deviancy, the independent variable is culture, while in the second type it is social structure. If deviance, albeit of different types, is the dependent variable, then what is anomie? Is it the cause or the result of the conflict or the deviation? Indeed, when reading through Merton's typology one may easily find oneself wondering whether anomie leads to innovation and rebellion, for instance, or whether innovation and rebellion leads to anomie? Again, is anomie the cause or the result, or neither? In addition, if Merton's anomie rests on the functionalists' notion of a malintegration between the social and cultural systems, then why would Merton maintain at one point that "In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, the outcome is normally a type of ritualism rather than anomie" (1957:136, #8)? I thought both extremes—innovation where the ends are strong and the means weak and ritualism where the ends are weak and the operating means strong—represented anomie malintegration. Further, on what grounds does Merton gratuitously presume that similar success values are shared by all? Should we not be careful not to mistake universalistic "logics" with universal acceptance of them? If in Merton's second case of anomie he considers the differential distribution of access to institutional means, should he not then also consider the differential distribution of values? These and other related questions shall occupy us in the next section.
C. Merton's Second Type of Anomie

1. The Typology of Individual Adaptations to Malintegration

In the second section of his famous essay, Merton turns to analyze typical modes of individual adaptations to various strains in their sociocultural situation. Here we shall explore only the first two main modes; of course, Merton's concern centered on innovative deviancy. This category combines both of Merton's types of anomie. In regard to the other logically derived possibilities, Merton does not generally regard "conformity" as problematic, and it is unclear what systematic theory lies behind the last three types (see also Turner and Scott, 1965:234, #3).

Turning from these culture patterns, we now examine types of adaptation by individuals within the culture bearing society. Though our focus is still the cultural and social genesis of varying rates and types of deviant behavior, our perspective shifts from the plane of patterns of cultural values to the plane of types of adaptation to these values among those occupying different positions in the social structure (1957:139).

Merton then proceeds to diagram out five logically possible permutations concerning the acceptance or rejection of legitimate cultural goals and institutional means. Conformity represents acceptance of both cultural goals and institutionalized means. Merton considers conformity to be the modal response in all groups. Innovation represents acceptance of goals but rejection of existing legitimate means (and the substitution of illegitimate means). Ritualism, in terms of his later typology, refers to the rejection of legitimate goals but the acceptance of operating means (implying not only the displacement of original goals, but also their replacement by means, "means becomes ends"). Retreatism implies the rejection of both goals and means (although it is not made clear how one then exists in a vacuum; surely again something else must be at least partially substituted). And finally, rebellion represents "rejection of prevailing values and substitution of new ones" for both goals and means. As my parenthetical additions suggest, however, Merton's typology is not
wholly consistent. For each case implies not only the rejection of one or both elements, but also at least partial substitution of new elements. The same rationale that first appears clearly in the case of rebellion would also apply to the other categories. Merton adds this footnote on rebellion:

This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that of the others. It represents a transitional response seeking to institutionalize new goals and new procedures to be shared by other members of the society. It thus refers to efforts to change the existing cultural and social structure rather than to accommodate efforts within this structure (1957:140, #13).

It is simply not clear to me how Merton purports to differentiate so neatly between change and internal accommodations: for don't efforts at accommodation that reject either or both cultural goals and institutional means and thereby substitute new elements also constitute indirect efforts to change the "existing cultural and social structure"? How could it be otherwise? If his theory rests, in turn, on the fine distinction between imputation of conscious motives or not, then it becomes more tenuous. Even with the intentional difference, isn't the functional result, the very factor Merton thinks important, similar? In short, isn't Merton's starting point, his logical abstract typology, internally inconsistent as outlined?

When Merton reiterates his thesis, does he recognize, for instance, not only the difference between his first and second anomie, but the real possibility that differential distribution may apply to goals as well as to means? That it may be the upper and upper-middle classes which are the prime carriers of Pragmatic and individualist cultural logics which are then differentially followed by members of other classes?

... It is a primary assumption of our typology that these responses occur with different frequency within various sub-groups in our society precisely because members of these groups are differentially subject to cultural stimulation and restraints (1957:140, #12).
2. **Adaptation I: Conformity**

Merton begins his typological analysis with conformity. Although at first it appears that he considers conformity to be the general modal response in all groups, and therefore unproblematic by definition, in some later related writings Merton considerably revises his earlier simplified analysis of conformity. Yet, it is interesting to note that as Merton continued to revise his earlier and simple view of conformity in favor of a more inflected approach, much of the certainty of the original formulation began to fade. For not only, by implication, are the other categories equally complex and yet equally simplified in the original formulation, but also the base category of conformity itself has ramified and become capable of multiple interpretations and expressions. Hence, the very category which, by its seeming straightforward simplicity, anchored the rest of the typology, has become less obvious and less certain in the very process of refinement.

As I suggested before, Merton's original assumption that conformity is relatively unproblematic is perhaps understandable from the way in which he goes about theorizing. Most likely derived from Parsons' abstracted idealization of "The Social System," Merton proceeds deductively to elaborate a schema based upon logical permutations, and assuming perfect integration as the basic anchor. Now, this curious procedure of functionalist theorists differs little from economists who have traditionally started from a series of arbitrary and normative premises, such as perfectly competitive markets, rationality and optimization, and so on. Perhaps Merton's later revisions of some of these assumptions (eg. consensus), is attributable to his growing independence of his teacher Parsons over the years. For example, although many continue to charge Merton (eg. 1971:795-7) with that brand of functionalism which had made an abstract value consensus a key postulate, ever since at least his essay on "Manifest and Latent Functions" (1949), Merton had taken care to avoid such a dubious thesis.
Here Merton describes conformity as the prototypical case of sociocultural integration.

To the extent that a society is stable, adaptation type I—conformity to both cultural goals and institutionalized means—is the most common and widely diffused. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies constituting every social order is sustained by the modal behavior of its members representing conformity to the established, though perhaps secularly changing, culture patterns. It is, in fact, only because behavior is typically oriented toward the basic values of the society that we may speak of a human aggregate as comprising a society. Unless there is a deposit of values shared by interacting individuals, there exist social relations, if the disorderly interactions may be so called, but no society.... Since our primary interest centers on the sources of deviant behavior, and since we have briefly examined the mechanisms making for conformity as the modal response in American society, little more need be said regarding this type of adaptation, at this point (1957:141).

Although in both his original and revised editions, Merton spends little time on conformity but rather takes it for granted, in his subsequent essays related to anomie and deviance, Merton began to admit that conformity might be more problematic than he had previously acknowledged. For example in his 1957 "Continuities" essay, Merton explicitly responded to criticism from Herbert Hyman and others by admitting that one should not presume that universalistic goals are universally accepted. "It is a matter for inquiry, not a matter of supposition, to find out how widely the values under examination have been assimilated" (1957:170). Merton qualifies his former presumptions in this way:

... It becomes essential to state this assumption more clearly by qualifying it; the analysis assumes that some individuals in the lower economic and social strata actually adopt the success goal. For after all, the analysis holds not that all or most members of the lower strata are subject to pressure toward non-conformist behavior of the various kinds set out in the typology of adaptation, but only that more of them are subject to this pressure than those in the higher strata.... Deviant behavior is still the subsidiary pattern and conformity the modal pattern. It is therefore sufficient that a sizable minority of those in the lower strata assimilate this goal for them to be differentially subject
to this pressure as a result of their relatively smaller opportunities to achieve monetary success (1957:171).

If this sounds like special pleading, perhaps it is. To maintain his position, Merton is forced here to perform some fancy footwork. First, Merton does not yet appear to recognize that his idea of anomie really contains two separate propositions; else he would not have claimed again that some members of lower strata are differentially subject to anomie more than members of higher strata. In that case he would have to admit that they are differentially subject to different strains. Second, whereas before he boldly claimed that all are subject to the same disjunction which differentially affects lower strata because of their weaker structural position, Merton is now forced to backtrack and suggest instead that more members of the lower class are subject to anomie than members of the upper classes. If we extend our questioning here to Merton's tacit assumption still underlying his revision--namely, that different strata share the same aspirations (see Mizruchi especially, 1967), then Merton would be forced to do even more backtracking. But as far as I can tell, Merton has never answered in print Mizruchi's criticisms.

Further, it is not correct to unqualifiedly identify Merton's "conformity" with the assumption of "value consensus" so often characteristic of functionalist thought. For as early as 1949 in his lead essay on codification of functional theory "Manifest and Latent Functions" in Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton explicitly disavows the notion of a clear consensus. And as late as 1971 (eg. 796-7), Merton again defends himself with copious quotation from his own work against this persistent charge. Yet, as Gouldner once remarked of the difference between Parsons' theoretical and historical writings, it's as if two separate sets of books were being kept. It is certainly correct to say that earlier, while still under Parsons' spell, Merton did indeed, especially in "Social Structure and Anomie," tacitly presume an abstracted value consensus as the corollary of conformity.
Yet, in some of his later related essays, especially while responding to criticism, Merton himself questions these very assumptions. Merton is probably right in contending that:

... it is difficult to see the basis for imputing the notion of a "consensual society" to functional analysis. It is as though an intellectual stereotype had taken charge, as though it were mandatory for a functional orientation to social problems to adopt the assumption of full consensus, and so need look no further to learn whether this is really so (1971:796).

Yet, even so, once again the irony of this recent disclaimer should not escape us, for despite some of his own best efforts over the years, Merton himself had aided and abetted over the same period this wide-spread confusion.

We ought also to consider some further implications of Merton's original assumption of the unproblematic nature of conformity, especially in the political vein. In his introduction to Part Two of Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton indicated a number of new concerns. Implicitly responding to criticism, Merton rises to defend his theory against possible misunderstandings. For instance, instead of implying a society governed by consensus of values, Merton took care to point out, as he did again in 1971, that consensus is often variable and that one must specify the "degree of support of particular institutions" by particular groups. This qualification includes an additional factor--namely, power as a key element in maintaining social control. By implication, then, members of groups who have not shared the dominant cultural values yet have been held relatively in check by power and social control, to these people whose deviation has always been labelled "criminality," Merton now extends the possibility that this may simply represent a case of a different type of "innovation." It may therefore be misleading to describe non-conformity with particular institutions merely as deviant behavior; it may represent instead the beginning of a new alternative pattern with its own distinctive claims to moral validity" (1957:122).
Thus, in extensively revising his earlier, over-simple stance regarding conformity as a modal response, Merton has evidently arrived at a much more complex and subtly inflected position. This progressive development parallels Merton's growing sophistication over the years in the elaboration, for instance, of the concepts of social organization and deviancy. Yet, the paradox previously mentioned should not be allowed to escape us, for as Merton has progressively refined his conceptions of conformity (and thus deviance), he has unwittingly made at least two things clear: (a) the most questionable and critical transition in his functional thought is that between the manifest and latent levels of functions, and (b) the seeming clarity and logically elegant appearance of his earlier schemas in "SS&A," which anchored the rest of the typology by its simplistic certainty, has by its own ramification betrayed the self-evident obviousness of the rest of the typology by contrast. In short, without an unproblematic notion of conformity, the rest of the typology becomes also more problematic.

Finally, in comparing Merton's assumptions about conformity to the dominant American value system and success ethic with Durkheim's and Weber's ideas, we should remember these facts. Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not that they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that the "infinity of dreams and desires" flowed directly from the culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfection." They were, therefore, "chronic," and, in a sense, the "normal" forms of the "moral anarchy" reigning in the modern era. Further, who can forget the anguished tones with which Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart! this nullity imagines that it has achieved a level of civilization never before achieved" (1958a: 182). Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted conformity to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as Merton often did. In short, both Durkheim and Weber directed their most critical shafts at the very values which Merton
appears to have taken for granted. Are these pioneers really to be considered the progenitors of that "arid functionalism" which claims them for its own?

Finally, we should recall that Merton himself had just finished exploring some of the pathologies permeating the dominant "American Dream" value system. Surely conformity to social or cultural pathologies is itself pathological! Besides personality pathologies induced by our "moral alchemies" in those who are unsuccessful, conformity to those eternally expanding dreams and ever-accelerating desires and demands represents an even greater moral pathology on the part of those who are successful. Such a sorry state of human affairs is not to be so easily accepted as "normal" as Merton did, but rather cries out in its historical uniqueness, power, and inversion of human values as a fact to be explained. Remember that Durkheim proposed that poverty serves as protection against anomie and suicide. And in one of those grim paradoxes of modern history, it is precisely those of us who are the most successful who are also the ones most beset by the "infinity of dreams and desires," and therefore the most anxiety ridden and driven and most prone to various moral, spiritual, and existential maladies largely unrelated to deprivation or oppression. Strangely, Merton managed to invert the real thrust of Durkheim and Weber's most profound paradigms—for what is comparatively normal to Merton was anomie to Durkheim and an "iron cage" to Weber!

3. **Differential Responses to Malintegration: The Case of Structurally Blocked Strata**

Now, the typological discussion in Merton's original essay contained little material on upper or middle class "deviant innovation." Rather, it was primarily concerned with the blocked mobility of the lower class, and the supposition that this structural blockage would result in their turn to crime, organized vice, and other assorted forms of highly visible, traditional "deviance." Much more material on upper class deviancy appears in the 1949 revision. Perhaps it was
not surprising that Chicago of the 1930's should have provided Merton with a number of his illustrations (e.g. Capone, organized vice, etc.). In terms of his main theme, Merton notes:

But whatever the differential rates of deviant behavior in the several social strata, and we know from many sources that the official crime statistics showing uniformly higher rates in the lower strata are far from complete or reliable, it appears from our analysis that the greatest pressures toward deviation are exerted upon the lower strata. Cases in point permit us to determine the sociological mechanisms involved in producing these pressures. Several researches have shown that specialized areas of vice and crime constitute a "normal" response to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed, but where there is little access to conventional and legitimate means for becoming successful. The occupational opportunities of people in these areas are largely confined to manual labor and the lesser white collar jobs. Given the American stigmatization of manual labor, which has been found to hold rather uniformly in all social classes, and the absence of realistic opportunities for advancement beyond this level, the result is a marked tendency toward deviant behavior. The status of unskilled labor and the consequent lower-income cannot readily compete in terms of established standards of worth with the promises of power and high income from organized vice, rackets, and crime (1957:144-5).

I suggest part of Merton's basic theses are sound--namely, that "anti-social behavior" is socially produced, and that "internal contradictions" beset American and other social systems. However, not only did Merton bring these two factors together in a certain way, he also implied other postulates which we have taken care to elucidate here. Especially questionable among the flaws in Merton's theory are the lack of recognition of the pragmatism of the basic American value system itself, and the tacit assumption, as Cohen (1965) pointed out, that those who find themselves structurally blocked will react pragmatically and rationally. Merton restates his ideas:

For our purposes, this situation involves two important features. First, such antisocial behavior is in a sense "called forth" by certain conventional values of the culture and by the class structure involving differential access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, prestige bearing pursuit of the culture goals. The lack of high integration between the means and ends elements of the cultural pattern and the particular class structure combine to favor a heightened frequency of antisocial
conduct in such groups. The second consideration is of equal significance. Recourse to the first of the alternative responses, legitimate effort, is limited by the fact that actual advance toward desired success goals through conventional channels is, despite our persisting open-class ideology, relatively rare and difficult for those handicapped by little formal education and few economic resources (1938:679).

The attentive reader will observe that Merton's earlier reflections on the American dilemma--the gap between our individualistic, achievement oriented goal of unlimited success for all and the grim historical realities of ethnicity, religion, region, and class--were a good deal more critical. For example, the following footnote was deleted save for the first sentence in the 1949 revision.

The shifting historical role of this ideology is a profitable subject for exploration. The "office-boy-to-president" stereotype was once in approximate accord with the facts. Such vertical mobility was probably more common then than now, when the class structure is more rigid. The ideology largely persists, however, possibly because it still performs a useful function for maintaining the status quo. For insofar as it is accepted by the "masses," it constitutes a useful sop for those who might rebel against the entire structure, were this consoling hope removed. This ideology now serves to lessen the probability of Adaptation V (rebellion). In short, the role of this notion has changed from that of an approximately valid empirical theorem to that of ideology, in Mannheim's sense (1938:679, #15).

One can only speculate on the tacit political undercurrents flowing beneath Merton's efforts that led him to soften his critique of American society in the decade following the Great Depression. In any case, in this early passage one can detect Merton's tacit usage of Marxian perspective to "pry open" Durkheimian anomie in the context of American society and its internal contradictions and deflections of revolutionary possibilities.

Merton next indicates how, from his own special perspective, similar pressures to succeed exert different strains on different social strata. This passage marks one of the crucial transition points between Merton's first and second theses on anomie and innovative deviancy.
The dominant pressure of group standards of success is, therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, expedients of vice and crime. The cultural demands made on persons in this situation are incompatible (1938:679).

Here both upper and lower class deviancy are beset by Parsonsian (normative) cross-pressures, for both are tacitly encouraged to elevate purely pragmatic considerations over legitimate norms. However, the actual historical situation from which which Merton generalized is really rather different than the schematic picture painted here by Merton. First, as we have noted, our cultural values are themselves Pragmatic. Second, Mertonian anomie results not merely from incompatible normative demands, but primarily from the overwhelming emphasis placed by the culture on individual success. In other words, this social pathology is due not merely to normative conflicts --internal contradictions in the Marxian sense--but rather to the incredible and distortive power of the dominant values in themselves. At root, then, the problem is Weberian and Durkheimian, not Marxian. For as Durkheim observed, our vices are merely the "exaggerated or deflected forms of our virtues."

Again, note that both the first and second types of innovative deviancy proceed from the very same cultural pathology, for whereas upper class individuals find their culturally mandated insatiable desires swamping out legitimate and merely bothersome institutional channels, the lower class, in a very different structural situation, finds themselves faced not with institutional norms too weak to restrain their insatiable desires, but, rather with structures too closed to them. They do not enjoy full access to the institutional structures of upward mobility in the first place.

Merton continues, unaware that his description of innovative deviancy has given rise to two very different analyses of structural responses to the same cultural values. Merton's typology has often been touted as the very paradigm of sociological analysis; but, once again, why should the cultural goals themselves remain unexamined?
On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth, and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally. The consequences of such structural inconsistency are psycho-pathological personality, and/or anti-social conduct, and/or revolutionary activities. The equilibrium between culturally designated means and ends becomes highly unstable with the progressive emphasis on attaining the prestige-laden ends by any means whatsoever. Within this context, Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence over morally prescribed "failure," when the channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed in a society which places a high premium on economic affluence and social ascent for all its members (1938:679-80).

In short, normative cross-pressures resulting from structural inconsistencies generate personality problems, anti-social conduct, and perhaps even revolutionary activities! Surely an ambitious theory! One can readily understand how Merton's elegant schema and underlying proposition became the very paradigm of sociological theorizing, especially over against models from other disciplines and fields. But, given these sociocultural tensions, wouldn't the ascendancy of the dominant standard American value system itself represent the triumph of "amoral intelligence"—in terms of our Pragmatic and Utilitarian cultural logics—seen especially in terms of economic and technological activity? Shouldn't Merton also have briefly explored how these particular cultural logics came to dominance? But perhaps this might have led to two uncomfortable conclusions. First, it might have revealed that even "universalistic" values are not universally shared; that they have "particularistic" origins, and perhaps even special continuing sociocultural "carriers." Certainly, they are particularly applied in practice, though perhaps less so in 1970's in America than in the 1930's and 1940's when Merton first wrote. This recognition might have led Merton to more carefully distinguish between "universalism" in values and "universalism" in belief and practice. Indeed, Merton seemed to assume that lower classes do internalize upper and middle class aspirations; but as he later noted, this must be empirically demonstrated, not presumed. Second, had Merton explor-
ed these historical questions of the sociocultural bases of competing systems of legitimate moral and intellectual authority, he might have run directly counter to Weber's theses. For while Merton here assumes a structurally induced pressure toward utilitarian or pragmatic (on the generic level, and thus spelled with a little "u" and "p") attitudes and behavior, Weber suggested the emergence of these very same cultural operating logics (on the specific historical level, and thus capitalized), not from some abstracted notion of "strain in The Social System," but rather from the secularization of "inner-worldly ascetic" Protestantism. Remember, if the dominant American values are themselves Pragmatic and counsel individualistic and insatiable ambition, then in Merton's framework, this state of "malintegration" would be "normal"! In other words, our Central Value System is itself anomie! I believe this to be an inevitable conclusion, given both the inner logic and sociocultural history implied in Durkheim's and Merton's versions of anomie (and given Parsons' rendering of egoism). Indeed, the recognition emerging from our detailed examination of Merton's theses constitutes a compelling foundation for the second schema of anomie as generated by our dominant cultural system (see Book Three). In short, these recognitions include: (a) insatiable ambition is counseled and sanctioned by our value system, and (b) historically, our value system derives from the secularization of ascetic Protestantism.

Merton continues expanding his main theme in a series of succinct and insightful passages that made his essays classics.

... other phases of the social structure besides the extreme emphasis on pecuniary success must be considered if we are to understand the social sources of anti-social behavior. A high frequency of deviate behavior is not generated simply by "lack of opportunity" or by this exaggerated pecuniary emphasis. A comparatively rigidified class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may limit such opportunities far beyond the point which obtains in our society today. It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain common symbols of success for the entire population at large while its social structure rigorously restricts or
completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquiring these symbols for a considerable part of the same population, that antisocial behavior ensues on a considerable scale. In other words, our egalitarian ideology denies by implication the existence of noncompeting groups and individuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success. The same body of success symbols is held to be desirable for all. These goals are held to transcend class lines, not to be bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is such that there exist class differentials in the accessibility of these common success symbols. Frustration and thwarted aspiration lead to the search for avenues of escape from a culturally induced intolerable situation; or unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit attempts to acquire the dominant values. The American stress on pecuniary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses, and anti-social behavior (1938:680).

Again, Merton's theses here rest on the notion of "internal contradictions" or "strain in The Social System." Surely Merton has performed valuable service in exploring the cross-pressures exerted upon individuals of different strata by competing values of Pragmatism, success, law and order, and so on. Further, Merton incisively observes that our egalitarian ethos compounds the tensions by implicitly denying that actual differences in equality of opportunity exist. Such a "moral alchemy" deflects criticism away from the societal structure, and back onto the lone individual who internalizes these values, but meets with a contradictory reality. Such failure is then explained away by these "moral alchemies" which transmute "base" failure into new cultural gold. If, indeed, as American culture proclaims, every man may become a king, then the failure of any individual, even a deprived one from the lower classes, to achieve part of whole of the American dream is forced back upon the individual himself as wholly his fault, and hence individualized in terms of his lack of character or ethical virtue. Surely such "moral alchemies" have tacit, deeply embedded ethical bases.

In his own way, Merton is debunking the actualization of the dream, and not the dream itself. Indeed, few men have typified the dreamt of rapid upward mobility than Merton himself, who skyrocketed from a Philadelphia immigrant slum to
the pinnacle of American academia in a few short decades (see M. Hunt, 1961). In his own way, Merton was calling us to make the dream real for all. Although Merton began, with Durkheim, by emphasizing the content of the success ethic, especially its insatiability and egoism, he turned instead to another perspective. Merton's real point is that our success goals are universalized, but the means for achievement are not. The momentous historical breakthrough to an egalitarian, achievement ethos slights the historical fact that the instrumental means, the institutional channels, of achievement are still so often differentially distributed. In short, Mertonian anomie rests on the disjunction between universalistic goals and particularized structural opportunities.

However, this means that Merton, in turn, accepts these same universalistic goals as givens, and thus shifts attention away from the question of the legitimacy of these goals to the problems of the structured inequality confronting lower strata. Hence, Mertonian anomie raises essentially a distribution problem—how to open up the doors to let more in. It is a problem in social engineering for a liberal society. But Durkheim, on the other hand, meant anomie to refer to the content of these goals, as counseling an "infinity of dreams and desires." To Durkheim, anomie referred to the constitutive foundations of the whole social and cultural structure, not merely to a few peripheral classes. To Durkheim, anomie and egoisme were most rampant precisely among the more progressive, not the backward, sectors of society. As Lynch (1966:45) suggests, "... an ideal that seems to be commanded and that is also hopeless" can be the source of cultural, social, and personal pathology. I repeat: for Durkheim, these "ideals" of unending "progress and perfection," "daily represented as virtues," are impossible and destructive for all, not just a few.

Further, in his original essay, Merton took pains to point out that this state of anomic malintegration does not
simply result from blocked opportunities of oppressed strata alone. Nor does Mertonian anomie, in the American historical context, refer to a simple inconsistency between cultural goals and structural means. Rather, Mertonian anomie actually refers primarily to our own type of society dominated by extreme emphasis on values of individual achievement and success for all, contrasted with the historical realities of structured inequality. Although pitched abstractly on the formal level, Merton himself came very close to the core of his thesis which could also serve as a epigrammatic summary for the present dissertation: "... a cardinal American virtue, "ambition," promotes a cardinal American vice, "deviant behavior" (1957:146).

4. Anomie, Poverty, and Crime

Merton then turned to explore the relations between anomie, crime, and poverty. He began by rejecting simple, linear correlations between crime and poverty. Rather, he proposed that anomie acts as a crucial intervening variable between these two social phenomena.

This theoretical analysis may go far toward explaining the varying correlations between crime and poverty. Poverty is not an isolated variable. It is one in a complex of interdependent social and cultural variables. When viewed in such a context, it represents quite different states of affairs. Poverty as such, and consequent limitation of opportunity, are not sufficient to induce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behavior. Even the often mentioned "poverty in the midst of plenty" will not necessarily lead to this result. Only insofar as poverty and associated disadvantages in competition for cultural values approved for all members of the society is linked with the assimilation of a cultural emphasis on monetary accumulation as a symbol of success is anti-social conduct a "normal" outcome.... It is only when the full configuration is considered, poverty, limited opportunity and a commonly shared system of success symbols, that we can explain the higher association between poverty and crime in our society than in others where rigidified class structure is coupled with differential class symbols of achievement (1938:680-81).

Now, among others, Ephraim Mizruchi has noted a discrepancy between Durkheim's and Merton's ideas on anomie and poverty. Mizruchi questions whether various classes share the same
aspirations as Merton presumes.

The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its focus is on means rather than on ends, assumes relatively uniform aspirations across the class structure, and a greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower classes. This theory, however, largely ignores observations made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, among others, regarding the relatively low levels of aspiration which characterizes those at the lowest level of the class structure, and it ignores certain qualitative differences within and between the classes (1967:441).

The question Mizruchi raises here concerns not consensus, but differential aspirations. Are the same goals shared by all classes? As we discovered earlier in the section on "Conformity" as the modal response, in his 1957 "Continuities" essay Merton showed himself sensitive to criticism by Herbert Hyman and others that "... clearly Merton's analysis assumes that the cultural goal is in actuality internalized by lower class individuals." There we saw that Merton (eg. 1957:171) responded with the weak claim that, in terms of absolute numbers rather than the percentages that social scientists prefer, more of the lower classes are differentially subject to these crosspressures than upper classes.

In essence, Mizruchi, Hyman, and others have posed a critical problem for Merton's schema: are, in fact, the dominant cultural aspirations and achievement goals, especially insatiable individual aspiration underlain by ethical sanctions, uniformly internalized among all sectors of the population? Or, on the contrary, do different sectors and classes, especially traditional, national, and ethnic minorities or even regional minorities, have relatively different kinds or lower levels of goals and aspirations? According to Merton's premises, one would expect that some of the lower classes would inculcate the dominant aspirations, and the more they find themselves structurally blocked, the more they would pragmatically turn to "innovative deviancy" to get what they had been promised but had been denied by structured inequality. On the contrary, however, much empirical evidence shows that traditionally backward or oppressed strata simply do not share upper or even middle class expectations; rather, they
are often permeated with what one observer brilliantly called an "analgesic subculture" (Richard Ball, 1968). As Weber noted with his concept of "traditionalism" (and Merton with his notion of "fatalistic" versus "activistic" societies, 1971), here the major emphasis is on maintaining one's traditional level of subsistence, security, conservatism, low risk-taking, and various means of escape and/or masochism. It is an entirely different ethical world-view than the one which counsels pragmatic and calculated revolt of "getting back" or "getting on."

Merton's problem here stemmed from his unwarranted presumption that universalistic achievement values are universally embraced; in effect, that the Protestant Ethos is the norm for the whole population. He assumed "relatively uniform aspirations across the class structure." But we are perhaps more justified in presuming that rather different values, aspirations, level of expectations, and so forth are identified with different ethnic, national, or socioreligious groups. Hence, Merton's original presumption that universalistic values were particularistically structured in practice needs to be taken back one step further--namely, that to a great extent, our universalistic values are themselves particularistic--that is, not only differentially distributed but perhaps even emerging from powerfully situated cultural minorities (eg. the New England Puritans and their descendants). In other words, not only are structures of opportunity differentially distributed, but the culture of aspiration and values are also differentially distributed and emerge from special groups.
5. Merton Versus Durkheim and Weber

Why didn't Merton directly examine Durkheim's ideas on anomie? Why did Merton (and Parsons) slight certain critical features in Durkheim's work? Why didn't Merton relate his own analyses of the American success ethic to Weber's theses? And most importantly, why didn't Merton connect Weber's theses to Durkheim's? More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Merton should have recognized some links between his own theorizing on anomie, Durkheim's insights into the modern cultural sanctioning of anomie and egoism, and Weber's historical insights into the Protestant Ethos. The fact that Merton did not make these connections constitutes a mystery problem in the history of American sociological theory. Let us now briefly consider some of the reasons why we might have expected such an explicit convergence on Merton's part, and some conjectures why this revolutionary synthesis was not forthcoming.

First, let us consider Merton's background and his interests at the time he wrote "Social Structure and Anomie." Now, Merton had certainly been thoroughly exposed to what some thought were striking and significant convergences in Durkheim's and Weber's thought. As a student and then colleague, Merton was sensitized to these possibilities by the leading theorist of this persuasion, Talcott Parsons. Moreover, Merton himself was reworking themes borrowed from Durkheim and Weber at the same time. In the same year in which his famous "Social Structure and Anomie" was published (1938), Merton published his less famous, but equally important, doctoral dissertation Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England, in which he brilliantly applied Weber's theses to the development and legitimation of early modern Utilitarian science and technology in seventeenth century, post-Puritan Revolution England. Thus, the youthful Merton provided us with profound reworkings of both Weber's and Durkheim's theses in the same year, applying Weber's theses on the relationship between the Protestant Ethos and the development of
science and technology in England, and applying Durkheim's theses on anomie to American culture and internal contradictions in American society. Surely these simultaneous interests with the support of the Parsonian framework might have led us to expect a similar striking convergence between Durkheim and Weber in Merton's subsequent work on anomie in American society. Yet none was forthcoming. Why?

Let us further consider the curious fact that although Merton's discussion of the "cult of success" in American culture corresponds closely with the standard connotation of the Protestant Ethos, Merton nowhere refers to Weber's work on this subject, even though it was central to Merton's own themes. If Merton himself detected the moral sanctions underlying the deformations caused by the extreme individualism and insatiability of aspirations of the American Dream, why didn't he refer to Weberian themes? It is interesting to note that at least two observers, noting that Merton's notion of anomie, like Weber's analyses of the spirit of the modern era, rests on the cultural pervasiveness of unending pursuit of success, went so far as to propose that "Merton's anomie thesis is not a development of Durkheim's treatment of anomie, but a restatement, considerably simplified, of Weber's analysis of the Protestant Ethic" (Turner and Scott, 1965:240).

It is even more strange that when Merton finally did cite Weber in his articles relating to anomie, it served mainly to obfuscate the real and potential significance of the latter's insights for the former's exploration of the pathologies of American culture. When Merton cited Weber, it was not to indicate the relevance of the "Protestant Ethic" to Merton's own discussion of the American ethos of individual success, nor to link Weber's theses to Durkheim's. Rather, he cites Weber, amazingly enough, in a negative way.

This heavy accent of financial success is, of course, not peculiar to Americans. Max Weber's analytical and long-standing observation is still much in point: the impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money has in itself nothing to do with capitalism (and in the present instance nothing to do specifically with the American culture).
This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth (1957:167).

However, contrary to the thrust of this reference, what Weber was trying to do in the passage Merton cited from Weber's "Author's Introduction" to his unfinished collected works in the sociology of religion (see, for example, Benjamin Nelson, 1975) and in the second chapter on "The Spirit of Capitalism" in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, was to set aside precisely such misleading identifications of traditional economic motivations with the peculiarly modern type of functional rationality and this-worldly vocational asceticism practiced especially by the Calvinistic branches of Protestantism. Merton's use of this quote and his parenthetical insertion to the effect that the traditional economic impulse of greed is so universally applicable that the specific ethos of American culture needs no special explanation is misleading in the extreme. One wonders why Merton did it. For the real thrust of Weber's theses is precisely the opposite of what Merton intimates here.

Finally, we may note that Merton admitted into his discussion an important historical insight, properly coming from Weber, when he spoke of the "paradoxical emergence of 'individualists' from an 'idealistic' orientation." Recognition of this historical paradox underlying the foundations of American morality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of Durkheim's anomie and egoisme, especially as they relate to Weber's parallel Protestant Ethos theses. Even Merton himself tacitly acknowledged that this dominant Pragmatic attitude of functional rationality, seemingly devoid of visible ethical consideration, could have had its origins and continuing sanction in a deeply idealistic orientation demanding absolute individualism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, insatiable or unending drives for progress and perfection in this world, and the active, consensual mastery of the natural givenness of world, self, and
society for God's glory; in short, the basic elements of the Protestant Ethos. Although the resonances in much of Merton's description of the American cult of individual success with Weber's historical insights are striking, as with Durkheim, Merton simply neglected to link his work on anomie with Weber.

I suggest that we view Merton's simultaneous tacit rhetorical incorporation of Weber's ideas and his failure to explicitly explore the potential significance of Weberian themes, especially as they converged with Durkheim's critiques, on two levels: (a) the analytical-methodological level, and (b) the substantive cultural-historical level. As Merton veered away from the cultural historical level down to the social psychological level of analysis, he blunted (whether consciously or unconsciously) the critical edge of Durkheim's and Weber's theses as they applied to American culture and modern society in general. First, although Merton had already demonstrated his virtuosity as a historian of science and culture in applying Weber's ideas to the development of seventeenth century English science and technology, Merton did not follow through with further path-breaking work on that level. Rather, he turned instead to the micro, ahistorical level of abstracted social psychological analysis. In this perspective, Merton's work takes an added dimension in the history of American sociology, since as a scholar capable of numerous levels of analysis, Merton turned toward the one most preferred by the implicit nominalism of American sociologists. Comparing Merton's later work with Weber's "periods," Benjamin Nelson observes:

There have been some moves of a comparable sort in the work of Merton, but these have only been hints. His thrust has been different; instead of moving out toward the comparative historical sociology of sociocultural process, he has tended to develop an ever more keen concentration in the areas or the boundaries of the sociological psychology of social and cultural process. For Merton this dissertation may be said to represent the high point of his efforts in historical sociology rather than a point of departure.... To the great loss of instruction and research in our country--in my view--the several strains of his dissertation tended to draw apart during the years after his dissertation.... We witness a thrust toward the frames of reference which
came to serve as the formats of highly institutionalized theoretical and empirical work mainly in the sphere of a sophisticated sociological social psychology oriented to non-temporal horizons (1972b:229-30).

Nelson then suggests that Merton's impact on American sociological theory stems largely from the essay we are considering here, which seemed to offer a workable paradigm, a theory in the "middle range" suitable to the particular cultural and social environment of American theory.

... It was Merton's seminal paper "Social Structure and Anomie," published in the same year as the dissertation, which was to set the pattern for the "normal science" in departments of sociology at great American universities, and which became the "launching pad" for a great number of American doctoral dissertations and research monographs. This was the study which was to become the model of the so-called structural-functional analysis in the manner now regularly ascribed to Durkheim.... The road Merton was to take was to become the high road of American sociology and the one he was to visit only occasionally was to undergo very great neglect (1972b:231).

Of course, my hope in the present dissertation is to partly remedy that "very great neglect."

Now, we have repeatedly noted that Merton rarely questions the moral legitimacy of the dominant values as did Durkheim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber. Both Durkheim and Weber took up highly critical stances toward the very values which Merton appears to have taken for granted. Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not that they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that these "infinity of dreams and desires" flowed directly from our culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfection." They were, in a real sense, "chronic," the "normal" forms of our "moral anarchy." Further, who can forget the anguished tones with which Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has achieved a level of civilization never before achieved."

Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted conformity to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as Merton so often seemed to do. Remember that Durkheim proposed that poverty serves as protection against anomie and suicide. Strangely,
Merton managed to invert the real critical thrust of Durkheim's and Weber's most profound paradigms of the modern world—for what is relatively normal to Merton was anomie to Durkheim, and an "iron cage" to Weber!

Hence, we see that the pathology of anomie for Merton represents at root a problem of social mechanics and not, as with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central value systems of the modern world. Here we discover the relative narrowness of Merton's emerging social psychological framework in contrast to the scope of the progenitors' ideas with which he worked. For Durkheim and Weber argued from both within a deeply informed historical and comparative sociocultural analytical framework, and from a moral perspective on human nature. The ultimate force of Durkheim's *Suicide* and Weber's *Protestant Ethic*... theses rest on their perceptions of the destructive impact of modern psycho-socio-cultural demands upon human nature. Proceeding from these tacit, embedded images of human nature as anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot stand up alone under an "infinity of dreams and desires" (suicide and ecocide being the result), while Weber argued that attempts by self-proclaimed "visible saints" to master world, self, and society for God's glory and to build His Kingdom on earth binds all of us irrevocably in an inexorably tightening "iron cage."

Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the very hearts and souls of modern men.

Finally, I suggest that if Merton had explicitly linked his theses to those of Weber, he might have had to face some revealing difficulties. If, for instance, our culture is permeated by Utilitarian-Pragmatic, and individualist rationales in the first place, then why do we need the abstracted notion of sociocultural malintegration and "strain in The Social System" to explain this situation after the fact? If anomie is a sign of malintegration or "moral anarchy," it is one which is deeply rooted in our traditional values. For such anomie is due not simply to the release of the ego from all previous constraints, but rather is itself constructed and constantly reinforced by our most central values. Further, Merton's view of
anomic innovation—representing the purely individualistic
Pragmatic pursuit of success—can in one sense be seen as a
translation of the Hobbesian problem into the context of Amer-
ican society. But Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or
absence of restraining norms in the context of the Puritan Re-
bellion and English Civil War, while Merton's anomie context
is the consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms.
Hence, if our situation is anomic and Hobbesian, it is because
our values themselves are the ones which lead (perhaps ironi-
cally) to anomic and Hobbesian outcomes. We thus reach again,
from a different point of approach, the troublesome conclusion
that our state of malintegration, of "moral anarchy," is norm-
al.

Indeed, had Merton turned to explore the historical and
continuing moral sanctions of our sociocultural values he might
have run directly counter to Weber's theses. For whereas Mer-
ton assumed a structurally induced pressure toward Utilitarian
or Pragmatic attitudes and behaviors, Weber's theses suggest
the emergence of these very same cultural operating logics from
the secularization of inner-worldly ascetic Protestantism.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion—if the dominant American
values are themselves Pragmatic and counsel individualistic
and insatiable ambition, then, again, in Merton's own frame-
work, this state of malintegration would be normal. Our Cen-
tral Value System is itself anomie! Coming at it from a slight-
ly different angle, since Weber's theses suggest the derivation
of our main cultural sanctions for individual achievement and
drives for success, progress and perfection from the Protest-
ant Ethos, had Merton explicitly admitted Weber's theses into
his schema it would have suggested, especially in terms of his
first proposition concerning anomic deviancy, that our dominant
cultural values are themselves the source of anomie and social
pathology! For, in sum, (a) insatiable ambition is counseled
and sanctioned by our values, and (b) our central valuesystem
is a translation and secularization of ascetic Protestantism.
Surely as with Parsons, to acknowledge that our Central Value
System is itself anomie would have been unacceptable.
Preface. The basic outlines of Merton's famous essay have entertained the attentions of various theorists in extending his typology. Marshall Clinard (1964:23) noted major additions and reformulations of Merton's theory by Parsons, Robert Dubin, Richard Cloward, and Albert Cohen. We shall explore the contributions by the first three here, with the addition of Frank Harary's extension, while leaving Cohen's ideas to the next chapter on critiques of Mertonian anomie. Each of these extensions builds on Merton's basic premises and typology, and consists largely either of further and more explicit sub-divisions of categories, or of the addition of new categories.

A. Parsons' Extension

In the magnum opus of his abstracted social theory, The Social System (chapter seven, 1951), Talcott Parsons reformulates Merton's schema by incorporating it as "a very important special case" (1951:258) in a more generalized theory of deviance and social control. Parsons' usage of Merton's schema is rather interesting in the history of contemporary sociological theory in that Parsons here adopts, so to speak, one of his own grandchildren. Parsons' anomie rests here, as it did over a decade before when he originally inspired Merton's theory, on the notion of the malintegration in the socio-cultural "relational" system. Strain in these "interactive systems" generates pressures for deviance and change, a theme Merton himself returned to in his 1957 "Continuities" essay.

Let us first very briefly recall the thrust of Parsons' original interpretation of the meaning of anomie. Haunted by the "Hobbesian dilemma," Parsons seized upon Durkheim's ano-
mie as a social structural and cultural explanation of the breakdown of social order. However, Parsons deftly shifted the crucial thrust of Durkheim's anomie from the "infinity of dreams and desires" to the lack of definiteness of social expectations and moral obligations, a subtle but tremendous­ly significant shift in meaning. Parsons thus translated Durk­heim's profound concern about the infiniteness of expectations into the lack of definiteness or clarity of expectations, which leads to malintegration and, ultimately, to disintegra­tion of The Social System. As Parsons puts it, in his version "anomie represents a pathology not of the instrumental but of the collective normative system" (1968a:316).

Since Parsons' intention here is to go beyond Merton by generalizing an elaborate functional theory of deviance and social control, Parsons' account contains much more than the reformulation of Merton's anomie schema. Parsons is concerned with major areas such as: psychological needs and dispositions, social expectations, social interaction, strains in interaction, motivations, ambivalency, frustration, anxiety, etc. as res­ponses to strain; expressions or types of deviance, variance in clarity and definiteness of norms and sanctions, pragmatic situational factors in the genesis of deviance, role conflicts and the social patterning of deviant behavior, problems of claims to legitimacy, opportunity structures, mechanisms of social control, structured strains and social change, etc. However, here we shall be concerned mainly with his reformu­lated typology of modes of deviant orientation.

Parsons, like Merton, begins by assuming the most cri­tical factor—namely, conformity and normative consensus. Par­sons then sets out to consider the "other side of the coin, the processes by which resistances to conformity with social expectations develop" (1951:249). In general terms, Parsons takes conformity to be relatively unproblematic, and roughly synonymous with social integration, and deviance as synonymous with disturbances or "strains" in the social interactional e­quilibrium. Parsons accords the image of "strain" a key role in the genesis of deviance for he views these disruptive
"strains" as resulting from ambiguities, conflicts, or breakdowns in social expectations. Hence, "strains" are disturbances, or forms of localized "social friction" disrupting the "normal flow" of social interaction. As Smelser remarks:

The concept of strain is not identical with the concept of deviance; it constitutes one of the main responses giving rise to deviant responses.... As the phrase "from whatever source" indicates, Parsons is not initially concerned with the origin or disequilibrium or strain.... The main idea is that strain on the system of interaction frustrates expectations (1971:27).

However, as Smelser, a former student and colleague of Parsons, indicates, even this absolutely crucial concept of Parsons is not without its own ambiguity.

Strain is not a single variable but a system of variables--conditions that give rise to strain, strain itself, and mechanisms to reduce strain. Furthermore, strain gives rise to a number of responses, only one of which is deviant behavior.... Further refinement of the model would require a systematic classification of the types of sources of strain, the means of reducing strain, and the alternate responses to strain and an indication of the conditions under which strain would give rise to deviance and not another kind of response (1971:28).

A tall order indeed! Although Smelser suggests the minimum requirements for specifying systematically the meanings and types of strains, he perhaps misses the key point that Parsons' notion of strain may never be fully specified, since it, like almost all key concepts, rests on a metaphor, here a mechanical metaphor, whose very fruitfulness for extension from the natural to the social sciences depends on its latent ambiguity. If we were able to restrict this connotation to a precise and delimited denotation, Parsons' effort might prove impossible.

Noting that deviance may be defined in two ways by referring either to the individual or the patterns of social interaction, Parsons begins his typology by starting with the possible directions of deviant motivation itself. As Clinard has usefully summarized this position: "Parsons attempts to characterize types of motivational responses in terms of active and passive orientations, alienative or conformative need dispositions within the motivational structure, and the relation
of the person to social objects and to normative patterns" (1964:24). Parsons' typology rests on a series of dichotomous polarities: active/passive, positive (conformity)/negative (alienative) action, persons/norms, dominative/submissive. Thus, out of such polar orientations Parsons constructs a complex table containing eight major "directions of deviant behavior" (see figure 9).

**Figure 9:**

Parsons' Table of Deviant Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Activity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Passivity</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compulsive Performance Orientation</td>
<td>Compulsive Acquiescence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Social Objects</td>
<td>Focus on Social Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Norms</td>
<td>Focus on Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsive Enforcement</td>
<td>Perfectionistic Observance (Merton's ritualism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebelliousness</td>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness toward Social Object</td>
<td>Incorrigibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsive Independence</td>
<td>Evasion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Parsons' typology and his theory of deviant behavior are extraordinarily complex, a number of preliminary conclusions relative to our present concerns may be sketched. First, whoever wishes to construct a systematic theory of deviance and social control should at least attempt to decipher Parsons' elaborate scheme since it represents one of the most complete analytical statements on deviance from the functional school. Whatever its limitations, these derive largely from the more general analytical framework, and not the specific analysis alone. Second, Parsons' claim that his reformulation is congruent with Merton's more famous typology is contestable. As Smelser observes:

The cases of "equilibrated condition" and "conformity," "compulsive acquiescence" and "ritualism," and "withdrawal" and "retreatism" appear to be relatively straight-
forward instances of logical parallelism, and justify Parsons' claim. The cases of "compulsive performance" and "innovation" as well as "rebelliousness" and "rebellion" are more questionable (1971:32).

Coining new labels for old realities, one wonders why Parsons would advance this claim. Perhaps the "latent function" of Parsons' claim is to share in some of the reflected glory of Merton's famous schema, for as we have discovered, although Parsons may have originally inspired Merton's anomie, his own interpretation remained more obscure.

Further, despite its apparent comprehensiveness, Parsons' theory of deviance and social control is both logically and empirically incomplete. Such incompleteness should be viewed not as merely a localized flaw but rather as a generic problem in Parsons' mode of theorizing. In this regard, Smelser remarks that Parsons' analyses cannot directly be derived from his basic propositions, and instead rests on a whole series of tacit judgments; a major failing in one who claims the mantle of systematic theory.

Why was only one of several possible nonderived psychological reactions to strain on the interaction system chosen as a primary dimension for the classification of directions of deviance?... Parsons' derivations leave unanswered the question as to why these two types of individual reactions to institutionalized role expectations, rather than others, were chosen as the basic for the theoretical classifications of deviant tendencies (Smelser, 1971:33).

In addition, Smelser rightly characterizes Parsons' implied "logical ordering as very loose" and permeated by "... a kind of openness or indeterminacy with respect to specific outcomes" (1971:33). Also, Smelser catches the type of analysis with which Parsons is centrally concerned, its virtues and failings, in the following way:

... The type of propositions emerging from Parsons' analysis is that of a general class of independent variables (eg. several types of strain) and causally linked to a general class of dependent variables (eg. several types deviance). Because of this looseness of theoretical structure, it is not possible to relate a specific type of strain (eg. role conflict) to a specific deviant tendency (eg. compulsive conformity) (1971:33).
If, after reading this insightful critique by one of Parsons own circle, we ask ourselves: what then are the virtues of such analysis? Its supposed virtues might include: (a) a clear conception of generic elements, yet these cannot be adequately determined in a wholly deductive fashion; (b) its level of analysis which we have discovered has more to do with the abstracted claim of universality than with complexity of subject; (c) its formal and systematic character which yet seems both logically and empirically incomplete. Is it too much, then, to surmise that the claimed virtues of this mode of analysis also conceal its vices?

Finally, we are led to wonder once again about anomie as a protean concept here yielding yet another different set of typologies. While some might view this situation as illustrating the cumulativeness of social scientific knowledge, I merely ask: are all these variant typologies really derived from Durkheim's? Are they really compatible with one another? Are they empirically grounded? Or significant? Or even necessary? What ever happened to anomie?

B. Robert Dubin's Typology

Apparently, Robert Dubin experienced something like an explosion of interest in abstracted, formal theory in the late 1950's vis-a-vis Parsons and Merton. For in 1959 Dubin published an extensive reformulation of Merton's typology of deviance in his essay "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continuities in Social Theory," and in 1960 he published an extensive analytical critique and reformulation of Parsons' paradigm of social action in his article "Parsons' Actor: Continuities in Social Theory." Dubin's twin forays into "Continuities in Social Theory" seemed a challenge to these two leaders of American sociological theory, and, in a singular privilege accorded few peers, both Parsons and Merton apparently felt constrained to respond to Dubin's challenge. This interchange brought forth Parsons' important "Pattern Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert Dubin," and a response from Merton which we shall briefly examine here.
Dubin's sympathetic, yet ambivalent, analysis is significant for our present purposes in a number of ways: while formally laudatory, it also offers a number of telling criticisms; while accepting much of Merton's basic theme, it is much more circumspect and precise; and while on one level, Dubin's extension of Merton's typology is a compliment, on another level it unwittingly serves to reveal the absurdity of empty, a priori typologizing. The beginning and conclusion of Dubin's paper are most interesting. Dubin begins by proposing that "A complete theoretical model must specify the [empirical] outcomes." In his conclusion, Dubin reiterates this initial thesis, and then explicitly states that both his and Merton's typologies represent "... only part theories describing predictable states; they are not a theory of deviant behavior" (1959:162). Dubin is generally more careful than Merton to indicate the specific nature and limitations of his theory; he repeatedly (and correctly) emphasizes that his and Merton's contributions lie merely with the more or less sophisticated elaboration of a descriptive typology of deviant possibilities.

... our effort is to explore the range of outcomes of behavior called deviant, not to propound a theory of deviance.... This is not a theory of how deviant behavior occurs, nor why it occurs. It is simply a descriptive typology of the range of mutually exclusive types of non-conforming behavior.... These typologies are only part theories. Theoretical models of deviant behavior which explain why and how such behavior occurs remain to be constructed (1959:162,163,164).

Dubin's programmatic theses here are important because they corroborate my interpretation of the internal validity and potency of Merton's famous schema. In my judgment, Dubin is certainly correct in delimiting the thrust of these typological efforts as basically descriptive and not explanatory; it brings to mind Homan's charge that Parsons' work is more taxonomic than propositional. Such a conclusion runs directly counter to Merton's claim to have put forward a major theory which explains deviance.

Dubin also pointed out that Merton's schema did not spe-
cify any laws of interaction, hence ignoring the crucial social interactional processes between people and statuses. Finally, Dubin also rightly characterizes Merton’s theory as basically pitched at the social psychological level, not at the social structural level which it initially proclaims.

Now, the main body of Dubin's article is caught up in elaborating an extension of Merton's typology. Building on Merton's major categories, Dubin also distinguishes between institutional norms and means, and between actual behavior and orientation to values. By repeatedly subdividing the new and old categories, Dubin finally arrives at a list of fourteen main types of deviant adaptations, although he notes that there actually may exist twenty-seven possible modes of adaptation (see figure 10).

**Figure 10:**
Dubin's Typology of Deviant Adaptations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Deviant Adaptation</th>
<th>Mode of Attachment to Cultural Goals</th>
<th>Institutional Norms</th>
<th>Institutional Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Innovation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Invention</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Invention</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Invention</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Innovation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Invention</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Invention</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Movement</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Ritualism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveling of Aspirations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Moralist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Automation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Ritualism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demogogue</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Opportunist</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means Opportunist</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retreatism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = acceptance
- = rejection
± = rejection and substitution (active rejection)

Dubin's extension and reformulation are valuable in that they introduce greater consistency, rigor, and clarity into Merton's schema. Yet, what started out to be a valuable addition to Merton's theory ends up unwittingly in self-parody. What can we do with such an overwrought monster of a typological system such as this? If Merton's general schema was
demonstrably incomplete, at least its simplistic clarity allowed us to grasp it and attempt to apply it. But Dubin's typology overwhelms us with a vacuous series of permutations. Paradoxically, instead of a clear and definite step forward, Dubin's typology signifies the reductio ad absurdum of formalistic, empty, abstracted theorizing. Such hair-splitting can be elaborated ad infinitum et nauseam.

One should always know when to stop, but apparently Dubin's challenge to typological jousting got the better of Merton, and he responded. I now merely direct the reader's attention to the tone of Merton's response (1959), and ask that it be compared with Parsons' response to Dubin's other challenge. While Dubin's analytical critique stimulated Parsons to an important revision of one of his doctrines, by contrast Merton's response gives one a feeling of intellectual pique. No important revision of his theory was forthcoming; we should not miss the irony in this, for it was Merton who always held for the cumulativeness and codification of theory, and here it was Parsons and Dubin who advanced in fraternal argument while Merton and Dubin merely quarrelled. While at one point he favorably comments on Dubin's contribution, Merton seemingly takes affront at Dubin's intrusion into what had previously been Merton's own private domain.

**C. Richard Cloward's Contribution**

Richard Cloward, one of Merton's own students, is credited by Merton with initiating a new phase in the theory of anomie and opportunity structures. To Merton's schema, Cloward adds the hitherto unspecified, yet strategic, variable of "differentials in availability of illegitimate means." In his well known article "Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior" (1959), appearing in the same journal issue as Dubin's reformulation and Merton's response, Cloward explicitly proposes his new "variable" as the key link between divergent theoretical interpretations of deviance. Cloward set out to "consolidate the two major sociological traditions of thought
about the problem of deviant behavior"—namely, the anomie stream and the "differential association" and "cultural transmission" tradition exemplified by Sutherland. In these terms, Cloward proposes his "strategic new variable" as constituting Phase III of the "anomie tradition."

Cloward questions Merton's tacit assumption that "... illegitimate means are freely available," and observes:

... the notion that innovating behavior may result from unfulfilled aspirations and imperfect socialization with respect to conventional norms implies that illegitimate means are freely available, as if the individual, having decided that "you can't make it legitimately," then simply turns to illegitimate means which are readily at hand whatever his position in the social structure (1959:167).

Cloward then correctly notes that since Merton's anomie theory already explicitly recognizes the differential distribution of legitimate means of achievement, it should also now recognize, by simple extension, differentials in access to illegitimate means. (Merton's original "blind spot" is instructive).

By adding this strategically important, but overlooked variable, Cloward both modulates some of the simplistic rationalism and gaps of Merton's original formulation, and begins to tie in with the more empirically grounded theories of Sutherland and his school. In this regard, Cloward observes that Merton's theses about "strains in the sociocultural system" are inadequate explanations of the actual genesis of deviant processes, i.e. "... motivations or pressures toward deviance do not fully account for deviant behavior." Instead, Cloward proposes as intervening variables both "learning structures" and "opportunity structures" which provide the link with Sutherland's "differential association" tradition.

Further, Cloward's account is valuable in that it begins to specify more fully the "circumstances under which various modes of deviant behavior arise." For example, in terms of "retreatism," Cloward differs from Merton in that he views this deviant adaptation as a "double failure." Cloward notes that in Merton's view a "crucial element encouraging retreatism is internalized constraint concerning the use of illegiti-
mate means. But this element need not be present" (1959:175). Merton apparently assumed that such prohibitions were essential, since in their absence, the logic of his schema would compel him to predict that innovating behavior would result. But the assumption that the individual uninhibited in the use of illegitimate means becomes an innovator presupposes that successful innovation is only a matter of rational motivation, frustrated by the initial lack of proper outlets.

Once the concept of differentials in access to illegitimate means is introduced, however, it becomes clear that retreatism is possible even in the absence of internalized prohibitions.... retreatist adaptations may arise ... among those who are failures in both worlds, conventional and illegitimate alike (1959:175).

Now, Merton responded most favorably to his student Cloward's extension of the theory of anomie and opportunity structures, and its linkage with the other major school on interpreting deviancy at that time. In a short series of crucial admissions, Merton accepts Cloward's reformulation of the "social distribution of pressures for deviant behavior."

As Cloward now shows, this assumes by default that access to deviant or illegitimate means for reaching a valued goal is uniformly available. He corrects this unwitting and, it appears, untrue assumption by dealing with socially patterned differences of access in learning how to perform particular kinds of deviant roles and of access to opportunity for carrying them out.... Pressures for deviant behavior are construed as a function of access to both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures (1959:188).

Second, Merton accepts Cloward's point in terms of the "social distribution of vulnerability to pressures for deviant behavior." Merton admits that even his later suggestions about variance in socialization say little about the conditions predisposing individual toward one or another mode of adaptation.

Pressures for deviant behavior are one thing; actual rates of deviant behavior, quite another. I made a slight and insufficient effort to distinguish the two and to bridge the gap by distinguishing socially generated pressures for deviance from vulnerability to these processes. Socially patterned differences in the content and processes of socialization were said to affect vulnerability to pressure for one or another type of deviant behavior.... But, as Cloward shows, this is
at best no more than a bare beginning. It is necessary to identify other sociological variables that intervene between structurally induced pressure for deviant behavior and actual rates of such behavior (1959:188).

Finally, Merton accepts Cloward's refocus on the problem of the sequence and process of taking up one deviant role or another.

Toward the close of his paper, Cloward begins to develop an idea that is practically unnoticed in my own work, is implicit in Dubin's paper, and is greatly advanced in forthcoming articles by Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. This is the concept of patterned sequences of deviant roles, and of the conditions of social structure making for one or another sequence.... I did not see the problem that Cloward brings into focus: that it should be possible to work out the conditions making for patterned sequences of deviant behavior.... Cloward moves beyond [my] occasional remarks, poses the problem of deviant adaptations, and suggests processes making for one or another sequence. His observations on "double failure"--in both legitimate and illegitimate endeavors--as a prelude to retreatism afford one example (1959:189).

Even with these gracious admissions by Merton and his public subsidy of Cloward's reformulation, this new phase of anomie theory has not been without criticism. As Clinard notes, Cloward and Ohlin's theory (up to 1964) has been criticized for being:

1. largely culture-bound, and restricted to the ethnic and minority situation existing in large urban areas in the U.S. today;
2. not stating clearly the success goal aspirations of slum boys, except the economic and educational goals;
3. assuming that such goals are appreciated in all segments of society;
4. barely recognizing the extensive violations of ethical and legal norms in the general adult society among all classes (Clinard, 1964:30).

Finally, Short et al (1965) have observed that their data on gangs in Chicago, to which the Merton-Cloward-Ohlin theory should apply, does not support some of these theories. They conclude: "The logic of the theory clearly presumes that perceptions of opportunities precede involvement in delinquency, while our data reflect perceptions 'after the fact'" (1965:66). But perhaps just as important is their opening observation. They note that the way in which this new theory of delinquency...
and opportunity structures has been so uncritically and widely embraced as to almost constitute a reigning ideology in the field of juvenile delinquency during the 1960's.

Not since the advent of psychoanalysis has a theory had such impact in institutionalized delinquency control as the theory, explicit or implied, in Delinquency and Opportunity. Given the impetus of major foundation and federal support, the theory has been extensively adopted as a rationale for action programs in many areas of the country. There is some danger that, like psychoanalysis, "opportunity structure theory" may be rationalized and elaborated and extensively as to discourage, if not render impossible, empirical testing, pragmatic validation, or demonstration of worth by any other criterion of "good theory" (1965:56).

In sum, we see the public subsidy and ideological role of Merton's anomie schema given extended life, a second wind, in the work of his students.

D. Frank Harary's Contribution

Consider the unique and unsung contribution of Frank Harary (1966). Proceeding from Merton's original schema, then touching base next on Dubin's explosion of types, and finally Parsons' mode of analysis and typology, Harary manages to make a distinct contribution to these mushrooming typologies which seems, at the same time, a superb satire. Harary's paper is a rare phenomenon in scholarly writing: a paper which is at once short but concise and sufficient, and while making a serious contribution, it yet inverts itself in quiet satire.

Harary's only slightly-tongue-in-cheek article observes that Merton's usage of notation in his schema is ambiguous. Harary then proposes that adequate use of notation here should indicate valences in the attitudes of the individual—namely, indifference, rejection, interest, and so forth. By introducing "0" as a symbol for indifference, Harary expands Merton's original five element schema into nine separate categories, which if one accepts the simple logic of positive, negative, and neutral attitudes, seems to constitute the minimum acceptable typology in the Mertonian vein. Finally, Harary adds two more possible attitudes—ambivalence and rejection with replace-
ment; thus generating twenty-five theoretically possible permutations of attitudes toward goals and means. This inventory contains such descriptive terms as: "Vegetation, Ritualism, Retreatism, Confusion, Beatnikism, Indolence, Wishism, Innovation, Fetishism, Mobility, Preacherism, Developmentism, Demagoguery, Democracy, and Rebellion"!

Can it still be maintained that Merton's classic typology and its more logically consistent expressions represent an extremely useful way of correlating many otherwise unrelated concepts? At the beginning of his paper, Harary quotes Morton Hunt, the New Yorker profiler of Merton, on the initial impact on sociologists of Merton's elegant and seemingly all-inclusive schema.

Chilly and unprepossessing though the chart may look, it was truly a thing of beauty to Merton and many other sociologists, bringing into one readily comprehensible taxonomy such seemingly unrelated deviant personalities as Cubists and alcoholics, lone-wolf inventors and religious martyrs, executives and beggars, card-carrying communists and members of the Society of Cincinnati (1961:58-9).

Of course, if Merton's little schema really possesses such wonderful, semi-magical powers, one need not stop here. For any sociologist with the least spark of imagination could conceive of even more possibilities! Just think, for example, how wonderful it might be to pull together Merton's typology, with all its various extensions and revisions by luminaries such as Parsons, Dubin, Cloward, Harary, among others, and with each thinker adding his own unique contribution, into one grand theoretical typology encompassing every possible permutation of attitude and behavior! If one stirs into the pot the almost wholly neglected element of a time or historical dimension, then the possibilities grow absolutely staggering. But perhaps some lowly soul might rudely pierce our day dream with the coarse aphorism of computer programmers: "Garbage in, garbage out"! Such a mind-boggling exercise is absurd in almost everyone's eyes, except those who engage in them, for such intellectual activities may be rightly regarded as themselves deviations from a simple modicum of common sense. At which point the end-
less and unelightening elaboration of logically conceivable permutations becomes absurd cannot be decided here, yet we may echo Ockham's rule here: stick close to experience first, and never multiply typologies needlessly!

Harary's successful attempt to bring some all-too-rare comic relief to this typological logorrhea serves as one instructive end to a stream of thought. Finely wrought refutations such as that by Cary-Lundberg (1959) are another. Satire, critique, and proportionless exhaustion mark the collapse of intellectual traditions.
CHAPTER FIVE
CRITIQUES OF MERTON'S THEORY OF ANOMIE

Preface. In his response to Dubin and Cloward's papers in the same issue, Merton (1959) attempted to distinguish between amendments, revisions, and criticisms that simply extend "incomplete theories" from evidence and critiques that demonstrate a theory fundamentally mistaken. Counting his own theory of anomie in the former rather than latter category, Merton also indicates his own attitude toward his own theory and the development of theory. Finally, Merton graciously assents to what, as an elder statesman of contemporary American sociological theory, Durkheim once poetically called the "slow usury of time." Merton's statement here is noteworthy both for its propositions as well as his characteristic co-
gence.

They [papers by Dubin and Cloward] exemplify one way in which a theory develops through successive approxima-
tions. A set of ideas serves, for a time, as a more or less useful guide for an investigation of an array of problems. As inquiry proceeds along these lines, it uncovers a gap in the theory: the set of ideas is found to be not discriminating enough to deal with aspects of phenomena to which it should in principle apply. In some cases, it is proposed to fill the gap by further differentia-
tion of concepts and propositions that are consistent with the earlier theory, which is regarded as demonstrably incomplete rather than fundamentally mistaken. In other cases, the new conceptions put in question some of the assumptions underlying the earlier theory which is then replaced rather than revised. The papers by Dubin and Cloward are evidently of the first type, providing basic extensions, rather than a replacement, of the sociological ideas under review. Not the least merit of contributions such as theirs is that they keep us from behaving like sociological barnacles, clinging desperately to the theories we have learned in our youth, or that we may have helped develop at any age (1959:177).

Now, we may ask: after reviewing existing extensions, and detailed criticism, can Merton's theory be justifiably as-
signed to the first category as Merton himself claims, or will these compounding series of revisions and criticisms come to reveal his theory of anomie as fundamentally mistaken? And, how many times may a theorist amend and revise his theory before it loses its distinctive and originally significant configuration? Finally, at what point are we forced to relegate one of the paradigmatic theories of contemporary sociology from category one to category two?

A. Specific Criticisms

By their very nature, a number of the extensions of Merton's theory and typology conveyed specific criticisms of ambiguities, gaps, or other more or less serious limitations in Merton's theory. Dubin's, Cloward's, and Harary's contributions of this type, and it must be remembered that each basically accepted the validity of Merton's essential framework and intentions. Parsons' claim, for instance, that Merton's theory was really only a "very important special case" of his own more general theory of deviance and social control carried no explicit criticism, only a rather severe restriction of the potential scope of Merton's paradigm. While it is known that Merton himself intended his schema to explain more than juvenile delinquency, Parsons' claim, as befits the relations between these two theorists, has apparently never been contested in print by Merton (eg. 1959:177, #1). Hence, we are left to conclude that, either by default or tacit concurrence, Merton acceded to Parsons' claim.

Some of Dubin's criticisms of Merton's schema are tantamount in a different way to Parsons' more imperial claims. Dubin argued that Merton's theory and typologies (and his own) were largely descriptive, not explanatory. They were only part-theories, which did not specify empirical outcomes. In addition, Dubin observes that Merton's theory does not specify any laws or principles of social interaction processes, especially over time. Of course, these preliminary critiques are damaging to Merton's central thesis which purports to offer an explanation of the social structural pressures for non-con-
But perhaps the most significant criticism, for our present purposes, proffered by Dubin concerns the real level at which Merton pitched his analysis. While purporting to provide a social structural explanation of the causes of deviance, Merton's descriptive typology is actually focused on the social psychological level of the motivations of separate individuals.

Merton, in fact, pitches his discussion at two levels. He presents a typology of deviant behavior using an implicit set of social psychological laws. He also considers a variety of instances in which imperatives are created the consequences of which are deviant behavior. The latter sociological analysis, although brilliantly set forth, remains wholly descriptive. When Merton combines the two levels of analysis, the linkage becomes a social psychological one. For the mechanisms by which persons or groups, subject to structural imperatives, make decisions in favor of deviant courses of conduct are social psychological. This is the only legitimate interpretation of the plusses and minuses in Merton's tables and my own (1959:162).

Dubin's criticisms of Merton echo my criticism of Parsons, and we shall encounter a similar criticism of Merton from Albert Cohen.

While Cloward's contribution, which Merton hailed as signalling a new era in anomie research, constitutes merely an addition of a key "strategic variable" ignored or tacitly assumed by Merton, and Harary's witty and refreshing satire initially pointed out ambiguities involved even in Merton's use of notation, Ephraim Mizruchi offered no major or minor revision of Merton's typology, yet his specific criticism drives to the heart of some of Merton's implicit basic assumptions. Mizruchi notes that in the key factor of individual aspiration, Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie sharply diverge (see also A. Thio, 1975). Merton apparently assumes that universalistic achievement values are universally adhered to and aspired to by all classes, while Durkheim considered poverty as protection against suicide because it restrained the insatiable "disease of the infinite" which was the endemic dis-ease of the middle and professional classes.

... the emphasis in his [Durkheim's] theory of anomie
was on the unrealizable goals which characterize peri-
iods of prosperity and upward mobility. The greatest ef-
et of anomie was experienced not by those in pov-
ety but by the more affluent in society. According to
Durkheim poverty is a restraining force in relation to
anomie. It is the lifting of limitations on aspiration
which reflects Durkheim's major concern with anomie ra-
ther than the utilization of illegitimate means for
the attainment of given ends.... The Merton theory, at
least in part since its focus is on means rather than
ends, assumes relatively uniform aspirations across the
class structure and a greater impact of anomie on the
relatively lower classes. This theory, however, largely
ignores observations made not only by Durkheim but by
Veblen and Marx, among others, regarding the relatively
low levels of aspiration which characterizes those at
the lowest levels of the class structure, and it ignores
certain qualitative differences within and between the
classes (1967:440).

Alex Thio (1975) also seriously questions Merton's idea that
lower-class persons are more likely than upper-class persons
to suffer from an aspiration-opportunity disjunction, and are
therefore subject to greater pressure toward deviation. In-
stead, following Durkheim, Thio suggests that the higher clas-

es are more prone to this anomic disjunction. "Merton's theo-
ry is seriously flawed by its over-simplification of the rela-
tionship between social class, on the one hand, and aspiration
opportunity disjunction and deviant behavior on the other"

Although Mizruchi's conclusion is cautiously understated,
the thrust of his intention is clear. He requests a thorough
revision of our estimates of the various forms of anomie theo-
ry, as this dissertation attempts.

... our analysis clearly suggests that:

(a) more clarity regarding the differences between Mer-
ton's and Durkheim's concepts of anomie would be de-
sirable;
(b) our conception of lower-class social processes may
well require overhauling, and
(c) although Merton's theory does, at given points in the
social structure, provide insight and understanding of
these processes, contemporary sociology needs a con-
tinued assessment of the theory's strengths and weak-
nesses in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:
446).

Mizruchi's points are well-taken. It is surprising that few
have perceived the need for such a complete reevaluation. Apparently, the lingering prestige of Merton and his classic theory retarded such a searching inquiry.

Finally, Mizruchi's last paragraph is worth quoting in this regard because it tacitly testifies to these problems of the almost unquestioned prestige of Merton's theory of anomie.

Must we assume that only one theory is necessary to explain a given set of phenomena, for example, deviant behavior? Can a field afford several theories which may be utilized in attempting to understand diverse aspects of the same general phenomena? It is our position that sociology can and should direct itself to developing parallel theories in given content areas rather than monolithic ones. Thus, the immediate theoretical problem is not simply a matter of middle range as against highly generalized theories.... The current state of sociology can well tolerate both Merton's and Durkheim's theories of anomie so long as we maintain a proper perspective in relation to each (1967:446).

Mizruchi's observations suggest some of the problems faced by theories, at least until the 1970's (see S. Cole, 1975), competing with anomie theory which, if not "monolithic" in content and empirical validation, seemed through the 1950's and 1960's to be almost monolithic in its unquestioned acceptance and reputation. As with Parsons' self-serving and misleading reconstruction of Durkheim, which has unfortunately constituted almost a reigning orthodoxy for years in Durkheim interpretation, Merton's theories of anomie seem to have sometimes been granted the almost magical quality of possessing numerous lives and resistance to attack or contradiction. Short et al (1965) feared the same uncritical embrace of Cloward and Ohlin. And this unhealthy situation raises another question (which we cannot take time to answer here): how is it possible for certain theories and theorists to attain such enormous prestige that their ideas, detached from their point of origin and freed of the lowly need for empirical validation, come to constitute images or symbols almost exempt from scientific review?
B. Albert Cohen's General Critique

More damaging than the criticism of either Dubin or Mizruchi is the general critique of Merton's theory of anomie by Albert Cohen. Cohen's observations in 1965 cut to the very heart of Merton's perspective, and Merton himself felt obliged to respond. Cohen's critique takes on additional significance in that he represents a link between the two main traditions of deviancy theory (up through the 1960's)--namely, the milieu and differential association school (with roots at Chicago and Indiana) and the Harvard-Columbia structural-functional school. Whereas Cloward attempted to argue for a partial theoretical convergence between the two, much of Cohen's work in this area represents an actual working link.

Cohen's paper is worth examining in some detail. Although initially friendly and laudatory, Cohen launches immediately into some telling criticisms. Clearly, he is ambivalent toward Mertonian anomie, perhaps because of his strategic position as a meditator between these two different theoretical schools. Cohen's first substantive observations begins with a footnote expressing his intentions in his article and containing important insights into the relative lack of development of anomie theory.

I am not here concerned with empirical applications and tests of anomie theory.... In view of the sustained interest in anomie theory, its enormous influence, and its numerous applications, it is worth noting and wondering about the relatively slow and fitful growth of the substantive theory itself (1965:5).

Cohen then begins blazing away with a charge that rocks the foundations of Merton's famous theory. Cohen charges that there is a hiatus, a divergence, between Merton's levels of analysis. On the formal and explicit level, his theory is seen as the very prototype of sociological (i.e. social structural) theorizing, while Merton's actual descriptions and typology are pitched at the micro, social psychological interactional and motivational level. Cohen also charges that Merton's formulation really contains atomistic and individualistic biases.

Merton's theory has the reputation of being the preemi-
sociological theory of deviant behavior.... The theory is radically sociological. And, yet, as far as the level and explicit structure of Merton's first formulation is concerned, it is, in certain respects, atomistic and individualistic. Within the framework of goals, norms, and opportunities, the process of deviance was conceptualized as though each individual ... were in a box by himself. He has internalized goals and norms, regulatory rules; he assesses the opportunity structure; he experiences strain; and he selects one or another mode of adaptation. The bearing of other's experience—their strains, their conformity and deviance, their success and their failure—on ego's strain and consequent adaptations is comparatively neglected.... In the original version of his theory, each person seems to work out his solution by himself, as though it did not matter what other people were doing (1965:5,6,7).

Actually, in addition to Cohen's charge that Merton's theory is atomistic and individualistic, there lies concealed in Cohen's critique another insight into Merton's hidden presuppositions. These series of charges are that in Merton's schema the isolated individual acts rationally and pragmatically, as if he were a scientist armed with reliable knowledge and coolly surveying his options in an attempt to optimize returns over constraints, in response to his predicament. The allusions here are intentional, for indeed, such tacit premises do echo the "economic man" of classical Utilitarian economic theory.

As an illustration of his contentions, Cohen critically examines Merton's key concept of strain (see also Smelser, 1971). Although he does not see "strain" as a metaphor, Cohen cuts to the core of the inadequacy of the Parsonian-Mertonian image of strain. In contrast to the mechanical metaphors of equilibrium and strain, Cohen correctly observes that the social perceptions of individuals engaging in deviant behavior, especially in terms of relative deprivation, should be key elements in any theory of social strain.

One thing that is clear is that the level of goal attainment that will seem just and reasonable to concrete actors, and therefore the sufficiency of available means, will be relative to the attainments of others who serve as reference objects. Level of aspiration is not a fixed quantum, taken from the culture and swallowed whole, to lodge, unchanged, within our psyches. The sense of proportionality between effort and reward is not determined by the objective returns of effort alone (1965:6).
In addition to his criticism of the absence in Merton's schema of reference to the social phenomenology of perceptions and moral processes, Cohen also observes that Merton's theory is permeated with a certain discontinuity.

To say that anomie theory suffers from the assumption of discontinuity is to imply that it treats the deviant act as though it were an abrupt change of state, a leap from a state of strain or anomie to a state of deviance .... The dominant bias in American sociology has been toward formulating theory in terms of variables that describe initial states, on the one hand, rather than in terms of processes whereby acts and complex structures of action are built, elaborated, and transformed (1965: 8-9).

And, finally, if we supplement these characteristics with the abstracted, deductive, formalistic quality of Merton's theorizing, we can recognize the essential congruence of this theoretical perspective with other expressions of the Anglo-Cultural Tradition (see Book Three), especially classical Utilitarian economic theory (see for example, Merton1934a, in Nisbet, 1965: 111). Atomism, mechanism, Pragmatism or Utilitarianism, and deductive formalism are all intimately related root logics underlying diverse expressions of this cultural tradition, whether it be sociological or economic theory, psychology, medical or legal theory, biology or physical theory, and so on. If Merton's theory is so evidently empirically and theoretically inadequate, it stems as much from the mistaken perspective taken over from this cultural tradition as from the complexities of deviant processes themselves.

Cohen's insistence on the importance of phenomenological processes in social interaction, in contrast to Merton's tacit atomistic image of "every individual in a box by himself," is significant for our present purposes. If one considers, for instance, what is involved in the social phenomenology of relative deprivation, one must assign central importance to mutual perceptions of legitimacy, virtue, resources, etc. through time; all processes which cannot be approached directly from either a Pragmatic individualistic action schema, or from a mechanical image of society. Cohen offers a series of insightful suggestions into the social phenomenology of in-
vidious comparisons of moral virtue, a topic one might expect to be important for Merton's theory, but one which was curiously ignored by him. Cohen asks: "... what strains does deviance on the part of others create for the virtuous?" (1965: 6). While I cannot here review all of these suggestive observations, it should be noted that Cohen, along with a few others such as Kai Erikson (eg. 1962, 1966) and Joseph Gusfield (eg. 1963, 1967) during the 1960's, seems to have recognized a key factor missing from many theories of deviance prior to the emergence of labelling theory--namely, the social phenomenology of perceptions, images, symbols, and moral processes. To remedy the more blatant inadequacies of anomie theory, Cohen suggests marriage not only with reference group theory, but also with the theory of relative deprivation, symbolic interactionism, role theory, self-identity theory, and so on; in short, a wholesale reconstruction relegating the structural-functional contribution to a relatively minor role. Especially significant here is Cohen's repeated insistence on the social and symbolic rather than the individual and pragmatic-mechanical nature of deviance.

Much of what we call deviant behavior arises as a way of dealing with this disjunction [between goals and means]. As anomie theory has been formally stated, this is where it seems to apply. But much deviant behavior cannot readily be formulated in these terms at all. Some of it, for example, is directly expressive of the roles. A tough and bellicose posture, the use of obscene language, participation in illicit sexual activity, the immoderate consumption of alcohol, the deliberate flouting of legality and authority, a generalized disrespect for the sacred symbols of the "square world" ... all of these may have the primary function of affirming, in the language of gesture and deed, that one is a certain kind of person. The message-symbol relationship, or that of claim and evidence, seems to fit this behavior better than the means-ends relationship (1965:12-13).

I entirely agree with Cohen's suggestion that deviant processes may be better comprehended from the point of view of both the participants and society as symbolic and expressive action, rather than merely pragmatically motivated self-interested functional behavior (see also Mary Douglas, 1966). Such a view
has the evident merit of emphasizing precisely the key socio-cultural dimension of perceptions, images, symbols, messages, rhetoric, reactions, legitimacy, power, authority, and so on. Rather than a psychological and individualistic theory masquerading as a structural interpretation, what is needed is an explicit focus on both the structural and symbolic-cultural aspects of deviancy as symbolic violations and symbolic processes. Durkheim, of course, knew this, but Merton forgot apparently (see Book One).

Finally, Cohen notes a curious but instructive fact about Merton's mode of theorizing: a number of the inadequacies which he has pointed out could be remedied from a careful search through Merton's own writings. Like Thio (1975:148), Cohen remarks upon the slighting of reference group theory in Merton's discussions of anomie:

The student of Merton will recognize that some of these points are suggested or even developed at some length here and there in Merton's own writing. Merton is, of course, one of the chief architects of reference group theory, and in his chapter on "Continuities in the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure," he has a section entitled "Nonconformity as a Type of Reference Group Behavior." There he recognizes the problems that one actor's deviance creates for others, and he explicitly calls attention to Ranulf's treatment of disinterested moral indignation as a way of dealing with this problem. In "Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie" he describes how the deviance of some increases the others vulnerability to deviance. In short, my characterization of the earliest version of "Social Structure and Anomie" as "atomistic and individualistic" would be a gross misrepresentation if it were applied to the total corpus of Merton's own writings on deviance. He has not, however, developed the role of comparison processes in the determination of strain or considered it explicitly in the context of anomie theory. And, in general, Merton does not identify the complexities and subtleties of the concept of strain as a problem area in their own right (1965:7).

One may ask however: whose responsibility is it to draw together all of the relevant insights to a particular area—the theorist himself or his audience? And, can it be legitimately maintained that scattered, peripheral, or "cosmetic" statements alter the fundamental propositions and structure of a theory?
Surely, if Merton purports to provide us with a systematic, though partial, theory of deviance and anomie, then the responsibility is his, and not his students' or his audience's to provide us with a coherent and systematic statement. Clearly, Merton is not a systematic theorist in the same vein as Parsons. Rather, Merton's favorite genre appears to be the essay, which accounts for his incisiveness, insightfulness, felicitous phrasing, and the relatively unsystematic nature of his writings.

C. Merton's Response to Cohen

In 1964, Merton felt compelled to respond and perhaps deflect Cohen's criticism which had first been made at a sociological convention in 1963. Merton prefaces his remarks by noting:

... I consider that part of this [Cohen's] paper contains sound observations which have in fact been taken into account in the theory of SS&A and that another part contains important contributions which have not been explicitly stated in the theory but which can be incorporated in it. Cohen's paper is directed toward the core of the theory and promises to extend it considerably, should its implications be followed up (1964:231).

Merton's introductory footnote is noteworthy for a number of reasons here: he recognizes that Cohen's criticisms touch the heart of his theory of anomie, and he attempts to deflect the damaging thrust of Cohen's critique by (a) maintaining that much of Cohen's critique is unnecessary since what is criticized as lacking is really already contained in Merton's existing theory, and (b) the other part of Cohen's criticisms can be easily accommodated within the existing outlines of anomie theory without radical shift or internal breakdown. However, Merton should perhaps be more careful than to so easily admit Cohen's critique strikes at the core of his theory, and then to suggest that Cohen's other arguments be incorporated and extended within anomie theory itself, since such a casual attitude toward an ambivalent critic like Cohen might well unhappily surprise Merton. (Perhaps these are some potential dangers and ironies of intellectual public relations in trying
to play down the significance of criticism, by admitting it and then attempting to co-opt it, but then later being torn apart from within). Merton does not seem to publicly perceive the full and potentially dangerous implications of Cohen’s critique, for if, indeed, one did follow out the thrust of Cohen’s key criticisms, not only would Merton’s anomie theory begin to fall apart, but structural-functional theory itself might prove impossible! Again, how often and how deeply may a theorist, in response to criticism and extension, amend and revise his theory before it ceases to represent a coherent and distinctive theory? How many ad hoc concessions to criticisms and empirical reality may a theorist make before the unique and distinctive outlines fade, and his theory becomes an amorphous and shifting grab-bag of insight, principle, anecdote, ad hoc revision, and so on? Does this represent the so-called "cumulativeness" of social scientific theory, or its negation?

Now, although Merton outlines two possibilities concerning Cohen’s critique, he does not attempt to evaluate Cohen’s contributions which might significantly extend anomie theory. Rather, Merton merely responds to Cohen’s first set in a critique of the critique in which he attempts to refute Cohen’s charge that his anomie theory is "atomistic, individualistic, discontinuous," and lacks any reference to social interactional processes, by citing allusions in his previous work which purportedly show that Cohen is attacking a straw man. Merton begins by dividing his own work on anomie and deviance into early and later periods, and then suggests that Cohen’s criticisms apply mainly to the first rather than the second phase.

The early formulation of the theory of SS&A amply justifies this criticism. In that formulation, my principal concern was to develop a systematic way of thinking about the seeming paradox that the structure of society and culture, ordinarily thought of as operating to produce patterned behavior in rough accord with social norms could, under designated conditions, operate to produce deviant behavior (both aberrant and nonconforming). In retrospect, it seems evident that this theoretical task usurped my attention in the early paper. As a result, I did not examine processes of social interaction between members of collectivities that affect changes in the ex-
tent of anomie and responses to anomie through one or another form of deviant behavior (1964:231-2).

Next, Merton argues that although Cohen's criticisms are appropriate to the early phase of his anomie theory, in his later revisions he claims that he did indeed take into account these crucial variables. Yet, Merton's claims is disingenuous.

It was only in later formulations of the theory that individual responses to anomie began to be linked with processes of social interaction. There, it was explicitly stated that the changing likelihoods of individuals engaging in deviant behavior, either separately or collaboratively, is conceived to be a function of changing rates of anomie in the social system and that these changing rates in turn are a result of patterns of interaction among members of a collectivity (1964:232).

But what is the nature of the later evidence which Merton now encourages us to accept as clear testimony that Cohen's criticisms are not justified when applied to later formulations?

In order to see that this part of Cohen's cogent criticism has already been incorporated in the theory of SS&A, it is necessary to quote rather than to paraphrase earlier formulations in print. Paraphrase might mistakenly suggest that it was necessary to improvise an ad hoc patchwork to meet this criticism once it had been made (1964:232).

But to prove his assertions taken in his own defense, and to exonerate himself from Cohen's changes, Merton proceeds to quote extensively from verbal remarks made in response to questions and criticism contrasting psychiatric and sociological approaches to deviance made at a conference on juvenile delinquency in 1955! (See the edited proceedings by H. Witmer and R. Kotinsky, 1956:37-38). Surely, however, this is a comparatively weak defense on Merton's part—that a few years before, at a conference on juvenile delinquency, Merton made some occasional remarks alluding to social interaction, which were subsequently published in an obscure and largely inaccessible government publication! In the hierarchy of evidential canons of scholarly hermeneutics, statements published by the author himself are to be given more credence than reported verbal remarks transcribed from open discussions, as must statements directly related to the subject in dispute rather than peri-
pheral or off-hand allusions, as must statements published in disciplinary (ie. sociological) literature rather than in obscure or non-disciplinary publications. Yet, in each of these instances, Merton is left to defend himself with the weaker sets of evidence.

Having considered the nature of the majority of Merton's main exhibits, we shall now consider the substance of his attempted self-exoneration. Merton observes that after the verbal remarks made at the conference in 1955, he began to explicitly consider the importance of social interactional processes.

After this first allusion to the interplay between anomic and deviant behavior, it became clear to me that the theory implicitly contained the notion of differences in the degree of vulnerability to anomic strains in the social system. That is why, in the next extension of SS&‘A, I tried to explicitly link up the conception of social interaction among members of a collectivity marked by a substantial initial degree of anomic with the conception of vulnerability (1964:233-34).

Merton's tactic here is worth noting: although initially he admits that Cohen's criticism is well-taken, he then shifts his ground by claiming that reference to social interactional processes was not really missing after all. Instead, it was actually latent in it from the beginning, and all one need do is bring into stronger relief that which was already implicitly contained. Such a rhetorical tactic has the evident value of claiming that the concept of social interaction can really be easily accommodated through the existing concept of vulnerability, and thus wholly within the existing framework of anomic theory itself. Although Merton then claims that the reason he next quotes extensively from his 1957 "Continuities" revision is to retain the "lines of continuity" with the remarks published the year before, perhaps a latent function was to help buttress his case to extricate himself from Cohen's charges.

What is the actual substance of Merton's claim to have first tacitly, and then explicitly and systematically, considered the range and type of social interactional processes requested by Cohen? Quoting two paragraphs (eg. 1957:179-80)
from his revision, and proceeding also from his concept of "patterned differentials" in response to exposure to anomic strains (eg. "vulnerability"), Merton claims that the vulnerability of one person, if it leads to successful deviancy, is then imitated by another and another, in a sort of mechanical or social chain-reaction process.

These long extracts must make it clear that there is nothing "integral to the theory" of SS&A--the quoted phrase is Cohen's--which requires it to be atomistic and individualistic, without regard to social interaction between members of a collectivity.... On the contrary: the theory does not conceive of anomie as the result of this or that individual proving to be vulnerable to straining for what he happens to regard as success. For anomie is a condition of the social environment, not of the isolated self....

To make this component of the theory of SS&A emphatically plain, something that is evidently needed in of the counter-impression left with even so perceptive a sociological critic as Albert Cohen, I repeat in thin outline that the social process making for anomie is conceived as follows: the men most vulnerable to the stresses resulting from contradictions between their socially induced aspirations and poor access to the opportunity structure are the first to become alienated. Some of them turn to established alternatives (Cloward's illegitimate opportunity structure) that both violate the abandoned norms and prove effective in achieving their immediate objectives. A few others actually innovate for themselves to develop new alternatives. These successful rogues--as measured by the criteria in their significant reference groups--become prototypes for others in their environment who, initially less vulnerable and less alienated, now no longer keep to the rules they once regarded as legitimate. This, in turn, creates a more acutely anomic context for still others in local social system. In this way, anomie, anomia, and mounting rates of deviant behavior become mutually reinforcing unless counteracting mechanisms of social control are called into play (1964:234, 235).

This sounds like the sociological equivalent of the domino theory. Merton's reconstituted view still seems as atomistic and mechanical as the dynamical theory of gases, for it seems as if successful deviancy exerts some relatively fatal form of social gravity by pulling others out of their normal social "orbits" and leading them into "eccentric" deviations. Or, from another perspective, it seems that we are to assume here
vulnerability to anomie (what an ill-defined concept), if supplemented by social imitation (taking us back to the nineteenth century social psychologists, e.g. Tarde and Le Bon), can lead to contagious social diseases! But even with such defenses, Merton ignores the central thrust of Cohen's critique, for although he postulates interaction as imitation, he almost completely ignores how, in actual fact, all the complex social processes underlying deviances tend to compound each other. Why are imitation and gravitational attraction better suited to explain the complex moral phenomenologies and symbolic cultural processes than properly phenomenological categories? I see little gained, and much lost by Merton's vocabulary. Further, does Merton really expect us to accept these few relatively isolated and peripheral statements as significantly altering the basic presuppositions of his famous theory? If so, then should not Merton have also directly altered the presuppositions themselves? If Merton himself admits that Cohen's critique cuts to the very heart of his theory, then are we to judge Merton's defense adequate when he neither alters his theory nor extends it by incorporating Cohen's suggestions, all the while attempting to exonerate himself by sending us off to read occasional verbal remarks made at some obscure conference or statements buried deep in later revisions?

In addition, Merton introduces at least three new elements in his summary: "alienation," "significant reference groups," and "counteracting mechanisms of social control." Merton's protestations notwithstanding, just as Parsons' elaborate inventories of interactional processes (1951:chapter 7) on deviance ultimately rest on the reductive notions of psycho-biological needs and drives for tension-reduction, so Merton's reconstruction of his own theory, even when he attempts to squarely meet the issue, ultimately rests on a rough analogy of deviance with a type of social gravity pulling people out of their normal "orbits." In the end, Merton's theory remains atomistic and mechanistic. Although he refers now to legitimacy, for instance, how can one adequately hope
to approach this problem without reference to people's actual perceptions, to images held by various groups, to their logics in use, to their participation in symbolic and moral processes, and so on? Therefore, not only do Cohen's explicit criticisms stand, but they now loom larger than before, for this episode reveals that even when Merton was directly confronted with a critical challenge, invisible but powerful leading strings pulled him back to his culturally derived orientations and premises.

Let us briefly consider the following series of paradoxical conclusions concerning the essential nature of Merton's theory and framework. Although initially social structural in point of departure, Merton's actual focus in "Social Structure and Anomie" becomes social psychological. But although his real focal level is social psychological (e.g., individual adaptations to strain), it's not really micro sociological in the sense of accounting adequately for social psychological interactional processes, and thus leaves a vast gulf between the social and the individual factors. And, although it is social psychological in focus it is not so in content, for Merton's theory assumes individual perceptions and Pragmatic motivations and attitudes, yet says little about perceptual, social, or moral phenomenological processes. Therefore, we are forced by these curious series of internal contradictions to the sad conclusion that Merton's paradoxes reveal deep inconsistencies embedded at the very foundation of his theoretical position.
CHAPTER SIX
SROLIAN ANOMIA

Leo Srole's anomia scale has become as widely known and used as Merton's notion of anomie, and, indeed, there is a constant tendency to conflate the two. Srole's thesis is similar to the tradition carried on by Gibbs and Martin in that it focusses on the breakdown of social integration, and attempts to derive measurable indices for it. Yet, Srole's anomia differs from all the other conceptions in that it looks at this central variable of the lack of social integration from the individual's own psychological viewpoint. Srolian anomia represents a "psychologization" of a fundamental sociological concept.

Shifting from what he termed the "molar" (sociological) level down to the "molecular" or micro (psychological) level, Srole explicitly set out to construct a scale to test what he considered to be the essence of Durkheim's anomie--namely, "inter-personal alienation." However, Srole did not explicitly derive his specific propositions from Durkheim's notions of anomie, nor did he explicitly set out to test the validity of Durkheim's ideas. Rather, Srolian anomia emerged on "piggy back," since this scale was first developed as an adjunct to some "diversionary items" in research primarily designed to study authoritarianism and prejudice. Srole himself reports: "These diversionary items afforded a 'hitch-hike' opportunity to test hypotheses centering on Durkheim's concept of anomie" (1956:710).

Failing to explicitly cite Durkheim's writings, Srole referred to other writers to justify his conclusion that Durkheim's different types of suicide could be reduced to one common element. "In the writer's view, 'self-to-others alienation' may be regarded as the common element in Durkheim's
conceptualization of anomie, egoism, altruism, and fatalism as different but overlapping forms of suicide" (1956: 712).

But, as we have unhappily discovered, this type of approach in which the total framework and subtlety of Durkheim's argument is simply ignored is unfortunately the rule rather than the exception. The ambiguity of Durkheim's concepts has led many secondary observers to arbitrarily decree that "this is really what Durkheim had in mind," or else to throw up their hands, and propose that Durkheim's different types of suicide "really" are one and the same in any case, so why bother with tedious exegesis?

Proceeding partly from MacIver's and Lasswell's psychologized notions of anomie, Srole postulated a series of subjective attitudes representing "interpersonal alienation." Srole's hypothesis for these "diversionary, hitch-hike" items to his larger study on authoritarianism and prejudice was that: "... social malintegration, or anomia, in individuals is associated with a rejective orientation toward out-groups in general and toward minority groups in particular" (1956: 712).

Yet, identifying anomia with Parsonian-Mertonian "malintegration" in general is not sufficient, for this concept is itself fuzzy. Certainly, it should not be assumed to be clear and self-evident in its meaning and implications. Thus, at the crucial point of translating Durkheim's ideas into a testable index, Srole waffled, and fell back on Parsonian and Mertonian metaphor.

Now, as many observers have noted, Srole's anomia scale seems to have indiscriminately lumped together a number of diverse synonyms of anomie such as alienation, meaninglessness, apathy, anonymity, isolation, powerlessness, etc.; and in the last analysis, Srole's scale seems virtually indistinguishable from a generalized feeling of apathetic resignation or despair (see also Gwynn Nettler, 1965: 763). Teevan suggests:

Too many sociologists have reified the Srole scale. It has several faults in form and several in content. Perhaps the biggest shortcoming it exhibits is that it does not measure anomia as discussed either by Durkheim or by Merton. It measures neither alienation from norms, nor
lack of means to achieve goals, but instead a mixture
of powerlessness and other forms of alienation (1975:
165-6).

One of the scale's major faults is that the items are so am­
biguous. On one reading, the first two elements of Srole's
scale refer roughly to social environmental perception, while
the last three items correspond to self-perceptions (at least
this is what appears to have been intended by Srole's explana-
tory preface to each item, see 1956:712-13). Yet, other read­
ings are possible: Dubin (1959:158) suggests that Srole's
first item deals with an institutional norm, while the last
four pertain to cultural goals. Teevan remarks:

Ideally, there should be two separate measures of an
individual's perception of his own anomia and his per­
ception of the anomia of others. Unfortunately, the two
have been confused. Srole's scale purports to measure
the individual's perception of his own social psycholo­
gical anomia. Instead, it measures the individual's per­
ception of others' anomia.... It measures the indivi­
dual's perception of the "average man's," and not his
own anomia. Examination of the scale reveals that ques­
tions one and three have the average man as their re­f­
erent, questions two and five, and question four, an
unknown referent.

Thus, the Srole scale asks for the individual's percep­
tions of the anomia of others, and not for his percep­
tions of his own anomia. This may lead to confusion
since sociologists have designated the individual who
scores highly on the scale, who perceives the average
man to be anomic, as the anomie individual himself.
There would be no confusion if the respondent sees him­
self as the average man or if he projects his personal
feeling to others around him. If, however, these condi­
tions do not obtain, then one errors in assuming that
the Srole battery measures ... the individual's percep­
tion of his own anomia (1975:162).

Teevan's objections are well-taken, and we now see that Srole's
scale really is predicated on the individual's projection of
himself or herself into the mold of that hypothetical type--
the "average man." And as Teevan notes, "the average man is
generally perceived as more anomic than the individual him­
self." Teevan goes on to suggest that we develop different
questions to distinguish between an individual's perception
of his own anomie, and an individual's perception of the ano­
mia of the larger society.
Further criticisms of Srole's scale come from Lenski and Leggett (1960) and L. Carr (1971) who argue that the lower class may appear to be more anomie than they really are due to a deference effect, or the acquiescence to "yes" answers posed by middle class interviewers. McClosky and Schaar question Srole's sampling in his original research:

Srole's 1951 paper ... and his 1956 paper on anomie rested upon a sample of 401 native-born, white, Christian residents of Springfield, Mass., all of whom lived within walking distance of transit lines and rode the bus four or more times per week. This seems a curious sample with which to test an anomie scale or to assess the relations between anomie and various other factors --unless one has a powerful theoretical conviction that anomies tend to congregate on Springfield buses. To our knowledge, Srole has never questioned the appropriateness of that sample. Nor has he challenged the samples used in numerous other studies that have employed the Srole anomie scale (1965:765-66).

And, in terms of the methodology of scaling, C. Miller and E. Butler question the unidimensionality of underlying items of Srole's scale, and conclude: "Gradations of the Guttman scale type would appear to be contra-indicated, and polarization would appear to be more appropriate" (1966:405). Doubtless, there are other problems; but the irony of these conclusions shall not be lost on a perceptive observer. For it is precisely these various shades of meaning which such scales claim it is their virtue to determine in the first place! Yet, here Srole only succeeded in confusing the various shades and grades of meaning, and thus sacrificed conceptual precision and theoretical significance for the appearance of statistical accuracy.

Srole appears to have been influenced in his efforts from a number of different sources. First, from his teacher and colleague at The University of Chicago, W. Lloyd Warner (see R. Hinkle, 1960:288-89), Srole derived an admiration for Durkheim's ideas from the perspective of British-influenced social anthropology. Now, although it would appear evident that Srole was influenced in some manner or another by Durkheim, it is hard to detect in his famous article these precise relations. It appears that the content of Durkheim's in-
fluence tended to exerted a generalized concern affecting Srole's psychiatric predelictions. For example, Srole concludes his paper by offering his new research method as a scientific instrument which he hoped might help to alleviate the dangers of social disintegration.

... there appears to be a trend among social scientists toward convergence of interest in the phenomena of social integration. Equipped with the advances of the past decade in theory and research technology, this trend gives promise of accelerating the scientific attack, powerfully and single-handedly launched by Emile Durkheim more than a half-century ago, on one of the most pervasive and potentially dangerous aspects of Western society, namely, the deterioration in the social and moral ties that bind, sustain, and free us (1956:716).

Yet, although Srole obviously shares with Durkheim a deep concern over these problems, we find a paucity of references to Durkheim's work on these subjects. Although Srole drops Durkheim's name several times, like Merton, he never specifically quotes Durkheim. Nor does Srole, amazing as it might seem in retrospect, even refer to any of Durkheim's works! If Srole, like Merton's undercitation, simply presumed that Durkheim's ideas were simple, clear, and understood by all in their original meanings, he made a fatal mistake.

A second source of Srole's anomia appears to have been derived from the American structural-functional theorists' concern with "malintegration" and the problematics of social integration. Srole tells us at the beginning of his 1956 paper that he "... felt the need of theoretical developments centering on the concept of 'social integration.'" Then Srole cites various sociologists including Robin Williams, Parsons and Shils, W. Landecker, R.C. Angell, and Merton. Given the subsequent prestige of Srole's efforts deriving from the structural-functionalists' perspective on social integration, even Merton himself was pleased to report: "I can only take chauvinistic pleasure in Srole's report that he developed his scale of anomia in 1950, when he was a member of the Bureau of Applied Social Research as Columbia University" (1964:227, #5).

Third, Srole's own unique contribution was the meshing of these anthropological and sociological outlooks with his
own psychiatric emphasis on the components and conditions of mental health. Srole's own career predilections toward a social psychiatric approach to social and individual problems, which generated the subjective anomia scale, appears to have been the right instrument in the right place at the right time in meeting the needs of many American social scientists for some research tool with which to test for anomie. At once congruent with the basic biases of American sociologists toward a micro-social psychological level of focus, and of the milieu and social problems approaches, Srole appeared to be eminently successful in providing survey methodologists with their required scale instrument to measure aggregated anomic perceptions.

Srole's attempt to scale out anomic responses for survey questionnaires can be seen as a key methodological breakthrough in the research administration of this concept. Apparently joined in one single and concise instrument were diverse ideas ranging from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton to MacIver to Srole himself. This meant that the continental tradition of social theory was now extended beyond Parsons' and Merton's general theorizing, and implicitly joined with the other dominant strain of American sociology--namely, the pragmatic-reformist-nominalist concern with empirical social research. Anomia now constituted one of the few visible and testable fusions of continental theory, grand theory, middle range theory, social reformist theory and the efficient procedures of mass social research. Quite an accomplishment for only five short items!

Now, although many have noticed (eg. Merton, 1964:227-28) that Srole's anomia scale is basically psychological, few have explicitly recognized the ramifications of the usage of this scale and other survey tools of the same nature as mass psychological interviewing devices. This largely unheralded but powerfully driven development signals an important shift in the central focus of fundamental sociological ideas down to the psychological level. Whether this be explained as a result of the need to develop measurable indices, or as a natu-
ral reversion of ideas in the American context back to our nominalistic roots (eg. see R. Hinkle, 1960), the unhappy fact remains that too much of the content and method of contemporary sociological research has become far more psychological than sociocultural. In this case, perhaps the single most famous sociological concept, which has so often been heralded as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration of the "autonomy of social facts," is not even sociological anymore!

The contradictions underlying Srolian anomia constitute another important chapter in our ironic history of a classic sociological idea. What happened to Durkheim's ideas, especially at the hand of his admirer Leo Srole, and, in turn, how other sociologists have utilized these various ideas, can perhaps best be understood as an another instance of the more general process characterizing the translation, reappropriation, fragmentation, and progressive trivialization of the paradigms central to the "normal science" of any discipline. This entropic process is abundantly illustrated in Miller and Butler's flippant statement: "While the theoreticians debated among themselves as to what anomie might be, several researchers constructed questionnaire items in an effort to measure it" (1966:400). In short, their cavalier and casual remark reveals the basic feelings of too many of the "puzzle solving normal scientists" in sociology who seem to be saying: its no good unless we can formalize a theory and test it statistically; and any scale is better than no scale at all, even if it means that we have little idea about the content or validity of the concept we are testing (see McCloskey, 1974,1976a)!
CHAPTER SEVEN
CROSS-OVERS BETWEEN SROLIAN ANOMIA AND MERTONIAN ANOMIE

Preface. We have already noted that Srole developed his scale of anomia while working at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. And Merton (1964:228, #6) reports that it was not until after April 1956 that Srole even began using the term "anomia" instead of the Mertonian and Durkheim "anomie." Now, some might consider the cross-over between the two best-known developments of anomie theory to constitute definite and visible progress in sociology—namely, the cumulativeness of theory interrelated with empirical research. Yet, the perspective which emerges from detailed examination is that each of these streams of development of anomie represents fundamentally different positions, and that each of these streams represents an entropic degeneration and fragmentation of Durkheim's original ideas. It would be a dubious proposition to attempt to maintain that these cross-overs signify important sociological progress. Let us briefly review some of the empirical applications of Mertonian anomie, and consider some of the relations between these two streams.

A. Stephen Cole's Defense of Mertonian Anomie

Now, it is interesting to note that the problematic relations between Merton's theoretical developments and empirical testing of his notion of anomie have called forth two defenses of Merton from within his circle, and Stephen Cole was involved in both. In 1964, Cole produced along with Harriet Zuckerman, a long bibliography of work on anomie theory. And in 1975, in the Merton festschrift, The Idea of Social Structure (L. Coser, ed.), Cole returned again to the same problem with more sophisticated analytical and statistical techniques. Let us examine each of these defenses of the fate of
In Clinard's volume *Anomie and Deviant Behavior* (1964), there is included a summary table inventorying empirical and theoretical studies on anomie since Durkheim compiled by Merton's students Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman. Merton prefaced the table by linking his own notion of anomie with Durkheim's, and then added these remarks:

... just as there was little concerted attention given the matter after Durkheim first introduced it, so there was a considerable interval after the later 1930's before anomie research became a focus of empirical and theoretical attention.... The accompanying tabulation shows ... that there was a gap of some fifteen years before there emerged a substantial (though still limited) concentration on the subject (1964:216).

Merton includes the following figures for the number of empirical studies reported on anomie in these five year intervals: 1940-50:3; 1950-54:7; 1955-59:25; 1960-64:39. It would appear at first glance that empirical research in anomie theory was a burgeoning industry at that time. Now, although Merton does not explicitly state it, we are led to implicitly assume that most or all of these studies have to do with a clearly formulated conception of anomie, especially Durkheim's anomie and Merton's extension. However, a closer look at the items in Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman's inventory on which Merton's totals are based reveals several curious findings. First, although the inventory appears very impressive at first glance (extending over forty pages and from 1897 to 1964), one discovers upon closer examination that only certain items are designated as "explicit testing or extensive application of Merton's theory of social structure and anomie." Of the total of eighty-seven different studies listed, only fifteen are starred by Cole and Zuckerman as explicitly working with Merton's notion of anomie. Approximately twenty others are based upon Srole's scale of anomia. In short, the clear majority of studies cited are not directly concerned with contemporary theoretical formulations of anomie.  

Of the fifteen studies specifically designated by Cole and Zuckerman in 1964 as related to, or in some way testing,
Mertonian anomie, many of the earlier studies cited appear to come from authors who were Merton's own students, colleagues, or acquaintances. Two articles remain unpublished. In at least five of the studies (Riley and Flowerman, 1951, Rosenthal, 1954, E. Barber, 1955, R. Coser, 1958, R. Cloward, 1956), Merton's SS&A paradigm appears either as an afterthought, or as an appendage serving as an *ex post facto* interpretive device for impressionistic evidence. In no way can such studies be legitimately cited as demonstrative evidence. Only Hyman (1953), Lander (1954), Glaser and Rice (1959), Mizruchi (1960), Stinchcombe (1960), and Rhoades (1964) appear to be based on more carefully drawn data. Of these, Mizruchi and Rhoades both utilized Srole's anomia scale to test Mertonian anomie (a troublesome procedure which even Merton rejects, see the following section). Glaser and Rice (1959) merely invoke Merton's theory at the end as a possible complement to Sutherland's differential association theory. Hyman (1953), as we have seen, is critical of some of Merton's crucial assumptions, and Lander's work was criticized by Merton himself (later by Bordua, 1958, R. Child, 1964, R. Gordon, 1967). Thus, while the empirical literature concerning Mertonian anomie appeared in 1964 to be truly voluminous, upon closer examination the inventory performed under Merton's own supervision appears to have been greatly inflated. Indeed, it is hard to point to even a couple of studies at that time which conclusively verified the empirical validity of Merton's notion of anomie. As we shall see in the following section, this paucity of good research greatly bothered Merton himself in 1964.

Eleven years later, for the Merton festschrift volume *The Idea of Social Structure*, Stephen Cole went much deeper into the empirical fate of Merton's theory of anomie by treating it as a case-study in the growth of scientific knowledge. Rather than simply compiling an index as in 1964, Cole now submitted the use of Merton's anomie theory in the sociological literature to sophisticated statistical and theoretical analyses. Let us explore this latest defense from the Merton camp.

Cole offers us a summary of the frequency with which
Merton was cited for the periods 1950-54, 1955-59, 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-73, as an index to his influence on the sociology of deviance. According to Cole's findings, Merton was ranked first or second in all periods but the last, when his prominence declined precipitously (to number 12). Cole's 1975 sample was drawn from four leading sociological journals, and tabulated only citations to different authors, not number of citations of the same author of different works. Thus, if an author received ten citations, it means he was cited by ten different people. Although Cole claims this was done simply "... to prevent a few authors who might heavily cite a particular person from tipping the results" (1975:189), it should be noted that this unusual way of indexing citations worked to tip the scales in Merton's favor. Again, as in the over-long bibliography in 1964, Merton's collaborators tended to inflate these tables. Even Cole himself felt it necessary to justify this unusual procedure:

It should be noted that this procedure does differ from that normally employed, in which each distinct reference to an author's work would count as a citation. For example, when we looked at the distribution of citations done in the typical fashion, Short rather than Merton received the most citations for this period (1950-73). This is because Short was frequently cited for four or more articles within a single article, whereas Merton was usually cited for one or two contributions *(1975:217, #36).

Now, the results of Cole's factor analysis of Merton's prominence in each period are also interesting. During the period, 1950-54 for instance, Cole observes that:

... Merton was an intellectual isolate in the field of deviance as then constituted.... Although Merton was the second most frequently cited sociologist in the period, his work had not yet made a major impact on the field. He was cited by people who were still primarily doing the type of work done by Sutherland and Sellin [differential association].... Although by this time Merton had established himself as a prestigious theoretician, the theory of SS&A had very little impact on deviance research in the four leading sociological journals (1975:195,196).

It should be noted that this was the curious situation more than a decade after Merton's article "Social Structure and A-
nomie" was first published; Merton himself (1964) was disturbed by this "delayed utilization." Cole suggests (1975:205-6) that it was the 1949 revision of "Social Structure and Anomie" in Merton's collected essays Social Theory and Social Structure which really gained prominence. To explain this lag, and the apparent rise of Mertonian anomie in the 1950's, Cole suggests that it was not until this period that Ph.D.'s trained in structural-functional theory spread out across the country.

Of the citations in 1955-59 period, one-third referred to Merton's work other than SS&A. Three used SS&A to legitimate and support the ideas of the authors, and two others simply refer to it as part of the relevant literature. Of the remaining third, Cloward and Ohlin's work (1960) was a theoretical revision and extension of Mertonian anomie, and not an empirical test, while Powell (1958) and Dohrenwend (1959) attempted to define and develop the concept of anomie independently. The remaining study, Glaser and Rice (1959), used SS&A as an ex post facto interpretive device, invoking Merton's theory only at the end as a possible complement, as noted earlier, to differential association theory. Cole claims:

In the second period anomie theory had emerged as a distinctive orientation to the study of deviance. The theory of SS&A was further developed and extended, but at least in the four major journals there were still relatively few empirical studies aimed at testing it or in which it was used as an interpretive device (1975:197).

During the periods 1960-64 and 1965-69, in which anomie theory emerged as a major factor and then the dominant perspective in deviancy studies, the breakdowns are similar. And during the 1970-73 period, the labelling-interactionist approach displaced anomie as the dominant perspective in deviancy theory in terms of citations. Now, it interesting to note that during the whole period 1950-73, Cole (1975:228) notes that forty-two percent of the articles cited Merton in a ceremonial fashion only to legitimate the work of the author. And while there were twenty-one articles which used SS&A as an ex post facto interpretive device to make sense of certain empirical findings, Cole (1975:211) found only nine articles re-
port research designed to empirically test a part of SS&A or a derivative theory. Of these nine, at least two (Mizruchi, 1960, and Rhoades, 1964) used Srole's anomia scale, four (Spergel, 1963, Landis and Scarpitti, 1965, Short, Rivera, and Tennyson, 1965, and Voss, 1966) really test Cloward-Ohlin's theory and Cohen's derivative theory rather than directly testing Merton's. One study (Wilson, 1971) used Srole's scale, tested some of Lander's (1954) assumptions, and came up with results contradictory to SS&A, and some striking findings on the sub-cultural norms of ghettos. Another study (Reiss and Rhodes, 1959) yielded indeterminate results, while only one study (William Rushing 1971) attempted a direct test of SS&A with results consistent with Merton's theory. Since Rushing's study is one of a precious few which could be cited as empirically confirming Merton's theory, let us briefly review it.

Rushing's article is cogent both in its criticism of existing usage of Mertonian anomie and its own theoretical formulations. Therefore, Rushing constructed his own scale of anomie, which appears, however, to suffer from several of the flaws which Teevan (1975), among others, pointed out for Srole's scale. Actually, Rushing (1971:859-60) explicitly set out to test psychological alienation from norms, rather than to test anomie as a societal state; whereas Merton's theory, as he has repeatedly declared (eg. 1957, 1964), pertains primarily to anomie as a societal state rather than a psychological condition. Noting that "class differences in goals is not the crucial datum," Rushing suggests that it is rather, as Merton himself says, whether "... disjunction between goals and opportunity among lower class strata [occurs with greater frequency] than among the more advantaged upper-class strata," and "if so, whether such disjunction is associated with normlessness" (1971:862).

Although his "... results consistently support Merton's hypothesis about the dynamics of normlessness in the lower class" (1971:864), Rushing also contends that "... it is not blocked opportunity per se that is important, but the way
blocked opportunity is interpreted, and such interpretations will differ depending on one's cultural background" (1971: 866). Indeed, Rushing's conclusion that "cultural interpretation is a significant intervening variable in the relationship between aspirations and blocked perceived opportunity" (1971:870) reinforces my earlier criticism of the culture-boundedness of Merton's theory.

In sum, out of the huge 1964 bibliography and the 1975 citation analysis, Cole is only able to come up with one or a few valid empirical studies validating Merton's theory of anomie, and even these are often equivocal confirmations. This is hardly overwhelming empirical evidence for so famous a theory. If this troubles the reader, it should also be noted that this embarrassing lag between the popular acclaim for his theory and empirical support also rankled Merton himself, as we shall discover in the following section.

Against this troubling background, Cole tries two different rhetorical tactics to salvage Merton's theory of anomie. On the one hand, he claims that interest in Merton's theory continues unabated and that it has merely shifted in theoretical significance from one research area to another. On the other hand, from the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of science, Cole suggests that anomie theory has declined not because of lack of hard empirical evidence to support it, but rather from an external shift in the sociological community's focal interest. Let us consider these rhetorical defenses in turn.

First, in the face of the apparent precipitous decline in citation of Merton during the 1970-73 period, Cole tries to salvage Merton's theory in this way.

... SS&A has declined in significance in the last period. Yet there is a good deal of evidence that SS&A remains a very important theory.... When, for example, we look up citations to Merton's work on deviance in the 1973 volume of The Social Science Citation Index, we see that in this one year it has been cited approximately sixty times.... Consider some additional evidence on the continued interest in SS&A. This article has been reprinted many times and the rate at which it has been reprinted has increased in recent years rather than de-
clined. The theory has been discussed in scores of introductory textbooks and continues to be discussed in virtually all the introductory texts published in the last few years. The theory is frequently discussed in both American and European symposiums on deviance. In short, the theory has anything but disappeared (1975: 201).

What Cole refers to here, of course, is the "halo effect" or "lag" in the reputation of a theory which has had its day and faded. While thinkers and researchers on the cutting edge of the discipline no longer pursue this theory, other publics, less well-informed, to whom sociologists wish to present their intellectual wares, are still regaled with its cogence and significance. The theory dies in the journals, only to gain a second lease on life in introductory textbooks.

Cole attempts to salvage the importance of this "second lease on life" for Merton's theory of social structure and anomie by distinguishing different phases in the life of any great theory.

How can we explain the decline in citations to SS&A in the four leading journals at the same time that the theory continues to received heavy attention in other places? Perhaps we must think of the various stages that a theory goes through from the time that it is presented until the time that it is either abandoned or obliterated through incorporation. When SS&A was first published it may have experienced delayed utilization; later, it became the leading theory guiding work at the research front in deviance. Now its significance at the research front of other areas may be increasing, and as an exemplar or paradigm of sociological theory, it may continue to be reprinted in anthologies and cited in introductory texts for years to come. In short, we must not assume that the life of a theory is unidimensional. A full understanding of the role played by a theory would consider the full range of uses a theory is put to and the stages through which it progresses (1975:201).

It is interesting to see this admission from the Merton camp which reinforces my earlier suggestion that the reasons Merton's theory gained such prominence had more to do with its symbolic and ideological function than its logic or empirical validity. Old theories never die, they just just lodge in textbooks like barnacles.

Further, Cole attempts to deflect the lack of empirical
verification of Merton's anomie theory and its relative de-
cline in terms of external shifts in the sociological commun-
ity's commitments. Now, Cole claims that the empirical evi-
dence critical of Merton's theory could have been deflected
had Merton made a crucial shift in one of his assumptions.

What can we conclude from the studies that have act-
ively attempted to test the theory? There was certain-
ly as much evidence in support of SS&A and derivative theo-
tories as in opposition. The strongest negative evi-
dence confronting SS&A are the several studies finding
no differences in rates of deviant behavior between lo-
er class and middle class people. By the time the
1949 revision of SS&A was published, Merton was aware
that actual rates of deviant behavior may be considera-
ibly higher in the middle classes than official crime
statistics indicated.... At this time, Merton had to
decide whether he should see anomie as characterizing
the entire society and thus creating high rates of de-
viance in the society as a whole, or as being unevenly
distributed, with the lower class being more exposed
than the middle class. He opted for the latter choice.
If he had chosen the other alternative, most of the
criticism would have been avoided (1975:212).

Cole then suggests that the decline in influence of Mer-
ton's theory is due more to shifts in the external "sociologi-
cal framework" rather than to contradictory empirical evi-
dence.

It is easier to explain the decline of utilization of
SS&A from what I should like to call the "sociological framework." From this point of view, the acceptance or
rejection of a theory is not primarily dependent on em-
pirical evidence. It is dependent on the way the theo-
ry fits in with the other interests of the community of
scientists and the ability of the theory to fulfill what
might be called its "functional requirements." First,
what evidence is there in this case that the acceptance
or rejection of a theory is not dependent on empirical
evidence? I have shown that at least in the four major
journals, there were few attempts to directly test the
theory, and that there were even fewer attempts that
claimed to find evidence contradicting the theory (1975:
212).

Finally, proceeding from the contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, Cole concludes with the striking admission that the real
function of theories such as SS&A is to act as a research pro-
gram providing orientations and problems for the discipline.
It is thus a paradigm not in the sense of an achievement to
be imitated, but as a source of potentially fruitful ways of thinking about certain problems.

Before I began this research, I believed that SS&A had been difficult to test because it had not been put forth in a precise enough manner to operationalize the key components. I believed that it would be possible to state the theory in a more precise way, and that a definitive empirical test would then be possible. I, of course, no longer believe this would be either possible or desirable. SS&A is an approach to studying a wide range of behavior that stimulated much theoretical thought and a good deal of empirical research. The range of empirical phenomena for which SS&A is relevant is too wide for a definitive test to have been performed. Besides, theories that provide puzzles are not rejected in the face of negative empirical evidence unless an alternate theory is present and deemed superior. And, in fact, the utilization of SS&A may be declining, not because it has been empirically proven false, but because we have exhausted most of the puzzles that it provided. Labelling theory is currently the major source of puzzles for deviance researchers (1975:213).

This acknowledgment is, of course, a chastening experience for the partisans of Mertonian theory, not only in terms of his anomie theory but also in terms of his more general philosophy of scientific progress and his program of consolidation and codification of theory.
B. Merton's Program for Empirical Research into SS&A

Merton himself noticed with chagrin both the paucity of empirical studies concerned with his famous paradigm, and their generally distressing qualities. For instance, in his 1957 "Continuities..." essay, Merton carefully termed Bernard Lander's 1954 study using census tract data "a symptomatic advance."

For just as the mere availability of official statistics constrained Durkheim to employ such rough, indirect and highly provisional measures of anomie as occupational status, marital status, and family disintegration, so the fortuity that census tracts in Baltimore include data on delinquency, racial composition, and house ownership, led Lander to use these as a rough, indirect, and highly provisional measure of anomie. Pragmatic considerations of this sort are no suitable alternative to theoretically derived indicators of the concept. Turnover in residence may be an indirect measure of the rate of breakdown in established social relationships, but it is evident that the measure would be substantially improved if provision were made to obtain data directly on rates of disrupted social relationships.... just as the scales of the subjective aspects of anomie must be further improved, so must scales of its objective aspects. The utilization of social book-keeping data is only a pragmatically enforced and interim substitute (1957:165-66).

In the 1960's, Merton's concern increased about the lack of methodological precision involved in anomie and deviant behavior studies. Merton explained this gap in development "... between theory and systematic empirical research" by relying on the principle that "... sociological theory tends to outrun the inevitably slower pace of systematic empirical research in sociology" (1964:240). Of course, such justification of the gap between theory and research stems from the tacit presumption that these really are separable activities; hence, it is inevitable that the theorists will always move ahead of the plodding researchers. The resulting lacuna means that theorists are allowed, nay encouraged, to continue to spin out their typologies on one side, while on the other the empirical survey researchers are encouraged to continue to gather data regardless of what it means in
practice. Ironically, it was precisely this potentially fatal split which Merton's own call for "theories of the middle range" was itself supposed to mediate. Indeed, Merton himself (eg. 1964:215) tells us that his theory of anomie is a prime example of a "middle range theory." Yet, here in the case of his single most famous theory, Merton is forced to admit that adequate empirical testing still awaits us after almost thirty years (after almost forty years if you count Cole's 1975 tabulation)! And, we should remember that Merton himself never undertook such an empirical confirmation of his theoretical schema. And although Merton wrote well-known treatises on "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research" and on "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological Theory," in terms of his own anomie theory, Merton himself never undertook to provide us with a paradigmatic study intimately intertwining the two sides of the scientific process. Thus, despite his preachments, Merton has continued to aid and abet this unfortunate lacuna still plaguing contemporary sociology. One of the few thinkers who could have, and should have, exemplified the conciliation of theory and research, not as separate roles but as mutually reciprocal phases of the same process of intellectual inquiry, did not do so. And thus, Robert Merton must be judged responsible, certainly more than his students, for the lack of empirical confirmation of his own theory of anomie and opportunity.

Now, Merton asserts that the general principle of "empirical research lag" is the reason for the gap between his development of anomie theory and its empirical confirmation. And he admits that his own theory has proven surprisingly resistant to rigorous testing and application, which would seem anomalous in the case of one who has made it much of his life's work to tell other members of the profession how they ought to better conduct their intellectual affairs ("do as I say, not as I do"). Merton observes of this general process:

... very rough approximations to the requirements of the theory are developed and these, in the nature of the case, prove indecisive. At times, empirical investigators find themselves compelled to make such extreme
compromises in their collection and analysis of data that what starts out as an effort to institute a demanding test of a theoretical idea ends, as the Cole-Zuckerman inventory of research on anomie periodically suggests, by being so loose an approximation to the theory as to be wholly inconclusive. There is not a single empirical investigation of anomie and deviant behavior that has succeeded in mounting a research design that systematically, rather than impressionistically and qualitatively, includes simultaneous analysis of collectivity, subgroup, and individual attributes in relation to deviant behavior along the lines set out in the preceding pages *(1964:240).

The gap Merton so poignantly points out leads me to wonder out loud: in the case of anomie theory, who is to blame for this serious lacuna between the development of theory and empirical testing? The theorist or the researchers or both? While Merton's statements appear to explain this oft-lamented gap in terms of some postulated necessary gap between the sophisticated theorists the compromising difficulties encountered by the empirical researcher, perhaps the latent function of Merton's self-justification here is to displace the burden of responsibility for failure onto the data gatherers. Although Merton attempts to alleviate their imputed guilt by grounding their inadequacies in the very nature of their role, Merton seldom assumes that the basic problem might lie instead with the theorists' own procedures and assumptions. It is not surprising that Merton fails to recognize, even in the face of discomforting evidence drawn by his own colleagues, that perhaps the root problem underlying this endemic lacuna between the proposal of theoretically viable propositions and empirical confirmations stems originally from the sterile stance of the structural-functional theorists that theories can and should be elaborated in vacuo, deductively, abstractly, ahistorically, generically, without immersion in the muddy actual." Perhaps one can even detect here a hint of the age old conflicts between the spirit and the world; why else would these theorists confidently consider their splendid yet sterile theoretical isolation so high a calling? It may seem ironic that we should make these claims against Merton who, in turn, "cut the umbilical cord" by advancing them against Parsons
in 1947 (see Merton 1949, and "On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range"), but so be it.

Always possessed of a sensitive ear for innuendoes, Merton explicitly disclaims any feeling of exasperation or pique against the less endowed empirical researchers who have so consistently failed to fulfill and support his grand theoretical vision.

All this may sound as though it were an attack on empirical research into anomie and deviant behavior, and a defense of theory bearing on this subject. But this would be to miss the point entirely. This is no evaluative, let alone invidious observation on the comparative merits of theory and research on anomie. It lays a claim, instead, to being a detached, objective observation of a discrepancy in the pace at which theoretical formulations are being developed and the necessarily slower pace at which systematic empirical research is mounted.... It is this gap between the character of current theories and the character of much of the current research that explains the difficulty of decisively confirming, modifying, or rejecting one or another aspect of the contemporary theory of deviant behavior (1964:241-2).

We should not here miss the curious yet characteristic ploy through which the supposed "value-freeness" of functional theory yet carries with it such invidious or moral overtones at the very time it explicitly denies this intention. Also, while Merton pointedly reflects on the "only natural" superiority of the "character of current theories" vis-a-vis "current research," almost any inquirer in these areas knows matters are rarely so simple. Again, I propose that the gap which Merton rightly laments is due not so much to any "natural law" of the inferiority of research to theory, but rather to the nature of the specific type of theorizing favored by Merton.

Although his last statement ignores that other major theories of deviant behavior than his own carry substantial empirical support, it should be recognized that Merton was trying sincerely here to act as his own best critic. Earlier in the 1950's, Merton had called for the reconciliation of his own objective structural conception of anomie with the subjective anomia scale developed by Srole.
Growing out of the conception of both subjective and objective components of anomie is the further evident requirement that research on the sources and consequences of anomie deal simultaneously with the interaction of the two types of components.... This means that the behavior of "anomic" and "eunomic" individuals within groups having a designated degree of objective anomie would be systematically compared, just as the behavior of individuals of the same type could be examined in groups with varying degrees of anomie. This kind of research plainly constitutes the next step forward in the study of anomie (1957:166).

Now, clearly Merton's attempts to clarify his own schema, to criticize existing research, and to suggest guidelines and encourage further empirical investigation into his own theory represent laudable activities, and also constitute an extraordinarily interesting case study in the history of the development of a very significant concept in sociology. Few other sociological concepts have enjoyed such continuous elaboration, refinement, extension, critique, and rebuttal by a major figure such as Merton for nearly four decades.

Almost thirty years after his original publication of "Social Structure and Anomie," how did Merton come to specifically suggest that empirical testing of his paradigm in systematically designed research be carried out? The structure and argument of Merton's outline for research is very significant for the unraveling of our story of the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit." In his 1964 essay "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction," Merton proffers a number of revealing suggestions. First, urging cognizance of the crucial, yet complementary, differences between his own social structural notion of anomie and the more psychologized subjective concept of Srole's anomia, and eschewing critical examination of the technical adequacy of Srole's scale, Merton begins with the following significant admission: "Curiously enough, the advance represented by Srole's preliminary scale designed to measure anomia--a condition of the individual--seems to have had an adverse effect on systematic studies of anomia--a condition of the social system" (1964:228). Merton here implies that although he systematically introduced the idea of
anomie ("... simply a matter of drawing out some of the implications of Durkheim's work, 1964:215) into American sociology through his famous SS&A paradigm, his concepts lay unapplied on a larger scale for almost thirty years, and when Srole's scale came to be widely known, Srolian anomie superseded Mertonian anomie in research studies. This is, in my judgment, an accurate historical reflection. While too many sociologists indiscriminately lump together Durkheim's anomie (and egoisme) with Mertonian anomie and it, in turn, with Srolian anomia, Merton attempted to draw definite distinctions. In 1964 Merton appears to lament the fact that Srole, who proposed only a simple scale to measure anomia, has taken over the lead in anomie-anomia research, while Merton himself, who offered a complex and changing theoretical typology, now lags behind.

Merton's specific suggestions as of 1964 for concrete research to "bridge the theory-research gap" and to lead to a resolution of Srolian anomia and Mertonian anomie are as follows. We ought to note that as Merton attempts to reconcile the subjective and objective views of anomie, he appears to make crucial concessions to the other ("complementary") side, and gets ensnared in a fundamental methodological error. Merton's program for resolution begins thus:

It seems not to have been widely recognized—if we are to judge from the appended inventory of research on the subject—that by adopting well-known procedures of analysis, the measures of anomia for the individual can be adapted to serve as a measure of anomie for the social system. By doing so, composite studies that simultaneously examine the behavior of individuals, with similar degrees of anomia, within differing social contexts of anomie, would enable us to deal with theoretical problems that have remained on the periphery of systematic research.

... both the logic and substance of analysis which have been known for sometime have yet to be comprehensively applied to the study of anomia, anomie, and deviant behavior (1964:228; 230, #8).

Merton proceeds to outline three successively more sophisticated phases of inquiry into these areas. In Phase I, Merton makes the crucial proposal that anomie as a social structural condition can be measured by aggregating the individuals' sub-
jective feelings of anomia, which then could be used to differentiate between the comparative rates of deviance between anomics and non-anomics. While Phase I may be considered his concession to Srolian anomia, Phase II may be considered Merton's conciliatory response to Albert Cohen's (1965) criticism of Merton's theory as "atomistic." Thus, Phase II specifically focuses on "Rates of Social Interaction Between Anomics and Non-Anomics in Collectivities Differing in Degrees of Anomie." Phase III pulls Phases I and II together by studying the "Rates of Deviant Behavior Among Anomics Within Collectivities Differing in Degree of Anomie" (1964:237). Lastly, to cope with the processual dimension, Merton suggests a panel analysis also.

Now, my criticism here is directed not so much to the specific design of these phases as to Merton's underlying methodological assumptions. First, clearly the lead in formulating anomie had passed from his hands. Indeed, this outline represents an inversion of the theoretical sequence so successfully employed earlier; whereas formerly he had begun deductively and proceeded from the macro-systemic generic level of analysis down to the micro-empirical level, now Merton, in attempting rapprochement with the rapidly developing empirical stream of work which threatened to outstrip his own, proceeds inductively from the micro to the macro levels. Such an acquiescence on Merton's part gives credence to the approach of many researchers who hope to construct meaningful inductively generated theories of masses of data. Indeed, Merton himself (1968:151) comes perilously close to suggesting that "empirical generalizations" generate their own higher-order theory. However, as many philosophers of science (eg. the classic by N. Campbell, 1920; and contemporary thinkers such as T.S. Kuhn, 1970, N.R. Hanson, 1958, K. Popper, 1968, Lakatos & Musgrave, eds. 1970) have shown, the problem of scientific discovery is not so much a matter of "inductive generalization" as "abductive inference," of theory-finding. Far too often this inadequate conception of the intimate relations between insight and evidence has been reinforced by the pragmatic bias of American social scientists.
Another fundamental methodological problem implicit in Merton's formulation has to do with the unwarranted move from one level of analysis to another, with the expansion and contraction of scientific theories. If the "ecological fallacy" (e.g. see Robinson, 1950) suggests that from demographic-ecological data one may determine the characteristics of individuals living in an area, then Merton's suggestion similarly contains the invalid assumption that one can simply aggregate individual attitudes as an accurate index of social structural and cultural conditions. By proferring Srole's anomia scale of individual feelings as the basis for aggregating subjective "self and others" perceptions as accurate statistical indices of objective social structures, Merton succumbs to the unwarranted presumption that aggregated subjective attitudes of individuals accurately represent objective social structural conditions. Since the ecological fallacy works both ways, Merton here, along with many others, is guilty of the flipside: the unwarranted expansion of scientific constructs from one diverse level to the next. Such a mistaken, yet widespread, practice stems, perhaps, from the almost universal psychologization of key sociological concepts in mass-survey research. Far too much survey research masquerading as sociology is really only mass psychological interviewing unjustifiably projected onto the societal level. Indeed, one of the virtues of Merton's functionalism had always been that it distinguished between structural and psychological levels, especially concerning anomie, and between perceived and unperceived conditions. Yet, here Merton has succumbed to the erroneous conclusion that Srole's anomia can be plugged in to measure objective anomie. Merton is not alone in this fallacious endeavor, for it is one of the most widespread procedures in contemporary sociological survey research, and indeed, here has the cited sanction of Lazarsfeld himself.
C. Research Cross-overs Between Mertonian Anomie and Srolian Anomia

A number of research studies concerning anomie have used Srolean's scale to test Merton's propositions. These cross-overs between Srole's anomia and Mertonian anomie appear to have resulted from the lack of measurable indices for Mertonian anomie, and thus, when Srole's scale appeared, empirical methodologists wedded to mass survey techniques embraced it without sufficient critical analysis. This literature is far too large (and repetitive) to discuss at length here; some of the better known examples of this cross-over include D. Meier and W. Bell's "Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life Goals" (1959), L. Rhodes' "Anomia, Aspiration, and Status" (1964), Ephraim Mizruchi's "Social Structure and Anomia in a Small City" (1960), R. Wilson "Anomia in the Ghetto" (1971), and so on. While some of these studies have yielded at least partial confirmations of Merton's theses, many of them recognize confusion over the meaning of anomie and admit inconsistent research findings.

Let us take Mizruchi's research as an illustrative study. This research is especially important for our present interests because Mizruchi consciously sets out to test what he conceives to be the common elements of Durkheimian and Mertonian anomie by using Srole's scale of anomia. Noting that the lower classes studied have lower social participation scores and higher anomia scores, Mizruchi pointedly observes: "... [the data] does not provide a full test of Merton's theory since we have assumed that the respondents have similar life goals. Merton himself makes this assumption" (1960:655). In a subsequent exchange of letters, Lorna Mui and Mizruchi disagreed over the validity and meaning of Mizruchi's work. Mizruchi then explicitly states:

Merton's theory, as I see it, is essentially derived from Durkheim's proposition that "to aspire to what is unattainable" reflects extreme pathological conditions in a social system. Thus Merton's theory must be viewed within a Durkheimian framework.... Both Durkheim and Merton view anomie ... as chronic states for industrial
societies, though Durkheim stressed acute anomie in order to clarify, by contrast, what he had in mind. In the case of American society, Merton takes the Durkheimian position that for certain segments of the population, aspiring to what is, for them, unattainable, anomie is greater than for other segments of the population. Thus Merton's contribution is to be found in his application of the Durkheimian scheme and his typology of patterned reactions to structured strain. My own study, is consequently, a partial reassessment of Durkheim's theory in American society (1961:277).

Mizruchi began, then, by closely identifying Mertonian and Durkheimian anomie. Not only do these streams converge in his studies, but they also begin to gradually diverge again as Mizruchi begins to test various key assumptions Merton made, and as he reflects on his own findings. Hence, Mizruchi's work represents the high point in empirical terms of the fusion of Durkheimian anomie with Merton's schema and Srolian anomia, and also, simultaneously, one of the most significant points at which they began to be distinguished again.

Mizruchi characterizes his early efforts in the following manner: "The level of generality remains Durkheimian and in my study the Srole scale is particularly useful since it was designed from a Durkheimian point of view" (1961:277). Then Mizruchi, still identifying Mertonian and Durkheimian anomie, makes the following relevant observations:

It is precisely the affluent society which breeds anomie—this was Durkheim's point. Affluence creates a thirst for more and more wants beyond the reasonable possibility of attainment. I'm afraid that Lorna Mui has completely misinterpreted Durkheim, and as a consequence, Merton as well.... My current study suggests that there are three sub-types of anomie which must be taken into account in assessing the Durkheim-Merton theory: (1) boundlessness, which represents Durkheim's notions regarding the lack of limits to aspirations in a social system; (2) bondlessness, which suggests Merton's lack of tie between norms and goals; (3) normlessness, the process of breakdown or normative systems. Boundlessness seems to occur primarily in the middle classes in American society and bondlessness appears to be characteristic of the lower classes. Normlessness would appear to characterize the marked changes occurring in the old upper classes.
whose normative systems are being subjected to strain and breakdown (1961:277).

The last distinction is particularly interesting; one wonders whether, and to what extent, Parsons' concern with anomie as a withdrawal of affect from dominant norms or as lack of normative clarity might speak for the "strain" of these upper classes of which Mizruchi speaks. In any case, Mizruchi's useful distinctions illustrate that he is both closer to Durkheim in a number of respects, and closer than Merton to contemporary changes in the social structure.

By 1967, these careful distinctions which Mizruchi had begun to draw between the various shades and grades of meaning between Durkheimian and Mertonian anomie began to culminate in a much sharper series of distinctions between these notions which would lead to their severance.

A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie suggests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's and that this difference leads to varying hypotheses.

... The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its focus is on means rather than ends, assumes relatively uniform aspirations across the class structure and a greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower classes. The theory, however, largely ignores observations made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, among others, regarding the relatively low levels of aspiration which characterizes those at the lowest levels of the class structure, and it ignores certain qualitative differences within and between classes (1967:439-441).

In contrast to Merton's implicit but central assumption that all classes and sectors share the same values and goals, Mizruchi, as noted earlier, proposes that "retreatism" and the subsequent withdrawal of motivation and affect from cultural mandates does not adequately explain the long-standing conservatism of lower classes.

... we hold that aspirational conservatism represents both an adaptation to a social condition in which there is a discrepancy between the goals of the larger society, i.e. "success," and the limited means available as well as a more chronic condition characteristic of many societies rather than "retreatism" in relation to the American Dream (1967:446).

Finally, Mizruchi suggests that, in the future, re-
searchers attempt to draw more careful distinctions between
the various types of anomie which they might wish to empiri-
cally test (see also Teevan, 1975).

Our analysis clearly suggests that:
(1) more clarity regarding the differences between Mer-
ton's and Durkheim's concepts would be desirable;
(2) our conception of lower class social process may
well require over-hauling;
(3) although Merton's theory does, at given points in
the social structure, provide insight and understanding
of these processes, contemporary sociology needs a con-
tinued assessment of the theory's strengths and weakness-
es in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:446).

Hence, in terms of our wider story, Mizruchi is one of the
few empirical researchers who have consciously set out to re-
late Merton's anomie to Durkheimian anomie using Srole's ano-
mia scale. Yet upon reflection on inconsistent findings, Miz-
ruchi has gradually pulled back from any facile identification
of these diverse approaches to anomie. His conceptual and re-
search itinerary, and his frank and cogent reflections, con-
stitute a fascinating case study on the vicissitudes of at-
tempting to cross-over these three separate streams of devel-
opment of anomie. Rather than constituting definite progress
in sociological theory, these studies reveal the sterility of
the philosophy of science championed by Merton for thirty
years. Although unwilling as of 1967 to wholly reject Merton's
claims, Mizruchi clearly delivered a body-blow to one of Mer-
ton's tacit assumptions, distinguished clearly between the
Durkheimian and Mertonian notions of anomie, and cautioned
greater care in formulating theory and research tests in these
areas. Mizruchi's work here is significant, then, be-
cause it represents the end point in empirical terms of the
unquestioned fusion of Durkheim's anomie, Merton's anomie,
and Srolian anomia.
CHAPTER EIGHT
MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF ANOMIE

Preface. Alongside the more clearly demarcated streams of development of anomie, there has emerged a more diffuse and less systematically refined series of efforts. These miscellaneous developments often lack a clear and coherent theoretical perspective; also, since so few have been sufficiently pursued and elaborated, they cannot really be said to now constitute distinct and important streams of development. As this literature too is very large, we shall consider here only some of the more distinctive theoretical and empirical studies which formulate or test a new or different notion of anomie; and further, we shall try to focus primarily on studies which are not examined elsewhere in the dissertation. First, let us consider the construction of several new scales of anomie; second, we shall explore some new theoretical formulations of the meaning of anomie.

A. New Scales and Empirical Research

In a short article, Dwight Dean and Jon Reeves (1962) consciously claim to set out to test "... whether Durkheim's hypothesis that Protestants exhibit a higher degree of anomie than Catholics can be sustained" (1962:208-9). Ignoring the differences between egoisme and anomie, and the crucial fact that Durkheim identified Protestants with egoisme and not anomie, Dean and Reeves set out to test their hypotheses by using their own "normlessness" scale. Like Srole's scale, Dean and Reeves use their "normlessness" scale in "hitch-hike" fashion as indirect indices of other concerns, notably alienation. Also like Srole, Dean and Reeves never bothered to attempt to relate their notions of anomie to Durkheim's work. And as with Srole's scale, it is hard to tell exactly
which analytical level is being probed, and whom the referents are. Like Srole's scale, the Dean and Reeve's scale questions are inherently ambiguous. These items are:

1. The end often justifies the means.
2. People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll ever have anything to depend on.
3. Everything is relative and there just aren't any definite rules to live by.
4. I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.
5. The only thing that one can be sure of today is that he can be sure of nothing.
6. With so many religions abroad, one doesn't really know which one to believe (1962:210).

Because there is no conceptualization offered here it is hard to know what the authors intended to test by these items; what we appear to find is a hodge-podge including rule-breaking and the absence of set or absolute norms, relativism, meaningless, pluralism and value-conflict, etc. Are each of these dimensions synonymous with anomie, or taken all together? As Teevan (1975) noted of Srole's scale of anomia, Dean and Reeves' scale depends upon projections of the individual into the shoes of the "average man," and also of the individual's own feelings. Again, is anomie here conceived of as an individual psychological problem, or a societal condition?

Eschewing such questions, Dean and Reeves conclude that their evidence shows that "Durkheim's keen observation of long ago gains empirical validation" (1962:212). Since the theoretical formulation is vague, the scale multi-dimensional and ambiguous, and mistakenly connects Durkheim's notions of anomie rather than egoism with Protestantism--for these and other reasons--we can hardly follow Dean and Reeves in either their empirical conclusion or testing instrument.

Unfortunately, two other researchers--Lee and Clyde (1974) followed Dean and Reeves' scale and their empirical hypotheses. On the level of contemporary standards of "normal science" in the sociology of religion, Lee and Clyde's paper suggests at least three interesting propositions:

1. "Normlessness" varies inversely with "religiosity;"
(2) Religious identification (eg. Protestant, Catholic), in contrast to Durkheim and others, is not significantly related to "normlessness;"

(3) In their study, "normlessness" was more strongly correlated with "religiosity" than with socioeconomic status.

However, Carr and Hauser (1976) came up with findings which conflict with the notion that anomie was inversely related to religiosity. But there are so many conceptual problems in Lee and Clyde's work that it is a moot question what the theoretical significance of their empirical findings might be. McCloskey (1974) offers a detailed analysis and rebuttal of their position which applies to many others of the same genre. McClosky and Schaar (1965) explicitly set out to construct a scale by which to test for the psychological dimensions of anomie. They offer a much fuller conceptualization than either Srole or Dean and Reeves. McClosky and Schaar propose to:

... conceptualize anomie as a state of mind, a cluster of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings in the minds of individuals. Specifically, it is the feeling that the world and oneself are adrift, wandering, lacking in clear rules and stable moorings. The anomic feels literally de-moralized; for him, the norms governing behavior are weak, ambiguous, and remote. He lives in a normative "low pressure" area, a turbulent region of weak and fitful currents of moral meaning. The core of the concept is the feeling of moral emptiness (1965:19).

Further, McClosky and Schaar are sensitive to the difficulties of projecting individual feelings onto the "average man" and calling the aggregated results an index to the anomie of the larger society.

... the leap from the subjective feelings expressed by individuals to statements about objective social conditions is a perilous one. What people believe about a society may or may not be an accurate reflection of its nature: perceptions and feelings are never a literal copy of what is "out there" but are always powerfully shaped by the needs, motives, attitudes, and abilities of the observer. Hence, we can never confidently assume that because some people feel anomie the society is anomie. Moreover, even if one could establish that some members of a society report strong anomie sentiments, one could label the society anomie only after systematically comparing that society with others (1965:18-19).
Then McClosky and Schaar propose their basic thesis: that such anomic feelings are learned, especially by those in the lower classes, the outsiders, ethnic minority groups, and so on.

...whatever interferes with learning the norms of a society tends to increase anomic feelings among its members....In short, whatever interferes with one's ability to learn a community's norms, or weakens one's socialization into its central patterns of belief, must be considered among the determinants of anomie (1965:20).

Specifically, McClosky and Schaar focus on three types of factors which may impair effective learning norms.

The personal factors that impair learning and socialization may be divided into three categories: (1) Cognitive factors that influence one's ability to learn and understand; (2) Emotional factors that tend to lower one's ability to perceive reality correctly; (3) Substantive beliefs and attitudes that interfere with successful communication and interaction (1965:21).

To test for these three complexes, these researchers construct the following nine-item scale:

(1) With everything so uncertain these days, it almost seems as though anything could happen.

(2) What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime.

(3) With everything in such a state of disorder, it's hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next.

(4) Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow.

(5) I often feel that many things our parents stood for are just going to ruin before our very eyes.

(6) The trouble with the world today is that most people really don't believe in anything.

(7) I often feel awkward and out of place.

(8) People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.

(9) It seems to me that other people find it easier to decide what is right than I do (1965:23).

However, even though McClosky and Schaar attempt to conceptualize more fully their notion of psychological anomie, unfortunately their scale is prone to the same flaws as many others.
First, it is unclear why they would wish to identify their notions and scale with anomie, for these bear little relation to Durkheim's ideas. Their formulation is probably closer to the Parsonian stream, with its premises of normative confusion, lack of definiteness of norms, breakdown in the relational system of society and culture, and so on. Second, as noted with Srole's scale and Dean and Reeves's scale (see Teevan 1975), the present scale mixes analytical levels and prime referents—for example, items five, seven, and nine ask for the individual's own feelings, while the other items ask him to project his own attitudes onto the larger society. Also, their legitimation of their scale items is tautologous—for they simply define as anomic who scores high in response to their items, whereas it is these items which set out to find out what anomie is in the first place. One can hardly object to their scale, given such a premise, that it does not really test anomie at all, for anomie is, by definition, what the scale tests. However, close examination reveals that this scale, too, appears to be a grab-bag of different concepts and psychological and sociocultural conditions. Apparently included here are: general uncertainty, lack of social ties, unpredictability coming from rapid social change, loss of continuity with the past, a deflation of traditional values, relativism and pluralism, loss of normative clarity from generation to generation, and so on. Rushing suggests that this normlessness scale "... appears to refer more to unpredictability and meaninglessness and to the effects of normlessness ... than to normlessness itself" (1971:860). McClosky and Schaar themselves sum up their scatter-gun approach to defining the so-called "anomic mentality" in these terms:

The items express the feelings that people today lack firm convictions and standards, that it is difficult to tell right from wrong in our complex and disorderly world, that the traditional values which gave meaning to the individual and order to society have lost their force, and that the social ties which once bound men together have dissolved (1965:24).
Nettler (1965:763) questions the validity (meaning) of their scale of anomie, and suggests that their scale, like Srole's, may actually measure a sort of generalized despair. Curiously, McClosky and Schaar (1965:767) agree with Nettler. But if their scale actually measures generalized despair, then why not simply call their scale a measure of individual projection of a generalized feeling of despair rather than anomie? I hardly find it acceptable to add yet another confusing synonym for anomie. Why don't researchers simply make up their own terms for their own ideas, be bold and straight about it, rather than trying to cash in on the still resonant "charisma-on-deposit" of the founding fathers (see McCloskey, 1974)?

Critical of the Srole, Dean and Reeves, and McClosky-Schaar scales, William Rushing (1971) set out to construct his own scale of psychological alienation or an individual's feeling of generalized normlessness. Items in Rushing's scale include the following:

1. Is a person justified in doing almost anything if the reward is high enough?
2. Some people say you have to do things that are wrong in order to get ahead in the world today. What do you think?
3. Would you say that the main reason people obey the law is the punishment that comes if they are caught?
4. Some people say that to be a success it is usually necessary to be dishonest. Do you think this is true?
5. In your opinion, is the honest life the best regardless of the hardships it may cause?
6. In your opinion, should people obey the law no matter how much it interferes with their personal ambitions? (1971:861).

Though there is a certain degree of redundancy, Rushing's scale has at least two advantages over related scales of normlessness. Except for item one which asks for projection into the shoes of an abstract "person," Rushing's scale specifically asks for the individual's (you, your) attitudes. Second, since Rushing's items are theoretically grounded in the Mertonian notion of anomie, they consistently attempt to test an individual's feeling of the pervasiveness of deviations from a
generalized normative order, especially in terms of the perceived propensity to use illegitimate means to pragmatically further one's own self-interest. Indeed, Rushing expressly indicates that his scale is close in content to Han's (1968) scale of "illegitimate expediency." Therefore, in this regard, Rushing's scale of normlessness is better suited than Srole's anomia scale as a test for Mertonian anomie.

However, Rushing's scale neglects to address the two major premises of Merton's theory--namely, whether people feel our culture places a great emphasis on individual achievement and success for everyone and whether the means of achievement are differentially distributed. Furthermore, as noted earlier, one of Rushing's more significant findings is that the crucial factor is not so much the posited Mertonian disjunction between goals and means as the cultural interpretations given to blocked opportunity. Hence, any new scale should include this factor as a crucial component.

Finally, let us consider some of the empirical studies of Warren Breed who has shed new light on one of Durkheim's forgotten types--namely, fatalisme, the opposite of anomie. Breed's 1963 study relates Durkheim's idea of "de-classification" in anomie suicide to the "downward mobility" of the status "skidder." Then, in his 1970 study, Breed extends Durkheim's ideas on "fatalisme" and oppressive regulation to Negroes and American Indians. Breed's reappropriation of "fatalisme" as a type of suicide is valuable for two reasons. First, since so many contemporary formulations of anomie are almost indistinguishable from what Durkheim meant by "fatalisme," Breed helps us to differentiate, once again, Durkheimian anomie from its opposite. Second, in applying "fatalisme" to a number of cases, Breed demonstrates its empirical and theoretical relevance in contemporary society. He remarks, for instance, that the "... suicide among young, low class single Negro males is frequently fatalistic suicide" (1970:162). Surely, it is a sad commentary on the history of sociology that Durkheim's central notion of anomie had become so fuzzed
B. New Theoretical Formulations of Anomie

Since Durkheim's work is so central to sociology, and since anomie is so central a sociological concept, a review of various secondary observers' and thinkers' accounts and concepts might potentially include almost every introductory textbook and history of sociological thought, we obviously cannot attempt such a review here. Nor shall we even detail usages or passing references to anomie by luminaries such as MacIver (1950), Lasswell (1952), Wolin, (1960), Riesman et al (1950), Nisbet (1966), Coser (1971), and so on and so forth. However, since Sebastian de Grazia makes anomie the central superstructure of his suggestive study (1948) on the modern political community, we shall briefly explore his treatment of anomie here.

De Grazia's notions are of importance to our present interests for a number of reasons. First, his formulation is an independent one, derived directly from Durkheim himself, instead of being filtered through Parsons' and Merton's interpretations. Also, it is an application of Durkheim's notions to the field of political science. Further, when de Grazia does quote Durkheim (eg. 1948:3-5, 99-100), he recognizes to a certain extent that insatiability played a crucial role in Durkheim's perspective (eg. 1948:4). Moreover, completely on his own, de Grazia comes close to recognizing the crucial step necessary for moving from Durkheim's first to his second notions of anomie (see Books Two and Three). Specifically, de Grazia questions Durkheim's tacit assumption that insatiable desires are innate, and insightfully suggests instead that they are learned.

When Durkheim spoke of the ill effects of "illimitable desires," he failed to realize that the establishment of illimitable desires in man is itself the result of a well-developed system of beliefs. It is not the natural result of man's freedom from all restraining rules or norms of behavior. Far from being natural to man, it took a long time to groom him for the mere idea of illimitable acquisition. To be the very model of the
indefatigable entrepreneur it was necessary that a man
drink in activism with his porridge or count among his
ancestors a person who, with Cotton Mather, read a lit­
tle of Calvin each night "to sweeten his mouth" (1948:
72).

This insight is especially important for our present purposes
because this passage comes directly at the end of a chapter
devoted by de Grazia to the tension exerted on modern men by
the Protestant Ethos! In short, de Grazia sees that Durkheim­
ian anomic insatiability is--yes, a morbid condition--but al­
so one that is learned, and not innate; it is the result of
specific historical types of cultural conditioning (see Book
Three). Finally, given this background, although de
Grazia cites crucial passages from Durkheim's Suicide illus­
trating primarily anomie as insatiability or the "infinity of
desires" alongside de Tocqueville's pregnant observations on
American society (eg. 1948:99-100), somehow de Grazia fails
to draw the conclusion that Durkheimian anomie is culturally
sanctioned in American culture.

Perhaps what held de Grazia back was his loose, even
metaphorical, "catch-all" definition of anomie as a conflict
in values and belief systems. He suggests that Durkheim's no­
tion essentially implied a breakdown in common, binding, sat­
isfying belief systems: "... as the disintegrated system of
a society that possesses no body of common values or morals
which effectively govern conduct" (1948:xii). "For him [Durk­
heim], anomie was most often the disordered condition of a
society that possessed a weak conscience collective ... the
ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens
of the same community" (1948:4-5). Specifically, de Grazia
suggests that "... anomie as Durkheim conceived it in the
subjective sense had three characteristics: a painful uneasi­
ness or anxiety, a feeling of separation from the group or
isolation from group standards, a feeling of pointlessness
or that no certain goals exist" (1948:5). Now, while de Gra­
zia's conception of anomie is primarily subjective, in con­
trast to Durkheim and Merton's which are primarily societal,
his distinction between simple and acute anomie is valuable
in that it indicates that anomie, whether societal or subjective, may differ in degree; that it is not an all-or-nothing condition (see also Merton, 1957:163). However, in the last analysis, de Grazia's loose usage of anomie as almost synonymous with the ills and tensions of the modern world render it less usable as a concept than our analysis; it is too generalized a concept, lacking the specificity we gave anomie here in Book Three.

Marvin Olsen (1965) claims to have discovered that Durkheim used the notion of anomie in two different ways in The Division of Labor and in Suicide. Basically, Olsen says that in the first book anomie referred to inadequate functional integration, while in the latter anomie referred to inadequate normative integration.

... anomie, as Durkheim first conceived it in The Division of Labor in Society, might be defined as a condition of inadequate procedural rules to regulate complementary relationships among the specialized and interdependent parts of a complex social system. In Suicide, Durkheim makes extensive use of the concept of anomie, but gives it a different meaning. He begins with the assumption that man's social and emotional needs are unlimited, as compared with physical needs, which are automatically regulated by the body.... Under stable social conditions, the collective conscience defines and orders social relationships. As societies become more complex and dynamic however, social controls weaken, and men are led to aspire to goals which are extremely difficult or impossible to obtain. These pressures for "infinite" or "receding" goals then generate additional stresses within the normative order.... In sum, anomie, as Durkheim described it in Suicide, might be defined as a condition of inadequate moral norms to guide and control the actions of people and groups in the interests of the social system (1965:40-1).

Now, Olsen is undoubtedly on to something important here; one need only note that many secondary reformulations (see Part II of this appendix) of Durkheim's suicide schema revolve around precisely the problem of reconciling the structural-functional and normative dimensions. And, to a certain extent, Olsen is justified (see Books Two and Three) in characterizing the early and later notions of anomie in two different ways.
Two significant differences are noticeable between Durkheim's early and later uses of anomie. First, in *The Division of Labor*, anomie refers to inadequate procedural rules for interaction, whereas in *Suicide* it means inadequate moral norms for social control. In one case the emphasis is on functional expediency, while in the other case the concern is for social responsibility. ... The discussion of organic solidarity in *The Division of Labor* is concerned with functional integration, whereas *Suicide* is directed toward normative integration. Anomic division of labor therefore refers to inadequate functional relationships among specialized parts of a social system, while anomic suicide is the result of an inadequate normative order in society (1965:41-2).

Finally, to distinguish between the two different connotations of anomie, Olsen (1965:43) suggests that the term "discordance" be used to "... refer to a relative state of inadequate procedural rules for maintaining functional relationships."

While on one level Olsen's distinctions are well taken, on a deeper level Olsen misses the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. I went to great lengths in Book One to lay out the continuity and in-depth structure of Durkheim's thought which cut across all his works. And in Book Two I connected Durkheim's first schema of suicide with his notions of the anomic division of labor. While Olsen sees, on the simple topographical exegetical level, the apparent differences between Durkheim's use of anomie in 1893 and his use of anomie in 1897, because his analysis has no depth, he neglects to see the deeper connections between the two notions. Nor can he make wider sense of the difference he has discovered. In short, Olsen has stumbled on to something important here, but he doesn't quite know what it is, or its significance.

Although he does not cite Olsen, a similar thesis can be found in Stephen Marks's lengthy review (1974) of Durkheim's changing theory of anomie. Like Olsen, Marks appears to detect certain differences in Durkheim's theory of anomie as it developed through his career. Like Olsen, Marks is on to something here--a sympathetic reading might dispose us to grant that he has discovered a potentially troublesome hiatus between Durkheim's micro and macrosociological approaches to resolving the problem of anomie and the "moral anarchy" of the modern world.
One might abstract Marks's argument as follows.

A hiatus between Durkheim's micro and macrosociological analyses of anomie has been discovered. Focusing on Durkheim's program to "engineer the crisis of anomie out of existence" (1974:330), this paper shows that Durkheim attempted successively four different solutions. The key to each solution concerns what structural base generates what kind and level of normative consensus. On the micro-level, Durkheim first tried the occupational solution. The problem of anomie was then shifted to the macrolevel, where the "bold problem that Durkheim ... now set for himself" (1974:338) was how to generate a "macro-nomos," "a societal self-consciousness." On the macrosocietal level, Durkheim explored two indirect "gate-keeper" solutions in terms of normative mediation by political and educational elites. Finally, Durkheim suggests the direct macro societal solution of charismatic mass movements. Ultimately, however, all these theoretical solutions to the problem of anomie failed on their own terms. It is concluded that Durkheim's attempts were doomed to failure, in any case, since anomie inevitably characterizes any large group (see McCloskey, 1976a).

While there are many valuable things about Marks's argument on the topographic exegetical level, his analysis is beset by many problems. As with so many others who dare to tread in these treacherous regions, Marks's account simply has little notion of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. Specifically, this means that Marks slights: (a) Durkheim's crucial doctrine of the inherent egotism and insatiability of the presocialized individual; (b) Durkheim's central explanatory model linking superstructural (cultural) collectively representational processes to substructural social morphological processes; (c) Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary perspective, especially his notion of the primitive sacral complex; (d) Durkheim's developing concern with civilizational processes; (e) Durkheim's central concern, on the world-historical level, with universalizing, autonomizing, and rationalizing inter-cultural processes. If one attempts to address any part of Durkheim's sociology, especially his notion of anomie, without reference to these and other crucial anchors of his system, one runs the risk of seriously distorting the true meaning and significance of anomie. This is precisely the limitation of all topographic exegeses (on all of this see McCloskey, 1976a).
Yinger (1964), like de Grazia, makes a valuable attempt to distinguish between different degrees of anomie. Yinger especially tries to differentiate between cultural pluralism and anomie. Yinger raises some good questions:

What is the opposite of an anomic situation? Is it a completely stable society where everyone agrees on both goals and appropriate means? If so, it is quite unimaginable in the modern world, where social change is chronic, diverse ethnic and religious groups live within the same society, and individual choice and freedom are ranked high as values. Anomie is a variable that can range from little to much (1964:159).

Are heterogeneous and pluralistic societies by definition anomie (1964:159)?

No, Yinger answers, and then suggests a criterion for this important judgment.

A person strongly committed to his own values and thoroughly aware of the extent of value disagreement is likely to declare that society is dissolving in chaos, that anomie is upon us. But if anomie is not an individual moral term but a concept referring to the operations of a group, we need some way of distinguishing anomic value disagreements from what I call pluralistic value disagreements. If the disagreement does not disrupt the workings of the society—the interactions of members that require the fulfillment of shared expectations—it is pluralistic, not anomie (1964:160).

Utilizing Merton's (eg. 1964) "social imitation hypothesis," Yinger proposes a "cyclic test of anomie": "... value disagreements that tend to spread through the social system are anomie; those that have no tendency to spiral are pluralistic" (1964:161). Then Yinger distinguishes between four related types: cultural unity, cultural pluralism, subcultural anomie, and full anomie, in terms of the criteria of whether value disagreements are present, whether value disagreements disrupt interaction, and whether value disagreements are cumulative (1964:162).

This quasi-scale is meant to suggest a range from a situation in which normative agreement is high and governs most interactions to one in which normative agreement is low, and because of that very fact, tends to fall ever lower. In situation one interactions are effectively governed by the system of shared expectations. In situation two (pluralism), there are some value disagreements, but these are accepted as legitimate
or desirable, at least they are tolerated. . . . Situation three (subcultural anomie) represents the beginning of anomie—a situation in which value disagreements disrupt the pattern of mutual expectations; the differences make a difference. . . . [we see] a "demoralization"—the lack of widely shared norms to control the interaction. In situation four (full anomie), demoralization has gone farther. Value confusion now characterizes not only interactions among individuals, but the inner lives of many individuals as well (1964:161-2).

If one accepts the Parsonian-Mertonian frames in which Yinger works here, these are, of course, valuable refinements of the full range of anomic possibilities.

Especially in terms of race relations during the 1960's, Yinger saw an unmistakable trend of increasingly anomic social interaction, a spreading spiral of ungoverned relations. "... there has been a great increase in anomie, both in the sense of normlessness (disagreement on norms in an interacting group) and in the sense of the use of illegitimate means in the pursuit of culturally learned goals (1964:163). Further, noting that "Modern societies are made up of various combinations of the four normative situations discussed, with the two middle areas—pluralism and subcultural anomie—often of great importance" (1964:168), Yinger goes on to emphasize:

... the complexity of modern societies. They are neither "riddled with anomie," nor likely in the foreseeable future to eliminate it. If one starts from a strongly ideological position, he is likely to mistake pluralism for anomie: since so many people do not behave according to my norms, there is normlessness. In a heterogeneous society it is not easy, as Robin Williams says, to distinguish deviation from the norms from (1) subcultural variation; (2) a permissible alternative interpretation of general norms, or (3) patterned evasions of "heroic" norms that are so common that the evasions themselves are normative (1964:163).

Again, these are valuable distinctions; far too many scales of anomie are really only self-fulfilling prophecies—since the investigator defines the self and society as normless, they then discover widespread and pervasive projections of anomie! Or, if people do not agree with my norms, the society is going to hell in a handbasket. Clearly, neither of these projections are acceptable as indicators of sociocul-
tural anomie. Yinger's distinctions would prove helpful in clearing up the loose theoretical formulations and projections of anomie by liberal-radical thinkers on the larger society, and might also help researchers better test exactly what they set out to explore.

Finally, Yinger, who works largely with a Parsonian-Mertonian "functionalist" framework, tends at a few points to recapture some of Durkheim's original emphases. For instance, when he turns to consider the rising anomie during the 1960's, Yinger speaks of the rising level of aspirations in these terms:

I think there can be little doubt that the urbanization of American society, the increase in education, the diffusion of media of communication, the enormous visibility of goods and services available, among other influences, have raised the levels of expectations enormously. Opportunity structures have probably not kept pace with opportunities envisaged—the very essence of anomie as Merton sees it (1964:164).

However, Yinger fails to consider whether such an opportunity-aspiration disjunction is not inherent in American society—for Durkheim's notion of anomie is that aspirations always outstrip reality, because they are inherently limitless. If so, American culture is permeated with acute Durkheimian anomie (of the second variety).

In the mid-1970's, two other thinkers raised this problem in a slightly different way. Simon and Gagnon (1976) suggest that, in contrast to Merton's notions of an "anomie of deprivation caused by scarcity," we see today an "anomie of affluence." Whereas Merton emphasized lack of access to structural means of achieving cultural success goals, Simon and Gagnon emphasize that ease of access to means of success trivializes achievement, it depreciates the "currency." Addressing themselves especially to the loss of support for the standard American Dream of individual success among upper-middle and middle-class youth during the 1960's and '70's, Simon and Gagnon see a "demystification of success": "Where success is hard to get it is worth a lot, where it is easy, it becomes worthless." "In such a situation, the problematic nature of
the means that plays such a crucial part in Merton's formu-
lation tends to lose much of its significance" (1976:369).
In contrast to Merton's typology of adaptations and much of
deviance research which had traditionally focussed on non-
conforming outsiders and lower-classes, Simon and Gagnon ob-
serve that "It is the largely neglected and largely unexplain-
ed deviance of those in the higher economic and educational
strata" (1976:369) which is to be explored under the title
of the "anomia of affluence." To be fair to Merton, however,
it should be noted that he has explored the related problem
of the "anomie of success" in 1964 and elsewhere. In any
case, Simon and Gagnon's contribution to understanding the
sociocultural situation in which the commitment to goals,
to the prime cultural values themselves becomes problematic
(instead of the less critical Mertonian notion of lessened
commitment to operating institutional means) is a welcome
one. Perhaps we might surmise, as is suggested in Book Four,
that the withdrawal of affect from the dominant success goals
and "American Dream" ideology during the cultural revolution
of the 1960's and '70's had something more to do with the
rejection of the anomie--the embedded egoism and insatiabil-
ity of American culture. Although Simon and Gagnon did recog-
nize that Durkheim's notion of anomie referred to insatiabil-
ity, they neglect to link the rejection of the endless, ex-
hausting, and destructive American drive for individual suc-
cess with the ravages of Durkheimian anomie.

Finally, let us consider the ambitious attempt of Elwin
Powell (1958) to redefine the meaning of anomie in terms of
occupation, status, and suicide. Freely mixing sociological,
psychological, and psychoanalytic perspectives, Powell propo-
ses that the common denominator of the different elements of
Durkheim's typology and the different definitions of anomie
is "meaninglessness." Proceeding from what he takes to be
Durkheim's and Merton's discussions, Powell contends:
"When the ends of action become contradictory, inaccessible, or in-
significant, a condition of anomie arises. Characterized by a
general loss of orientation and accompanied by feelings of "emptiness" and apathy, anomie can be simply conceived of as meaninglessness" (1958:132).

Powell then constructs a U-shaped scale to describe suicides based upon occupational status. Powell terms the lower extreme "anomie as dissociation"--the skidders, men in retreat from the world, and "desocialized personalities"--devoid of a coherent conceptual structure, impotent to act, and so forth. At the upper end with the professional-managerial groups, Powell distinguishes "anomie as envelopment." In contrast to the other end (type V) where "anomie seems to be associated with a fragmentation of the conceptual" and (quoting Durkheim) results from "society's insufficient presence in the individual," in this type the "self is almost completely enveloped by the success ideology and presents the paradox of what might be called institutionalized anomie, i.e. meaninglessness arising from normative regulation itself." Here Powell comes close to the transition from Durkheim's first to second schema of suicide with his notion of an "institutionalized anomie" among professional-managerial types in business and the liberal professions. Because the "whole of life" for these upper-middle class occupational groups "revolves around drives for success, it wholly permeates the individual who thus has no life of his own." Yet, while insightful in a number of ways, Powell concludes in contrast to Durkheim that:

The source of anomie is not the destruction of ends or the quest for infinitely receding goals, but the inability of the self to reconstruct its own ends from the raw materials (concepts) presented to it by the culture. Living by the unexamined directives of the culture, the person has the sense of being totally controlled by forces outside himself. Hence, he feels he is not really living at all (1958:139).

Powell then summarizes his ambitious reconstruction of Durkheim's theory of anomie, and his own U-shaped continuum of dissociation and envelopment in these terms:

As opposite poles of a continuum, two forms of anomie can be discerned: the one results from the self's dissociation from, the other, its envelopment by, the conceptual system of the culture. Both render the indivi-
dual impotent and thus give rise to self-contempt which in extreme cases eventuates in suicide (1958:139).

Now, while Powell's article contains useful insights, and approaches both Durkheim's notions of anomie at certain points and our second schema, his claim that the essence of Durkheim's theory is "meaninglessness" is itself almost meaningless, for it is without any demonstration beyond bald assertion. Indeed, Powell's interesting but highly arbitrary redefinition of anomie seems somewhat like a sponge soaking up any and all available meanings of anome, egoisme, alienation, and the like. Once again, anomie reveals its nature as a protean concept.

In a little known but excellent rejoinder to Powell's proposals, Cary-Lundberg (1959) raised a series of questions with a degree of insight and historical precision rarely seen in these matters. Her perspicacious response to Powell's fuzzing of Durkheimian anomie can be taken as a valuable critique of the dispersive tendencies of the miscellaneous stream of development of anomie. First, Cary-Lundberg asks whether Powell's rather arbitrary declaration that the essence of Durkheim's anomie is "meaninglessness" is true to Durkheim's usage and intentions.

Durkheim's major concern in Le Suicide is with a society as a collectivity, with the state of its ordre collectif and its conscience collective. To describe Europe's collective consciousness pre-1900, Durkheim used the term malaise. A sickness, not economic, but moral, he said, afflicts France and the West because all previously existing cadres have either broken down or been worn away by time. Thus: social disorganization; discarded and discredited norms; a flat unwillingness to accept in any form a checkrein on pleasures, appetites, production, or prosperity... In de-controlled societies "suffering" from anomie, he said, large numbers of men are driven to suicide by frustration at the collapse of exaggerated hopes, by exasperation at the failure of excessive ambitions, by rage over being balked in any pursuit....

Anomie ... can by no scientific canon be "simply conceived as meaninglessness" (1959:250, 251).

She concludes her excellent short response by soliciting "Mr. Powell's reexamination of his primary source ... his findings
do not require him to redefine anomie. On the contrary, they require Durkheim's type of refined analysis and penetrating insight" (1959:252). Powell's reply, in turn, rests simply on his weak assertion that he is working in the spirit of Durkheim rather than from his explicit works!

It often happens that, as a stream of thought begins to diffuse and confuse the original paradigm, an incisive commentator will bring the intellectual exhaustion to public light. The various criticisms of Merton's anomie, Mizruchi's questioning of the relations between Mertonian and Durkheimian anomie, and Cary-Lundberg's incisive rebuttal to Powell's arbitrary claims, illustrate this possibility. At such times, two basic options seem open: either disregard the original conception and boldly strike out on one's own, without making any self-legitimating claims, or stop the facile and misleading identifications of different streams of thought and try to recapture the fullness of the pioneer's ideas.
PART II

CONFUSIONS OVER DURKHEIM'S TYPOLOGY OF SUICIDE

Introduction. Despite the almost universally acclaimed paradigmatic status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide remains largely undeveloped and confused in the sociological literature. While social scientists have lavished attention on anomie, with diverse results, the complementary types of egoisme, altruisme, and fatalisme continue to languish in sociological darkness. If Durkheim himself, for instance, insisted that egoisme was responsible for more suicides in the modern world than anomie, how has it been possible for sociologists to either consistently ignore egoisme or to collapse it into anomie? In turn, how has it been possible, even for historical sociologists and ethnographers, to ignore the historical and cultural implications of altruisme and fatalisme? Of Durkheim's four types, only one--anomie--really survives; what accounts for this radical truncation of his profound and complex theories? Is this truncation and distortion an outcome unique to the reception of Durkheim's doctrines? Or, on the other hand, can we begin to see here the outlines of a generic sociocultural process (see McCloskey, 1974)?

Several other observers of the curious fate of Durkheim's typology have noted this characteristic process. For instance, although over fifteen years ago Dohrenwend noted "... a tendency to overlook the conditions labelled by the companion concepts of egoism and altruism, and the footnoted stepchild, fatalism, has all but been ignored" (1959:466), the balance between these equally important types has yet to be fully redressed. Giddens (1966:277) observed: "Durkheim's types of egoistic and anomic suicide ... have not been developed by later sociologists as a typology." Over a decade after
Dohrenwend's initial statement of concern, A.R. Mawson echoed both Dohrenwend and Giddens: "The relations between Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoisme have been virtually ignored in the substantial body of literature on social pathology" (1970: 298).

Now, the mystery surrounding the virtual disappearance of three-quarters of Durkheim's typology of suicide is deepened by the curious fact that anomie—the one type developed by sociologists—has been mostly applied to theories of deviance and despair, while sociologists concerned with understanding suicide have largely ignored both egoisme and anomie by translating them into some standard sociological euphemism such as social disintegration, normlessness, alienation, and so forth. And it is unfortunate that Durkheim's typology of suicide has had little impact on historical or philosophically minded sociologists concerned with historical processes and the origins and dilemmas of the modern and post-modern worlds. Giddens observes in this regard:

Sociologists studying suicide have tended to reject the concept of anomie as either being indistinguishable from egoisme, or as having little explanatory reference to suicide. Writers concerned with other forms of deviant behavior, on the other hand, have made anomie the mainspring of a general theory.... There seems to be little logic in the uneven use which has been made of these concepts *(1966:277).

Durkheim's fate here has been cleverly summed up by one observer: "Clearly our estimate of Durkheim is more reverential than referential. Presently it is less appreciation than patterned evasion" (C. Parker Wolf, 1966:723). As I indicated earlier (see Book Three), Durkheim's classic Suicide has experienced a doubly sad fate, for not only has anomie--his most famous concept--undergone routine and progressive distortion--but at the same time the rest of Durkheim's complementary typology has also been routinely ignored, and thus relegated to sociological darkness.

Fortunately, over the years several observers have attempted to rescue Durkheim's typology from obscurity. We shall now briefly explore their widely diverging reinterpretations.
Attempts to restore Durkheim's schema to the center stage of sociological thought can be roughly classified into two different types—what I shall term "reductions" and "rescues." By the former I refer to those reinterpretations which argue that Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues" refer to those interpretations which seek to restore the full measure of distinction to the four interrelated types of suicide. Of course, we cannot here review all the various descriptive summaries or recapitulations of Durkheim's typology in the secondary literature; rather, we shall be concerned only with those who argue a distinctive reduction or rescue of the four types.

Underlying these conflicting discussions is the recognition, of course, that the structure and meaning of Durkheim's typology of suicide is not self-evidently clear, that it may often be ambiguous, and in process of development. Precisely because the schemas are obscure, they require careful interpretation. Something lost, something hidden—-it is to the recovery of such meanings that we sharpen our hermeneutical tools.

Let us turn first to consider several reductions of Durkheim's typology, and then, finally, consider several rescues of the distinctness of all four types which serve as a bridge to our own second schema of suicide as developed in Book Three. Our guiding assumptions here are that any adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide must: (a) take seriously the reductionists' attempts to elucidate an underlying unity to the four types, and (b) follow the rescuers in their attempt to elucidate the distinctness of the four types. Hence, we seek to reconcile this conflict by simultaneously interrelating the four types, yet maintaining their distinctness. We seek here a coherent unity-in-diversity (see also Part I, Book Three).
CHAPTER NINE
REDUCTIONS

A. Poggi and The Four-Fold Table

Following Parsons’ emphasis on normative regulation, Gianfranco Poggi (1972) suggests that social cohesion is really dependent upon normative regulation. Although citing neither Barclay Johnson (1965) nor Bruce Dohrenwend (1959), Poggi attempts to demonstrate his theses by showing that Durkheim’s typology cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms of a standard four-fold table.

Although Poggi has a point in revealing the essential links between social structural integration and normative regulation, in attempting to argue his thesis, Poggi—as with the other reductionists—goes to the other extreme by insisting that there is no significant difference between these variables, and thus between egoism and anomie. And, of course, like the others, Poggi neglects to ask whether the variables of social cohesion and normative regulation are sufficient to adequately conceptualize the full complexity of Durkheim’s types.

The distinctions between cohesion and regulation, like that between mechanical and organic solidarity, may be one on which Durkheim places more weight than its analytical tenability warrants. In particular, his interpretation of the differential suicide rates of various religious groups implicitly suggests that in his own view a society’s cohesion depends on the extent to which which individuals are made the subject of norms, and is thus a product of regulation. The fact that in one passage his distinction between “egoistic” and “anomic” suicide is linked to that between cohesion and regulation ... is not decisive for two reasons. In the first place, the distinction between egoistic and anomic suicide can be alternatively construed in terms of different types of norms. In the second place, Durkheim’s own attempts to base the distinction on that between cohesion and regulation is intrinsically faulty. This can
best be seen from a longish footnote [S:279] in which Durkheim insists that cohesion and regulation should be treated as mutually independent variables but fails to establish his case (1972:200).

While Poggi's argument, as with the other reductionists, is valuable in that it attempts to establish a deeper, underlying coherence to Durkheim's typology, Poggi seems so consumed by the search for normative themes in Durkheim's doctrines that he is also willing, like the other reductionists, to simply set aside or contradict Durkheim's own statements when they run counter to their theses. This, then, is the virtue and vice of the reductionists: while, on the one hand, they will lead us to articulate the interrelation of all four types in terms of some underlying unity, they will, on the other hand, lead us to ignore or swamp out crucial differences between the various types. Instead of generating an articulated schema, the reductionists lead us to one irreducible common denominator, a radical reduction to one category.

To demonstrate his contention that underlying Durkheim's typology is the single, fundamental continuum of normative regulation, Poggi attempts to categorize Durkheim's schema in terms of a simple, standard four-fold table. Failure to do so, Poggi holds, implies the rejection of all attempts to maintain the distinctness of Durkheim's types.

But there is no way of constructing such a table with Durkheim's pretended independent variables as its two coordinates and his four types of suicide as its cells; that is, no "property space" comprising the four types will result from actually treating his two variables as independent and crossing them (1972:201).

As might be expected, however, Poggi neglects to inquire whether: (a) there are any other adequate ways of schematically conceptualizing Durkheim's types in a coherent structure; (b) there is any inherent necessity in conceptualizing Durkheim's types exclusively in terms of a simple four-fold table; (c) and if not, whether this still disqualifies Durkheim's own explicit statements to the contrary.

Since he fails to pursue such alternative formulations, Poggi concludes:
Cohesion and regulation [can be] juxtaposed, but they cannot be "crossed," either because they are not independent of one another or because they belong to different levels of conceptualization. I have already suggested that Durkheim's own treatment assumes the dependence of cohesion on regulation in spite of his claims to the contrary. At any rate, Durkheim's repeated discussions of the nature of society, the concept of social fact, and on morals unequivocally indicate that in his thought normative regulation has no rival as the central and critical component of society (1972:201-2).

Again, Poggi's claim is valuable in that it directs our attention to the pervasiveness of normative themes in Durkheim's notion of social control; however, Poggi's argument is no more acceptable than many of the translations of anomie since, it too, ignores much of the underlying "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. How can one speak, for instance, of the need for "normative regulation" unless one knows what Durkheim thought needed controlling—namely, the insatiable passions of the pre-socialized ego? Not including this factor in any discussion of Durkheim's theory of normative regulation is a basic failure. Further, even given his two central variables of social cohesion and normative regulation, Poggi neglects to explore Barclay Johnson's interesting attempt to schematically present just these two factors in terms of high and low positions, or Anthony Giddens' helpful attempt to present anomie and egoisme as representing two low positions on two continuums of integration, social and normative. For these and other reasons, Poggi's curious exercise demonstrates little, except the limitations of four-fold tables as standard interpretive devices, and the binds interpreters get themselves into by slighting whole portions of the very doctrine which they hope to understand.
B. Barclay Johnson's Reduction

In one of the more interesting and independent analyses of Durkheim's types, Barclay Johnson alleges that all four types can be reduced down to one basic underlying dimension--integration or regulation. However, in order to reduce the distinctness of Durkheim's types down to one homogeneous, common denominator, Johnson is forced to do great violence not only to Durkheim's crucial doctrines of human nature and his image of the direction of historical development, but also to much evidence in Durkheim's own statements opposing such a reduction. One thing is certainly clear, however, from such an attack as Johnson's--any adequate theory of suicide, even if based upon their essential distinctiveness, must follow interpreters such as Halbwachs, Gibbs and Martin, Johnson and others in so far as they attempt to establish common foundations for egoisme and anomie.

Johnson begins well enough by identifying from the first part of Durkheim's work two key "independent variables"--namely, social integration and social regulation (e.g. see also Smelser, 1976: 90). Then Johnson characterizes these as continuums, with high, low and medium possibilities. Next, he matrices these possibilities--anomie, fatalisme, egoisme, and altruisme--as low and high locations on these continuums of regulation and integration, respectively. As long as one ignores Durkheim's inherent dichotomizing tendencies, and his doctrines of human nature and history, Johnson's analysis appears to be a useful schematic summary of common observations. Indeed, at least one observer of Durkheim who maintains that Durkheim's types can be distinguished, Anthony Giddens, bases his schema of Durkheim's typology on essentially the same schema of continuums of social structural integration and normative regulation (1966).

Then Johnson begins his own series of reductions by first eliminating altruisme and fatalisme from serious consideration. Johnson contends: "Under Durkheim's own premises, he cannot legitimately study altruistic and fatalistic groups"
(1965:879) because reliable statistics are not available for primitive societies! And thus what began as an attempt to restore Durkheim's original schema to fuller significance now turns into the one of the most extreme and questionable reductions attempted. By abstracting Durkheim's thought and ignoring the historical underpinnings of the typology of suicide, Johnson presumes that Durkheim's notions of fatalisme and altruisme are largely suppositionary. "Altruisme should be excluded from Durkheim's theory, then, because, with the single exception of the army, all the cases he cites either lack evidence or are not explained in purely social terms" (1965:881).

After attempting to justify thus his unfounded slighting of the entire pre-modern half of Durkheim's schema, Johnson then attempts to extend his reformulation by citing the discovery of a "serious flaw in the theory," and thus seeming to justify his collapse of anomie and egoisme down to one common denominator. "To overcome this flaw, egoisme and anomie should be equated, for integration and regulation are in truth one dimension, rather than two" (1965:881). Johnson insists that, since the suicide rate depends on two social variables, integration and regulation, "... even to predict a group's relative rate requires that one locate each group on both dimensions at once" (1965:882). Now, we have ourselves (eg. see Part I, Book Three) pointed out some fundamental flaws in Durkheim's theory, especially as they relate to his application of his doctrine of homo duplex to cases of suicide; the question here is whether Johnson has identified a real flaw or simply confused further an already ambiguous situation. How can one equate integration and regulation unless you know what each specifically implies? And, what role does Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex play in relation to these two notions of social integration and normative regulation? These questions must be answered by the reductionists.

Then Johnson offers a series of reasons justifying his claim that egoisme and anomie are not merely related but identical.
Suicide contains a number of reasons for concluding that egoisme and anomie are merely two different names for the same thing. First, if anomie and egoisme can be equated, so that integration and regulation are really only one dimension, then one need only know which of the two will have the higher suicide rate. Thus, equating egoisme and anomie resolves the flaw I have found in Durkheim's theory and makes his predictions determinate (1965:882).

Rather than attempt, through systematic exegesis and comparison of Durkheim's foundational theory with one of his special sociologies, to elucidate and sort through the various complexities and ambiguities of Durkheim's doctrine, reductionists such as Johnson wade in with sledge hammers, pound the typologies into a homogeneous pulp, and emerge triumphantly with a single common denominator! Small matter, really, that in the process one simply contradicts the pioneer thinkers' own testimony. For his second reason, Johnson argues that since anomie and egoisme usually occur together, they are more or less identical. Johnson's special dispensation to ignore crucial parts of Durkheim's theory, and to reconstruct other parts solely in terms of his own special logics, allows him to go so far as to propose that "... not only do the two coincide empirically, but there is not even a conceptual distinction between them" (1965:883).

Johnson then attempts to argue, from a very incomplete exegesis of Durkheim's work, that "... Durkheim's very definitions of the terms make egoisme and anomie identical" (1965:883). He continues:

But it remains to be shown that the two conditions are conceptually identical. Such a conclusion can be defended on the grounds that when Durkheim creates what purports to be a separate concept, anomie, from one aspect of egoisme, he contradicts one of his own principles. His definitions of mechanical and organic solidarity in The Division of Labor, and of egoisme in Suicide, seem to derive from the working principle that several dimensions coinciding empirically should be regarded as one conceptually. Each end of a such a multi-faceted dimension is then assigned a single name, and treated as a single concept. According to Durkheim's own practice, then a legitimate definition of anomie must encompass not only the absence of social regulation but the other two aspects of egoisme as well. Ano-
mie and egoisme are thus identical conceptually as well as empirically (1965:884).

While one cannot fault the attempt to point out internal inconsistencies in an argument, we can hardly follow Johnson here in his curious slighting of evidence in Durkheim's own work contrary to Johnson's claims. Johnson repeatedly ignores counter evidence and invokes tacit and questionable "principles" purportedly derived from the text itself. The violence that secondary interpreters sometimes wreak on "sacred texts" is nowhere seen so clearly as here, for Johnson simply outlaws Durkheim's own explicit distinctions between egoisme and anomie, especially in the section on "Individual Forms of Suicide."

Again, Johnson's fourth argument relies on the same specious type of claim.

My fourth argument for equating the two conditions is that he fails in this attempt.... If the morphological types depend logically on the aetiological types, there can only be as many of the former as there are of the latter. In short, if egoisme and anomie are identical social conditions, they cannot have distinguishable psychological manifestations (1965:884).

But Johnson simply ignores that it is he, not Durkheim, who has "established" the fact that "egoisme and anomie are identical social conditions," and therefore must be morphologically as well as aetiological identical. What an arrogant way to interpret a text--to consistently and repeatedly ignore not only the author's doctrines but his explicit statements, to revise the stated theories by engaging in purely imposed "internal logical checks," instead of first attempting to discover and make systematic and explicit the "logics-in-use" in the original theory, and finally, when faced with incontrovertible evidence from the text itself, to appeal to the specious authority of the "conclusions" which one has already "established" solely by oneself!

Interestingly, Johnson then considers and rejects Parsons' discovery of an important distinction between egoisme and anomie.

... Parsons' claim is an ill-founded one. His position is that Durkheim implicitly linked anomie with the strength of the common conscience, and egoisme with its
content. Anomie is present where common sentiments and social regulation are weak, whereas egoism occurs where a common sentiment places a high value on the individual. I have no quarrel with Parsons' view of anomie, but I must challenge his interpretation of egoism (1965:885).

How Johnson treats this discordant suggestion (see the succeeding chapter) is most interesting, for here one interpreter summarily dismisses the important insights of Parsons into one of Durkheim's most profound breakthroughs.

Parsons derives this interpretation largely from Durkheim's discussion of Protestantism. Durkheim says Protestants are ruled by a "spirit of free inquiry." Parsons contends that this spirit is a shared sentiment maintained by the religious authority of the Protestant church. But, on the contrary, Durkheim asserts that it is a breakdown of collective sentiments which has led Protestants to pursue truth independently of any social authority. Protestant society is weak and poorly integrated. This absence of integration, and of the shared sentiments accompanying it, forces individuals to find purpose and meanings for their lives independently (1965:885).

But Johnson does not here sufficiently emphasize, in contrast to Parsons, Durkheim's highly critical attitude toward egoism; further, in order to refute Parsons' virtuous image of egoism as sanctioned by Protestant individualism, he falls back on the weak link in Durkheim's evolutionary argument. Although Johnson is prone to invoke many logical checks, he fails here to critically review Durkheim's generalized doctrine of the emergence of individualism through the progressive division of labor (see Book One). Not only is this not a sufficient explanation of the historical process, but, as Parsons observed, there is much evidence in Durkheim's work itself to support the notion of egoism as culturally sanctioned.

But Johnson next turns to deal summarily with this critical evidence in *Suicide* itself.

Occasionally, Durkheim contradicts his usual view of egoism and his cult of personality, and his confusions help to account for Parsons' misunderstanding. At several points he speaks as if the cult of personality prevailed in his time, as if it is upon it that "all our morality rested." But this notion contradicts other, more powerful lines in his thought. If a strong common respect for the individual existed in Durkheim's time,
then his whole analysis of modern egoisme (and, since it is indistinguishable from egoisme, of anomie as well) must be considered invalid. The common conscience in a given society cannot be simultaneously strong and weak (1965:885).

Johnson was on to something important here—he almost recognizes the foundations of Durkheim's second schema, that anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the modern world. But Johnson rejects these transitional possibilities as a "hopeless muddle," and thus again misses important clues to the breakthrough to Durkheim's second theory.

Nonetheless, if the cult of personality and egoism co-exist empirically, they must somehow be reconciled theoretically. Durkheim toys with the position that the two are somehow compatible, so that egoism is "associated with" respect for individuality in civilized nations.... Since Parsons equates the cult of personality with egoisme, he may well have relied heavily on this passage. But it is a hopeless muddle, an attempt to reconcile two irreconcilable views of the modern world, and thus hardly a suitable proof text for the Parsonian view (1965:836).

Hence, we witness once again how difficult basic conceptual breakthroughs can be—for here one of the leading contemporary interpreters of Durkheim's suicide typology, when led by Parsons, one of the seminal modern interpreters of Durkheim, to the very brink of discovery of Durkheim's second theory, instead turns around, throws up his hands in dismay, and castigates the outlines of Durkheim's second schema as "hopeless muddle"! I merely now note that what Barclay Johnson retreated from as a "hopeless muddle," viewed in terms more faithful to the complexities of Durkheim's own thought, constitutes the foundations of the linkage of such basic paradigms of anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos.

Instead of sorting through the various levels of Durkheim's meanings, Johnson, though rightly noting many ambiguities permeating Durkheim's work, nonetheless wrongly concludes that this fruitful ambiguity must be set aside and the most severe and simplest kind of reductions embraced. Johnson is like a sociological Puritan, reducing the complex deposit of faith, tradition, and symbol down to the barest essentials.
Durkheim's confusion must be acknowledged. But the evidence strongly suggests that his primary view is that egoisme implies not a strong common sentiment of respect for the individual, but rather the weakness of the common conscience. Since this weakness, and the resulting absence of social regulation, is also defined as anomie, I conclude once again that egoisme and anomie are identical (1965:886).

Once again, Johnson was on to something important here—for he realizes, as we do (see the section on Parsons in the succeeding chapter), that Parsons has taken only one of Durkheim's explanations of the origins of egoisme. In our reconstruction, we suggest that Parsons took over egoisme from the second schema, and tried, unsuccessfully, to insert it into the first schema of suicide. But Johnson's drive to reduce, rather than elucidate, the complexities of Durkheim's thought, leads him to ignore this important possibility. Finally, Johnson neglects to even cite the wholly contrary assertions of Bruce Dohrenwend (1959).

Although he begins well, and offers several valuable insights, by pursuing so relentlessly his theses Barclay Johnson not only reduces the diversity and rich meaning of Durkheim's typology, but also manages to set aside contrary evidence from Durkheim himself as "confusing" and a "hopeless muddle," while also ignoring counter-evidence from other secondary interpreters. While Johnson turned away from the complexities and ambiguities of Durkheim's thought, and reduced his types down to one common denominator, other interpreters seized upon the potentialities of Durkheim's profound theses, and moved boldly ahead to forge new perspectives.
C. Whitney Pope and Social Integration

One of the more sophisticated reductions of Durkheim's typology of suicide can be found in Whitney Pope's recent book, *Durkheim's Suicide: A Classic Analyzed* (1976). Pope is a follower of Barclay Johnson: "I accept Johnson's equation of integration with regulation, but reject the rationale underlying the elimination of altruisme (and fatalisme)" (1976: 46). Pope treats social integration as the key to suicide; he emphasizes social structure and social interaction. In taking "mechanical solidarity" as his essential model, Pope drops out the evolutionary dimension, and collapses all down to social integration. Pope asserts that: "... Durkheim shifted away from The Division of Labor's two types of solidarity model, and toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the mechanical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to primitive but also to modern societies" (1976:37). Pope even goes so far as to reverse Durkheim's theses: "... egoistic and anomie suicide do not result from lack of organic solidarity, but precisely from lack of mechanical solidarity" (1976:37).

In one sense, Pope's analysis is a welcome reexamination of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. His exploration is good in that it recognizes the complexity of Durkheim's theses, and insofar as it proposes a more complex, multivalent sequential theory of suicidal processes. Specifically, Pope's attempt is valuable in that he attempts to link Durkheim's notions of social morphological and interactional processes to his theory of sociocultural processes, and these, in turn, to Durkheim's theses on suicide. Pope's theory is preeminently a theory of intervening processes. The question remains, however, whether or not Pope's articulation of these intervening processes is justified and compelling.

The essential flaws in Pope's effort include: (a) he doesn't provide an in-depth exegesis of the underlying "nuclear structure" of all of Durkheim's work; hence, he has no deeper structure in which to locate his literal exegesis of *Suicide*; (b) Pope ignores Durkheim's crucial doctrine of man
as homo duplex; (c) he also fails to place Durkheim's suicide typology in an evolutionary context. I must insist, on the contrary, that if there is no insatiability and egoism, and no transforming historical process, there can be no anomie and egoisme! Perhaps the most telling flaw in Pope's argument is his unfounded equation of "mechanical solidarity" with an abstracted notion of social interaction. Unfortunately, Pope's attempt emerges as a yet another abstract, ahistorical reduction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Instead of enriching Durkheim's seminal insights, Pope leaves us with flatter, less interesting heritage.

Now, in his reconstruction of the typology, Pope insists on: (a) focussing almost exclusively on integration and regulation (as if they were somehow key code words by which to unlock the secrets of Durkheim's schemas), and (b) conceptualizing the four types as if they had to be opposite poles on these two continua. In both instances, he is misled by occasional or summary comments of Durkheim. For example, in the first case, it is more essential to elucidate Durkheim's actual "logics-in-use" rather than to seize upon these two terms as if there were magic keys. Pope's failure to compare and contrast a systematic exegesis of the "nuclear structure" of all of Durkheim's work with a systematic "literal" exegesis of *Suicide* bars access to these actual shifting "logics-in-use." Hence, Pope's exegesis remains on the outside of the "hermeneutical circle;" his interpretation remains on the surface.

In the second case, there is no innate necessity to conceive of Durkheim's types as if they had to be opposite poles on the ends of an integration and regulation continuum. For these continua really do not emerge from a systematic exegesis of the actual interpretive "logics-in-use" through which Durkheim built up his typology from *The Division of Labor* through his lectures on *Moral Education* and *Professional Ethics* and *Civic Morals, Socialism, and Suicide*. Specifically, Pope argues:
The first of Durkheim's two major explanatory variables was integration. Two types of suicide represent opposite ends of the integration continuum. One type is egoistic. Rates of interaction in egoistic groups are low; beliefs, values, traditions, and sentiments are not common to all members. Consequently, they reciprocally enfeeble one another as they come into conflict. Collective life diminishes, and individual interests assert themselves.

Just as weak integration leads to high suicide rates, so also does strong integration. With the individual completely absorbed into and controlled by the group, his individuality, so slightly developed, cannot be highly valued (1976:12).

Thus, on the integration continuum, Pope portrays egoisme as low integration and altruisme as high integration. In addition:

Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence of social change resulting in a diminution of social regulation. Durkheim recognized that just as egoisme and altruisme represent opposite ends of a single continuum, so logically there should be an opposite end of anomie on the regulation continuum (fatalisme) (1976:12-13).

Pope then connects these two continua with what he takes to be "the underlying logical structure" of the theory.

Implicit in the derivation of Durkheim's typology of suicide is the underlying logical structure of the theory. Durkheim postulated identical relations between each of two independent variables—integration and regulation—and suicide. When either is high or low, the suicide rate is high; when either is moderate, the rate is low. Changes in rates are proportional to changes in the strength of these two variables. The high and low points of each are named—egoisme and altruisme (integration) and anomie and fatalisme (regulation)—and identified as the causes of suicide. The theory, then, proposes that suicide rates are low at some point along the integration and regulation continua, increasing in proportion to the distance from those points (1976:14).

Yet, at various points Pope acknowledges that his schema is a secondary construction, and imposed on the material. Suicide conveys the impression that Durkheim was only vaguely and intermittently conscious of the underlying logical structure of his theory. Only twice did he note that when either integration or regulation is moderate, suicide rates are low (1976:14).

Pope then admits that his schema is interpretive—that is,
he attempts "... to make explicit what is left implicit in Suicide itself;" but, how can we hope to accurately elucidate the implicit underlying structure of Durkheim's theses here without performing a comprehensive and systematic exegesis of the underlying substantive structure informing all of Durkheim's works?

Because he never explicitly worked with the total configuration (Suicide identifies only one or two steps at a time), the figure (4.1) entails some reconstruction (1976: 31).

Again, Pope acknowledges that he has imposed his conceptualization on Durkheim's Suicide.

... it should be remembered that Durkheim did not typically think of his theory as diagrammed in figure 5.1. Thus, he did not always take into account that in crossing the mid-point of the integration continuum, the relationship between integration and suicide changes from negative (egoisms) to positive (altruisme) (1976:210, #5).

In sum, Pope insists on imposing on Durkheim's material an abstract, ahistorical continuum, and insists on taking integration and regulation as code words; then, he reduces normative regulation down to structural integration; and finally, he reduces this down to social interaction which is mistakenly equated with "mechanical solidarity." When, at the end of his book, Pope claims to have thereby resolved the "central ambiguity" of Suicide--the relationship between anomie and egoisme, integration and regulation--"without cost," we can hardly agree with him. For his reduction has been achieved, as with Barclay Johnson's, only through a certain sort of textual violence which shrinks and flattens this seminal text. Our task today is to reappropriate our heritage, our informing cultural traditions, not to flatten and reduce them.

In terms of his first continuum of integration, while faced with the ambiguous relation of egoism to religion and belief systems, Pope chose to take Durkheim's early causal model at face value, and thus, to collapse the cultural to the structural level.

The strength of collective beliefs varies inversely
with free inquiry. Strength of collective beliefs is the independent variable, and each diminution of its strength results in a concomitant increase in free inquiry and individuality. But to speak of the strength of collective beliefs is really to speak of the vitality, cohesion, or integration of society itself. The more integrated a society is, the more it controls the behavior of its members, protecting them from suicide. Durkheim's explanation emphasizes the strength of collective beliefs and, hence, the level of integration in a society determines, and varies inversely with, the strength of free inquiry (moral individualism, or simply individuality) (1976:16).

But Pope apparently did not realize that to Durkheim, moral individualism was the opposite of egoistic individuality. In addition, Pope (e.g. 1976:19-20) fails to distinguish Durkheim's notion of individuation in The Division of Labor from later developments, especially the crucial insight that moral individualism is not simply a product of individuation and differentiation, but, rather, that it must be culturally constructed (see Chapter Eight, Book One).

In terms of integration in familial society, Pope sounds some of his essential themes:

... the number of people determines the amount of interaction, which determines the number of reacting consciousnesses, which determine the number of consciousnesses reacting in common and sharing collective sentiments, which determines the degree of social integration (1976:17).

Although the level of integration is explained in terms of the strength of collective sentiments, Pope attempts to anchor this, in turn, in degrees of social interaction without recognizing the full extent of Durkheim's notions of social morphological processes in evolution (see Chapter Four, Book One), and Durkheim's "law of moral mechanics" (see Part II, Book Two).

Pope then offers his own synthetic theory of social integration. Here he acknowledges, again, that "... what is missing is Durkheim's own synthesis ... A synthesis is not readily apparent" (1976:22). Pope's model, though complex, centers around a strong/weak social interaction process.

Rate of interaction is central because it determines the number of consciousnesses acting and reacting in
common to each other and to collective sentiments, which in turn determines the strength of the latter.... The strength of the collective factor--here collective sentiments--and that of the individual factor--vary inversely. The strength of collective sentiments determines the degree of social integration (1976:22).

Pope here takes Durkheim's early simplistic opposition of society to the individual as the key, and sees it as an either/or proposition. Yet, Pope also sees that cultural factors--"collective representations" and "sentiments"--are crucial, as we documented in Chapter Four of Book One, and in Book Three on the autonomization of "collective representations."

The higher the rate of interaction, the greater the fusion of individual consciences into collective representations and, consequently, the stronger the latter. Durkheim here explained why both integration and regulation vary inversely with interaction, which is decisive not only as the process through which the "essential" social component (collective representations, sentiments) is created, but also as the determinant of the social factors' strength (1976:191).

And, of course, Pope's focus on social interaction is central in Durkheim, as we saw in Book One. "Interaction is identified as the process through which emergent realities are created" (1976:195). Yet, somehow, even though Pope perceives certain key elements, his reductionistic drive leads him to a certain type of positivistic stringing together of hypotheses. For instance:

... the rate of interaction determines the strength of collective sentiments which, in turn, determines the degree of social integration. Degree of integration determines the degree to which the individual finds meanings in this life, which determines the social suicide rate (1976:25).

This flattening drive yields, then, summary propositions such as the idea that Durkheim's central empirical generalization was:

... rate of interaction is proportional to numbers, integration is proportional to rate of interaction, and suicide rates are inversely related to interaction (1976:77).

Yet, the drive for common denominators simply obscures cru-
cial principles in Durkheim's work; and the restringing of causal connections leads to a very different model than that which we discovered in Suicide.

To turn this into a theory of suicide requires adding the following linkages: the strength of social integration determines the extent to which individuals act in service of social interests, which determines the degree to which they find meaning in life, which in turn determines the social suicide rate. In sum, the theory of egoisme as a theory of suicide holds that the higher the rate of social interaction, the stronger collective sentiments; the stronger collective sentiments, the stronger social integration; the stronger social integration, the more individuals act in service of social interests; the more individuals act in service of social interests, the more meaning they find in life and the lower the social suicide rate (1976:23).

But Pope then runs into trouble defining altruisme—why should higher social integration lead to higher suicide rates? Is it a case, perhaps, of too much meaning in life? No, Pope claims that altruisme places too little meaning on continued individual existence. "High levels of social integration lead to lack of meaning in individual existence, which in turn leads to high suicide rates" (1976:23). But this is sheer nonsense. However, it is not this existential flaw which is most glaring in Pope's claim here; rather, it is the failure to fully understand what "mechanical solidarity" implies to Durkheim.

Pope then sets out to synthesize the two opposite sets of suicide on the integration continua—namely, egoisme and altruisme.

Given that egoisme refers to low, and altruisme to high, levels of integration, it should be possible to integrate the two theoretical statements. Both treat rate of interaction as causally linked to level of social integration. However, the two linkages are somewhat different. The theory of egoisme speaks of the number of consciousnesses reacting in common as a determinant of the strength of collective sentiments. In contrast, the theory of altruisme states that high rates of interaction enable strict social control, thereby insuring highly developed common group life and minimum individual divergences. Hence, it becomes possible to integrate the theory of altruisme and egoisme. The rate of interaction determines the strength of collective sentiments, or, in
different terms, the extensiveness of common life. The strength of collective sentiments, in turn, determines the strength of social integration. The similarities underlying certain differences in terminology and causal linkages are such that the theories of egoisme and altruisme may be synthesized into a single theory of integration. The egoist commits suicide because his existence fails to fulfill his need to find meaning in life; the altruist because he attaches little meaning to his continued physical existence. Lack of meaning is decisive in both cases (1976:23-4).

But underlying Pope's synthetic effort here is an unacceptable proposition. Can it really be the case that altruistic suicide is a result of a lack of meaning in continued physical existence? Or, rather, is it because the individual is so penetrated by collective rationales that, if necessary, he will sacrifice himself for the group? Pope entirely misses the point (see Books Two and Three) that in using altruism as an index to mechanical solidarity, Durkheim pointed to a sociocultural and evolutionary situation in which the sacromagical collective conscience pervades the individual's nascent conscience and bends it almost completely to collective duties and traditional obligations. It is ludicrous to suggest here, as Pope does, that altruisme is due to anything but the presence of extremely strong cultural sanctions for self-abnegation.

Pope's collapse of egoisme and altruisme down to an abstract continuum of integration obscures these and other important differences. It is not high social integration which is the opposite of suicide; for in mechanical solidarity, dominated by a sacral complex (see Book One), altruisme itself results from strong collective sentiments, high social control and interaction, from high solidarity. Thus, Pope's simplistic interactional-integration model suffers from the outset.

... Number of people determines the rate of social interaction, which in turn determines the strength of collective sentiments.... The strength of collective sentiments determines the degree of social integration, which in turn determines the degree to which the individual finds meaning in life, which determines the social suicide rate (1976:25).
Now, Pope does identify (see his figure 4.1) the psychological correlates of anomie and egoism which Durkheim associated in *Suicide*, but it is hard to pull these together as Pope does. For, in reality, these belong to two different schemas.

Altruistic suicide contrasts with egoistic in being more active and passionate, and with anomie in that the source of the "inspiring passion" is external, coming from society.... When related to the earlier distinctions between egoism and anomie, these contrasts raise questions. Curiously, Durkheim attributed to altruistic suicide two characteristics--activity and strong emotions--that had previously been reserved for anomic (as opposed to egoistic) suicide. This attribution shows why the distinction between egoism and anomie cannot be equated with that between integration and regulation generally.

Suicide successfully identifies several differences between anomie and egoism. The difficulty is that the sociological difference between them as causes of suicide is never elucidated. In terms of key variables, Durkheim drew his distinctions at the level of intervening, rather than independent, variables.... It is the sociological distinction between integration and regulation that Durkheim never identified. Suicide's failure in this regard is an indication that the distinction between the two basic independent variables in his theory, and hence between egoism and anomie, is uncertain at best *(1976:33).*

However, Pope's real insight here leads him, like Johnson, on a relentless drive to reduce the apparent differences between anomie and egoism, rather than to provide a clearer and deeper articulation. If Pope had not insisted on conceptualizing the suicide schemas in terms of those code words--integration and regulation--many of his problems would vanish. For instance, he rightly observes that these two types are intimately related (eg. S:288). But, while it is true that egoism and altruism share common foundations, Pope slights the real possibility that they may be still distinguished as different expressions of a common cultural source. Instead he collapses their differences: "If egoism and anomie have the same cause, if they are aspects of the same social state, then, by definition, they are identical" *(1976:45).* "Suicide makes a strong case for the identity of egoism and anomie" *(1976:45-6).* This is the very hallmark of the reductionistic thrust.
In his program to reduce the regulation continuum to social integration, Pope claims that:

... both integration and regulation may be linked to either loss of meaning or to a means-needs equilibrium. The unsuccessful nature of existing attempts to distinguish between egoisme and anomie, Durkheim's own failure in this regard (especially in contrast with the many indications in Suicide that anomie and egoisme are essentially the same), the similarity of Durkheim's empirical examples, his failure to control for either in analyzing the relationship between the other and suicide, and the possibility of coupling the links between suicide and other major independent variables with those of the other strongly argue for the essential similarity of integration and regulation (1976:48).

Pope then adds the following caveat:

Of course, demonstrating the overlap between integration and regulation does not necessarily rule out the possibility that they are in some measure distinct. However, to be viable, any identification of a distinction between the two must be accompanied by a demonstration that the distinction is comparable in theoretical importance to their overlap, which lies at the core of Durkheim's theory (1976:48).

I contend I have met these requirements in Book Three. By contrast, what is to be gained, and what is lost, from Pope's reduction? While he would probably answer: "a unified theory," it is clear that this is possible on other grounds, as we have shown, one that maintains a unity-in-diversity. Why does Pope insist on a radical reduction as the only way to resolve the real ambiguities in Durkheim's work? Why is it not more desirable, as a matter of course, to discern both a fundamental unity and also a real diversity?

Pope's reductionistic drive leads him to make utterly gratuitous assumptions; for instance, that the real function of Durkheim's anomie theory is to protect the schema from falsification. When faced with ambiguity, the reductionist flattens the powerful, though unclear, portions, and then raises up tiny molehills where no problem exists.

Durkheim's theory contains one pervasive ambiguity resulting from the fuzziness of the integration-regulation distinction. Since these are Durkheim's central independent variables, ambiguity therefore exists at the core of the theory. Indeed, the overlap between the theory of
egoism and that of anomie is virtually complete. Including the latter makes Durkheim's theory of suicide far more difficult to falsify; however, it adds no more explanatory power. Consequently, there is a strong case for equating egoism and anomie and, hence, integration and regulation; thus resolving the most problematic aspect of Durkheim's theory without cost (1976:201).

... the real function of the theory of anomie is to protect the overall theoretical statement from falsification (1976:56).

Pope then offers the following summaries of his theoretical reconstruction of the schemas of suicide.

... in seeking the starting points of his causal chain, my obvious choice is to focus primarily on the theory of integration.... Rate of interaction occupies a central place in Durkheim's causal chain. This rate, in turn, is determined by the numbers of mutually accessible people in a given group or area which, in turn, is a function of society's morphological structure. The rate determines the strength of collective sentiments, which determines the degree of integration-regulation.

To turn this statement into a theory of suicide requires including links between the level of integration-regulation and social suicide rates. The stronger collective sentiments are, the higher the degree of restraint exercised by the group over individual needs and the more nearly means are proportioned to needs (theory of anomie) or, alternately, the greater the meaning in life (theory of egoism) and the lower the suicide rate. This, then, is Durkheim's theory of egoism-anomie as a theory of suicide (1976:58).

Perhaps what underlies Pope's collapse of regulation (cultural and normative forces) to integration-interaction is a certain bias toward social structure as a causal anchor. Pope then contrasts this first schema with altruism.

In contrast to this theory, which postulates an inverse correlation between level of social control and suicide, that of altruism postulates a positive relationship. Otherwise, the variables and their mutual relations are the same, with one exception--the variable linking degree of social control to suicide. In the case of egoism-anomie, means-needs equilibrium and meaning in life can be seen as alternative links between level of social control and suicide, while in the case of altruism the former is ruled out.

Clearly, the high level of social control in altruism insures the restrained individual passions and modest needs that preclude the development of a means-need dis-
equilibrium. Here it is a matter of the relative lack of meaning in continued physical existence per se, because meaning resides either in adhering to social dictates or in achieving union with some goal beyond this life. When "meaning in life" is defined as including these possibilities, it constitutes the link between degree of social control and the social suicide rate. Through degree of social control, the relationship between variables are the same as for the theory of egoisme-anomie (1976:58).

Again, there is much of value in passages such as these; and insofar as Pope makes distinctions such as those of above, he helps to establish the common foundations of the suicidal types.

Pope summaries the overall theoretical structure of his argument in these terms:

The final relationships are as follows: the higher the degree of social control, the less meaning is attached to continued life per se, and the higher the social suicide rate. Alternatively, the lower the degree of social control, the more meaning is attached to continued life per se, the less willing the individual is to part with it, and the lower the social suicide rate. The complete theory of suicide is produced by joining the theory of egoisme-anomie with that of altruisme:

(1) the morphological structure of society determines
(2) the number of people in a given group or area, which determines
(3) rate of social interaction, which determines
(4) strength of collective sentiments, which determines
(5) level of integration-regulation (social control), which determines
(6) means-needs proportionality (meaning in life) (theory of egoisme-anomie), and meaning attached to continued existence (theory of altruisme), which together determines the
(7) the social suicide rate (1976:60).

Having outlined and summarized Pope's theoretical reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide, let us now briefly review Pope's retreat from the second schema as we have outlined it in Book Three. At various points Pope, like others, perceived certain ambiguities in Durkheim's complex treatment of suicide; however, Pope retreated from the second schema just as he reduced normative regulation to structural
integration. Let us here document those recognitions which converge with mine, and then how Whitney Pope turned away from the implications toward a very different schema.

For example, in his discussion of the relations between egoisme and religion (1976:15-16), Pope sees that Durkheim emphasized the role of religious beliefs and ideas, even though Durkheim's early mechanical model of one-way causality from structure to culture limited him. Then, in terms of the relation between egoisme and suicide, Pope observes:

From Durkheim's perspective, however, this explanation is less than satisfactory; even though the suicide rate is a function of level of social integration, the suicidal thrust is conceptualized as in opposition to social forces and as originating with the individual. It may be stretching the point here to maintain that suicide is socially caused. Thus, it is not surprising to find Durkheim [8:210] characterizing the above reasons as "purely secondary" before going on to explain that excessive individualism, itself the creation of the operation of strictly social factors, creates the inclination to suicide "out of whole cloth"*(1976:18).

Yet, Pope cannot grasp why Durkheim conceived of the suicidal thrust in egoisme as opposed to social forces, because he has no idea of Durkheim's doctrine of the insatiable passions of the pre-social ego.

In terms of anomie in our second schema, Pope observes that modern moral anarchy is culturally sanctioned:

Observing, characteristically, that belief systems reflect an underlying social reality, Durkheim also noted that in modern society, the anarchic state is elevated to a virtue: "The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction" (1976:27).

Yet, Pope didn't know what to do with this insight.

In terms of his first characterization of anomie, Pope comes closer to Durkheim's central ideas.

Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence of social change resulting in a dimunition of social regulation.... Freed of social control, passions and appetites are subject to no restraint, since only the collective moral authority of a group can perform this function. People's desires quickly outstrip their means. The result is frustration, exasperation, and weariness lead-
ing to high suicide rates (1976:12).

Thus, Pope did recognize the problem central to Durkheim--the release of the individual from social control, and the deregulation of desires. Pope even conceptualizes this in terms of a means-needs imbalance.

The crucial consideration is whether man's means are adequate for the fulfillment of his needs. Where means are proportional to needs, Durkheim said that they exist in a state of equilibrium; where the former are inadequate to fulfill the latter, they exist in a state of disequilibrium. These needs are not given by man's biological, psychological, or individual nature. Rather, they are social products that vary from one social context to the next. Particular goals, desires, passions, or appetites for comforts may become translated into needs. Durkheim used needs in a very broad sense to include all of these things, and he spoke of needs, ends, and goals, or the persons, appetites, and desires that can turn a want into a need *(1976:25).

All of this is, of course, very close to schema number two. Pope even notes that, to Durkheim, these needs are insatiable.

Human needs are boundless and insatiable; consequently, unless restrained they represent a constant threat to individual happiness [S:246-8]. Far from serving to satiate the individual, satisfaction of needs serves only to stimulate further needs. Thus, the sine qua non for equilibrium between means and needs is some force that limits man's desires. Since the needs in question are moral, society alone can provide the required restraint, because it is the only superior moral power whose authority the individual accepts (1976:25).

This is straight from Durkheim; yet, again, one wonders why are human needs are boundless? And why, if Durkheim considered (in his first schema) these insatiable desires to be the very hallmark of anomic a-morality, then why does Pope say that "these needs are moral"? How can they be both anomic (amoral) and moral at the same time? But Pope sees no significance to these problems and contradictions; these subtleties simply drop from view in his reduction.

Pope elaborates this point, but simply fails to relate it to Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex.

Durkheim's explanation is based on three assumptions. First, the happiness of man is to be explained not as
a function of property or wealth, but rather of the degree to which their means are proportional to their needs. Second, the needs of man are not subject to any inherent limitation. Finally, society is the only power that can restrain these otherwise boundless goals and thereby create the equilibrium between means and needs upon which man's happiness depends (1976:26).

Pope fails to question Durkheim's underlying image of human nature here; indeed, his neglect of this problem is so complete that homo duplex doesn't even appear in his index!

Pope's blindness in this regard is matched by his truncation of Durkheim's theory of authority and social control. While we went to great lengths in Book One to uncover Durkheim's developing theory of social, cultural, and phenomenological processes, Pope suggests:

Though his basic purpose was to explain how society develops, shapes, and controls the individual, Durkheim never clarified how social control occurs. He [8:318-19, 335] conceptualized the relationship between society and the non-social individual as one of forces in opposition. In these terms, the more powerful society is as a system of forces, the better able it is to control the opposing force represented by the unsocialized individual (1976:194; 195).

Thus, not only does Pope slight Durkheim's absolutely crucial doctrine of man as homo duplex, thus missing the source of insatiability, he also ignores the developing notion of social control and internalized moral authority to be found in such works as Moral Education and The Elementary Forms.

In terms of altruisme, Pope sees two loci for this type--namely, primitive society and the modern military; and he notes (1976:21) that the military represents an evolutionary survival in the modern world. Yet, his abstractness leads him, like so many others, to simply drop out the absolutely critical historical dimension to Durkheim's schemas of suicide. This is a basic failing.

Further, Pope sees that altruisme is culturally sanctioned, he fails to make this a central principle, and focusses instead on high social interaction. His basic mistake here is not to recognize that Durkheim used altruisme as an index to mechanical solidarity. He ignores the cultural com-
ponents of traditional societies; he underplays the role of values. Instead, Pope emphasizes the high integration and interaction found in mechanical solidarity.

More or less every society outside of modern Europe and its offshoots—anything from preliterate tribes to the great world-civilizations of China, Japan, and India—is classified as primitive... Durkheim stressed that primitive societies are small, compact, and undifferentiated. In these terms the prototypical primitive society is a small, preliterate tribe. But if small size, compactness, and undifferentiated social structure are hallmarks of primitive society, then China, Japan, and India do not qualify (1976:103).

Of course these societies wouldn't qualify if one looked merely at size and differentiation as the key criteria of "mechanical solidarity." But, as with so many others, Pope misses the crucial element here—namely, that in all these societies there was no decisive break with the collectivistic and traditional structures of conscience and consciousness, no break with "Consciousness Type I."

This persistent slighting of the role of cultural factors in evolution leads to Pope's disagreement with Parsons (see also Part I, Book Three). Underlying this opposition, as we have discovered, is a disagreement concerning the relative weight of structural versus cultural factors in human society. Now, Pope observes that: "Parsons argued that integration refers to the content of the collective conscience; regulation to its strength" (1976:34). Pope then accepts Parsons' discussion of regulation, but criticizes Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim's notion of integration—that is, of egoisme as culturally sanctioned (the second schema). Pope also criticizes Parsons' treatment of altruistic suicide.

Parsons and Durkheim agreed that in the case of altruisme, the individual is subordinate to the group. According to Parsons, though, the important factor is not strength of integration, but rather the content of values. In fact, this is not the case, as Durkheim himself (S:220-1) made clear. Parsons simply ignored a pervasive theme in Durkheim: the content of belief and value systems is a derived phenomenon in that it reflects the underlying social reality.... High levels of integration...
cause "feeble individuation." Subtracting what is central for Durkheim (strong integration), and omitting reference to low valuation of individuality (as reflecting the existing social reality), leaves Parsons with value content. Parsons maintained that value content was crucial, even though Durkheim made it clear that the value content upon which Parsons focussed—low valuation of the individual—is caused by the very factor, high levels of integration, whose importance Parsons denied (1976:34-5)!

But Pope is simply wrong here in baldly equating high integration with low individuation; even Durkheim himself shifted away from such a simplistic schema. For the value content of mechanical solidarity—pantheism, a sacro-magical collective consciousness—is the key to the strength of traditional social and cultural structures; in other words, ultimately, high social integration depends on these cultural factors.

But, here again, the Bendix-Pope axis lines up against Parsons.

Pope gets into further trouble when he suggests:

... Durkheim shifted away from The Division of Labor's two types of solidarity (mechanical and organic) and toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the mechanical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to primitive but also to modern society) (1976:37).

This claim is simply mistaken (see Book One). Indeed, his misunderstanding of mechanical solidarity, his equating it simply with high integration and interaction, and his slighting of Durkheim's evolutionary perspectives reveals that Pope simply does not fully comprehend the "nuclear structure" informing Durkheim's life-work. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim:

"Egoistic and anomic suicide do not result from lack of organic solidarity but precisely from lack of mechanical solidarity" (1976:37). But this is only possible if Pope is right in baldly equating integration with mechanical solidarity. Yet, Pope's ahistorical reduction collapses the distinction between traditional and modern forms of solidarity.

Durkheim's famous proposal to heighten levels of solidarity in modern society spoke not of developing individuality, heightening complementary differences, encouraging functional interdependence, or grouping individuals according to differences, but rather of integration produced through commonalities. The lack of solidarity in modern society is to be rectified through massive infu-
sions of mechanical (not organic) solidarity! In referring to the development of individuality and differentiation, even in the mechanical altruistic setting, Parsons read elements of Durkheim's Division of Labor's organic model into mechanical solidarity. Altogether, Parsons reversed the shift in emphasis in comparing Division with Suicide (1976:37).

But, once again, Pope is factually mistaken (see Book Two); for Durkheim did indeed speak of functional interdependence and a differentiated autonomy as the foundations of organic solidarity. Pope's reductionistic drive leads him here to do great violence to the texts.

And although there are problems with Parsons' treatment of egoisme, Pope is wrong in criticizing Parsons' interpretation of altruisme.

Parsons wanted to show that in the altruistic setting, in individuality and differences can coexist with high levels of integration. However, central to Durkheim's theoretical structure is the notion that the social factor (identified in terms of extent of commonalities, strength of the collective conscience, or strength of social integration) varies inversely with individuality. Thus, Parsons' failure to cite any passages supporting his interpretation is not surprising, for it runs counter to Durkheim's basic theoretical perspective (1976:37).

But, again, Pope is mistaken (see Chapter Eight, Book One). Thus, Pope misconstrues both altruisme from the first schema, and Parsons' insights into egoisme in the second schema.

Egoisme is the second point at which Parsons attempted to discern value content as the decisive variable.... Even if Parsons' account of Protestant-Catholic differences were acceptable, his identification of value content as the key factor in egoisme is not (1976:38-9).

But Pope fails to criticize Durkheim's mechanical model of causality here; and, for these and other reasons, shrinks away from Parsons' real insight that egoisme, as a form of absolute individualism, is culturally sanctioned in the modern world.

Indeed, the notion that the person is culturally constructed, especially Durkheim's apotheosis of the "cult of man" in the modern era, gives Pope trouble.

Durkheim's general position was that the strength of the collective conscience and of individuality vary in-
versely. But what is the relationship when the collective conscience stresses the value, dignity, and importance of man generally and the individual in particular? The stronger such shared sentiments, the stronger the collective conscience; but also, presumably, the greater the development of individuality. Durkheim first struggled with this dilemma in *Division of Labor*. He acknowledged that the cult of dignity, basically a shared belief in the value and dignity of man and his individuality, is growing stronger, not weaker. To accept this as an increasingly important source of social solidarity is inconsistent with his conclusion that "all social links which result from likeness progressively slacken" as mechanical solidarity is increasingly undercut and replaced by organic solidarity during the course of social evolution. Durkheim [DL:171-2] resolved this dilemma by denying that this shared belief represents a bond of social solidarity. Since a basic premise of his theory asserts that shared beliefs constitute bonds of social solidarity, it is hard to avoid concluding that this represents an *ad hoc* assertion designed to resolve an otherwise intractable theoretical dilemma (1976:40).

But we cannot follow Pope in concluding that Durkheim's notion of the emergence of the individual person through history (see Chapter Eight, Book One) is merely an *ad hoc* and tangential hypothesis; rather, we see it as central to the substantive and historical structure of all of Durkheim's work. By abstractly contrasting shared belief (traditional society) with absence of shared belief (modern society), Pope misses the crucial fact that the cult of moral individualism is the modern religion of the self; that extreme individualism is a result of shared beliefs.

... insofar as he explained the "completely exceptional place in the collective conscience" of this cult, he did so by appealing to the content of this shared belief, which turns the will toward the individual rather than social ends. However, since Durkheim did not elsewhere treat the content of beliefs as relevant to their solidarity producing qualities, this appeal must, as before, be judged to be *ad hoc* (1976:40).

Thus, even when Pope does stumble on Durkheim's second scheme, he tosses it away; he is simply mistaken in claiming that Durkheim never treated beliefs as producing solidarity. Indeed, we have seen that the autonomization of culture and the modern cult of the morally autonomous individual person are two central themes in all of Durkheim's work. And appar-
ently Pope entertains here some hidden bias against normative or cultural explanations, preferring instead to anchor everything in social structure.

Pope continues struggling with the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism, and yet refusing to allow himself to enter into the implications of the second schema.

In Suicide Durkheim continued to struggle with the problems posed by the cult of man. In particular, he evidenced uncertainty as to whether the cult of man leads to egoistic suicide through its stress on individualism. At one point [S:336], he denied that the cult is associated with egoistic suicide, thus reasserting his premise that shared sentiments constitute a fundamental bond of solidarity... As in The Division of Labor (but contrary to his own formulation earlier in Suicide), Durkheim held that a shared sentiment, presumably because its content stresses the value and dignity of the individual, does not represent a social bond but, on the contrary, encourages individualism and egoistic suicide (1976:41).

Again and again, Pope shies away from the cultural anchoring of the suicide schemas.

The underlying theoretical paradox takes somewhat different forms in different contexts. In The Division of Labor the question is whether an increasingly important component of the collective conscience can be seen as an increasingly important element in modern organic society. In Suicide the question is whether a shared belief which emphasizes the importance of the individual leads to individuality and egoistic suicide. The underlying dilemma, however, is the same in both cases: Does a shared belief that stresses the value of the individual strengthen social solidarity (as do other shared beliefs), or does it, because of its emphasis on the individual, actually weaken social solidarity? (1976:41)?

Yes, that is the question precisely, finally. Can there be a culture of the self, a cultural sanctioning of the moral anarchy of anomie and egoisme? I believe there is such a sanctioning in modern culture, and this is the foundation of the second schema.

But Pope, once again, turns away from his real insight into this second possibility.

Granting the existence of the dilemma and recognizing that at one point in Suicide Durkheim denied that a shared sentiment represents a social bond (thereby implicitly acknowledging the importance of value content),
one must also acknowledge that this statement appears late in his book, long after his primary development of the contrast between egoïsme and anomie. Furthermore, the point is unrelated to any of the distinctions he drew between integration and regulation, and is never directly employed to explain variation in social suicide rates. Clearly this reference cannot be read back into Durkheim's systematic contrasts between more and less integrated groups in religious, domestic, and political societies; it is thus an unconvincing foundation upon which to reinterpret integration in terms of value content. Indeed, overall Parsons' attempt to distinguish between regulation and integration is based on such an array of pervasive misrepresentations that it may be unhesitatingly rejected (1976:41).

It is, of course, for others to finally judge who has misrepresented Durkheim, and slighted important elements. Let it now simply be recorded that Whitney Pope, author of a full book-length study of Durkheim's classic Suicide, perceived many of the same ambiguities and problems as I, glimpsed the outlines of the second schema, but turned away.
A. Parsons

Preface. Since Durkheim's *Suicide* was not translated until 1951, Talcott Parsons' exploration in his classic *The Structure of Social Action* provided for many years the most extensive secondary treatment of Durkheim's typology of suicide. Parsons' pioneering analysis remains to this day one of the most influential accounts, constituting almost a ruling orthodoxy which has only recently been effectively challenged (see especially Giddens, 1970, 1971a,b,c, 1972a,b, 1976; Pope, 1973, 1975a). Besides the systematic explication in *The Structure*, Parsons added a 1960 article "Durkheim's Contribution to the Theory of the Integration of the Social System," and his review of Durkheim's life and work in the 1968 *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

In essence, Parsons reconstructs Durkheim's typology of suicide in terms of his own notions concerning the strength and content of The Central Value System (or conscience collective). Parsons distinguished between the presence (e.g. altruisme and egoisme) of normative consensus, and its absence (anomie). Then he proceeds to distinguish between the orientation of the shared values--if the collectivity takes precedence, then altruisme results; if the individual, then egoisme results. Parsons reconstruction of Durkheim's typology is schematically represented in figure 11 (see also Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951:176-7).
Figure 11: Parsons' Interpretation of Durkheim's Typology of Suicide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Norms</th>
<th>Absence of Norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism -- Altruisme</td>
<td>Anomie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism -- Egoisme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Apart from abstracting and translating Durkheim into his own terms, Parsons' schema is asymmetrical, and ignores one whole category—namely, fatalisme. But Parsons must be given his due, for he has insisted on retaining the distinctness of three out of four of Durkheim's basic types.

1. **Parsons on Egoisme and Altruisme**

   At the outset, we should note a startling fact: Parsons stands almost alone among American sociologists who have paid close attention to Durkheim's concept of egoisme. For over thirty years, Parsons has steadfastly insisted on interpreting Durkheim's concept of egoisme in a virtuous light, as religiously sanctioned "institutionalized individualism" (e.g. 1968a:317). In his search for the source of internalized moral obligation and a religiously sanctioned value consensus on which such obligation rests, Parsons first places great emphasis on Durkheim's conception of egoisme, and then even greater stress on the significance of anomie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's description of egoisme, Parsons takes it to refer to what he himself holds most dear—namely, the "higher order of individualized moral obligation in Protestantism." Opposed to his elevation of Protestant egoisme to a principle of the first order, is Parsons' negative valuation of altruisme, which subordinates the individual to the archaic, fused, collective conscience which Parsons, in turn, identifies with Catholicism as a survival in the modern world.

   In both cases, Parsons interprets egoisme and altruisme as proceeding from the presence of religio-cultural sanctions. However questionable other aspects of his interpretation of Durkheim's typology, Parsons stands almost alone among contemporary social theorists in recognizing Durkheim's breakthrough to his second schema of suicide (see Book Three). Of course, I differ from Parsons in his positive valuation of egoisme, and cannot follow his confusion of Durkheim's first and second schemas. Moreover, by deemphasizing Durkheim's image of historical process and doctrine of human nature, Parsons turns Durkheim's first image of the presence of generic drives in the pre-social
ego into the misleading image of the generic absence of social control ("the Hobbesian dilemma"). Parsons' abstracted search for the generic elements of social order and control hardly mirrors Durkheim's highly inflected philosophical, moral, and historical concerns (see Book One).

Parsons' tortuous but brilliant account of Durkheim's types is predicated upon his own special thesis regarding certain fundamental shifts in Durkheim's theoretical development. Parsons places great weight on Durkheim's breakthrough in Suicide in his own proposed sequence of Durkheim's developmental phases. Here, Parsons sees Durkheim as transcending his supposed previous difficulties in separating the collective conscience from organic solidarity, and in postulating only external, physical constraint, instead of internalized motivations and obligations. Parsons later summarizes his theses in these terms:

... in The Division of Labor Durkheim had much to say about the role of institutionalized norms, but little about the character of the motivation underlying commitment to values and conformity with norms.... In Suicide, however, and in his work on the sociology of education, he took two important steps beyond this position.... The first is his discovery and partial development of the idea of the internalization of values and norms. The second is the discrimination he makes, with special reference to the problem of the nature of modern "individualism," between the two ranges of variation. One of these concerns types of institutionalized value-norm complexes, and is exemplified by the distinction between egoisme and altruisme. The other concerns the types of relation that the individual can have to whatever norms and values are institutionalized. Here the distinction between egoisme and anomie is crucial; it is parallel to that between altruisme and fatalisme (1960:141-2).

In locating his underlying schema in terms of Durkheim's development, Parsons thus appears to gain deeper validation for his central thesis that the fundamental source of social order and control can only be ultimately found in certain types of socially enforced self-discipline which penetrates to the heart of the personality structure; in short, in the "internalization of moral authority." In religious terms, with latent Weberian overtones, Parsons conceives this to be also the prime difference between Catholicism and traditional cultural structures and the rigors of the collectivized self-discipline characteristic of ascetic Protestantism.
The Significance of Egoisme and Protestantism

Parsons anchors his favorable notion of egoisme in an equally favorable valuation of Protestant "moral individualism." Not unsurprisingly, Parsons appears to discover here the very factor for which he searches so relentlessly—namely, that stable equilibrium and social order can only be based in the long run upon internalized moral obligation founded upon a religiously sanctioned over-arching abstracted value consensus. Now, Parsons interprets Durkheim's linking of egoistic suicide with Protestantism to mean that Durkheim had thereby broken through his previous identification of the conscience collective with primitive mechanical solidarity. Thus, Parsons would have us suppose that Durkheim only gradually came to see that even modern "moral (or "institutionalized") individualism" must also enjoy normative support and deeply embedded religious and cultural sanctions.

Since Durkheim himself ostensibly described his first dichotomous set—egoisme versus altruisme—as high and low types of social integration, Parsons sums up these possibilities as three positions on a continuum of social structural integration:

There is an optimum intensity of group attachment which the Catholic with a large family comes close to. Too strong an attachment, an increase far beyond the optimum, leads to an increase (the army rate), as does too weak an attachment (the Protestant rate) (1949:331, #3). However, Parsons proceeds to his crucial contention by noting that, as Durkheim himself observed, the actual historical reason why Protestants seemed to be more egoistic is not simply because they weren't sufficiently structurally integrated into groups, but rather that their "egoisme" was instead itself the result of a certain type of group pressure, indeed of a new type of collectively sanctioned "individual conscience." Unlike other interpreters, Parsons critically compares Durkheim's description of altruisme and egoisme with the latter's rather different explanation of their root causes. Parsons explores this gap between Durkheim's descriptive and explanatory levels by comparing the way in which Durkheim first described egoisme and altruisme as opposites on a continuum of social integration,
with the different picture emerging from the central historical rationales in which both egoisme and altruisme were presented as resulting from the presence of culturally sanctioned moral obligations.

Egoisme seems to exist as a factor in suicide so far as people are freed from group control, while altruisme exists so far as the group control is excessively strong.... This leaves the relation of egoisme to anomie unclear....

(1949:331)

Now, Parsons identifies one of Durkheim's shift in rationales when he considers the relation between religion and suicide rates.

... The striking fact is that the rate for Protestants is much higher than for Catholics.... The explanation lies, according to Durkheim, in the Protestant attitude toward individual freedom in religious matters. The Catholic precisely in so far as he is faithful has laid down for him a system of beliefs and practices which his membership in the church prescribes for him. He has no initiative in the matter; all responsibility belongs to the church as an organization. The very state of his soul and chances of salvation depend on his faithful adherence to these prescriptions. The case of the Protestant is very different. He is himself the ultimate judge of religious truth and the rightness of conduct deduced from it. The church is in a very different relation to him (1949:331-2).

In historical and doctrinal terms, then, Parsons correctly observed, as did Durkheim, that the actual reason Protestants are less structurally integrated is not simply that they were released from moral control because of the weaker, more decentralized character of Protestant churches, but rather that Protestant norms themselves force the individual to be self-reliant and autonomous.

It is in the relation of the individual to the organized religious group that Durkheim sees the decisive difference. In one sense the difference consists in that the Catholic is subjected to a group authority from which the Protestant is exempt. But ... the essential point is that the Protestant's freedom from group control is not optional. In so far as he is a Protestant he must assume this responsibility and exercise his freedom. He cannot devolve it on a church. The obligation to exercise religious freedom in this sense is a fundamental feature of protestantism as a religious movement * (1949:332).

Hence, Parsons intimates that traditional Catholicism, for instance, corresponds to the submission of the individual con-
science in mechanical solidarity, while Protestantism corresponds to the new type of "institutionalized individualism" appropriate to modern societies. In contrast to the hierarchical submission of the individual to the church in Catholicism:

A Protestant is free of these types of control. But he is not free to choose whether or not to accept such controls.... The obligation to accept such responsibility is legitimized by the common values of the Protestant group and is translated into norms governing behavior (1960a:147).

It is a remarkable interpretation, both in itself and because it converges with the theme developed a few years later by Max Weber concerning the importance of the Protestant ethic in modern society. There is also ... an echo of Rousseau, in that Durkheim seemed to be citing an instance of the famous paradoxical formula about a man being "forced to be free," adding that this enforced freedom may become too hard to bear (1968a:316).

Parsons interprets this as the critical point at which Durkheim was obliged to shift the grounds of his first argument by recognizing the cultural-historical rootedness of Protestant values. Now both altruisme and egoisme are seen to proceed from the presence of cultural sanctions; the difference between the two is merely in the direction of individual duty. Altruisme, proper to mechanical solidarity, requires the individual to submerge himself in the fused, primitive collective conscience, and includes the demand to sacrifice oneself for one's group. On the other hand, egoisme, in Parsons' version, implies the religiously sanctioned injunction to guide oneself by one's own inner-light, even in the face of conflicting social or traditional claims, and proceeds from the historically rooted "social pressure in Protestant norms toward a higher order of individualized religious responsibility."

Parsons also proposes that this new perception of egoisme as generated by the presence of religio-cultural rationales constituted a solution of what he supposed to be Durkheim's original problem in The Division of Labor--namely, the content and obligatory force of the collective conscience in the modern organic division of labor. Against the common, but misleading, notion (embraced by R.H. Tawney, 1926 for example) that the roots of the modern world can be adequately explained as due simply to
the release of the individual from traditional controls, Parsons correctly emphasizes, following Max Weber, the absolutely crucial fact that Protestant individualism as egoisme cannot be historically considered the result of either structural or normative breakdown. Rather, both egoisme and the most distinctive features of the modern world as the "Protestant Era" (Tillich, 1948), are due to the secularizing thrusts of this religio-cultural system. Durkheim's first causal explanation—social morphological differentiation and individuation—simply will not suffice as a full and sufficient explanation of either the emergence of Protestantism or modern individualism (see Books One, Two, and Three). This point is critical to emphasize, for even as late as 1965 an observer such as Barclay Johnson could attempt to counter Parsons' interpretation of egoisme with Durkheim's weak evolutionary model suggesting that Protestantism is itself a result of the progressive breakdown of traditional collective sentiments due to the ubiquitous effects of the division of labor. Parsons insists, on the contrary, that this comes:

... close to a manifestation of the collective conscience. For religious freedom is a basic ethical value common to all Protestants. In so far as a man is Protestant he is subjected to a social, a group pressure. But the result is a very different relation to the religious group as an organized entity from that of the Catholic. He is under pressure to be independent, to take his own religious responsibility, while the Catholic is under pressure to submit himself to the authority of the church *(1949:332). Thus, contrary to almost all other theories of anomie and egoisme as caused by the absence of social structural or normative integration, Parsons, in embracing half of Durkheim's second theory, correctly argues that the great historical significance of Protestantism, in this respect, is precisely that it shifted the main source of normative control and directive from the collectivity to the individual, from external constraint to internalized self-discipline. With this historical insight into the religio-cultural foundations of individualism and egoisme, Parsons clearly forges a potentially profound link to another famous interpretation of the significance of Protestantism in the modern world. Weber, of course, also recognized the importance of the various ascetic Protestant sects (eg. Weber, 1946, 1958)
1968; see also Benton Johnson, 1971, and Stephen Berger, 1971) in exerting the unrelenting social pressures needed to inculcate a new level of intensity of self-discipline and drives for moral perfection within the world. Surely it is one of the great mysteries of contemporary sociological theory that no one has yet attempted to systematically and historically explore the significance of Durkheim's second notion of egoisme as generated by the presence of ethicoreligious values with Weber's theses, which also rested on the perception of the ironic and even tragic outcomes of the Protestant resolve to construct new self-disciplined, rationally integrated, perfection seeking character structures (but see Book Three).

In exploring this striking convergence between Durkheim's critical notion of the "pathologies" and "moral anarchy" of the "infinity sickness" of the modern world, and Weber's notion of once visible saints leaving us all in an "iron cage," we must differ, of course, with Parsons in regard to a number of crucial omissions and distortions in his account. While agreeing that in Durkheim's second schema egoisme is as much an institutionalized norm as altruisme, nevertheless, we must note that Parsons generally slights Durkheim's crucial doctrine of human nature (although occasionally recognizing its centrality, e.g. see 1949:384). This omission creates a potentially disruptive hiatus in Parsons' own schema which we shall soon explore. Further, there is little or no mention of Durkheim's notion of the "infinity of dreams and desires," of the individual pathological forms of suicide, insufficient recognition of moral condemnation involved in Durkheim's discussion, or the fact that Durkheim considered egoistic suicide the most prevalent chronic form of "moral anarchy" afflicting the modern world. How can Parsons expect us to follow him in his wholly laudatory valuation of egoisme, in direct contrast to Durkheim's critique? Isn't it strange that what is "moral anarchy" to Durkheim is "moral, institutionalized individualism" to Parsons? Parsons later argued for redress in the balance of attention given to anomie and egoisme. However, by 1968, Parsons' perspective altered somewhat, for in responding to more prevalent
notions than his own, he confused matters further by loosely identifying egoisme and alienation.

b. Parsons on Altruisme

Parsons observes that the key to altruistic suicide is that collective norms so penetrate the individual that his own nascent conscience is so little individuated that he considers self-sacrifice for the group a moral duty. Parsons thus correctly perceives that the key elements distinguishing altruisme from egoisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as simply high and low positions on a continuum of social integration. Rather, the difference is cultural: between collective norms which demand that the collective conscience take precedence over the individual (altruisme) versus collective norms which demand that the individual conscience take precedence over any traditional claims of the collective conscience; in short, between collectivistic and individualistic cultural norms. Parsons observes that altruistic suicide:

... involves a group attachment of great strength such that in comparison with claims made upon the individual fulfillment of the obligations laid upon him by the group, his own interests, even in life itself, become secondary. This leads to a generally small valuation of individual life, so that he will part with it on relatively small provocation; on the other hand, it leads to a direct social mandate to suicide (1949:328).

There is, however, besides the cultural differences in dominant rationales concerning the obligation of the individual to society and self, another crucial difference between altruisme and egoisme implicit in Durkheim's schema—namely, the historical differences between primitive, mechanically integrated societies and modern nations prior to the full institutionalization of organic solidarity. By spending most of his analysis on the army, Parsons fails to sufficiently emphasize this crucial historical dimension. The elimination of Durkheim's evolutionary framework from Parsons' account (see Book One) is, however, understandable since Parsons had earlier decreed that Durkheim was most basically concerned with the abstract problem of social order and control, with "social statics" rather than "dy-
namics." Parsons partially perceives Durkheim's underlying time dimension, but characteristically transmutes it into an abstracted theoretical proposition!

It seems clear that the altruistic factor in suicide is, for Durkheim, on essentially the same theoretical plane as mechanical solidarity. It is a manifestation of the conscience collective by group pressure at the expense of the claims of individuality. But even here there is a slight shift of emphasis. It is no longer similarity which is the central point, but subordination of individuality to the group... Already Durkheim is moving away from the identification of the problem of "solidarity" with that of the social structure. Altruistic suicide is a manifestation of the collective conscience which is strong in the sense of subordinating individual to group interests, and which has a particular content of low valuation of individual life relative to group values (1949: 330).

Thus, to the cultural dimension involving the differing rationales governing the direction of individual moral obligation, we must add Durkheim's crucial historical dimension by locating these two types in social and cultural structures at the two ends of history.

2. **Parsons' Anomie as the "Hobbesian Dilemma"

After discovering egoisme (ala Protestant virtue) as his first anchor, Parsons seizes upon anomie as the key to his search for the resolution of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"--what he conceives as the generic problem of individual anarchy, social control, and the foundations of lasting social order. Anomie in these terms becomes absolutely central to Parsons' argument. Having discovered with egoisme and altruisme the universal requirement of the internalization of norms (or the solution to the sources of social instability in self-disciplining moral obligation), Parsons next turns to anomie as solving the problem of the source of the breakdown of social order in general, not only in terms of the absence of effective, internalized obligation, but also the sources of normative confusion. Parsons supposes Durkheim's second and decisive breakthrough to have come with the latter's recognition of the central importance of the "contents of motivation with his notion of anomie." Anomie holds the key to social disorder; or more precise-
ly, anomie is the Hobbesian dilemma.

In his 1968 encyclopedia essay, Parsons proposes that "anomie has become one of the few truly central concepts of contemporary social science" (1968a:316). But whose version of anomie does this mean? Durkheim's, Halbwach's, Parsons' own, Merton's, Srole's, countless other installments? If anomie has become a paradigmatic concept, then I suggest that this has largely come about through not only Parsons' efforts, but the intellectual charisma claimed, usurped, and popularized by Merton and later Srole. Indeed, it is questionable whether most sociologists really know what Durkheim's notions of anomie imply (or those of Parsons' either, for that matter). Further, how close is Parsons' version of anomie to Durkheim's, and hence, which meaning of anomie should hereafter be considered "truly central" to sociological theory?

The key to Parsons' own version of anomie rests upon another dichotomy--the presence versus the absence of effective, legitimate, internalized norms. To Parsons, anomie implies the absence of norms, or more specifically, the absence of clearly defined norms, goals, values, etc. Essentially, Parsons' notion of anomie connotes ambiguity, confusion, or lack of meaningfulness resulting from the breakdown of the intimate relations between the cultural and psychological components of the General System of Action. In Parsonian anomie, the "relational system becomes confused," or in later Parsonian terms, "malintegrated."

As the opposite of clearly perceived and effectively internalized moral obligations, Parsons views anomie as the lack of clarity leading to a normative breakdown.

Anomie is best interpreted in terms of Durkheim's Cartesian frame of reference. The observer as actor is naturally concerned with the definiteness of the reality with which he is confronted. The problem is the definiteness of expectations... (1968a:316).

Having posited internalized moral obligation (ala Protestant egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability, Parsons proceeds to explain disorder in terms of the lack of "definiteness of expectations." In a subtle, yet absolutely crucial,
shift in meaning, Parsons switches Durkheim's connotation of anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." In this way, Durkheim's profound and critical notion of "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness" plaguing the modern or "Protestant era" becomes transmuted and routinized into mere personal confusion or a feeling of lostness because of changing or unclear cultural mandates.

As always, Parsons presumes that Durkheim was led to the logic of these conclusions and a crucial breakthrough in his own theoretical schema by yet another empirical confrontation with Utilitarian theory.

Durkheim was led to make his study of suicide by a paradox: according to utilitarian theory, a rising standard of living should bring about a general increase in "happiness;" however, concomitant with the certain rise in the standard of living in Western countries, there was a marked rise in the suicide rate. Why is it that as people become happier, more of them killed themselves (1960a:142)?

This was clearly an anomaly from the point of view of utilitarian theory, and stimulated Durkheim to a major, if not complete, theoretical reconstruction in Suicide (1968a:315).

... the decisive breakthrough in solving the paradox came about with his working out of the concept of anomie (1960a: 143).

Parsons, as always, overestimates the degree to which Durkheim developed his own ideas in polemical opposition to the Anglo Utilitarians; conversely, he overlooks the degree to which Durkheim was engaged in polemics with several opposing cultural traditions. Surely neither statistics nor a purely intellectual squabble with an opposing school suffices to explain Durkheim's intentions in writing Suicide. But, to be sure, any adequate explanation of Durkheim's shifts in his typologies of suicide should rest on a clear conception of both Durkheim's multiple polemical critiques of opposing cultural traditions, and his own core commitments to his own cultural tradition.

Starting with Durkheim's statistics demonstrating that anomic suicides are related both to commercial prosperity and depressions, Parsons begins to add his own series of connotations to Durkheim's description of anomie. Parsons says that the source of these startling facts is "due to the same order
That cause Durkheim finds in the fact that in both cases large numbers of people are thrown with relative suddenness out of adjustment with certain important features of their social environment. In depression, expectations relative to the standard of living, with all that implies, are disturbed on a large scale. In unusual prosperity, on the other hand, things which had seemed altogether outside the range of possibility become for many people realities. At both extremes the relations between means and ends, between effort and attainment, is upset. The result is a sense of confusion, a loss of orientation. People no longer have the sense that they are "getting anywhere" (1949:335).

Parsons exegesis is incomplete, only partially accurate. His off-hand rendering of Durkheim's crucial notion of the Social Schedule--with "all that implies"--leaves out the central intervening steps in Durkheim's argument (see Book Two and Three). The reason that people are "thrown out of adjustment" is that the Social Schedule of expectation is upset, chronically in the modern world. And "people no longer feel that they are getting anywhere" not because their goals lack clarity or definiteness, but rather because of the infiniteness of their desires. Parsons is correct in the following passage to note that happiness is dependent on "a clear definition of ends," but a clear definition of infinite goals is devastating.

Durkheim's analysis goes far deeper. The sense of confusion and frustration in depression seems not so difficult to understand, but why is the reaction to unusual prosperity not increased satisfaction all around, as any utilitarian point of view would take for granted? Because, Durkheim says, a sense of security, of progress toward ends depends not only on adequate command over means, but on clear definition of the ends themselves (1949:335).

Parsons series of associations may be summed up thus: normative clarity is to value consensus as normative confusion is to anomie and anarchy.

Although Parsons occasionally mentions Durkheim's central concern with anomie and egoisme--namely, insatiability and the "infinity of dreams and desires"--he hardly gives it comparable significance (eg. 1949:335-6). Now, one of the most basic shifts in the grounds of Durkheim's argument concerns the location of the motive force of egoisme and anomie--insatiability. Durkheim
himself began abstractly by anchoring insatiable desires and egotism in the organic half of homo duplex (see Books One and Three); in this he was undoubtedly influenced, as Parsons observes, by the similar, though virtuous, images of man held by the Anglo Utilitarians. But, as Durkheim confronted the specific historical origins of egoism and anomie, especially in terms of the empirical evidence regarding Protestantism and suicides in commerce, industry, the professions, etc., he was forced to recognize, as Parsons partly did with egoism, that anomie along with egoism emerged from modern ethical sanctions pushed to extreme. Since every form of suicide "is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," anomie and egoism come from our "virtues becoming vices."

How does Parsons respond to the implications of Durkheim's developing argument as outlined in Books Two and Three of this dissertation? First, he does note that the central tenet of Durkheim's economic sociology--the Social Schedule of the distribution of reward through the occupational system--has another key facet--legitimacy.

This discipline which is indispensable to the personal sense of attainment, and thus to happiness, is not imposed by the individual himself. It is imposed by society. For it to serve this function, the discipline cannot be mere coercion. Men cannot be happy in the acceptance of limitations simply imposed by force; they must recognize them to be "just," the discipline must carry moral authority. It takes the form, then, of socially given moral norms by which ends of action are defined. If anything happens to break down the discipline of these norms, the result is personal disequilibrium, which results in various forms of personal breakdown, in extreme instances, suicide.... For each class in society there is always a socially approved standard of living--which is relatively definite. To live on such a scale is a normal legitimate expectation. Both depression below it and elevation above it necessitate what Durkheim calls a "moral re-education," which cannot be accomplished quickly and easily, if at all (1949:336).

In breaking through to his second schema, Durkheim, like Parsons with his notion of "institutionalized individualism," began to see that, through the Social Schedule, these religiously sanctioned egoistic and insatiable desires are culturally legitimized and economically expressed.
In structural-functional terms, Parsons considers anomie to represent a pathological state of "malintegration."
The cultural and psychological components of The Social System are "out of alignment," inducing "strain" in the individual.

An individual does not commit suicide primarily because he lacks the "means" to accomplish his goals, but because his goals cannot be meaningfully integrated with the expectations which have been institutionalized in values and norms. The factors responsible for this malintegration may be social, cultural, or psychological in any combination, but the common point of strain concerns the meaningfulness of situations and of alternatives of action.... it is the relational system, not the individual, which needs straightening out *(1960a:27).

"anomie" may be considered that state of a social system which makes a particular class of members consider exertion for success meaningless, not because they lack capacity or opportunity to achieve what is wanted, but because they lack a clear definition of what is desirable. It is a pathology not of the instrumental system but of the collective normative system *(1968a:316).

At root, Parsons' notions of "malintegration" and "strain" rest on mechanistic metaphors (see Smelser, 1971). Here we see Parsons taking pains to distance his idea of anomie from Merton's--for anomie is "a pathology, not of the instrumental system, but of the collective normative system." While Durkheim emphasized egoism and insatiability, and Parsons emphasized normative confusion, Merton saw anomie as the lack of structural access to culturally approved goals. Although linked in certain ways, these fundamental shifts in the nature and origin of anomie from one pioneer sociologist to the next reveals a basic sociocultural process--the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974). Before proposing a detailed critique of Parsons' translation of anomie, let us consider the other anchor of his interpretation--namely, his argument concerning the importance of anomie in Durkheim's methodological breakthrough.
3. Parsons on Durkheim's Methodological Breakthroughs in Relation to His Theories of Social Control and Suicide

If Parsons' fundamental thesis on Durkheim is that the latter was centrally concerned with the theoretical problem of social order, then at the heart of this assertion is Parsons' own notion of social control. To Parsons, social order, integration, constraint, obligation, control and so on seemed inextricably interrelated. Beyond the dubiousness of Parsons' "creative" interpretation of Durkheim's core commitments, it is surely misleading to identify Durkheim's central concerns with the shifting historical sources of legitimate moral authority too closely with the abstract heading of social control. The questions of the source and nature of legitimate moral authority, on the one hand, and power and social control are very different, though related, issues.

As always, Parsons asks us to see Durkheim as developing his own central methodological postulates and procedures primarily in polemical response to Utilitarian theory. In the background, of course, lies Parsons' insistence on the centrality of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma," for if men are by nature egoistic and insatiable,

and bound only by passing interests, then how is the "war of all against all" to be moderated? Since Parsons starts from this premise, and then forces Durkheim's theories into the mode of critical response to these dilemmas, one would hardly expect that Durkheim would fail to yield Parsons the very answer for which he so insistently searched.

According to Parsons, since Durkheim's central concern was to clarify the theoretical bases of social order and constraining control over against Hobbesian anarchy, Durkheim logically took up a position opposite to the Utilitarians at almost every point. Durkheim's sociologicist positivism, with its doctrine of "social facts," countered the Utilitarian claims of the subjectivity, spontaneity, and randomness of individual wants with the ideas of externality, constraint, and the notion of the sacred as the foundation of social and moral order.
Parsons assumes that Durkheim's claim that "social facts" should be regarded as "things" represents the first phase, that of "naturalistic causation," in Durkheim's evolving methodological position. This is seen, for example, in Durkheim's theory that the causes of the division of social labor are social morphological (which Parsons and others after him mistakenly termed "biological"). The next factors critical to Durkheim's methodological breakthroughs, Parsons maintains, came with: (a) the synthesis argument, (b) the idea that society is also a "psychic entity," and (c) the specification of the "social factor" in terms of the concepts of the conscience collective and representations collective (see also Pope, 1973).

According to Parsons, Durkheim's next important shift was away from naturalistic causation to concern with legal sanctions (eg. 1949:463). The decisive breakthrough, Parsons informs us, came with Durkheim's analysis of egoisme and anomie in Suicide, and his ideas in Moral Education (eg. 1949:463).

... in terms of the great dichotomy of this study, the social factor becomes a normative, value factor, not one of heredity and environment.... Durkheim's sociologism has turned out to be fatal to his positivism (1949:464).

Parsons summarizes his assertions on the phases in Durkheim's developing methodology thus far:

... in following out the problem of social control Durkheim has progressed through the conception of control as subjection to naturalistic causation and then avoidance of sanctions, to laying primary emphasis on the "subjective" sense of moral obligation. The element of constraint persists, with a changed meaning, in the sense of obligation (1949:385).

Since Parsons' account of Durkheim's methodological breakthroughs and his supposed developing theory of social control are intimately related, let us note some limitations in Parsons' account. First, Durkheim was not centrally concerned with the "Hobbesian dilemma" (see the works by Giddens); it did not haunt him as it did Parsons. Perhaps Parsons' insistence on this problem is more understandable as a projection of inner difficulties of his own cultural tradition. For Durkheim's own central methodological problem, stemming from the problematics of his own cultural tradition, was to construct a science of
morality to replace the old cultural regime. Second, Durkheim did not develop his own methodology simply in categorical response to the inadequacies of Anglo Utilitarian theory. As he makes clear in *The Rules*, in the essay "Individual and Collective Representations," in *The Elementary Forms* and other places, Durkheim opposed key elements of both Utilitarian and Idealistic theory. When we add his critique of metaphysics and the Catholic cultural tradition, it is clear that Durkheim polemicized on three different fronts simultaneously (see Book Three). In these terms, Durkheim's central problem was to resolve the antinomies between these opposing cultural traditions, while still remaining true to his own cultural historical mission (see Chapter One, Book One). Parsons' peculiar definition of positivism ignores the very French flavor of modern positivism; Pope (1973) unfortunately follows Parsons here, when he erroneously concludes that Durkheim was never a positivist. Third, Durkheim simply did not undergo the major revolutionary stages outlined by Parsons. Pope is certainly correct in rejecting this part of Parsons' argument. As we discovered in Book One, Durkheim's emphasis on social morphological differentiation was a life-long concern in his causal model. Parsons' mistaken thesis that Durkheim's central causal anchor of social morphological process represented a theoretical dead-end after *The Division of Labor* has begun to dissolve. Schnore (1958) was one of the first to point out the centrality of social morphological processes in Durkheim's causal model. Also, Robert Bellah (1959) recognized the importance of social morphological differentiation as a key evolutionary process. By 1960, Parsons had begun to waver from the firmness of his earlier judgment. Thus, while the question of the ratio of continuity to discontinuity in any major thinkers' development is important, Parsons' interpretation was mistakenly predicated on the image of a radical discontinuity in Durkheim's intellectual career. Here Parsons' basic mistake, deriving from his earlier theses, was to split the two halves of Durkheim's causal model by assigning social morphology to the early "radically positivistic" Durkheim, and "collective representations"
to the later "idealistic" Durkheim. Yet, even Parsons himself, as Pope emphasized (1975a), now acknowledges that he "... may have overdone the periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual development" (1975a:106), and agrees instead with Bellah (1973:xiii, xxiii, xix), that there is "an impressive continuity" in Durkheim's intellectual career.

Fourth, Parsons' notion of a third phase where Durkheim broke through to the conception of the internalization of moral obligations is similarly invalidated. On the contrary, as Pope (1973, 1975a) has rightly insisted, Durkheim assumed the internalization of moral obligation from the very beginning. Even Parsons (1975a:107) now agrees. For Durkheim was centrally concerned from the very beginning, as his book reviews (eg. see Giddens, 1970), and many passages in The Division of Labor and its appendices testify, with the internalized contents of the individual conscience in relation to the external contents of the collective conscience. Again, Parsons' basic problem here was the mistaken portrayal of the "early" Durkheim as a crude or radical positivist who acknowledged only "external" environmental factors such as "population pressure." In sum, Parsons' conjoined theses in this regard must be set aside, namely:

(a) Durkheim was centrally concerned with "social statics" and not "dynamics" and historical change;

(b) Durkheim was centrally concerned with the "Hobbesian dilemma"—that is, the search for the generic bases of social order and control (or alternately the "Integration of The Social System");

(c) Durkheim's rhetorical animus was directed primarily against the Anglo Utilitarians;

(d) Durkheim's central causal anchor (social morphological processes), which formed the basic theorem of his school, represented a theoretical dead-end and Durkheim never returned to it after The Division of Labor;

(e) The development of Durkheim's thought passed through at least four distinct phases, in which he broke with positivism, and moved toward idealism and voluntarism.

(f) Durkheim moved from originally identifying all non-sociologicist explanations of social action with "individualistic" theories toward a central focus on the subjective point of view.
Parsons' own special intentions are revealed again as he explores the significance of Durkheim's notion of anomie for his methodology, especially as it relates to the problem of social order and control. Parsons proposes that the extreme limit of anomie:

... is the state of pure individualism (correlative with "disorganization of personality") which is for Durkheim as for Hobbes--the "war of all against all." Coordinate with and opposite to (as a polar antithesis) the state of anomie is that of "perfect integration" which implies two things--that the body of norms governing conduct in a community forms a consistent system (this aspect of integration significantly enough Durkheim scarcely takes notice of at all) and that its control over the individual is actually effective--it gets itself obeyed (1949:377).

Here Parsons is faced with a number of difficulties. First, what Parsons refers to as the extreme limit of "pure individualism" is closer to what Durkheim meant by his first notion of egoisme. This notion was influenced by the Utilitarians' image of human nature; Durkheim simply inverted the negative valuation of natural egoism and duty-bound insatiability. But by accepting the image of human nature from his polemical opponents which located the destructive passions of egoism and insatiability in the pre-social or organic ego, Durkheim unwittingly got himself in a most unfortunate bind for a sociologist (see Books One and Three). And Parsons slights Durkheim's derivation of dark forces from the pre-social level, perhaps because Parsons himself shares this darkly negative image of human nature. Further, Parsons unwittingly identifies the "polar (antithetical) opposite of anomie" as "perfect integration" with fatalisme, which has always been considered the opposite of anomie. But Parsons has rightly referred to "suicide fataliste" as "the situation where the pressure of the conscience collective is excessive" (1949:336). Unfortunately, this mis-identification pulls into the same orbit the state of "perfect integration," value consensus, and the "mechanically integrated" collective conscience seen in primitive fatalistic suicides (see Books Two and Three)!
haps Parsons' way out of this Comtean vision is, as later passages suggest, to view altruisme and fatalisme as possible cases of "pathological overconformity."

Parsons further fleshes out his assertions concerning the meaning of anomie and egoisme in the context of Durkheim's methodological development by simultaneously rooting these assertions in another parallel theoretical change—namely, the shift in the connotations of constraint in Durkheim's theory of moral obligation. At first, Parsons suggests, Durkheim used almost any external objective factor to counter the individual's natural egoism and insatiability. However, Durkheim later shifted to recognition of the critical importance of moral rules which, in his final phase, were seen as internalized in terms of ethical duty.

In regard to the nature and source of socially effective constraint in Durkheim's early stages, Parsons asks: "What is their source and what is the nature of the social force which constrains (1949:381)? Durkheim's next big breakthrough, according to Parsons, came with the notion of anomie—representing the absence of effective internalized moral obligations. However, as his early reviews and the suppressed introduction to The Division of Labor, which Simpson reprinted as an appendix, demonstrates, Durkheim was centrally concerned with the internalization of moral obligation based on respect for transcending moral authority from the very beginning of his career. This fact, in turn, casts more doubt on Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim's supposed acceptance of the Utilitarian dilemma, his supposed phases, and his supposed "radical break with positivism" (see also Pope, 1973).

There [with anomie] he was led to take another great step, the implications of which bring him to the next great phase of his development. Up to this point he has always thought in terms of the utilitarian dilemma—from the subjective point of view action must be explained in terms of individual ends or wants (which to the utilitarian are concrete wants).... Durkheim has hitherto accepted this so that it has simply gone without saying that, since he rejects the utilitarian solution, his social factor has to fit into the category of conditions.
Now he makes the far-reaching empirical observation that since individual wants are in principle unlimited, it is an essential condition of both social stability and individual happiness that they should be regulated in terms of norms. But here the norms do not, as the rules of contract, merely regulate "externally," but enter directly into the constitution of the actors ends themselves*(1949: 381).

As is his custom, Parsons portrays Durkheim as a sort of inverted mirror of Utilitarianism—of course, "it simply went without saying" that if the Utilitarians said up, Durkheim said down, the Utilitarians left, Durkheim right, and so on. But this portrait of Durkheim, bordering on caricature, seriously underestimates, as noted earlier, the uniquely French and personal sources of Durkheim's thought. More troublesome is Parsons tacit acceptance of Durkheim's first philosophical doctrine of the dualism of human nature—here expressed as the idea that "individual wants are in principle unlimited." Curiously, Parsons terms this an "empirical observation!" But in what sense? On the contrary, I would suggest that as men are defined in these terms and placed under powerful sanctions to act out these definitions, then and only then will they come to act and see themselves in this way. In this case, the sources of this powerful image is a powerfully situated cultural group; by no means can human nature be blamed (see Book Three). The fact that historically different cultures endow different styles of life with entirely different images of perfection, and hence social sanctions, demonstrates that egoism and insatiability are not accurately projected as generic afflictions on the human species. In sum, Durkheim's key antinomy, to Parsons, was the ahistorical dichotomy: individual anarchy/moral discipline. In turn, we can also recognize how Parsons transmuted Durkheim's dualism into a dichotomy between self-disciplined, Protestant individualism versus the confusion of anomie (or perhaps the lapse from Protestant norms).

However, Parsons' contorted translation of Durkheim's conceptions into his own schema raises another deeper problem for Parsons. If, as he maintains, norms do not merely "regulate externally," but rather enter intimately and "directly
into the constitution of the ends themselves," then Parsons
is faced with two additional difficult problems. If, in his
own terms, norms work primarily in negative fashion by re-
straining the natural passions of the egoistic and insatiable
organic ego, then how do norms also work primarily in a pos-
itive fashion to generate desires and mobilize thought and
action? Further, if norms do enter positively into the con-
stitution of desires and ends in themselves, does not Par-
sons have to consider the possibility, developed in Durkheim's
second schema of suicide (see Book Three), that insatiabili-
ty and egoisme are not natural but socioculturally generated?

Indeed, I now pose the same questions to Parsons as were
directed against Durkheim's first schema and its underlying
image of man as homo duplex: on what grounds do you assume
that the "individual" is naturally "amoral," or that human na-
ture is inherently egoistic and insatiable? Is this a moral
or philosophical doctrine, or an empirical comparative-his-
torical observation? How is this image of the most signifi-
cant drives of human action to be reconciled with the suppo-
sed internalization of cultural images of perfection in mo-
dern socialization processes? Now, Parsons readily admits
that "the normal concrete individual is a morally disciplin-
ed personality." If this is the normal empirical case, then
what abnormal case is Parsons talking about? Where, in point
of fact, can we find one of these naturally "amoral" indivi-
duals? Historically, it should be remembered that Hobbes re-
ferred to the Puritans and the aftermath of the English Civil
War, whose descendants Parsons tenaciously defends; but this
irony has escaped almost everyone). Isn't this image of egois-
tic and insatiable man a pre-social, philosophical notion of
the pessimistic moral theorists? If so, then isn't egoism and
insatiability, when historically observed, due as much to so-
cialized cultural values, as to human nature? (See Book Three).

As Parsons continues to sort through the different mean-
ings Durkheim bestowed upon anomie, the individual, the histor-
ical emergence of the person, the social morphological neces-
sity of the modern "cult of individualism," and so on, it be-
comes clear that while Durkheim derived, in the main, his central notion of "moral individualism" from the progressive division of labor, Parsons emphatically rejects this and identifies "moral individualism" and the internalization of moral obligations and authority with egoisme and Protestantism. By doing so he mixes up the two senses of egoisme as the egoism of human nature and as the "cult of the individual." But if one does not accept Parsons' theses, Durkheim's first schema, and the Utilitarians' (and Romantics') image of human nature as inherently egoistic and insatiable, but rather follows the more fully sociological and empirical-historical position implied in Durkheim's second schema (see Book Three), and views egoisme and anomie as culturally sanctioned "drives for progress and perfection" and as the "infinity of dreams and desires," and, in turn, acknowledges Parsons' embrace of this second sense of anomie as socially "institutionalized individualism," then isn't it legitimate to similarly conclude that egoisme may be derived from culturally sanctioned "moral individualism" of an extreme type, chronically gone to excess? And that insatiability, too, may be derived from extreme cultural sanctions? In short, if Parsons wishes to claim "moral individualism" as a Protestant contribution, must he not also assume responsibility thereby for the culturally sanctioned drives for modern egoism and insatiability which Durkheim so profoundly attacked as symptomatic of the "moral anarchy" of the modern world?

Let us look again to Parsons' own testimony on the matter: On the one hand, there is the element of chaotic, undisciplined impulse and desire—the "individual" element in Durkheim's sense; on the other, the normative rule; in order that the whole conception of normative control may make sense these two elements must be kept radically apart in principle. For unless in "individual desires" there were this inherently chaotic, "centrifugal" quality, the need for control would not be present at all. Moreover, it is important to note that the analysis is couched in terms of the subjective point of view of the actor. It is a question of the relation of his desires, his subjective impulses or ends, to certain disciplining controlling factors. Without the dichotomy of the two sets of factors, Durkheim's whole critique of utilitarianism falls to the ground * (1949:377-8).
In rediscovering Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature (see Books One and Three), Parsons now correctly observes that without this crucial tension, Durkheim's original position becomes less tenable. Indeed, as we have seen, the breakdown of this dichotomy paves the way for the emergence of the second schema of suicide. Parsons thus comes to translate Durkheim's early dichotomy of insatiable appetites/moral rules (see Lukes, 1973; Book One) into his own terms, first in the Hobbesian sense of anarchy/social order, and then later into the functionalistic jargon of malintegration/integration and equilibrium.

Durkheim's dichotomy rested, of course, on an extremely negative image of human nature. In contrast to the unprecedented ethical inversion of the relations between egoism and social responsibility in Utilitarian theory, Durkheim rejected the liberal economists' presumption that unbridled individualism, regulated only by the competition of the marketplace, would inevitably lead to the improvement of the commonweal (e.g. Mandeville's "private vices, public virtues"). Further, if Durkheim's "whole critique of Utilitarianism" is in danger of "falling to the ground," it can only be because the historical evidence as well socialization process reveals that it is sociologically inadmissible to base social science on biological or moral doctrines of human nature. For all such images are philosophically derived, and are based on the rhetorical fiction of a lone, pre-social individual ego. If Durkheim did indeed make the breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoisme as culturally sanctioned, then, while on a superficial level Durkheim's "whole critique" may fall to the ground, on a deeper cultural-historical level, Durkheim discovered a profound insight into the fundamental rationales of modern society, personality, culture, and historical process. Significantly, Durkheim's breakthrough converges with Weber's historical-cultural investigations into the religio-cultural foundations of the modern world (see Books Three and Four).
4. **Critical Summary**

Let us briefly review some key points in Durkheim's argument which Parsons misconstrues.

(a) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is **incomplete**--for it ignores fatalisme.

(b) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is **asymmetrical**--for it contrasts two categories (egoisme and altruisme) with one (anomie).

(c) By consistently abstracting Durkheim's argument, Parsons misses Durkheim's doctrine of historical-evolutionary process. I submit that Durkheim was always centrally concerned with the broad evolutionary processes of social differentiation and individuation (see Book One). The transition from simple to complex societies, and the individual's changing position within that great historical transformation, formed one of Durkheim's central axes of thought. This neglect means that Parsons, like so many after him, simply failed to sufficiently recognize the historical rootedness of Durkheim's typology of suicide.

(d) As a consequence, while Parsons does note that the difference between egoisme and altruisme is cultural, he fails to emphasize that it is also primarily historical--namely, the distinction between two dominant modes of solidarity at the two ends of history. This same failure of Parsons applies to the distinction between modern anomie and that sort of fatalistic resignation to one's collectively assigned traditional fate in primitive societies.

(e) Further, Parsons ignores Durkheim's processual-historical theory of the emergence of the autonomous individual which accompanies the progressive division of labor (see Book One). Perhaps Parsons ignores this crucial point because he searched for justification that egoisme, positively regarded as "moral or institutionalized individualism," should be viewed not as inevitable or mechanically produced in sociocultural evolution, but rather that this special type of individualism is a praiseworthy product of Protestant values. Such an assertion is opposed, of course, both to "mechanical solidarity" of traditional societies and to hierocratic Catholicism, and to Durkheim's central historical proposition concerning individuation and social morphological differentiation.

(f) As a further consequence of his slighting of Durkheim's processual framework, Parsons neglects to emphasize that the modern world is, in Durkheim's estimate, in a "critical" transitionary stage. Hence, anomie and egoisme are due to the moral disturbances prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity." Egoisme and anomie are not
due to the generic absence of social constraint, as Par­
sons implies by inserting the "Hobbesian dilemma" every­
where into Durkheim's thought. Rather, they are symptomatic
of the abnormal forms of division of labor in the
"critical" contemporary transitional phase of societal e-
volution (see, for example, Giddens, 1972a:42).

(g) Parsons slights Durkheim's charges that the state of mo­
dern "critical" economies and societies, in their transi­
tional stage, are permeated by a "chronic moral anarchy." Par­
sons generally underplays Durkheim's highly critical
account of anomie and egoisme, just as he later underplay­
ed Weber's critical attitude toward the moral foundations
of the modern world.

(h) By ignoring Durkheim's historical and critical thrust,
Parsons feels little compunction in rendering egoisme as
a highly virtuous product of Protestantism. What Durkheim
described as "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness," Par­
sons transmutes into "moral" or "institutionalized indivi­
dualism." One can only guess at the influence of Parsons
own cultural tradition on this laudatory identification.
However, Parsons' reconstruction gets him here into a num­
ber of serious birds involving his own interpretation, and
in dealing with Durkheim's critique of modern economy and
society. Perhaps Parsons became entangled in this double
resistance against the main critical thrusts of Durkheim's
analysis because Parsons sees the modern "contractual soli­
darity" not as anomic, but rather that these "non-contract­
ual elements in contract" are themselves underlain by norms.
Since egoisme as "institutionalized individualism" may be
taken as derived from Protestantism, so perhaps are the
normative foundations of "contractual solidarity" and the
modern socio-economic order similarly derived from ascetic
Protestant norms (eg. see volume two of The Structure of
Social Action on Weber). In light of Parsons own background,
(some one once called Parsons' doctrines "sublimated asce­
tic Protestantism"), it is not hard to understand Parsons' underlying rhetorical interest in these issues. Curiously,
however, Parsons later charged others with ignoring the
significance of the religious background of Durkheim's ego­
isme: "Largely for ideological reasons, this basic insight
is still far from being assimilated into the thinking of
social scientists"(1960a:147). But whose ideology is at
work here?

While mistaken in underestimating Durkheim's theses
concerning differentiation and individuation, Parsons is
indeed correct, in my estimate, in detecting certain limi­
tations in Durkheim's overly generalized developmental sche­
mas. Although seemingly abstracted, Parsons here seems to
think in terms of specific preconditions for breakthroughs
from one fundamental evolutionary level to the next; a help­
ful premise I believe. Perhaps Parsons was tacitly playing
off Weber's methodology and theses on individualism and
Protestantism against Durkheim's ideas. However, again, this puts Parsons in the extremely difficult position of dealing with the implications of Durkheim's (and Weber's) critique of modern society and culture. If egoïsme as "institutionalized individualism" and its correlate "contractual solidarity" are both tacitly and historically supported by Protestant religio-cultural norms, then how can Parsons account for the modern egocentricity and insatiability with which Durkheim and Weber were so agonizingly concerned? In terms of his own reconstruction and splitting of Durkheim's schemas, must not Parsons admit that the fundamental sources of modern egoïstic insatiability also find their origins and continuing sanctions in Protestant norms? That Protestantism is the proximate source of both the positive aspects of "institutionalized individualism" and the drives for "progress and perfection" which Parsons (and perhaps many of us) hold dear, and the egoism and insatiability seen by Durkheim as underlying the "moral anarchy" of the modern world, would most probably prove an unacceptable admission on Parsons' part. Yet, not only are the historical, cultural, and psychological links there, but the very logic of his own and Durkheim's argument leads inevitably to this conclusion: our virtues, gone to extreme, become our vices!

Further, Parsons ignores much evidence in Suicide that not only egoïsme but anomie as well are both supported by dominant modern cultural sanctions. Durkheim repeatedly links egoïsme and anomie, and suggests that both are the result of the "entire morality of progress and perfection," and "the longing for the infinite, daily represented as virtue." Yet Parsons conveniently ignores the powerful implications of recognizing that all four suicidal types are, in the last analysis, supported by central cultural sanctions. Although Parsons was in a good position to discover Durkheim's breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoïsme as generated by the presence of cultural sanctions, Parsons' own cultural predilections stopped him short.

Indeed, such a recognition of the historical and cultural rootedness of all four types, when coupled with the unforeseen implications of identifying egoïsme with Protestant virtue explored above, would prove fatal to Parsons' assertion about the great importance of Durkheim's breakthrough to The Theory of The Integration of The Social System. For Parsons might find it difficult to accept the inevitable conclusion that the very factors for which he so desperately searched in Durkheim's work--namely, the internalization of moral obligation and religious values as the foundation of the "voluntaristic" theory of action--are also simultaneously the source of the disorder and anomie so relentlessly criticized by Durkheim (eg. see LaCapra, 1972:162,169,178). What would Parsons say to the inevitable conclusion that our modern Central Value System is itself anomic? Or racked by Durkheimian anomie?
(j) By following Durkheim only half-way, Parsons mixes up Durkheim's first and second schemas. While Durkheim's first schema was predicated on the image of the absence of effective social constraint over the passions of the pre-social individual in the modern era prior to the full institutionalization of organic solidarity (see Book Two), and his second schema was based on the image of the presence of cultural sanctions for autonomy and drives for "progress and perfection," Parsons leads us to mix up these separate possibilities by including egoisme (positively construed) from Durkheim's second implicit schema with a truncated version of anomie from the first schema.

(k) As critical an omission as Parsons' ignoring of Durkheim's view of historical process was Parsons' slighting of Durkheim's doctrine of human nature. By abstracting Durkheim's concerns as focussed on the theoretical problem of social order, Parsons managed to miss both the crucial historical dimension to Durkheim's thought (which he only later acknowledged through his protege Robert Bellah, 1959), and Durkheim's image of human nature. Both are critical to any adequate interpretation of Durkheim's typology of suicide.

(l) In consequence, Parsons seriously underemphasizes not only the source of the disruptive elements in egoisme and anomie, but most importantly, the nature of these inordinate passions and desires. Durkheim's central concern in analyzing the origins and nature of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the world was with egoism (in its negative aspects), and with ravages of insatiability wrought by these driven and isolated egos. Given his early dichotomy of moral rules and sensual appetites, it is clear that Durkheim's central concern was with the "infinity of dreams and desires." Parsons explains the resulting social instability (or anomie) in terms of the "lack of definiteness of expectations." But in an absolutely crucial shift in meaning, Parsons changes Durkheim's connotation of anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." But lack of normative clarity is simply not synonymous with insatiability.

(m) By ignoring Durkheim's crucial doctrine of the inherent egoism and passionate insatiability of human nature (in the first schema, culture in the second schema), Parsons' schematic distinction between the presence (egoisme and altruisme) versus the absence of norms (anomie) simply falls to the ground. For, in contrast to Parsons, Durkheim's problem was not the generic absence of social control. His distinction was rather between that type of culturally sanctioned social solidarity in which the inherent passions of human nature are directed solely collective ends, and the modern type of "critical" transitional period in which no effective social force acts to constrain these naturally insatiable and egoistic passions. And if one completes the journey started by Parsons and follows Durkheim to his second implicit schema by locating egoism
and insatiability in modern culture rather than in human nature, then Parsons' schema becomes not only mistaken and incomplete but historically irrelevant as well.

(n) As always, Parsons mistakenly presumes that Durkheim developed his theories, especially concerning suicide, in exclusive and categorical response to the Anglo Utilitarians. But Durkheim's second typology of suicide cannot adequately be understood apart from either multiple polemics against opposing cultural traditions, or his core cultural commitments to the Franco-Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition (see Book Three).

(o) Parsons' rendering of anomie as simply the confusion resulting from declassification neglects key intervening variables of great general significance in Durkheim's argument. Contrary to Parsons, the deregulation of anomie, to Durkheim, is merely the releasing and sustaining condition of the "diseases of the infinite." An especially critical variable which Parsons strangely enough in view of his interest in the sociological foundations of economic theory and action, is Durkheim's important notion of The Social Schedule. Further, Parsons ahistorical abstraction of Durkheim's methodological framework leads him to also ignore the crucial historical differences in the content and mode of enforcement of the Social Schedule at the two ends of history.

(p) Accordingly, Parsons fails to sufficiently emphasize the critical fact concerning the Social Schedule governing the distribution of socioeconomic rewards of the two societal types at the two ends of history--namely, legitimacy. If Parsons had linked his correct recognition that both modern egoisme and traditional altruisme were sanctioned as legitimate by dominant cultural values, with Durkheim's notion of the importance of The Social Schedule at both ends of history, then he too might have broken through to recognition of Durkheim's second implicit schema in which all four types of suicide are sanctioned as legitimate, though extreme, expressions of dominant cultural values. In turn, with his Weberian-inspired insights into the origins and development of dominant modern cultural traditions, Parsons might have then profitably explored the legitimizing foundations of egoisme and anomie in the modern world.

(q) Parsons fundamentally misconstrues the importance of anomie and egoisme in Durkheim's methodological development, since the elements Parsons separates out and assigns to different phases do not represent distinct stages. Rather, they were all bound up together from the beginning. In turn, Parsons' caricaturing of the early Durkheim as a crude materialistic positivist, and his equally mistaken interpretation of the later Durkheim as a curiously inconsistent idealist, not only distort Durkheim's thought, but unfortunately directed attention away from some of Durkheim's
really crucial breakthroughs. As we saw in Book Three, these include his growing social realism, his breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoism, his breakthrough to the notion of civilizational process, his historical work on the evolution of education in France which attributed an independent causality to cultural-historical factors, and so on.

Finally, Parsons' solution to the very dilemma which so haunted him that he constantly foisted it off on Durkheim is largely fictitious. For Parsons came to posit the very elements which are lacking in the first place. If, indeed, the absence of a value consensus is the cause of the so-called "Hobbesian problem," then Parsons cannot hope to solve this dilemma simply by postulating the existence, the the generic presence of internalized moral obligation.

Even more damaging, Parsons prescinds from the historical situation which originally generated the "Hobbesian dilemma"--namely, the Puritan Revolution and the English Civil War of the seventeenth century. The same type of ascetic Protestantism which Parsons virtuously identifies with egoism was also the prime historical cultural source of the anarchy of egoism and anomie in the actual context of the real Hobbesian dilemma! Further, the Utilitarian liberals' economic doctrine was also a later outgrowth of the same Protestantism which Parsons defends, and which Durkheim attacked as anomic!

But, true to his own cultural tradition, Parsons did not trouble himself with the disturbing implications of his doctrines and those which he appropriated for his own purposes.
B. Dohrenwend and Fatalisme

One of the leading analyses contending that the distinctness of Durkheim's types should be maintained is Bruce Dohrenwend's article "Egoism, Altruism, Anomie, and Fatalism: A Conceptual Analysis of Durkheim's Types" (1959). As widely cited as Barclay Johnson's paper, Dohrenwend takes a position diametrically opposed to the reductions favored by Johnson. Dohrenwend follows in the Parsonian stream of normative development of Durkheim's theses. Specifically, Dohrenwend accepts Parsons' distinctions between the strength and content of norms. However, Dohrenwend tries to find a set of distinctions for the category which Parsons neglected—fatalisme. Dohrenwend thus distinguishes between fatalisme and the other types in terms of the regulatory source of norms.

Now, we should note again the dangers inherent in setting aside crucial theses in the original works, and translating the remaining portions into one's own special vocabulary, theoretical structure, and one's own special preoccupations. For instance, Dohrenwend contends that Durkheim's image of human nature can be profitably detached from his typology of suicide: "... moralizing about 'the state of human nature' influences Durkheim's descriptions of the norm states at many points; it serves for the most part as an obstacle to the analysis of these states" (1959:468). Although purporting to provide an accurate interpretation of Durkheim's types, Dohrenwend, too, feels little compunction in simply excising, without the detailed exegesis and exploration we undertook here in Books One and Three, one of the critical anchors of Durkheim's theory. "The focus of this paper, then, is on the norm-states themselves as distinct from their relation to ideas about basic human nature" (1959:469). However, how can one really grasp Durkheim's notions without understanding the central emphasis he placed on the insatiable passions of the organic ego? I must insist: no egoism and no insatiability, and no historical process, no typology of suicide!

Taking his clues from Durkheim's assertion that "egoisme
and altruism are opposites, as are anomie and fatalism" (1959: 470), Dohrenwend sets out, as with so many others, to determine in precisely what sense these types are distinguishable as opposites. "The assumption here is that each type can be differentiated from every other in terms of its polar oppositeness to each of the other types on at least one major dimension" (1959:470).

Now, Dohrenwend takes his lead more from Parsons than Durkheim; this can be seen not only in terms of his abstracted normative emphasis, but also in his initial formulation of the first two dimensions of Durkheim's types.

... one is the presence versus the absence of social norms, distinguishing both altruism and egoism from anomie; the other is the collectivistic versus the individualistic content of norms, which distinguishes altruism from egoism (1959:471).

Here we encounter again the asymmetry of Parsons' typology. However, Dohrenwend moves to elaborate an additional comparison allowing us to further distinguish between all four types. Hence, he focuses on the sources of effective legitimate social control or normative regulation—whether it derives primarily from external or internal controls.

According to this interpretation, there is implicit in Durkheim's types a distinction between two main sources of normative regulation: one stemming from rules which have been internalized by individuals..., the other from rules applied from a source of external authority (1959:472).

Supposedly taking his lead from altruisme, Dohrenwend then attempts to add another dimension to the Parsonian classification which will take care of that "neglected stepchild" —fatalisme. This effort is summed up Dohrenwend this way:

The four types can be differentiated each from every other, and in terms of oppositeness on at least one of three major dimensions: the existence of norms, their content, and their effective source of regulatory power. Both egoism and altruism are characterized by the existence of effective, internalized rules, but the content of the rules is individualistic in the first case and collectivistic in the second. Fatalism stands in strong contrast to egoism and altruism, for its effective source is an authority external to the social aggregate; nevertheless, all three types involve
rules which are binding on the overt behavior of individuals. Anomie, however, appears to be a type apart, as it is marked by the absence of norms altogether (1959:472).

Hynes (1975:93) offers a schematic representation of Dohrenwend's typology.

Now, Dohrenwend's reconstructed typology retains many of the same flaws as Parsons'—including abstracted ahistoricalness, neglect of the insatiability and egoism of human nature, and in this case, anomie is left floating in sociological space as a purely negative category. While his inclusion of fatalisme in the typology is important, not only is Dohrenwend's Parsonian classification assymmetrical, but it might have benefited from the application of the active/passive dichotomy (one of Parsons' favorites) to the problem of interpreting fatalisme. In contrast to Dohrenwend, I must insist that fatalisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as merely the result of external regulation, for Durkheim's notion of archaic society, followed by Parsons' positing of the generic need for internalized moral obligation, presumes that individuals are permeated with the dominant norms. No, fatalisme as well as altruisme in both of Durkheim's schemas is sanctioned by dominant cultural values, and in Parsons' schema this includes as well. Surely we can find more viable alternatives than "jerry-rigging" already inadequate schemas.
C. Neyer, Mawson, Cresswell

Here we shall briefly explore the suggestions of three observers who, while not offering coherent typologies, nonetheless argue for the distinctness of Durkheim's types. In 1960, in a footnote Joseph Neyer sums up Durkheim's general schema of suicide in this way:

... altruism = too much self-transcendence; egoism = not enough self-transcendence; fatalism = too much regulation; anomie = not enough regulation. In Durkheim's moral terms, altruism and egoism are concerned with the good, while fatalism and anomie are concerned with duty. Self-transcendence corresponds to the action of society as immanent; regulation corresponds to the action of society as transcendent (1960:66-7, #48).

While suggestive (e.g. Hynes, 1975:100, notes the similarity to his own typology), as expressed Neyer's distinctions are stated in such a compressed form that it is difficult to know exactly what they imply. Are these distinctions classifiable in a graphic schema, or do they designate a series of distinctions? Besides the cumbersome terminology (e.g. transcendence/immanence), it is not clear to me to what extent Neyer's rough typology is grounded in the basic structure of Durkheim's thought. While intriguing, I confess I am at a loss to know what to do with this suggestive typology.

In a valuable review and critique of the literature on anomie and social pathology, A.R. Mawson (1970) argues for the importance of retaining the distinction between egoism and anomie. Essentially, as Lukes summarizes, Mawson argues that egoism and anomie represent different kinds of normlessness: "... egoism is the breakdown of social attachments constituting the breakdown of the self; anomie is the breakdown of constraining legal and moral norms" (Lukes, 1973:207, #67). Mawson proposes:

First, had Durkheim pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to reexamine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite the difficulties in Durkheim's theory, which the concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some of their original meaning. All
contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the distinction between anomie and egoism with the result that social conditions, psychological states, and processes which are entirely different from one another have been assimilated (1970:298).

Mawson notes also the underlying importance of Durkheim's negative view of human nature as inherently egoistic and insatiable. And Mawson distinguishes between anomie and egoisme in terms of their externalizing/internalizing, passions/intellect modes of expression.

... if a weakening external control over the passions is the distinguishing feature of anomie, deregulation of the intellect as a result of isolation from group activity is the differentia specifica of the second pathological state: egoism. Durkheim thus postulates a distinction between man's intellect and his passions (1970:301-2).

But Mawson proposes that "... analysis of anomie and egoism leads to a paradox, the solution of which necessitates the abandonment of his theory and the assumptions on which it had been based" (1970:301). Specifically, Mawson, like so many others, is puzzled by Durkheim's distinction between attachment and regulation in regard to egoism and anomie. Noting (1970:303) several apparent contradictions in Durkheim's development of these distinctions, Mawson contends that he has discovered a paradox: "... which Durkheim assiduously avoided, for perhaps he realized intuitively that his entire theoretical structure would have been called into question if he had tried to solve it systematically" (1970:304). Like Marks and myself, then, Mawson claims to have discovered a basic hiatus in Durkheim's developing theory of anomie. But Mawson's discussion is opaque sometimes, and doesn't appear to have a clear sense of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. Like so many others, too, Mawson makes too much of Durkheim's notion of "externality" as a criterion of social facts; hence, he claims that the notion of external regulation denied the possibility of social participation and the internalization of norms. Mawson concludes that:

The crucial difference between anomie and egoism ... is that egoism is defined as the psychological isolation of individuals from groups, whereas individuals
in a state of anomie, where legal and moral rules have ceased to have sanctioning power, are not isolated psychologically from each other (1970:306).

But I suggest that Mawson has not fully understood Durkheim's notion of normative and symbolic process, nor his notion of the construction and emergence of the person through history. Thus, when Mawson opposes rules to meanings in Durkheim's thought, he does something which Durkheim doesn't really do. Once again, Mawson, like Barclay Johnson and others, is on to something important here, but it isn't quite what he thinks it is. I must disagree, therefore, with Mawson's rather opaque conclusion:

For in reconciling the notion of regulation with that of attachment by juxtaposing an analysis of norms with that of psychological isolation we arrived at a social psychology in which the intimate relation between norms and the self implied a set of presuppositions which were fundamentally opposed to those with which Durkheim began (1970:307).

Finally, Cresswell (1972), while not having a real grasp of the underlying structure of Durkheim's thought, nor of the complexities and ambiguities of his suicide schemas, offers some observations which have value. First, he raises some interesting questions regarding the meaning of the various notions of social integration (eg. 1972:139). Second, he observes that Durkheim's sociological theory of suicide rested on a moral and philosophical position (eg. 1972:137-8). Finally, in attempting to articulate the relations between Durkheim's types, Cresswell includes the historical dimension of primitive and modern societies as an integral part of his typology.
D. Anthony Giddens' Work

One of the most perceptive of recent interpreters of Durkheim, Anthony Giddens, has come closer than many others to identifying some of the essential elements of an adequate reinterpretation of Durkheim's first typology of suicide. Not only has Giddens generated, over the last decade or so, some of the better work on the sociology of suicide, but he also enjoys the distinction of having produced some of the finest exegetical and interpretive work on Durkheim. It is hardly surprising that Giddens would come closer than others before him, for he has put close exegesis of texts first, and thus more often remained faithful to what Durkheim really said and meant. Unfortunately, Giddens largely stopped at the exegetical level, and did not proceed to a systematic, in-depth exploration of Durkheim's paradigmatic or "nuclear structure." As a result, Giddens' generally excellent insights into Durkheim's schema of suicide remain scattered, and are not brought to bear on a whole scale reconstruction of Durkheim's typology. Let us now briefly explore some of Giddens' excellent and thought provoking exegeses, which can often be used as a summary starting point for understanding Durkheim's first schema.

Giddens stands, for instance, with those who would rescue the distinctness of Durkheim's different types of suicide. Yet he also tries to interrelate them, and in the process provides some important insight into Durkheim's second notion of egoisme.

Durkheim's discussion of the differences between egoistic and anomie suicide is not always unambiguous, and this has caused some commentators to suppose that the two types in fact, cannot ... be meaningfully distinguished [eg. Barclay Johnson]. Careful reading of Durkheim's account against the broader backdrop of The Division of Labor however, makes this position difficult to maintain. Egoistic suicide is clearly linked to the growth of the "cult of the individual" in contemporary societies. Protestantism is the religious forerunner and primary source of modern moral individualism, which has in other areas of social life become wholly secularized. Egoistic suicide is thus an affront to the growth of the "cult of the personality." "Where man is a God to mankind a certain growth in egoisme is unavoidable." "Individual-
ism is undoubtedly not egoism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stimulated without further spreading the other. Thus egoistic suicide arises."

Anomic suicide, on the other hand, derives from the lack of moral regulation particularly characteristic of major sectors of modern industry. [Footnote: Durkheim holds that a certain amount of anomie is a necessary element in societies committed to progressive change. "Every morality of improvement and progress thus presupposes a certain level of anomie".]. Egoistic and anomic suicide are nevertheless closely related to one another, especially on the level of the individual suicide. "It is, indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have some tendency to deregulation; for since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him*(1971a:84-5).

In addition, Giddens' account is valuable in that he insists on the historical framework of Durkheim's typology. Anomie and egoism are specific to the modern socioeconomic order, while altruism and fatalism are rooted in primitive or archaic society.

Suicide in traditional societies takes a different form than the egoistic and anomic types: this is directly traceable to the characteristics of social organization, specified in The Division of Labor, whereby such societies differ from the modern form. In one category of suicides found in traditional societies, it is a duty for an individual, when placed in certain circumstances, to kill himself. A person kills himself because he has an obligation to do so.... Both kinds of altruistic suicide rest upon the existence of a strong collective conscience, which so dominates the actions of an individual that he will sacrifice his life in furtherance of a collective value (1971a: 85).

Indeed, Giddens goes on to insist that anomie and egoism cannot be understood apart from this macro-evolutionary framework. Therefore, all those versions of anomie that portray it in abstracted and formal terms are in that measure misleading.

If there is a basic opposition in all of Durkheim's works, it is not that of social integration (normative control) versus social disintegration (lack of normative regulation or anomie), but, as with virtually all leading social thinkers of his time, that of "traditional" versus "modern" society with all the profound transformations which this latter distinction implies. It does not seem to have been generally appreciated that there is necessarily an historical dimension to Durkheim's treatment of anomie: this is integral to the very conception of "socially generated need," but is also important in regard to the second aspect of anomie, that of provision for wants.
In the traditional social order, human faculties and needs are kept to a low level, and therefore are readily provided for. The dominance of the conscience collective plays a role in each of these respects: on the one hand, by restricting the development of "individuation"—the liberation of the individual personality—and, on the other hand, by setting strict limits to what may legitimately be striven for by an individual in any given social position. The process of evolution away from traditionalism both increases the level of individuation and at the same time undermines the fixed moral boundaries characteristic of previous ages. It is these twin developments which create the important theoretical problem which Durkheim seeks to resolve in terms of his analysis of the emergence of moral individualism (1971b:216).

Here Giddens clearly recognizes that needs are socially generated, and the provision for these wants are historically determined. Giddens implicitly recognizes the importance of Durkheim's notion of the crucial historical differences in the Social Schedule at the two ends of history. Hence, Giddens provides here a valuable entree to Durkheim's second schema which rests on historical differences in the generation and regulation of desires.

Further, Giddens rightly insists that "anomie is specific to the modern order." Therefore, anomie, according to Durkheim and Giddens after him, is not to be viewed primarily as a generic problem, applicable in equal degree to all societies, but rather is primarily a problem characteristic of the modern transitional crisis.

Anomie, therefore, is a phenomenon specific to the modern order (as is indexed by the documentation of the growth of anomic suicide in Suicide); it is to be understood in relation to individuation and moral individualism. Although Durkheim concedes that a "certain level of anomie" is inevitable in modern society, which is committed to rapid and continuous change, anomie as pathology is to be traced to the temporarily inadequate development of moral individualism. The upsurge of anomie found in the contemporary age is mainly centered in economic life, which has broken away from the confines of tradition, but has not yet been sufficiently penetrated by the new morality of individualism (1971b:216).

It is only through acceptance of the moral regulation which makes social life possible that man is able to reap the benefits which society offers him. The failure to inject the historical element into Durkheim's analysis of this issue has led many critics to suppose that his views
represent a thinly veiled rationale for authoritarian political doctrine. But it is, in fact, central to Durkheim's thesis that all forms of moral regulation are not identical. In other words, "regulation" (society, social constraint) cannot simply be juxtaposed in an abstract and universal sense with "lack of regulation" (anomie) (1971a:117).

All those who would enter the lists in debate over the true meaning and historical significance of anomie would do well to heed Giddens' words here; it would save much confusion, and allow us to progress faster.

The notions of both egoism and anomie must be understood within the scope of the general conception of the development of society presented in The Division of Labor. Seen in this context, egoism and anomie are not simply functional problems facing all types of society in equivalent degree: they are stimulated by the very moral individualism which is the outcome of social evolution. The dilemmas facing the modern form of society, Durkheim maintains, are not to be resolved through a reversion to the autocratic discipline found in traditional societies, but only through the moral consolidation of the differentiated division of labor, which demands quite different forms of authority from those characteristic of earlier types of society * (1971a:118).

Now, in terms of anomie specifically, Giddens clearly recognizes that Durkheim's concept ambiguously combines both the notion of goals and the potential for satisfaction. And Giddens rightly pinpoints this ambiguity as a source of confusion in interpreting what Durkheim "really meant" or "should have meant."

... according to the theory of anomie, moral obligation not only sets limits to human action, but also focusses it and gives it a defined objective (1971b:219).

... In Durkheim's formulation, the concept [of anomie] involves two components, which tend to be assimilated in his own use of it. One of these refers to the degree to which human action is provided with definitive objectives; the other concerns how far these ends are realizable. The distinction is fundamental, yet Durkheim glosses over it.... The fact that Durkheim failed to utilize the distinction between the two aspects of anomie is a source of the most basic flaws in his sociology. As most recent literature employing the concept of anomie demonstrates, the concept takes on quite divergent theoretical applications according to which aspect is emphasized. If anomie is taken to refer mainly to "normlessness"--the first aspect of anomie--then it tends to support a standpoint emphasizing
the dimensions of "meaning/lack of meaning" in individual conduct. The end result is ... a position which ... treats social conflict as "pathological," i.e. which links conflict to "deviance" produced by "imperfect socialization." If the other aspect is emphasized, it tends to lead to a conception of "normative strain" rather than "normlessness." Here the objective of conduct may be quite clear to the actor, and there is not the strong overtone of irrationality which appears to characterize the conduct of the individual where the first aspect is stressed. The importance of this conception is that it allows a much greater scope for conceptualizing conflicts deriving from divisions of interest in society. Durkheim undoubtedly minimizes the significance of this form of conflict in his writings....

There are two respects in which a given objective is not "realizable." One is that there exists barriers in the society which prevents its realization (e.g. Mertonian anomie) .... But there is another sense in which an objective has no limits: the insatiable appetite (1971b:225).

Giddens is thus led to the next step in the process of breakthrough to the second schema--namely, that goals are unrealizable because of the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. Giddens then brings up the crucial possibility that anomie suicides may be ultimately generated by sociocultural factors--namely, moral and religious obligations.

He [Durkheim] fails to consider the theoretical possibility that moral obligations themselves may be "factual" elements in the horizon of the acting individual....

While Durkheim accepts that there are varying degrees of attachment to moral norms, he has no place for this in his theoretical analysis of the nature of moral obligation (1971b:226).

But, of course, I disagree with Giddens' conclusion here, for it is precisely my thesis that Durkheim did indeed suggest at many points that moral obligations were not merely "factual" elements in the horizons of individuals, but motivating ones as well. Durkheim did come to perceive egoïsme and anomie as the result, not simply of the generic absence of moral discipline, but as the result of the historical presence of a very strong type of internalized moral discipline. Certainly this is the conclusion which Max Weber's work urges upon the reader interested in the relations between Protestant norms and sanctions and the tensions which may issue at their extreme in suicide. But Giddens, perhaps more than anyone else since Parsons and
Merton thirty years earlier, should have recognized these crucial historical sociocultural linkages, and thus broken through to the second schema of suicide. Giddens, after all, is an erudite intellectual historian who wrote, among other things, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* which was specifically devoted to comparing and contrasting the social theories of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, although he cogently criticized the reigning Parsonian orthodoxy, Giddens also failed to breakthrough to the second schema. Even though he was close at many points to discovery of the inner links between these two famous paradigms, the "abductive" reorganization (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958; T. Huff, 1975) never came. We must, therefore, go beyond Giddens' helpful exegeses, and those of Lukes (1973), to an in-depth exploration and reconstruction of Durkheim's basic theses on suicide (see Books Two and Three).

We might also note that Giddens has a keen recognition that Durkheim engaged in multiple polemics against opposing cultural traditions--especially against the Anglo Utilitarians and the German Romantic-Idealists. However, Giddens' insight is incomplete here, too, for he does not sufficiently emphasize that Durkheim's prime historical opponent was--as with all French positivists--the Catholic Hierocratic Metaphysical Cultural Tradition (see Book Four). Nor does Giddens sufficiently refine or emphasize Durkheim's own deep roots and the dilemmas inherent in the Franco Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition. Most importantly here, Giddens fails to connect these deeply rooted polemics against opposing cultural traditions to Durkheim's typology of suicide.

In addition, Giddens' account is valuable because it links anomie and egoisme in the modern transitional crisis with Durkheim's structural-social morphological theses, seen in evolutionary perspective. Also, Giddens has good insight into Durkheim's notion of the emergence of "moral individualism" and the person through history (see Book One). However, these insights await reconstruction as in Books Two and Three.
E. Eugene Hynes: Suicide and Homo Duplex

Eugene Hynes's linkage of Durkheim's notion of homo duplex to his typology of suicide must be counted as one of the most important steps forward in the reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide in particular, and his thought in general. Hynes's breakthrough came because he recognized the centrality of the notion of homo duplex in all of Durkheim's thought, and moved to link it to the typology of suicide. He argues: "... the major influence on Durkheim in his formulation of the different causes and types of suicide was his conception of the nature of man and the need for authority..." (1975:88). Indeed, Hynes goes so far as to argue that "... Durkheim's suicide typology derived from his homo duplex concept" (1975:98). Incorporating Durkheim's view of man as double into the suicide typology, Hynes brings us very close to the first adequate reformulation of the Durkheim's initial schema of suicide (see Book Two of the present dissertation). After Hynes explicitly pointed out the intimate and necessary connection between homo duplex and Durkheim's suicide typology, there is no longer any excuse for this crucial factor to be ignored again in the sociological literature.

Focussing on socialization process (instead of the Social Schedules in societies at the two ends of history), Hynes seeks to answer the questions which I have repeatedly posed to the reductionists: Why did Durkheim use the two analytical dimensions of "integration" and "regulation"? Why not others? And why did he keep these dimensions distinct? (See Hynes, 1975:88). Because he includes the notion of man as double, Hynes, for the first time (see also McCloskey, 1974, 1976a) provides an adequate answer. He argues that the need for dual attachment to society and the view of man as double imply one another.

For the individual to be "socialized"... (1) the insatiable, selfish drives associated with the animal part of his nature must be repressed or checked, and (2) he must be directed to some minimal extent toward social ends, i.e. a part of his personality must be made social (1975:89).
Hynes (1975:89) graphically presents these relationships in the following manner (see figure 12):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialization of Homo Duplex</th>
<th>Quantity Involved</th>
<th>Suicidal Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Repression of drives (regulation)</td>
<td>(a) too much</td>
<td>Fatalisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) too little</td>
<td>Anomie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Direction towards social ends (integration)</td>
<td>(a) too much</td>
<td>Altruisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) too little</td>
<td>Egoisme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The major shortcoming of Hynes's valuable typology is that it neglects to include the crucial evolutionary framework of Durkheim's suicide typology. This historical dimension can be factored in, however; the historical type of society and the drives of homo duplex then become the two main classificatory criteria (see figure 13):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialization of Homo Duplex</th>
<th>Repression</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Solidarity</td>
<td>too much-- too little</td>
<td>too much-- too little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Transitional Crisis</td>
<td>Fatalisme</td>
<td>Altruisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anomie</td>
<td>Egoisme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the resulting schema reveals again how Durkheim tacitly compared and contrasted traditional types of suicide with modern ones, for there are four empty cells here—there are no possibilities suggested where there is too little social control of homo duplex in traditional society, or too much control of the organic ego in modern society.
FOOTNOTES

#1, p. 1099--I originally prepared a much longer version of the critical reviews of both Parsons and Merton's treatment of Durkheim and anomie, especially as these impacted on the development of American sociology.

#1, 1213--The studies specifically cited here by Cole and Zuckerman can be found in their appendix to the volume edited by Clinard (1964).

#1, 1216--The studies specifically cited in the present regard may be found in Cole's (1975) bibliography.
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and Harriet Zuckerman
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