ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions,
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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VOLUME I

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June 1978

An Abstract of the Thesis of

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in the Department of Sociology   to be taken   June 1978

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I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical
axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline
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tle/too much—these are the key analytical axes around which
Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved.

Resting on his image of human nature (homo duplex) as
inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns
the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-so-
cial ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema,
which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the
organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the
presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism
and drives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts
of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by
sociologists.

In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen
as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both ano-
mie and egoisme proceed from common sources; they differ in
their prime mode of expression. Anomie is active; egoisme
passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress
and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see

anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of the
will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic a-
rena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the "Anglo
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sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatia-
bility are turned inward against the self, we witness ego-
isme--the "infinity of dreams"--and the collapse of the will
and imagination in frustration and exhaustion seen in sui-
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angst and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide
becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call the
"Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition."

Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some
of our highest aspirations are then linked with Weber's work
in the sociology of religion and culture. As an "infinity of
desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural tradition,
anomie is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protes-
tant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As an "in-
finity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant contempor-
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larized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly
mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest callings
and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral anarchy"
and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world.
Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health
as the "golden mean," lead us to recognize, then, that when
our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become, iron-
ically, our special vices.

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American Journal of Sociology, May 1976.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the ladies in my life:

Agnes, my mother,

Marsha, my wife,

Amanda, my daughter.

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"Man is neither angel nor beast, and
it is unfortunately the case that anyone
trying to act the angel acts the beast."
                            (Pascal)

INTRODUCTION

Few have perceived that Durkheim entertained two distinct schemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic Suicide. I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions. Absence/presence, too little/too much--these are the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved.

Resting on his doctrine of human nature (homo duplex) as inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-social ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema, which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism and drives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by sociologists.

In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both anomie and egoisme proceed here from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression. Anomie is active; egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the "Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate in-

satiability are turned inward against the self, we witness
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callings and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral
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world. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and
health as the "golden mean," lead us to recognize, then, that
when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become,
ironically, our special vices.

I first heard of Emile Durkheim and anomie as an un-
dergraduate sociology major. But it was not until graduate
school that, among my readings into Marx, Weber, Durkheim
and others, I first encountered Suicide. Having rejected the
positivist scientific ethos, reading Durkheim was, at first,
an unpleasant experience. As with many others, all I could
see at first were pages and pages of statistics, strident
positivist declarations, extreme sociologism, hypostatizing
social realism, a conservative world-view, and so on; after
all, to Durkheim wasn't society all and the individual noth-
ing? Besides, the very presentation of the book itself repel-
led me: the cover was blood red, I was interested in neither
despair nor suicide, Simpson's psychoanalytically-oriented

preface set me off, the table of contents was relegated to
the back of the book, and so on! I was ready to believe the
worst I had heard about Durkheim. Little did I then know
that I would come to dwell in this book and this man's mind
for the next seven years!

During several rereadings, an interesting shift in my
perception of Suicide and Durkheim began to emerge. The sta-
tistics seemed to fade from view, and Durkheim's moral philo-
sophy came into focus. It seemed as if, in 1969, I had dis-
covered something different, almost a different Suicide than
commonly reported, a book within a book. Especially compel-
ling to me was Durkheim's anatomy of the "moral anarchy" of
the modern world--the destructive "diseases of the infinite,"
ending in ecocide or suicide, which I saw all about me. Here,
then, Durkheim offered profound insights in my search for the
origin and ground of many of the negative aspects of the mod-
ern world. At the time, I hardly suspected that my search for
a fundamental, non-Marxian or Freudian, critique of the mod-
ern world would lead me deep into Durkheim; nor did I antici-
pate that my attempts to tell others of the potential signi-
ficance of my discovery would necessarily involve a long
struggle to free myself and others of deeply rooted stereo-
types of Durkheim, a struggle that would remake me in the
process. And, although I had earlier liked Weber much more
than Durkheim, the experience of coming to have two polestars
stimulated effort to bring their work together, especially
their profound and ironic anatomies of the modern world--
Suicide and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism.

With these two classics as guides, in about 1971 I em-
barked upon an arduous journey on two parallel paths--inten-
sive reading of Durkheim's other works, major and minor, on
the one hand, and on the other intensive search through the
secondary literature on Durkheim and anomie. I sought there
several insights: a new way of conceptualizing Durkheim's
notions of anomie and egoisme, indeed, of reconstructing his

whole typology of suicide, and more generally, to attempt to
grasp the foundational or "nuclear structure" which informed
all of Durkheim's life-work. In this task I was fortunate to
begin my systematic reflection during a great renaissance of
of interest in Durkheim; almost weekly new books and articles
poured forth from the presses. Durkheim was "in the air"
everywhere it seemed; such convergence of interest was exhil-
irating for this scholarly apprentice.

And, while learning much from Parsons' and other stan-
dard accounts stemming from the first great revival of inter-
est in Durkheim during the 1930's, I found, to my dismay,
that many did not recognize what I thought to be a signifi-
cant discovery; moreover, my own incorporation through "osmos-
is" of certain premises rooted in the secondary literature
was actually leading me astray. For I was, like so many oth-
ers, simply taking over unfounded images from the secondary
literature at the same time as I was struggling to interpret
Durkheim directly. Hence, reliance on questionable secondary
accounts in my first faltering attempts to conceptualize
Durkheim's schema of suicide faced me with the difficult task
of learning to unlearn popular stereotypes.

In my struggle to free myself from two pervasive secon-
dary accounts--Merton's version of anomie and Parsons' ver-
sion of Durkheim--I found help in many places, especially in
the works of two contemporary British sociologists, Anthony
Giddens and Steven Lukes. With their assistance I began to
move toward more faithful exegesis, and, thus, to begin to
reconstruct not only Durkheim's suicide typology, but also
the paradigmatic structure informing all his work. While my
conceptual breakthrough in 1972 to the present formulation
of Durkheim's two schemas of suicide was largely independent,
I gratefully acknowledge that I learned invaluable lessons
from these and other insightful observers.

However, I soon discovered that as I tried to relate
my discovery to others, many sociologists held stubbornly
to certain established stereotypes. For example, when I men-

tioned Durkheim, they thought of Parsons' famous account in
The Structure of Social Action, and when I spoke of anomie,
it was Merton's essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which
seemed automatically to come to mind. While remaining valua-
ble in a number of ways, these accounts had become like bar-
nacles clinging to the past; they had become, unfortunately,
obstacles to deeper insight and scientific progress. I had,
therefore, to dislodge these and other obstacles from my
path.

In truth, our dilemma went deeper. For I discovered
that anomie had become a protean concept. As with so many
other paradigmatic notions, like alienation or "The Protes-
tant Ethos," anomie had come to mean so many different things
to so many different people that it had lost specific meaning.
Then I realized that the transformation of Durkheim's con-
cepts into amorphous, protean notions capable of meaning al-
most anything was an instance of a wider, typical process.
Somehow, as if by some iron law, we manage to forget (eg.
Maine's Ancient Law), or distort (eg. Weber's Protestant
Ethic... and Durkheim's Suicide) many of the very paradigms
which constitute our basic intellectual capital (see also
Glock and Hammond, 1973:409). Indeed, I fear that the pro-
found works of our founding fathers--whose charisma we are
so quick to cash in on--are more often cited than read, more
often absorbed through secondary or even textbookish ac-
counts than wrestled with in the original, more often read
fragmentarily than in the context of the pioneer's life-
work and life-context, and more often simply misconstrued,
usurped, or selectively altered than understood or legiti-
mately extended (see McCloskey, 1974). Indeed, in the ser-
ies of interpretations which come to constitute any tradi-
tion, there is the same sort of drift and displacement of
goals and meanings which characterize the typical life-his-
tory of any institution. Inevitably, a hidden law of cul-
tural entropy seems at work, for later generations stray

from the full meaning and intention of the original break-
through. Without undue irony, might we not call this sadly
inevitable sociocultural process the "routinization of
charisma-on-deposit"?

Hence, the necessity of periodic renewals or renais-
sances are built into this on-going process, which affects
sociology as well as society-at-large. Specifically, I
found that Durkheim's sociological charisma, stemming from
Suicide and other works, had become routinized, distorted,
emptied of meaning, on the one hand, and on the other his
doctrine and anomie in particular were beset by conflicting
interpretations. Thus, I came to find myself in the peculiar
position of one who, having started by rejecting Durkheim
and much of the sociological tradition, came to return to
this tradition in order to recover lost meanings. And, of
course, the reappropriation of meaning is a continuous pro-
cess.

Faced with a paradigm in crisis, and the need to re-
turn to the source of the tradition, what specific strategy
could I evolve for recovering lost meanings and reconciling
conflicting interpretations? I was like a miner of a vein
of gold who had been granted a share in a vast common land-
claim. Here, one was faced with a welter of conflicting
claims; further, some refined ore proved to be valuable,
yet there was much dross and pilings to be cleared away.
In this way I took up mining full-time, and this mining was
systematic exegesis; like mining raw ore, it was the hard-
est work I've ever done.

I began to sink shafts both vertically and horizon-
tally into some of the richest deposits. My strategy, then,
was this: to perform, first, a systematic exegesis of the
basic strata underlying all of Durkheim's work, and then
perform a systematic exegeis of Durkheim's sociology of
suicide. Exegesis, then, involved, first, an in-depth
"stratigraphy," and then a systematic "topography." Accord-
ingly, my strategy is to systematically compare and contrast

an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's foundational
paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" informing all his work
with a systematic exegesis of his special sociology of sui-
cide. Hence, this dissertation will alternate between Durk-
heim's general sociology (the "nuclear structure" of his
work, see Book One), and his specific sociology of suicide
(see Book Two). Further, in the first part of Book Three,
we shall review shifts in Durkheim's basic premises, and then
bring these two movements of thought together in Part II of
Book Three by reconstructing Durkheim's schema of suicide.

My intention here is to provide the systematic, de-
tailed, comprehensive documentation needed to reach a clear-
er understanding of Durkheim's work, and to enable us to re-
solve conflicting claims about the significance of his work.
My hope has been to write the definitive work on Durkheim's
schemas of anomic and egoismic suicide. Patient, systematic
exegesis, then, is the main reason for the extraordinary
length and denseness of this dissertation; in a real sense,
Durkheim himself directed this effort. Further, since dis-
sertations, being self-financed, are free from the normal
pressures of publishing, I realized that only in this format
could I hope to provide full documentation for my claims.
The demise of monographs and the tyranny of the ten-page
article led me to seize upon this unique opportunity for
painstaking scholarship.

At the same time, the length of this dissertation is
also a function of the difficulty of the task facing us.
For the real scholarly burden was bequeathed us by Durkheim
himself--for it was he who left us vast tracts of material,
some of which remain largely unexplored territory to this
day, while other parts remain largely misunderstood. We do
not yet know Durkheim well enough; far too often our claims
on his work (eg. concerning anomie) are unjustified; more-
over, we need a way of resolving conflicting claims and re-
covering lost meanings.

One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those who might wish to systematically review the evidence and enter the debate in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of science--the special method by which we rise above the divisiveness of partisan rhetoric and endemic conflict to the unities of dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigorous standards of logic and evidence can we hope to successfully resolve the cacophany of competing claims or refutations (eg. see Appendix). Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963), the growth of science is fundamentally structured in terms of claims and refutations, ascending through ever-more rigorous agreed-upon rules or canons for resolving conflict. Without such norms, the ascent of science is impossible. The very cumulative nature of science itself, in contrast to other cultural forms, lies precisely in these mutually agreed-upon norms--namely, that all parties to the debate agree on constantly "raising the ante" to ever-higher levels of precision and comprehensiveness of evidence and logical principle.

In this spirit, I suggest several cautions at the outset. The following conventional errors in interpreting Durkheim's typology of suicide simply will no longer do; they should be set aside once and for all. Anomie cannot simply be equated with "normlessness" (whatever that means, precisely), nor with structural-cultural "malintegration," nor with "strain in the relational system of society," nor with "alienation" or a feeling of lostness, generalized despair, or a host of other negative "states of mind." Anomie cannot be simply collapsed into such broad categories as "social disorganization," "lack of structural integration," or even "lack of social participation." (On all this, see Appendix).

In addition, egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered virtuous, ala Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot justifiably be collapsed into one category, nor can anomie and egoisme be

accurately located as two extremes on two continuums of in-
tegration--structural and normative. Nor can altruisme and
fatalisme be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical
referents.

Such partial accounts mislead because they slight
both Durkheim's doctrine of human nature as homo duplex,
and his image of historical development. In all these ver-
sions, Durkheim's image of man as homo duplex--portraying
the source of insatiable and egoistic passions as the organ-
ic ego, and his critical assessment of the broad, world-
historical processes transforming the basic relations be-
tween society, culture, and person--simply drop from view.
In short, no transforming historical process, and no egoism
and insatiability, no anomie or egoisme!

General criteria for more adequate reinterpretation
of Durkheim's underlying schema of suicide include the fol-
lowing:

   (1) Specify the source of egoism and insatiability--
       what are the origins of these destructive forces?
       Further, Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex
       --presuming the inherent egoism and insatiability
       of the pre-social ego--should be critically review-
       ed;

   (2) Durkheim's evolutionary framework--reconstructed
       typologies should be based upon his social evolu-
       tionary framework, not abstracted or formalistic
       schemas. Specifically, new typologies should con-
       tain comparisons of the dominant "ideal types" of
       morality, and the types of suicide associated with
       them, at the two ends of history.

   (3) All four types--successful reconstructions should
       attempt to resolve the current impasse of "reduc-
       tions" and "rescues" (see Part II, appendix) by
       simultaneously inter-relating the four types, yet
       maintaining their distinctness. In other words, a
       new typology should reveal both a fundamental unity
       and an empirical-historical diversity; in short,
       the four types must be distinct, yet related.

   (4) Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust--new typol-
       ogies should include Durkheim's critical or polem-
       ical thrust. Specifically, any adequate recon-
       struction should be rooted in his polemic against
       opposing cultural traditions dominant in the modern
       world.

When beset by disorder, negation, breakdown, loss, we seek enlightenment as to their source and meaning. Our fundamental explanations of how things come to fall apart-- in short, of how evil and suffering come to reign--once were called "theodicies," a term I wish to retrieve for this dissertation. What, then, was Durkheim's basic theodicy?

The problem of locating the source of egoism and insatiability--le mal l'infini--is central to Durkheim's schemas of suicide. In his first schema, Durkheim grounded egoistic individualism and insatiable desires in the pre-social half of human nature--the organic ego. Indeed, this doctrine of the dualism of human nature (homo duplex)--the generic opposition between ego and person, between sensual appetites and moral rules, between percepts and concepts--lies at the very heart of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology of religion and morality, and his sociology of knowledge.

However, I propose that Durkheim's early image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was a mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, historically, and culturally (see Part I, Book Three). Indeed, Durkheim himself later shifted away from the "anomic" ego to the "alogic" ego; thus, instead of assigning the presence of self-destructive desires to the generic ego, Durkheim came to merely impute to it the inherent absence of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts. Moreover, as we shall discover in Book Two, at various points Durkheim also suggested that egoism and insatiability derive as much from the presence of modern cultural sanctions as from the absence of traditional moral controls over the pre-social ego in the modern world. This reversal of the presence/absence polarity is crucial to reformulation of the first schema of suicide.

Which theodicy, then, shall we pursue? Shall we accept the notion, as I have done, that anchors our vices in deformed virtues? Or shall we, as Durkheim's first schema

does, anchor our vices primarily in the organic ego? In this case, shall we then implicitly accept the underlying release/control continuum (eg. see P. Rieff, 1966)? Shall we then also accept the telling of history as either the growth or recession of repressive moral controls over the ego? If so, shall we then take up our stand in terms of the resulting symbolic alignments--namely, advocating release of the natural harmonies of the ego means liberal, while control becomes conservative and archaic? As for myself, since I am inclined neither to demonize nor apotheosize the organic ego, I cannot stand on either the liberal or the conservative end of this traditional continuum.

Rather, I shall follow Durkheim's occasional insight that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue." I propose, therefore, that it is, fundamentally, not our lapse from rules--not our lowest animal instincts--which leads us into trouble; it is not the lowest in us but the highest in us which leads to our own undoing. Perhaps my own conscientiousness in following out all the twists and turns in Durkheim's changing schemas might serve as a case in point. The structure of my argument, then, like Weber's in The Protestant Ethic... is i-ronic. My essential theodicy is that our virtues, when pushed to extreme, metamorphose or invert themselves and become our leading vices. In one sense, then, this dissertation may be read as a systematic search through Durkheim's work for evidence of a largely unnoticed but powerful break away from the release/control tradition of thought to a fully socio-cultural position, and a profoundly dialectical, ironic, or dramatic insight into the structure of human action based on another, older tradition of the "golden mean."

For the ultimate key to anomie and egoisme lies not, as in the first schema, in the release of the inherently insatiable appetites of the organic ego in the modern transitional crisis. Rather, it is found, as Parsons, Bellah, and others have repeatedly observed, not in the recession

of medieval systems of moral control but rather in the internalization of new and different systems of moral authority in the Protestant Era. Hence, the modern crisis, represented by egoisme and anomie, is not so much the result of the release of the floods of passion inherent in the organic ego as the ironic or unanticipated consequences of the deformation of extreme systems of moral control.

Let me briefly explain the logical structure of the two schemas presented here.

Now, a systematic search through the vast literature on anomie (see Appendix) reveals many different ways of schematically arranging Durkheim's typology of suicide. However, each schema rests on reinterpretation of one of several of Durkheim's underlying premises. Since I shall systematically criticize each of the major reconstructed typologies (see Appendix), let me first indicate the underlying logical structure of the two schemas of suicide which anchor and inform this dissertation.

Perhaps the simplest articulation of Durkheim's first typology is the following schema:

Figure 1.   Contemporary Crisis/Mechanical Solidarity

Suicidal
  Type   egoisme   /   altruisme
                          anomie   /   fatalisme

Although a heuristic point of departure for us as well as for Durkheim, such a schema is evidently incomplete. One wishes to know, for example, what are the mediating causes of suicide and of our crisis? Hence, one is forced to introduce several other analytical dimensions. I have not followed the usual procedure of distinguishing between integration and regulation, as I believe this distinction to be misleading by itself without the underlying image of man as homo duplex.

Now, I have arranged my schemas in a different format

than commonly utilized; I feel no compulsion to utilize a
simple four-fold table, for instance. Rather, I prefer to
attempt to precisely distinguish the multiple mediations and
sub-categories in several dimensions. Thus, the overall
structure of the schemas is a series of descending polar
axes which overlap, and through several mediations, generate
the four suicidal types. In one sense, then, the hermeneuti-
cal task is, through systematic exegesis, to infer back from
the four types to their underlying logical structure (a pro-
cedure which Durkheim himself said he used in Suicide).
Hence, we shall outline a series of compounding polarities
until we reach the four suicidal types.

For example, in Durkheim's first schema the first and
most basic axis is Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex paired
with sociocultural evolution. Thus, as graphically presented
in Figure 2, Axis Ia represents the generic desires of the
organic ego on the vertical dimension coupled with sociocul-
tural evolution on the horizontal dimension. In turn, the
second Axis subdivides into two more sets of polar categor-
ies--namely, Axis IIa represents Control or Release of the
generic desires of the organic ego, while Axis IIb splits
into Mechanical Solidarity and the Contemporary Transitional
Crisis as the two poles on the continuum of sociocultural
evolution. At the same level, the Future represents a new
kind of organic solidarity reached through the national en-
franchisement of corporations (see Part II, Book Two), which
results in harmony restored through the "golden mean;" it
represents the cessation or overcoming of anomic and egois-
tic passions. A third, and final, mediating level is added
under Control and Release--namely, active/passive orienta-
tions, which may be mirrored on the corresponding horizontal
dimension by collective versus self, or outside versus in-
side, orientations.

To sum up, we arrive at altruisme when the generic
desires of the organic ego in mechanical solidarity are
controlled and redirected in an active, collective manner;

fatalisme in a passive, inward turning manner. Further, in the first schema, _anomie_ occurs when the generic desires of the organic ego are released in the modern transitional crisis; _egoisme_ is the same situation except that it is expressed in a passive, introverted manner. The other two possible categories are, of course, historically null.

In the same manner, in my reconstruction of Durkheim's second schema of suicide, the first and most basic axis combines the generic power of cultural sanctions with sociocultural evolution. On the second axis, IIa represents Mechanical Solidarity (traditional societies), while IIb represents the Modern Transitional Crisis (pre-Organic Solidarity). Axis IIIa represents the common cultural content of Mechanical Solidarity--namely, Absolutizing Collectivism and the Traditional Social Schedule of Satisfaction, which, when expressed in active and passive forms, generates, finally, _altruisme_ and _fatalisme_, respectively. Correspondingly, Axis IIb --the Modern Transitional Crisis--is followed by Axis IIIb where the common cultural content of the modern era--Absolutizing Individualism and Legitimized Insatiability--is mediated successively through different cultural traditions reaching different suicidal expressions in _anomie_ and _egoisme_ (see Figure 3.)

Figure 2. Durkheim's First Schema

Axis Ia. <u>Homo</u> <u>Duplex</u>
(generic desires of
organic ego)

Axis IIa.

<u>Control   Release</u>
Axis IIIa.
Active/Passive   Active/Passive

Axis IIb.

Mechanical   *Altruisme/Fatalisme*
Solidarity

Axis Ib.

<u>Sociocultural</u>
<u>Evolution</u>

Contemporary   *Anomie/Egoisme*
Transitional
Crisis

The Future:

Organic
Solidarity   *"The Golden Mean"*
via
Corporations

Figure 3. Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions

Axis I: The Generic Power of Cultural Sanctions (a) in Sociocultural Evolution (b)

Axis IIa: Mechanical Solidarity (Traditional Societies)

Axis IIIa:

  a. Common Cultural
     Content

  b. Different Modes
     of Expression

Axis IVa: Dominant
     Suicidal Types

Absolutizing Collectivism and
The Traditional Social Schedule of Satisfaction

Active   Passive

Altruisme   Fatalisme

Axis IIb: The Modern Transitional Crisis

Axis IIIb:

  a. Common Cultural
     Content

  b. Different Cultural
     Traditions

  c. Different Modes
     of Expression

Axis IVb: Dominant
     Suicidal Types

Absolutizing Individualism and
Legitimized Insatiability

Anglo Cultural Tradition   Romantic Cultural Tradition

Active, External   Passive, Internal
"The Infinity of Desires"   "The Infinity of Dreams"

Anomie   Egoisme

Axis IIc: The Future: Organic Solidarity via Cultural Shifts

The "Golden Mean"

--xxxvi--

How shall we explain the origins of, and continuing sanctions for, anomie and egoisme in the modern world? It was this haunting question which first drove me to attempt to anchor these modern forms of suicide in these series of mediating contexts; for I was dissatisfied with other's schemas and my own first formulations. Indeed, my attempts to anchor anomie and egoisme in better explanatory contexts went through at least three distinct stages.

Once having recognized that anomie and egoisme were culturally sanctioned, and having seen absolute individualism and insatiability as keys to these types, I first began to try to anchor anomie and egoisme in the modern world conceived as a unitary period. This is a common procedure: to portray the structure of the modern world as radically different from preceding eras, and to couch these differences in terms of such basic shifts as those from community to society, the attenuation of the social bond, and the resulting atomism, pluralism, market capitalism, rationalistic science, destructive technology, and so forth.

However, while true to a certain extent, all of these revolutionary shifts failed to truly illuminate, for by anchoring change in a unitary period, it seemed all one need do was to locate the crucial shifts in time, and once one entered the door, all changed. Such an explanation was too global, it lacked specificity. Further, it was not really sociocultural, for it was hard to locate groups-in-process, to determine their shifting rhetorical claims and counter-claims. And, besides, it was too close to Durkheim's first schema, since these shifts were primarily viewed as negative devolutions.

A second approach which emerged out of my dissatisfaction with the period approach was to pursue specific themes over time. Thus, I came to pose the basic problem in terms of the sociocultural origins, development, and impact of: (a) Individualism, nominalism, atomism, etc., and (b) Ideas of progress, time, future orientations, etc., and

(c) Drives toward perfection, infinite striving toward the
ideal, and so on. The notion here was to try to compare and
contrast these ideas with the second schema of anomie and
egoisme, and then attempt to trace the historical genealo-
gies connecting earlier notions to modern ideas and moral
sanctions. I began to canvass Western history and, then, in-
deed, all of human history for similar notions of, and sanc-
tions for, individualism and drives for progress and perfec-
tion. While it was fascinating reading many great thinkers,
this tracing of different notions of the Self and the mean-
ing of the Individual, and of time, infinity, drives for
progress and perfection, and so on, soon confused rather
than clarified the issue; the specific outlines of my own
project began to fade. The limitation of all such thematic
or history of ideas approaches then became evident--they
simply lacked sufficient sociocultural anchors. While better
than the simple unitary approach in that one pursued speci-
fic themes across time periods, nonetheless, this interpre-
tive perspective suffered from a certain disembodied, ab-
stracted character. Were these real traditions, for in-
stance, or merely "streams" of thought in which people in-
dependently assumed similar positions, without dialogue or
reference? Were these traditions merely verbal construc-
tions of the investigator? And, most importantly, were these
ideas or streams of morality and thought related to the ac-
tual rhetorical contexts, the lived frames of reference,
the actual "logics-in-use" of different groups at different
times?

Thereafter, an interesting dialectic emerged. On the
one hand, my drive to anchor anomie and egoisme in their
generative contexts led me to seek a new level of cultural
and historical specificity--namely, cultural traditions.
Because it combines the notion of culture as a symbolic
meaning and directive system of a group and the notion of
tradition and historical process, the synthetic interpre-
tive perspective of cultural traditions reaches both the

necessary level of cultural-historical specificity and of-
fers a new and generalizable perspective for the human sci-
ences.

Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is
the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, devel-
opment, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing indivi-
dualism and legitimized insatiabilities in the modern world,
we look to the interface between religion and culture. Here
we ask: what are the prime terms of translation between mod-
ern religions and contemporary culture and psyche, especial-
ly anomie and egoisme? Thus, we shall explore whether, and
to what extent, various ethical sanctions coming from Pro-
testantism have become sedimented at the heart of modern
structures of conscience and consciousness?

Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One we
shall link the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism
with two contemporary cultural traditions. In Book Two, we
shall explore the problematic relations between Protestant-
ism and suicide. In Book Three we shall connect anomie and
egoisme as absolutized forms of individualism and legitimi-
zed insatiabilities to two dominant modern cultural tradi-
tions. Thus, having argued that Durkheim's four types of
suicide must be addressed in historical terms, we cannot
leave the foundations of anomie and egoisme floating in his-
torical space. How, then, did it come to be that anomie and
egoisme were (are) culturally sanctioned? What are the mor-
al, spiritual, and intellectual foundations of the Utilitar-
ian Ethos and the Romantic Ethos?

Having linked anomie and egoisme in the second schema
to modern cultural traditions, at the very end of this dis-
sertation we shall briefly move to link modern cultural
traditions, in turn, to religions--to two versions of the
Protestant Ethos; that is, anomie to the secularization of
Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheran-
ism. In short, we shall finally propose the following es-
sential cultural-historical linkages. As the active extern-

alization of absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability, anomie is connected with the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Calvinistic Ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original and continuing source. Further, as the "infinity of dreams" seen, for instance, in the modern artists' anguished "journey into the interior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition as its prime carrier, and, then, ultimately, with the Lutheran's and spiritual radicals' ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its original and continuing source.

Finally, it may be of interest to note the significance of one other shift which the modern cultural sanctioning of anomie and egoisme necessitates in Durkheim's processual image of breakdown and breakthrough. Now, clearly in the first schema (see Book Two), Durkheim conceived suicide as a process involving, first, the breakdown of traditional social control, and second, the breakthrough of the directionless and proportionless passions of the pre-social ego. Even here the structural factor which most sociologists have taken as the decisive element of a sociological explanation of suicide--namely, the breakdown of social integration or regulation--was <u>not</u> considered by Durkheim himself to be the critical factor. Rather, social breakdown acted merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of the insatiable and self-centered passions of the organic ego. Hence, in his first schema, Durkheim's central concern was not so much the breakdown of norms as with the <u>breakthrough</u> of an "infinity of dreams and desires." The weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acted here merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of this egocentric insatiability. In sum, in the first schema Durkheim posited a two-step process, in which the <u>breakdown</u> of moral control preceded a <u>breakthrough</u> or release of the insatiable desires of the organic ego.

However, in the second schema, the sequence of this

two-step process is reversed. Because "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," and, therefore, because of the cultural sanctioning of absolute individualism and the "longing for infinity" in the modern world, we shall posit, first, a breakthrough in the dominant systems of morality, and then a breakdown of those structures. For example, first we see appearing the Weberian notion of the "New Model Man," the "visible saints" of ascetic and mystical Protestantism breaking forth from the medieval cloister to master self, society, and world for God's greater glory. Indeed, it was this unprecedented, massive, and sustained breakthrough to "inner-light," "inner-worldly mysticisms and asceticisms" which produced the modern moral cosmos. Only after the secularization of these new moral sanctions do we encounter, as an unanticipated and extreme consequence, Durkheim's isolated and seemingly "amoral action" on a large scale in anomie and egoisme. Hence, the theodicy underlying Durkheim's first schema is limited only to the latter, derivative process. Thus, the shift in the absence/presence polarity in locating egoism and insatiability implies, correspondingly, a reversal in the two-step process causing anomie and egoisme. Specifically, since the moral positions underlying anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned, in the second schema we posit, first, a moral breakthrough and then, second, a breakdown or deformation of this new system of moral direction. In sum, absence/presence, breakdown/breakthrough--it is Durkheim's double shift on these key rhetorical axes which constitutes the inner tension of this dissertation.

Before we begin, it is important to point out what lies beyond the scope of even this massive dissertation. Despite their evident interest, the reader will not find the following topics addressed here:

(a) an exploration of the roots, especially the Greek classical roots, of Durkheim's notion of anomie, nor of the classical-Christian notion of limits, of human finitude, of gradation and balance, or of the "golden mean" (but see for the latter H. Hadyn, 1950).

(b) a review of all of Durkheim's work, a summary of all his major books, for instance, or even an in-depth treatment of his whole methodological and substantive doctrine; it must be emphasized that even in Book One I shall treat only of those central parts of Durkheim's substantive doctrine that relate to the schemas of suicide;

(c) detailed tracing of all the intellectual or cultural influences on Durkheim's work or life; this is far too complex a problem to be addressed here (but see Lukes, 1973);

(d) detailed investigation of the phenomenon of suicide per se, nor background on suicide studies, nor concern with the tradition of moral statistics;

(e) systematic explorations of the psychodynamics of anomie and egoisme;

(f) systematic histories of the development of the modern cultural traditions sanctioning anomie and egoisme.

Further, the reader is alerted to the following distinctions. When I use the word egoism, I shall refer to the organic ego, but when it use the term egoisme I shall refer to Durkheim's suicidal type. Moreover, to recall their distinctive connotations, I have retained the French expressions to refer to Durkheim's four suicidal types--namely, altruisme and fatalisme, anomie and egoisme.

In addition, the reader is alerted to the following conventions adopted here. Asterisks at the end of a quote mean that I have added underlining to emphasize significant parts of a passage.

Moreover, to simplify citation, the following abbreviations of the titles of Durkheim's major works shall be adopted: S for <u>Suicide</u>, DL for <u>The Division of Labor in Society</u>, EF for <u>The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life</u>, R for <u>The Rules of Sociological Method</u>, ME for <u>Moral Education</u>, PC for <u>Primitive Classification</u>, SP for <u>Sociology and Philosophy</u>, PECM for <u>Professional Ethics and Civic Morals</u>, Soc for <u>Socialism</u>, PE for "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," and DHN for "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions." Other articles and notes by Durkheim are indicated by year of publication, and may be found entered in this format under the appropriate bibliography entry. Footnotes are recorded in terms of their sequence on each page (eg. #2, page 200), and will be found at the end of each book.

Finally, a few words of appreciation for those who helped me on my way. First, the kindness of my departmental chair at Seattle University, Father James G. Goodwin, S.J., and the small grant to help defray the costs of reproducing this manuscript are greatly appreciated. In addition, I should like to acknowledge the support and guidance offered by three of my late teachers and friends. From Benjamin Nelson I first learned to appreciate the full power and significance of Weber's and Durkheim's life-work; also I found in Nelson's own work a learned and compelling example of an in-depth interpretation of the evolution of Western society, culture, and psyche. After I had begun my research into Durkheim, I was grateful for the warm support and mature guidance extended to this neophyte Durkheimian by two old masters--Harry Alpert and Jack Foskett. Even though they shall not be here to see this task completed, their help and trust was invaluable. I also wish to thank the other members of my committee, Dick Hill and Stan Pierson from History, for their support and helpful suggestions.

In my dissertation director, Ben Johnson, I was fortunate to find a good and wise man, blessed with insight,

tact, fine editorial sense, and displaying unflagging person-
al support and confidence in me. He is one of three people
without whom I could never have begun, much less finished,
such an arduous task.

Finally, I wish to thank my mother, who provided not
only room to work and helped purchase an IBM typewriter so
that I could type this oversize dissertation myself, but also
offered encouragement in every way possible, as did my wife,
who provided invaluable aid by proofreading the entire manu-
script, helping support our family, and putting up with my
"burden." Their creative fidelity truly makes this work "our"
achievement.

New York
Eugene
Berkeley
Seattle, 1970-1978   David D. McCloskey

BOOK ONE

THE "NUCLEAR STRUCTURE" OF DURKHEIM'S WORK

"Si vous voulez mûrir votre pensée, attachez-vous
à l'étude scrupuleuse d'un grand maitre; démontez
système dans ses rouages les plus secrets."

(Emile Durkheim)

Synopsis. We shall explore the foundational or "nuclear
structure" informing all of Durkheim's substantive work in
two phases. In the first section, we shall focus on his key
generic premises, while in the second section we shall fo-
cus on his key genetic-evolutionary premises. Our explora-
tion will be sequential in that each succeeding chapter will
amplify the central thrust of the preceding one. Hence, we
shall progressively develop the generic sociocultural foun-
dation and the evolutionary trajectory informing all of
Durkheim's work, especially as these relate to his schemas
of suicide.

In Part I, we shall first briefly explore Durkheim's
penchant for addressing problems in terms of polarities,
and his attempts to overcome such dichotomies through the
dialectical mediums of sociocultural process and evolution-
ary progress. In Chapter Two, we shall unfold the basic di-
chotomy informing Durkheim's sociologies of morality, know-
ledge and religion--namely, homo duplex. Here Durkheim op-
posed the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego
to the moral rules and intellectual concepts coming from
society. Thus, Durkheim identified the moral and logical
with the social. However, not only shall we offer a few pre-
liminary criticisms of Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo
duplex (amplified in Part I, Book Three), but we also note

that Durkheim later shifted from the anomic to the alogic
ego. This shift opens the way for the move from schema number
one to schema number two--that is, the ego can then no longer
be considered the negative source of the destructive "infini-
ty of dreams and desires" seen in anomie and egoisme.

In Chapter Three we shall explore the most important
half of Durkheim's homo duplex dichotomy--the sociocultural
construction of the person in terms of structures of con-
cience and consciousness. In Durkheim's basic sociocultural
theory, the logics of moral decision and the moralities of
intellectual judgment are always and everywhere intertwined.

Next, we shall explore in detail how Durkheim specifi-
cally anchored the emerging relations between structures of
conscience and consciousness by linking them to the fundamen-
tal structure and process of collectivities. Thus, in Chap-
ter Four, we shall explore Durkheim's causal model which al-
ways anchored social facts in social processes. Here Durk-
heim posited a two-story causal model in which superstructur-
al collectively representational (symbolic) processes were
intimately linked with substructural social morphological
processes. The prime link between the "material lower-story"
and the "ideal upper-story" was "moral or dynamic density."
Our attention here shall be directed primarily toward the
collectively representational level, because in his later
work Durkheim's thought moved increasingly toward symbolic
processes and the autonomization of collective representa-
tions.

Some key sequential linkages by which collective sym-
bols emerge out of social morphological process include:

    (1) Social morphological implosions moralize organic
        egos in creating societies and persons;

    (2) Cultural implosions thereby lift man above the con-
        fines of the organic ego; social energies lift us
        into the realm of freedom, of moral rules and in-
        tellectual concepts;

    (3) Symbols act as visible, public collective represen-
        tations of group self-consciousness. Due to the mor-
        al intensities which created them, some symbols be-

come "sacralized"--invested with obligatory respect and desirability;

(4) Because moral intensities inevitably fade and "sacred symbols" become depreciated, periodic renewals are necessary to reaffirm the social bond and to revitalize the structures of conscience and consciousness;

(5) The marked contrast between these two alternating phases of sociocultural life creates the opposition between the "sacred" and the "profane." These basic oppositions create tension in the sociocultural and phenomenological fields, and life becomes progressively energized and organized by these two poles;

(6) Inevitably the organizing tension between sacred and profane is extended to all spheres of reality and levels of experience. The world is cosmicized through a compounding series of symbolic equations. Phenomenological analogies serve as bridges transforming empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity;

(7) Tension is resolved, and the powers of imagination and will reorganized and released, through a crucial transformation of the oppositions into a new and higher synthetic unity. Thus, sociocultural process in its symbolic dimension has an inherently dialectical or dramatic structure.

In Part II, we shall explore four key facets of Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary theory. It is important, however, to first understand how it was that Durkheim's causal model led him to always return to the simplest case, the clearest example of necessary connection between the "material" and "ideal" halves of society. For in fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and development of human society and culture, Durkheim sought to discover a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, for a crucial experiment in which there would be a one-to-one correspondence between symbolic forms and social forms, between the social morphological substratum and the social physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collective symbols are deeply fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durkheim believed he had discovered the "monocellular" form of sociocultural life, the template, from which all complex sociocultural forms evolved. As Lukes observes,

Durkheim held it as axiomatic that there is an identity be-
tween sociocultural simplicity and evolutionary priority.
Hence, only in terms of the most "elementary" forms did Durk-
heim believe that he could surely discover generic socio-
cultural processes directly and unmistakably fused with gen-
etic-evolutionary processes.

In Chapter Five, then, we shall explore Durkheim's
guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of social life. For
all of his work was grounded in this genetic and evolution-
ary framework. The trunk of the tree corresponds to the in-
variant conditions of social and cultural life, while the
branches represent different types of societies. Durkheim's
metaphor thus combined both evolutionary continuity (the
roots and the trunk) and discontinuity and diversity (the
branches and fruits).

In Chapter Six we shall explore Durkheim's seminal no-
tion that the primitive sacral complex served as the prime
evolutionary womb of society and culture. Elementary cultural
forms are: (a) socio-centric, and (b) governed by sacro-magi-
cal rationales and ritual etiquettes. Thus, the first founda-
tions of legitimate moral and intellectual authority are
grounded in the group and its religion; in the beginning,
they are all fused together. The double historical signifi-
cance of the primitive sacral complex is that it both served
as the creative womb of human culture and as an obstacle to
progressive cultural evolution. Thus, the transition from
simple, sacral societies to complex, secular societies forms
the mainline of Durkheim's evolutionary concerns.

In Chapter Seven, we shall explore Durkheim's neglect-
ed sociology of civilizational process. For as societies e-
volve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. The
close parallel on the macro-evolutionary level between social
morphological differentiation and symbolic differentiation
implies the transition from concrete to abstract symbolism,
from parochial or tribal to universal representations, from
the fused embeddedness of symbols in the primitive sacral

complex to the differentiated autonomy of symbols, institu-
tional spheres, and persons. The inner key to the progres-
sive evolution of societies and their symbolic guidance sys-
tems is the link between widening structures of fraterniza-
tion and rationalization in the grounds of moral and intel-
lectual discourse. In sum, civilizations emerge through the
progressive extension of social bonds which, in turn, require
universalizable symbolic forms.

Finally, in Chapter Eight we shall explore Durkheim's
notion of the evolution of the person through history. Durk-
heim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social
conditions at the two ends of history. In primitive socie-
ties, the individual's sense of self is submerged in the
group, and permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective
conscience. Now, there are two different, yet complementary,
lines Durkheim pursued to explain the emergence of the indi-
vidual out of archaic "mechanical solidarity." Early in his
career, Durkheim equated societal differentiation with indi-
viduation. Thus, he asserted that the division of labor pro-
gressively frees the individual from the constraints of the
repressive conscience collective. Here Durkheim was central-
ly concerned with the de-collectivization of structures of
moral and intellectual responsibility. However, at this ear-
ly stage Durkheim neglected to distinguish between individua-
tion and personalization.

By contrast, in his later work Durkheim took care to
distinguish between these two processes, and emphasized the
symbolic construction of the notion of the person. Hence,
we discover here a double dialectic in the evolution of the
person through history between individuation (de-collectivi-
zation and autonomization through separation) and phenomeno-
logical deepening and centering through more powerful cul-
tural sanctions. Thus, for example, far from being embedded
in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally au-
tonomous and intellectually responsible person is rather a
critically significant sociocultural and historical construc-

tion.

Finally, the emergence of the person through history
finds its culmination in Durkheim's own religion of _la per-
sonne humain_, and in the Anglo and Romantic traditions' moral
subsidy of the autonomous ego. At the same time, however
(and this forms the link to the shifting schemas of suicide),
acknowledgment of the extraordinarily strong modern cultural
sanctions for individualism leads us to recognize that, like
all cults which absolutize their prime values, this one, too,
may ironically culminate in self-destructive extremes.

CHAPTER ONE

DICHOTOMIES AND DIALECTICS

... Durkheim tried to avoid making a narrow doctrin-
aire choice between allegedly incompatible opposites.
Rather, he strove to attain a new synthesis, a unity
of opposites, a coincidentia oppositorum, which would
provide a new level of analytic insight (Robert Bellah,
1973:xxi).

Perhaps the most characteristic and revealing hallmark
of Durkheim's doctrine is the series of "root dichotomies"
permeating his thought. This compounding system of "binary
oppositions" provided Durkheim with key analytical anchors
as he progressively unfolded his thought. Correspondingly,
they may serve us as interpretive keys in our attempt to
systematically comprehend the substantive "nuclear struct-
ure" of Durkheim's thought.

Although various observers over the years have noted
one or more aspects of these crucial underlying polarities,
certainly Steven Lukes (1971, 1973) was the first to system-
atically present and analyze many of these dichotomies as
key analytical series anchoring Durkheim's system of socio-
logy. Some of the more significant pairs in Durkheim's com-
pounding binary system include: society/individual, object-
ive/subjective, sociology/psychology, universals/variables,
normal/pathological, science/mysticism, necessary/contingent,
person/ego, concepts/sensations, moral rules/sensual appet-
ites, sacred/profane, and so on and so forth.

There is no need here to explore the details of this
interrelated series of "root dichotomies," as Lukes calls
them, for he has already fruitfully explored several of the
more basic pairs. It is enough for our present purposes to
simply acknoᵂledge this ever-proliferating series of polarities.

Lukes also explores various ambiguities and shifts in many of
the more central polarities. Further, it is important to note
that the contents of these dichotomous sets are not perfectly
parallel, since the phenomena addressed by each differs. How-
ever, in each case the dichotomizing logic remains the same;
and once one perceives the root logic operative in Durkheim's
theorizing, it can easily be recognized that many of these
dichotomous pairs unfolded one out of the other.

However, it is not sufficient to merely explore the ex-
istence of various Durkheimian dichotomies, nor even to re-
cognize the inner logic of his initial interpretive proce-
dure. For the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought is
inevitably distorted if portrayed simply as rhetorical or fa-
tally dichotomizing, for it was inherently dialectical as
well. Poggi remarks, for example, how Durkheim always wished
to move beyond the very oppositions which he himself had
constructed:

> On close examination, these points seldom turn out to
> be tenable as dichotomies ... in the sense that the
> two elements do not lie on the same plane. Instead,
> one of them stands over the other and "envelops" it.
> ... In my view, these unacknowledged breakdowns of pur-
> portedly crucial dichotomies express the urgency of
> Durkheim's moral passion for unity... (1972:252).

While everyone has observed Durkheim's polemical points of
departure, few have emphasized that Durkheim's penchant for
root dichotomies served merely to heighten the dramatic con-
trasts between traditional antinomies which he then attemp-
ted to reconcile in terms of a higher (positivistic and so-
ciologistic) synthesis. It is almost as if Durkheim drew
such sharp distinctions primarily to heighten the drama of
his equally characteristic attempt to dialectically resolve
these traditional opposites.

Fortunately, the current renaissance of Durkheim stu-
dies has recovered a sense of his higher dialectical ambi-
tions. In 1960, for instance, Hayward described the inner
tensions in Durkheim's sociological thought in this way:

> Durkheim's social philosophy ... has been described
> as "Kantianism reassessed and supplemented by Com-

tianism." Whilst ... it would be more accurate to char-
acterize it as an attempt to conciliate the neo-posi-
tivism and sociologism of Comte's predecessor, Saint-
Simon, with the neo-criticism and "juridism" of Kant's
disciple, Renouvier, this affirmation is valuable in
indicating the tension within Durkheim's doctrine be-
tween determinist and libertarian, holist and person-
alist, transcendental and immanentist tendencies which,
throughout his work, he endeavored to resolve into a
harmonious synthesis through the unrelenting applica-
tion of "conscience," i.e. a combination of analytical
reason and imperative ethic (1960:19).

Bellah (1973) also reveals a keen sense of the extent to which

Durkheim strove constantly to transcend perennial polarities

such as those between materialism and idealism, empiricism and

rationalism, the individual and society, Gemeinschaft and Gesel-

lschaft, and so on. Wallwork especially has emphasized the dia-

lectical character of Durkheim's thought.

A second characteristic of Durkheim's method is the
dialectical manner in which he approaches virtually
every major philosophical and theoretical issue. As
Henri Peyre rightly observes, "Durkheim was a master
of dialectics".... Durkheim invariably sets forth an-
tithetical views that are brilliantly criticized and
seemingly discarded until they are joined, in a modi-
fied form, in his own unique synthesis.... Durkheim's
frequent use of the dialectical method has unfortun-
ately passed unnoticed by most of his American inter-
preters (1972: 5-6).

Wallwork also offers the following examples of some of the

dialectical tensions inherent in Durkheim's thought, and thus,

its paradoxical character.

The paradoxical quality of Durkheim's social and polit-
ical thought derives from these and other dialectical
resolutions. Man is of infinite worth, but this value
is not inherent within him; it is but a supreme fiction
created by society. Man is totally dependent upon so-
ciety for the qualities that make him human, yet so-
ciety has increasingly freed him from group tyranny.
Man has become an "autonomus center of activity," yet
secondary group restrictions, by preventing anomie,
actually increase his liberty. Patriotism is a funda-
mental duty, yet patriotism must be counterbalanced
by humanistic ends. For the ambiguities, lacuna, and
errors in some of these paradoxical formulations, Durk-
heim has been justly criticized, but it is no longer
justifiable to attribute to him conservative doctrines
unqualified by the liberal, and occasionally radical,
elements in his thought (1972:119; see also 136).

Finally, LaCapra also noted Durkheim's dialectical passion for transcending traditional polarities.

> The truly basic philosophical tension in the thought
> of Durkheim was related to his rationalism. It invol-
> ved his partial failure to transcend classical ration-
> alism. Durkheim's thought was caught up in a tension
> between the narrowly analytical and the dialectical
> heritages transmitted to him through Renouvier.... One
> might simplistically label the narrowly analytical ten-
> dency of his thought a Cartesianized and socialied
> neo-Kantianism. The most obvious influence of neo-Kant-
> ianism was in his passion for dualistic antinomies. The
> more profound influence, which led into his dialectical
> attempt to reconcile or at least relate antinomies, was
> his ultimate affirmation of a philosophy of finitude
> based upon a normative sense of limits (1972:8).

LaCapra also remarks that:

> Durkheim's broader rationalist dream was to transcend
> partisan ideological struggles and to forge a dialecti-
> cal reonciliation of conservative, radical, and liberal
> traditions of thought (1972:18).

> Like Marx, Durkheim tried to integrate a critique of
> political economy, German speculative philosophy, and
> the French socialist tradition in a comprehensive theory
> of the genesis and functioning of modern society
> (1972:23).

In sum, Durkheim's mode of conceptualizing always pro-
ceeded in a two-phase process. First, he set up mutually ex-
clusive dichotomies, seemingly a radical contrasting of op-
posing claims to primacy in human action. It is this image
of Durkheim as always radically polarizing primacy and vir-
tue to his own chosen side of his own dichotomy which so
often offends readers enjoying their first taste of one of
his great works. Inevitably, however, deeper exegesis re-
veals that Durkheim always attempted to resolve the inherent
oppositions which he himself had so sharply posed. Durkheim
always sought, in positivistic and sociologistic terms, to
dialectically transcend traditional antinomies by generating
a new over-arching synthesis which all parties to the debate
could embrace. Recognition of this two-step process of rad-
ical dichotomization and polemics on multiple rhetorical
fronts, and then resolution of these polarities in terms of
an evolutionarily-won synthesis is a key to understanding

Durkheim's conceptual and methodological structure and, in turn, his prime dialectical ambitions.

Without this necessary perception of the entire process of the normal "logics-in-use" in Durkheim's thought, various elements can be lifted out of context, leaving each man to "quote Scriptures" to his own purpose. As Lukes (1973) notes, there are many different and even contradictory "Durkheims" floating around in sociological space. As with Weber, or indeed, with any great thinker, one may choose to emphasize one aspect of Durkheim's thought at the expense of another, and one may find on almost any page convincing refutation from Durkheim himself against any such simple or narrow portrait. Perhaps this multiplicity of simultaneous interests and perspectives can be seen to constitute one key to both great thinkers and the uncertain fate of their paradigms. In turn, the same multiplicity can help to explain the subsequent diffusion, separation, and "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974). For, often as not, by virtue of their ability to encompass ever-more diverse phenomena, paradigms almost necessarily become protean models, capable of eliciting myriad meanings. Might we not call this phase of the eternal dialectic of "merger and division" (Kenneth Burke, 1945) the "proteanization of paradigms"?

CHAPTER TWO

HOMO DUPLEX: DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF THE
DUALISM OF HUMAN NATURE

> The soul and the body, sensation and reason, ego-
> istic appetites and moral will are opposed and, at
> the same time, mutually related, just as the sacred
> and the profane, which are forbidden to one another,
> nonetheless are forever intermingled (Durkheim, in
> (Lukes, 1973:22).

Preface. Almost the entire range of Durkheim's underlying series of "root dichotomies"--especially polarities such as society/individual, person/ego, moral rules/sensual appetites, concepts/sensations, public/private, sacred/profane--are summed up in Durkheim's central image of the dualism of human nature. Steven Lukes rightly observes:

> This central, but ... multiple, dichotomy between the
> social and the individual is, in a sense, the keystone
> of Durkheim's entire system of thought. In particular,
> it can be seen as crucial to his sociology of morality,
> his sociology of knowledge, and his sociology of reli-
> gion, since it underlies the distinctions he drew be-
> tween moral rules and sensual appetites, between con-
> cepts and sensations, and between the sacred and the
> profane (1973:22).

Indeed, it can hardly be overemphasized that the image of man as homo duplex lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociologies of morality, knowledge, and religion. As we shall discover, without this distinction between ego and person, and the characterization of the former as inherently egocentric, passionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim's theory of anomie and the need for constant moral discipline makes little sense. Since in Book Three we shall extensively criticize Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex, I merely wish here to document in outline the nature and development of this crucial doctrine.

As a modern positivist moral philosopher working socio-
logically, Durkheim embraced the old image of man as <u>homo du-</u>
<u>plex</u>, but with a fundamentally new twist. Traditional Western
and especially Christian moral philosophy portrayed man in
his generic essence as representing a unique union between
the opposing realms of matter and spirit--humankind was <u>the</u>
link between heaven and earth. In Durkheim's system of posi-
tivist symbolic equations, this relation became translated
as: ego is to person as body was to soul. Thus, Durkheim ful-
filled his commitments to both positivism and moral philoso-
phy by insisting that while man was, indeed, "double," it is
society as the prime source of discipline and goals, of le-
getimate moral authority, impersonal public concepts, univer-
salizable rules, on the one hand, and the inherently egocen-
tric and privatized passions of the amoral, presocial indi-
vidual on the other, which constitute the two basic poles of
human existence.

We need not wander far to discover the cultural source
from which Durkheim drew this doctrine of the duality of hu-
man nature. For Durkheim's own deep positivist cultural com-
mitments led him here to embrace and extend traditional Car-
tesian dualisms splitting into separate spheres self and
world, mind and body, spirit and mechanism, and so on. Wall-
work has noted of this origin of Durkheim's doctrine: "...
the world of objective facts was set against the realm of i-
deas and ideals, and matter was contrasted with spirit. These
conflicts were essentially continuations of Cartesian dual-
ism" (1972:9). LaCapra also noted the Cartesian influence,
adding that of Durkheim's neo-Kantian "passion for dualistic
antinomies" (1972:8; see also 285).

> The influence of Cartesianism was most obvious in Durk-
> heim's reliance upon the antinomy between mind and mat-
> ter. This antinomy was expressed in the idea of <u>homo du-</u>
> <u>plex</u>--the dual nature of man--which was interpreted by
> Durkheim in terms of the opposition between the organic
> and the social (1972:9).

Lukes also emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of Cartesian
and neo-Kantian thought in the late nineteenth century as it

influenced Durkheim's "passion for dichotomies."

> Durkheim's conception of human nature as dual invol-
> ved ... two parallel oppositions: between sensual ap-
> petites and moral rules, and between sensations and
> concepts. The Kantian nature of this conception is un-
> mistakable and corresponded to the predominant philo-
> sophical ideas of the time, which he had absorbed,
> first through the major formative influence of Renou-
> vier, and later from the more specifically epistemo-
> logical thinking of Hamelin (1973:435).

Through the fusion of Cartesian and neo-Kantian philosophical currents in his day, Durkheim's penchant for "root dichotomies" was deepened and reinforced. Finally, in a curious way, Durkheim's original Cartesian dualism was reinforced by the opposi-tions between individual and society embraced by Utilitarians and Romantics (eg. from Rousseau on) alike. But as we shall dis-cover, this negative polemical reinforcement of the split be-tween individual and society embraced by his opponents led to the undoing of Durkheim's first schema of suicide (see Book Three).

It is rather strange that this absolutely critical an-chor of Durkheim's theories has been so often slighted in secon-dary accounts over the years. Besides Wallwork and LaCapra, Peristiany (1953:viii), Giddens (1971b:221), Coser (1971:136), Douglas (1967:343-4), Lukes (1973:432-3), and Nisbet (1974: 229) have recently begun to glimpse the centrality and signi-ficance of this doctrine in Durkheim's work. However, one se-condary account, perhaps slighted because it is out of print, puts the image of man as homo duplex at the very heart of Durk-heim's doctrine. I refer, of course, to Edward Tiryakian's useful summary of Durkheim's seminal article "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions," in the former's Socio-logism and Existentialism (1962). In sum, even though Durk-heim's aforementioned article was translated and published in Kurt Wolff's 1960 collection of articles on Durkheim, and Ti-ryakian usefully summarized Durkheim's thesis, it is still not generally perceived that the image of man as homo duplex is absolutely central to Durkheim's system. This blindness and discontinuity in terms of scientific development is most dis-tressing.

If consideration of the ways in which various influences fused in Durkheim's central doctrine of the duality of human nature is complex, when these multiple origins are coupled with Durkheim's ever-proliferating series of parallel dichotomies, we must stand ready to acknowledge not only the deepening ramifications of his complex argument, but also various shifts in the grounds of his argument. Thus, one may legitimately begin, for instance, by asking: but why should the individual be necessarily considered amoral? And why should society be portrayed as the sole source of goodness, authority, and reason? One answer might be: because, in direct contrast to preceding metaphysical theories which endowed the individual with cosmic or divine "essential" qualities, Durkheim insisted that only "existential" or "positive" sources be admitted as relevant evidence. Further, in contrast to the dominant individualistic or nominalist theories of his day, Durkheim stripped the lone abstracted individual not only of existential priority, but also of corresponding qualities such as the "inner light" of Reason, moral authority, and so on. Given his own negative incorporation of the hypothetical isolated ego--circumscribed by its own private passions--it is no wonder that Durkheim felt justified in assigning all the positive (in both senses) qualities to human society and culture. Thus, to Durkheim, <u>society</u> <u>is</u> <u>the</u> <u>only</u> <u>moral</u> <u>phenomenon</u> <u>in</u> <u>nature</u>; the individual ego is basically amoral. Morality, conversely, is pre-eminently social; that is, not only is it a social construction, but it pertains primarily to social obligation.

In any case, while highly complex and synthetic arguments such as Durkheim's offer intrinsic fascination simply because of their rhetorical appeal, we should not be surprised that such a "brittle synthesis," as Giddens (1971b:222) terms it, by virtue of the inherently incompatible elements, represents a constant temptation to logical and empirical error (see Book Three). Despite his dialectical ingenuity, the binds Durkheim unwittingly placed himself in unfortunately led him too far for us to fully embrace his doctrine. Indeed, given his commitments,

and his aspiration to transcend all previous oppositions root-
ed in opposing cultural traditions, perhaps he had little
choice. As for us, forewarned is forearmed.

Indeed, as we set out on this journey to recapture the
full depths of Durkheim's doctrine of the duality of human na-
ture, it is important to recognize that there is a crucial dif-
ference between the early and late installments of his views.
While egocentricity represented a constant negative factor in
both Durkheim's early and later notions of the duality of hu-
man nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or alogical
factor differed in these versions. In his early formulation,
Durkheim grounded insatiability--the very absence of determin-
ate form and natural limit (the sine qua non of morality)--in
the dark desires of the unsocialized ego. However, toward the
end of his life Durkheim apparently grew more pessimistic, and
attributed the source of the endemic incapacity of man to gain
inner peace and satisfaction to the warring halves of human na-
ture. In addition, in the early image, the insatiable and ego-
centric passions represent a darkly destructive, even chaotic,
energetically expansive force, while in the later version the
purely idiosyncratic ego represents an inward-turning, purely
privatized existence, that can only be pulled from its local-
ized orbit by the intense impersonal forces of society and cul-
ture. In the first installment of this crucial doctrine, the
a-nomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contradict-
ion of all morality" (DL:431); in other words, the nomos of
society and culture was actively opposed by the anti-nomian
forces erupting up from the biological and psychological levels.
In the later formulation, the relatively passive a-nomie or
a-logic of the pre-socialized ego was opposed not so much to
nomos as to a universalizable logos. Although Durkheim's doc-
trine of "human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) and his philosophy
of health and well-being as the "golden mean" are closely rela-
ted themes, we shall consider them later in the second part
of Book Three. Let us now turn to consider the first install-
ment of Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature.

A. The Multiplicity of Meanings of the "Individual" in Durkheim's System of Sociology

Preface. At the outset, it is important to recognize some of
the potential ambiguities emerging from the mounting resonances
between Durkheim's root dichotomies and his seminal image of
the dualism of human nature. These resonances are compounded
because Durkheim's thought moved here on both the generic and
genetic-evolutionary levels, and because he assigned both posi-
tive and negative features to each half of the dichotomy on each
of these levels. Further, we shall discover critical shifts in
the grounds of argument, especially in regard to the question
of the source of the seemingly constitutional inability of man-
kind to attain inner peace and lasting satisfaction. While he
originally grounded insatiability in the pre-socialized ego,
Durkheim later argued that the suffering inherent in the human
condition derives instead from the impossibility of simultan-
eously satisfying both halves of human nature. Whereas the ear-
lier notion required over-coming the darkly destructive pas-
sions of the isolated ego, Durkheim's later doctrine grew in-
creasingly pessimistic, viewing the warring halves of human
nature as the endemic dis-ease of the human condition. Let us
now attempt to briefly sort out some of these important dis-
tinctions between different Durkheimian meanings of that cru-
cial term the "Individual."

1. Generic Versus Genetic-Evolutionary Meanings of the "Individual"

We might begin by recalling that the long-standing cri-
tique of Durkheim as a kind of Platonizing metaphysician of so-
ciety--an extreme hypostatizing social realist--persists in the
still popular rendering of Durkheim as stridently anti-indivi-
dualist. However, as Anthony Giddens rightly insists in his ex-
cellent article "The Individual in the Writings of Emile Durk-
heim":

> ... most secondary interpreters of Durkheim have fail-
> ed to connect his analytical discussion (and rejection)
> of individualism as a methodological approach to social

theory with his <u>developmental</u> conception of the emer-
gence of individualism as a morality brought into be-
ing by the growth of the differentiated division of
labor (1971b:210).

This is a very important distinction;indeed, the misleading,
but still pervasive, image of Durkheim as anti-individualist
must now give way to more subtly inflected distinctions drawn
between the various meanings assigned by Durkheim to the term
"individual" on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary le-
vels. Let us now briefly explore these different connotations.

  Steven Lukes provides the following useful guide to
untangling the multiplicity of meanings of "individual":

> By the 'individual,' Durkheim meant sometimes the
> (pre-social) individual seen as a biologically given,
> organic unit, sometimes the (abstract) individual seen
> as possessing certain invariant properties (eg. Util-
> itarian or economic man), sometimes the (extra-social)
> individual isolated from human association, and some-
> times the real, concrete individual person, living in
> society--not to mention a further sense in which the
> 'individual' refers to a socially-determined concep-
> tion of the human person in general (as in the 'reli-
> gion of the individual,' which is the 'product of so-
> ciety itself,' in which the 'individual' becomes a
> sacred object (1973:21-2).

In his valuable 1971(b) article, Giddens adds that Durkheim
placed two different valuations on the "individual" on two dif-
ferent levels. On the abstract, generic, universal level, Durk-
heim regarded the pre-socialized individual (eg. the child)
as the negative carrier of insatiable and egoistic passions,
or, at the very least, as the locus of privatized passions.
On the same level, he portrayed society, by contrast, as the
source of moral discipline, legitimate authority, reason, con-
cepts, universalizable rules, and so on. However, on the his-
torical level, Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of
two opposite social conditions at the two ends of human his-
tory. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self
is necessarily submerged in the group; it is permeated by the
fused sacral-magical collective conscience. In evolutionary
terms, therefore, what we witness is the progressive awaken-
ing of the structures of conscience and consciousness, of the
emergence of the individual, or rather the person, through his-

tory. Individual autonomy progressively emerges through societal differentiation. Far from being embedded in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person is a crucial historical and social construction. But how could the individual be at one and the same time considered basically amoral and the evolutionary object and expression of a higher morality?

No real paradox arises, however, since Durkheim's philosophical notion of the pre-socialized human ego was couched on the generic organic level, while, on the contrary, his notion of moral individualism as a sociocultural emergent was cast on the evolutionary level (see Chapter Eight of this Book). The first image represents a generic and destructive given, while the second concerns the construction of the autonomous conscience and consciousness as the preeminent value of the modern world. In short, the difference is between the generic ego and the emergent person. Late in life, Durkheim insisted on the importance of this distinction:

> We say our individuality, and not our personality. Although the two words are often used synonymously, they must be distinguished with the greatest possible care, for the personality is made up essentially of supra-individual elements (DHN:339-340).

Although Durkheim himself failed to adequately clarify this distinction early in his career (eg. in The Rules), in 1912 he took great care in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life to separate the two meanings.

> ... it is not at all true that we are more personal as we become more individualized. The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially individual; yet we are more personal the more we are freed from our senses and able to think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon all the social elements of the individual do not mean by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8).

Durkheim's discovery of the evolving dialectic between universalization in the grounds of moral and cognitive discourse

and the emergence of the autonomous person (see E. Leites, 1974) is of the greatest importance. Clearly, the distinction between ego and person is fundamental for the human sciences; yet the precise origin, nature, and significance of this root contrast remains to be articulated. Leaving analysis of Durkheim's theory of the emergence of the moralized person through history till the end of this Book, let us now explore further the many meanings of the "individual" on the generic level.

2. The Conflation of Meanings of the "Individual" on the Generic Level

As noted, Durkheim's philosophically derived image of human nature paralleled his growing series of root dichotomies, thus leading him to progressively "conflate," as Lukes terms it, at least the following contrasts:

(1) Between the socially determined and the organically or biologically given;

(2) Between factors specific to particular societies, and abstracted or postulated features of "human nature;"

(3) Between factors that are general within a given society or group and those that are particular to one or several individuals;

(4) Between the experience and behavior of associated individuals, as opposed to those of isolated individuals;

(5) Between socially prescribed obligations and spontaneous desires and behavior;

(6) Between factors coming from "outside" the individual and those generated within his consciousness;

(7) Between thoughts and actions directed towards social or public objects and those which are purely personal and private;

(8) Between altruistic and egocentric behavior (Lukes, 1973:20).

Certainly, one of critical points here is the extent to which these and other similar properties can be legitimately considered parallel. In terms of the emergence of this ever-proliferating series of dichotomous distinctions, however, I tend to think that they both proceeded from Durkheim's primal opposi-

tion between the egoistic and socialized halves of human na-
ture, and also later fed back and reinforced the potency of
this prime opposition. Certainly, it is true that although
Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex served him as a po-
tent symbolic anchor from early on, it was not until toward
the end of his career that Durkheim attempted to sum up this
basic antinomy in his important 1914 paper "The Dualism of
Human Nature and Its Social Conditions."

Now, the dual or ambivalent nature of such protean
terms as "individual" and "society" partially accounts for
this proliferating series of more or less parallel dichoto-
mies, for such terms combine increasing generality of mean-
ing and specificity of application. Whenever we encounter such
persistent efforts to progressively unfold parallel properties
in ever-more diverse situations, we may detect the workings of
a subterranean unifying metaphor. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding
metaphor early in his career was that of order and chaos, or
more exactly, the analogous set was society is to the indivi-
dual as order is to chaos. As often happens, the very process
of unfolding new applications of this guiding analogy leads,
however, by the very nature of the diverse properties encoun-
tered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or metaphor-
ical "load." Toward the end of his career, Durkheim's guiding
root opposition seemed to shift slightly, but significantly,
on its metaphorical axes from order versus chaos, to universal-
ity versus particularity; or in other words, from nomos versus
anomos, to logos versus alogos.

Finally, we should note the significance of Durkheim's
rhetorical inversion of the high valuation placed on the lone
abstract individual posited by his polemical opponents, inclu-
ding Utilitarians, rationalists, and Romantic-Idealists alike.
In one sense, this inversion must be considered a clever but
ultimately misconceived rhetorical device, since he thereby ad-
mitted in the backdoor some of the very elements against which
he had so resolutely taken up arms in the first place. Nonethe-
less, in a second and more powerful meaning, Durkheim's dis-
tinctions represented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens

provides an important clue to the deeper significance of Durk-
heim's distinctions between the generic ego and the sociocul-
turally and historically constructed person, when he insists:
"Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach "liberal
individualism" regarded as a conception of the characteristics
of the modern social order, from 'methodological individualism'"
(1971b:210; see also Lukes 1968, 1969, 1973). The deeper in-
tellectual and cultural ramifications of Durkheim's revolution
in thought become clearer here if we recall that for centur-
ies the progressive mainlines of European thought had tacitly
presumed there to be necessary inner logical, ethical, and his-
torical connections between so-called "methodological indivi-
dualism" and atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism), and
its supposed epistemological correlates of pragmatic or utili-
tarian empiricism, individual political freedom and liberal
democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man."

Durkheim's insistence, however, on a negative image of
the isolated ego, and his transference of the source of moral
goodness to society, coupled with his corresponding postulate
that moral individualism, far from being a generic human uni-
versal, is rather a sociocultural historical construction,
snapped apart the tacit, but deeply rooted, prevailing presup-
position of certain necessary links between logical nominal-
ism and moral and political autonomy. Durkheim thus severed
the inner symbolic links between these doctrines in mediating
between preceding cultural traditions by rejecting certain
points and incorporating others in a revised form in a new
and hopefully more compelling model. A bold and new powerful
doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the still per-
vasive presumption of the necessity of the inner symbolic links
which Durkheim dissolved, has still to be understood in its
full significance. I repeat: <u>Durkheim</u> <u>demonstrated</u> <u>the</u> <u>possi-
bility</u> <u>of</u> <u>derivation</u> <u>of</u> <u>autonomous</u> <u>or</u> <u>moralized</u> <u>individualism</u>
<u>from</u> <u>"realistic"</u> <u>or</u> <u>"socially</u> <u>organic"</u> <u>premises</u>. As Parsons
(1949) recognized, this was Durkheim's revolution in the epis-
temology and methodology of the social sciences.

However, it is imperative that we place Durkheim's dialectical achievement against the background of his rhetorical failure--I mean his unfortunate incorporation of crucial premises of his polemical opponents (see especially Part I, Book Three). Giddens summarizes these important trade-offs:

> ... although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from methodological individualism is much more subtle and profound than what has been assumed by many of his critics, what results is a brittle synthesis, and essentially an unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and the very serious deficiencies which run throughout his works, however, have to be understood in the light of this attempt. As so often happens with a writer whose works are strongly polemical in tone, ultimately he was unable to abandon certain of the very premises of which he was most critical in the writings of his opponents (1971b:222).

It shall be our task, in part, to explore the making and unmaking of Durkheim's "brittle synthesis."

B. <u>Insatiability</u> <u>Versus</u> <u>Moral</u> Discipline: Durkheim's <u>Early</u> <u>Version</u> <u>of</u> <u>His</u> <u>Doctrine</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Dualism</u> <u>of</u> <u>Human</u> <u>Nature</u>

Durkheim's early version of the dualism of human nature focussed on the presumption that the unsocialized ego--that organic bundle of drives energizing each organism--was inherently passionate and even insatiable. The need for moral discipline which could only be provided through sociocultural rules was a constant background reference throughout Durkheim's major early works such as <u>The</u> <u>Division</u> <u>of</u> <u>Labor</u>, <u>Suicide</u>, and the lectures later published as <u>Moral</u> <u>Education</u>. Since we shall consider his related, and very significant notions of "human finitude" and the "golden mean" later (see Book Three), let us move immediately to consider his early notions of man as <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u>.

Perhaps one of the earliest expressions in Durkheim's work of the traditional formula that "man is double" appeared in <u>Suicide</u>. Typically, as a moral philosopher, Durkheim began by observing that human needs and desires must somehow be proportioned to what is objectively possible if happiness is to be attainable.

> In the order of existence, no good is measureless.
> A biological quality can only fulfill the purposes
> it is meant to serve on condition that it does not
> transgress certain limits. So too it is with social
> phenomena (S:217).

> No living thing can be happy or even exist unless
> his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his
> means.... If his needs require more than can be grant-
> ed ... they will be under continual friction or can
> only function painfully. Movements incapable of pro-
> duction without pain tend not to be reproduced (S:246).

Durkheim then observed that the organic needs of ani-
mals are ecologically and physiologically limited--that is,
such needs are constrained and formed both by the amount of
resources available in any given environment, and by the inher-
ent limitations in processing capacity and physiological magni-
tudes of any given organism.

> In the animal ... this equilibrium is established
> with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends
> on purely material conditions. All the organism needs
> is that the vital supplies of substance and energy con-
> stantly employed in the vital process should be period-
> ically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replace-
> ment be equivalent to use. When the void in resources
> created by existence is filled, the animal, satisfied,
> asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not
> sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those
> implicit in its physical nature (S:246).

Thus, Durkheim argued that animals live in a state of (more or
less) automatic balance in terms of their own built-in limita-
tions and in relation to the possible resources or "carrying
capacity" of their supporting habitat.

But Durkheim argued that man is governed by no such sim-
ple, built-in internal limitations or ecological equilibrium.
Why? Because, over and above the obvious biological continui-
ties, the relations of human beings to their environment are
socially and culturally defined, and thus, Durkheim supposed,
without natural built-in limits. In other words, while biologi-
cal needs in man are limited as with the lower forms, socio-
culturally generated desires--unique to man-as-man--enjoy no
such natural restraints.

> This is not the case with man, because most of his needs
> are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree.

> ... Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies
> nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection
> suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends
> craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admit-
> tedly sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot
> pass. But how to determine the quantity of well-being,
> comfort, or luxury legitimately to be craved by a hu-
> man being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his
> physiological constitution which sets a limit to such
> tendencies. The functioning of individual life does
> not require them to cease at once point rather than
> another; the proof being that they have constantly in-
> creased since the beginnings of history, receiving
> more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weak-
> ening of average health (S:247).

Therefore, man must construct his own schedule of satisfac-
tion for wants; thus, every society is constantly engaged in
negotiating a variable ratio, in terms of available resources
and the legitimacy of wants, between organically generated
needs (eg. food) and socioculturally generated desires (eg.
honor, or the demands of charisma).

> Above all, how to establish their proper variations
> with different conditions of life, occupations, rela-
> tive importance of services, etc.? In no society are
> they equally satisfied on the different stages of the
> social hierarchy. Yet, human nature is substantially the
> same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is
> not human nature which can assign the variable limits
> necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far
> as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective
> of any external regulatory force, our capacity for
> feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless a-
> byss (S:247).

Given his notion of the pre-socialized human ego as
not only egocentric but insatiable, Durkheim proceeeded to
establish the constant need for regulation of these generic
egoistic and undisciplined passions. Thus, Durkheim's ini-
tial dichotomy presumed, on the one hand, the egocentric
passions of unsocialized human nature, and on the other,
the moral discipline provided only by society. Alone, or de-
socialized--that is, demoralized--the individual ego reverts
back to generic type, and, ultimately, destroys itself in the
fruitless passions so often seen in human action.

But if nothing external can restrain this capacity,
it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlim-
ited desires are insatiable by definition, and insa-
tiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity.
Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely sur-
pass the means at their command; they cannot be quen-
ched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed
torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human act-
ivity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits, and
sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an
undetermined state be any more reconciled with the
conditions of mental life than with the demands of
physical life? (S:247-8).

Having set up the specter of the undetermined and undisciplin-
ed pre-social human ego, Durkheim was clearly setting up his
critically important derivation of morality from society. The
first requirement of such socially constructed rules, then, is
discipline of these potentially insatiable desires.

... Passions must first be limited. Only then can they
be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But
since the individual has no way of limiting them, this
must be done by some force exterior to him. A regula-
tive force must play the same role for moral needs
which the organism plays for physical needs. This means
that the force can only be moral. The awakening of con-
science interrupted the state of equilibrium of the ani-
mal's dormant existence; only conscience, therefore,
can furnish the means to re-establish it (S:248).

In a later comment, Durkheim likened the innate insatiability
of the presocialized ego to the energies expressed in the in-
herent expansiveness of gases. Energy, whether physical, or-
ganic, or sociocultural,   Durkheim suggested, indefinitely
expands its radius of movement.

Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily
tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body
of gas, provided no other matter resists its expan-
sion, fills the immensity of space, so all energy--
whether physical or moral--tends to extend itself with-
out limit so long as nothing intervenes to stop it.
Hence the need for regulatory organs, which constrain
the total complex of our vital forces within appropri-
ate limits. The nervous system has this function for
our physical being. This system actuates the organs
and allocates whatever energy is required by each of
them. But the moral life escapes the physical system.
Neither our brain nor any ganglion can assign limits
to our intellectual aspirations or to our wills. For
mental life, especially in its more developed forms,
transcends the organism.... Sensations and physical

appetites express only the conditions of the body, not ideas and complex sentiments. Only a power that is equally spiritual is able to exert influence upon spiritual forces. This spiritual power resides in the authority inherent in moral rules (ME:40-41).

Durkheim was building here, from first principles, the role of society as the necessary counter-balance to the incessant expansion of the energy of the pre-socialized ego. And like moral philosophers of old, Durkheim insisted on grounding his argument on the level of man's generic species essence; that is, man-as-man, in contrast to the lower biological forms, is characterized by the "awakened reflection" and growth of conscience and consciousness, the striving for ideals beyond mere survival, which marks the intense new sociocultural life of this new and powerful species. We shall soon explore in greater detail how Durkheim constructed his notion of the social bases of morality. For now, let us simply observe that by first theoretically grounding his argument on the level of society and culture as evolutionary emergents, Durkheim implied that these potentially insatiable desires are not to be understood merely in terms of psychobiological needs. Rather, the "awakening of conscience" which defines man signifies that these new generic desires are now socioculturally generated. No other conclusion is logically possible, since man is, by evolutionary essence, the sociocultural animal. The implications of the fundamental principles of Durkheim's philosophical anthropology are numerous and profound, not only in altering his own theses but also many of our own today. For example, the unsocialized child cannot hereafter legitimately be considered just an animal like any other, for a new level of biological achievement--the sociocultural--has been achieved by man. By its generic species essence, the infant can only be considered a human animal. Certainly, it would be absurd to presume that even man's closest animal relation could, with provision of the most elaborate socialization procedures, ever become a human being among other human beings. What we sometimes forget

when we repeat the old formula that man's inheritance is double, is the critical fact that the sociocultural level in man feeds back down and alters his psychobiological make-up; in short, higher levels do influence lower levels. Even in terms of his biological constitution, man is not simply an organism like any other organism, for even his organic form and process have been socioculturally altered. In sum, much of man's biological inheritance has been socioculturally constructed. Indeed, the old formula that "man makes himself" has deeper dimensions than suspected. Further, this theoretically profound argument is reinforced by Durkheim's insistence that these new desires represent "moral forces," and thus, must consequently be opposed by moral forces. As Durkheim later insisted, even the features of our immorality are the expression of our system of morality (eg. see PECM:119). This same principle was the source of a number of Durkheim's more stimulating propositions, including the normality of crime; and we shall use it as a key guide which to later introduce some surprises into Durkheim's own schemas.

Given these negative and positive poles, let us next explore how Durkheim proposed that the original destructive or anomic energies of the pre-social ego are contained and redirected by society as the fount of moral discipline. Here we see Durkheim suggesting almost a simple one-to-one correspondence between the negative qualities of this pre-social ego, and the positive qualities of morality. Proceeding from his initial metaphor of the indefinite expansion of the radius of the energy of the pre-socialized ego, in Moral Education Durkheim first pictured morality as "like so many moulds with limiting boundaries into which we must pour our behavior" (ME:26). Since the energies of the organic ego have no determinate form of their own, they can only attain human form and shape through acceptance of definite and constant rules of social conduct. "The function of morality is, in the first place, to determine conduct, to fix it, to eliminate the element of individual arbitrariness ... moral-

ity is basically a constant thing" (ME:27). According to Durkheim, the first thing that the unsocialized child must be taught is that regularity of conduct required not only for survival, but for continued social interaction.

> Insofar as our inclinations, instincts, and desires
> lack any counterbalance, insofar as our conduct hangs
> on the relative intensity of uncontrolled dispositions,
> these dispositions are gusts of wind, erratic stop-
> start affairs characteristic of children and primi-
> tives, which as they endlessly split the will against
> itself, dissipate it on the winds of caprice and pre-
> clude its gaining the unity and continuity that are
> the essential preconditions of personality. It is pre-
> cisely in this development of self-mastery that we
> build up moral discipline (ME:46).

In contrast to the potentially infinite passions of the isolated organic ego, the very first defining characteristic of morality, as socially constructed, is regularity, stability, in a word, definition.

But Durkheim then emphasized that there is more to morality than simply the stability and regularity of life provided by social norms, by cultural rules and meanings. A related aspect of morality is focus on attainable goals.

> Morality is basically a discipline. All discipline has
> a double objective: to promote a certain regularity in
> people's conduct, and to provide them with determinate
> goals that at the same time limit their horizons (ME:47).

As we shall discover later, and as Giddens (1971b:225-6) emphasizes, both aspects of assigning goals to the ego are crucial--goals need to be both clearly definable and attainable. But if the individual ego is unable to either regularize its own energies, or to rise above its own egocentricity to devote its own energies to the attainment of defined goals, whence derives these devotions? Why should we do violence to our own natures?

Surely power or constraint alone is not sufficient. In Weberian terms, the distinction Durkheim next draws is couched in terms of the source of legitimate moral authority. As always, underlying Durkheim's notion of legitimate authority is the notion of the sacred. Ultimately, the only force able to pull the ego out of its passionate self-centered (pro-

fane) orbit is the moral or spiritual power embodied in the respect for the sacred as the source of all legitimate moral authority. I repeat: when Durkheim spoke here of constraint, he meant it not in the sense of physical forces, but rather in terms of the respect due to the foundations of legitimate moral authority (Parsons missed this distinction).

> By authority we must understand that influence which imposed upon us all the moral power that we acknowledge as superior to us (ME:29).

> Morality is a system of commandments (ME:31).

Thus, regularity and deference to the inherent moral and conceptual superiority of collective processes constitute the first major characteristic of morality to Durkheim--namely, discipline.

> At the root of the moral life there is, besides the preference for regularity, the notion of moral authority. Furthermore, these two aspects of morality are closely linked, their unity deriving from a more complex idea that embraces them both. This is the concept of discipline. Discipline regularizes conduct. It implies repetitive behavior under determinate conditions. But discipline does not emerge without authority--a regulating authority.... The fundamental element of morality is the spirit of discipline (ME:31).

There is an additional element constituting morality besides discipline and obligatory respect--namely, desirability. Durkheim later elaborated this element in his article "The Determination of Moral Facts." While Parsons (1949) tried to claim that this notion of desirability--of wishing to achieve the good--represented a key breakthrough in Durkheim's moral theory, we do not agree, since we now see that Durkheim's earlier notion of constraint did not refer primarily to a crudely positivistic notion of external physical constraint. In fact, this distinction first appeared in The Division of Labor in the material that was suppressed in later editions, but which can be found in the appendix to Simpson's translation. In contrast to Parsons, Durkheim assumed all along that internalized obligation referred to the sacredness of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Hence, being drawn toward sacredness--its inherent desirabil-

ity--follows just as much as obligation from its role as the
source of legitimacy. Clearly, all these basic elements of mo-
rality--discipline, authority, obligation or duty, and desira-
bility--are intimately bound up together in Durkheim's basic
moral theory. We shall also briefly explore some additional
factors, such as attachment to social groups and personal au-
tonomy, which complete the basic outlines of Durkheim's theo-
ry of morality. However important a clearer presentation of
Durkheim's moral theory may be, it is not here our present
task. Rather, we must now return to further explore our ori-
ginal problem: why did Durkheim so emphasize discipline as the
very key to morality?

Only if we begin to perceive the depths and magnitude
of Durkheim's assignment of negative and even dangerous traits
to the pre-socialized ego, can we hope to understand how he
could insist: "Discipline derives its _raison d'etre_ from itself;
it is good that man is disciplined" (ME:32). Let us now
follow Durkheim as he rhetorically asks: "What makes moral di-
scipline good?" In clear contrast to the Utilitarian and Roman-
tic moralists alike, Durkheim observed how his hard-line com-
ments may be seen by some as an affront to "widespread human
sentiment." Since such sentiments may still be "widespread,"
we shall now briefly explore Durkheim's rhetorical attack on
competing counter-principles, an exercise that is valuable be-
cause it clearly reveals how his position differed not only
from his opponents, but also from many reigning tacit presup-
positions of our own day.

> To limit, to restrain--this is to deny, to impede the
> process of living and thus partially to destroy; and
> all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it
> be good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits
> that it cannnot overcome? If life is not good, what is
> there of worth in the world? To be is to act, to live,
> and any reduction of life is a diminution of being.
> Does not all constraint, by definition, do violence to
> the nature of things? It was just such reasoning that
> led Bentham to see in law an evil scarcely tolerable,
> which could only be reasonably justified when it was
> clearly indispensable (ME:35-6).

Clearly, the Utilitarians' penchant for _laissez faire_ and their
unprecedented claim that unbridled egoism will inevitably lead,

by a natural identity of interests, to altruism, presumes the
investing of the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego with preci-
sely all those virtues that Durkheim progressively stripped a-
way. Against this investment, Durkheim rhetoricized:

> Must one view discipline simply as an external palpa-
> ble police force, whose single raison d'etre is to
> prevent certain behaviors and which, beyond such pre-
> ventive action, has no other function? Or, on the con-
> trary, may it not be, as our analysis leads us to sup-
> pose, a means sui generis of moral education, having
> an intrinsic value which places its own special imprint
> upon moral character (ME:37)?

To buttress his own case that "discipline in itself is
good," Durkheim proposed a series of positive functions played
by moral disciplining of the pre-socialized organic ego. First,
as Parsons later argued, social interaction cannot successfully
proceed without shared mutual expectations; thus, regularized
communal norms provide the basic substructure of social life.

> At each point in time, it is necessary that the func-
> tioning of the familial, vocational, and civic life
> be assured; to this end, it is necessary that the per-
> son be free from an incessant search for appropriate
> conduct. Norms must be established which determine
> what proper relationships are, and to which people
> conform. Deference to established norms is the stuff
> of our daily duties (ME:37).

In contrast, however, to Parsons (and note the way functional-
ism is linked with Utilitarian attitudes), Durkheim insisted
that "Such an analysis and justification of discipline is
scarcely sufficient. For we cannot account for an institution
simply by demonstrating its social utility" (ME:38).

Therefore, Durkheim next emphasized that the very nature
of man--since he represents only a small part of the universe--
can attain fulfillment only if this prior limitation is accep-
ted. In opposition to traditional religionists who portrayed
man's nature and "the flesh" as inherently evil, Durkheim ar-
gued that the preference for asceticism which he shares with
these religions is thus "not good in and of itself." Rather,
all beings can only realize their true nature through accept-
ance of their prior particularity.

> If we believe that discipline is useful, indeed neces-
> sary for the individual, it is because it seems to us

> demanded by nature itself. It is the way in which
> nature realizes itself normally, not   a way of
> minimizing or destroying nature. Like everything
> else, man is a limited being: he is part of a whole.
> Physically, he is part of the universe; morally, he
> is part of society. Hence, he cannot, without viola-
> ting his nature, try to supersede the limits imposed
> on him. Indeed, everything that is most basic in him
> partakes of this quality of partialness or particu-
> larity. To say that one is a person is to say that
> he is distinct from all others; this distinction im-
> plies limitation. If then, from our point of view,
> discipline is good, it is not that we regard the work
> of nature with a rebellious eye, or that we see here
> a diabolical scheme that must be foiled; but that
> man's nature cannot be itself except as it is disci-
> plined. If we deem it essential that natural inclin-
> ations be held within certain bounds, it is not be-
> cause that nature seems to us bad, or because we deny
> the right to gratification; on the contrary, it is
> because otherwise such natural inclinations could have
> no hope of the satisfaction they merit (ME: 50-1).

Now, clearly one of the factors distinguishing us from others,
yet by which each of us completes our nature--is our own per-
sonality. Durkheim next argued that personality can only devel-
op if the ego accepts the limiting boundaries distinguishing
it from the rest of the world and from others.

> Discipline is thus useful, not only in the interests
> of society and as the indispensable means without
> which regular cooperation would be impossible, but
> for the welfare of the individual himself. By means
> of discipline we learn the control of desire without
> which man could not achieve happiness. Hence, it
> even contributes in large measure to the development
> of that which is of fundamental importance for each
> of us: our personality (ME:48).

In terms of socialization and education, especially
the moralizing of the ego--the first prerequisite is that the
child be taught self-discipline. To Durkheim, self-discipline
was the key precondition for the successful construction of
the personality structure, and the subsequent welfare of the
individual.

> The capacity for constraining our inclinations, for
> restraining ourselves--the ability that we acquire
> in the school of moral discipline--is the indispen-
> sable condition for the emergence of reflective, in-
> dividual will. The rule, because it teaches us to re-
> strain and master ourselves, is a means of emancipa-
> tion and of freedom (ME:48).

It is important to emphasize that Durkheim did not attempt
to justify mastering the inordinate desires of the "enemy
within" in terms of the supposed evilness of man's nature.
Nor did he consider the role of moral discipline in the ed-
ucational process as simply a "police action," designed to
prevent the depredations of one freedom against another.

> Moral discipline not only buttresses the moral life
> ... it performs an important function in forming
> character and personality in general. In fact, the
> most essential element of character is this capa-
> city for restraint--as they say, of inhibition--
> which allows us to contain our passions, our de-
> sires, our habits, and subject them to law (ME:46).

Now, the subjection and transformation of pre-social
anomie into a sociocultural nomos is not merely the means for
creating character, but more importantly, the acceptance of
rules, meanings, and determinate horizons constitutes the very
preconditions of human happiness, freedom, and even individual
health.

> We should not see in the discipline to which we sub-
> ject children a means of constraint necessary only
> when it seems indispensable for preventing culpable
> conduct. Discipline is in itself a factor sui generis
> of education. Through discipline and by means of it
> alone are we able to teach the child to rein in his
> desires, to set limits to his appetites of all kinds,
> to limit and, through limitation, to define the goals
> of his activity. This limitation is the condition of
> happiness and of moral health (ME:43-44).

But how can the repression of individual desires be consider-
ed the way to freedom? Today our moral subsidization of the
autonomous spontaneity of the unencumbered ego is so great
that we have trouble even perceiving the structure of Durkheim's
argument. For isn't freedom itself defined as the release from
all previous, especially irrational, constraints? On the con-
trary, in a seeming paradox Durkheim contended that freedom
only emerges out of the school of self-discipline.

> Imagine a being liberated from all external restraint,
> a despot still more absolute than those of which his-
> tory tells us, a despot that no external power can re-
> strain or influence. By definition, the desires of such
> a being are irresistible. Shall we say, then, that he
> is all powerful? Certainly not, since he himself cannot
> resist his desires. They are masters of him, as of every-

thing else. He submits to them; he does not dominate
them. In a word, when the inclinations are totally
liberated, when nothing sets bounds to them, they
themselves become tyrannical, and their first slave
is precisely the person who experiences them. What
a sad picture this presents (ME: 44).

Since we moderns have so often conceived of freedom and auto-
nomy in wholly negative terms, as a progressive shedding or
disengagement from traditional claims on us, Durkheim's ironic
paradox grates on our sensibilities and moral fervor. But Durk-
heim continued extending the irony by insisting on the impo-
tency and self-destructiveness of ego-based desires.

A despot is like a child; he has a child's weaknesses
because he is not master of himself. Self-mastery is
the first condition of all true power, of all liberty
worthy of the name. One cannot be master of himself
when he has within him forces that, by definition, can-
not be mastered.... Since there is nothing to restrain
them, they inevitably go to violent extremes, which are
self-destroying (ME:45).

Certainly, Durkheim's insights here run forcefully against the
modern ethos that liberation is to be primarily found in con-
tinuous release, instead of self-mastery.

Not only freedom but happiness itself, Durkheim argued,
is attainable only if we learn to inhibit our inherent and po-
tentially insatiable egoistic desires. The very act of scaling
down these expansive energies enables them to gain the possi-
bility of satisfaction.

The totality of moral regulations really forms about
each person an imaginary wall, at the foot of which a
multitude of human passions simply die without being
able to go further. For the same reason--that they are
contained--it becomes possible to satisfy them (ME:42).

The irony continues, for the very constriction of horizons that
would inevitably bring forth a mixture of indignation and path-
os from representatives of our contemporary liberating sub-cult-
ures, instead brings relief to human nature, Durkheim contend-
ed. He thus counseled us in the seemingly paradoxical puzzles
of a very different therapeutic--that is, human happiness can
only be attained to the extent to which the inherent passions
of the pre-socialized ego can be constrained or disciplined to
embrace only regular, determinate, and achievable goals.

Rather than instilling the drive for individual ambition and fulfillment of our limitless human potential, the prime function of education, Durkheim argued, is to inculcate the spirit of restraint and realizable ambitions.

> Education must help the child understand that ...
> there are limits based on the nature of things, that
> is to say, in the nature of each of us. This has no-
> thing to do with insidiously inculcating a spirit of
> resignation in the child; or curbing his legitimate
> ambitions; or preventing him from seeing the condi-
> tions existing around him. Such proposals would con-
> tradict the very principles of our social system. But
> he must be made to understand that the way to be hap-
> py is to set proximate and realizable goals, corres-
> ponding to the nature of each person, and not to attempt
> to reach objectives by straining neurotically and un-
> happily toward infinitely distant and consequently in-
> accessible goals.... We must make the child appreciate
> that he cannot rely for happiness upon unlimited power,
> knowledge, or wealth; but that it can be found in very
> diverse situations, that each of us has his sorrows as
> well as his joys, that the important thing is to dis-
> cover a goal compatible with one's abilities, one which
> allows him to realize his nature <u>without seeking to sur-
> pass it in some manner, thrusting it violently and arti-
> ficially beyond its natural limits</u>*(ME:49-50).

Conversely, Durkheim argued that moral discipline is not only necessary for social functioning, to complete man's nature, to develop personality or character structure, for freedom and happiness, but moreover, discipline is essential for health (see also Book Three). Without constraint of the egocentric passions of one half of human nature, a constitutional human dis-ease rages out of control.

> We have observed that discipline is often viewed as a
> violation of man's natural constitution, since it im-
> pedes his unrestricted development. Is this contention
> sound? Quite to the contrary, an inability to restrict
> one's self within determinate limits is a sign of dis-
> ease--with respect to all forms of human conduct and,
> even more generally, for all kinds of biological beha-
> vior. With a certain amount of nourishment a normal man
> is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be
> satisfied (ME:38).

Indeed, Durkheim argued, again and again, here and especially in <u>Suicide</u>, that the release from the constraints of moral dis-cipline--or anomie--and the release of the insatiable passions harbored in the human ego--can only result in suffering. The

inevitable consequence of the release of the affliction of "dis-eases of the infinite" is self-destruction.

> A need, a desire, freed from all restraints, and all rules, no longer geared to some determinate object- ive and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it. What grati- fication indeed, can such a desire yield, since by definition it is incapable of being satisfied? An in- satiable thirst cannot be slaked*(ME:39-40).

Thus, the only true way for man to avoid the affliction of "insatiable thirst" and self-destruction--Durkheim's equiva- lent of the metaphysical notions of evil and sin--is for the will to become disciplined in the "school of duty"--that is, in social obligation.

> In order to have a full sense of self-realization, man, far from needing to see limitless horizons un- rolling before him, in reality finds nothing as un- happy as the indeterminate reach of such a prospect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career without any definite terminus, he can only be happy when involved in definite and specific tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however, that man must arrive at some fixed position where ultimately he finds tranquillity. In intermittent steps one can pass from one special task to others equally specific, without drowning in the dissolving sense of limitless- ness. The important thing is that behavior have a clear-cut objective, which may be grasped and which limits and determines it (ME:40).

Durkheim completed his outline of his philosophy of "human finitude" and the need for limitation by suggesting that man too must submit to the natural law that "all life is complex equilibrium."

> In order to live, we have to confront the multiple requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital energy. The amount of energy that we can and should devote to achieving each particular goal is neces- sarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of the strength at our disposal and the relative signi- ficance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a complex equilibrium whose elements limit one another; this balance cannot be disrupted without producing un- happiness or illness. Moreover, those activites in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupted become a source of pain to the person--and for the same rea- son--the disproportionate development accorded to them (ME:39).

Thus, with his philosophy of "human finitude" Durkheim pro-
vides an explanation--a "theodicy" and a "therapeutic" if you
will--of man's essential nature, the causes of the inevitable
tensions renting his equilibrium, and causing human suffering,
the way forward to happiness, and so on. Even as a positivist,
Durkheim clearly stands in an honorable tradition of moral
philosophy reaching all the way back to Aristotle and his
Ethics.

C. A Preliminary Critique

It is not my purpose to engage here in a full-scale
critique of Durkheim's sociological theory of moral reality.
Further, I shall relegate many criticisms of Durkheim's doc-
trine of the dualism of human nature as they are relevant to
our present concerns to Book Three. Instead, I wish now to
merely note the following points which may prove relevant to
our subsequent explorations. Hopefully, this brief examina-
tion of the basic outlines of Durkheim's early moral theory
has revealed some of the many reasons why Durkheim considered
discipline absolutely necessary to restrain the potentially
insatiable and egocentric passions of the organic ego. How-
ever, I feel compelled to lodge some objections. My first cri-
tique is directed at the very topic which Durkheim chose here
for his own--namely, the grounds of moral obligation.

Now, it is only by perceiving the role of the extreme-
ly negative, even chaotic, reality of the insatiable passions
of the pre-socialized human ego in posing dangers to the moral
life,that I can even begin to understand why Durkheim assigned
discipline the pre-eminent role in the moral life. Certainly,
by this disproportionate emphasis, Durkheim largely ignored
another fundamental aspect which many moral theorists have
postulated as the very foundation of morality--namely, equity
or reciprocity. It was precisely at this point that the great
Piaget objected to Durkheim's moral theory, for he noted that
Durkheim's notion of morality was largely hierarchical, as if
rules were unilaterally handed down from on high to the child.

Instead (for example, in The Moral Judgement of the Child, 1965), Piaget distinguished two different forms of the construction of morality--the hierarchical form, and the type of reciprocity negotiated between peers, especially among children playing games for example. Piaget, of course, was more interested in the second type, while Durkheim was more interested in the first. Yet, is any account of the genesis of morality complete without discussion of both obligation and reciprocity? Indeed, we would do well to remember Durkheim's own dual emphasis on society as both the source and the object of moral rules; morality regulates social relations.

This curious lapse in Durkheim's theoretical framework helps to explain why--even when working within Durkheim's own positivistic frame of reference--he gave so little attention to the varied rationales underlying specific types of social obligations. In Durkheim's system we scarcely find mention of the reasons for the many moral rules and prohibitions which guide our lives--namely, the concern with the potential harm (whether physical, moral, or spiritual) that we may do to others (whether by omission or commission) by our actions (whether they be consciously intended or merely emerge as unanticipated results).

Further, Durkheim's limitation of the object of morality to social groups slights the fact that moral rules and individual duties are directed not only to society and self but even to the world. Here Durkheim was led astray by his later insistence that the choice of physical objects with which to invest sacredness is largely arbitrary; on the contrary, I maintain that the choice of prime symbols is rarely arbitrary (eg. see Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, 1973, or Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols, 1967). If there be techno-logic, there also has to be symbol logic; and here the particular characteristics of the symbolic object in a symbolic process are often crucial. Moreover, how could we, within the confines of Durkheim's sociologistical system, even begin to speak of an ecological conscience, of the pressing need for a "wilderness ethic" (eg. see Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac, 1966, or Christo-

pher Stone, <u>Should</u> <u>Trees</u> <u>Have</u> <u>Standing</u>? <u>Toward</u> <u>Legal</u> <u>Rights</u>
<u>For</u> <u>Natural</u> <u>Objects</u>, 1974)?

Clearly, Durkheim's ascetic obsession with repressing
the inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recogni-
tion of potentially significant wider moral horizons. However,
even given the magnitude and significance of this obsession
in his system, Durkheim was still often not clear about the
precise source of this important insatiable drive. Earlier I
suggested that, given the logic of his theoretical grounding
of his argument in man's evolutionary status as <u>the</u> sociocult-
ural animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and
biology was hereafter subject to critical review by the fact
that, by definition, man's sociocultural achievement had chang-
ed the very structure of his organic inheritance. In addition,
it seemed clear that biological appetites were restrained nat-
urally--either by physiological limitation or by the upper lim-
its of carrying capacity of the supporting environment. Unfor-
tunately, however, Durkheim didn't seem to perceive these ful-
ler implications of his original evolutionary propositions; a
pity for both him and for us. Had he done so, my task in eluci-
dating the possible extensions of this logic in terms of the
wider implications of his <u>Suicide</u> schemas would have been great-
ly eased. In other words, if the potential for insatiability
is derived from man's generic essence as <u>the</u> sociocultural ani-
mal, then it follows that we must look to the specific config-
urations of cultural values in any historical society for the
specific expressions--whether realized, repressed, or redi-
rected--of this potential drive for infinity. For example,
Durkheim unfortunately often speaks of the unsocialized child
as almost an animal. And in much of <u>Moral</u> <u>Education</u> and <u>Suicide</u>
Durkheim seemed to revert back to the very position which his own
theoretical logics had seemed to confute--namely, that the
source of this key insatiability (his positivist analogy with
old notions of evil and sin)--was biological, that is, expres-
sed primarily in terms of the sensual appetites.

Thus, by a sort of covert operation in the underground
of thought, Durkheim's posivitism led him here (however much he

may have consciously rejected the identification) toward link-
ing in his system the source of human suffering to the "origi-
nal sin" (our organic inheritance) embodied in the inordinate
desires expressed through the sensual appetites (the "flesh").
The tension in human existence derives from the inherent con-
flict in the nature of man between these two separate lower
and higher entities warring in each man's breast. However,
Durkheim's early tragic vision did not include here the per-
haps more critical sources of tension and suffering in the hu-
man condition. I refer to the wrenching, exhausting conflicts
between competing value systems or moralities, especially when
these compete for ascendancy within the same person. I believe
social psychologists refer to this situation as "cognitive dis-
sonance." Certainly, Max Weber, Durkheim's contemporary, knew
from tragic personal experience (eg. see Mitzman, 1971) the
tensions introduced by the warring demons holding the "very
fibers of our lives." The later Durkheim moved closer to this
position, as we shall soon see.

Now, one might attempt to rescue part of Durkheim's
"brittle synthesis" by suggesting a distinction between his
conflation of the human ego in terms of the concrete ego of
the child, for instance, and the abstract generic essence of
the nature of the human species. Nevertheless, Durkheim's lo-
gical troubles have only begun. For we have seen that Durkheim
had insisted, when he came to theoretically ground man's nature
in terms of his evolutionary achievement, that man is man not
only because of those sociocultural achievements known as civ-
ilization" (eg. ME:325), but also because his generic species
nature is based on a "newly awakened conscience," "spiritual
forces," "moral and mental life," and so forth. How, then,
can it be that this generic species essence (I use the term
in the evolutionary, not the metaphysical, sense) of man-as-
man--even if expressed in the concrete pre-socialized ego of
the child--could simultaneously be the source of both the amor-
ality of the non-social ego and the moral discipline of socie-
ty? If man is, by nature, social and cultural, then from what
derives his essential amorality? His passionate insatiability?

Given the thrust of Durkheim's evolutionary arguments, we have
already ruled out of court man's animal nature (since our biolo-
gical needs and processes are naturally disciplined). The only
candidate left is the old standby--the pre-socialized ego; but
how can we reconcile the social and moral origins of the human
individual--even the ego, evolutionarily considered--with its
supposed insatiability? How can Durkheim legitimately have
sought to maintain his stark dichotomy between the individual
and the social, when he himself had insisted that the very
foundations of the human individual--as an "awakened conscience"
a new reflective center--emerges in evolutionary terms only
from sociocultural origins? In other words, is the ego more im-
portant here as the source of insatiable drives, or as repre-
senting the absence of moral rules and rational concepts? I
believe the latter is more acceptable, and, indeed, that is
the direction in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop.

Now, Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways; and in-
deed, in other places the opposition is much simpler and less
paradoxical when he speaks as if the basically amoral passions
of the troublesome ego derived from the lower organic levels.
In that case, the only logical conclusion is that the human ego
is virtually identical with animal egos, with the biological
ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself. There
is, however, scant justification for pursuing such an abstact-
ed argument very far beyond its obvious applications, and thus,
evident limitations. Certainly this alternative is not a socio-
cultural explanation (see also Book Three). Therefore, we are
left little choice but to conclude that Durkheim's thought on
this absolutely crucial question of the source of insatiability
--whether it be the pre-socialized organic ego or human socie-
ty and culture itself--did, indeed, represent a "brittle syn-
thesis." Surely much of the unsatisfactory "brittleness" of
this first view is that it represented an unwarranted incorp-
oration--even with the rhetorical inversion--of a foreign ele-
ment into Durkheim's thought (see Book Three). Further, the
first solution represented a way of metaphorically translating
and anchoring in his positivistic system some of the tradi-

tional moral elements such as sin and evil which otherwise
could not be accomodated.

Moreover, we need not really be surprised that, even
as a pioneer sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts
be explained socially, Durkheim's concurrent other role as a
positivist moral philosopher constantly led him to surrepti-
tiously contravene the basic methodological rules that he him-
self had laid down as the foundation of his school. Indeed, few
have noticed how inconsistent Durkheim was in regularly assign-
ing key dynamic elements of human action to the very abstract-
ion--the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego--which he had so
powerfully criticized in the "social contract" theorists. Here,
Durkheim's logical flaw was that rather than portraying the
child as a socially neutral entity, possessed of certain pro-
clivities and potentialities awaiting cultural imprinting, on
the contrary, he constantly pictured human nature as the power-
ful source of negative and destructive passions. Besides the
rhetorical mistake of accepting a basic image from his polem-
ical opponents, here reinforced by Cartesian metaphors rife in
his own culture, Durkheim's dark doctrine of generic human na-
ture gets him into the serious bind, as it does to all social
thinkers who unwittingly insist on basing society and culture
on psychological or biological premises, of proposing that some
of the most dynamic, generative, and significant sources of
human action are to be derived primarily from lower, non-human,
non-sociocultural levels. Besides running directly counter to
his own notion of society and culture as evolutionary emergents,
and social facts as <u>sui</u> <u>generis</u> phenomena that cannot be re-
duced to lower levels, and against my definition of man as <u>the</u>
sociocultural animal, and further, against Parsons' (1949) and
others' important thesis that the advance of social science
depends on the progressive over-coming of "naturalistic" (i.e.
physical, biological, psychological, geographical, etc.) re-
ductions by properly drawn sociocultural explanations, Durk-
heim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as
darkly and destructively egoistic and insatiable implicitly
reduces society and culture to the relatively passive role of

con§training or simply redirecting the really critical organic
desires (see also Book Three for fuller development of these
objections).

Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here--I mean
extending a key Cartesian logic deeply embedded in his own
cultural tradition, and rhetorically inverting the high valua-
tion of the generic individual so insistently proclaimed by his
polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of pos-
itivist moral science--barred complete and unconditional em-
brace of the fully sociocultural position. The sociological
position more fully consistent with Durkheim's own stated me-
thodological prescriptions is that society and culture should
be considered, both in generic and evolutionary terms, as the
crucially important generative and directive sources of the most
significant aspects of human action. In sum, despite the evident
cultural and polemical functions served by the early version
of his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknow-
ledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of interpretive
root dichotomies originally anchored in this same image, none-
theless, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher
intrudes too strongly here for us to follow him in his funda-
mental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as in-
herently insatiable.

D. Durkheim's Tragic Vision of the Human Condition: His Later Notion of the Duality of Human Nature

Preface. Although Durkheim's notion of the endemic antagonism
between the individual ego and the socially constructed person
represented a seminal dichotomy from early in his career, it
was not until much later that Durkheim came to explicitly and
systematically formulate this notion as a constitutive founda-
tion of his doctrine. Those secondary observers who have missed
the significance of this crucial split in man's nature running
through his earlier works are not alone, for even Durkheim's
critics in his own day failed to recognize this dichotomy as
one of the driving forces behind his masterpiece The Elementary

Forms of the Religious Life. Yet, Durkheim announced in the
introduction his intention to reformulate this old staple of
traditional moral philosophy.

> According to the well-known formula, man is double.
> There are two beings in him: an individual being
> which has its foundation in the organism, and the
> circle of whose activities is therefore strictly
> limited, and a social being which represents the
> highest reality in the intellectual and moral order
> that we can know by observation--I mean society.
> This duality of our nature has its consequence in
> the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral
> ideal to a utilitarian motive, and in the order of
> thought, the irreducibility of reason to individual
> experience. In so far as he belongs to society, the
> individual transcends himself, both when he thinks
> and when he acts (EF:29).

Again and again in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim utilized the
old formula of homo duplex in highly innovative ways. For exam-
ple, in terms of the awakening of conscience and consciousness,
and thus the emergence of the person in collective ritual,Durk-
heim explicitly referred to the duality of human nature.

> This is the objective foundation of the idea of the
> soul: those representations whose flow constitutes
> our interior life are of two different species which
> are irreducible one into another. Some concern them-
> selves with the external and material world; others,
> with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral su-
> periority over the first. So we are really made up of
> two beings facing in different and almost contrary di-
> rections, one of whom exercises a real preeminence
> over the other.
> Such is the profound meaning of the antithesis which
> all men have more or less clearly conceived between
> the body and the soul, the material and the spiritual
> beings who coexist within us. Moralists and preachers
> have often maintained that no one can deny the reality
> of duty and its sacred character without falling into
> materialism. And it is true that if we have no idea
> of moral and religious imperatives, our psychical life
> will all be reduced to one level, all our states of
> consciousness will be on the same plane, and all feel-
> ing of duality will vanish. To make this duality intel-
> ligible, it is, of course, in no way necessary to ima-
> gine a mysterious and unrepresentable substance, under
> the name of the soul, which is opposed to the body....
> It remains true that our nature is double; there really
> is a particle of divinity in us because there is within
> us a particle of these great ideas which are the soul
> of the group (EF:298-9).

Two years after publication of The Elementary Forms,
Durkheim expressed surprise and chagrin that these underlying
root dichotomies had not been adequately understood as the cru-
cial foundation of that masterwork. The basic opposition with
which Durkheim filled in the old formula of homo duplex was
the contrast between the privatized physical sensations and
appetites, almost the autistic, inward-turning of the organic
ego, on the one hand, and the publicly communicable collective
representations expressed in terms of the increasingly univer-
salizable moral rules and rational concepts emerging from the
generic sociocultural process, and embedded in the core struct-
ures of conscience and consciousness constituting the person.
The general failure of others to understand his crucial series
of interpretive symbolic equations underlying the analytical
framework of The Elementary Forms led Durkheim to reemphasize
and explicitly articulate them in two important later addresses.
In 1913, Durkheim contributed to an important discussion, pub-
lished in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie
(see Lukes, 1973:585), on "Le Probleme religieux et la dualite
de la nature humaine." And in 1914, Durkheim published his
article "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions"
(in Wolff, 1960). Since the latter paper is Durkheim's most
explicit statement of this doctrine, we shall focus on it here.

As noted earlier, in the very process of extending his
root interpretive dichotomies, Durkheim's model tended to shift
slightly but significantly on its rhetorical axes. First, insa-
tiability was no longer the simple product of the inherently
inordinate desires of the human pre-socialized ego. Rather
than acting as the demonic source of destructive desires, the
organic ego came to be portrayed as merely privatized and cir-
cumscribed by its own inherent limitations. Thus, it is most
significant for our present purposes that Durkheim's concern
shifted from emphasizing the presence of destructive drives
in the pre-socialized generic ego, to the generic absence of
moral rules and universalizable concepts (see also Book Three).

The antagonism between the two halves of human nature
was, of course, still present, and even intensified. For now,

rather than the insatiability of the non-social half of human
nature being branded as the cause of man's endemic torment, it
was instead the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the
conflicting demands of both the physically privatized organic
ego <u>and</u> the claims of society on the moralized and rationalized
person. Truly, it seemed man was "double," for the two beings
in him represented different universes of being and valuing,
of knowing and doing. "Torn between two masters"--it was this
old image of man's tormented lot which lay at the heart of Durk-
heim's deepening tragic vision. Now, every endemic conflict re-
quires that we finally take our stand, and choose which side
will prevail. In this light, Durkheim's later sociological work
can be seen, in the last analysis, as that of a positivist mo-
ral philosopher issuing a "priestly" call for the necessary and
prolonged sacrifice of the ego, so that <u>logos</u> --universality
in morality and rationality in thought--might ultimately come
to prevail. Durkheim's call for a kind of modern stoic asceti-
cism embodied the essence of his own sociological system and
that of the Durkheimian school. In the face of the spreading
aggressions and impending doom of World War I, Durkheim, as
the "high priest" of positivist moral sociology, issued final
calls for the sacrifice of the ego--or <u>eros</u>--and the enthrone-
ment of reason--or <u>logos</u>.

1. <u>Ego</u> <u>is</u> <u>to</u> <u>Person</u> <u>as</u> <u>Body</u> <u>is</u> <u>to</u> <u>Soul</u>

When he finally came to explicitly and systematically art-
iculate his philosophical anthropology, Durkheim began by in-
sisting that "the constitutional duality of human nature"--
especially in terms of the root opposition between the body
and the soul--is a universal phenomenon. The antagonism be-
tween physical and moral-rational principles is perennial, and
always and everywhere these invidious dualisms between body and
soul, between <u>Geist</u> and <u>Welt</u>, are inextricably bound up with
the religious realms of the sacred and the profane. Inevitably,
things connected with the sacred principle are invested with
higher dignity, while things linked with the profane principle,
by virtue of their diammetrically opposed nature to the divine,

are reserved for general opprobrium.

As a positivist moral philosopher, Durkheim attempted
to "save the phenomena" by translating these seemingly univer-
sal dualities of human nature into purely sociologistical form-
ulas. Durkheim insisted that any universal social or cultural
phenomena cannot be illusory, that is, either mere ignorant
superstition or misplaced metaphysics. The universal must be
true--this was one of Durkheim's fundamental principles. There-
fore, since Durkheim presumed that symbols are real in their
causes and effects, he proposed that the duality of human na-
ture, especially in terms of the ubiquitous opposition between
the body and the soul, can be deciphered as merely a symbolic
projection of a constitutive experiential reality. Again and
again, Durkheim sounded the same refrain.

> A belief that is as universal and permanent as this
> cannot be purely illusory. There must be something
> in man that gives rise to this feeling that his na-
> ture is dual, a feeling that men in all known civi-
> lizations have experienced (DHN:326).

Against competing monistic images of man, which dismiss this
duality as illusory, Durkheim contended that, since this inner
tension has been felt by all peoples in all times and places,
it cannot thereby be legitimately dismissed simply as one of
man's earlier aberrations.

> It is still true that at all times man has been dis-
> quieted and malcontent. He has always felt that he is
> pulled apart, divided against himself; and the belief
> and practices to which, in all societies and all civi-
> lizations, he has always attached the greatest value,
> have as their object not to suppress these inevitable
> divisions but to attenuate their consequences, to give
> them meaning and purpose, to make them more bearable,
> and at the very least, to console man for their exist-
> ence. We cannot admit that this universal and chronic
> state of malaise is the product of a simple aberration,
> that man has been the creator of his own suffering, and
> that he has stupidly persisted in it, although his na-
> ture predisposed him to live harmoniously (DHN:330-1).

Durkheim's deep sense that this duality is irretrieva-
bly embedded in the very nature of life can be seen in a re-
port of a doctoral examination in 1910. Lukes reports the fol-
lowing exchanges:

> Durkheim: There is a sense in which "we" are subject to physical laws, and another in which "we" perform the moral law: we are double.
>
> Pradines (the candidate): I wanted to put an end to this dualism.
>
> Durkheim: You have not succeeded. Reason, you say, unifies the tendencies in the moral law just as in the physical law it unifies natural phenomena, but do you not see that this antagonism is in us, in ourselves? What difficulty is there here? How can you imagine that a dialectical trick will unify this dualism, which all thinkers before you have expressed, each in his own language, some tracing the social to the perceptible, others opposing the rational to the individual, but all seeing one characteristic, the most profound of all moral characteristics. You who claim to have so keen an apprehension of complexity, how is it that you have not felt that there is always in us something which is elevating, while another part of us draws us in an opposite direction?
>
> Pradines: It has seemed to me that classical rationalism was wrong not to put an end to this undeniable dualism.
>
> Durkheim: Such a solution is impossible. You have found in all systems an internal opposition. You have denounced this as a contradiction; you should have see that this contradiction is in life itself (Lukes, 1973:646).

This last phrase--"the contradiction is in life itself"--aptly sums up Durkheim's evolving tragic sense of the human condition

Durkheim further suggested that "Psychological analysis has, in fact, confirmed the existence of this duality--it finds it at the very heart of our inner life" (DHN:326). Durkheim found this psychological validation in the apparent constitutional opposition between the physically rooted sensations and appetites, on the one hand, and conceptual thought and moral rules on the other. Although we have noted these dichotomies before, it is important to recognize how these oppositions moved to the very center of Durkheim's later thought, while concern with the insatiability of the pre-socialized organic ego faded into the background. The physically rooted ego was no longer seen as insatiable, just fatally circumscribed in its own private orbit.

> Our intelligence, like our activity, presents two very different forms: on the one hand, are sensations and sensory tendencies; on the other, conceptual thought and moral activity. Each of these two

parts of ourselves represents a separate pole of
our being, and these two poles are not only dis-
tinct from one another, but are opposed to one ano-
ther. Our sensory appetites are necessarily egoistic:
they have our individuality and it alone as their ob-
ject. When we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, and so
on, without bringing any other tendency into play, it
is ourselves and ourselves alone, that we satisfy.
Conceptual thought and moral activity are, on the con-
trary, distinguished by the fact that the rules of con-
duct to which they conform can be universalized. There-
fore, by definition, they pursue impersonal ends. Mo-
rality begins with disinterest, with attachment to some-
thing other than ourselves. A sensation of color or
sound is closely dependent on my individual organism,
and I cannot detach the sensation from my organism.
In addition, it is impossible for me to make my aware-
ness pass over into someone else.... Concepts, on the
contrary, are always common to a plurality of men. They
are constituted by means of words, and neither the vo-
cabulary nor the grammar of a language is the work or
product of one particular person. They are rather the
results of a collective elaboration, and they express
the anonymous collectivity that employs them.... Be-
cause they are held in common, concepts are the supreme
instrument of all intellectual exchange. By means of
them, minds communicate (DHN:327).

To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites are neces-
sarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting particularity
meant that they cannot, by definition, rise above their purely
private sensational level. On the other hand, since concepts
and moral rules are social both in their origin and object--
that is, impersonal and collective--they tend to become uni-
versalized. Note that Durkheim here explicitly suggests that
these lower level organic needs can be satisfied; yet, by vir-
tue of their purely physical base, such need-satisfactions re-
main egocentric and thus inherently private.

Therefore, these two levels of our organism and our mo-
ral and intellectual life are opposed to one another as the in-
dividual ego is contrasted with the impersonal collective cul-
ture, and thus, as private is opposed to public. Since the two
beings within us--ego and person (body and soul)--are simul-
taneously drawn in different directions, Durkheim maintained
that man's inner life is irretrievably marked by a oscillation
back and forth between these two opposing poles of our exist-
ence. Because our inner life has a "double center of gravity,"

the perennial problem of resolving the competing claims of
these beings and maintaining an integrated, coherent person-
ality structure is greatly intensified.

> These two aspects of our psychic life are, therefore,
> opposed to each other as the personal and the imper-
> sonal. There is in us a being that represents every-
> thing in relation to itself and from its own point of
> view; in everything that it does, this being has no
> other object but itself. There is another being in
> us, however, which knows things sub specie aeternitis,
> as if it were participating in some thought other than
> its own, and which, in its acts, tends to accomplish
> ends that surpass its own. The old formula homo du-
> plex is therefore verified by the facts. Far from be-
> ing simple, our inner life has something that is like
> a double center of gravity. On the one hand, is our
> individuality--and more particularly, our body in
> which it is based; on the other is everything in us
> that expresses something other than ourselves (DHN:327-8).

The outlines of Durkheim's later tragic vision of life
thus emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to the earlier empha-
sis on insatiability, but now directed instead to the inevita-
ble discord between the two warring halves of our nature. Rather
than portraying the ego and the person, the physical and the mo-
ral, the private and the public, the concrete and the universal
halves of our beings, as necessarily complementary, Durkheim
contended that these opposing forces wage an eternal struggle
for ascendancy over our inner lives. To Durkheim, human reality
is fundamentally conflictual.

> Not only are these two groups of states of conscious-
> ness different in their origins and their properties,
> but there is a true antagonism between them. They mu-
> tually contradict and deny each other. We cannot pur-
> sue moral ends without causing a split within oursel-
> ves, without offending the instincts and the penchants
> that are most deeply rooted in our bodies. There is no
> moral act that does not imply a sacrifice, for, as
> Kant has shown, the law of duty cannot be obeyed with-
> out humiliating our individual sensitivity (DHN:328).

Durkheim thus insisted that living up to the demands of moral
and intellectual life requires constant sacrifice of egocentric,
purely privatized organic desires. In effect, Durkheim argued
that the life of man-in-society-and-culture is made possible
only through constant repression of all that is implied in ego-
centricity.

As Durkheim deepened the tension in the inner life of man by insisting that the antinomy between the two halves of human nature is irreconcilable, he came round again to the problem of insatiability, though in a rather different way. Now, man's inner torment comes from his inability to simultaneously satisfy both the biological and cultural halves of his inheritance.

> This antinomy is so deep and so radical that it can never be completely resolved. How can we belong entirely to ourselves, and entirely to others at one and the same time? The ego cannot be something completely other than itself, for if it were, it would vanish--this is what happens in ecstasy. In order to think we must be, we must have an individuality. On the other hand, however, the ego cannot be entirely and exclusively itself, for, if it were, it would be emptied of all content. If we must be in order to think, then we must have something to think about. To what would consciousness be reduced if it expressed nothing but the body and its states?
> We cannot live without representing to ourselves the world around us and the objects of every sort which fill it. And because we represent it to ourselves, it enters into us and becomes part of us. Consequently, we value the world and are attached to it just as we are to ourselves. Something else in us besides ourselves stimulates us to act (DHN:328).

In his own way, Durkheim began to approach the old metaphysical problem of the relations between unity and plurality. For, if "in order to think we must be" (the Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum"), we must have an individuality that is directed both to ourselves and the external world. At the same time, however, Durkheim contended that because of the physical limitations of individual experience, we cannot raise ourselves independently and spontaneously to the level of universal validity. Instead, the only path from the eros of the ego to the universalizable logos of the collectivity is to transcend our isolated and limited physical existence through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, culture, and history. As Durkheim had said earlier: "Only the universal is rational. The particular and the concrete baffle understanding."

> We understand only when we think in concepts. But sensory reality is not made to enter the framework of our concepts spontaneously and by itself. It

>resists, and, in order to make it conform, we have
>to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to
>sorts of laborious operations that alter it so that
>the mind can assimilate it. However, we never com-
>pletely succeed in mastering our sensations and in
>translating them completely into intelligible terms.
>They take on a conceptual form only by losing that
>which is most concrete in them, that which causes
>them to speak to our sensory beings and to involve
>it in action; and in so doing, they become something
>fixed and dead. Therefore, we cannot understand things
>without partially renouncing a feeling for life, and
>we cannot feel that life without renouncing the under-
>standing of it (DHN:329).

Shades of Simmel! We now discover that, according to Durkheim,
the deeper dimensions of the tragic paradox of the duality of
human nature come not merely from the need for higher human
levels to repress lower, non-human levels, but from the al-
most fatal double-bind that man finds himself in, especially
in terms of the mounting costs of this self-inflicted violence.
Inevitably, as we embark upon the journey from our own concrete
particularity to collective universality and rationality, the
necessarily increasing abstraction means that the feeling for
the vital flow of life itself is lost. As with Simmel's view
of the "tragedy of culture" and the "autonomization of forms"
(in Wolff, 1950), sensational life is in continuous motion
and process; but the abstract representations that are extern-
alized and lifted out of this continuous flow thereby become
frozen, things "fixed and dead." The inner struggle between
these two poles of being and becoming is couched here not so
much in terms of the Romantic notion of the inevitably and
paradoxical duality between life (Spirit) and death (mechan-
ism), as in terms of the opposition between eros and logos.
I repeat: the real source of Durkheim's tragic vision of the
human condition lies in an inescapable paradox; it is not sim-
ply that the collective and public side of man must do violence to
the organic ego, but rather that in this necessary process
the original feeling for the flow and ebb of the life-process
itself is lost. Ultimately, both ego and person--or eros and
logos--stand clearly for eternally valuable and necessary,
though eternally opposed, poles in the "double-bind" that is

human existence.

To emphasize this feeling of the tragedy inherent in the human condition, Durkheim characteristically returned to one of its preeminent expressions in his own cultural traditions--namely, to Pascal's formula that man is both "angel and beast." Thus, Durkheim's original dualism takes on increasingly diverse and profound overtones. To Durkheim, human reality is fundamentally conflictual; man is caught, by his very constitution, in a tragic "double-bind." The duality in the inner life of man means that suffering is rooted in our very nature.

> This inner contradiction is one of the characteristics of our nature. According to Pascal's formula, man is both "angel and beast," and not exclusively one or the other. The result is that we are never completely in accord with ourselves for we cannot follow one of our natures without causing the other to suffer. Our joys can never be pure; there is always some pain mixed with them; for we can never simultaneously satisfy the two beings that are within us (DHN:329).

It is important to emphasize that, by this point, the key problem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was now rooted in the eternal contradiction and inner division between the two halves of our nature, rather than in simply burdening one side --the organic--with the blame. The inability of man to attain inner peace and harmony is due to the fact that man is "double" and "divided against himself." Indeed, this image of reality as inherently conflictual--isn't this what is meant by a philosophy of dualism?

Granting that "we are double," that "we are the realization of an antinomy," that "man is divided against himself," that "man is a monster of contradictions" who "can never satisfy himself," Durkheim then asked rhetorically: "But where do this duality and antinomy come from?" Now, Durkheim's drive to reformulate moral philosophy and action in purely positivist and sociologistical terms is clearly evident here when he insisted that, contrary to most contemporary sociologists (especially those who consider themselves "positivists" and "pure social scientists"), it is the prime task of the science of man (or as Durkheim once called it anthroposociologie), to

account for this wrenching dualism of human nature, the prime mover in human action. Durkheim first set aside both the opposing monistic versions of the two dominant modern cultural traditions as eliminating the problem rather than meeting its complexities. Further, he dismissed the ontological argument, dating at least from Plato, which was the source of the notion of homo duplex--namely, that two opposed worlds of being meet in man--spirit and matter, heaven and earth. To Durkheim, the old ontological metaphor recognized but did not explain the root origins of this opposition. Of course, it was just this type of metaphysical argument, embedded especially in the Catholic Cultural Tradition, which served as the source of much of the very moral philosophy which tacitly nourished Durkheim, and which also helped fuel the positivists' centuries-long revolt. As he set aside the last major contender-- the neo-Kantian position which simply assigned these two opposing activities to opposing human faculties--Durkheim made the following crucial point. Contrary to all these contending positions, the "human spirit," far from being a generic given, must be considered a key sociocultural historical construction (see also the last chapter in this Book).

> We have generally thought of man's mental nature as a sort of ultimate given which needs not to be accounted for. Thus we tend to believe that all has been said and done when we attach such and such a fact, whose causes we are seeking, to a human faculty. But why should the human spirit, which is--to put i briefly--only a system of phenomena, be outside and above explanation? We know that our organism is the product of a genesis; why should it be otherwise with our psychic constitution (DHN:334)?

We see enunciated here a critical substantive principle of Durkheim's sociology (which we shall explore), one that would be developed later on by Marcel Mauss in his profound lecture "Une Categorie de l'esprit humain: la notion de personne, celle de 'moi'" (translated by L. Krader, 1968). Sociocultural analysis generally, and even philosophical discourse, would greatly improve if this critical principle were more widely understood.

After setting aside competing explanations, Durkheim
moved to anchor the origins of ego and person in the univer-
sal opposition between the sacred and the profane.

> The duality of our nature is thus only a particular
> case of that division of all things into the sacred
> and the profane that is the foundation of all reli-
> gions, and it must be explained on the basis of the
> same principles (DHN:335).

Just as the profane can only be defined by contrast with the
sacred, so too the organic ego is defined in opposition to a
category of the human spirit--the socioculturally constructed
person. As religion is double, so also the two poles of moral
and intellectual existence echo within each of us.

> It is not without reason, therefore, that man feels him-
> self to be double: he actually is double. There are in
> him two classes of states of consciousness that differ
> from each other in origin and nature, and in the ends
> toward which they aim. One class merely expresses our
> organisms and the objects to which they are most direct-
> ly related. Strictly individual, the states of conscious-
> ness of this class connect us only with ourselves, and
> we can no more detach them from us than we can detach
> ourselves from our bodies. The states of consciousness
> of the other class, on the contrary, come to us from so-
> ciety; they transfer society into us and connect us with
> something that surpasses us. Being collective, they are
> impersonal; they turn us toward ends that we hold in com-
> mon with other men; it is through them and them alone
> that we can communicate with others. It is, therefore,
> quite true that we are made up of two parts, and are like
> two beings, which, although they are closely associated,
> are composed of very different elements and orient us in
> opposite directions.... In brief, this duality corresponds
> to the double existence that we lead concurrently: the
> one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the
> other social and nothing but an extension of society.
> The origin of the antagonism that we have described is
> evident from the very nature of the elements involved in
> it. The conflicts ... are between the sensations and the
> sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the intellectual
> and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that pas-
> sions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual
> constitutions, while our rational activity--whether theo-
> retical or practical--is dependent on social causes (DHN:
> 337-38).

Finally, Durkheim returned to the theme of the suffering
inherent in the duality of the human condition. Pain and pro-

longed inner anguish are the lot of mankind, split as we are
between the forever conflicting claims of our physical and
moral selves. Durkheim's "social reality principle" insisted
on an inevitable clash of social forces with the unencumbered
ego. As with all split loyalties, the impossibility of simul-
taneously satisfying both halves of human nature is the cause
of perpetual tension and man's endemic inner torment.

> The painful character of the dualism of human nature
> is explained by this hypothesis. There is no doubt
> that if society were only the natural and spontaneous
> development of the individual, these two parts of our-
> selves would harmonize and adjust to each other without
> clashing and without friction: the first part, since
> it is only the extension and, in a way, the complement
> of the second, would encounter no resistance from the
> latter. In fact, however, society has its own nature,
> and consequently, its requirements are quite different
> from those of our nature as individuals: the interests
> of the whole are not necessarily those of the part.
> Therefore, society cannot be formed or maintained with-
> out our being required to make perpetual and costly sac-
> rifice. Because society surpasses us, it obliges us to
> surpass ourselves; and to surpass itself, a being must,
> to some degree, depart from its nature--a departure that
> does not take place without causing more or less painful
> tensions   (DHN:338).

Moreover, as society and culture grow increasingly complex
and differentiated, and thus, the need for rationality and
universality in thought and action grows correspondingly, man's
"double-bind" deepens, and inner tensions increase.

> Human malaise continues to increase. The great religions
> of modern man are those which insist the most on the
> existence of the contradictions in the midst of which
> we struggle. These continue to depict us as tormented
> and suffering, while only the crude cults of inferior
> societies breathe forth and inspire a joyful confidence.
> For what religions express is the experience through
> which humanity has lived, and it would be very surpri-
> sing if our nature became unified and harmonious when
> we feel that our discords are increasing (DHN:331-32).

In many ways, Durkheim's tragic vision of life was close
to Weber's, for both, in their most prophetic, pessimistic, and
profound moments, saw that each of us must finally choose among
the "inner demons holding the very fibers of our lives" which
to devote our life-energies. The choice, never easy, always
painful, must be made in full awareness both of the violence

we do to the lesser, though more vital, half of our nature, and the growing historical necessity of such asceticism. Both Durkheim and Weber demanded that ego and _eros_ give way to _logos_ and the morally disciplined person if western civilization was to survive.

> We must do violence to certain of our strongest inclin-
> ations. Therefore, since the role of the social being
> in our single selves will grow ever-more important as
> history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there
> will ever be an era in which man is require to resist
> himself to a lesser degree, an era in which we can live
> a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the
> contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort
> in the struggle between the two beings within us to in-
> crease with the growth of civilization (DHN:339).

A stark vision indeed--the inner anguish of the constitution-
al duality of human nature deepened by historical necessity.
In the face of this "theodicy," it was precisely the stead-
fast refusal to endorse any of the myriad and competing
"therapuetics" abroad in their own days which counseled
"trascendence" and diverse modes of "jumping out of your
skin" which marks both Durkheim and Weber as moral realists,
and ultimately as tragic figures. In one of those hidden i-
ronies of history, wherein the gods take revenge on those ti-
tans who challenge them, both Durkheim and Weber, from oppo-
sing sides of the first European catastrophe of the twentieth
century, felt compelled, each in his own way, to issue calls
for the values of _logos_--universality and rationality--and to
stand steadfastly by their fates, and simply "meet the demands
of the day." Weber died within a year or so after the end of
World War I; Durkheim died in 1917, it has been said, of a
broken heart.

CHAPTER THREE

CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

> It is not at all true that between science on the one
> hand, and morals and religion on the other, there ex-
> ists that sort of antinomy which has so frequently
> been admitted, for the two forms of human activity
> really come from one and same source (EF:494).

> The French word conscience is ambiguous, embracing
> the meanings of the two English words "conscience"
> and "consciousness." Thus, the "beliefs and senti-
> ments" comprising the conscience collective are, on
> one hand, moral and religious, and, on the other,
> cognitive (Lukes, 1973:4).

The intimate relations between rationales of conscience
and the structures of consciousness constitute one of the
most fundamental, and least recognized, of Durkheim's postu-
lates. The very terms employed by Durkheim here reveal his deep-
est intentions, for the French word conscience, as with the
Latin conscientia, conveys both the meanings of moral decision
and intellectual understanding. This fruitful ambiguity is re-
tained today in the two meanings of "right and wrong" in the
cognitive and moral senses. Thus, although the terms conscience
and consciousness are separated in English, in Durkheim's basic
sociocultural theory the logics of moral decision and the lo-
gics of intellectual understanding are always and everywhere
intertwined.

As we approach the significance of this fruitful ambi-
guity, we would do well to remember that Durkheim declared that
society is itself a moral phenomena, or more precisely, socie-
ty is the only moral phenomenon. Correspondingly, morality
is preeminently social. Moreover, these reciprocal relations
between morality and society are evolutionarily grounded. With
these commitments in mind, we can begin to perceive the central-
ity in Durkheim's system of the crucial relation between social

forms and the forms of conscience and consciousness. Indeed, the notions of conscience and consciousness as a closely interrelated pair constitute key links in Durkheim's system between different historical societies and different phenomenologies of the person, on the one hand, and Durkheim's corresponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of morality, religion, and knowledge on the other.

If we continue to translate away the fruitful ambiguity of Durkheim's usage of that seminal French word conscience--I mean its dual meanings of morality and cognition--we shall also continue to forfeit the key to unlocking the seemingly paradoxical relations which Durkheim posited between his sociology of religion, knowledge, and morality. Far too often we approach Primitive Classification or The Elementary Forms, for example, in terms of a rather simple equation between social structure and the basic forms of thought and religion. Whether or not they agree, most observers seem to grasp Durkheim's notion that the source of key collective representations embodied in religious ritual and the categories of logical thought are to be found originally in the social morphological structure of the human group. However, what perennially mystifies is this: even granting their common origins, why should Durkheim so insistently intertwine his sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge? Once one begins, however, to perceive the intimate interrelations between cognition and morality suggested by the connotations of the French term employed by Durkheim here, the paradox begins to evaporate. Alpert reminds us: "The Elementary Forms, it should not be forgotten, was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of Thought and of Religious Life" (1939:55). Wallwork has also noted that " ... Durkheim associates epistemological and phenomenological connotations with the collective conscience, which enables him to employ this concept in explaining moral obligation" (1972:37). In sum, in Durkheim's sociologistical system, conscience--in terms of the moralities of thought--and consciousness--in terms of the logics of action--often follow

one from the other, while both, in turn, are linked with the underlying social morphological substratum of the human group.

Indeed, Durkheim's central insight that the rationales of conscience and the structures of consciousness are always and everywhere intertwined constitutes, in my opinion, a highly illuminating and significant tool for sociocultural analysis. Even more, when seen in comparative and historical terms, Durkheim's rule suggests the following hermeneutical canon: in general, fundamental changes in the grounds of conscience often precede fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness. In short, tracing basic shifts in the grounds and structures of legitimate moral authority and intellectual decision move to the center stage of in-depth sociocultural inquiry.

Strangely, none of those prominent sociologists who read Durkheim in the original French, and then published noteworthy accounts of his thought in English, were apparently able to successfully shake loose from the translators perennial difficulty. Neither Parsons (who chose to leave conscience untranslated), nor Alpert, nor Foskett, nor Bellah, nor Nisbet, nor LaCapra, nor Poggi, nor Wallwork, nor Giddens, nor Lukes, capitalized on the crucial ambiguity of Durkheim's intertwined notions of conscience and consciousness to illuminate his system, and especially his closely interrelated sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge. Even so perspicacious an observer as Steven Lukes, the foremost contemporary intellectual biographer of Durkheim, has apparently not yet perceived the crucial significance of Durkheim's usage of this ambiguity. Lukes, as with many others, unfortunately treats this double meaning as simply yet another difficulty encountered in translation.

> There is the further difficulty of translation from French to English. Sometimes what is perfectly intelligible in French cannot be directly translated into seemingly equivalent English words (such as conscience and "conscience").... The French words map out a different conceptual structure from the English; they make different discriminations, and carry different presuppositions and connotations*(1973:3).

Perhaps because of the long-standing opposition between science

and religion, or the investment in the fact-value distinction, or perhaps because of the drive to establish sociology as an autonomous science, free from lingering ethical or philosophical entanglements, or for whatever reasons, none of these mainline sociologists successfully brought our attention to the potential significance of Durkheim's thesis of the intimate linkages between structures of conscience and consciousness. Rather, from the point of view of their own special preoccupations, it has been a medieval historian turned sociologist, a famous psychologist of child development, and a cultural anthropologist, who, having turned to Durkheim for illumination, discovered there these crucial insights. Let us now briefly explore this curious turn of events.

I first learned the significance of the intimately intertwined Durkheimian notions of conscience and consciousness from a former medieval historian turned sociologist--namely, Benjamin Nelson. Nelson has specialized in precisely these areas of unraveling the tangled relations between structures of conscience and consciousness, and, in turn, the significance of fundamental shifts in these structures as anchors of cultural complexs and civilizations, all seen in comparative and historical perspective. Nelson, who was sensitized to the significance of these double connotations by his knowledge of their linkage in medieval culture, was led to Durkheim's insights through the medium of Jean Piaget.

> Following a maxim of Piaget based on Durkheim, I have called the schemas the "moralities of thought" and the "logics of action." Since the Middle Ages, both of these structures have regularly rested upon a single hinge, namely, the notion of conscientia which had the combined sense in Latin and other languages of "conscience" and "consciousness" (1972:105).

In another, earlier work, Nelson also acknowledged:

> I owe the phrase (the"moralities of thought and the logics of action") to Jean Piaget (1948) who derived it by extending a notion of Durkheim" "Logic is the morality of thought, morality is the logic of action" (1968: 161).

Indeed, Piaget's very turn of phrase here suggests the potency of Durkheim's insights, for normally we associate morality with action, and logic with thought. However, under Durkheim's

influence, Piaget profoundly inverted these terms and spoke instead of the central "moralities of thought and logics of action" which lie at the very bases of society, culture, and personality.

The anthropologist, Paul Bohannan, has rightly emphasized the theoretical potency of Durkheim's ambiguous language.

From his anthropological perspective, Bohannan illuminates the several meanings of Durkheim's key term conscience in relation to the notions of culture and generic sociocultural process. Of Durkheim, Bohannan remarks:

> ... Perhaps no social scientist ever used ambiguity with better effect.... It is plain that Durkheim meant at least three things by conscience, and it was this very triunity that allowed him to think with the concept. The first ambiguity is inherent in the French language. English requires two words--"conscience" and "consciousness"--to translate conscience. That these two form a single concept in French means that, for all French sociologists, internalized sanctions are amalgamated ... with awareness of the social milieu. This factor is not unique with Durkheim.... Rather, attention must be paid to a more subtle ambiguity, one that cannot be untangled with reference to a dictionary. Conscience was used by Durkheim to mean the instrument of awareness, a meaning which is more or less equivalent to the English "consciousness." But the third and more important meaning of conscience is "that of which someone is (or many persons are) aware" and the only suitable English term for this notion is the anthropologists' term "culture." Thus, the French term conscience means three things: internalized sanctions, awareness, and perceived culture (1960: 78-79).

Bohannan then proceeds to make the crucial observation that Durkheim's simultaneously resonating conscience also implied both the noun and verb-like aspects of culture. This linkage between the notions of conscience and consciousness and cultural process in terms of collective representations as both object and process is, I agree with Bohannan, a crucial perspective that must be recaptured by the human sciences.

> To read Durkheim's concepts of representation and conscience as interaction of a subject and an object is to misunderstand them. Their vital characteristic is a blending of subject and object into a single unit. In Durkheim's theory, something which

> we view as an interaction between two processes is
> analyzed as a single process.... Durkheim focussed
> his attention on the verbal connection between them:
> the "knowing" or, as he called it, the process of
> representation.... This ambiguous assimilation of
> the knowing instrument and the known thing--of con-
> sciousness and culture--into a single concept was
> vital to Durkheim's thought.... American and Eng-
> lish interpretations of Durkheim ... have separa-
> ted the two substantive elements which Durkheim in-
> tended to leave conjoined. In the separation, the
> processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared
> (1960:79-80).

Bohannan's insights into the processual aspects of Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process are critical to understanding how the latter related social morphological intensities to the emergence of collective representations as crystallizations both of group self-awareness and normative discipline.

> ... the collective representation is both a thing
> perceived and a perceiving agent; one can say that
> it is a "perceiving." Seen in this way, the mass of
> collective representations--of "perceivings"--be-
> comes the collective conscience (1960:82).

Bohannan's argument that Durkheim's seemingly simple notions of conscience and representation imply both verb and nounlike dimensions is reinforced by Steven Lukes. Lukes notes two related ambiguities built into Durkheim's concept of representation collective which have great interpretive significance.

> In the first place, the concept representation refers
> both to the mode of thinking, conceiving, or perceiv-
> ing, and to that which is thought, conceived, or per-
> ceived. And second, the representation is collective
> both in its origin, determining its mode or form, and
> in its reference or object (it is also, of course, col-
> lective in being common to the members of a society or
> group). Thus, Durkheim wanted to say both that repre-
> sentations collectives are socially generated and that
> they refer to, and are in some sense "about" society.
> (This duality is clearest in his sociology of religion
> and in his sociology of morality) (1973:6-7).

Thus, Durkheim's fundamental sociocultural theory presents us with a series of fruitful ambiguities in relation to the seminal terms--conscience, representation, and collective.Truly a profound ambiguity, and a profound contribution to the building of the human sciences!

How difficult this process of recapturing the simul-
taneously intertwined meanings implied in Durkheim's usage of
his paradigmatic terms can be gauged by the long odyssey of
Durkheim's foremost American interpreter--Talcott Parsons.
While Parsons wisely avoided the imputation of the "group mind"
specter to Durkheim's term <u>collective conscience</u> (1949:309) by
leaving it untranslated, nevertheless, he also tended to split
the two meanings of <u>conscience</u> and assigned them to separate
phases in Durkheim's intellectual development (eg. see 1949:
309). After the great series of intellectual breakthroughs
which Parsons imputes to Durkheim's development, <u>conscience</u>
was said to take on a very different meaning.

> It involves a radical shift of emphasis from the ori-
> ginal definition and context of use of the <u>collective</u>
> <u>conscience</u>. The latter concept originally referred to
> a body of beliefs and sentiments held in common; the
> collectiveness of it consisted in the "in commonness."
> <u>Now</u> the collectiveness consists in the nature of the
> reality exterior to the individual to which the indi-
> vidual's "representations" refer. It is not a subject-
> ive community of beliefs and sentiments which is the
> source of solidarity, but rational orientation to the
> same set of phenomena in the environment of action, an
> "objective" source of uniformities (1949:360).

So intent was Parsons on forcing Durkheim into the mold
of "Social System" thinking that it took over thirty years for
him to begin to revise his notion of the split between the moral
and cognitive meanings of Durkheim's seminal term <u>conscience</u>.
In his 1973 article "Durkheim's <u>Elementary Forms of the Reli-</u>
<u>gious Life</u> Revisited," Parsons acknowledges, in contrast, to his
earlier position, that the "cognitive and moral elements" im-
plied in Durkheim's usage of the term <u>conscience</u> belonged togeth-
er from the very beginning. "The essential thing is the inclu-
sion of <u>both</u> (cognitive and moral) references in the same form-
ula, not the shift in interest from the cognitive to the moral"
(1973:164). Although still not directly perceiving the simple
but fruitful ambiguity in the French meanings of <u>conscience</u>,
which suggested Durkheim's fundamental insight that structures
of conscience and consciousness are always and everywhere inti-
mately intertwined, Parsons acknowledged his earlier ambivalence

toward Durkheim's insistent linkage of his sociologies of religion, morality, and knowledge.

> I had not been fully aware of the extent to which the progression from the Cartesian conception of the facticity of the milieu social to the idea of constraint by moral authority was not simply progress from a more to a less elementary theoretical perspective, but was the framework within which both conceptions came to be combined in a unique manner. The realization that this is the case has, I think, been basically dependent on the conception that much of Durkheim's thought was couched at the level of the general theory of action and not only of the social system (1973:163).

It is revealing, however, that even as Parsons plods closer to this important insight, he still insists on placing it within his own very special framework. Parsons implies that this last great breakthrough in understanding Durkheim's doctrine could only have come through his own convoluted theory of generic human action. But, as we have just discovered, several theorists before Parsons clearly recognized the great significance of Durkheim's multiple meanings of his crucial terms conscience, representation, and collective. Perhaps they made this important discovery because they simply attended to the multiple meanings of the words in themselves, instead of allowing themselves to be sidetracked by Parsons' great (and greatly misleading) intellectual drama.

Indeed, this episode serves as an object lesson in the history of science--namely, how the profundity of a great thinkers' paradigms can be distorted by the powerfully wrought, and widely pervasive, intellectual drama of an influentially situated theorist (and intellectual broker) like Talcott Parsons. This irony is compounded here because the famous secondary interpreter entertained the best of intentions as a would-be rescuer of the original founding fathers' much-maligned theories. Further, it demonstrates how even ardent followers of the pioneer could not perceive the full depths of the original doctrine, except through the colored-glasses of a prime secondary interpreter (see much of Lukes, 1973, for instance). Finally, it reveals how only a small handful of relative "outsiders," with little investment in the dominant perspective, boldly returned

to the original source itself, and discovered there meanings
which had long been slighted.

       The ironies of history are such that it may not be
possible, at this time (see McCloskey, 1976b) to fully judge
the significance of the ways in which Parsons retarded or ad-
vanced the understanding of Durkheim's contributions to the
human sciences. In any case, the preceding case-study reveals
a typical sociocultural process--in any renaissance, new en-
ergies are generated and new paths blazed by those bold e-
nough to return to the full dimensions of the original sour-
ces themselves. And, in this case, Durkheim's intentions and
potential significance are clearly indicated by the double
meanings conveyed by the key terms <u>conscience</u>, <u>representation</u>,
and <u>collective</u>.

DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL:

SUBSTRUCTURAL SOCIAL MORPHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SUPER-

STRUCTURAL COLLECTIVELY REPRESENTATIONAL PROCESSES

Besides the social ways of being, there are the social
ways of doing; besides the morphological phenomena,
there are the functional or physiological phenomena
(1960:362).

Structure itself is encountered in becoming (1960:362).

In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the ele-
mentary group which gave rise to ever-more compound
groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the
elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with
one another, have formed the progressively more complex
phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution
(1960:374).

One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying
social phenomena ... we take care not to leave them in
the air, but always to relate them to a definite substra-
tum ... a human group occupying a determinate portion of
geographically representable space (1971:809).

The progress of the division of labor is in direct ratio
to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL:257).

If we specialize, it is not to produce more, but it is
to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that
have been made for us (DL:275).

With animals, the organism assmilates social facts to
it, and, stripping them of their special nature, trans-
forms them into biological facts. Social life is mater-
ialized. In man, on the contrary, and particularly in
higher societies, social causes substitute themselves
for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized
(DL:346-7).

Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from
being antagonistic to social action, it results from it.
... it is a conquest of society over nature. [Liberty]
can realize itself progressively insofar as man raises
himself above things and makes law for them, thus depri-
ving them of their fortuitous, absurd, amoral character;
that is, insofar as he becomes a social being. For man
can escape nature only by creating another world where
he dominates nature. That world is society (DL:386-7).

Society is also of nature and yet dominates it. Not only
do all the forces of the universe converge in society,
but they also form a new synthesis which surpasses in
richness, complexity, and power of action all that went
into it. In a word, society is nature arrived at a higher
point in its development, concentrating all its energies
to surpass, as it were, itself (SP:97).

Society ... is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs,
and sentiments of all sorts which realize themselves
through individuals.... Society is the field of an in--
tense intellectual and moral life with a wide range of in-
fluence. From the actions and reactions between its in-
dividuals arises an entirely new mental life which lifts
our minds into a world of which we could not have the
faintest idea had we lived in isolation (SP:59).

If left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are
closed to each other; they can communicate only by means
of signs which express their internal states (EF:262).

Collective representations ... presuppose that minds act
and react upon one another.... They are the product of
these actions and reactions (EF:263).

Human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collec-
tively (EF:440).

A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself
without at the same time creating an ideal (EF:470).

The principal social phenomena, religion, morality, law,
economics and aesthetics, are nothing more than systems
of values and hence of ideals. Sociology moves from the
beginning in the field of the ideal (SP:96).

For a society to become conscious of itself, and maintain
at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which
it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself
(EF:470).

... collective representations ... presuppose that minds
act and react upon one another; they are the products of
these actions and reactions which are themselves possible
only through material intermediaries. These latter do not
confine themselves to revealing the mental state with
which they are associated; they aid in creating it
(EF:263).

... without symbols, social sentiments could have only a
precarious existence.... Social life, in all its aspects
and in every period of its history, is made possible only
through a vast symbolism (EF:263-4).

The rite serves ... to revivify the most essential ele-
ments of the collective consciousness. Through it, the
group periodically renews the sentiments which it has of
itself and of its unity (EF:420).

The ideas and sentiments that are elaborated by a collectivity ... are invested, by reason of their origin, with an ascendancy, and an authority that cause the particular individuals who think and believe in them to represent them in the form of moral forces that dominate and sustain them (DHN:335).

The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and unknown, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects. When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity ... the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion (EF:56).

All known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world (EF:165).

... the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympatheitcally (EF:175).

Religions are the primitive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history. They are in the social order what sensation is in the individual
(PECM:160).

In the present day just as much as in the past, we see society creating sacred things out of ordinary ones (EF:244).

There is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its personality (EF:274-5).

Collective thought transforms everything it touches. It fuses natural orders and combines contraries; it reverses ... the natural hierarchy of being, it eliminates differences and differentiates between what is similar. In a word, it substitutes for the world revealed to us by the senses, a quite different world which is nothing other than the projection of the ideal it constructs (SP:94).

Preface. Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as a hy-
postatizing or Platonizing "social realist," the central rule
of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analysis of social
facts in a social substratum. Indeed, Durkheim's dualistic pas-
sion extended to his causal model, for he always linked super-
structural collectively representational (symbolic) processes
with substructural social morphological processes. The prime
link between the "material" lower-story and the "ideal" upper-
story is "moral" or "dynamic density." When a "critical mass" was
reached, there occurred a social implosion, cultural energies
were generated and released, and egos became moralized and
transformed into persons. Conscience and consciousness are a-
wakened, and society, culture, and persons are born. Collect-
ive representations symbolize group self-awareness. Such the-
ses form the core of Durkheim's central causal model. Now,
while Durkheim's explanatory framework was processual through
and through, since much of this section shall necessarily focus
on The Elementary Forms, we shall here be concerned mainly
with micro-interactional processes, leaving Durkheim's very im-
portant macro-evolutionary concerns for succeeding chapters.

    Now, it has not been sufficiently emphasized that Durk-
heim's key explanatory model combined, in a rather unique way,
the two central divisions of sociology--I mean "social morpho-
logy" and "social physiology." Consciously utilizing organic
metaphors, Durkheim described these two basic divisions in
the following terms:

> Besides the social ways of being, there are the social
> ways of doing; besides the morphological phenomena,
> there are the functional or physiological phenomena
> (1960:362).
> The composition of society consists in certain combin-
> ations of people and things which by necessity are con-
> nected in space. The explanatory analysis of this sub-
> stratum, however, should not be confused with that of
> the social life which builds on it. The way in which
> society emerges fully formed is one thing; the manner
> in which it acts is another. These are realities of
> two kinds, so different that they cannot be treated
> by the same procedures but require separate investiga-
> tions. Consequently, the study of the first forms a

special, though fundamental, branch of sociology.
We have here a distinction that is analogous to that
which can be observed in all the sciences of nature.
Chemistry, the study of the manner in which bodies
are formed, stands besides physics, the study of the
phenomena that are enacted by various bodies. Next to
physiology, which seeks the laws of life, stands ana-
tomy or morphology, which investigates the structure
of living things, the manner of their formation, and
the conditions controlling it (1960:360).

In regard to each basic division of the sociological field,
Durkheim attempted to specify rules for understanding both
the peculiar constitution of each sphere of social life, and
the relations of one to the other.

In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the ele-
mentary group which gave rise to ever-more compound
groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the
elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with
one another, have formed the progressively more complex
phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution
(1960:374).

Against Comte's (and perhaps Saint-Simon's) somewhat
similar designation of the main branches of sociological in-
quiry into "social statics" and "dynamics," Durkheim counter-
posed his own processual approach to the morphological and
physiological aspects of society.

This branch of sociology [social morphology] is ... not
purely a science of statics. Consequently, we do not
think it proper to use this word: "static" poorly des-
cribes the view of society which is considered here.
It is not a question of looking at society arrested at
a given moment by abstraction (as has sometimes been
said), but of analyzing its formation and accounting
for it. Undoubtedly, the phenomena that have to do with
structure have something more stable about them than
have functional phenomena, but there are only differ-
ences of degree between these two orders of fact.
Structure itself is encountered in becoming, and one
cannot illustrate it except by pursuing this process
of becoming. It forms and dissolves continually; it is
life arrived at a certain measure of consolidation; to
disconnect it from the life from which it derives or from
that which it determines is equivalent to dissociating
things that are inseparable* (1960:362).

Since I shall later emphasize the importance of Durkheim's pro-
cessual view of social morphology, I now merely note that, just

as Bohannan noted the processual aspect of Durkheim's key
terms <u>conscience</u> and <u>representation</u>, so too I must empha-
size that it is misleading to attempt (eg. Bellah, 1973: xiv-
xv) to summarize Durkheim's two analytical modes in terms of
so-called "structural" and "functional" approaches, since we
have Durkheim's own word that even "structure is itself encoun-
tered in becoming." Of course, Durkheim's well-known designa-
tion for all the sub-fields of social physiology--including
religious, juridical, economic, linguistic, and esthetic so-
ciology (eg. see Alpert, 1939:51)--was based on the notion
of "collective representations" as cultural symbolic forms.

Now, this same explanatory model--the anchoring of social
physiological or sociocultural symbolic processes in their
underlying social morphological substratum--marks all of Durk-
heim's work and that of his school. Yet, for some reason, his
essential logic here remains relatively obscure to the present
day. Some prestigious interpreters (eg. Parsons, 1949; Nisbet,
1965) have, by splitting Durkheim's model in two and assign-
ing social morphology to Durkheim's early "positivistic"
phase and his concern with "collective representations" to his
later "idealistic" phase, proposed thereby a radical discon-
tinuity in Durkheim's life-work. Contrary to these and other
fateful misconceptions of Durkheim's central causal model, I
propose that, as a general rule, Durkheim always and everywhere
approached social morphological processes as the causal "ma-
terial" substructure, and "collective representations" as the
social physiological or sociocultural process in the reflected
or projected "ideal" superstructure. Almost alone among con-
temporary secondary observers, Lukes (1973) and Giddens have
begun to recognize the importance of this dualistic explana-
tory framework. It must be noted,however, that Durkheim's cen-
tral focus was always on the second factor, especially moral
and juridical and religious "collective representations" (see
also Book Three). Let us now turn to explore in greater detail
Durkheim's central causal model as it informs his first and
last great works.

A.   Social Morphological Processes

The first great subdivision of Durkheim's sociological system was "social morphology." "We propose to call the science that has for its object the study of the material forms of society 'social morphology'" (1960:362). The fundamental rule of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analyses of social facts in their generating material substratum. For instance, late in his career, Durkheim, with the assistance of Mauss, summed up their basic interpretive rule this way:

> One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we take care not to leave them in the air but always to relate them to a definite substratum, that is to say, a human group occupying a determinate portion of geographically representable space (1971:809).

In applying his positivistic version of the scientific method to society, Durkheim always sought to anchor his analyses of the type of social facts which instinctively drew his attention--moral phenomena--in an empirically verifiable material "social body." Durkheim's positivistic search for empirically determinable entities led him, in direct contrast to those who insisted that Durkheim hypostatized social facts, to embrace social morphological forms and processes as a key constitutive ground of society and history.

> Social life has various manifestations ... all of them, however, have this in common: they emanate from a group, simple or complex; the group is their substratum.... It is the object most immediately accessible to the sociologist because it takes on material forms that we can perceive with the senses (1960:360).

Those who do not perceive the seemingly paradoxical connections between positivist science and French moral philosophy, will probably not understand why Durkheim, although centrally concerned with the facts of the moral life, should have, nonetheless, taken great care to ground his analyses of these moral facts in existentially--empirically verifiable--"material social bodies."

As Durkheim launched L'Annee sociologique, he took some care to articulate these various subdivisions of sociological

inquiry. For instance, I have quoted above from an important programmatic statement "Sociology and Its Scientific Field" first published in 1900 in Italian, and only recently translated by Kurt Wolff (1960). And in 1898 in L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim wrote a "Note sur la morphologie sociale." There he argued that the content of the new synthetic sociological base-line science of social morphology was to be drawn, in part, from a series of existing and overlapping disciplines. Unfortunately, these special sciences pursue their own isolated tasks today just as they did in Durkheim's day.

> The works that treat of these questions actually come from different disciplines. Geography studies the territorial forms of states, history traces the evolution of rural or urban groups, demography reviews all that concerning the distribution of population, etc. There is, we believe, an interest in pulling these fragmentary sciences from their isolation, and putting them in contact and reuniting them under the same title; they would thus take on the sentiments of their unity (1898:520-21).[1]

And, of course, one of the prime intentions of the Annee circle was precisely to "pull fragmentary sciences from their isolation," "to give them a greater sentiment of their unity." To this day, L'Annee sociologique stands out as one of the landmarks in the unity of the social sciences. But in attempting to generate this new field of social morphology, Durkheim, as always is true, had to contend against existing disciplinary boundaries.

> ... because different disciplines exist in separation from each other, and almost without being aware of each other, the way in which they have divided up the social world is not always consistent with the nature of things. Thus, for example, geography and demography (or the science of population) until recently remained separate from one another, and are only beginning to become interrelated. However, both study the same subject matter, in order to understand the material substratum of society; for what is it which forms the main substance of society, if it is not social space plus the population which occupies this space? (in Giddens, 1972a:83).

Against geography's "tribal mentality," for instance, Durkheim argued that the new inclusive science of social morphology should:

> ...   study not the forms of the earth, but the forms
> which affect societies and establish them on the earth;
> that is very different. Without doubt, the courses of
> water, mountains, and so forth, enter as elements into
> the constitution of the social substrata; but they are
> neither the only ones nor the most essential (1898:521) .

In contrast to geography, which assumes that the physical and
topographical shapes of the earth's surface constitute the ba-
sic "template" to which societies rather passively adapt, Durk-
heim's view of social morphology looked to the ways in which
societies shape their own habitats. In short, the roles were
reversed in the two disciplines, for man and society were now
considered to be active, independent forces in not only shaping
their own habitats but in changing the face of the earth it-
self. Elsewhere, Durkheim argued:

> ... as nations increasingly involve the land in their
> life and transform it for their own use, it becomes,
> to the same degree, increasingly difficult to separate
> them from it. The only thing is, that if in this case
> there is indeed still a relation of dependence, it is
> almost the converse of that which is found originally.
> If now society is linked to the land, this is not be-
> cause it has come under its influence, but, on the con-
> trary, because it has incorporated it within itself.
> Far from it being the case that society models itself
> upon the land, it is the land which bears the imprint
> of society. Thus it is not the land which explains man,
> it is man which explains the land; and if it remains
> important for sociology to be aware of the geographi-
> cal factorm this is not because it sheds new light on
> sociology, but because the former can only be under-
> stood in terms of the latter *(in Giddens, 1972a:88).

Specifically, Durkheim's new sociological science of
social morphology, rooted in this key perception of society's
active impact on the constitution of the earth's surface and
the way it is variously used, would consider the external forms
and internal contents of society in its spatial aspects, in-
cluding the structures of the "built environment," and the
movements and interactions of inhabitants of various regions.
In short, Durkheim assigned a special program to this new
sub-discipline:

> The social substratum must, above all, be determined in
> its external form. This external form is chiefly defin-
> ed by: (1) the size of the territory; (2) the space

which the society occupies, that is, its peripheral
or central position in regard to other "continents"
and the way it is enclosed by other societies, and
so on; (3) the form of its frontiers.... In addition
to the external form, there is the content, which is,
first of all, the total mass of the population in its
numerical size and density. Furthermore, there are wi-
thin society secondary groupings which have a mater-
ial basis, such as villages, cities, districts, and
provinces of varying importance. In respect to each
of them, there arise various questions which need to
be studied in respect to the given collectivity: ex-
tension of habitations, size of cities, and villages,
water courses, external enclosures, size and density
of populations, and so on.
Finally, every group, as a whole or in part, makes use,
according to its needs, of the soil or that part of it
that it occupies. Nations surround themselves with fort-
resses or fortified cities, and roads for communication
are constructed. The disposition of streets and squares,
the architecture of the houses, and the structure of
things made vary from village to town and from the large
city to the small one, and so on. Man modifies the so-
cial substratum in a thousand ways, and the resultant
differences have great sociological significance because
of both the causes on which they depend, and the effects
that they produce (1960:3f0-61).

But as happened with so much else of Durkheim's system
of sociology, even though he proposed the nascent sub-disci-
pline of social morphology as an essential foundation for
sociology, and even assigned it a special program subsequent-
ly developed by such an eminent member of his school as Maur-
ice Halbwachs, nonetheless, social morphology is almost for-
gotten today (however, see the exemplary article by L. Schnore
1958). This crucial aspect of Durkheim's sociology has been
either consistently ignored, so that several critics persist
in branding him as a Platonic theorizer leaving his hyposta-
tized "collective conscience" dangling in sociological space
(see Book Three), or else leading theorists (eg. Parsons, 1949,
Merton, 1934a) mistakenly treat social morphology as a largely
"biological factor" which Durkheim later overcame. Again, this
sad story represents a salutary lesson in the history of any
science precariously based on highly selective exegesis.

B. Durkheim's Key Link Between Social Morphology and Social
    Physiology: "Moral Density," Intensity, and Social Energy

The key link between substructural social morphologi-
cal processes and superstructural "social physiological" (sym-
bolic) processes was Durkheim's notion of "moral or dynamic
density." The very fact that Durkheim would consider "moral"
and "dynamic" as almost synonymous reveals a central clue to
his linkages of social morphological processes with social
physiological or representational processes. Once again, Durk-
heim's dynamic or processual focus moves to center stage
("structure itself is encountered in becoming"). For Durkheim
was not merely concerned with the size of the society's ter-
ritory, the number of its inhabitants, the forms of its fron-
tiers, the dominant internal "built" forms, and so forth, but
more importantly, how the degree of population concentration
leads to increased rates of social interaction ("dynamic or
moral density"), social intensity, and new rates of social
energy, and thus, finally, social change.

> It is clear that social phenomena vary not only with
> the nature of the component elements of society but
> also with their mode of composition; they will espe-
> cially be very different according to whether each of
> the subgroups keeps its local life or is drawn into
> the general life--in other words, according to their
> degree of concentration (R:85).

Now, besides Schnore (1958), and to a certain extent Lukes
and Giddens, Gianfranco Poggi (1972) stands almost alone among
contemporary social scientists in understanding the importance
in Durkheim's system of the intimate inner links between so-
cial morphology, social institutions, collective representa-
tions, and types of personality structure. To better grasp
these inner links, especially between population concentration
and social energy, we should follow Poggi's observation that
the key to physical density, and thus, increased "moral" or
"dynamic" social intensities, is the population/territory ra-
tio (1972:187). The degree of population concentration is only
partially a matter of physical density (itself a resultant of
the population/territory ratio), and is also partially due to

the existence of key infrastructural transportation and communications networks binding groups together through time and space. Again, the key to the linkage in Durkheimian sociology between social morphological processes and collectively representational processes is <u>not</u> simply the volume of people, but rather the <u>rates</u> <u>of</u> <u>sustained</u> <u>social</u> <u>interaction</u>, as Alpert saw many years ago (1939: 90). Population density is important here only insofar as it leads to increased "moral or dynamic density," or in other words, increased social intensity and social energy. By "dynamic density," Durkheim argued,

> ... (it) must not be understood the purely physical concentration of the aggregate, which can have no effect if ... groups of individuals remain separated by a social distance. By it is understood the social concentration, of which the size is only the auxilliary and, generally speaking, the consequence. The dynamic density may be defined, the volume being equal, as the function of the number of individuals who are having not only commercial but also social relations, i.e. who not only exchange services or compete with one another, but also live a common life (R:113-14).

Thus, in Durkheim's system, "moral or dynamic density" leads to increased social intensities and energies, and the emergence of a common sociocultural life among previously separated individuals or groups. This proposed causal sequence constitutes one key anchor to almost all the rest of Durkheim's work. Indeed, this notion of greater "moral" densities leading to greater social intensities forms the key link between the material social morphological substratum and the emergence of the crystallized symbolic forms which come to represent this collective effervescence. Long term social morphological changes leading to greater population densities and social intensities also constitute a key causal sequence linking the progressive division of labor, societal evolution, historical change, and the emergence of the notion of the person throughout history, and so on and so forth. In sum, this generic micro sociocultural process of increasing social intensities leads, on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad, constitutive, historical processes of the evolution of societies, persons, and moralities, which formed a central preoccupation

in Durkheim's sociological system. Finally, it is very import-
ant to recognize that these intimate linkages between micro
and macro-societal processes represent a relatively constant
series of sequential equations running throughout all of Durk-
heim's life-work, from The Division of Labor to The Elementary
Forms. Let us now briefly explore some of the more important
sequential linkages underlying these basic process in all of
Durkheim's major works.

In The Rules, for instance, Durkheim suggested that
heightened degrees of sustained social interaction are neces-
sary to the breakdown of segmental societies, and thus, are
a prior condition of the progressive division of labor.

> Social life can be affected only by the number of those
> who participate effectively in it. That is why the dy-
> namic density of a people is best expressed by the de-
> gree of fusion of the social segments. For, if each par-
> tial aggregate forms a whole, i.e. a distinct indivi-
> duality separated by barriers from the others, the act-
> ion of the members, in general, remains localized within
> it. If, on the contrary, these partial societies ...
> tend to be all intermingled within the total society,
> to that extent is the radius of social life extended
> (R:114).

Further, Durkheim proposed that, with the continuous extension
of the "radius of social life," the division of labor proceeds
apace with the progressive effacement of "segmental" types of
societies.

> ... all growth in the volume and dynamic density of
> societies modifies profoundly the fundamental condi-
> tions of collective existence by rendering social life
> more intense, by extending the horizon and thought of
> each individual (R:115).

> ... the progress of the division of labor is in direct
> ratio to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL:
> 257).

While space does not allow us here to review all the
details of his argument, it is important to note that Durk-
heim's thought moved simultaneously on two different levels--
the intra-societal and the inter-societal levels. In terms
of external relations between formerly distinct societies,
Durkheim saw the breakdown of this isolation occuring through
the extension of the "radius of social life," and thus the

entering into of sustained and ever-more diverse social rela-
tionships to be a necessary prerequisite for the progressive
emergence of new types of societal complexity.

> The growth of the division of labor is thus brought
> about by the social segments losing their individual-
> ity, the divisions becoming more permeable. In short,
> a coalescence takes place which makes the combinations
> possible in the social substance (DL:256).

The "progressive effacement of the segmental type of society"
and thus, the evolution of ever-more complex social morpholo-
gical structures on the inter-societal level, depends, in turn,
on corresponding shifts on the level of the intra-societal
division of labor. There is an additional variable intervening
between increasing moral density as the primary causal factor
and the resulting division of labor. This crucial intervening
variable underlying the progressive division of labor is com-
petition.

> If work becomes divided more as societies become more
> voluminous and denser, it is not because external cir-
> cumstances are more varied, but because the struggle
> for existence is more acute (DL:266).

Following Darwin and other naturalists, Durkheim observed
that the competition between members of the same species, or
by analogy, between members of the same society, is more in-
tense than inter-specific or inter-societal competition be-
cause the more similar the members, the more intense the com-
petition for similar resources. The result of ever-more intense
intra-societal competition is increasing specialization and
diversification.

> ... in proportion to the segmental character of the
> social constitution, each segment has its own organs,
> protected and kept apart from like organs by divisions
> separating the different segments. But as these divi-
> sions are swept away, inevitably like organs are put
> into contact, battling and trying to supplant one ano-
> ther. But, no matter how this substitution is made,
> it cannot fail to produce advances in the course of
> specialization (DL: 269).

Against the classical economists who deduced the cause of the
division of labor from the innate tendency of human nature to
produce more in order to become happier, Durkheim insisted that

increasing competition is the key cause behind the progressive specialization. "If we specialize, it is not to produce more, but it is to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that have been made for us" (DL:275).

Thus, Durkheim attempted to specify a whole series of sequential equations intervening between moral density and the progressive division of labor. This series of generic sociocultural sequences ran something like this: greater population density within a given geographic area (the population/territory ratio), held together by increasingly comprehensive and efficient infrastructural transportation and communications networks, leads to greater degrees of "dynamic density" or sustained increases in "quantity, intensity, and diversity of social relationships." This increased moral density or social intensity leads, in turn, to greater competition for resources between members of the same society, while this increased intrasocietal competition leads to greater specialization and occupational differentiation. These typical socioeconomic responses to long term changes in supply and demand lead almost inevitably, as generally agreed, to greater efficiency which leads to greater total productivity, which thus accelerates the progressive division of labor by increasing the potential for population growth, and the extension of key technologies such as the transportation and communications systems. This progressive extension of "the radius of social life" inevitably leads, in turn, to greater social energies and socioeconomic and cultural change, which leads onward and upward, on the general evolutionary level, in a progressive self-stimulating feedback cycle. Certainly, Durkheim posited a most complex process which his readers ignore at their own peril!

When discussing subsequent phenonena which he anchored in the progressive division of labor, it is important, therefore, to remember that this factor is really only a secondary one, derived from the primary source of social energy--moral or dynamic density--and the resulting social intensity.

> If society, in concentrating,determines the develop-
> ment of the division of labor, the latter, in its turn,
> increases the concentration of society.... The division
> of labor remains the derived fact, and, consequently,
> the advances which it has made are due to parallel ad-
> vances of social density.... That is all we wish to
> prove (DL:260).

> The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the
> volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses
> in a continuous manner in the course of social develop-
> ment, it is because societies become regularly more dense
> and generally more voluminous (DL:262).

This fundamental social morphological theme of greater densi-
ties and social or moral intensities underlies all the secon-
dary historical processes concerning the evolution of society,
religion, law, science, morality, the person, and so on. It
runs as a constant refrain and explanatory model throughout
all of Durkheim's works. Indeed, it became the very paradigm
of Durkheim's sociology; one of its most succinct expressions
was the Annee essay by Marcel Mauss and Henri Beuchat in 1906
on seasonal variations in the life of the Eskimos, which was
specifically subtitled "Etude de morphologie sociale."

While it is clearly misleading to proclaim a radical
discontinuity in Durkheim's career by dividing into positivis-
tic and idealistic phases as Parsons (1949) did, it is true,
nonetheless, that Durkheim did increasingly turn his attention
toward establishing the linkages between social morphological
processes and the emergence and elaboration of collective re-
presentations. Even Parsons himself, as Pope (1975a) empha-
sized, now acknowledges that he "... may have overdone the
periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual development" (1975a:
106), and now agrees instead with Bellah (1973) that there
is "an impressive" continuity in Durkheim's work. (See esp-
ecially Giddens, 1970, for convincing refutation of Parsons
early thesis of the split between the young and old Durkheim).
However, Parsons clearly saw (along with Alpert, 1939, and
Foskett, 1939), that Durkheim shifted the main focus of his
attention as his career progressed; this remains the valid
anchor of Parsons' "stage" thesis. Even though he was mistaken

about the content and dating of Durkheim's developing stages, there is now emerging general agreement that Durkheim's thought increasingly focussed on superstructual symbolic processes, and the autonomization of collective representations (eg. see Giddens, 1971a, 1972a; Lukes, 1973:10, 233-6; Jack Douglas, 1967:45; Wallwork, 1972:48, 113; Parsons, 1975a:106; Pope,1973: 410, 1975a:112, 114).

It is especially important to note Durkheim's continuing concern with elaborating key links between these material and symbolic processes, not only because of the misleading "idealization" of the "later Durkheim," but also because there is simply no other way of fathoming Durkheim's identification of the moral and the logical with the social. In The Elementary Forms, for example, Durkheim anchored his theory of the social origins, character, and meaning of religion in the alternating slack and intense periods of social interaction among the Australian natives.

> The life of the Australian societies passes alternately through two distinct phases. Sometimes the population is broken up into little groups who wander about independently of one another, in their various occupations; each family lives by itself, hunting and fishing ... trying to procure its indispensable food by all the means in its power. Sometimes, on the contrary, the population concentrates and gathers at determined points for a length of time varying from several days to several months. This concentration takes place when a clan or a part of the tribe is summoned to the gathering, and on this occasion they celebrate a religious ceremony.... These two phases are contrasted with each other in the sharpest way. In the first, economic activity is the preponderating one, and it is generally of a mediocre intensity. Gathering the grains of herbs that are necessary for food, or hunting and fishing are not occupations to awaken very lively passions. The dispersed condtion in which the society finds itself results in making its life uniform, languishing, and dull. But when a corrobbori a religious celebration takes place, everything changes (EF:245-6).

Clearly, to Durkheim, the "very fact of concentration" itself "acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant." Social life, in its elementary forms, is portrayed here as constantly alternating between isolated, dispersed, "profane," subsistence activities, on the one hand, and concentrated, col-

lective, intense, effervescent "sacred" activities.

> When they are at once come together, a sort of elect-ricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exalta-tion. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each re-echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance* (EF:247).

> So it is in the midst of these effervescent social en-vironments and of this effervescence itself, that the religious ideas seems to be born (EF:250).

And again:

> For a society to become conscious of itself and main-tain at the necessary degree of intensity the senti-ments which it thus attains, it must assemble and con-centrate itself (EF:470).

Indeed, it was these very linkages between the empirically observable material social morphological substratum and col-lectively symbolic ideal representations, that underlies Durkheim's bold and brilliant attempt to build a positivist scoiology of morality, religion, and knowledge over against the most persistent nemesis of his cultural tradition--name-ly, the metaphysical and clerical claims of the Catholic Metaphysical-Hierocratic Cultural Tradition.

> The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science, it depends upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the neces-sary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. Now, this concentration brings about an exaltation of the mental life which takes form in a group of ideal con-ceptions where is portrayed the new life thus awakened. ... A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal (EF: 470).

In short, in Durkheim's developing view, collective efferves-cence of "social electricity" resulting from imploding "moral densities" and increased social intensities generates those religious, moral, and logical collective representations as externalized symbols of the inward social bond by which society first attains self-consciousness of its existence as a group.

C. "Social Physiology" and "Collective Representations":
   Durkheim's Theory of Generic SocioCultural Process

Preface. Given Durkheim's notion of the radical egocentricity of the unsocialized organic ego, how is it possible
that society and culture ever come to be born? What forces
breakthrough the isolation of the organic cage and create
the moralized, self-disciplined person? And once born, how
is it possible that society and culture should survive beyond
the moment? In effect, we are asking: what, precisely, was
Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process? And what
is the role of symbolism in this fundamental sociocultural
process?

In exploring the first part of Durkheim's central explanatory model concerned with the social morphological substratum of society, we discovered that Durkheim's perspective was
always processual. Social morphology referred not merely to
the spatial demography of the group, but more importantly,
to certain key constitutive processes; especially important
here were those leading to greater moral densities and social
intensities, and the production and release of social energies. It is precisely these social energies released at such
collectively intense times that gives rise to the questions
now posed: namely, how are groups born? How do groups come
to conceive of themselves as a group? What role do collective
representations play in this generic sociocultural process?
And, how are these cultural symbols to be related to their
continuing structural bases? While Lukes (1973: chapter 10)
has given a very useful account of Durkheim's changing estimates of the relation between sub and superstructure (see also
Book Three), let us now explore some of these questions in
terms of a frontal analysis of Durkheim's causal model.

To continue the initial analogy, collective representations act, in Durkheim's causal schema, as the "ideal" or
superstructural expression through externalized symbols of
a groups' awakening self-consciousness. As noted earlier
(see also Lukes, 1973: introduction), these crystallized sym-

bols are collective and representations in two senses:
first, they are collectively generated and carried; second,
they are the externalized, shared vehicles by which the
group first attains, and then reaffirms, their own distinct-
ive existence as a group. Now, while almost everyone recog-
nizes the importance of several of these notions in Durkheim's
sociological system, few have clearly brought into focus the
role of these critical inner connections linking social mor-
phological processes with the corresponding sociocultural pro-
cesses in Durkheim's fundamental explanatory model.

Doubtless, much of the difficulty in perceiving the
full outlines of Durkheim's causal model come from his char-
acteristic convergence of generic and genetic-evolutionary
analyses. Now, Durkheim's own genetic and evolutionary claims
for the significance of his pilgrimage to the "elementary
forms" have often annoyed (eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, or W.H.
Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973) or puzzled (eg. Bellah, 1973:xliii)
many of his leading secondary interpreters. The British anthro-
pologists and American functionalists' search for the generic
or universal structures of human society led them to persist-
ently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; in
short, their _generic_ emphasis swamped out Durkheim's _genetic_
emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent tenden-
cy of "... secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's function-
al and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign
to Durkheim's thought" (1971a:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves
credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's _Elemen-_
tary _Forms_, for example, has to be read genetically. Although
Giddens appears willing to grant that this same work can also
be read functionally, I cannot so easily agree. _For_ _I_ _have_
discovered _that,_ _even_ _as_ _Durkheim's_ _genetic-evolutionary_ _em-_
phasis _has_ _been_ _persistently_ _slighted,_ _so_ _too_ _his_ _generic_
focus _on_ _sociocultural_ _process_ _has_ _been_ _faultily_ _reported._
Saving discussion of Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary frame-
work for subsequent chapters, let us now move to more closely
define Durkheim's concern with generic sociocultural process.

It must be acknowledged again and again that much of
the confusion and neglect was unintentionally assisted by
Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of generic and
genetic-evolutionary approaches to sociocultural analysis.
Now, Tiryakian (1962:19) reminds us that the French word
elementaire as used by Durkheim "signifies not only 'elemen-
tary' as in a scale of complexity, but also 'fundamental' or
'basic.' " It is precisely in these terms that Durkheim's Bri-
tish anthropological critics have charged him with confusing
"earliest" and "simplest" (eg. see Lukes, 1973:456). But the
logic underlying Durkheim's conflation of his search for the
universal or generic essence of human society and culture is
still not widely perceived. For, in fusing his generic and
genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and devel-
opment of human society and culture, Durkheim sought to find
a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, for a "crucial
experiment" in which there would be a one-to-one correspon-
dence, as it were, between symbolic forms and social forms,
between the social morphological substratum and the social
physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collectively
symbolic representations are deeply inter-fused with the fun-
damental structures of the group, Durkheim felt that he had
discovered the "monocellular" (eg. see Bellah, 1959:456-7)
form of sociocultural life, the template, as it were, from
which all complex sociocultural forms evolved. Thus, the gen-
eric links between religion, society, and culture which Durk-
heim thought he had discovered in Australian aboriginal reli-
gion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connections.
It is absolutely critical to realize that Durkheim's causal
model--substructural social morphological processes and super-
structural collectively representational processes--led him
to return, again and again, to the simplest case, the clear-
est connection between these two halves of human society.
Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified his
own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic analyses
by likening them to Descartes' "first ring of certainty"

(EF:16). For Durkheim's conflation derived, in large part, from the influence of his cultural tradition--his was the sociological equivalent of the Cartesian method of systematic doubt, and return to indubitable first principles as the only sure road to objective certainty and inner certitude. "He (Durkheim) simply took it as axiomatic that there is an identity (structural and cultural) between simplicity and evolutionary priority " (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his conflation of generic and genetic in this perspective, we should no longer wonder that only in terms of the most "elementary" forms--in both senses--did Durkheim believe that he could surely discover generic sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably inter-fused with genetic-evolutionary ones. "Primitive classifications, then, offer privileged cases, because they are simpler ones" (EF:18). And again, "In the primitive religions, the religious fact still visibly carries the mark of its origins" (EF: 20). Those who persist in reading Durkheim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional propositions must continue to neglect Durkheim's own logic and method, and his insistence that the intimate relations between society, culture, and the person are evolutionarily constructed. As Giddens has rightly noted: "There is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is contingent upon the level of advancement of society" (1972a:27).

Let us briefly outline these two intimately related, but analytically separable, aspects of Durkheim's notion of the dual generic and genetic-evolutionary significance of the "elementary forms." In terms of Durkheim's elaboration of links between material and symbolic process, there is no way of fathoming Durkheim's virtual identification of the moral and the logical with the social without recognition of two previous types of crucial ambiguities concerning the paradigmatic Durkheimian terms--namely, "conscience" and "representation." As I have emphasized before, we continue to forfeit

the key to unlocking the connections between Durkheim's socio-
logy of religion, his sociology of morality, and his sociology
of knowledge. For in Durkheim's system, structures of conscious-
ness are intimately related to, and evolve out of, structures
of conscience, while both, in turn, derive from the underlying
social morphological process. Alpert reminded us over three
and a half decades ago:"Les Formes Elementaires, it should not
be forgotten, was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of
Thought and of Religious Life" (1939:55; see also W.H, Stanner,
1967:227). Similarly, as noted earlier, "collective representa-
tion" contains both a verb-like and noun-like dimension. But
as Bohannan points out: "American and English interpretations
of Durkheim ... have separated the two substantive elements
which Durkheim intended to leave conjoined. In the separation,
the processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared" (1960:
79-80). As Bohannan rightly notes, the fruitful ambiguities of
Durkheim's key terms conscience and representation led him
to a fundamentally different, and perhaps more profound, per-
ception of cultural and phenomenological process than the per-
spective today which splits apart the cultural object, the gen-
erating group, the constitutive symbolizing process, and the
phenomenological experience.

In terms of Durkheim's own biological metaphors, social
morphology was to take as its prime task the study of the spa-
tial and material forms and physical-moral energies of socie-
ties, while social physiology was to focus primarily on the
study of key collective representations as constitutive symbol-
ic processes. Clearly, just as in the organism morphological
structures are closely intertwined with physiological-psycholo-
gical processes, so too Durkheim postulated similar intimacies
between social morphological forms and processes and social
physiological forms and processes. As noted earlier, Durkheim
always sought to ground sociological analysis in an empirical-
ly verifiable material "social body." For example, against
the Marxist Labriola in 1897, Durkheim refuted his later crit-
ics in these terms: "Either the conscience collective floats

in a void ... or else it is connected with the rest of the
world by a substratum, upon which, consequently, it is depen-
dent" (in Giddens, 1972a:159). Bellah suggests:

> The analysis of society, personality, and symbolism and
> their interpretation in The Elementary Forms remains a
> fundamental reference point for present understanding.
> ... In his theory of ritual Durkheim attempts to show
> how a new level of consciousness comes about and super-
> sedes the isolated, fragmented, individual conscious-
> nesses which operate in the dispersed conditions of ev-
> eryday life. The new consciousness could be called a
> social consciousness or even a symbolic consciousness
> ... for it cannot occur without symbolism ... but it
> penetrates into the interior of the personality and e-
> ven strongly affects physiology (1973:xlviii).

Now, Durkheim's dynamic or processual focus moves to
center stage in The Elementary Forms. In the "crucial exper-
iment" in which he purposely conflated generic and genetic-
evolutionary analyses, Durkheim's concern with both was pro-
cessual through and through. Durkheim took great care here
to specify the links between social morphological and collec-
tively representational processes, with central focus on the
social morphological "critical mass" needed for the emergence
of religious phenomena. Further, these social intensities al-
so are the preconditions for the constitution of moral, reli-
gious, and logical categories and symbols. Let us briefly ex-
plore some of the following key sequential linkages by which
collectively symbolic representations emerge out of social
morphological intensities.

(1) Social morphological implosions moralize organic
    egos in creating societies and persons.

(2) The moralization of organic egos by cultural implo-
    sions releases man from the confines of the organic
    cage. Social energies lift persons into the realm of
    freedom, of moral rules and intellectual concepts.
    Liberty is the product of reglementation. Man is the
    sociocultural animal. The evolution of man and the
    evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic
    culture is the prime genetic medium of human society
    and human personality.

(3) Symbols act as visible, public collective represen-
    tations of group self-consciousness. These collec-
    tive representations both represent and constitute

symbolic bonds of the group. Due to the moral inten-
sities which created them, certain collective symbols
become "sacralized"--that is, invested with obliga-
tory respect and desirability.

(4) Inevitably, however, moral intensities fade in the
face of the demands of everyday life. "Sacralized"
collective symbols face similar moral depreciation.
Therefore, periodic renewals help to remoralize or
recreate the sacred intensity of collective symbols
representing the group, and thus to reaffirm the so-
cial bond, and to revitalize the structures of con-
science and consciousness.

(5) The marked contrast between these two alternating
phases of sociocultural life-dispersed and ordinary
versus gathered together in extraordinary excitement
--gives rise to dichotomous oppositions between the
"sacred" and the "profane." This fundamental set of
symbolic oppositions creates tension in the socio-
cultural and phenomenological fields, and life be-
comes progressively energized by, and organized a-
round, these two poles.

(6) In the very nature of the alternating rhythms of so-
ciocultural process, the "sacred" significance ori-
ginally attached to the moral implosion of the group
gradually becomes transferred to the image of the
group. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective
representations become detached from their proces-
sual origins, and crystallized into permanent sym-
bolic forms. Symbolism always tends to grow more au-
tonomous.

(7) The "contagiousness" of "sacral energies," plus the
dependence of sociocultural process upon symbolism,
means inevitably that the organizing tension between
"sacred" and "profane" becomes extended to all
spheres of reality and levels of experience. The
world is cosmicized through a compounding series of
symbolic equations. The greater the degree of lami-
nation, or multiple linkage of meanings on several
levels, the greater the symbolic load, and thus, the
greater the potency and significance. Phenomenologi-
cal analogy and metaphor serve as symbolic tools for
the construction of classificatory systems in their
their early stages. These constitutive symbolic e-
quations serve as crucial bridges transforming em-
pirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity.

Elementary classificatory systems are simultaneous-
ly sociocentric and sacro-magical, for the prime
symbolic forms are linked to the structure of the
group and its magical protocols. The legitimacy of
structures of conscience and consciousness are bound
both to the group and its religion.

Since symbols serve as time-binders holding groups together through time and space, as collectivities grow, so too must their representational symbols. Some viable, yet highly crystallized, symbols and transformational equations may become deeply sedimented as axial or paradigmatic collective representations on the level of cultural traditions. As societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. Although first born in the clan and its totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connection with the restrictive structures of both group and religion. Symbols blessed with a high degree of universalizability may help generate supra-societal or civilizational bonds. The extension of the social bond in terms of widening structures of fraternization, and universalization and rationalization of the legitimate structures of moral and intellectual authority proceed together on the world-historical level (we shall pursue these latter points especially in Chapters Six and Seven).

(8) Since the structure of human symbolic action is inherently dramatic (or rhetorical and dialectical), here we add the third and final, culminating phase to the first phase (tension-creating polarities)and the second phase (symbolic equations which extend the polarities)--namely, reunification through symbolic transformations. Specifically, the two basic religious modes of asceticism (separation) and mysticism (unification) sum up these phases of socio-cultural process. Hence, tension is resolved, and the powers of the imagination and will released, through a crucial series of transformations of these mounting oppositions into a new and higher synthesis or unity.

Now, if Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process is still to be considered a brilliant "just-so-story," as even so insightful and sympathetic critic as Evans-Pritchard (1965) insists, then so be it! As Ken Kesey said in the introduction to his classic American novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, "Its the truth even if it didn't happen" (1962:13).

1. Social Morphological Implosions, the Emergence of Society, and Transformation of Egos into Moralized Persons

Given Durkheim's initial image of the isolated unsocialized organic ego, one way of viewing The Elementary Forms is as a detailed description, on the micro social interactional level, of "that singularly creative and fertile psychic operation ... by which a plurality of individual consciousnesses enter into communion and are fused into a common consciousness" (DHN:335). Through this communion process, egos are transformed into persons. Through this fusion or consubstantiality, a new reality is born--society.

Now, no entity as self-centered and closed as the pre-socialized individual willingly foregoes its own nature. Only an extraordinary force--a suprahuman (as it were) source of energy--can transform isolated egos into moralized persons with meaningful goals. Durkheim discovered this source of "sacred energy" in "collective effervescence."

> ... if collective life awakens religious thought upon reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are over-excited, passions are more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him (EF:469).

The social psychological process which Durkheim postulated here can be likened to centrifugal and divisive energies imploding into a fused, centripetal source of energy; Chardin (1961) described these as "tangential" and "radial" organizing energies, respectively. In effect, the self-seeking ego is blasted out of its own self-centered private orbit into a new and more powerful "energy state"; or to shift the analogy slightly, there is a passage from the "out of step" diffused energy of normal white light to the fused and coherent energy of a "laser beam."

Now, these moral implosions generate extra-ordinary energies that transform the isolated and privatized ego into a

socially constructed person. The center of his isolated ex-
istence then revolves not around private passions but around
public prescriptions.

> One can readily conceive how, when arrived at this
> state of exaltation, a man does not recognize him-
> self any longer. Feeling himself dominated and car-
> ried away by some sort of external power which makes
> him think and act differently than in normal times,
> he naturally has the impression of being himself no
> longer. It seems to him that he has become a new be-
> ing: the decorations he puts on and the masks that
> cover his face figure materially in this interior
> transformation, and they aid in determining its na-
> ture (EF:249-50).

Such interior transformations mean that, in a very real sense,
the pre-socialized ego becomes a new being; now moralized and
socialized, it is now under the sphere of influence of the po-
werful energies of human society. Analogies with nuclear phys-
ics and other high energy phenomena in attempting to describe
this crucial generic transformation of egos into persons are
useful (though, of course, limited). For what Durkheim sought
to describe here is essentially the evolutionary emergence of
a totally new phenomena, breaking through the old restrictive
organic envelope. The organic cage is left behind. It takes
high-energy forms to overcome other strong energy patterns,
and this is precisely what Durkheim postulated as going on in
an "ideal typical" way in the "white heat"of Australian ritual.

According to Durkheim, as traditional American social
psychology also maintains (see, eg. Nisbet, 1974), "society
and person are twin-born." Society becomes the center of moral
and conceptual life, having its phenomenological anchor in the
newly moralized person's conscience and consciousness. For
ever more, man shall be homo duplex, "two souls in one body
twain." Ego and body, person and society, these Durkheimian
symbolic equations are now the twin anchors of the irretrieva-
bly ambivalent human condition.

> When individual minds are not isolated but enter into
> close relation with and work upon each other, from their
> synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life. It is clear-
> ly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that
> led by the solitary individual. Sentiments born and

> developed in the group have greater energy than pure-
> ly individual sentiments. A man who experiences such
> sentiments feels himself dominated by outside forces
> that lead him and pervade his milieu. He feels him-
> self in a world quite distinct from that of his pri-
> vate existence. This is a world not only more intense
> but also qualitatively different. Following the col-
> lectivity, the individual forgets himself for the com-
> mon end and his conduct is oriented in terms of a stan-
> dard outside himself.... This activity is qualitatively
> different from the everyday life of the individual, as
> is the superior from the inferior, the ideal from the
> real (SP:91).

Thus, in Durkheim's view, when a new level of intensity and

collective effervescence reaches a white heat, and consub-

stantiality is thereby consummated, social energies implode.

Society and culture are born as entirely new levels of world-

activity. Through this evolutionary breakthrough, society and

culture are energized, thereafter to dominate biological and

psychological levels. Through this communion process,the dual-

ity of human nature is constructed, and the person--as oppo-

sed to the ego--emerges. Society and person are thus mutual

co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the genetic medium.

If it is important to emphasize that society depends

for its continued existence upon persons--"the clan, like

every other sort of society, can live only in and through the

individual consciousnesses that compose it" (EF:253)--the

converse is equally true. Collective ritual and myth--the

genetic symbolic medium of co-creation--provide, as Durkheim

poetically said, a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature."

If moralized persons are not to lapse back into the scatter-

ed egoisms or deepening autism of pre-social human nature,

they can sustain themselves only by dipping again and again

into the very fount of their existence--namely, collectively

effervescent, symbolically energizing, human society.

> The sentiments which society has for him raise the
> sentiments which he has for himself. Because he is
> in moral harmony with his comrades, he has more con-
> fidence, courage, and boldness in action, just like
> the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of
> god turned graciously toward him. It thus produces,
> as it were, a perpetual sustenance of our moral nature
> (EF:242).

Collective action, especially when extra-ordinary in nature,
raises man above his egoistic half, and replenishes his moral
nature. Collective ceremonial publicly revalidates his civic
sense of self as a socially constructed and valuable person.

> Men do not deceive themselves when they feel at this
> time that there is something outside of them which is
> born again, that there are forces which are reanimated
> and a life which reawakens. This renewal is in no way
> imaginary, and the individuals themselves profit from
> it. For the spark of a social being which each bears
> within him necessarily participates in this collective
> renovation. The individual soul is regenerated too, by
> being dipped again in the source from which its life
> comes; consequently, it feels itself stronger, more
> fully master of itself, less dependent upon physical
> necessities (EF:391).

Consciousness and society, conscience, culture, and per-
son, all imply one another in Durkheimian sociology. As Bohan-
nan points out, it was precisely one of Durkheim's main vir-
tues, in contrast to the heirs of both the idealists and the
materialists, that he didn't bifurcate sociocultural process
from phenomenological process. To Durkheim, cultural (that is,
impersonal) process must become internalized in the person's
conscience and consciousness if either are to live. There is
no paradox here, really, for Durkheim himself observed:

> Just as there is no society without individuals, so
> those impersonal forces which are disengaged from the
> group cannot establish themselves without incarnating
> themselves in the individual consciousness where they
> individualize themselves (EF:302).

Impersonal and personal, universal and particular, thing and
process, culture and individual, these and other conventional
dichotomies are seen simply as complementary phases of the
same overall human process in Durkheim's sociological philoso-
phy. Surely this is necessary prerequisite for the foundations
of the human sciences of the future.

Now, according to Durkheim, the contrast between ego-
centric and undisciplined, random action, on the one hand, and
highly focussed, socialized and moralized human action, on
the other, creates a basic tension within the heart of man.
It is as though we have conflicting voices competing for as-
cendancy within our inner lives. Freud, for example, at about

the same time as Durkheim, mythologized this inner conflict
in terms of id, ego, and superego. While human reality is
thus basically conflictual to Durkheim, it is also fundamen-
tally creative. There was no oppressive feeling of primal
guilt in Durkheim, however, as there was in Freud's work;
no Durkheimian would call man "a disease of history" (N.O.
Brown, 1959). Rather, if society makes men, so too do men
make societies, and in the process each irretrievably alters
the other. Society and person thus stand as mutual co-crea-
tions, and henceforth must perennially cope with their double
burden. This was Durkheim's fundamental dialectic of human
action. Forever more, man is double. His interior life has a
"double-center of gravity"--for on the one hand, we see
the self-centered and proportionless passions; on the other,
we witness that cosmos of obligations, ideals,archetypal sym-
bols and dynamic energies called culture. By virtue of the
latter's contrast with the former, they are set apart or "sa-
cralized."

> When the Australian goes away from a religious cere-
> mony, the representations which this communal life
> has aroused or rearoused within him are not oblit-
> erated in a second. The figures of the great ances-
> tors, the heroic exploits whose memmory those rites
> perpetuate, the great deeds of every sort, in which
> he too has participated through the cult, in a word,
> all these numerous ideals which he elaborated with
> the cooperation of his fellows, continue to live in
> his consciousness and, through the emotions which are
> attached to them and the ascendancy which they hold
> over his entire being, they are sharply distinguish-
> ed from the vulgar impressions arising from his daily
> relations with external things. Moral ideals have the
> same character. It is society which forces them upon
> us, and as the respect inspired by it is naturally extend-
> ed to all that comes from it, its imperative rules of
> conduct are invested, by reason of their origin, with
> an authority and a dignity which is shared by none of
> our internal states; therefore, we assign them a place
> apart in our psychical life (EF:298).

With the evolutionary emergence of human society, and
therefore also cultural and phenomenological process, a pain-
ful but creative dualism is enshrined in the very heart of
man. "Our nature is double: there really is a particle of di-

vinity in us because there is within us a particle of these
great ideas which are the soul of the group" (EF:299). As al-
ways, Durkheim perceived the key nexus between our inner and
outer lives to be structures of conscience. And granting that
conscience and consciousness are always intimately intertwin-
ed, nonetheless, in general, questions of conscience take pre-
cedence over questions of consciousness.

> Although our moral conscience is a part of our conscious-
> ness, we do not feel ourselves on an equality with it.
> In this voice which makes itself heard only to give us
> orders and establish prohibitions, we cannot recognize
> our own voices; the very tone in which it speaks to us
> warns us that it expresses something within us that is
> not of ourselves. This is the objective foundation of
> the idea of the soul: those representations whose flow
> constitutes our interior life are of two different spe-
> cies which are irreducible one into another. Some con-
> cern themselves with the external and material world;
> others with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral
> superiority over the first. So we are really made up of
> two beings facing in different and almost contrary di-
> rections, one of whom exercises a real preeminence over
> the other. Such is the profound meaning of the antithes-
> is which all men have more or less clearly conceived be-
> tween the body and the soul, the material and the spiri-
> tual beings who coexist within us (EF:298).

The progressive transformation of the organic ego into a per-
sonality structured by conscience and consciousness generates
the dualism of human nature. As with the old Christian image
of man as homo duplex, the two parts of man are opposed to
one another as body is to soul.

> It is perfectly true that we are made up of two distinct
> parts, which are opposed to one another as the sacred to
> the profane, and we may say that, in a certain sense,
> there is divinity in us. For society, this unique source
> of all that is sacred, does not limit itself to moving
> us from without and affecting us for the moment; it es-
> tablishes itself within us in a durable manner. It arou-
> ses within us a whole world of ideas and sentiments which
> express it but which, at the same time, form an integral
> and permanent part of ourselves (EF:297-8).

In sum, the human condition is both unprecedently powerful
and irretrievably ambiguous.

2. The Break From the Organic Cage: Man's Ascent From the Kingdom of Necessity to the Kingdom of Freedom

Evans-Pritchard observed of Durkheim's theses, borrowing a phrase from Engels, that through the genetic medium of religious symbolism "Man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (1965:61). I believe that this telling phrase succinctly summarizes Durkheim's general framework of thought. Since the textual evidence presented here comes largely from The Elementary Forms, it should be noted that from his first great book on, Durkheim never tired of repeating that society is the source of moral rules and intellectual concepts, that society constructs the person, that culture releases man from the fixed bonds of the organic cage, that human liberty comes through sociocultural reglementation, and so on and so forth. Let us, then, further explore Durkheim's early formulation of his philosophical anthropology.

In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim correctly argued that cultural evolution replaced biological heredity as the prime mode of human adaptation. "The more elevated the species, the more discretionary instinct becomes" (DL: 322).

> ... the hereditary contribution diminishes, not only in relative value, but in absolute value. Heredity becomes a lesser factor in human development, not only because there is an ever greater multitude of new acquisitions it cannot transmit, but also because those it transmits disturbs individual variations less.... Indeed, it is very remarkable that instinctive life is weakened as one mounts in the animal scale (DL:321).

Thus, Durkheim posited a progressive release from the cramped confines of the organic cage--from the kingdom of necessity. With all his repeated arguments on "creative synthesis" (see especially Rules, and "Individual and Collective Representations" in Sociology and Philosophy), Durkheim pushed back the liberating principle of the human condition to society and culture in themselves.

> To say that the influence of heredity is more general, more vague, less imperious is to say that it is smaller. It no longer imprisons the activity of the animal in a rigid form, but leaves him with freer activity.

When from animals one passes to man, this regression
is still more marked.... Even where instinct survives,
it has less force, and the will can more easily subdue
it   (DL:322).

And again:

... heredity always leaves more room for new combina-
tions. Not only is there a growing number of things
over which it has no power, but the properties whose
continuity it assures become more plastic. The indivi-
dual is, thus, less strongly chained to his past; it is
easier for him to adapt himself to new circumstances
which are produced, and the progress of the division
of labor thus becomes easier and more rapid (DL:328).

Agreeing with the old adage that "the progress of conscience
is in inverse ratio to that of instinct" (DL:346), Durkheim
further argued that the very notion of the person progress-
ively emerges through societal differentiation and the multi-
plication of individual possibilities.

... individual differences steadily multiply ... the
constitutive elements of the average type are more di-
versified.... The average man assumes a physiognomy less
and less precise and recognizable, and more and more sch-
ematic. He is an abstraction more and more difficult to
fix and delimit. Further, the more elevated the species
to which societies belong, the more rapidly they evolve,
since tradition becomes more supple.... The average type
changes, then, from one generation to the next (DL:327).

The increasing suppleness of cultural traditions, as opposed
to the rigidity of molecular inheritance, depends, in turn, on
on societal differentiation. Thus, there emerges a more in-
tense and continuous collective symbolic life.

... as the social horizon extends, as collective life,
instead of being dispersed in a multitude of small cen-
ters where it can only be weak, is concentrated in a
more limited number of places, it becomes at the same
time more intense and more continuous   (PE:297).

The increasing intensity and continuity of long-term collect-
ive cultural activity forces man himself to change in turn.

... as societies become more vast and, particularly,
more condensed, a psychic life of a new sort appears.
Individual diversities, at first lost and confused a-
midst the mass of social likenesses, become disengaged,
become conspicuous, and multiply. A multitude of things
which used to remain outside consciences because they
did not affect the collective being become objects of

representations. Whereas individuals used to act only
by involving others ... each of them becomes a source
of spontaneous activity. Particular personalities be-
come constituted, take consciousness of themselves.
...(the psychic life of society) becomes freer, more
extensive, and, as it has, after all, no other bases
than individual consciences, these extend, become com-
plex, and thus more flexible.
...Hence, the cause which called forth these differ-
ences separating man from the animals is also that
which has forced him to elevate himself above himself
(DL:347-8).

Indeed, as Durkheim repeated again and again, this di-
versification itself forces man to grow increasingly autono-
mous and rational. Thus, both morality and knowledge move
toward greater universality and freedom. In Moral Education,
for example, Durkheim contended that:

... the more societies become complex, the more dif-
ficult for morality to operate as a purely automatic
mechanism. Circumstances are never quite the same,
and as a result the rules of morality require intel-
ligence in their application. Society is continually
evolving; morality itself must be sufficiently flex-
ible to change gradually as proves necessary (ME:52).

The distinguishing characteristic of man from animals is "...
the greater development of his psychic life, (which) comes
from his greater sociability" (DL:347). Indeed, Durkheim
transforms the old definitions of man as the reasoning ani-
mal, or homo religiosus, into homo sociale et symbolizans.[1]
Given this evolutionary grounding of man's liberation from
genetic chains to the past in emergent human interaction
and cultural relationship, Durkheim enunciated the follow-
ing principle: "With societies, individuals are transformed
in accordance with the changes produced in the number of so-
cial units and their relationships" (DL:345). For man's evo-
lutionary identity as the sociocultural animal means that
man's dependence upon society is a liberating dependence.

They (individuals) are made more and more free of
the yoke of the organism. An animal is almost com-
pletely under the influence of his physical environ-
ment; its biological constitution predetermines its
existence. Man, on the contrary, is dependent upon
social causes (DL:345).

Man is the cultural animal. Man is the creature who dwells within his own images. "Man is the animal," said C. Geertz, "who is suspended in webs of meaning that he himself has spun." Man is the "time-binder" as Korzybski suggested. Man is the only creature who makes himself through the medium of his own symbolic forms. The evolution of man and the evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic culture is the prime genetic medium of human societies and persons. Culture is an autonomous, emergent phenomenon, irreducible to biology and psychology; indeed, cultural processes feedback down and alter biological structures (eg. the brain of homo sapiens) and individual psychological processes. Culture is the prime symbolic meaning and directive system of a group. This is part of Durkheim's profound, and basically optimistic, philosophical anthropology.

Further, if energy and information are considered basic categories of life processes, then culture may be likened to "social DNA," for it lays the foundation of human informational processes. Both socialization (social reproduction and the simultaneous construction of the person) and life-cycle development are in-formed by the great collective symbolic forms. "Mutations" or revolutions in the more adaptable (efficient and universalizable) symbolic forms stand on the mainline of sociocultural evolution. Human culture is negentropic, for instead of randomizing its potency, symbolic evolution shows a clear and definite tendency toward increasing complexity and adaptive power (eg. see Weber's concept of "rationalization"). I believe that Talcott Parsons deserves credit for having been one of the first, as far as I know, to explore the analogy between religious culture in Durkheim's Elementary Forms and genetic processes, information theory, and general systems theory (eg. see Parsons, 1973). I believe he might agree that culture acts as social DNA, for that is the secret to human evolution.

> With animals, the organism assimilates social facts
> to it, and, stripping them of their special nature,
> transforms them into biological facts. Social life

is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and part-
icularly in higher societies, social causes substi-
tute themselves for organic causes. The organism is
spiritualized (DL:346).

This "hyper-spiritualization" is the very source of the
reorganization of organic nature as social and cultural life
implode into ever-more powerful and universal structures of
conscience and consciousness; this is the foundation of hu-
man freedom. As we discovered earlier, Durkheim argued that
liberty comes through reglementation.

> Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from
> being antagonistic to social action, it results from
> social action. It is far from being an inherent pro-
> perty of the state of nature. On the contrary, it is
> a conquest of society over nature....
> Liberty is the subordination of external forces to so-
> cial forces, for it is only in this condition that the
> latter can freely develop themselves. But this subord-
> ination is rather the reverse of the natural order.
> It can, then, realize itself progressively only insofar
> as man raises himself above things and makes law for
> them, thus depriving them of their fortuitous, absurd,
> amoral character; that is, insofar as he becomes a so-
> cial being. For he can escape nature only by creating
> another world where he dominates nature. That world is
> society (DL:386-7).

It is only because we moderns habitually think of freedom in
negative terms, as the release of the individual from con-
straining traditional claims, that we have difficulty with
Durkheim's notion that, at root, human freedom is positive--
it emerges only through relationship. As Lynch (1966) observes, it is
only mutuality that is ultimately liberating.

> The individual submits to society and this submissive-
> ness is the condition of his liberation. For man free-
> dom consists in deliverance from blind, unthinking phy-
> sical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them
> the great and intelligent force which is society, under
> whose protection he shelters. By putting himself under
> the wing of society, he makes himself, also to a certain
> extent, dependent upon it. But this is a liberating de-
> pendence. There is no paradox here (SP:72).

Truly, then, "Man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the
kingdom of freedom" through collective symbolic forms.

3. Collective Representations as Symbols of Group Self-Consciousness

"For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself" (EF:470). In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed that human society is itself first created through the genetic medium of religious ritual. This symbolic genetic medium concentrates and intensely focusses social energies, as a solar mirror collects the rays of the sun, and thereby generates the first form of group self-consciousness. Durkheim's image of primitive religion, as Lukes aptly suggests, as a kind of "mythologized sociology" was not a late development. For as early as 1897, in Suicide (see also Durkheim 1886, R.A. Jones, 1974b), Durkheim succinctly summarized this essential notion in this way: "Religion is--in a word--the system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic way of thinking of collective existence" (S:312). Indeed, physical concentration becomes moralized through ritual sacrifice, for through such symbolisms men actually feel themselves becoming consubstantial. And the generative medium of this creative metamorphosis is collectively representational symbolism.

As always, in his exploration of the nature and origins of the elementary forms of sociocultural life, Durkheim fused his generic and genetic investigations. Therefore, he sought the generic nature of sociocultural process in terms of the genetic origins of human society. This necessarily involved central focus on what I shall call the "primitive sacral complex" (see succeeding chapters) as the womb of society, culture, and person. I believe, along with Giddens (eg. 1971a:106, 110, 114), that Durkheim's theses here should be read genetically as well as generically. In critical terms, this means that Parsons' attempt to treat, for example, Durkheim's theory of the generic role of religion (translate to "ultimate value system based on non-empirical referents") in maintaining normative concensus, and thus, social order, in all societies is largely

misconceived. Rather, Durkheim here demonstrated genetically, in terms of the most elementary forms he could discover, the self-creativeness of generic sociocultural process. Or, as Giddens puts it, "Religion is the expression of the self-creation, the autonomous development, of human society" (1971a:110). And, of course, the emergence and crystallization of collective

symbolic representations as the cultural vehicle of group self-consciousness depends upon sustained social morphological intensities and imploding energies. Surely this recognition should greatly change the widely pervasive image of The Elementary Forms supposed "idealization" of religion as the generic basis of The Central Value System, as well as the older misleading of Durkheim as a Platonic social realist.

Now, the very key to this collective process of group and self-transformation (for the person is created along with the group) is the creative effect of cultural symbols. Indeed, as my formula that culture acts as "social DNA" suggests, Durkheim proposed that "Social life in all its aspects, and in every period of its history, is made possible only through a vast symbolism" (EF:264). (Parsons, among others, mistook this as Durkheim's turn toward idealism). Now, the symbolic basis of the socioreligious bonds of the Australian aboriginees on which Durkheim lavished his attention was, of course, the totemic emblem. Over and above the ties of "blood and soil," Durkheim insisted that the clan was first and foremost a community of common belief, of shared symbols, a community of memories.

> For the members of a single clan are not united to
> each other either (solely) by a common habitat or by
> common blood, as they are not necessarily consanguin-
> eous and are frequently scattered over different parts
> of the tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from
> their having the same name and the same emblem, their
> believing that they have the same relations with the
> same categories of things, their practising the same
> rites, or, in a word, from their participating in the
> same totemic cult (EF:194).

In the final analysis, Durkheim made the symbolic community prior to the geographical or even the biological community.

Indeed, kinship here is seen first and foremost as a socio-religious bond.

In essence, Durkheim proposed that public process is symbolic process. Symbolism serves as the visible vehicle of communication by which communion is consummated; it acts as the external cultural medium through which society attains consciousness of itself as a group.

> ... if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs individuals that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity (EF:262).

External signs and symbols, as prime modes of social communication, thus serve as the womb of society. Man makes himself through the genetic medium of cultural symbols.

Durkheim further proposed that material things as signs and gestures serve as externalized symbols which represent internal feelings. Especially important here is the creative role of religious and ritual symbolism in the awakening of conscience and consciousness, the key phenomenological embodiments of sociocultural process. For what was closed and private becomes open, public and creative. Thus, paradoxically, in the beginning, moral processes depend upon the utilization of material objects or physical gestures which, while devoid of "value" in themselves, yet become moralized or "sacralized" through group action.

> ... collective representations originate only when they are embodied in material objects, things, or beings of every sort--figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on--that symbolize them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are by nature closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison. The things that embody the collective representations arouse the same feelings as do the mental states they represent, and,

in a manner of speaking, materialize. They too are respected, feared, and sought after as helping powers. Consequently, they are not placed on the same plane as the vulgar things that interest only our physical individualities but are set apart from them. Therefore, we assign them a completely different place in the complex of reality and separate them; and it is this radical separation that constitutes the essence of their sacred character (DHN:335).

Now, the specific empirical focus of these sacred symbolisms is the totem. As noted earlier, Durkheim proposed that the community of ideals and memories symbolized by the totem underlay the communities of "blood and soil." The rite is thus the religious occasion when "Men who feel themselves united, partially by bonds of blood, but still more by a community of interest and tradition, assemble and become conscious of their moral unity" (EF:432). Here, Durkheim suggested, men are led to symbolically project their sense of moral community onto some external object which they portray as the constitutive principle of their consubstantiality. This symbol embodying their essential mutuality is the totem. "They are led to represent this unity in the form of a very special kind of consubstantiality: they think of themselves as all participating in the nature of some determined animal" (EF:432; on consubstantiality, see also Kenneth Burke, 1969).

The men who assemble on the occasions of these rites believe that they are really animals or plants of the species whose name they bear. They feel within them an animal or vegetable nature, and in their eyes, this is what constitutes whatever is most essential and the most excellent in them. So when they assemble, their first movement ought to be to show each other this quality which they attribute to themselves and by which they are defined. The totem is their rallying sign, for this reason ... they design it upon their bodies, but it is no less natural that they should seek to resemble it in their gestures, their cries, their attitude.... By this means, they mutually show one another that they are all members of the same moral community and they become conscious of the kinship uniting them. The rite does not limit itself to expressing this kinship; it makes it or remakes it. For it exists only insofar as it is believed in, and the effect of all these collective demonstations is to support the beliefs upon which they are founded *
(EF:400).

Thus, in short, Durkheim regarded the totem as the first
prime constitutive symbol: "It is the flag; it is the sign
by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the
visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything
which is a part of the clan ... men, beasts, or things" (EF:
236).

I wish to emphasize now, as Robert N. Bellah (1973)
has rightly pointed out, that these symbolic systems serve
not merely a neutral representative function, but more im-
portantly, they are creative, or "constitutive" as Bellah
suggests. They are "constitutive symbolism," the genetic
cultural medium, vital to the very construction of the group
in the first place.

> That an emblem is useful as a rallying center for
> any sort of group is superfluous to point out. By
> expressing the social unity in a material form, it
> makes this more obvious to all, and for that very
> reason the use of emblematic symbols must have
> spread quickly.... But more than that, this idea
> should spontaneously arise out of the conditions
> of common life; for the emblem is not merely a con-
> venient process for clarifying the sentiment society
> has of itself: it also serves to create this senti-
> ment; it is one of its constituent elements (EF:262).

I believe that Durkheim here proposed a profound phenomeno-
logy of generic sociocultural process: cultural symbols are
the genetic medium leading to the co-creation of the person
and society. Such key symbols act not merely as neutral de-
vices of objective representation but also enter into the
self-creation of the group itself. Acting as the collective-
ly representational symbols of group self-consciousness,
gradually they become the very foundations of impersonal
thought and group action. These dual functions of symbolism--
representative and constitutive or creative--must be empha-
sized as twin keys as important to Durkheim's thought as the
intimate relations between structures of conscience and con-
sciousness.

> Collective representations ... presuppose that minds
> act and react upon one another; they are the product
> of these actions and reactions which are themselves
> possible only through material intermediaries. These

latter do not confine themselves to revealing the mental state with which they are associated; they aid in creating it. Individual minds cannot come in contact and communicate with each other except by coming out of themselves; but they cannot do this except by movements. So it is the homogeneity of these movements that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist. When this homogeneity is once established and these movements have once taken a stereotyped form, they serve to symbolize them only because they have aided in forming them* (EF:263).

4.   Alternating Phases of SocioCultural Life and
       Periodic Renewals

Preface. By their very nature, however, such moral intensities are extra-ordinary. "Ecstasy" (in the root sense, see EF:259) cannot last forever. High energy particles fall into lower orbits; newly fused egos, caught up in the momentary intensities of moralized implosions, face the problem of the "morning after." Inevitably, the extraordinary concentration of human energies disperses and fades back into the interstices of everyday life. In short, "ecstasy," while self-fulfilling, is also self-exhausting. Further, the demands of everyday life--of eating, working, babies crying, fires burning, storms coming, enemies approaching, and so on-- rudely intrude upon the sacred inviolability of the communal sacralizing moment. "Charisma," to use Weber's roughly parallel term, is like a high mountain peak surrounded by undulating valleys. At some point, we must come down from the heights and return to the mundane tasks of everyday life.

The tension between everyday routine (Weber's alltag) and the charismatic moment is two-fold. First, these sacred symbols and energies flow back out to socialize, energize, and sacralize us and the world as we strive to "meet the demands of the day." Correspondingly, even though we are newly energized, the farther we get from the the generating source of power, the more these symbolic energies are usurped and dissipated in everyday life. As Durkheim once poetically said, they are subject to the "slow usury of time." In sum, al-

though these tensions between alltag and "charisma" allow
sacred energies to flow, it also means that the energy re-
serves, as it were, shall be constantly depleted.

Even though we must forego the vulgar summary that
the function of regular ritual and periodic celebration is
to help men "recharge their batteries," as it were, none-
theless, analogies with electricity and other types of ener-
gy flows are stimulating. Both Durkheim and Weber compared
the "sacred" and "charisma" with electricity, in terms of
its power to energize, and its tendency to flow or its con-
tagiousness. Thus, charismatic forces are like sacred elect-
ricity, for they energize as they flow. Now, because "ec-
stasy" is self-exhausting, and because the force of "charis-
ma" is inevitably dissipated in the routine of everyday life,
men must gather again and again to renew or recreate these
sacred energies. "The essential constituent of the cult is
the cycle of feasts which return regularly at determined e-
pochs" (EF:391). In turn, if society is to continue, that is,
if the "collective conscience" is to perdure, it must con-
stantly reassemble itself. "... Before all, rites are means
by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically" (EF:
432). Thus, rite and ceremonial are the prime public means
of society's self-creation and recreation. Through religious
ritual, society rekindles social energies and moral intensi-
ties, and thereby strengthens both persons and its own con-
sciousness of itself as a group. "The rite serves ... to re-
vivify the most essential elements of the collective conscious-
ness. Through it the group periodically renews the sentiments
which it has of itself, and of its unity" (EF:420).

Just as moral intensities inevitably fade, so too the
energy of the sacralized collectively representational sym-
bols face the same dissipation or moral depreciation. Be-
cause they no longer circulate at the same speed, they
are no longer current, they lose their worth as "currency."
Charismatic moment and charismatic symbol equally tend to
fade from consciousness and conscience. Society then tends to

lapse back into that whirl of isolated and privatized ego-
isms from which it had only just escaped.

> Of course, social sentiments could never be totally
> absent. We remain in relations with others, the ha-
> bits, ideas, and tendencies which education has im-
> pressed upon us and which ordinarily preside over
> our relations with others, continue to make their
> action felt. But they are constantly combatted and
> held in check by the antagonistic tendencies arou-
> sed and supported by the necessities of the daily
> struggle. They resist more or less successfully, ac-
> cording to their intrinsic energy: but this energy
> is not renewed. They live upon their past, and con-
> sequently, they would be used up in the course of
> time, if nothing returned to them a little of the
> force that they lose through these incessant con-
> flicts and frictions (EF:390).

In addition, the only way the twin attributes of human
personhood--conscience and consciousness--can be in-formed
and re-formed is through symbolic processes. "Since society
cannot exist but in and through individual consciousnesses,
this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within
us; it becomes an integral part of our being and by that
very fact this is elevated and magnified" (EF:391). In turn,
social institutions and cultural forms also fundamentally de-
pend upon viable energizing symbols. Thus, as the power of
symbols fade, society, culture, and the person also begin
to fade in the same degree. In short, beyond the desire for
charismatic communitas (see Victor Turner, 1969), and
periodic recharismatization of the profane, the continuing
life of society and of symbolic culture require more or less
regular moments of renewal and recreation.

Steven Lukes provides the following lucid and concise
summary of some of Durkheim's basic theses here:

> ...symbolism was 'necessary if society is to become
> conscious of itself', and is 'no less indispensable
> for assuring the continuation of this consciousness.'
> Indeed, 'social life, in all its aspects and in every
> period of history, is made possible only by a vast
> symbolism.' The role of the emblem was to perpetuate
> and recreate the 'social sentiments' aroused by the
> rites; moreover, the rites   themselves enabled
> social communication to 'become a real communion,
> that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments

into one common sentiment,' and they not only expres-
sed but served to 'support the beliefs upon which they
are founded.' Hence, the cult in general was both a
'system of signs by which the faith is outwardly trans-
lated' and a 'collection of the means by which this is
created and recreated periodically' (1973:472).

Let us now explore the course of Durkheim's argument
in this regard. Remember, first, that the life of the Aus-
tralian aborigenees, which Durkheim chose for his "crucial
experiment," passed through alternating phases (as, apparent-
ly, all energy forms must). Using Durkheim's own dichotomies,
one might term these the "economic" or "egoistic" phase (see,
however, Book Three), on the one hand, and the "social" phase
on the other. In the first, the population is scattered, hunt-
ing for food. In the second, the group gathers and moral in-
tensities rise, and sociocultural energies are generated and
released (see also, for example, EF:246-7).

> The religious life of the Australian passes through
> successive phases of complete lull and of superexci-
> tation, and social life oscillates in the same rhy-
> thm. This puts clearly into evidence the bond uniting
> them to one another, but among the peoples called civ-
> ilized, the relative continuity of the two blurs their
> relations. It might even be asked whether the violence
> of this contrast was not necessary to discharge the
> feelings of sacredness in its first form. By concen-
> trating itself almost entirely in certain determined
> moments, the collective life has been able to attain
> its greatest intensity and efficacy, and consequently
> to give men a more active sentiment of the double ex-
> istence they lead, and of the double nature in which
> they participate (EF:250-1).

Now, as we have noted, "ecstasy" is self-consuming. In
terms of the ultimate consummation or release of charismatic
energies in the second or sacral phase, Durkheim noted:

> This effervescence often reaches such a point that it
> causes unheard of actions. The passions released are
> of such impetuosity that they can be restrained by
> nothing. They are so far removed from their extraor-
> dinary conditions of life, and they are so thoroughly
> conscious of it, that they feel that they must set
> themselves outside of and above their ordinary morals
> .... They produce such a violent super-excitation of
> the whole physical and mental life that it cannot be
> be supported very long; the actor taking the princi-
> pal part finally falls exhausted to the ground (EF:247-8).

Inevitably, the ebb and flow of everyday life returns. Durkheim observed that collective effervescence can never sustain itself for long: "... the exaltation cannot maintain itself at such a pitch; it is too exhausting. Once the critical moment has passed, the social life relaxes, intellectual and emotional intercourse is subdued, and individuals fall back into their ordinary level" (SP:92). Since Durkheim's social psychology here inevitably suggests sexual analogies, especially when these charismatic moments or communitas are considered as orgiastic activities, it should be noted that the evident value of the analogy between moral and physical intercourse is, apart from the mutual excitation, the communion that is ultimately consummated. These analogies are not unusual, for one of the favorite images of mystics, for example, over the centuries has been the intimate and all-encompassing union with their divine being or world-principle as bride or bridegroom.

Inevitably, the demands of everyday life intrude upon communitas, upon the special world set apart. It is simply a rule of existence that men, having once attained the heights, must return to the lowlands, to the secure and supportive routine of everyday life. Indeed, there is a hidden dialectic in the alternating rhythms of "charismatic communitas" and the alltag or routine "profane" existence, for it is precisely the continuing contrast between the two different forms of creativity unique to each that enables us to appreciate the distinctive virtues of the other. As always, diversity is generative; it is their very opposition which creates their processual unity. Durkheim observed that:

> Society is able to revivify the sentiments it has of itself only by assembling. But it cannot be assembled all the time. The exigencies of life do not allow it to remain in congregation indefinitely; so it scatters, to assemble anew when it feels again the need of this. It is to these necessary alternations that the regular alternations of sacred and profane times correspond (EF: 391).

Moral passions are thus dissipated in the routine of "meeting the demands of the day" (Weber, after Goethe). Al-

though energized by collective moralization, such sacred
forces face inevitable depreciation. So too do the collect-
ively representational symbols, which serve as the genetic
medium and prime cultural vehicle of these moralizing for-
ces. Society thus threatens to constantly lapse back into
an amorphous collocation of warring egoisms.

> Without symbols, social sentiments could have only
> a precarious existence. Though very strong as long
> as men are together and influence each other reci-
> procally, they exist only in the form of recollect-
> ions after the assembly has ended, and when left to
> themselves, these become feebler and feebler; for
> since the group is now no longer present and active,
> individual temperaments easily regain the upper hand.
> The violent passions--which have been released in the
> heart of a crowd fall away, and are extinguished when
> this is dissolved, and men ask themselves with aston-
> ishment how they could ever have been so carried away
> from their normal character (EF:263).

Due to these alternating phases of communitas and all-
tag, or in Durkheim's terminology, the "sacred" and the "pro-
fane," sociocultural life rises and falls in an oscillating
rhythm. And thus, the moralized person's commitment to his
newly found obligations and goals also ebbs and flows with
the rise and decline of sociocultural symbolism. The contin-
ued viability of significant prime symbols, as a genetic and
cultural medium, is vital to the continued viability of both
society and the moralized person.

> Sacred beings exist only when they are represented
> as such in the mind. When we cease to believe in them,
> it is as though they did not exist. Even those which
> have material form and are given by sensible exper-
> ience, depend upon the thought of worshippers who a-
> dore them; for the sacred character which makes them
> objects of the cult is not given by their natural
> constitution; it is added to them by belief.... If
> these sacred beings when once conceived, are to have no
> need of men to continue, it would be necessary that
> the representations expressing them always remain the
> same. But this stability is impossible. In fact, it
> is in the communal life that they are formed, and
> this communal life is essentially intermittent. So
> they necessarily partake of this same intermittency.
> They attain their greatest intensity at the moment
> when the men are assembled together and are in immed-
> iate relations with one another, when they all partake

of the same idea and the same sentiment. But when
the assembly has broken up and each man has returned
to his own peculiar life, they progressively lose
their own original energy. Being covered over little
by little by the rising flood of daily experiences,
they would soon fall back into the unconscious, if
we did not find some means of calling them back to
consciousness and revivify them. If we think of them
less forcefully, they amount to less for us and we
count less upon them; they exist to a lesser degree
(EF:38 6-7).

As always, Durkheim considered evolutionary differences be-

tween these alternating rhythms according to social type.

This rhythm is capable of varying in different societ-
ies. Where the period of dispersion is long, and the
dispersion itself is extreme, the period of congrega-
tion, in its turn, is very prolonged, and produces
veritable debauches of collective and religious life.
Feasts succeed one another for weeks and even for mon-
ths, while the ritual life sometimes attains to a sort
of frenzy. Elsewhere, these two phases of the social
life succeed one another after shorter intervals, and
then the contrast between them is less marked. The
more societies develop, the less they seem to allow
of too great intermittencies (EF:391-2).

Therefore, Durkheim proposed an evolutionary rule: in general,

the intensity of collective rites varies inversely with their

society's continuity and complexity.

Further, the periodic renewal of self and society

through ritual concelebration becomes reinforced, in a sort

of psychosociocultural feedback process, as the prime creative

cultural medium. Thus, religious culture, which by its nature

seeks to establish definite and obligatory relationships be-

tween the macrocosm and the human microcosm, acts as a sort

of "social DNA" in a number of ways. First, it both social-

izes and resocializes men (that is, acts as the medium of so-

cial reproduction), and second, it directs the growth of so-

ciety and the person as they develop. In social psychological

terms, Durkheim suggests that the person realizes his contin-

ued dependence on collective symbolic process, and thus "he

holds with all the strength of his soul to these practices in

which he periodically recreates himself; he could not deny

their principle without causing an upheaval of his own being,

which he resists" (EF:403). Durkheim further observed that
"the real reason for the cults" is to be found "in the in-
ternal and moral regeneration which they bring about" (EF:
388).

> The only way of renewing the collective representa-
> tions which relate to sacred beings is to retemper
> them in the very source of the religious life, that
> is to say, in the assembled groups.... The common
> faith becomes reanimated quite naturally in the heart
> of this reconstituted group, it is born again because
> it again finds those very conditions in which it was
> born in the first place. After it had been restored,
> it easily triumphs over all the private doubts which
> have have arisen in individual minds. The image of the
> sacred things regains power enough to resist the in-
> ternal or external causes which tend to weaken it.
> In spite of their apparent failure, men can no longer
> believe that their gods will die, because they feel
> them living in their own hearts.... Men are more con-
> fident because they feel themselves stronger; and they
> really are stronger, because forces which were lang-
> uishing are now reawakened in their consciousness
> (EF:387).

However, the mere fact of physical congregation alone
is not, of course, sufficient to generate adequate moral in-
tensities and thus social communion. Rather, symbolic proces-
ses enter, as necessary elements, into the very creation of
society and self. The specific form of the first constitutive
cultural symbols was ritual sacrifice, joined with mythic
commemorations. Through sacred commensality all are made
"as one," again and again.

> ... the object of this communion is manifest. Every
> member of a totemic clan constitutes a mystic sub-
> stance within which is the pre-eminent part of his
> being, for his soul is made out of it. From it came
> whatever powers he has and his social position, for
> it is this which makes him a person. So he has a vi-
> tal interest in maintaining it intact and in keeping
> it, as far as possible, in a state of perpetual youth.
> Unfortunately, all forces, even the most spiritual, are
> used up in the course of time if nothing comes to re-
> turn to them the energy they lose through the normal
> workings of things; there is a necessity of the first
> importance here which ... is the real reason for the
> positive cult. Therefore, the men of a totem cannot
> retain their position unless they periodically reviv-
> ify the totemic principle which is in them; and as

they represent this principle in the form of a vege-
table or an animal, it is to the corresponding ani-
mal or vegetable species that they go to demand the
supplementary forces needed to renew this and reju-
venate it. A man of the Kangaroo clan believes him-
self and feels himself a kangaroo; it is by this qual-
ity that he defines himself; it is this which marks
his place in the society. In order to keep it, he
takes a little of the flesh of this same animal into
his own body from time to time. A small bit is enough,
owing to the rule: the part is equal to the whole (EF:
378-9).

Even more, Durkheim observed that there are special
moments and special things which are favored as commensal
sacrifices due to their special potencies, and thus, their
special symbolic significance. Contrary to his repeated as-
sertions strewn throughout The Elementary Forms, Durkheim
here acknowledged that the choice and content of religious
symbols is not wholly arbitrary (see also Mary Douglas, Nat-
ural Symbols, 1973). Especially important here were the first
fruits of the harvest.

If this operation is to produce all the desired ef-
fects, it may not take place at no matter what mo-
ment. The most appropriate time is when the new gen-
eration has just reached its complete development,
for this is also the moment when the forces anima-
ting the totemic species attain their maximum inten-
sity. They have just been drawn with great difficul-
ty from those rich reservoirs of life, the sacred
trees and rocks. Moreover, all sorts of means have
been employed to increase their intensity still more
.... Also, by their very aspect, the first fruits of
the harvest manifest the energy which they contain:
here the totemic gods acclaims himself in all the
glory of his youth. This is why the first fruits have
always been regarded as a very sacred fruit, reser-
ved for very holy beings. So it is natural that the
Australian uses it to regenerate himself spiritually.
Thus, both the date and the circumstances of the cere-
monies are explained (EF:379).

Often, the manifest purpose of totemic ritual commun-
ion is to insure the reproduction of the totemic species.
"When the close union of the animal has once been admitted,
men feel acutely the necessity of assuring the regular repro-
duction of the principal object of the cult" (EF:432-3).Indeed,
as Durkheim noted, "it is owing to this state of dependency

upon the thought of men, in which the gods find themselves, that the former are able to believe in the efficacy of their assistance" (EF:387).

> Of course, men would be unable to live without gods, but on the other hand, the gods would die if their cult were not rendered. This does not have the sole object of making the profane beings communicate with sacred beings, but it also keeps these latter alive and is perpetually remaking and regenerating them
> (EF:388).

In addition, the totemic commensal sacrifice often takes on the added meaning of a mythic commemoration. The heroic memories of the ancestors, who first received the totem from the spirits or from the world-directive principle, are thus simultaneously called to life. Belief and act, conscience and consciousness, are forever joined in fundamental sociocultural process. Imagination and symbol serve as the key mediating terms. The function or rather the effect of commemorative rites, Durkheim observed, consists "... in recollecting the past and, in a way, making it present by means of a veritable dramatic representation" (EF:416). "We have here a whole group of ceremonies whose sole purpose is to awaken certain ideas and sentiments, to attach the present to the past or the individual to the collectivity" (EF:423).

> Everything is in representations whose only object can be to render the mythical part of the clan present to the mind. But the mythology of a group is the system of beliefs common to this group. The traditions whose memory it perpetuates express the way in which the society represents man and the world; it is a moral system and a cosmology as well as a history. So the rite serves and can serve only to sustain the vitality of these beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from memory, and in sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social natures. The glorious souvenirs which are made to live again before their eyes, and with which they feel they have a kinship, give them a feeling of strength and confidence: a man is surer of his faith when he sees to how distant a past it goes back and what great things it has inspired (EF:419-20).

In the last, Durkheimian, analysis, society perdures only, as Weber also once observed, as a "community of memories." It is these shared memories of the heroic ancestors, coupled with the memory of the "charismatic *communitas*" that lingers on. These not only constitute phenomenological foundations of society, but also continue to energize and direct people by their august greatness or awful sanctity. Thus·, Durkheim postulated another key dialectic to human symbolic action--the ideal becomes a reality, yet inevitably they diverge, only to fuse again, and in the process, each pole irretrievably alters the other.

> All that was said, done, and thought during this period of fecund upheaval survives only as memory, a memory no doubt as glorious as the reality it recalls, but which is no longer at one. It exists as an idea or rather as a composition of ideas. Between what is felt and perceived and what is thought of in the form of ideals there is now a clear distinction. Nevertheless, these ideals could not survive if they were not periodically renewed. This revivification is the function of religious or secular feasts and ceremonies, all public addresses in churches and schools, plays and exhibitions, in a word, whatever draws men together into an intellectual and moral communion. These movements are, as it were, minor variations of the great creative movements. But these means have only a temporary effect. For a short time the ideal comes to life and approaches reality, but it soon becomes differentiated from it (SP:92).

Indeed, Durkheim universalized the necessity of regular renewals of the charismatic energy of all groups:

> ... This is why all parties, political, economic, or confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions where their members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common. To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with one another (EF:240-1). [1]

By virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual commensality, and the commemorative dramatic representations or mimetic re-enactments of the ancestors heroic deeds, and the ensuing "community of memories," the sacred symbols become historicized. Sacral symbols thereby become attached to durable social sentiments and memories. Thus, the dialectic of

symbol and sociocultural process deepens, for these " ...
systems of totemic emblems, which are necessary if society
is to become conscious of itself, are no less indispensable
for assuring the continuation of this consciousness" (EF:263).
If society and person are to endure, they must become rooted
in symbolic forms. If symbols are to survive, sentiments must
become durable; in short, they must become historicized. If
sentiments are to attain historical durability, they must be
symbolically sedimented deep within the sociocultural pro-
cess. In other words, they must become prime constitutive sym-
bols.

> ... if the movements by which these sentiments are ex-
> pressed are connected with something that endures, the
> sentiments themselves must become more durable. These
> other things are constantly bringing them to mind and
> arousing them; it is as though the causes which exci-
> ted them in the first place continued to act. Thus
> these systems of emblems, which are necessary if so-
> ciety is to become conscious of itself, are no less
> indispensable for assuring the continuation of this
> consciousness (EF:263).

Besides the more or less regular periodic commemorations
or concelebrations of ritual commensality, Durkheim observed
that there are other periods of history which are, as it were,
permeated by charisma. During these extraordinary times, the
ideal is formed and lived, and becomes thereby a model for
generations to come. These are the crucial turning points of
societies, the charismatic times when a people is really born,
or made anew, or reformed, or when they embark upon entirely
new directions and aspirations. Such extraordinary periods,
since they strike so deeply into the axial structures of con-
science and consciousness, come to constitute the cultural
historical capital off of which societies and persons live
for generations after. Here, Durkheim observed:

> Besides these passing and intermittent states, there
> are other more durable ones, where this strengthening
> influence of society makes itself felt with greater
> consequence and frequently even with greater bril-
> liance. There are periods in history when under the
> influence of some great collective shock, social in-
> teractions have become much more frequent and active.
> That general effervescence results which is character-

istic of revolutionary or creative epochs. Now this
greater activity results in a general stimulation of
individual forces. Men see more and differently now
than in normal times. Changes are not merely of shades
and degrees; men become different. The passion moving
them are of such intensity that they cannot be satis-
fied except by violent or unrestrained actions, act-
ions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism.
This is what explains the Crusades, for example, or
many of the scenes, either sublime or savage, of the
French Revolution (EF:241).

As Robert N. Bellah (1973:xlix) notes, Durkheim thus
distinguished between two basic phases of sociocultural pro-
cess: the creative and the re-creative or commemorative. Ri-
tual repeats archetypal symbolic events, while those "great
historic outbursts of collective effervescence" create new
prime guidance symbols. Thus, charismatic movements come to
represent foundation periods in the life of all societies.

    ... at such moments of collective ferment are born
the great ideals upon which civilizations rest. The
periods of creation or renewal occur when men for var-
ious reasons are led into a closer relationship with
each other, when reunions and assemblies are most fre-
quent, relationships better maintained, and the ex-
change of ideas most active. Such was the great crisis
of Christendom, the movement of collective enthusiasms
which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bring-
ing together in Paris the scholars of Europe, gave
birth to Scholasticism. Such were the Reformation and
Renaissance, the revolutionary epochs and the Social-
ist upheavals of the nineteenth century. At such mo-
ments, this higher form of life is lived with such in-
tensity and exclusiveness that it monopolizes all minds
to the more or less complete exclusion of egoism and
the commonplace. At such times the ideal tends to be-
come one with the real, and for this reason men have
the impression that the time is close when the ideal
will in fact be realized and the Kingdom of God estab-
lished on earth (SP:91-2).

Finally, we should reflect briefly on the "eternal"
significance of these generic dialectical processes which
Durkheim here postulated, such as those between symbol and
sentiment, self and society, charismatic and ordinary moment,
communitas and history, and so on and so forth. Many inter-
preters of Durkheim's Elementary Forms have taken his famous
concluding remark that "there is something eternal in reli-

gion" (EF:474) in a rather narrow functional sense. Believers, for instance, have seized upon this passage as evidence that religion, in the traditional metaphysical sense, should be considered an eternal generic phenomenon (eg. see G. Baum, 1973:14). Others have concluded that Durkheim spoke in formal generic terms of the universal functional contributions of religion to social solidarity, psychological strength, and so on. Yet, neither position adequately grasps Durkheim's full meaning or larger intention, for neither takes into account the genetic and evolutionary and metaphorical meanings of Durkheim's famous statement. Setting aside until a succeeding chapter discussion of the "primitive sacral-magical complex," we should not forget that Durkheim here interpreted religion in a metaphorical sense as the prime symbolic form by which a group attained consciousness of itself as a group. Further, in Durkheim's doctrine, ritual process was seen mainly as signifying the self-creativeness of sociocultural process; Durkheim secularized its meanings. Giddens (1971a, 1972a) is one of the few analysts who has begun to stress this aspect of Durkheim's sociology of religion. Indeed, if one puts this famous quotation back in the context of his total statement, one can clearly discern Durkheim's real underlying intention.

> There is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to each other, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come the ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly at Christmas celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the Exodus from Egypt, or the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life (EF:474-5)?

5. The Sacred and the Profane: Fundamental Tensions in Sociocultural Life

Preface. The marked contrast between these two alternating phases of sociocultural life gives rise, in Durkheim's model, to dichotomous notions contrasting the sacred with the profane. This conflict between dispersed and autistic egos and communalized and moralized persons is creative in that the tension works to energize and organize all of human life. Tension between the sacred and the profane is the driving force in the symbolic field of society, and within the person. As is true of all levels of reality, without this tension between incompatible elements or positions, no energy would flow. Difference energizes; diversity is generative. Energy flows created by this tension between the sacred and the profane serves, in short, to organize and energize and guide the decision matrices of societies and persons.

Now, if human experience were merely neutral or homogeneous, we would find ourselves devoid of reason for choice, and, therefore, action. If human reality lacked elementary invidious distinctions--such as those between good and evil, order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher and the lower, the positive and the negative, the beautiful and the monstrous, the creative and the destructive, the way forward and the way back, and so on--we would lack the basic organizing tension that energizes and directs human action. Every society and person makes some series of distinctions between fundamental polarities, for without these compounding oppositions, we stand paralyzed. Given a primal undifferentiated unity, in Durkheim's case the communion of aboriginal collectively effervescent ritual, our next need is to begin to differentiate within this unity certain separable parts. Such fundamental cleavages between "higher" and "lower" (eg. Genesis, see also K. Burke, 1970) serve as the vehicle for differentiating reality and allowing us to deal with its specific forms. Primal unity, and then progressive differentiation, coupled with periodic re-unification; these are the funda-

mental phases in Durkheim's dialetic of generic sociocult-
ural process.

Now, always and everywhere, positive and negative as-
pects of these basic polarities are expressed in terms of
conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral right and
wrong are always intimately intertwined with questions of
consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality ra-
ther than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and
persons lay themselves under positive obligations to affirm
as true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable
those series of phenomena judged as "sacred" to the group.
Sacred means values constitutive to the group. These posi-
tive injunctions generate goals and values which are carried
through the imagination, and internalized in the personality
structure, and established in the institutions of the group.
Conversely, all societies and persons find themselves nega-
tively obligated to avoid falsity, evil, destructiveness,
and regions of unreality. Those who follow the positive norm-
ative prescriptions gain in self-esteem, and their sense of
self-worth and contributions to moral order are often public-
ly validated. Those who violate, or congenitally follow nega-
tive proscriptions, lose in status and self-esteem. They may
be branded or "labelled" as failures, and at the most, as
dangerously destructive deviants. As Robert K. Merton once
observed, every society has its own peculiar set of "moral
alchemies," especially for the assignment of guilt and nega-
tive status. Anxiety, fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate
defilement are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate
(see, for example, P. Ricoeur, 1969). Thus, by its very na-
ture, deviance is linked with the profane, and the profane
is also dependent, in turn, upon the prior definition of the
sacred. As Mary Douglas (1966) notes, "purity and danger"
are relational.

Just as human nature is irretrievably rent by conflict
beteeen the dictates of ego and person, body and soul, so too
society and culture are inevitably polarized in terms of the

active opposition between the sacred and the profane, between the pure and the impure. Indeed, one of the virtues of Durkheim's perspective here is that he clearly perceived the intimate links between the resonating tensions between all that is sacred, true, good, orderly, pure, powerful, and all that is profane, false, evil, chaotic, dangerous, in symbolic terms on both the phenomenological and sociocultural levels. In short, public and private phenomenologies are to be seen as inextricably intertwined phases of the same generic human process.

a. The Transformation of the Ego, Alternating Phases of Social Life, and the Emergence of the Sacred and the Profane

Through collective effervescence, Durkheim postulated, and the resulting fusion into a common consciousness, egos are transformed into persons. Through this consubstantiality, a new reality is born--society. In the very nature of this transformation "... the contents of their consciousness is changed" (EF:389). The very core of this change from ego to person is the emerging contrast between the sacred and the profane.

In his own set of positivist symbolic equations, Durkheim associated the ego, commonness, and utilitarian life activities with the profane, while the person, the extra-ordinary, and things worthy of obligatory respect were linked with the sacred. Hence, from the first, it is the alternation of phases of sociocultural life which gives rise to these very different psychological and cultural modes of life. Durkheim observed, for instance, that when an individual participates in the collective effervescence:

> ... it is just as though he really were transported into a special world, entirely different from the one where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him and metamorphose him. How could such experiences as these, fail to leave in him the conviction that there really exist two heterogeneous and mutually incomparable worlds? One is that where daily life drags wear-

> ily along; but he cannot penetrate into the other
> without at once entering into relations with extra-
> ordinary powers that excite him to the point of fren-
> zy. The first is the profane world, the second that
> of sacred things (EF:250).

Thus, Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different worlds of human experience: ordinary days spent by dispersed egos in utilitarian tasks, versus extraordinary feast days spent by moralized persons in concentrated collective ceremonial.

> On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual a-
> vocations which take the greater part of the attention.
> Every one attends to his own personal business; for
> most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the
> exigencies of material life, and the principal incen-
> tive to economic activity has always been private in-
> terest. On feast days, on the contrary, these preoc-
> cupations are necessarily eclipsed; being essentially
> profane, they are excluded from these sacred periods.
> At this time, their thoughts are centered upon their
> common beliefs, their common traditions, the memory
> of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of which
> they are the incarnation; in a word, upon social things
> (EF:389-90).

Now, due to his own polemical situation and cultural commitments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with the social and the moralized person, and the profane with dispersed egos engaged in common and utilitarian activity. I believe, however, that the validity of Durkheim's insight into the universality of sacred and profane cultural symbolizations can be considered quite apart from the peculiar contents of referents which he utilized. I believe that Durkheim appeared to have made a basic mistake by seemingly banishing common and practical activity, especially in the economic sphere, from the all-important realm of the social and the moral (see also Book Three). Unfortunately, his polemics led him here to extreme statements contrary to other parts of his own doctrine, such as the following sociologically inadvisable thesis: "The principal incentive to economic activity has always been private interest." This is only true if economic action is to be regarded solely from the biological or utilitarian point of view. However, I believe that one

could mount a properly sociological view of economic action, drawing in part from Durkheim himself (see also Book Three):

> Even the material interests which these great reli-
> gious ceremonies are designed to satisfy the public
> order and are therefore social. Society as a whole
> is interested that the harvest be abundant, that the
> rain fall at the right time and not excessively, that
> the animals reproduce regularly. So it is society
> that is in the forefront of every consciousness; it
> dominates and directs all conduct; that is equivalent
> to saying that it is more living and active, and con-
> sequently, more real, than in profane times (EF:390).

b. The Positive Pole of Sociocultural Life: Attributes of
      the Sacred

According to Durkheim, key distinguishing characteris-
tics of "sacredness" include: hierarchical value, the moral
authority and obligatory respect due to high position, its
opposition to, or ability to repel, the profane, and its "con-
tagiousness." Such attributes are, of course, linked together.
It is important to remember at the outset, however, that the
sacred and the profane are relationally defined--that is,
their dichotomous existence is inter-dependent. Their contrast
is necessary to their very mutual existence; much like the
contrast between figure and field is necessary to perception.
Second, following the same metaphor, just as localized figures
depend for their separate perceptual existence upon contrast
with the prior existence of a more generalized background
field, so too does the profane depend upon the prior exist-
ence of the more fundamental category of the sacred. Or, in
other words, as Poggi (1972) observes, even the profane itself
is a religious creation! For the sacred defines not only it-
self, but its opposite as well. Thus, the anchor of the sym-
bolic system of society and the person is the sacred; it is
the ground of human existence. While the negative pole of the
profane is a necessary element, only the sacred is sufficient.
Let us now explore some of these more or less paradoxical con-
tentions of Durkheim in his magisterial Elementary Forms.

First, it is well to remember that Durkheim directed

our attention toward religion as the primal evolutionary
matrix of society, culture, and the person; I call this his
seminal thesis of the "primitive sacral complex" (see a suc-
ceeding chapter in this Book). This meant that in generic
terms Durkheim defined religion's role in social, cultural,
and phenonenological process in relational terms. That is,
religion referred to the energizing and guiding oppositions
between sacred and profane, on the one hand, and the micro
and macrocosm on the other. In etymological terms, this mean-
ing of religion was as re-_ligare_ that which binds or ties
everything together, and orients experience, and guides us
toward a common goal.

This is one reason why Durkheim constantly repeated his
contention that sacredness is superimposed upon objects, pla-
ces, and things by society--"anything can be sacred." Now,
while I have criticized this position that symbols are utter-
ly arbitrary and conventional, I believe that Durkheim's cen-
tral thrust here was correct in emphasizing that symbolic sets
and series of equations are socioculturally generated. They
are not natural "givens." Indeed, using Levi-Strauss's funda-
mental binary opposition between nature and culture, these
symbolic sets of equations are the interface between "condi-
tions" and "intentions." Symbols are our own creations, the
means by which we make and remake ourselves. Therefore, the
first key to understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal
significance of the opposition between the sacred and the pro-
fane is to be sought in terms of the symbolic sets of equa-
tions by which society, culture, and person are progressively
constructed.

Early in The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim
defined religion, as the symbolic interface between nature
and culture, society and person, in terms of the compounding
series of oppositions between the collectively defined sacred-
ness and profaneness.

> All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex,
> present one common characteristic: they presuppose a
> classification of all things, real and ideal ... into

two classes or opposed groups, generally designated
by ... the words profane and sacred. This division of
the world into two domains, the one containing all
that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the
distinctive trait of religious thought. The beliefs,
myths, dogmas, and legends are either representations
or systems of representations which express the nature
of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are at-
tributed to them, or their relations with each other
and with profane things. But by sacred things one must
not understand simply those personal beings which are
called gods or spirits: a rock, a tree, a spring, a
pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word, anything
can be sacred (EF:52).

In his drive to emphasize the social creation of sacredness,

Durkheim argued that this positive pole of sociocultural life

is not based upon the inherent qualities of objects.

The sacred character assumed by an object is not implied
in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added
to them. The world of religious things is not one part-
icular aspect of empirical nature; it is superimposed
upon it (EF:261).

Durkheim resisted, therefore, all efforts to narrowly circum-

scribe the parameters of religious symbolism; indeed, he had

to do so if he was to successfully maintain his tacit conten-

tion that religious action is the constitutive foundation

of human life. Thus, definitions of religion cannot be limited

solely to consideration of spirits, gods, rites, etc.; rather,

any definition must refer to the massive and sustained social,

cultural, and phenomenological impacts of religious action.

The circle of sacred objects cannot be determined,
then, once and for all. Its extent varies infinitely,
according to the different religions. That is how Bud-
dhism is a religion: in default of gods, it admits
the existence of sacred things, namely, the four noble
truths and the practices derived from them. (Footnote:
not to mention the sage and the saint who practice
these truths and who for that reason are sacred (EF:
52).

Now, the particular ceremonial occasions whereby the op-

positions between the sacred and the profane are symbolically

orchestrated, and human energies mobilized, are called rites.

Religious rites serve to concentrate collective attentions

and intentions; as a solar mirror collects the rays of the

sun, ceremonial and ritual act as the focal point by which
the refractory rays of life are gathered up together and
fused into the most potent instrument of society. The rite,
the magic circle, is thus the point of origin, and contin-
uing creative center of sociocultural life (see, for example,
Josef Pieper, 1963).

> A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite
> does not exist which does not have it to a certain
> degree. There are words, expressions, and formula
> which can be pronounced only by the mouths of con-
> secrated persons; there are gestures and movements
> which everybody can not perform. If the Vedic sacrifice
> has had such an efficacy that, according to mythol-
> ogy, it was the creator of the gods ... it is because
> it possessed a virtue comparable to that of the most
> sacred beings (EF:52).

Now, the creative character of these socioculturally genera-
ted symbols is clearly manifest in the sacred objects of the
Australian aboriginees. The churinga, Durkheim observed, not
only "... keeps the profane at a distance," but it also has:

> ... all sorts of marvellous properties: by contact
> it heals wounds ... it has the same power over sick-
> ness; it is useful for making the beard grow; it con-
> fers important powers over the totemic species, whose
> normal reproduction it ensures; it gives new force,
> courage, and perserverance, while, on the other hand,
> it depresses and weakens their enemies. This latter
> belief is so firmly rooted that when two combatants
> stand pitted against one another, if one sees that
> the other has brought the churinga against him, he
> loses confidence and his defeat is certain (EF:142-3).

Clearly, this passaage reveals the centrality of symbols of
prime potency within aboriginal culture. Following Durkheim,
Pieper, and Evans-Pritchard, we may now discover why through
religious ritual man "ascends to the kingdom of freedom."
First, because religion in the sense of re-ligare places
man in direct and mutually obligatory relationships with the
generative and directive sources of the macrocosm. Second,
because freedom is thus defined relationally--it is not mere-
ly a negative category, a state from which we escape from
constraint, from negative being. Rather, human freedom is
seen here as a voluntary and consistent relationship with
the generative and directive sources of the cosmos.

Next, Durkheim asked: how is the sacred to be distinguished from the profane? His first answer was: reflective judgments made about reality always distinguish gradations or hierarchy of value. Human reality is neither simple nor homogeneous; rather, rankings and invidious status distinctions of higher and lower, are perennially made. Clearly, greater dignity and honor--in short, value--are accorded to those things which come as if "from on high."

> One might be tempted, first of all, to define them by the place they are generally assigned in the hierarchy of things. They are naturally considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, and particularly to man, when he is only a man and has nothing sacred about him. One thinks of himself as occupying an inferior and dependent position in relation to them; and surely this conception is not without some truth (EF:52-3).

Then, Durkheim noted that the respect we accord sacred objects, places, and times differs greatly from the practical attitude by which we regard common, everyday things.

> The   sentiments which they inspire in us differ from those we have for simple visible objects. As long as these latter are reduced to their empirical characteristics as shown in ordinary experience, and as long as the religious imagination has not metamorphosed them, we entertain for them no feeling which resembles respect, and they contain within them nothing that is able to raise us outside ourselves. Therefore, the representations which express them appear to us to be very different from those aroused in us by collective influences. The two form two distinct and separate mental states in our consciousness, just as do the two forms of life to which they correspond. Consequently, we get the impression that we are in relations with two distinct sorts of reality and that a sharply drawn line of demarcation separates them from each other: on the one hand is the world of profane things, on the other, that of sacred things (EF:243).

Further, Durkheim argued that this unique capacity of society to construct anchors of our existence, to demarcate our lives and attitudes into two organized and opposing camps, is not limited to aboriginal societies. Rather, the ability to define some things as worthy of respect and others as deserving of "damnation," is a generic capacity of all societies in all times and places.

> In the present day just as much as in the past, we see
> society constantly creating sacred things out of ordi-
> nary ones. If it happens to fall in love with a man and
> if it thinks it has found in him the principal aspira-
> tions that move it, as well as the means of satisfying
> them, this man will be raised above the others, and, as
> it were, deified. Opinion will invest him with a majes-
> ty exactly analogous to that protecting the gods.... In
> addition to men, society also consecrates things, espe-
> cially ideas. If a belief is unanimously shared by a peo-
> ple, then ... it is forbidden to touch it ... to deny it
> or contest it. Now, the prohibition of criticism is an
> interdiction like the other and proves the presence of
> something sacred. Even today, howsoever great may be the
> liberty which we accord to others, a man who should to-
> tally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which
> modern societies are attached would produce the effect
> of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which
> those most devoted to free examination of everything
> tend to place above discussion and to regard as untouch-
> able ... as sacred: this is the very principle of free
> examination (EF:243-4).

However, Durkheim reflected, hierarchical gradation and high moral authority, while necessary elements, are insufficient by themselves to distinguish sacredness. It is important to note that when Durkheim suggested that hierarchical scales rank phenomena in terms of more or less value, he acknowledged here an underlying gradation by degree. That is, there is a continuum here ranging from extremely sacred to neutral to extremely profane. Indeed, Durkheim admitted: "It must not be lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and that there are some in relation to which a man feels himself relatively at his ease" (EF:53). Thus, I believe that Evans-Pritchard's (1965) and W. H. Stanner's(1967) objections to Durkheim's seemingly rigid dichotomy between sacred and profane are lessened.

In summarizing the two extremes of the sociocultural hierarchy of valuation, Durkheim next argued that an additional key criterion distinguishing sacredness from profaneness is their radical polar opposition to one another. Durkheim appeared to argue here in rather static and categorical terms that the opposition between these two poles is absolute. Such a statement, however, as numerous critics of this aspect of Durk-

heim's sociology of religion have pointed out, is both theo-
retically and empirically untenable. I believe that taking
Durkheim's statements here too literally, simply at face va-
lue, is both unjustified and misleading.

> But if a purely hierarchical distinction is a criter-
> ion at once too general and too imprecise, there is
> nothing left with which to characterize the sacred in
> its relation to the profane except their heterogeneity.
> However, this heterogeneity is sufficient to charact-
> erize this classification of things and to distinguish
> it from all others, because it is very particular: it
> is absolute (EF:53).

However, again Durkheim's rhetorical animus was responsible
here for this seeming over-statement. The most viable meaning
of Durkheim's notion of the absoluteness of the opposition be-
tween the sacred and the profane is that their polar relation-
ship is an absolute societal universal. In other words, while
their opposition is relational--not rigid and absolute, none-
theless, it is true that their polar opposition is a cultural
universal.

However, my attempted rescue of Durkheim from his polem-
ical indiscretions is partially restricted by his penchant for
rhetorical excess. Had he not (I believe mistakenly) identi-
fied the ego and utilitarian activity with the profane, Durk-
heim would not have made the following revealing statement:

> In the history of human thought there exists no other
> example of two categories of things so profoundly dif-
> ferentiated or so radically opposed to one another.
> The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing
> beside this; for the good and the bad are only two op-
> posed species of the same class, namely morals, just as
> sickness and health are two different aspects of the
> same order of facts, life, while the sacred and profane
> have always and everywhere been conceived by the human
> mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between
> which there is nothing in common (EF:53-4).

Had Durkheim set his anti-utilitarian polemics aside and
rested content with the universal opposition between good and
evil, truth and error, the pure and the impure, order and chaos,
and so forth, he would have spared himself much undeserved op-
probium and us much confusion. While his rhetorical excess led
him astray, his underlying purpose comes through clearly enough

in the following passage:

> We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal be-
> ings to whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves
> and our own interests at the same time; we cannot devote
> ourselves entirely to the group and entirely to our own
> egoism at once (EF:356).

When Durkheim set his programmatic statements aside and returned to description rather than polemic, his real intentions and empirical concerns prevailed. For instance, I find little that is objectionable in the following quote:

> The forces which play in one area are not simply those
> which are met with in the other, but a little stronger;
> they are of a different sort. In different religions,
> this opposition has been conceived in different ways.
> Here, to separate these two sorts of things, it has
> seemed sufficient to localize them in different parts
> of the physical universe; there, the first have been
> put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the
> material world is left in full possession of the others.
> But howsoever much the forms of contrast may vary, the
> fact of the contrast is universal (EF:54).

In short, as I earlier argued, although the symbolic contents of this opposition may vary, the "fact of the contrast" between the sacred and the profane is a cultural universal. This universal attribute gives rise to Durkheim's definition of religious phenomena.

> The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that
> they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole
> universe, known and knowable, into two classes which em-
> brace all that exists, but which radically exclude each
> other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions
> protect and isolate; profane things, those to which
> these interdictions are applied and which must remain
> at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the
> representations which express the nature of sacred things
> and the relations which they sustain, either with each
> other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the
> rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should com-
> port himself in the presence of these sacred objects.
> When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations
> of coordination or subordination with each other in such
> a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but
> which is not comprised within any other system of the
> same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their cor-
> responding rites constitutes a religion (EF:56).

c. The Contagiousness of the Sacred

Earlier analogies likening the sacred with various
energy forms and flows suggest what Durkheim meant when he
referred to the "contagiousness of sacred forces," as ano-
ther of their distinguishing qualities. Like a sort of "sacred
electricity," those phenonena endowed with "charismatic ener-
gy" reveal great elusiveness and fluidity. "A sacred charact-
er is to a high degree contagious" (EF:254). The sacred is
first and foremost to be regarded as an energizing force; its
very intensity "incites it to spreading" (EF:363).

This extraordinary intensity and diffuseness of "sacred
electricity" has at least two important consequences. First,
it requires that the profane be isolated from the sacred,
thus giving rise to myriad boundary-making efforts; second,
as the sacred energy flows and spreads, it tends to organize
the whole life of the group into a symbolically aligned mi-
crocosm of the universe. We shall discuss the first aspect
now, and come back to the "global" nature of sacred-profane
symbolic cosmization shortly.

It is important to note, moveover, that the constant ef-
fort directed toward isolating and prohibiting contact between
these opposing forces is largely intended to protect the sacred
from con-fusion with the profane. The energetic contagiousness
of the sacred requires that it be bottled up, as it were, and
held in its most potent and pure state. If the sacred refers
to the sum total of all the aspects of the virtuous side of
the universal dichotomy, then, as the focal or gathering point
of these sacred energies, it is necessary to maintain its
clarity and undiluted potency. Indeed, this is precisely what
is referred to in the etymological meaning of profane --
pro-fanum -- that which is outside the temple.

Durkheim's analysis of totemism rests on this underly-
ing notion of a primal undifferentiated "sacred electricity."
Of the American Indians, Durkheim commented: "Now the common
principle of life is the wakan. The totem is the means by
which an individual is put into relations with this source of

energy; if the totem has any powers, it is because it incarnates the wakan" (EF:224). Indeed, the _wakan_ or charismatic force is:

> ... the original matter out of which have been constructed those beings of every sort which the religions of all times have consecrated and adored. The spirits, demons, genii, and gods of every sort are only the concrete forms taken by this energy, or "potentiality" in individualizing itself, in fixing itself upon a certain determined object or point in space, or in centering itself around an ideal and legendary being (EF:228).

It should be noted, in passing, that Durkheim's description of the "essential consubstantiality of all sacred things" and the "fluidity" of sacred energies converges closely with Weber's description of charisma and the evolution of the gods in his magisterial _The Sociology of Religion_ (1963, 1968). Durkheim's proposition that "... the wakan ... comes and goes through the world, and sacred things are the points upon which it alights" (EF:228-9) could have been written by Weber, or perhaps it was the other way around, as Mauss once insisted (see R. Aron, 1967: 271; E. Tiryakian, 1966:332, #7).

Durkheim's evolutionism was so strong that he discerned this primal, undifferentiated flow of sacred energy as lying back of all the more crystallized spirits and gods. Instead of gods at the origin of religious life, Durkheim discovered "indefinite, anonymous forces," and it is for this reason that he refused to define religion solely in terms of gods.

> We are now in a better condition to understand why it has been impossible to define religion by the idea of mythical personalities, gods, or spirits; it is because this way of representing religious things is in no way inherent in their nature. What we find at the origin and basis of religious thought are not determined and distinct objects and beings possessing a sacred character of themselves; they are indefinite powers, anonymous forces, more or less numerous in different societies, and sometimes even reduced to a unity, and whose impersonality is strictly comparable to that of the physical forces whose manifestations the sciences of nature study. As for particular sacred things, they are only individualized forms of this essential principle.... Even the most elementary mythological constructions are secondary products which cover a system of be-

liefs, at once simpler and more obscure, vaguer, and
more essential, which form the solid foundations upon
which the religious systems are built. It is this prim-
itive foundation which our analysis of totemism has en-
abled us to reach (EF:229, 232).

Additionally, Durkheim noted that the sacred and the
profane are not simply defined by the obligatory respect due
to the former. Rather, their active antagonism implies that
the universality of the rigorous systems of interdictions
serve to "close one sphere to another," for "between them
there is an abyss" (EF:357). The particular reason for this
"exceptional isolation and mutual exclusion" which Durkheim
found in the "contagious" nature of sacred phenomena, and
thus the corresponding need to keep these anchors of socio-
cultural life from being irretrievably confounded one in the
other. Thus, there are two forces at work here: the conta-
giousness of the "sacred electricity," and the sort of random-
izing entropy characterizing all energy flows.

> ... by a sort of contradiction, the sacred world is in-
> clined, as it were, to spread itself into this same pro-
> fane world which it excludes elsewhere; at the same time
> that it repels it, it tends to flow into it as soon as
> it approaches. This is why it is necessary to keep them
> at a distance from one another and to create a sort of
> vacuum between them. What makes these precautions ne-
> cessary is the extraordinary contagiousness of a sacred
> character. Far from being attached to the things which
> are marked with it, it is endowed with a sort of elu-
> siveness. Even the most superficial or roundabout con-
> tact is sufficient to enable it to spread from one ob-
> ject to another. Religious forces are represented
> in the mind in such a way that they always seem to es-
> cape from the points where they reside and to enter every-
> thing passing within their range.... It is also upon this
> principle of the contagiousness of sacredness that all
> the rites of consecration repose. The sanctity of the
> churinga is so great that is action is even felt at a
> distance (EF:358).

Because of the contagiousness of this charismatic ener-
gy, Durkheim next explored the whole system of interdictions
which spread out like reversed magnets from the ritual core
throughout the whole fabric of social life. The pure is like
a distilled precipitate that only retains its unique quali-
ties and potencies when isolated and concentrated. Since, if

left to themselves the sacred and profane would confound
themselves in the generic flow of life and existence, social
interdictions or taboos become necessary to maintain their
separate identities. Like survey markers continuously erased
by time and circumstance, the boundary lines between the pure
and the impure, between order and chaos, must be constantly
maintained and periodically realigned. Dirt, weeds, noise,
chance, ugliness, and so on, these and other phenomena which
constantly threaten the clear outlines and meaningful patterns
of our axial organizing coordinates must be controlled and in-
terdicted.

> Since, in virtue of this extraordinary power of expan-
> sion, the slightest contact, the least proximity, either
> material or simply moral, suffices to draw religious
> forces out of their domain, and since, on the other hand,
> they cannot leave it without contradicting their nature,
> a whole system of measures is indispensable for maintain-
> ing the two worlds at a respectful distance from one ano-
> ther. This is why it is forbidden to the profane, not
> only to touch, but even to see or hear that which is sa-
> cred, and why these two sorts of life cannot be mixed in
> their consciousnesses. Precautions are necessary to keep
> them apart because, though opposing one another, they
> tend to confuse themselves into one another (EF:359-60).

Finally, I must insist that this passage clarifies some of
the intellectual controversies which have swirled around these
points. First, contrary to Durkheim's earlier extreme "abso-
lutistic" statements, and contrary to Stanner's and Evans-
Pritchard's acceptance of these rhetorical excesses at their
face value, in his more empirically descriptive work Durkheim
never radically dichotomized these polarities nor rigidly ab-
solutized their universal opposition. For if there can really
be no contact between the sacred and the profane, what need
have we then of interdicting their possible confusion? Further,
what need would we have of rites that transform one category
into another? Indeed, as we shall see, religious life is only
possible and even necessary if there is at least the possibil-
ity of continuous contact and threats of confounding the sa-
cred with the profane. Much   tension in sociocultural life
depends upon just this risk of confusion and pollution;

the irony of the human condition depends on it. Second, it is clear that the meaning of their interdicted separation is to maintain the axial boundaries, the survey markers on the base map of culture. Third, these cultural maps are not solely cognitive, but also simultaneously moral, emotional, and imaginative as well.

d. Pollution and Walling Off the Profane: The Negative or Ascetic Rites

Beyond the contagiousness of the sacred, and the need to keep it potent in its concentrated, pure form, there is also need to keep profaneness segregated from the sacred. Not only must these elements not be allowed to mix and confound themselves in the homogeneity of life, but they must also be walled off, as it were, from each other if the order of the microcosm is to maintained. This is the function (or consequence) of the negative or ascetic rites. If harmony in the cosmos is to be maintained, the relationships between the sacred and the profane, in terms of the alignment of the microcosm with the macrocosm, must be continuously regulated and reaffirmed. Through these ascetic or regulatory rites, we establish and reinforce boundaries separating the profane from the sacred. Naturally, these interdictions spread to the whole of socio-cultural life. Time, space, objects, events, people, and so forth, in short, all aspects of life, become classified, separated, and re-articulated in terms of the fundamental anchor of oppositions between sacred and profane. The whole world becomes valorized, that is, society progressively imposes positive, negative (and neutral) valences on all details of existence.

In genetic-evolutionary terms, it is important to note how primitive societies thus tend to become hedged in by ritual prescriptions and proscriptions. Sacral and magical taboos come to permeate tribal life. Questions of right and wrong, of truth and error, become inextricably bound up with the cosmic consciousness reflected in the mirror of the micro-

cosmic conscience. Sin, guilt, and pollution come from vio-
lating the boundaries between sacred and profane. Disturban-
ces of the harmonious relations between macro and microcosm
in bringing illness, attack, bad weather, etc., threaten the
entire society. Thus, the first major forms of deviance are
those of the "religious criminal" whose violation of the
norms laid down by the collective conscience must be strong-
ly repressed. As noted, profaneness and deviance are inti-
mately intertwined. Moreover, the interdiction or prohibition
of contact itself becomes sacrosanct, so that the rule in-
stead of the actual violation becomes gradually sanctioned.
Thus, the image rather than the event gradually takes over,
giving rise to all those more or less "irrational" restrict-
ive practices surviving long after their original reason for
being has been lost forever to memory.

Now, the contact between sacred and profane is both in-
evitable and even necessary. In view of their opposition and
prescribed separation, this prohibited mixing might seem para-
doxical. Yet, we should always remember that these are rela-
tional polarities; if there were absolutely no contact possi-
ble between them, we would have no way of contrasting them,
and thus, even of identifying them as universal contraries.
It is only because, prior to conscious and systematic reflect-
ion, they are simply bound up with the mix and flow of every-
day life. Paradoxically, _it_ _is_ _only_ _by_ _profanations_ _and_ _de-_
filements _that_ _we_ _are_ _able_ _to_ _separate_ _out_ _the_ _sacred_ _from_
the _non-sacred_ _in_ _the_ _first_ _place_. Second, however, beyond
the inevitable pollutions of the pure and creative sources
of life, points of communion must be possible if we are to
regularly experience re-creation by the energizing powers of
"sacred electricity" in our daily lives. There must be regu-
larly scheduled passages from the profane to the sacred world,
and back again. If these "doors" do not open, the crucial
links binding the micro to the macrocosm would be fatally
snapped.

Even while it tends to permeate life because of its

fluidity and contagiousness, the sacred or positive pole of
sociocultural life is also separated and protected. Sacred
things are, by definition, a "world apart."

> By definition, sacred beings are separated beings.
> That which characterizes them is that there is a
> break in continuity between them and the profane
> beings.... A whole group of rites has the object of
> of realizing this state of separation which is es-
> sential. Since their function is to prevent undue
> mixings and to keep one of these two domains from
> encroaching upon the other, they are only able to
> impose abstentions or negative acts ... taboos ...
> interdictions (EF:337-8).

Thus, things worthy of respect must be protected from con-
tamination with things of little or negative value. In short,
the fundamental classificatory principle is that things of
unequal value must be separated. This principle is especially
important because of the tendency of the sacred to spread by
virtue of its own energy, and thus to confound itself in les-
ser states of being.

> All that is sacred is the object of respect, and every
> sentiment of respect is translated in him who feels it,
> by movements of inhibition. In fact, a respected being
> is always expressed in the consciousness by a represen-
> tation which, owing to the emotion which it inspires,
> is charged with a high mental energy; consequently, it
> is armed in such a way as to reject to a distance every
> other representation which denies it in whole or in part.
> Now, the sacred world and the profane world are antagon-
> istic to each other. They correspond to two forms of life
> which mutually exclude each other, or which at least can-
> not be lived at the same time with the same intensity.
> We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal to
> whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves and
> our own interests at the same time; we cannot devote
> ourselves entirely to the group and entirely to our own
> egoism at once (EF:35 6-7).

Now, the critical factor is not the separation of sacred and
profane beings or things in the external world, for life it-
self combines both poles of existence inextricably in its on-
ward flow. Indeed, since the origin of these separations which
we project outward and imprint upon the world is really cul-
ture and mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred and
profane lies within man himself. The interdiction is, first

and foremost, <u>a phenomenological injunction</u> that man directs toward his own conscience and consciousness, towards his own imagination and will.

> Here there are two systems of conscious states which are directed and which direct our conduct toward opposite poles. So the one having the greater power of action should tend to exclude the other from the consciousness. When we think of holy things, the idea of a profane object cannot enter the mind without encountering grave resistance; something within us opposes itself to its installation. This is because the representation of a sacred thing does not tolerate neighbors. But this psychic antagonism and this mutual exclusion of ideas should naturally result in the exclusion of the corresponding things. If the ideas are not to coexist, the things must not touch each other or have any sort of relations. This is the very principle of the interdict (EF:357).

Both thought and action must be different in the presence of sacred things. Sacred places, sacred times, impose their own norms and appropriate behaviors. One need not be told how to act in a sacred place, for instance; it issues its own requirements; indeed, a fully socialized adult would not think of profaning a church, temple, courtroom, hospital, historical site, etc., regardless of whether or not others are there at the same time to sanction potential deviance.

> Since it (the sacred) is opposed to the profane world ... it must be treated in its own peculiar way: it would be a misunderstanding of its nature and a confusion of it with something that it is not, to make use of the gestures, language, and attitudes which we employ in our relations with ordinary things.... We may handle the former freely; we speak freely to vulgar beings; so we do not touch the sacred beings, or we touch them only with reserve; we do not speak in their presence, or we do not speak the common language there. All that is used in our commerce with the one must be excluded from our commerce with the other (EF:357).

Now, there are various kinds of taboos meant to separate the sacred from the non-sacred. For not even the sacred is a homogeneous category. First, we must distinguish between various degrees and types of sacredness; for example, greater and lesser forms of charismatic power, and their differentiation by task.

> ... there are interdictions of different sorts which
> it is important to distinguish.... These interdictions
> are intended to prevent all communication between the
> purely sacred and the impurely sacred, between the sa-
> credly auspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All
> these interdictions ... come from the fact that there
> are inequalities and incompatibilities between sacred
> things (EF:338, 340).

Especially important here are the oppositions between magical
and religious taboos. Durkheim distinguished between magical
and religious interdictions in terms of the differing reasons
for their respective sanctions.

> First of all, beside those coming from religion, there
> are others which are due to magic. The two have this in
> common, that they declare certain things incompatible,
> and prescribe the separation of the things whose incom-
> patibility is thus proclaimed. But there are also very
> grave differences between them. In the first place, the
> sanctions are not the same in the two cases (EF:338).

According to Durkheim, magical sanctions revenge violation of
taboo in an automatic fashion, as if it were a mechanical fact.
Religious sanctions, over and above the seemingly mechanical
retribution forthcoming to all violations, adds a real socio-
cultural and psychological punishment. There is no "sin" in
magic, and therefore no need for re-definition of self and
internalization of guilt.

> ... the violation of the religious interdicts is fre-
> quently believed ... to bring about material disorders
> mechanically, from which the guilty man will suffer,
> and which are regarded as a judgement on his own act.
> But even if these really came about this spontaneous
> and automatic judgement is not the only one; it is al-
> ways completed by another one, supposing human inter-
> vention. A real punishment is added to this, if it does
> not anticipate it, and this one is deliberately inflict-
> ed by men; or at least there is a blame and reprobation.
> Even when the sacrilege has been punished, as it were,
> by the sickness or natural death of its author, it is
> also defamed; it offends opinion which reacts against
> it; it puts the man who did it in fault. On the con-
> trary, the magical interdiction is judged only by the
> material consequences which the forbidden act is be-
> lieved to produce, with a sort of physical necessity.
> In disobeying, a man runs risks similar to those which
> an invalid exposes himself in not following the advice
> of his physician; but in this case disobedience is not
> a fault; it creates no indignation. There is no sin in
> magic (EF:338-9).

Continuing the contrast, Durkheim proposed that magic is basically asocial, and therefore nonnormative; it relates mainly to the factual or behavioral order. Religious interdictions, by contrast, are primarily concerned with the sociocultural and phenomenological order of "sacredness." Magical proscriptions, on the other hand, are concerned mainly with the technical impropriety of linking inappropriate profane utilities. In sum, religious interdictions are ethical "categorical imperatives," while magical interdictions are "technical" recipes.

> This difference in sanction is due to profound difference in the nature of the interdictions. The religious interdiction necessarily implies the notion of sacredness; it comes from the respect inspired by the sacred object, and its purpose is to keep this respect from failing. On the other hand, the interdictions of magic suppose only a wholly lay notion of property. The things which the magician recommends be kept separate are those which, by reason of their characteristic properties, cannot be brought together and confused without danger.... Magic lives on profanations ... and reasons of temporal utility. In a word, religious interdictions are categorical imperatives; others are useful maxims, the first form of hygienic and medical interdictions. We cannot study two orders of facts as different as these simultaneously, or even under the same name, without confusion. We are only concerned with religious interdictions here (EF:339).

However, even with these basic distinctions, Durkheim acknowledged that magical and sacral interdictions are continuous in other respects. For Durkheim made magical taboos a derivative subset of sacral-social ones.

> This is not saying that there is a radical break in continuity between the religous and the magical interdictions: on the contrary, it is one whose true nature is not decided.... Magical interdicts cannot be understood except as a function of the religious ones
> (EF:339, #5).

This kinship is true regardless of whether the technical prohibition came first and then was subsequently secularized, or whether it was first sacral and then only later became de-sacralized, yet was still customarily observed. In short, magical taboos are directed primarily toward cognitive norms of consciousness, while sacral taboos are directed mainly toward

ethical norms of conscience. As always, questions of con-
science and right action tend to override questions of con-
sciousness and right thinking.

Having thus set aside magical taboo from prime consi-
deration, Durkheim next briefly distinguished between types
of sacral interdictions. Recognizing that there are degrees
of sacredness, Durkheim noted that "... the more sacred re-
pels the less sacred" (EF:341). Thus, all the interdictions
"... arrange themselves into two classes: the interdictions
between the sacred and the profane, and the purely or the im-
purely sacred" (EF:341).

> ... the most important interdictions ... are intend-
> ed to prevent all communication between the purely sa-
> cred and the impurely sacred, between the sacredly in-
> auspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All these in-
> terdictions have one common characteristic; they come
> not from the fact that some things are sacred while oth-
> ers are not, but from the fact that there are inequali-
> ties and incompatibilities between sacred things (EF:340).

But Durkheim also set aside these various types of interdict-
ions, as not really touching "what is essential in the idea
of sacredness." Such observances could not lead to Durkheim's
central sociological interest, namely, the cult or moral com-
munity and its collectively representational rites. All his
statements concerning the radical abyss separating the sacred
and the profane aside, we must remember that Durkheim here in-
sisted: "Before all, a cult is made by regular relations be-
tween the profane and the sacred" (EF:340).

Durkheim next turned our attention to the center of his
interest: those interdicts prohibiting contact between the sa-
cred and the profane. Again, it is important to note that the
setting of these crucial boundaries is a one-directional pro-
cess, for it is the sacred which defines both its boundaries,
and also walls off the profane. The profane may threaten the
sacred and the order of the microcosm, but only sacral symbol-
ism and action is sufficient to organize the world and main-
tain the all-important harmonious relations between microcosm
and macrocosm.

... there is another system of religious interdictions
which is much more extended and important; this is the
one which separates, not different species of sacred
things, but all that is sacred from all that is pro-
fane. So it is derived immediately from the notion of
sacredness itself, and it limits itself to expressing
and realizing this. Thus, it furnishes the material for
a veritable cult, and even of a cult which is at the ba-
sis of all the others; for the attitude which it pre-
scribes is one which the worshipper must never depart
from in all his relations with the sacred. It is what
we call the negative cult. We may say that its inter-
dicts are the religious interdicts par excellence (EF:
340).

e. Types of Sacral Interdictions

Sacral interdictions which seek to separate and restrict
the profane from the sacred are the focus of religious cults.
The ritual is the means by which the cult implements these in-
terdictions. Durkheim called this the negative or ascetic cult.
These interdictions can take multiple forms. The preeminent
taboos are those concerned with restricting contact between
these two constructed anchors of sociocultural life.

Before all are the interdictions of contact: these are
the original taboos, of which the others are scarcely
more than particular varieties. They rest upon the prin-
ciple that the profane should never touch the sacred (EF:
341).

Under certain circumstances, contact with blood, hair, corpses,
and so on, is forbidden, as the contact is unholy.

Clearly perilous to violation are alimentary interdict-
ions, especially those concerning the consumption of totemic
life.

An exceptionally intimate contact is the one resulting
from the absorption of food. Hence comes the interdict-
ion against the sacred animals or vegetables, and espe-
cially against those serving as totems. Such an act ap-
pears so sacrilegeous that the prohibition covers even
adults ... only the old men attain a sufficient reli-
gious dignity to escape this interdict sometimes (341-2).

Now, this prohibition works both ways--sacred foods are for-
bidden to the profane, and profane foods are forbidden to
those considered sacred. Moveover, we see emerging here   a
kind of cosmization of food and human diet. Those who take up

full-time religious status, or as Weber said "take a lease on charisma," as professional ascetics or religious virtuosos, inevitably make a systematic, symbolically aligned, and restricted diet part of their methodical regimen.

> ... if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, certain others, on the contrary, are forbidden to persons of a sacred character, because they are profane. Thus, it frequently happens that certain animals are especially designated as the food of women; for this reason they believe that they partake of a feminine nature and they are consequently profane. On the other hand, the young initiate is submitted to a series of rites of particular severity; to give him the virtues which will enable him to enter into the world of sacred things, from which he had up until then been excluded, they center an exceptionally powerful group of religious forces upon him. Thus, he enters into a state of sanctity which keeps all that is profane at a distance. Then he is not allowed to eat the game which is regarded as the special food of women (EF:342).

The old aphorism "you are what you eat" reminds us that diet, in both meanings of the term, has often become a prime spiritual technology. As an ascetic regimen, the dieter purposely restricts his nutritional intake to some predetermined minimum; as a means of building himself and his disposition, the dieter attempts to align the type of character he wishes to embrace with the type of foods symbolically associated with those specific attributes. This serves as an excellent example of sociocultural norms organizing and directing lower biophysiological levels; or in Levi-Strauss's terms, of culture organizing nature.

Certainly, other types of contact are forbidden also. Visual recognition, for example:

> One comes into relations with a thing merely by regarding it: a look is a means of contact. This is why the sight of a sacred thing is forbidden to the profane in certain cases. A woman should never see the instruments of the cult (EF:342).

The contagiousness of the sacred, and the potential defilement of it by the profane, means that even verbal contact may be dangerous.

> The word is another way of entering into relations with persons or things. The breath establishes a communica-

tion; this is the part of us which spreads outwards.
Thus it is forbidden to the profane to address the
sacred beings or simply to speak in their presence....
Besides the sacred things, there are words and sounds
which have the same character; they should not pass
the lips of the profane nor enter their ears. There
are ritual songs which women must not hear under pain
of death. They may hear the noise of the bull-roarers,
but only from a distance. Every proper name is consi-
dered an essential element of the person who bears it;
being closely associated in the mind to the idea of
this person, it participates in the sentiments which
the latter inspires. So if the one is sacred, the other
is too. Therefore, it may not be pronounced in the cour-
se of the profane life (EF:343-4).

Moreover, in religious ritual, men often acquire another name,
a special designation that not only signifies their new or re-
born status, but also replaces their ordinary or profane names
for sacral purposes.

In addition to their public and everyday names, all men
have another which is kept a secret: the women and child-
ren do not know it; it is never used in the ordinary life.
... There are ceremonies during which it is necessary to
speak a special language which must not be used for pro-
fane purposes. It is the beginning of a sacred language
(EF:344).

In addition, the common profane appearance must often
be set aside--men shave, are forced to strip naked,   or
put on special ritual costumes which signify their change of
being. When approaching the sacred,men must put aside their
common, ordinary selves, and thus the things signifying this
profane style of life must also be set aside.

Not only are the sacred things separated from the pro-
fane, but also nothing which either directly or indi-
rectly concerns the profane life should be confused
with the religious life. Complete nudity is frequent-
ly demanded of the native as a prerequisite to being
admitted to participation in the rites; he is required
to strip himself of all his habitual ornaments.... If
he is obliged to decorate himself to play his part in
ritual, this decoration has to made especially for the
occasion; it is forbidden to use them in profane affairs;
when the ceremony is finished, they are buried or burnt
(EF:344-5).

Not only must the outward appearance of the self be
changed when approaching the sacred, but moreover, common and

ordinary everyday activities must also be suspended. Thus, society constructs not merely personality structures, but also time and spatial structure. The temporal rhythms of everyday life revolve around these alternating phases of sacred high intensity rites and everyday practical dispersal.

> In general, all acts characteristic of the ordinary life are forbidden while those of the religious life are taking place. The act of eating is, of itself, profane; for it takes place every day, it satisfies essentially utilitarian and material needs, and it is a part of out ordinary existence. This is why it is prohibited in religious times (EF:345).

Thus, time is punctuated by the extraordinary effervescence of the collective rites. As Halbwachs later showed, even the frameworks of memory and anticipation have a social and cultural character. In later societies, of course, it was the religiously sanctioned day of celebration, recollection, and recreation that came to anchor the weekly work cycle.

> ... all temporal occupations are suspended while the great religious solemnities are taking place.... The life of the Australian is divided into two very distinct parts: the one is devoted to hunting, fishing, and warfare; the other is consecrated to the cult and these two forms of activity mutually exclude and repel one another. It is on this principle that the universal institution of religious days of rest reposes. The distinctive character of the feast days in all known religions is the cessation of work and the suspension of public and private life, insofar as it does not a religious objective (EF:345).

Once again, however, we see that in counterposing religious and economic activity, Durkheim got himself in the bind of presuming that the former is social and normatively controlled and the latter is not. If work is indeed the preeminent form of profane activity, then should we not be interested in the ways in which it becomes sacralized? And, in turn, the way in which the workaday rhythms tend to "secularize" the sacred?

> ... work is an eminent form of profane activity: it has no other apparent end than to provide for the temporal necessities of life; it puts us in relations with ordinary things only. On feast days, on the contrary, the religious life attains an excep-

tional degree of intensity. So the contrast between the two forms of existence is especially marked at this moment; consequently, they cannot remain near each other. A man cannot approach his god intimately while he still bears on him marks of his profane life; inversely, he cannot return to his usual occupations when a rite has just sanctified him. So the ritual day of rest is only one particular case of the general incompatibility separating the sacred from the profane; it is the result of an interdiction (EF:346).

The need for separation takes another form--spatial. For example, certain places are inevitably set aside as special residences of the sacred. Sanctuaries and cultic ground tend to become "churches" and "temples" in the sense of holy places and facilities.

> The sacred character of the churinga is so great that it communicates itself to the locality where they are stored: the women and the uninitiated cannot approach it. The religious nature radiates to a distance and communicates itself to all the surroundings: everything near by participates in this same nature and is therefore withdrawn from profane touch. Is one man pursued by another? If he succeeds in reaching the (sanctuary) he is saved; he cannot be seized there. Even a wounded animal which takes refuge there must be respected. Quarrels are forbidden there. It is a place of peace ... a sanctuary of the totemic group, a veritable place of asylum (EF:142).

The critical factor here to note is how these interdictions become basic temporal, spatial, and cultural anchors of everyday life. Nature is moralized by culture; in turn, society and culture are cosmicized by nature. Therefore, the very frameworks of sociocultural life are constructed out of the more or less systematic application of these ramifying sacred/ profane oppositions. Durkheim noted that even granting the complexity of these myriad interdictions, they finally rest upon "two fundamental interdictions, which summarize and dominate" (EF:346), sociocultural life.

> In the first place, the religious life and the profane life cannot coexist in the same place. If the former is to develop, a special spot must be placed at its disposition, from which the second is excluded. Hence comes the founding of temples and sanctuaries: these are the spots awarded to sacred beings and things and serve them as residences, for they cannot establish themselves in any place

except on the condition of entirely appropriating to
themselves all within a certain distance. Such arrange-
ments are so indispensable to all religious life that
even the most inferior religions cannot do without them.
The spot where the churinga are deposited is a veritable
sanctuary. So the unintiated are not allowed to approach
it. It is even forbidden to carry on any profane occupa-
tion whatsoever there.... Likewise the religious time
and the profane time cannot coexist in the same unit of
time. It is necessary to assign determined days or per-
iods to the first, from which all profane occupations
are excluded. Thus feast days are born. There is no re-
ligion and, consequently, no society which has not known
and practiced this division of time into two distinct
parts, alternating with one another according to a law
varying with peoples and civilizations (EF:346-7).

We shall soon return to the progressive extension of the sa-
cred/profane oppositions throughout the whole of sociocultur-
al life. Let us now briefly turn our attention to the passage
from fluid to crystallized symbolism, and the autonomization
of these sacral symbolic forms.

6. Crystallization and Autonomization of Symbolism

"The images of totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves" (EF:156). Almost inevitably, due to the alternating rhythms of sociocultural process, and the contagiousness of sacred symbols, the significance originally attached to the newly moralized group gradually becomes transferred to the image of the group. Since such symbols represent the collectivity to itself, they become the basis of the cultural bond. Social interaction is always symbolic, as every introductory student learns. By attaining a certain stability, these sacral collective representations enable the group to perdure. Since consciences and consciousnesses are constructed through the medium of symbolic process, persons ground themselves in these group symbols as the anchor of their existence. In this long and complex process, the collectively projected image becomes more sacred than the group event which it first symbolized. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective representations become detached from their processual origins, and crystallize into relatively permanent symbolic forms. In short, symbolism always tends to become autonomous. The irony of this necessary generic process of displacement, substitution, and autonomization should, however, not be overlooked (eg. see Simmel, 1950).

Given the inevitable alternating rhythms of sociocultural process, our next task then is to briefly explore some ways in which newly generated symbols gradually become detached from their processual origins. In effect, Durkheim asked: what happens to collective symbols when the moral implosion is over? Once generated, does symbolism fade without a continuing underlying collective effervescence? On the contrary, since symbolism is essential to group life, instead of fading, symbols take on increasing significance. Indeed, symbols serve as prime "time-binders" holding groups together through time and space. Let us now turn to explore Durkheim's outline of the fundamental constitutive sociocultural process whereby cultural sym-

bols, once detached from their original generating matrices, come to take on a life of their own; how, in short, the image comes to take precedence over the underlying represented reality. Let us first consider Durkheim's earlier distinction between fluid and crystallized symbolism.

a. The Passage From Fluid to Crystallized Symbolism

True to his processual view of society and culture,Durkheim had earlier distinguished (eg. in The Rules and Suicide) between fluid and crystallized symbolic representations. Durkheim postulated a continuum here, ranging from new and highly fluid sociocultural "currents" (eg. opinion, fad and fashions, movements, etc.) on the one hand, and highly crystallized or stably institutionalized cultural forms such as religious and moral systems, science, law, and on, on the other hand.As Lukes (1973:10) observed, Durkheim suggested that:

> There is a whole series of degrees without a break in continuity between the facts of the most articulated structure and those free currents of social life which not yet definitely molded. The differences between them are, therefore, only differences in the degree of consolidation they present. Both are simply life, more or less crystallized (R:12).

Close to the beginning of The Rules of Sociological Method, for instance, Durkheim emphasized that it is important not to overlook these fluid "social currents." For those looking only to the highly crystallized major cultural systems will presume that symbolic forms must be rooted in some continuing social organizational base. Durkheim, of course, agreed, but his overarching concern with sociocultural process on all levels of complexity led him to insist that we should attempt to anchor analysis of symbolic forms not so much in terms of a "material social body" as in a sociocultural process. Thus, if in their early stages sociocultural forms are still shifting and uncertain, then we ought to expect that the symbols which reflect and guide these substructural processes would also be more or less fluid.

Since the examples we have just cited (legal and moral regulations, religious faiths, financial systems, etc.) all consist of established beliefs and practices, one might be led to believe that social facts exist only where there is some social organization. But there are other facts without such crystallized form, which have the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the individual. These are called "social currents." Thus, the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one of the particular individual consciousnesses (R:4).

Inevitably, however, some of these "fluid" "social currents" become habitualized patterns of social interaction, and thus become institutionalized. Correspondingly, the symbolic forms which represent these social patterns also become stabilized in more stable systems, and thus institutionalized (eg. see Berger and Luckmann, 1966). As often noted, the institutionalization of these sociocultural facts implies that they have become generally shared, continuously transmitted over generations, and obligatorily observed. Durkheim remarked:

... certain of these social manners of acting and thinking acquire, by reason of their repetition, a certain rigidity which on its own account crystallizes them, so to speak, and isolates them from the particular events which reflect them. They thus acquire a body, a tangible form, and constitute a reality in their own right, quite distinct from the individual facts which produce it. Collective habits are inherent not only in the successive acts which they determine but, by a privilege of which we find no example in the biological realm, they are given permanent expression in a formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and fixed even in writing (R:7).

Searching as he was for a definitive index of exterior signs by which to recognize and objectively analyze "social facts," in this early attempt in The Rules Durkheim rightly directed attention primarily to institutions and highly crystallized major cultural forms. However, as his approach to positivism shifted from grounding analysis of "moral facts" in "material bodies" and "mechanical" process to grounding analysis in sociocultural, and especially symbolic process (this evolution culminating in The Elementary Forms), Durkheim correspondingly came to focus attention on the passage from fluid to crystallized forms, instead of just the latter pole.

Social life consists, then, of free currents perpetually
in the process of transformation and incapable of being
mentally fixed by the observer, and the scholar cannot
approach the study of social reality from this angle.
But we know that it possesses the power of crystalliza-
tion without ceasing to be itself. Thus, apart from the
individual acts to which they give rise, collective ha-
bits find expression in definite forms: legal rules, mo-
ral regulations, popular proverbs, social conventions,
etc. As these forms have a permanent existence and do
not change with the diverse applications made of them,
they constitute a fixed object, a constant standard with-
in the observers reach, exclusive of subjective impres-
sions and purely personal observations (R:45).

Now, in <u>Suicide</u>, Durkheim's cultural realism led him
along the same lines when he insisted that "collective tenden-
cies have an existence of their own." "Social life is made up
of representations" (S:312). Let us reverse his order, and con-
sider fluid "collective representations" first.

... not all social consciousness achieves such external-
ization and materialization. Not all the esthetic spirit
of a nation is embodied in the works in inspires; not all
morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater
part is diffused. There is a large collective life which
is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate
everywhere, cross and mingle in a thousand different ways,
and just because they are constantly mobile are never crys-
tallized in an objective form.... all these eddies, all
these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single modifi-
cation of the main legal and moral precepts, immobilized
in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these very precepts
merely express a whole subjacent life of which they par-
take; they spring from it but do not supplant it. Beneath
all these maxims are actual, living sentiments, summed up by
these formula but only in a superficial envelope. The
formula would awake no echo if they did not correspond to
definite emotions and impressions scattered throughout
society (S:315).

A little earlier Durkheim had noted that society externalizes
its attitudes and sentiments in material objects. Thus, for
example, a certain style of architecture can be said to "mater-
ialize" a certain cultural sentiment.

... society ... also includes material things, which play
an essential role in the common life. The social fact is
sometimes so far materialized as to become an element of
the external world. For instance, a definite type of arch-
itecture is a social phenomenon; but it is partially em-
bodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once
constructed, become autonomous realities, independent of

> individuals. It is the same with the avenues of commun-
> ication and transportation, with instruments used in in-
> dustry or private life which expresses the state of tech-
> nology at any moment in history, of written language,
> etc. Social life which is thus crystallized, as it were,
> and fixed on material supports, is by just so much ex-
> ternalized, and acts upon us from without (S:313-14).

And as we shall discover from his analysis of the Australian
materials, as symbolic currents crystallize into systems they
tend to take on their own inner nature and form; in short,
they grow increasingly autonomous. And, the more these sym-
bolic systems are permeated with religious rationales and
magical protocols, the more rigid they become. Some symbolic
forms, on the other hand, reveal a special suppleness; these
lend themselves to further development and universalization,
as we shall discover in Chapter Seven. Durkheim refers to:

> ... the definite formula into which the dogmas of faith
> are precipitated, or legal precepts when they become
> fixed externally in a consecrated form... They have a
> manner of action of their own. Juridical relations are
> widely different depending on whether or not the law is
> written. Where there is a constituted code, jurispru-
> dence is more regular but less flexible, legislation
> more uniform but also more rigid. Legislation adopts it-
> self less readily to a variety of individual cases, and
> resists innovations more strongly. The material forms it
> assumes are thus not merely ineffective verbal combina-
> tions but active realities, since they produce effects
> which would not occur without their existence. They are
> not merely external to individual consciousnesses, but
> this very externality establishes their specific quali-
> ties. Because these forms are less at the disposal of
> individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to
> circumstances, and this very situation makes them more
> resistant to change (S:314-15).

Now, closely related to institutionalization of social
patterns and crystallization and legitimation of cultural
symbolic forms is the process of "sedimentation" or the lay-
ering down of multiple levels of symbolic meaning through
time. Since society and culture are inter-generational, sen-
timents which gain a certain durability over time may be sed-
imented both in terms of sequence and depth of significance.
Some lower levels may even be rediscovered or reappropriated
and thence brought up to the level of conscious reflection.

Now, it is precisely this complex layering down of cultural
elements from various sources and times, and their synergetic
fusion, which constitutes the inner secret of that human socio-
cultural historical complex known as civilization. In the rele-
vant sections of The Elementary Forms, for instance, we see
Durkheim observing:

> In addition to these free forces which are constantly
> coming to renew our own, there are others which are
> fixed in the methods and traditions which we employ.
> We speak a language that we did not make; we use instru-
> ments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we
> did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted
> to each generation that it did not gather itself, etc.
> It is to society that we owe these varied benefits of
> civilization.... Now it is these things that give man
> his own place among things; a man is a man only because
> he is civilized (EF:242-3).

We shall further explore Durkheim's theory of the evolution of
cultural symbolic forms in the following sections: in this Book,
the chapters immediately succeeding on "The Tree of Evolution-
ary Life," "The Primitive Sacral Complex,""Durkheim's Notion
of Civilizations," and the sections in Book Three, Part I, on
the autonomization of collective representations in Durkheim's
causal model, and his various transitions to sociocultural real-
ism.

b.   The Autonomization of Symbolic Forms

Well before The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
Durkheim had already noted the tendency of collective symbolic
systems, once institutionalized as the representative ground
of legitimate moral authority and intellectual decision, to
grow increasingly autonomous. Autonomous here means the tenden-
cy to become self-ordering, with its own laws, and developmen-
tal processes. As Weber once similarly remarked, "We are insert-
edintoseparate spheres of existence, each with its own laws."
Whereas in Part I of Book Three I shall explore Durkheim's no-
tion of the autonomization of symbolic forms from the methodo-
logical level, especially from the point of view of his argu-
ment from "relational realism" and "emergence," here I shall

approach this generic sociocultural process substantively in terms of primitive religion and ritual.

It should be noted that as early as The Division of Labor, Durkheim had remarked on the tendency toward autonomization of the collectively symbolic superstructure.

> ... wherever a directive power is established, its primary and principal function is to create respect for the beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that is, defend the common conscience against all enemies within and without. It thus becomes its symbol, its living expression in the eyes of all. Thus, the life which is in the collective conscience is communicated to the directive organ as the affinities of ideas are communicated to the words which represent them, and that is how it assumes a character which puts it above all the others .... It is the collective type incarnate. It participates in the authority which the latter exercises over consciences, and it is from these that it draws its force. Once constituted, however, without freeing itself from the source when it flows and whence it continues to draw its sustenance, it nevertheless becomes an autonomous factor in social life, capable of spontaneously producing its own movements without equal impulsion, precisely because of the supremacy which it has acquired (DL:84).

Now, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to indicate how the progressive detachment of symbols from the groups which they had come to symbolize occurred. First, the "hyper-spiritual" or moral forces, if they are to truly communicate, must gain some external, visible form of expression. The symbolic vehicle for moral and cognitive communion thus inevitably becomes lodged in an external material form or repeatable gesture. These visible, external, public signs are taken to manifest inward states. There is an eternal dialectic here between cultural forms and natural forms, for the former are dependent on the latter for their existence, even the one exists only to rise above the other. Moral processes depend upon natural vehicles to externalize the inner processes of moral communion which may lead to a linkage, exchange, or even confounding of their separable natures. We might recall that Durkheim had already explored the need for the clan to generate the totem as its prime "collective representation."

Now, by its very nature, the ideal forces must be externalized to become communicated. The vehicle for this moral-logical communion inevitably becomes lodged in a specific material form or gesture. Conversely, the natural symbolic potencies inherent in specific material mediums also feed back and structure the possible symbolic arrangements (eg. see Levi-Strauss, 1963, Victor Turner, 1967, Mary Douglas, 1973). As I have insisted, it is simply mistaken to assert, as Durkheim did along with many others, that symbols are utterly arbitrary and conventional. The only adequate way to conceptualize these two poles of culture and nature is as analogical, that is, as a resonating series of more or less parallel matrices of events. It is metaphor and analogy which allow us to pass from one to the other in a more or less coherent fashion.

> Since the clan cannot exist without a name and an emblem, and since this emblem is always before the eyes of men, it is upon this and the objects whose image it is, that the sentiments which society arouses in its members are fixed. Men are thus compelled to represent the collective force, whose action they feel, in the form of the thing serving as flag to the group. Therefore, in the idea of this force were mixed up the most different kingdoms; in one sense, it was essentially human, since it was made up of human ideas and sentiments; but at the same time, it could not fail to appear as closely related to the animate or inanimate beings who gave it its outward form.... There is no society where it is not active. In a general way, a collective sentiment can become conscious of itself only by becoming fixed upon some material object; but by this very fact, it participates in the nature of this object, and reciprocally, the object participates in its nature (EF:269).

Second, this inevitable linkage (or confounding) or moral and material is accelerated by the contagiousness of the sacred images which naturally spread as if propelled by some "sacred electricity" from thing to thing, from event to event. What Durkheim saw as contagiousness also rests, in part, of course, upon the verbal and symbolic mechanisms of metonymy and synecdoche (see especially the works of K. Burke), by which one thing comes to represent or "stand for another" in the extension of specific phenomenological linkages between a moral event and a natural sign, and thus the facilitation of trans-

ference of symbolic loads. Asking: "How does it happen that these externalized moral forces come to be thought of in the form of totems?"--that is, specific plants or animals, Durkheim replied:

> It is because this animal or plant has given its name to the clan and serves it as an emblem. In fact, it is a well-known law that the sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the symbol which represents them. For us, black is a sign of mourning; it also suggests sad impressions and ideas. This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely united in our minds; the result is that the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously to the other. But this contagion, which takes place in every case to some degree, is much more complete and more marked when the symbol is something simple, definite, and easily representable, while the thing itself, owing to its dimension, the number of its parts, and the complexity of their arrangements, is difficult to hold in the mind. For we are unable to consider an abstract entity, which we represent only laboriously and confusedly the source of the strong sentiments which we feel. We cannot explain them to ourselves except by connecting them to some concrete object of whose reality we are vividly aware. Then if the thing itself does not fulfill this condition, it cannot serve as the accepted basis of the sentiments felt, even though it may be what really aroused them. Then some sign takes its place; it is to this that we connect the emotions it excites. It is this which is loved, feared, and respected; it is to this that we are are grateful; it is for this that we sacrifice ourselves. The soldier who dies for his flag, dies for his country; but as a matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is the flag that has the first place. It sometimes happens that this even directly determines action. Whether one isolated standard remains in the hands of the enemy or not does not determine the fate of the country; yet the soldier allows himself to be killed to regain it. He loses sight of the fact that the flag is only a sign and that it has no value in itself, but only brings to mind the reality that it represents; it is treated as if it were this reality itself (EF:251-2).

Third, there is another sense of "contagion" here which is important to the continual attempts to separate out sacral from profane phenomena. For "contagion" also means "dangerous," and because, as Mary Douglas (1966) suggests, "the unclear is the unclean," the very mixture of sacred and profane symbolism in the onward flow of everyday life means that these boundaries

must be constantly reaffirmed in ever-new ways. The keeping
of the sacra, the esoteric sacred mysteries becomes a spe-
cial responsibility of the magicians and priests, those reli-
gious virtuosos who "take a lease on charisma," as Weber once
said. Mixture is dangerous because it threatens the newly con-
structed symbolic coordinates of the collectivity itself. If
the group depends upon these symbolic coordinates, then their
erasure means the collapse of the group itself.

> The churinga are preserved in a sort of temple upon
> whose threshold all noises from the profane life must
> cease; it is the domain of sacred things. On the con-
> trary, the totemic animals and plants live in the pro-
> fane world and are mixed up with the common everyday
> life. Since the number and importance of the interdict-
> ions which isolate sacred things, and keep it apart,
> correspond to the degree of sacredness with which it
> is invested, we arrive at the remarkable conclusion
> that the images of totemic beings are more sacred than
> the beings themselves (EF:155-6).

Durkheim thus avoided the crude error of some other early
anthropological analysts who presumed that the natives actually
worshipped their totemic animals or even their totem poles!
"In reality, it is not to the animal as such that the (totemic)
cult is addressed, but to the emblem and the image of the to-
tem" (EF:198). Specifically, Durkheim observed:

> The Arunta dance around the nurtunja, and assemble be-
> fore the image of their totem to adore it, but a simi-
> lar demonstration is never made before the totemic be-
> ing itself. If this latter were the primarily sacred ob-
> ject, it would be with it, the sacred animal or plant,
> that the young initiate would communicate when he is
> introduced into the religious life; but we have seen
> that, on the contrary, the most solemn moment of the ini-
> tiation is the one when the novice enters into the sanc-
> tuary of the churinga. It is with them and the nurtunja
> that he communicates. The representations of the totem
> are therefore more actively powerful than the totem it-
> self* (EF:156).

Now, it is evident that the clan is too complex a reality,
with all its multiple spheres and levels of relationships and
mutual obligations, to be represented clearly and fully by a
single image.

> The totem is the flag of the clan. It is therefore nat-
> ural that the impressions aroused by the clan in indivi-

dual minds--impressions of dependence and of increased
vitality--should fix themselves to the idea of totem
rather than that of the clan: for the clan is too com-
plex a reality to be represented clearly in all its
complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences. More
than that, the primitive does not even see that these
impressions come to him from the group. He does not
know that the coming together of a number of men asso-
ciated in the same life results in disengaging new ener-
gies, which transforms each of them. All that he knows
is that he is raised above himself and that he sees a
different life from the one he ordinarily leads. How-
ever, he must connect these sensations to some external
object as their cause. Now what does he see about him?
On every side those things which appeal to his senses
and strike his imagination are the numerous images of
the totem. They are the churinga and bull-roarer, upon
which are generally carved combinations of lines having
the same significance. They are the decorations cover-
ing the different parts of his body, which are totemic
marks. How could this image, repeated everywhere and in
all sorts of forms, fail to stand out with exceptional
relief in his mind? Placed thus in the center of the
scene, it becomes representative. The sentiments exper-
ienced fix themselves upon it, for it is the only con-
crete object upon which they can fix themselves. It con-
tinues to bring them to mind and to evoke them after the
assembly has dissolved, for it survives the assembly,
being carved upon the instruments of the cult, upon the
sides of rocks, upon bucklers, etc. By it, the emotions
experienced are perpetually sustained and revived. Every-
thing happens just as if they inspired them directly.
It is still more natural to attribute them to it for,
since they are common to the group, they can be associa-
ted only with something that is equally common to all.
Now the totemic emblem is the only thing satisfying this
condition. By definition, it is common to all. During
the ceremony, it is the center of all regards. While
generations change, it remains the same; it is the perm-
ament element of the social life. So it is from it that
those mysterious forces seem to emanate with which men
feel that they are related, and thus they have been led
to represent these forces under the form of the animate
or inanimate beings whose name the clan bears (EF:252-3).

Given his sociocultural framework, Durkheim interpreted
the totem as an external emblematical expression of the inward
social bond. The totem signified an inner unifying principle
which was expressed in terms of an obligatory sacral symbol.

The totem is the source of the moral life of the clan.
All the beings partaking of the same totemic principle
consider that owing to this very fact, they are moral-

> ly bound to one another; they have definite duties of
> assistance, vendetta, etc. towards each other, and it
> is these duties which constitute kinship. So while the
> totemic principle is a totemic force, it is also a
> moral power (EF:219).

It was this constitutive ground of legitimate moral and intellectual authority of the collective bond and individual conscience that the natives revered, argued Durkheim. Lukes aptly summarizes Durkheim's thought in this regard:

> The role of the emblems was to perpetuate and recreate
> the social sentiments aroused by the rites; moreover,
> the rites themselves enabled social communication to
> 'become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of
> all particular sentiments into one common sentiment,'
> and they not only expressed but served to 'support the
> beliefs upon which they are founded.' Hence, the cult
> in general was both 'a system of signs by which the
> faith is outwardly translated,' and 'a collection of
> the means by which this is created and recreated per-
> iodically'.... Durkheim saw totemism as essentially con-
> stitutive of aboriginal social organization: the totem
> identified the clan, whose members were bound by speci-
> fic ties of kinship, so that the 'collective totem is
> part of the civil status of each individual.' Indeed,
> a 'clan is essentially a group of individuals who bear
> the same name and rally around the same sign. Take away
> the name and the sign which materializes it, and the
> clan is no longer representable. Since the group is pos-
> sible only on this condition, both the institution of
> the emblem and the part it plays in the life of the
> group are thus explained' (1973:472).

Stating that "we are now in a position to understand all that is essential in the totemic beliefs," Durkheim observed:

> Since religious force is nothing other than the collect-
> ive and anonymous forces of the clan, and since this can
> be represented in the mind only in the form of the totem,
> the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the god.
> Therefore, it is from it that those kindly and dreadful
> actions seem to emanate, which the cult seeks to provoke
> or prevent; consequently, it is to it that the cult is
> addressed. This is the explanation of why it holds the
> first place in the series of sacred things (EF:253).

Finally, while it is not my present problem to review Durkheim's positivist alchemies, we should note that Durkheim posited here a whole series of inner transformations invisible to the participants themselves. Like the present day structuralists who often claim his mantle (eg. Levi-Strauss), Durk-

heim presumed that:

> Social action follows ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes. As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men know well that they are acted upon, but they do not know by whom. So they must invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way in which they were led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought (EF:239-40).

Having thus traced Durkheim's notion of the crystallization and autonomization of symbolism, let us next turn our attention to the progressive extension of these increasingly autonomous sets through symbolic equations. For it is only by extending such fundamental polarities that men are able to build up more complex classificatory systems which may then gradually become detached from both their original sacral and collective basis. Only by striving to view this long sequence as a whole process with many phases and transformations can we ever hope to understand how our modern rational and universally valid cognitive classificatory systems came to emerge.

7.　　The Building of Classificatory Systems:　Cosmization
　　　　Through Symbolic Equations

Preface.　　Since sociocultural process depends upon symbols
(which grow increasingly autonomous), inevitably the organi-
zing tension between "sacral" and "profane" collective repre-
sentations becomes extended to all spheres of reality and le-
vels of experience. "All known religions have been systems
of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things,
and to give us a complete representation of the world" (EF:
165). The so-called "contagiousness" of "sacral" symbolism
leads to a universal classificatory system covering the " ...
whole world in the fashion of a gnosis or cabbala" (PC:70).
Rooted first in varying degrees of phenomenological or con-
crete resemblance to the "sacral" and "profane" oppositions
which anchor all emerging systems of morality and knowledge,
through compounding series of analogies these symbolic equa-
tions progressively link together diverse experiences, places,
times, and levels of existence. As the prime vehicles for the
extension and synthesis of knowledge, analogy and metaphor
are crucial for the construction of these systems guiding
conscience and consciousness, especially in the early stages.
"In China, in all the Far East, and in modern India, as well
as in ancient Greece and Rome, ideas about sympathetic actions,
symbolic correspondences, and astrological influences not only
were or are very widespread, but exhausted or stillexhaust col-
lective knowledge" (PC:5). Thus, the progressive extension and
elaboration of resonating levels of phenomenologically based
symbolic equations and proportions serves to progressively a-
lign all aspects of experience into more or less coherent
structures of conscience and consciousness. "The men of the
clan and the things which are classified in it form by their
union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate
sympathetically" (EF:175). These constitutive systems of sym-
bolic equations and sequences act as bridges transforming em-
pirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. "This organ-

ization, which at first may appear to us as purely logical, is at the same time moral" (EF:175). Thus simultaneously moral and cognitive, these rudimentary systems of classification come to serve as the central directive paradigms of their cultures. World, self, and society become progressively organized around these compounding series of symbolic equations. For example, of the highly ramified Chinese Taoist system of classification, and also of moral and intellectual direction, Durkheim and Mauss observed: "It governs all details of life among the most immense population that humanity has ever known" (PC:67). In sum, first through polarities which create tension in the symbolic field, and then through ramifying series of symbolic equations based on the primal tensions,thewhole world becomes cosmicized; the   small scale human world becomes valorized.

In this regard, two essential principles have begun to emerge from our systematic in-depth reconstruction of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's substantive work so far. Let us first recall that Durkheim presumed that structures of conscience and consciousness are socioculturally and historically constructed, and thus remain for a long time linked and even confounded with specific groups. Moreover, as we have seen already, and will explore further in the succeeding section on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture the systems of morality and knowledge which so often become dominant first emerge in their most systematic way out of magical ritual and religious myth. In short, the two inner constitutive principles of the construction of over-arching systems of moral and intellectual classification are that these are, to a great extent, <u>sociocentric</u> and <u>sacral-magical</u>. As Durkheim and Mauss noted: "Among the Zuni, the idea which society has of itself, and its worldview, are so interlaced and merged that their organiztion, has perfectly been described as 'mytho-sociologic' " (PC:42).

Now, the linkage of the form of symbolic systems to the structure of the group, and the linkage of their content to

the sacral outlooks and magical protocols, are two principles
of utmost importance for the human sciences. Both Weber and
Durkheim, for instance, were very sensitive to this inner
linkage of the legitimate structures of conscience and con-
sciousness to the structure of the group and to its religion.
Although first born in the clan and the totemic cult, if sys-
tems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must pro-
gressively shed their primal connection with the restrictive
structures of both group and religion. For, as we have propo-
sed, as societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guid-
ance systems. And as Benjamin Nelson (see especially 1973a)
has proposed, following both Weber and Durkheim, we should
expect that the extension of the social bond--that is, shifts
in the structures of social fraternization--and universaliza-
tion and rationalization of the legitimate structures of moral
and intellectual authority proceed together on the world-his-
torical level. Indeed, as Nelson, Weber, and Durkheim empha-
size, the failure to break with either sacral-magical praxis
(ritual protocols, stereotyping, etc,) and classificatory sys-
tems rooted primarily in the collectivity, constitute prime
obstacles to modernization.

Now since Primitive Classification preceeded The Elemen-
tary Forms, and since, as we have seen, Durkheim originally
intended to entitle the latter "The Elementary Forms of Thought
and of Religious Life" (Alpert, 1939:55), let us first turn
to recall the general problems and theses which Durkheim pro-
posed to address. Then we shall consider the more fully ela-
borated answers which Durkheim offered in 1912.

a. Durkheim's Socio-Logic: The Links Between Symbols & Groups

As a prelude to the project which culminated in The
Elementary Forms, Durkheim wrote On Some Primitive Forms of
Classification with Mauss to reveal the inner sociocultural
"prehistory" of the categories of moral rules and intellectual
concepts. As always, Durkheim's socio-logic--his insistence
that symbols and logics be linked first to the group--had to

contend with a powerful and pervasive counter logic. And, in our own time, as in Durkheim's, that psycho-philosophical abstraction of the modern Western world--the generic ego floating in space endowed with a self-guiding rationality shining by virtue of its own inviolable "inner light"--still reigns. But Durkheim argued: "We have no justification for supposing that our mind bears within it at birth, completely formed, the prototype of this elementary framework of all classification" (PC:8). Indeed, I believe that the general thrust of Durkheim's thought here was correct, for the modern notion of the generic ego as the repository of an innate moral sense and a calculus of rationality depended upon the negation of tradition and the delegitimation and stripping away of the authority of the collectivity. What is most misleading here, of course, was the implicit symbolic equation between rationality, individualism, and freedom, the latter conceived largely in the negative sense as the absence of traditional social and cultural constraints. As Lukes (1968), among others, has observed, one of Durkheim's lasting accomplishments is to have demonstrated that there is no necessary inner connection between logical nominalism and its modern secular equivalents, and individual freedom and political democracy. Indeed, closer attention to the birth pangs of the modern world would have revealed, as both the Puritans in the English Civil War and Hobbes showed, that such positions may just as easily be linked with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes--with the Leviathans of the modern world. In sum, what Durkheim rightly insisted upon was that our modern notions here have themselves a distinct rhetorical structure. Against this highly dynamic position, Durkheim and Mauss declared in the opening pages of their essay:

> The faculties of definition, deduction, and induction are generally considered as immediately given in the constitution of the individual understanding. Admittedly, it has been known for a long time that, in the course of history, men learned to use these functions better and better. But it is thought that in their essential features they have been fully formed as long as mankind

has existed. It has not even been imagined that they
might have been, by a painful combination of elements,
borrowed from extremely different sources, quite for-
eign to logic and laboriously organized. And this con-
ception of the matter was not at all surprising so long
as the development of logical faculties was thought to
belong simply to individual psychology, so long as no
one had the idea of seeing in these methods of scien-
tific thought veritable social institutions whose ori-
gin sociology alone can retrace and explain (PC:3).

Yes, that is the key: scientific rationality, especially of

the Utilitarian or positivist varieties, even the rationali-

ty of the pre-social individual which are so often symboli-

cally associated, are themselves modern social institutions!

And, as with so many other useful fictions of the Enlighten-

ment, such as the "noble savage," "Robinson Crusoe," or the

self-equilibrating market mechanism of market capitalism,

these are merely images which we mistakenly project back into

history, and onto other societies and cultures. Now, Durkheim

clearly saw that, instead of being primarily anchored as fix-

ed faculties inherent in the generic ego, modern universalis-

tic and rationalistic classificatory systems had undergone a

long evolution which they could not adequately explain in

terms of their own premises. Durkheim's insights here are

crucial, for as societies evolve, so too do their prime sym-

bolic guidance systems, and if our modern system emerged

from the past, there must be some way of specifying the in-

ner link between two systems so different. The key to this

inner evolution, Durkheim posited, was a link or parallel

between the extension of the social bond and the rationali-

zation and universalization of classificatory systems and,

thus, of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual

authority. These were Durkheim's root "socio-logics," which

so few seem to have understood then and even today.

    It is interesting to note that few readers of Primitive

Classification have recognized that the very structure of the

essay is evolutionary. The more or less static preoccupations

of the two schools (American structuralism-functionalism and

British social anthropology) which still lay claim to the le-

gitimating mantle of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit" work against this crucial recognition. This is especially true of the latter school whose penchant for small-scale ethnographic analyses and anti-evolutionary biases have led them, although basically sympathetic, to mount what appears to be a devastating series of charges against the logical and evidential structure of Durkheim and Mauss's essay. For instance, Rodney Needham, the English translator of Primitive Classification, has raised a whole series of seemingly fatal criticisms against this essay (but see Alpert, 1965:665). Needham charges that there is good reason to believe that "Durkheim and Mauss's entire venture was misconceived" (1963:xxvi). Needham insists that "... there is no logical necessity to postulate a causal connection between society and symbolic classification" (1963: xxiv). "In no single case is there any compulsion to believe that society is the cause or even the model of the classification" (1963:xxv). "Now society is alleged to be the model on which classification is based, yet in society after society examined no formal correspondence can be shown to exist. Different forms of classification are found with identical types of social organization, and similar forms with different types of society" (1963:xvi). Needham adds that the most serious methodological failing was that "... Durkheim and Mauss did not subject their thesis to test by concomitant variation" (1963:xvi). Finally, in terms of the logical sequence underlying Durkheim's argument, Needham makes the oft-repeated charge that:

> If the mind is taken to be a system of cognitive faculties, it is absurd to say that the categories originate in social organization.... The social model must itself be perceived to possess the characteristics which make it useful in classifying other things, but this cannot be done without the very categories which Durkheim and Mauss derived from the model (1963:xxvii).

Needham concludes with what must be one of the weakest recommendations for the theoretical and historical value of translating and reading a classic essay ever given: "Whatever its faults, its prime theoretical contribution has been to isolate

classification as an aspect of culture to which sociological inquiry should be directed" (1963:xl). Damning with faint praise! William Runciman (1969:190) felt the same way, branding Durkheim's sociology of religion as "fundamentally misconceived," and summed up his disdain by referring to Durkheim's sociology of knowledge as resting on a "logical howler."

Now, although Steven Lukes follows many of Evans-Pritchard's and Needham's criticisms (eg. "in the first place, the very relations established must always presuppose the prior existence of these very abilities", 1973:447), nonetheless, he offers a more subtly inflected critical review. Lukes even finds some aspects of Durkheim's thesis valuable. Although Lukes hardly more than Needham has clearly recognized the "nuclear structure" underlying Durkheim's work as we have explored it here, his judgements in this regard are generally more reliable. Although resolutely criticizing Durkheim's evolutionary claims, Lukes, apparently influenced by the lone voice of Robin Horton (1967, 1973), does acknowledge that "... the hypothesis that primitive and traditional religions contain the germs of scientific thinking is, in many ways, both challenging and plausible" (1973:449). (We shall soon pursue this notion in the following section on the primitive sacral complex). And Lukes especially praises Durkheim's claims that:

> ... belief systems, including primitive religions, should be treated as cosmologies. This claim has proved immensely fruitful...Perhaps their most theoretically significant aspect derives from the implications of his (other) claim that there are structural correspondences between symbolic classification and social organization, and quite generally between different orders of social facts (1973:449).

Now, doubtless as many critics have charged, if the human mind were totally devoid of any inherent classificatory ability, as Durkheim's rather extreme statements in _Primitive Classification_ so often seem to suggest, then we would simply lack the rudimentary ability to construct ordered societies in the first place. Once again, Durkheim's "besetting scholarly vice" of _petitio principii_ was at work. However, it should

not be overlooked that Durkheim himself explicitly acknowled-
ged this logical necessity in The Elementary Forms.

> ... it is not our intention to deny that the indivi-
> dual intellect has of itself the power of perceiving
> resemblances between the different objects of which it
> is conscious. Quite on the contrary, it is clear that
> even the most primitive and simple classifications
> presuppose this faculty (EF:170).

Doubtless, Durkheim's bald sociologism ("The first logical
categories were social categories; the first classes of things
were classes of men", PC:82) was overstated. Once again, his
rhetorical animus toward psychologism led him to excess:

> Far from classifying spontaneously and by a sort of
> natural necessity, humanity in the beginning lacks
> the most indispensable conditions for the classifica-
> tory function. Further, it is enough to examine the
> very idea of classification to understand that men
> could not have found its essential elements in him-
> self (PC:7).

Consequently, I am not interested here in pursuing what
appears to many (eg. Needham) as Durkheim's main proposition--
namely, that social forms were the sole and primary source of
logical categories. Rather, like Lukes and Benjamin Nelson
(1973a), I am more interested in what we might term the "weak-
er" and less explored version of Durkheim's theses--namely,
that cognitive and moral classifications have been throughout
history inextricably bound up with the structure and culture
of collectivities. Now, while certainly the English anthropo-
logists have done some of the finest work on symbolism and
ritual using Durkheim's leads, I am convinced that the perspect-
ive which is emerging here has been generally slighted by them
and most others. I believe that if we focus on the evolution-
ary structure of Durkheim's thought, and constantly relate it
to Weber's sometimes parallel and sometimes complementary
work, we shall help pioneer a new and crucial foundation for
the emerging human sciences.

Now, it was this "socio-logic" which linked symbols to
groups rather than to individual minds (see especially Evans-
Pritchard, 1965), which led Durkheim and Mauss to explore
these relationships, while it was his rhetorical stance and

dialectical ambitions which led the former to excess. In the beginning of <u>Primitive Classification</u>, Durkheim and Mauss posed their problem in this manner.

> A class is a group of things; and things do not present themselves to observation grouped in such a way. We may well perceive more or less vaguely their resemblances. But the single fact of these resemblances is not enough to explain how we are led to group things which thus resemble one another; to bring them together in a sort of ideal sphere enclosed by definite limits, which we call a class, a species, etc.... To classify is not only to form groups; it means arranging these groups according to particular relations. We imagine them as coordinated or subordinate one to the other, we say that some (the species) are included in others (the genera), that the former are subsumed under the latter.... Every classification inplies a hierarchical order for which neither the tangible world nor our mind gives us the model. We therefore have reason to ask where it was found (PC:7-8).

To buttress their case which, as we shall see, so often rests upon an ingenious use of analogy between social forms and logical forms, Durkheim and Mauss note the curious lineage of the very terms of classifications themselves:

> The very terms which we use in order to characterize it allow us to presume that all these logical notions have an extra-logical origin. We say that species of the same genera are connected by relations of kinship; we call certain classes "families;" did not the very word genus (genre) itself originally describe a group of relatives (PC:8)?

Thus, Durkheim and Mauss proposed their socio-logical program of inquiry into the elementary forms of classification.

> Far from being able to say that men classify quite naturally, by a sort of necessity of their individual understanding, we must on the contrary ask ourselves what could have led them to arrange their ideas in this way, and where they could have found the plan of this remarkable disposition. We cannot even dream of tackling this question in all of its ramifications (PC:9).

But after a decades more work, Durkheim felt ready to address these problems which he first broached with Mauss in 1903. Now, as I have had occasion to remark before, because many secondary observers have failed to understand both Durkheim's linkage of conscience and consciousness and his evolutionary framework, many have also failed to understand why

he returned again and again primarily (some would say almost exclusively) to consideration of such problems in terms of their paradigmatic "elementary forms." But if, indeed, Durkheim was inspired in proposing that our modern forms of classification have a prehistory, then how else are we to empirically illuminate this hidden shroud if not by recourse to what appear as the elementary forms? Thus, in the first substantive chapter of Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss focussed on Australian totemism, to which the former devoted his full attention, of course, in The Elementary Forms. In this light, Primitive Classification can be seen as a wider evolutionary prolegomena to one of the two main threads of Durkheim's story which was later to unfold in his masterpiece of 1912. Therefore, the thrust of Needham's and many others' criticisms of Durkheim's logical base is attenuated by our shift from concern with the generic categories to the evolution of systems of classification, and the criticisms of the evidential base are lessened by the detailed and systematic presentation found in the classic of 1912.

Before we turn to consider how Durkheim charted in 1912 the manner in which classificatory systems are built up through a progressive extension of a series of resonating symbolic equations, let us briefly review Durkheim's setting of this specific problem in 1903. Doubtless his 1903 preliminary effort was less adequate than his later full blown analysis, for in the former we see that Durkheim and Mauss posited, ala Levy-Bruhl's law of "mystical participation" (see also Lukes, 1973:438, #17), a primitive state of undifferentiated confusion of categories. Now, in seeking to investigate the prehistory of modern universally valid, internally consistent, and rational "scientific" classifications, Durkheim was right in generally contrasting the fluidness of the former to the fixity of the latter. Indeed, however much religious thought and hermetic alchemical traditions may have contributed to the development of western thought, science as we know it today is simply not possible until the various orders of being are view-

ed as closed to one another, until phenomenal spheres are re-
garded as stable, and until there is the widespread feeling
of certitude that invariant laws describing these closed and
stable relationships can be discovered because there is a
"sufficient reason" for this particular world-order. Durkheim
noted this important difference between modern and primitive
thought patterns:

> For us to classify things is to arrange them in groups
> which are distinct each from the other, and are separa-
> ted by clearly determined lines of demarcation.... At
> the bottom of our conception of class there is the idea
> of a circumscription with fixed and definite outlines.
> Now one could almost say that this conception of classi-
> fication does not go back before Aristotle. Aristotle was
> the first to proclaim the existence and the reality of
> specific differences, to show that the means was cause,
> and that there was no direct passage from one genus to
> another (PC:4-5).

Now, Durkheim's achievement in deriving the Aristotelian cate-
gories from social and cultural process (what has been called
his "social Kantianism") was to attempt to illuminate both
the generic and especially the genetic-evolutionary processes
by which primitive symbolic systems gradually became transform-
ed into modern scientific classifications. In so doing, he be-
gan with the original totemic situation in which transforma-
tions from one classificatory set to another apparently pro-
ceeded at random and without a fixed logic.

> If we descend to the least evolved societies known ...
> we shall find a ... general mental confusion. Here, the
> individual loses his personality. There is a complete
> lack of distinction between him and his exterior soul
> or his totem. He and his "fellow animal" together compose
> a single personality. The identification is such that
> the man assumes the characteristics of the thing or ani-
> mal with which he is thus united.... There is a complete
> indifferentiation between sign and thing, name and per-
> son, places and inhabitants.... For the primitive the
> principle generatio aequivoca is proved.... Animals,
> people, and inanimate objects were originally almost al-
> ways conceived of as standing in relations of the most
> perfect identity to each other (PC:6-7).

Durkheim and Mauss even went so far as to liken this to the
development of the individual (PC:7), as in the principle of
"ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny." Finally, Durkheim and

Mauss noted the survival of this primitive mode of thinking
even today, beneath many of our sophisticated forms. Obser-
ving that "It would be impossible to exaggerate the state of
indistinction from which the human mind developed," Durkheim
and Mauss noted:

> Even today a considerable part of our popular litera-
> ture, our myths and our religion is based on a funda-
> mental confusion of all images and ideas. They are not
> separated from each other, as it were, with any clar-
> ity. Metamorphoses, the transmission of qualities, the
> substitution of persons, souls and bodies, beliefs about
> the materialization of spirits and the spiritualization
> of material objects, are the elements of religious
> thought or of folklore. Now the very idea of such trans-
> mutations could not arise if things were represented by
> delimited and classified concepts (PC:5).

Now, granting that the postulate of a primitive state
of indistinction and confusion to which rationality, as a coun-
ter principle, gradually gave order is an inadequate formula-
tion of the problem, let us turn our attention to The Elemen-
tary Forms in which Durkheim greatly elaborated his earlier
analysis of Australian totemism. We shall return at the end
of this section to Durkheim's summary statements of his ear-
lier theses in the conclusion to Primitive Classification.
But, first, since Durkheim thought that the "contagiousness"
of "sacral" symbolism offered the key to understanding the
origin of both classificatory systems as such, and the nature
of mythological transformations from one set of phenomena to
another, let us first turn to further analyze this essential
process. Now, even though Durkheim's later statement was far
better than his first tentative version, he still put far too
much emphasis on "contagion", while leaving its inner symbol-
ic mechanisms too little explored. Since the extension of sym-
bolic equations holds the key to the construction of systems
of morality and cognitive classification, let us precede these
other analyses with a quick look at some perspectives which
try to illuminate the basic equational and transformational
structures of symbolic process.

b. <u>Analogy</u> <u>and</u> <u>Metaphor</u>: <u>The</u> <u>Structure</u> <u>of</u> <u>Symbolic</u> <u>Equations</u>

It is crucial for those wishing to build the founda-
tions of the human sciences to recognize the critical im-
portance of analogy and metaphor as constitutive processes
in building the human cosmos called culture. For the use of
analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for the extension
of experience and the synthesis of knowledge. As such, they
allow us to link together separate things and events into
a meaningful relationship. Recognition of phenomenological
similarity or difference, and the construction of inner or
essential comparisons and contrasts, is the basic way of con-
stituting relationships. Besides controlled experiment, one
of the few tried and tested ways of extending knowledge from
the known to the unknown is through analogy and metaphor.
Indeed, the human cosmos called culture depends on these pro-
cesses of symbolic equations as one of its key inner consti-
tutive processes.

All cultural expressions thus take on meaning through
such equational structures. Language, for example, is built
up by extending a series of root metaphors from one situation
to another, by translating and retranslating basic guiding
images into their various manifestations. The more seminal
the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with potential
meaning will the word root become. In this spinning out pro-
cess, a whole web of related meanings is gradually construct-
ed, and the whole language can be seen to "hang together" on
a surprisingly small number of key pegs. Indeed, images come
before words; an extended search through a good dictionary
should convince almost anyone of the centrality of these root
images, and the equational structure in which whole rafts of
words and phrases are interdefined. Literary meaning, too, is
built up out of a compounding series of symbolic equations.
Indeed, the heart of the task of the literary critic is pre-
cisely to unfold and systematically elucidate these basic as-
sociational clusters, as Kenneth Burke calls them, or "what
goes with what."

All other forms of knowledge and expression also have
their own special equational structures and sequences. Noting
this universality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking
devices, Northrop Frye has remarked upon the "... similarity
of form between the units of literature and of mathematics,
the metaphor and the equation," which led him to wonder if:

> ... it is true that the verbal structures of psychology,
> anthropology, theology, history, law, and everything
> else built out of words have been informed or construct-
> ed by the same kind of myths and metaphors that we find,
> in their original hypothetical form, in literature (1957:
> 352)?

Now, there are good reasons for this to be so. For all
knowing, indeed, all mental processes, ultimately rest upon
perception, imagination, and cognition. The first supplies im-
ages, the second projects images, while the third compares and
contrasts these images and reconstructs them into a meaningful
interpretive schema. Thus, for example, the perceptual and cog-
nitive training of youngchildren centers largely around the in-
creasingly systematic comparison (discernment of similarity,
likeness) and contrast (difference) between these images, and
their classification into sets, and abstraction of their shared
qualities into generalizable attributes. Thus, the two key ele-
ments of symbolic process--polarities which create tension,
and symbolic equations which link diverse events into series
of meaningfully associated clusters, can be easily seen in
terms of the verbal games which adults often play with child-
ren for intellectual entertainment. For example, given a ser-
ies of rudimentary polarities such as hot/cold, black/white,
up/down, left/right, etc., it is a simple matter for most
school age children, once they grasp the underlying logic, to
begin to generate their own series of oppositions. Indeed,
knowledge always begins with such first order experiential
gestalts. A further stage is reached when these perceptual di-
chotomies are given an analogical structure, such as hot is to
summer as cold is to winter, and so on. Indeed, when this cap-
ability of constructing their own equational structures is ac-

quired, the comparing and contrasting reaches a new level of
sophistication, and the child grows into higher order proces-
ses. The continued importance of these operations is attested
to by the use of the Miller's Analogies Test for entrance in-
to graduate school.

Now, we should not be surprised to discover that almost
all higher level cognitive and judgemental process, including
science itself, also rest upon equational structures which con-
tain an irreducible phenomenological or first order base. Al-
though the positivists' program for the philosophy of science
banished all symbolic overtones from scientific language, and
insisted that science consists exclusively of the systematic
linkage of evidentially validated propositions, nevertheless,
other contemporary philosophers of science have revealed the
continuing importance of images, analogies, models, and para-
digms in the growth of science. For instance, Norman R. Camp-
bell, one of the pioneers of this recognition, maintained that
the truly valuable element in scientific theories derives from
a more or less fruitful embedded analogy which enables us to
imaginatively extend our understanding of laws from the familiar
to the unfamiliar. Indeed, Campbell argued that this is the
very structure of hypotheses and theories, and their prime val-
ue, as contrasted with the inertness of law-like statements.
Focussing on the process of discovery, Campbell, against the
positivists, contended that the embedded analogy "... is essen-
tial to and inseparable from the theory and is not merely an
aid to its formulation" (1920:119; see also 129-30). Signifi-
cantly, Northrop Frye, from a rather different perspective,
makes a similar observation "... whatever is constructive in
any verbal structure seems to me invariably some kind of meta-
phor" (1957:353). Decades later, Mary Hesse (eg. Models and Ana-
logies in Science, 1963) continued the same argument against
the positivists' denuding of the structure of scientific theory.
Further, it is interesting to note that other contemporary
philosophers of science contend that scientific discovery and
revolutions in science come about through "gestalt switches"

and paradigm changes (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958, T.S. Kuhn, 1962).
Kuhn's notion of a paradigm as a model, an exemplar to be emu-
lated by the scientific community, is almost Durkheimian. In-
deed, a sociologist might be indulged the speculation that had
philosophers of science been more familiar with fundamental
sociocultural theory, they would have reached these conclu-
sions in far clearer fashion long ago. In short, I submit that
science too, instead of moving exclusively in analytical fash-
ion from proposition to proposition, also grows and changes by
moving from image to image. This is the irreducible phenomeno-
logical and metaphorical structure of all cultural processes.

Researchers in the human sciences too would do well to
attempt to search out the fundamental equational and transform-
ational structures underlying their specific materials. For in-
stance, the philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) has convincingly
analyzed several "root metaphors" of world-scope. For example,
the informing "billiard ball" analogy which N.C. Campbell dis-
covered underlying the Gay-Lussac law of gases in chemistry is
a specific illustration of the workings of atomistic and mech-
anistic metaphors which have been so closely identified with
the very structure of modern science. It is important to recog-
nize, therefore, that these "root metaphors" of atomism and
mechanism constitute interpretive logics which tend to cut a-
cross modern physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, econo-
mics, political theory, sociology, jurisprudence, ethics, rel-
gion; in short, almost all modern disciplines in the Anglo
Cultural Tradition.   Indeed, analysis of
such cross-cutting interpretive logics of cultural traditions
means that the historical thrust in the human sciences would
be to proceed both analogically and homologically. Analogical
analysis means looking at the in-depth symbolic linkages be-
tween one sphere and another (eg. religious ethics and econo-
mic norms). The task here would be to unravel the series of
inner symbolic equations generating horizontally congruent
spheres of action and meaning through the progressive extension
of prime analogues from one set of experiences to another.

Homological analysis means looking at the historical connect-
ions between analogous elements in different spheres of devel-
opment. Here the main task becomes to unravel the key sets of
transformational equations linking diverse cultural phenomena
with their common historical origins.

c. Levi-Strauss's Notion of Totemism as a Primitive
        Equational Structure

        If we take this perspective and return to Durkheim's
study of the primitive kind of systems in which phenomenologi-
cal analogy serves as the chief classificatory principle, it
is striking to note that one who calls himself "an inconstant
disciple" of Durkheim should have developed a theory of totem-
ism precisely around such notions of deeply embedded equation-
al structures. Indeed, the "structuralist" program centers on
elucidating the basic equational and transformational opera-
tions which constitute cultural process. Levi-Strauss views
totemism as "... a classificatory scheme which allows the na-
tural and social universe to be grasped as an organized whole"
(1966:135). It is precisely these equational and transforma-
tional structures (which Levi-Strauss further explores in the
several volumes of his Mythologiques), which mark totemism as
a primitive, melded, phenomenologically based system of meta-
hors and condensation symbolism in which different spheres
and levels of experience are pulled together and seen as con-
vertible one into the other.

> The mythical system and the modes of representations it
> employs serve to establish homologies [analogies?] be-
> tween natural and social conditions, or more accurately,
> it makes it possible to equate significant contrasts
> found on different planes: the geographical, meterolo-
> gical, zoological, botanical, technical, economic, social,
> ritual, religious, and philosophical (1966:93).

Arguing that ".. the totemic representation amounts to a code
which makes it possible to pass from one system to another re-
gardless of whether it is formulated in natural or cultural
terms," Levi-Strauss also notes that this totemic classifica-
tion is more than just a system of knowledge, for "It is also

the basis of an ethic which prescribes or prohibits modes of
behavior" (1965:97).

The isomorphism between social status and relations and
symbolic cultural categories acts as the core, the framework,
or template--the metaphorical translating column--of public
and private phenomenological process. Arguing that the func-
tion of totemism as a phenomenological code "... is to guar-
antee the convertibility of ideas between different levels of
social reality," Levi-Strauss suggests that this is what Durk-
heim meant to get at: "As Durkheim seems sometimes to have
realized, the basis of sociology is what may be called 'socio-
logic' " (1966:76).

> ... ideas and beliefs of the totemic type particularly
> merit attention because they constitute codes making it
> possible to ensure, in the form of conceptual systems,
> the convertibility of messages appertaining to each le-
> vel.... This mediation between nature and culture is one
> of the distinctive functions of the totemic operator (1966:
> 90-1).

> ... totemism postulates a logical equivalency between a
> society of natural species and a world of social groups
> (1966:104).

Thus, instead of adopting a Utilitarian or pragmatic approach
to food interdictions, for instance, Levi-Strauss views them
as a symbolic way to emphasize a crucial link or opposition
between culture and nature: "Eating prohibitions and obliga-
tions thus seem to be theoretically equivalent means of deno-
ting significance in a logical system some or all of whose ele-
ments are edible species" (1966:103).

Now, while utilizing such fundamental generative opposi-
tions as culture/nature, general/particular, generic logic/
change and history, Levi-Strauss, searching for the panhuman
logic operating in the elementary structures of the human mind,
feels as if he can explain all the diversity in symbolism and
human action through abstract models of differentiation and
integration. In so far as he overstates his case, his work
can be viewed as a kind of applied metaphysics. Yet, still
his problem is akin to Durkheim's original one: how does dif-
ferentiation generate integration? Perhaps LaCapra (1972) is

more sensitive than most secondary observers to the significance of Levi-Strauss's development of Durkheim's seminal insights. Let us conclude with a fine summary statement of Levi-Strauss's insights into totemism as a symbolic coding system:

> What is significant is not so much the presence or absence of this or that level of classification as the existence of a classification with, as it were, an adjustable thread which gives the group adopting it the means of "focussing" on all planes, from the most abstract to the most concrete, the most cultural to the most natural, without changing its intellectual instrument (1966:136).

Thus totemism can be viewed as an ingenious primitive way of converting phenomenological diversity into moral and conceptual unity, of transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Indeed, this "science of the concrete" is adequate for its context, and as Durkheim observed, served as the foundation for the emergence of later rational and universal classificatory systems.

d. Sacral "Contagion" as A Primitive Metaphorical Link

Now, if Durkheim viewed the "contagion" of sacral forces as the prime unifying link in primitive classificatory systems, this was because this process contained a number of crucial metaphorical principles, especially "the part is equal to the whole," and "like produces like." Late in The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim summed up these metaphorical principles in this way:

> Since all the forces of the universe have been conceived on the model of the sacred forces, the contagiousness inherent in the second was extended to the first, and men have believed that all the properties of a body could be transmitted contagiously. Likewise, when the principle according to which like produces like had been established in order to satisfy certain religious needs, it detached itself from its ritual origins to become, through a sort of spontaneous generalization, a law of nature (EF:404).

Indeed, to Durkheim the contagion of sacral symbolism served as a way of translating through synecdoche and metaphor these constitutive principles into simpler form. Let us briefly explore these primitive analogical classificatory operations.

Once again, religion serves as the prime symbolic vehicle by which the sociocultural microcosm is first constructed. Due to the contagiousness of sacred energies, mounting oppositions between it and all that is profane spread to things that appear to resemble the totemic incarnation in some way or another. It is these binary oppositions which serve as the first principle of classification.

> When a classification is reduced to two classes, these are almost necessarily conceived as antitheses; they are used primarily as a means of clearly separating things between which there is a very marked contrast (EF:170).

As Levi-Strauss notes, such binary oppositions serve as the organizing womb of culture. Thus, the very basis of the symbolic alignments of the microcosm with the macrocosm is the series of radical antitheses between the sacred and the profane.

Now, the symbolic contagion of sacral energies is the linking force to the extension of these binary oppositions.

> A sacred character is to a high degree contagious: it therefore spreads out from the totemic being to everything that is closely or remotely connected with it. The religious sentiments inspired by the animal are communicated to the substances upon which it is nourished and which serves to make or remake its flesh and blood, to the things that resemble it, and to the different beings with which it has constant relations. Thus, little by little, sub-totems are attached to the totems, and form the cosmological systems expressed by the primitive classifications. At last, the whole world is divided up among the totemic principles of each tribe (EF:254).

Now, one of the marks of primitive thought in this regard is its phenomenological or concrete imagistic bases, for the ways in which experiences may be judged relevant to one or another set of symbolic references depend more upon the concrete details of specific situations, prevailing group definitions, and the individuals involved, than upon any universal or rational criterion. The point of departure here is the "natural attitude," which is shared by primitive and modern man in his everyday mode alike. Experience is linked to exper-

ience, image to image, instead of to abstract governing principles. The key anchor of this progressive cosmization is thus analogy. Based upon degrees of resemblance to the totemic incarnation, analogies drawn in a concrete way from immediate experience are progressively extended to other more or less related sets of experiences. Things similar to the sacred image are believed to be driven by the same essential energizing principles.

> The Australian does not place things in the same clan or in different clans at random. For him as for us, similar images attract one another, while opposed ones repel one another, and it is on the basis of these feelings of affinity or of repulsion that he classified the corresponding things in one place or another (EF:170).

Later in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim spoke of the "law of contagion" as containing two sub-principles of so-called "sympathetic magic." The first principle was that "the part is equal to the whole," which means that "Anything touching an object also touches everything which has any relations of proximity or unity whatsoever with this object. Whatever affects the part also affects the whole" (EF:398).

> ... when a sacred thing is subdivided, each of its parts remains equal to the thing itself. Insofar as religious thought is concerned, the part is equal to the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy. The debris of a relic has the same virtue as a relic in good condition. The smallest drop of blood contains the same active principle as the whole thing.... This conception would be inexplicable if the sacredness of something were due to the constituent properties of the thing itself, for, in that case, it should vary with that thing, increasing and decreasing with it. But if the virtues it is believed to possess are not intrinsic to it, and if they come from certain sentiments which it brings to mind and symbolizes, though these originate outside it, then, since it has no need of determined dimensions to play this role of reminder, it will have the same value whether it is entire or not. Since the part makes us think of the whole, it evokes the same sentiment as the whole (EF:261-2).

The second principle is that like attracts like. The representation of a being or condition reproduces this being or condition. Durkheim compared these two principles in terms of the differences between sympathetic magic and the effica-

ciousness of the totemic commensal rites. For instance, Durk-
heim spoke first of the mechanisms at work in a magic charm:

> The charm is, to a large extent, a simple phenomenon
> of transfer. The idea of the image is associated in the
> mind with that of the model; consequently, the effects
> of an action performed upon a statue are transmitted
> contagiously to the person whose traits it reproduces.
> The function of the image is for its original what that
> of a part is for the whole: it is an agent of transmis-
> sion. Therefore, men think that they can obtain the same
> result by burning the hair of the person whom they wish
> to injure: the only difference between these two sorts
> of operations is that in one, the communication is made
> through similarity, while in the other is by means of
> contiguity.
>
> It is different with the rites which concern us. They
> suppose not only the displacement of a given condition
> or quality, which passed from one object into the other,
> but also the creation of something entirely new. The
> mere act of representing the animal gives birth to this
> animal and creates it; by imitating the sound of wind
> or falling water, they cause clouds to form, rain to
> fall, etc. Of course, resemblance plays an important
> part in each case, but not all the same one. In a charm,
> it only gives a special direction to the action exerci-
> sed; it directs in a certain way an action not origina-
> ting in it. In the rites of which we have just been de-
> scribing, it acts by itself and is directly efficacious.
> So, in contradiction to the usual definitions, the real
> difference between the two principles of so-called sym-
> pathetic magic and the corresponding practices is not
> that contiguity acts in one case and resemblance in the
> other, but that in the former there is simple contagious
> communication, while there is production and creation in
> the latter (EF:398-9).

And Durkheim added this footnote: "We say nothing of what has

been called the law of opposition, for as Hubert and Mauss

(in their "General Theory of Magic") have shown, a contrary

produces its opposite only through the intermediary of a sim-

ilar" (EF:399). Thus, like attracts or produces like; analogy

is the mediating principle, the crucial third term between

empirical diversity and the all-embracing moral unity of the

cosmos.

What ultimately results from these cross-mixings is oft-
en a very complex classificatory system, what Levi-Strauss
has called a "bricolage," based upon the phenomenological

"science of the concrete." In short, there is a special logic
to the elementary forms of human classification, whether these
be elaborated by primitive peoples or moderns. The primitive
classificatory process, though seemingly idiosyncratic, really
does not proceed at random. Nor is it alogical or pre-logical;
it is phenomeno-logical. What must be respected here especially
is the extraordinary difficulty of building up systems of
moral and intellectual classification from scratch. Given
their meager cultural resources, the wonder is that primitive
societies should have ever been able to construct classifica-
tory systems of such sophistication and general usefulness.
Whatever their inadequacies, and these are manifold, one of
their undeniable virtues is, as Durkheim emphasized, that they
laid the first foundations of our modern epochal achievements
in science.

> We have seen the facility with which the primitive con-
> fuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous
> things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see
> one of the causes which has contributed the most to
> facilitating these confusions. Since religious forces
> are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening
> that the same principle animates very different objects
> equally; it passes from some into others as the result
> of either a simple material proximity or even of a su-
> perficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals,
> plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men
> because they bear the name of an animal; the animals
> because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the
> plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks
> because they mark the place where the ceremonies are
> celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore consi-
> dered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one
> single religious principle ought to pass as having the
> same essence, and as differing from one another only in
> secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite
> natural to arrange them in a single category, and to re-
> gard them as mere varieties of the same class, transmu-
> table into one another.
> When this relation has been established, it makes the
> phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken
> by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical
> life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings in
> spite of their natural differences? But we have seen
> that these confusions and participation have played a
> role of the highest utility in logic; they have served

> to bind together things which sensation leaves apart
> from one another. So it is far from true that   con-
> tagion, the source of these connections and confusions,
> is marked with that fundamental irrationality that one
> is inclined to attribute to it at first. It has opened
> the way for the scientific explanations of the future
> (EF:364-5).

Indeed, Durkheim went so far as to identify the origin of the

so-called "law of causality" (force and sequence) with these

primitive notions. (We shall later pursue the significance of

Durkheim's general assertions here in the following section

on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and

culture). It is important to repeat that even though to modern

"rationalized" observers these primitive systems of resona-

ting symbolic equations might seem wholly unreasonable and in-

deed devoid of everything we think of as logic, a veritable

superstitious "bricolage," nonetheless, part of Durkheim's

lasting achievement here was to emphasize the inner logic of

their construction and their evolutionary significance. Ele-

mentary classificatory systems are a series of phenomenologi-

cal projections constructed through the principle of exten-

sion of knowledge through analogy. To a certain extent, these

systems are "mytho-sociological," as Durkheim said, since col-

lective representations have sacralized the entire field of

human experience.

e. <u>Symbolic</u> <u>Equations</u> <u>and</u> <u>The</u> <u>Legitimate</u> <u>Foundations</u> <u>of</u>
   <u>Moral</u> <u>and</u> <u>Intellectual</u> <u>Authority</u> <u>of</u> <u>Collectivities</u>

The construction of systems of moral and intellectual
classification through the progressive extension of symbolic
equations originally rooted in the sacral/profane opposition
of collectivties is well illustrated by Durkheim and Mauss's
seminal monograph on <u>Primitive</u> <u>Classification</u>. For example,
of the phenomenological extension of concrete analogy among
the American Zuni Indians, Durkheim and Mauss noted:

> What we find among the Zuni is a veritable arrangement
> of the universe. All beings and facts in nature, 'the
> sun, moon, and stars, the sky, earth, and sea, in all
> their phenomena and elements; and all inanimate objects,
> as well as plants, animals, and men,' are classed, la-
> belled and assigned to fixed places in a unique and in-
> tegrated system in which all the parts are coordinated
> and subordinated one to another by 'degrees of resem-
> blance' (PC:43).

Through progressive extension of analogies, these compounding
systems of classification are interwoven more and more tight-
ly; cross-indexed as a librarian might say. Indeed, the degree
of complexity, "cross-indexing," and internal consistency
might serve as some basic criteria for judging the comparative
degree of cultural complexity as represented in the central
classificatory system.

> In the form in which we now find it, the principle of
> this system is a division of space into seven regions:
> north, south, west, east, zenith, nadir, and the center.
> Everything is assigned to one or another of these seven
> regions. To mention only the seasons and the elements,
> the wind, breeze, or air, and the winter season are at-
> tributed to the north; water, the spring, and its damp
> breezes to the west; fire and the summer, to the south;
> the earth, seeds, the frosts which bring the seeds to
> maturity and end the year, to the east. The pelican,
> crane, grouse, sagecock, the evergreen oak, etc. are
> things of the west. With the east are classed the deer,
> antelope, turkey, etc. (PC:43-4).

Now, these more or less systematic phenomenological
linkages continue to ramify: flora and fauna are linked with
specific regions of the sky and seasons of the year, colors
are added, as are human virtues and social classes. Indeed,

redundancy serves an important function, as in all systems
of communication, for it almost seems as if primitive cult-
ures constantly rotated the symbolic matrix, each time tying
in yet another thread in the emerging cosmological fabric.
This rotation and redundancy increases "inter-convertibility,"
as Levi-Strauss observes.

> A particular color is attributed to each region and char-
> acterizes it. The north is yellow, because, it is said,
> the light is yellow when the sun rises and sets; the
> west is blue because of the blue light seen at sunset.
> The south is red because it is the region of summer and
> fire, which is red. The east is white because it is the
> color of the day. The upper regions are streaked with
> colors like the play of light among the clouds; the low-
> er regions are black like the depths of the earth. As
> for the center, the navel of the world, representative
> of all regions, it is all the colors simultaneously (PC:
> 44).

In addition, men and things form integral parts of the
same cosmological system. The emerging symbolic economy thus
includes not only the creation of value but also the alloca-
tion of symbolic value to all the resources of the world. Na-
tural elements are assigned social functions.

> Not only things, but social functions are distributed
> in this way. The north is the region of force and de-
> struction, thus war and destruction belong to it; to
> the west, peace and hunting; to the south, the region
> of heat, agriculture, and medicine; to the east, the
> region of the sun, magic, and religion; to the upper
> world and the lower world are assigned diverse combin-
> ations of these functions (PC:44).

Noting that "... this division of the world is exactly the
same as that of the clans within the pueblo" (PC:44), Durkheim
and Mauss argued:

> ... not only do the divisions of things by regions and
> the division of society by clans correspond, but they
> are inextricably interwoven and merged. One may equal-
> ly well say that things are classified either with the
> north, south, etc. or with the clans of the north,
> south, etc. (PC:47).

Contending that we may discover the evolutionary links between
the type of classification by clans, seen in Australian totem-
ism, and more complicated systems of classification by quar-
ters, as seen for example in some of the American tribes,

Durkheim and Mauss claimed:

> Things were first of all localized by clans and totems.
> But this strict localization of clans ... necessarily
> brought with it a corresponding localization of the
> things attributed to the clans. From the moment that
> the wolf people, for example, belong to a particular
> quarter of the camp, the same necessarily applies to
> to the things of all sorts which are classified under
> this same totem. Consequently, the camp has only to be
> oriented in a fixed way and all its parts are immedia-
> tely oriented together with everything, things and peo-
> ple, that they comprise. In other words, all things in
> nature are henceforth thought of as standing in fixed
> relationships to equally fixed regions in space (PC:65).

Durkheim and Mauss further observe that this represents
that stage of cosmological classificatory system which por-
trays the "...tribe as a microcosm of the universe," an imago
mundi.

> Certainly, it is only tribal space which is divided
> and shared in this way. But just as for the primitive
> the tribe constitutes all humanity, and as the founding
> ancestor of the tribe is the father and creator of men,
> so also the idea of the camp is identified with that of
> the whole world. The camp is the center of the universe,
> and the whole universe is concentrated within it. Cosmic
> space and tribal space are thus only very imperfectly
> distinguished, and the mind passes from one to the other
> without difficulty, almost without being aware of doing
> so. And in this way things are connected with particular
> quarters (PC:65).

Now, this notion of the camp as the center of the world is a
particularly good illustration of what Durkheim and Mauss cal-
led the "sociocentrism" of primitive and archaic classifica-
tory systems or cosmologies.

> It has quite often been said that man began to conceive
> things by relating them to himself. The above allows us
> to see more precisely what this anthropocentrism, which
> might better be called sociocentrism, consists of. The
> center of the first schemas of nature is not the indivi-
> dual; it is society. It is this that is objectified, not
> man. Nothing shows this more clearly than the way in
> which the Sioux retain the whole universe, in a way,
> within the limits of tribal space; and we have seen how
> universal space itself is nothing else than the site oc-
> cupied by the tribe, only indefinitely extended beyond
> its real limits. It is by virtue of the same mental dis-
> position that so many peoples have placed the center of
> the world, "the navel of the earth," in their own poli-
> tical or religious capital, ie. at the place which is

the center of their moral life (PC:86-7).

Now, these insistent symbolic linakges imply consubstantiality--that the same sacred principle inheres in all linked things. They are made of the same "cosmic" substance, and energized by the same basic principle. The problem becomes to orchestrate a haimonious alignment between the two parallel orders. We witness here a most important equational process-- the moralization of nature, and the naturalization of man. In this crucial reciprocal interpenetration, as Levi-Strauss observes, world, self, and society grow together in a "solid system all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically."

> Men regard the things in their clan as their relatives or associates; they call them their friends and think that they are made out of the same flesh as themselves. Therefore, between the two are elective affinities and quite special relations of agreement. Things and people have a common name, and in a certain way they naturally understand each other and harmonize with one another.... Just as a man who belongs to the Crow clan has within him something of this animal, so the rain, since it is of the same clan and belongs to the same totem, is also necessarily considered as being 'the same thing as a crow'; for the same reason, the moon is a black cockatoo, every blacknut tree a pelican, etc. All the beings arranged in a single clan, whether men, animals, plants or inanimate objects are merely forms of the totemic being.... All are really of the same flesh in the sense that all partake of the nature of the totemic animal (EF:174-5).

These consubstantial linkages continue to ramify as the societies grow more complex, until, as Durkheim and Mauss said of the Chinese Taoist system, "... the whole world is covered like a gnosis or a cabbala." Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss imply here that one of the hidden keys to understanding the growth of cultural complexity comes from the suppleness or differential ease to which the central classificatory matrices of cultures can be progressively applied to encompass the incredible diversity of empirical facts. This differential ability to generalize, to progressively extend, in short, to universalize prime symbolic oppositions, shall prove a critical factor in later sociocultural evolution. Of the complex Taoist

classificatory system, for instance, Durkheim and Mauss noted:

> In order to adapt the basic principles of the system to
> the facts, the divisions and subdivisions of regions
> and things were ceaselessly multiplied and complicated.
> The fact is that this classification was intended above
> all to regulate the conduct of men; and it was able to
> do so, avoiding the contradictions of experience, thanks
> to this very complexity (PC:70-1).

Now, it is important to emphasize that such classificatory systems serve not merely cognitive but moral functions as well. This dual aspect of phenomenological process means that such "... classifications (are) intended above all to regulate the conduct of men," or as Levi-Strauss says, "these classifications also carry ethics." We have emphasized throughout this book that structures of conscience and consciousness are always intimately interwoven, but had we drawn the conclusion that the more elementary these systems become, the more the representations also function as reglementations? Thus, as Weber (1963,1968) also saw, primitive magical rites, which are the counterpart of myths, serve eminently practical functions--to ensure long life, reproduction of game or to make crops grow, to cure sickness, repel enemies, etc. It is hardly surprising then that such systems of conscience and consciousness should come to "... govern all details of life."

> ... a divinatory rite is not generally isolated; it is
> part of an organized whole. The science of the diviners,
> therefore, does not form isolated groups of things, but
> binds these groups to each other. At the basis of a sys-
> tem of divination, there is thus, at least implicitly,
> a system of classification (PC:77).

For instance, of the rather sophisticated divinatory rites of the Chinese Taoists, Durkheim and Mauss remarked:

> This classification of regions, seasons, things, and
> animal species dominates the whole of Chinese life.
> It is the very principle of the famous doctrine of
> feng-shui, and through this it determines the orien-
> tation of buildings, the foundations of towns and hous-
> es, the siting of tombs and cemeteries; if certain
> tasks are undertaken here and others there, if certain
> affairs are conducted at such and such a time, this is
> due to reasons based on this traditional systematiza-
> tion. And these reasons are not taken only from geo-
> mancy; they are also derived from considerations con-
> cerning hours, days, months, and years: a certain di-

rection which is favorable at one time becomes unfavor-
able at another. Forces agree or discord according to
season. Thus not only is everything heterogeneous in
time, as in space, but the heterogeneous parts of which
these two settings are composed correspond, or are oppo-
sed, and are arranged, in one system. And all these in-
finitely numerous elements are combined to determine the
genus and the species of things in nature, the direction
of movement of forces, and acts which must be performed,
thus giving the impression of a philosophy which is at
once subtle and naive, rudimentary and refined. Here we
have, then, a highly typical case in which collective
thought has worked in a reflective and learned way on
themes which are clearly primitive (PC:73).

The intimate linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies, there-
fore, that structures of morality and knowledge will line up
in parallel fashion. There is no escaping this attempt at har-
monious alignment, for the structures of responsibility are
preeminently collective, as Durkheim noted with altruistic and
fatalistic suicide. No, change comes here through greater a-
lignment or severing of relations between the microcosm and
macrocosm, or between systems of morality and knowledge. Not-
ing that "There is nothing more natural, moreover, than the
relation thus expressed between divination and the classifi-
cation of things," (PC:77), Durkheim and Mauss compared the
Chinese system to the Greek:

... the Chinese classification was essentially an in-
strument of divination. Now the divinatory methods of
Greece are remarkably similar to the Chinese, and the
similarities denote procedures of the same nature in
the way fundamental ideas are classified. The assign-
ment of elements and metals to the planets is a Greek,
perhaps Chaldean, fact, as much as a Chinese. Mars is
fire, Saturn is water, etc. The relations between cer-
tain sorts of events and certain planets, the simultan-
eous apprehension of space and time, the particular cor-
respondence of a certain kind of undertaking, are found
equally in both these different societies.

A still more curious coincidence is that which allows a
relationship to be established between Chinese and
Greek astrology and physiognomy, and perhaps with the
Egyptian. The Greek theory of zodiacal and planetary
melothesia, which is thought to be of Egyptian origin,
is intended to establish strict correspondence between

certain parts of the body and certain positions of the
stars, certain orientations, and certain events. Now
in China also there exists a famous doctrine based on
the same principle. Each element is related to a cardi-
nal point, a constellation and a particular color, and
these different groups of things are thought to corres-
pond, in turn, to diverse kinds of organs, inhabited by
souls, to emotions, and to different parts whose reunion
forms the 'natural character.' Thus, yang, the male prin-
ciple of light and sky, has the liver in the viscera,
the bladder as mansion, and the ears and sphincters a-
mong the orifices. This theory, the generality of which
is apparent, is not of mere curiosity value; it implies
a certain way of conceiving things. By it, the universe
is in fact referred to the individual; things are expres-
sed by it, in a sense, as functions of the living organ-
ism; this is really a theory of the microcosm (PC:76-77).

Although some have criticized him for ignoring the body (eg.

Victor Turner, 1967; P. Worsley, 1956) or the natural environ-

ment, Durkheim did acknowledge, it seems, that primitive and

archaic societies did feel compelled to construct parallel

alignments between society, the body, and the natural environ-

ment, especially the heavens in Mid-Eastern empires. Thus,

world, self, and society are all cosmized.

Now, the systems of classification which we call primi-

tive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding to-

gether moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a more

or less coherent system. Such cosmological classifications are,

at one and the same time, moral, intellectual and emotional,

for the body, society, and the environment are also used ana-

logically as resonating microcosms of the other. Thus, the

analytical dimensions cross-cut knowledge, belief, and action.

The ties which unite things of the same group or differ-
ent groups to each other are themselves conceived as so-
cial ties .... The expressions by which we refer to these
relations still have a moral significance; but whereas
for us they are hardly more than metaphors, originally
they meant what they said. Things of the same class were
really considered as relatives of the individuals of the
same social group, and consequently of each other. They
are of the 'same flesh,' the same family. Logical rela-
tions are thus, in a sense, domestic relations (PC:84).

And since domestic relations are rooted primarily in sentiment,

it is not surprising that these other (ana)logical relations

too should become suffused with social sentiment. In Moral Ed-

ucation, for instance, Durkheim explicitly noted that cogni-
tive representations must not only be moral reglementations,
but affect the sentiments as well. The existential is groun-
ded in the essential which then converts the obligatory into
the desirable. Such representations must:

> ... warm the heart and set the will in motion. The point
> here is not to enrich the mind with some theoretical notion
> ... but to give it a principle of action, which we must
> make as effective as necessary and possible. In other
> words, the representation must have something emotional;
> it must have the character of a sentiment more than a
> conception. Since, in the long run, one only learns by
> doing, we must multiply the opportunities in which the
> sentiments thus communicated to the child can manifest
> themselves in action. To learn the love of collective
> life we must live in it, not only in our minds and ima-
> ginations, but in reality (ME:229).

Although in Primitive Classification Durkheim was temp-
ted to identify the apparent inability of primitive man to form
fixed logical concepts with the fused emotion ladenness of
these moral-cognitive representations and reglementations, on
the same page Durkheim and Mauss also link these sentiments
to the authority of the sacral-magical complex. Indeed, it is
the obligatoriness, the collectivization of responsibility
for disharmonies between the microcosm and the macrocosm,
which tends to make such representations and reglementations
sacred. And because inviolable, immune to rational criticism
and change.

> ... emotion is naturally refractory to analysis, or at
> least lends itself uneasily to it, because it is too com-
> plex. Above all, when it has a collective origin it de-
> fies critical and rational examination. The pressure ex-
> erted by the group on each of its members does not permit
> individuals to judge freely the notions which society it-
> self has elaborated and in which it has placed something
> of its personality. Such constructs are sacred for indiv-
> iduals (PC:88).

Indeed, it is this infusion of religious or sacred sentiment
into the central classificatory paradigms which characterizes
the distinctiveness of the archaic cosmological system.

> ... it is possible to classify other things than con-
> cepts, and otherwise than in accordance with the laws
> of pure understanding. For in order for it to be pos-
> sible for ideas to be systematically arranged for rea-

> sons of sentiment, it is necessary that they should not
> be pure ideas, but that they should themselves be pro-
> ducts of sentiment.... For those who are called primi-
> tives, a species of things is not a simple object of
> knowledge, but corresponds above all to a certain senti-
> mental attitude. All kinds of affective elements combine
> in the representation of it. Religious emotions ... not
> only give it a special tinge, but attribute to it the
> most essential properties of which it is constituted.
> Things are above all sacred or profane, pure or impure,
> friends or enemies, favorable or unfavorable; ie. their
> most fundamental characteristics are only expressions of
> the way in which they affect social sensibilities. The
> differences in which they are grouped are more affective
> than intellectual (PC:85-6).

Indeed, it is precisely this on-going dialectic between senti-
ment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination and mo-
rality, macrocosm and microcosm, culture and nature, which
marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory systems.

Now, even granting the more or less direct line of con-
tinuity connecting our own day with these elementary forms,
the great gulf remaining between the two is revealed by the
religious affectivity of regions of space in primitive systems.
In contrast to the uniformly neutral, geometric homogeneity
of physical space in modern western thought, primitive cul-
tures have a highly emotionally charged, heterogeneous con-
ception of space.

> For us, space is formed of similar parts, which are sub-
> stitutable one for the other. We have seen, however,
> that for many peoples it is profoundly differentiated
> according to regions. This is because each region has
> its own affective value. Under the influence of diverse
> sentiments, it is connected with a special religious
> principle, and consequently it is endowed with virtues
> sui generis which distinguishes it from all the others.
> And it is this emotional value of notions which plays
> the preponderant part in the manner in which ideas are
> connected or separated. It is the dominant characteris-
> tic in classification (PC:86).

We see here the stark contrast between the world-views of the
"enchanted garden" and the "world-as-machine."

How did there come to be this great contrast if, indeed,
as Durkheim repeatedly insisted, "there is no gulf between
these stages of mankind"? Since such primitive cosmological
systems are largely built on phenomenological analogies, the

fusion of cognitive, moral and affective categories, socio-
centrism, and sacral-magical protocols, modern systems will
emerge only where classifications become progressively root-
ed in abstract "essential" principles which are true by their
very nature, in which structures of conscience and conscious-
ness become separated and the latter granted some legitimate
institutionalizedautonomy, where these categories become de-
tached from their prime or original group status referents,
and in which questions of truth and fidelity are resolved pri-
marily by recourse to rational logical and evidential canons
rather than by collective recourse to traditional magical prax-
is. In regard to one of these dimensions, Durkheim and Mauss
observed:

> ... the history of scientific classification is, in
> the last analysis, the history of the stages by which
> this element of social affectivity has progressively
> weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflect-
> ive thought of individuals (PC:8).

It is important to recognize, moreover, that this evolution
does not come about simply through the antagonism of one mode
of classification to the other, and the replacement of the
former by the latter. Rather, as Benjamin Nelson (1973a) and
Edmund Leites (1974) have realized, the passage to modernity
comes about through the expansion of structures of fraterni-
zation, of universalization, of rationalization, within spe-
fic religiously based cultural traditions. Indeed, as they
emphasize, conflict over the legitimacy of alternate anchors
of moral and intellectual legitimacy, and structures of res-
ponsibility, are central to this critical evolutionary pas-
sage from "sacral-magical" to "faith" to "rational" structures
of conscience and consciousness.

Certainly, one of the most valuable case-studies, all
the more profound because it combines Durkheimian and Weber-
ian interpretive perspectives, of a classificatory system in
which categories are primarily related to specific group sta-
tuses and to the ritual praxis associated with them is Louis
Dumont's study of the sacral foundations of Indian social or-
ganization in Homo Hierarchicus (1970). In contrast to the

western notion of social stratification as rooted primarily
in economic criteria, Dumont shows how the religious opposi-
tion between the pure and the impure serves as the key organ-
izing principle for cultural and structural legitimacy in the
Indian caste organization. Following both Nelson and Dumont,
Jerome Gittleman offers these valuable observations:

> Their description of the persistent authority of sacro-
> magical structures in the social institution of 'caste'
> illustrates the immense difficulty of the historical
> passage from 'sacro-magical' to 'faith' structures of
> consciousness.
> In his essay 'For a Sociology of India,' Louis Dumont
> points out that Indian culture has the appearance of
> a sort of 'history museum' in which new culture traits
> are pulled up, juxtaposed, or sedimented upon the old
> traits, but do not replace them. Dumont argues that
> this is due to the hierarchical nature of Indian so-
> ciety which places a premium upon the prestige of sta-
> tus attaching to all things, and not upon their intrin-
> sic functions. In another essay, ' A Structural Defini-
> tion of a Folk Deity,' Dumont refers to the 'familiar
> impossibility of universal judgements in India,' which
> he explains by reference to the prescriptive structures
> of caste hierarchy: 'In the caste society nothing is
> true by nature and everything by situation, there are
> no essences but only relations.' By 'relations' Dumont
> is referring (in Nelson's language) to the sacro-magi-
> cal definition of 'situation' prescribed ritualistical-
> ly for each caste status--a particularistic, rigid, col-
> lective praxis which defines the sociocultural spaces
> allocated to things, cognitions, and acts in terms of
> a sacro-magical whole. The term 'essences' refers to
> those cultural universals which would make it possible
> to describe things in terms of the category 'true by
> nature' if the sacro-magical rites of collective praxis
> had not preempted the logical space 'true' (1974:83).

Thus, the failure to break with the sociocentric referent--
the lack of cross-cutting social bonds of widening fraterni-
zation--and the sacro-magical traditional collective proto-
cols constituted, in Weber's terms, an almost "ineradicable
obstacle" to modernization.

Durkheim and Mauss were sensitive to the mechanics of
these crucially significant world-historical processes. They
well knew both the positive and negative results of the per-
meation of society and culture by sacral and magical ration-
ales. Evoking echoes of Weber's image of archaic culture as

an "enchanted garden," Durkheim observed in 1912:

> The field of religious things extends well beyond the
> limits within which it seemed to be confined at first.
> It embraces not only the totemic animals and the human
> members of the clan, but since no known thing exists
> that is not classified in a clan and under a totem,
> there is likewise nothing which does not receive to
> some degree something of a religious character. When,
> in the religions which later came into being, the gods
> properly so-called appear, this one over the sea, that
> one over the air, another over the harvest or over the
> fruits, etc., and each of these provinces of nature will
> be believed to draw what life there is in it from the
> god upon whom it depends. This division of nature among
> these different divinities constitutes the conception
> which these religions give us of the universe... Far from
> being limited to one or two categories of beings, the
> domain of totemic religion extends to the final limits
> of the known universe. Just like the Greek religion, it
> puts the divine everywhere; the celebrated formula
> "everything is full of the gods" might equally well ser-
> ve it as a motto (EF:179-80).

And like Weber, Durkheim noted an important parallel between
the evolution of the gods, ethical obligations, structures of
conscience and consciousness especially in terms of individua-
tion of responsibility, and the evolution of societies. In
sum, as societies develop, so too do their symbolic and prime
classificatory systems, especially their notions of gods as
symbols of prime potency. But this last is a theme which we
must save for the chapter after this on the genetic-evolu-
tionary significance of the primitive sacral complex as the
womb of society, culture, and the person. Having explored in
relative detail Durkheim's view of the building of classifi-
catory systems, both moral and cognitive, through the exten-
sion of a series of symbolic equations, rooted in religion,
which serves to cosmicize the human world and valorize human
experience, let us now turn our attention to the final phase
of symbolic process. I mean the overcoming of invidious dual-
isms which have thus been endlessly generated through symbol-
ic transformations. Tension-creating polarities, symbolic e-
quations which extend the polarities, and then unity through
symbolic transformations thus constitute the three main phases
of symbolic process.

8. Symbolic Transformations: The Positive Communion Rites

Preface. W.H. Stanner (1967) has suggested that the most viable aspect of Durkheim's sociology of religion is his dynamic theory of symbolic process which focussed essentially on cultural operations and transactions concerning value. I generally agree with Stanner, and even Parsons (1973:175) has complimented the former's quasi-Durkheimian efforts in this direction.

Now, as Kenneth Burke has rightly emphasized over the years, the structure of symbolic action is inherently dramatic (or rhetorical and dialectical). As we have discovered using Durkheim's materials, the temporal structure of generic symbolic action reveals at least three basic phases. First, binary polarities introduce a basic tension into human experience; dilemmas energize Everyman. Second, through metaphor and analogy, a whole series of symbolic equations, radiating out from the original opposition, serve to bind together different experiences in a resonating system charged with multiple levels of meaning. The greater the degree of lamination, or multiple linkage of meanings on several levels, the greater the symbolic load, and thus the greater the potency and significance. Third, tension is resolved, and the powers of imagination and will released, through a crucial transformation of the mounting oppositions into a new and higher unity. All human symbolic action thus has an inherently dramatic design. Van Gennep also saw these crucial phases with his three stages of "rites of passage"--separation, transition, and incorporation (or preliminal, liminal, and post-liminal, 1960: eg. 11). In this section we shall investigate the importance of positive communion rites which serve to effect a creative symbolic transformation from the profane to the sacred.

As we proceed, we should recall, for instance, Burke's counsel that "... in the structural analysis of the symbolic act, not only the matter of "what equals what", but also the matter of "from what to what" (1973:38) is important. Burke

offers some basic hermeneutical rules here:

> The first step ... requires us to get our equations
> inductively, by tracing down the interrelationships
> as revealed by the objective structure of the book it-
> self.... Along with the distinction between opposing
> principles, we should note the development of from
> what to what (1973:70-71).

Thus, like Levi-Strauss (eg. in the first volume of his Mytho-
logiques, The Raw and the Cooked, 1969), Burke goes so far as
to suggest a notation for these inner relationships: "The two
main symbols for charting structural relationships would be
the sign for equals (=) and some such sign as the arrow (from
$\longrightarrow$ to)" (1973:74). Even though Burke developed his theories
separately from Durkheim's influence, Parsons (1973:176) cred-
its the former with great insight into the "... fully mature
Durkheimian position developed in The Elementary Forms." While
Levi-Strauss's structuralism is rather different from Burke's,
clearly both structuralist and dramatistic analysis converge
in their common concern with the inner form of symbolic pro-
cess as a series of self-equilibrating equations and trans-
formations (see also Jean Piaget, Structuralism, 1971). Both
perspectives are concerned with the deep constitutive and
transformative processes making up the human symbolic economy.

Finally, we would do well to remember here that Durk-
heim chose to analyze religious phenomena in depth because
they represent the most systematic and sophisticated transla-
tion of generic symbolic processes into explicit symbolic
forms. Religious processes were analytically important, in
short, for the light they helped shed on generic symbolic
processes. Certainly, as a non-believer, Durkheim did not
accredit the truth claims of religions as such; nor do we
need to do so here in our review of his epochal discovery
and elaboration of the inner structure of generic human sym-
bolic process. Rather, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970) translates
theological relationships and terms into their "logological"
equivalents, so too we are primarily concerned here with re-
translating back religious symbols into their original and
constitutive sociocultural equivalents. Thus, we may be jus-

tified, to a certain extent, in considering the two prime
religious modes of asceticism and mysticism as serving to
transfigure two basic phases of sociocultural process. Just
as all religions embody, to a greater or lesser extent, as-
cetic and mystical modes (see especially Max Weber,1963,1968),
so too does the generic human symbolic process which religion
translates into sacral terms also contain both negative (asce-
tic) and positive (mystical) phases. Separation and reunifi-
cation are thus the rhetorical and dialectical phases of all
human symbolic processes.

a.   Symbolic Metamorphoses: The Sacred and the Profane Are
        Not Closed to Each Other

     While I do not wish to defend Durkheim's hyperbole in
regard to the so-called "absoluteness" of the opposition be-
tween sacred and profane, I have tried to demonstrate that
his rhetorical excesses derived in large part from Durkheim's
own symbolic equation of the profane with egoistic and util-
itarian economic activity. But contrary to many of Durkheim's
critics who were misled by the strident tone of some of his
programmatic declarations, Durkheim himself did not treat the
contrast between the sacred and the profane as absolute in
practice. Therefore, before we explore some of the materials
concerning communion rites, we would do well to note that
Durkheim observed, in the first section of The Elementary
Forms, that symbolic metamorphoses from one category of be-
ing to another can and do, indeed must, take place. The sa-
cred and the profane are thus not hermetically sealed boxes
from which whole categories of existence can never escape.

> This is not equivalent to saying that a being can
> never pass from one of these worlds into another:
> but the manner in which this passage is effected,
> when it takes place, puts into relief the essential
> duality of the two kingdoms. In fact, it implies a
> veritable metamorphosis (EF:54).

     Now, close exegesis reveals that Durkheim did not treat
this basic dichotomy as rigidly or statically as his critics,
especially Evans-Pritchard (1965) or Stanner (1967), contend.

As always, Durkheim merely sharpened their opposition in order to heighten the drama of their inevitable resolution, and thus, their inner transformation and reunification. For instance, after emphasizing the universality of the sacred/profane opposition early in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim acknowledged:

> This interdiction cannot go so far as to make all communication between the two worlds impossible, for if the profane could in no way enter into relations with the sacred, this latter would be good for nothing (EF:55).

Further, did not Durkheim remark that "... every consecration by means of annointing or washing consists in transferring into a profane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF: 362)? Now, if one looks to the latter phases of Durkheim's treatment of generic symbolic process in his 1912 masterwork, you shall discover that Durkheim did indeed explore the symbolic transformations from one state of being to another. Indeed, Durkheim acknowledged that sacred beings:

> ... would serve for nothing and have no reason whatsoever for their existence if they could not come in contact with ... worshippers.... There is no positive rite which does not constitute a veritable sacrilege, for a man cannot hold commerce with sacred beings without crossing a barrier which should ordinarily keep them separate (EF:379-80).

For what, indeed, would be the point of separating all that is sacred from all that is profane if there were not some regularly scheduled means of passing from the latter to the former, if there were no way for harmony between micro and macrocosm to be restored?

It would have been almost impossible for Durkheim to leave that "absolute" and irreconcilable opposition floating in the air, forever incapable of resolution. For the "absoluteness" of this opposition implies an exclusively rhetorical structure to human action. But not only is this unlikely in the nature of symbolic processes, it also ignores the fact that Durkheim, as a master dialectician, always recognized the ever-present desire for reconciliation of tension-filled opposites in a new and creative unity. As Burke constantly reminds us, to separate implies a joining. Diversity implies

unity, "extremes meet" as Coleridge said. No, in the end,
there must always be some path which men can take to restore
themselves and their troubled worlds to wholeness, to health
and well-being. Rites are these mediums of symbolic metamor-
phoses; rites are collective moral therapeutics.

In addition, Evans-Pritchard (eg. 1965:65) charges Durk-
heim's basic dichotomy with "situational inflexibility." But,
once again, if we set aside Durkheim's rhetorically inspired
programmatic declarations, we discover that, in practice, Durk-
heim did indeed recognize what Van Gennep called the "pivot-
ing of the sacred" around a few central symbolic axes. In the
first part of The Elementary Forms did not Durkheim acknow-
ledge that "... it must not be lost to view that there are sa-
cred things of every degree, and there are some in relation
to which a man feels himself relatively at ease" (EF:53)?
It should, first of all, be remembered that at the heart of
the sacramental world-view is the implicit declaration that
the orders of being are not necessarily closed to one another,
and that the exercise of this faith depends especially upon
special situational dispensations to ritually ingest a tiny
part of the sacred totem.

> The profane function of vegetables and even of animals
> is ordinarily to serve as food; then the sacred char-
> acter of the totemic animal or plant is shown by the
> fact that it is forbidden to eat them. It is true that
> since they are sacred things, they can enter into the
> composition of certain mystical repasts, and ... some-
> times serve as veritable sacraments; yet normally they
> cannot be used for everyday consumption (EF:150-1).

In addition, it should be recalled that whether or not a sa-
cralization of the profane or a profanation of the sacred oc-
curs depends upon the proper approach to any communion ritual.
Sacrilege occurs when the taboos surrounding the sacred ob-
jects are violated; yet there is no sacrilege when the ap-
propriate preparatory steps have been taken. Indeed, even:

> ... when it is permitted to eat the plant or animal
> that serves as totem, it is not possible to do so
> freely; only a litte bit may be taken at a time. To
> go beyond this amount is a ritual fault that has
> grave consequences (EF:151).

Further, the definition of sacralization and sacrilege are
differentiated by degree for different types of people. That
is, different roles are granted differential dispensations
to approach the sacred objects; this is, of course, the begin-
ning of specialization and differentiation of religious roles.

> The old men and those who have attained a high reli-
> gious dignity are freed from the restrictions under
> which ordinary men are placed. They can eat the sacred
> thing because they are sacred themselves; this rule is
> in no way peculiar to totemism, but it is found in the
> most diverse religions (EF:152; see also 346,#47).

Now, as there are always exceptions to the rule, Durk-
heim observed that there are also exceptions to the strict
totemic food interdictions. Although Evans-Pritchard charged
that Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy was "situationally
inflexible," Durkheim did in fact note that practical neces-
sity changed the definition of the sacral situation.

> ... here also there are exceptions and tolerations
> ... especially in the case of necessity, when the
> totem is a dangerous animal, for example, or when
> the man has nothing to eat. There are certain tribes
> where men are forbidden to hunt the animals whose
> name they bear, on their own accounts, but where
> they may kill them for others. But the way in which
> this act is generally accomplished clearly indicates
> that it is something illicit. One excuses himself as
> though for a fault, and bears witness to the chagrin
> which he suffers, and the repugnance which he feels,
> while precautions are taken that the animal may suf-
> fer as little as possible (EF:154).

As with the case of King David and his men eating the temple
showbreads in time of famine, Durkheim recognized (to borrow
a term from Van Gennep) the "pivoting of the sacred" along
several symbolic axes. Let us conclude this brief excursus
with Van Gennep's unjustifiably overlooked formulation of
this important problem.

> Characteristically, the presence of the sacred (and
> the performance of appropriate rites) is variable.
> Sacredness as an attribute is not absolute; it is
> brought into play by the nature of particular situa-
> tions.... The "magic circles" pivot, shifting as a
> person moves from one place in society to another.
> The categories and concepts which embody them operate
> in such a way that whoever passes through the various
> positions of a lifetime one day sees the sacred where

before he has seen the profane, or vice versa. Such changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society and of the individual, and it is the function of the rites of passage to reduce their normal effects (1960:12-13).

b.   The Transition From Negative to Positive Rites

Observing that "The absolute and universal nature of the contrast between the sacred and the profane does not mean that things or beings cannot or do not pass from one sphere to another" (1974:174), Robert Nisbet also rightly notes that the negative or ascetic rites serve merely as a preparatory stage to the passage to the sacred pole of sociocultural life. "Purification rites, as in initiation or eucharistic ceremonies, are the means through which a person or thing passes from the profane state to the sacred" (1974:174). Negative or ascetic rites, as we have seen, serve to demarcate the boundaries between the sacred and the profane, and thus to progressively separate all that which is aligned with the latter from the former.

> By definition sacred beings are separated beings. That which characterizes them is that there is a break in continuity between them and the profane beings.... A whole group of rites has the object of realizing this state of separation which is essential. Since their function is to prevent undue mixings and to keep these two domains from encroaching upon the other, they are only able to impose abstentions or negative acts ... taboos or interdictions (EF:337-8).

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's description of the transition from the negative, ascetic rites, to the positive communion rites.

Durkheim himself observed that the whole system of sacral interdictions, abstentions, purifications, etc. signify a progressive shedding of profane states, and thus serve as the necessary preparation for eventual sacral reunification.

> Up to the present, the negative cult has been presented to us only as a system of abstentions. So it seems to serve only to inhibit activity, and not to stimulate it or modify it. And yet, as an unexpected reaction to this inhibitive effect, it is found to exercise a positive action of the highest importance over the religious and moral nature of the individual (EF:348).

We might first recall, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970, 1966) has insisted over the years, that the negative is crucial to human symbolicity. For only through the negative, in the sense of moral commands, is man moralized. Thus, man becomes a moral personality through the negative, through abstention and purification. For the suffering inherent in the negative thrust means that the individual rises above the profane; in other words, culture moralizes nature.

> The positive cult is possible only when a man is trained to renouncement, to abnegation, to detachment from self, and consequently to suffering.... It is necessary that he train himself, and it is to this that the ascetic practices tend. So the suffering which they impose is not arbitrary and sterile cruelty; it is a necessary school.... Suffering is the sign that certain of the bonds attaching him to his profane environment are broken; so it testifies that he is partially freed from the environment and, consequently, it is justly considered the instrument of deliverance.... He is stronger than nature because he makes it subside (EF:355).

Indeed, the passage from the profane to the sacred requires a whole series of rites which serve to transform and liberate the moral subject. Van Gennep clearly recognized this with his distinctions between rites of separation (pre-liminal), transition (liminal), and incorporation (post-liminal). And Durkheim, in his discussion of the sacral origins of property, for instance, provided many insights into the symbolic significance of crossing thresholds and boundaries.

> In fact, owing to the barrier which separates the sacred from the profane, a man cannot enter into intimate relations with sacred things except after ridding himself of all that is profane in him. He cannot lead a religious life of even a slight intensity unless he commences by withdrawing more or less completely from the temporal life. So the negative cult is in one sense a means in view of an end: it is a condition of access to the positive cult. It does not confine itself to protecting sacred beings from vulgar contact; it acts upon the worshipper himself and modifies his condition positively. The man who has submitted himself to its prescribed interdictions is not the same afterwards as he was before. Before, he he was an ordinary being who, for this reason, had to keep at a distance from the religious forces. Afterwards, he is on a more equal footing with them; he has approached the sacred by the very act of leav-

ing the profane; he has purified and sanctified him-
self by the very act of debasing himself from the
base and trivial matters that debased his nature. So
the rites confer efficient powers just as well as the
positive ones; the first, like the second, can serve
to elevate the religious tone of the individual....
No one can engage in a religious ceremony of any im-
portance without first submitting himself to a sort
of preliminary initiation which introduces him pro-
gressively into the sacred world. Unctions, lustra-
tions, benedictions or any essentially positive oper-
ation may be used for this purpose; but the same re-
sult may be attained by means of fasts and vigils or
retreat and silence, that is to say, by ritual abstin-
ences which are nothing more than certain interdictions
put in practice (EF:348).

Indeed, noting that "asceticism ... is an integral part of

human culture" (EF:356), Durkheim emphasized the universality

of the separation phase as preparatory to the reunification

phase.

There is no interdict, the observance of which does
not have an ascetic character to a certain degree....
In order to have real asceticism, it is sufficient
for these practices to develop in such a way as to
become the basis of a veritable scheme of life. Norm-
ally the negative cult serves only as an introduction
and preparation for the positive cult (EF:350).

Finally, we might recall, as Nisbet (1974) reminds us, that

Durkheim considered ascetic suffering as good, for it creates

self-discipline, it moralizes the ego. It implies a reorder-

ing of the world, the overcoming of nature by culture, a re-

establishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great

"Yea and Nay" of all things. And as fasting increases our

hunger for the "Bread of Life," so privation, abstinence,

and suffering increases the tension to consummate the posi-

tive pole of sociocultural life.

... abstinences and privations do not come without
suffering. We hold to the profane world by all the
fibers of our flesh; our senses attach us to it;
our life depends upon it. It is not merely the na-
tural theater of our activity; it penetrates us from
every side; it is a part of ourselves. So we cannot
detach ourselves from it without doing violence to
our nature and without painfully wounding our in-
stincts. In other words, the negative cult cannot
develop without causing suffering. Pain is one of
its necessary conditions (EF:351).

Let us next briefly explore the significance of the "liminal" period (see V. Turner, 1967 especially), seen for example in initiation ceremonies, in which a person's change in social status is portrayed and experienced as a change in being. These are critical transformation points, "watershed moments," when there are "changes of slope" (as Burke suggests) in one's life trajectory. Here, the young initiates are forced to become veritable ascetics for a short while-- separated from society, they are forced to undergo various preparatory privations, abstentions, sufferings.

> This is what generally takes place at certain critical periods when, for a relatively short time, it is necessary to bring about a grave change of condition in a subject. Then, in order to introduce him more rapidly into the circle of sacred things with which he must be put into contact he is separated violently from the profane world; but this does not come without abstinences, and an exceptional recrudescence of the system of interdicts. Now this is just what happens in Australia at the moment of initiation. In order to transform youth into men, it is necessary to make them live the life of a veritable ascetic. Mrs. Parker very justly calls them the monks of Baime (EF: 351).

Often this passage from a profane to a sacred status, that is initation into the constitutive cultural mysteries and ranks (see the works of Kenneth Burke), is conceived of as a metamorphosis, a transformation totius substantiae.

> ... initiation is a long series of ceremonies with the the object of introducing the young man into the religious life: for the first time, he leaves the purely profane world where he passed his first infancy, and enters into the world of sacred things. Now this change of state is thought of, not as a simple and regular development of pre-existent germs, but as a transformation totius substantiae, of the whole being. It is said that at this moment the young man dies, that the person that he was ceases to exist, and that another is instantly substituted for it. He is reborn under a new form. Appropriate ceremonies are felt to bring about this death and rebirth.... Does this not prove that between the profane being which he was and the religious being which he becomes, there is a break of continuity (EF:54)?

Later in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim explored some of the specific privations required of the initiate in various Australian societies.

> The neophyte is submitted to a great variety of negative rites. He must withdraw from the society in which his existence has been oassed up until then, and from almost all human society. Not only is it forbidden for him to see women and unitiated persons, but he also goes to live in the brush, far from his fellows, under the direction of some old men, who serve him as godfathers. So very true it is that the forest is considered his natural environment, that in a certain number of tribes, the word with which the initiation is designated signifies "that which is from the forest."

> For this same reason, he is frequently decorated with leaves during the ceremonies at which he assists. In this way he passes long months, interspersed from time to time with rites in which he must take a part. This time is a period of all sorts of abstinences for him. A multitude of foods are forbidden him ... he is allowed only that quantity of food which is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of life; he is even sometimes bound to a rigorous fast, or must eat impure foods. When he eats, he must not touch the food with his hands. In some cases, he must go beg for his food. Likewise, he sleeps only as much as is indispensable. He must abstain from talking ... it is by signs that he makes known his needs. He must not wash; sometimes he must not move. He remains stretched out upon the earth, immobile, and without clothing of any sort (EF: 348).

Now, clearly one recurrent image for portraying this change of status and being is the cycle of death and rebirth. As Kenneth Burke says, "The symbolic slaying of an old self is complemented by the emergence of a new self" (1973:39). Very often this death to society, which is as Durkheim observed (eg. EF:55), the extreme logical expression of the ascetic thrust, is signified by withdrawl, segregation, by fasting, going naked, and so forth; in short, by separation from all those activities and ties which constitute the daily ground of prior social and cultural experience.

> Now the result of the numerous interdictions is to bring about a radical change of condition for the initiate. Before the initiation, he lived with the women; he was excluded from the cult. After it, he is admitted to the society of men; he takes part in

the rites, and has acquired a sacred character. The
metamorphosis is so complete that it is sometimes re-
presented as a second birth. They imagine that the
profane person, who was the young man up until then,
has died and been carried away by the god of the ini-
tiation ... and that quite another individual has ta-
ken the place of the one that no longer is. So here
we find the very heart of the positive effects of
which negative rites are capable (EF:349-50).

Now, the very act of withdrawal from all these social
forms and statuses means that the initiate becomes suspend-
ed in a "liminal" stage, as Turner (1967) after Van Gennep
calls it, which is "betwixt and between." Here, the initia-
tes are conceived of as neither children nor adults, neither
living nor dead, and both living and dead, when seen from
another aspect, as Turner notes. Their condition is one of
ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the normal cate-
gories. Withdrawing from the ordered social and cultural
microcosm of the village, the initiate returns to that un-
differentiated pole of experience--the forest, where he
sheds his clothes, the marks of his social status, and co-
vers himself with leaves. Quoting Jacob Boehme's aphorism
that "In Yea and Nay all things consist," Turner observes:

Liminality may be regarded as the Nay to all posi-
tive structural assertions, but as in some sense the
source of them all, and, more than that, as a realm
of pure possibility whence novel configurations of
ideas and relations may arise (Turner, 1967: 97).

Noting Mary Douglas's (1966) suggestion that "the unclear
is the unclean," Turner observes that the initiates "... as
a transitional being are considered particularly polluting,
since they are neither one thing or another, or maybe both"
(1967:97). Only the old men, who are, so to speak, "inocu-
lated" against them because of their own store of sacredness,
are allowed commerce with these ambiguously sacred and pro-
fane transitional beings.

We are not dealing with structural contradictions
when we discuss liminality, but with the essentially
unstructured (which is at once destructured and pre-
structured) and often the people themselves see this
in terms of bringing neophytes into close connection

with the deity or with superhuman power, with what is, in fact, often regarded as the unbounded, the infinite, the limitless. Since neophytes are not only structural- ly invisible (though physically visible), and ritually polluting, they are very commonly secluded ... from the realm of culturally defined and ordered states and sta- tuses (1967:98).

We shall briefly explore Durkheim's own perceptions of the inherent ambiguity of sacred forces in the following section.

Since sex distinctions are so important in primitive societies, during the liminal period the initiate is portray- ed as sexless, or as androgynous. Turner observes:

... in liminal situations (in kinship dominated socie- ties) neophytes are sometimes ... symbolically repre- sented as neither being male nor female. They are sym- bolically either sexless or bisexual, and may be re- garded as a kind of human prima materia--as undiffer- entiated raw material. [For example, in Plato's Sympo- sium] the first humans were androgynes. If the liminal period is seen as an interstructural phase in social dynamics, the symbolism both of androgyny and sexless- ness immediately becomes intelligible in sociological terms without the need to import psychological (espe- cially depth-psychological) explanations. Since sex distinctions are important components of structural status, in a structureless realm they do not apply (1967:98-99).

Further, since property is an essential component of the norm- al social order, the transitional beings must cast away their possessions. Again, for those who would be reborn in a new faith, all religions require a special form of institutiona- lized poverty, which signifies disengagement from the things of this world. Turner notes:

A further structurally negative characteristic of transitional beings is that they have nothing. They have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellows. Rights over proper- ty, goods, and services inhere in positions in the politico-jural structure. Since they do not occupy such positions, neophytes exercise no such rights (1967:98).

The symbolic analogues of the liminal period, in which retreat is preparatory to return (ala Toynbee), are often bor- rowed from basic organic processes. Turner observes:

> ... certain liminal processes are regarded as analo-
> gous to those of gestation, partuition, and suckling.
> Undoing, dissolution, decomposition, are accompanied
> by processes of growth, transformation, and the re-
> formulation of old elements into new patterns (1967:
> 99).

Further, in representations of the ambiguous nature of the
transitional period, Turner notes how the principle of sym-
bolic economy utilizes symbols carrying simultaneously sev-
eral meanings. The greater the multiplicity of meanings, the
greater the symbolic load and potency; thus, multivalent sym-
bols are central to representations in this phase.

> ... logically antithetical processes of death and
> growth may be represented by the same tokens, for
> example, by huts and tunnels that are at once tombs
> and wombs, by lunar symbolism (for the same moon
> waxes and wanes), by snake symbolism (for the snake
> appears to die, only to shed its old skin and reap-
> pear), by the bear (for the bear "dies" in autumn
> and is "reborn" in the spring), by nakedness (which
> is at once the mark of a newborn infant and a corp-
> se prepared for burial), and by innumerable other
> symbolic formations and actions. This coincidence
> of opposite processes and notions in a single repre-
> sentation characterizes the peculiar unity of the
> liminal: that which is neither this nor that, and
> yet is both (1967:99).

Thus, we see that in the "liminal" period, by its nega-
tive thrust, the "wayfarer" is returned to the primal undif-
ferentiated ground of being, what Burke (1966:46) notes has
been called, in negative theology, the Urground, or as Boeh-
me termed it, the Unground. Here contact is reestablished
with the primal unity, the time before distinction and form
emerged. Here men reimmerse themselves in the original gen-
erative sources from which men were originally shaped, the
primal clay. Again and again (eg. Genesis), we see religions
portraying the time before time as formlessness, darkness,
a primordial ocean, and so on, in which there is a creation
of cosmos from chaos. The primordial act of creation is thus
also a separation--the light from darkness, the waters above
from the waters below, which signals the emergence of form
and finiteness. Durkheim himself observed the importance of
this aspect of symbolic process in many primitive creation

myths.

> ... other Australian societies place at the begin-
> ning of humanity either strange animals from which
> men were descended in some unknown way, or mixed
> beings, half-way between the two kingdoms, or else
> unformed creatures, hardly representable, deprived
> of all determined organs, and even of all definite
> members, and the different parts of whose bodies
> were hardly outlined. Mythical powers, sometimes
> conceived under the form of animals, then interven-
> ed and made men out of these ambiguous and innumer-
> able beings which Spencer and Gillen say represent
> "stages in the transformation of animals and plants
> into human beings." These transformations are repre-
> sented to us under the form of violent and, as it
> were, surgical operations. It is under the blow of
> an axe or, if the operator is a bird, blows of the
> beak, that the human individual was carved out of
> this shapeless mass, his mouth opened and his nos-
> trils pierced. Analogous legends are found in Amer-
> ica, except that owing to the more highly developed
> mentality of these peoples, the representations which
> they employ do not contain confusions so troublesome
> for the mind. Sometimes it is a legendary personage
> who, by the act of his power, metamorphosed the ani-
> mal who gives its name to the clan into a man. Some-
> times the myth attempts to explain how, by a series
> of merely human events and a sort of spontaneous evo-
> lution, the animal transforms himself little by lit-
> tle, and finally took on a human form (EF:157-8).

Finally, Turner notes how, as the initiation progres-
ses from the negative to positive aspects and the liminal
being is given greater form, the initiate is then introduced
to the esoteric mysteries, the constitutive gnosis of the
cult. Indeed, it is the communication of these sacra which
confers form on the moral subject.

> The arcane knowledge or gnosis obtained in the limi-
> nal period is felt to change the inmost nature of
> the neophyte, impressing him as a seal impresses wax,
> with the characteristics of his new state. It is not
> a mere acquisition of knowledge, but a change in being.
> ... Communication of the sacra is the heart of the
> liminal matter (1967:102).

Indeed, as with Parsons' 1973 suggestions that Durkheim came
to conceive the significance of the generic symbolic religious
process as equivalent to social DNA, so too does Turner con-
sider the communication of these constitutive sacral symbols
as the foundation of the entire culture.

> The central cluster of non-logical <u>sacra</u> is then the
> symbolic template of the whole system of beliefs and
> values in a given culture, its archetypal paradigm
> and ultimate measure.... The term archetype denotes
> in Greek a master stamp or impress, and these <u>sacra</u>,
> presented with numinous simplicity, stamp into neo-
> phytes the basic assumptions of their culture....
> The communication of <u>sacra</u> both teaches the neophytes
> how to think with some degree of abstraction about
> their cultural milieu and gives them ultimate stan-
> dards of reference. At the same time, it is believed
> to change their nature, transform them from one kind
> of human being into another. It intimately unites man
> and office. But for a variable while, there was an
> uncommitted man, an individual rather than a sacral
> <u>persona</u>, in a sacred community of individuals (1967:
> 108).

Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's notion of the ambi-
guity of sacredness.

c. The <u>Ambiguity</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Notion</u> <u>of</u> <u>Sacredness</u>

Not only was Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy not
a rigid opposition, but we should also note that Durkheim dis-
tinguished between various forms of sacredness itself, the
prime constitutive pole of sociocultural life and phenomeno-
logical action. Moreover, Durkheim noted how these subdivi-
sions of the sacred pole are not merely antagonistic but,
given certain conditions, may be transformed one into the
other. Now, perhaps Rudolf Otto's <u>Idea</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Holy</u> is the
most famous expression of the duality of the "numinous."
Like Otto, Durkheim noted that the sacred simultaneously at-
tracts and repels us; that we may simultaneously entertain
two opposed attitudes toward it--horror and respect, awe and
fascination. Such ambivalent sentiments toward the pure and
the impure are directed toward those aspects of life endowed
with a special potency, with "charisma" as Weber said. As
Kenneth Burke notes, "<u>Sacer</u> might be more accurately trans-
lated as "untouchable," since the extremely good, the extrem-
ely bad, and the extremely powerful are equally "untouchable"
(1973:55). In short, Durkheim observed that there were two
poles within the sacred segment of culture; and he further

noted that the "sacredly inauspicious", the impure, may be transformed into the pure. When there is a passage from negative to positive status by situational changes, their definitions are transformed by their different meanings in different contexts. As Mary Douglas observes:

> Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides the materials of pattern. Order implies restriction ... so disorder by implication is unlimited ... its potential for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though we seek to create order, we do not simply condemn disorder. We recognize that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that it has potentiality. It symbolizes both danger and power. Ritual recognizes the potency of disorder (1966:94).

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's recognition of this important insight, developed most fully by the British anthropologists of religion and ritual, that "formlessness is credited with powers, some dangerous, some good," and Van Gennep's insight that "danger lies in marginal states."

First, it should be recalled that Durkheim's distinction between the sacredly inauspicious and the sacredly auspicious was situationally defined, that is, these two aspects of the sacred pole of symbolic life depended on the specific definition of the situation. For example, only under certain circumstances may a man ingest the totemic animal; without a whole series of preparations, it becomes sacrilege and confers guilt instead of grace. It is a profanation of the sacred when performed "out of turn."

> Owing to the contagiousness inherent in all that is sacred, a profane being cannot violate an interdict without having the religious force, to which he has upduly approached, extend itself over him and establish its empire over him. But, as there is an antagonism between them, he becomes dependent upon a hostile power, whose hostility cannot fail to manifest itself in the form of violent reactions which destroy him. This is why sickness or death are considered the natural consequences of transgressions of this sort; and they are consequences which are believed to come by themselves, by a sort of physical necessity. The guilty man feels himself attacked by a force which dominates him and against which he is powerless. Has he eaten the totemic animal? Then he feels it penetrating him and gnawing at his vitals; he lies down on the ground and awaits death (EF:360).

Indeed, Durkheim goes on to remark that "Every profanation
implies a consecration":

> ... but one which is dreadful, both for the subject
> consecrated and for those who approach him. It is
> the consequences of this consecration which sanc-
> tion, in part, the interdict (EF:360).

And Durkheim asks us: "Does not every consecration by means
of annointing or washing consist in transferring into a pro-
fane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF:362)?

Now, Durkheim repeatedly gave Robertson Smith credit here
for having been one of the first to recognize the inherent am-
biguity of the notion of sacredness (see, however, Evans-Pritch-
ard, 1965:51-2). This crucial duality or multivalency of sa-
cral energies raises the problem of situational shifts, com-
plex inversions, and transformations of symbolic equations.

> One of the greatest services which Robertson Smith
> has rendered to the science of religions is to have
> pointed out the ambiguity of the notion of sacredness.
> Religious forces are of two sorts. Some are benefi-
> cent guardians of the physical and moral order, dis-
> pensers of life and health and all the qualities
> which men esteem: this is the case with the totemic
> principle, spread out in the whole species, the my-
> thical ancestor, the animal-protector, the civili-
> zing heroes, and the tutelar gods of every kind and
> degree. It matters little whether they are conceived
> as distinct personalities or as diffused energies;
> under either form they fulfill the same function and
> affect the minds of the believers in the same way: the
> respect which they inspire is mixed with love and gra-
> titude. The things and the persons which are normally
> connected with them participate in the same sentiments
> and the same character: these are the holy things and
> persons. Such are the spots consecrated to the cult,
> the objects which serve in the regular rites, the
> priests, the ascetics, etc.
> On the other hand, there are evil and impure powers,
> productive of disorders, causes of death and sickness,
> instigators of sacrilege. The only sentiments which
> men have for them are a fear into which horror gener-
> ally enters. Such are the forces upon which and by
> which the sorcerer acts, those which arise from corp-
> ses or menstrual blood, those freed by every portion
> of sacred things, etc. The spirits of the dead and
> malign genii of every sort are their personified forms.
> Between these two categories of forces and beings, the
> contrast is as complete and even goes into the most
> radical antagonism. The good and the salutary powers

> repel to a distance these others which deny and con-
> tradict them. Therefore the former are forbidden to
> the latter. Any contact between them is considered
> the worst of profanations. This is the typical form
> of those interdicts between sacred things of differ-
> ent species (EF:455-6).

Specifically, Durkheim cited the following illustrations of this principle of the multivalence or ambivalence of sacral energies:

> Women during menstruation, and especially at its be-
> ginning are impure; so at this moment they are rigor-
> ously sequestered; men have no relations with them.
> Bull roarers and churingas never come near a dead man.
> A sacrilegious person is excluded from the society of
> the faithful; access to the cult is forbidden him.
> Thus, the whole religious life gravitates about two
> contrary poles between which there is the same opposi-
> tion as between the pure and the impure, the saint
> and the sacrilegious, the divine and the diabolic
> (EF:455-6).

In addition, Durkheim noted how the representations of sacred forces combine the "divine and the diabolic" in the same moral universe.

> There is no physical or moral ugliness, there are no
> vices or evils which do not have a special divinity.
> There are gods of theft and trickery, of lust and war,
> of sickness and of death. Christianity itself ... has
> been obliged to give the spirit of evil a place in its
> mythology. Satan is an essential piece of the Christ-
> ian system; even if he is an impure being, he is not
> a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and sub-
> ordinated, it is true, but nevertheless endowed with
> extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at
> least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignor-
> ing the real society and making abstractions of it, is
> in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the
> most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found
> there, and if in the majority of cases we see the good
> victorious over the evil, life over death, the powers
> of light over the powers of darkness, it is because
> reality is not otherwise. If the relations between
> these two forces were reversed, life would be impos-
> sible; but as a matter of fact, it maintains itself
> and even tends to develop (EF:468).

Now, Durkheim proceeded to complicate the matter even further by noting that instead of a simple dichotomization between these two inverted halves of the religious life, there is actually a close inner relationship.

But while these two aspects of the religious life op-
pose one another, there is a close kinship between
them. In the first place, both have the same relation-
ship towards profane beings: these must abstain from
all contact with impure beings, just as from the most
holy things. The former are no less forbidden than the
latter: they are withdrawn from circulation alike. This
shows that they too are sacred. Of course, the senti-
ments inspired by the two are not identical: respect
is one thing, disgust and horror another. Yet, if the
the gestures are to be the same in both cases, the sen-
timents expressed must not differ in nature. And, in
fact, there is a horror of religious respect, especial-
ly when it is very intense, while the fear inspired by
malign powers is generally not without a certain rever-
ential character. The shades by which these two atti-
tudes are differentiated are even so slight sometimes
that it is not always easy to say which state of mind
the believers actually happen to be in. Among certain
Semitic peoples, pork was forbidden, but it was not al-
ways known exactly whether this was because it was a
pure or an impure thing, and the same may be said of a
very large number of alimentary interdictions (EF:456-7).

Sometimes this inner kinship between the dangerously sacred

and the auspiciously sacred is revealed by the transforma-

tion of one into another through changes in the definition

of the situation.

But there is more to said; it frequently happens that
an impure thing or an evil power becomes a holy thing
or a guardian power, without changing its nature,
through a simple modification of external circumstan-
ces. We have seen how the soul of a dead man, which is
a dreadful principle at first, is transformed into a
protecting genius as soon as the mourning is finished.
Likewise, the corpse, which begins by inspiring terror
and aversion, is later regarded as a venerated relic:
funeral anthropagy, which is frequently practicied in
the Australian societies, is a proof of this transform-
ation. The totemic animal is the pre-eminently sacred
being; but for him who eats its flesh upduly, is a case
of death (EF:457).

Now, since the relationship between the symbol and the

structure of a situation may shift, so too may the meaning

of its positive or negative sacredness. For example, as we

have seen, to partake of the totemic animal, as today to eat

the eucharistic host, without the proper preparations and

special circumstances, almost necessarily implies sacrilege.

Indeed, the passage from sacrilege to sacredness depends

largely upon these inner symbolic transformations.

> In a general way, the sacrilegious person is merely
> a profane one who has been infected with a benevolent
> religious force. This changes its nature in changing
> its habitat; it defiles rather than sanctifies. The
> blood issuing from the genital organs of a woman,
> though it is evidently as impure as that of menstru-
> ation, is frequently used as a remedy against sick-
> ness. The victim involved in expiatory sacrifices is
> charged with impurities, for which they have concen-
> trated upon it the sins which were to be expiated.
> Yet, after it has been slaughtered, its flesh and
> blood are employed for the most pious uses. [Footnote:
> Among the Hebrews, for example, they sprinkled the al-
> tar with the blood of the expiatory victim; they burn-
> ed the flesh and used products of this combustion to
> make water of purification]. On the contrary, though
> the communion is generally a religious operation whose
> normal function is to consecrate, it sometimes pro-
> duces the effects of a sacrilege. In certain cases,
> the persons who have communicated are forced to flee
> from one another as from men infected with a plague.
> One would say that they have become a source of dan-
> gerous contamination for one another: the sacred bond
> which unites them also separates them (EF:457).

Durkheim offers the following cogent summary of his insight
into the ambiguity of the sacred:

> So the pure and the impure are not two separate clas-
> ses, but two varieties of the same class, which in-
> cludes all sacred things. There are two sorts of sa-
> credness, the propitious and the unpropitious, and
> not only is there no break in continuity between
> these two opposed forms, but also one object may
> pass from the one to the other without changing its
> nature. The pure is made out of the impure, and reci-
> procally. It is in the possibility of these transmu-
> tations that the ambiguity of the sacred consists *
> (EF:458).

Finally, Durkheim asks: How is it that the powers of
evil have the same intensity and contagiousness as the sacred?
Criticizing Robertson Smith's non-acknowledgement of these in-
ner transmutations, Durkheim suggests that the key to these
inner transformations may be found in the definitional se-
quence with which they enter into generic sociocultural pro-
cess. While we need not follow, or even accredit, all the
twists and turns of his argument, Durkheim was clearly aware
that the sequence, what we might even call the musical pat-

tern (see Levi-Strauss, 1969), of symbolic ritual process is most complex, in which a symbol for one pole may substitute for the other, and the "pure may contaminate while the impure sometimes serves to sanctify" (EF:458). Basically, Durkheim argued from his sociological position that the direction and sequence of religious force may be inverted depending upon the sociocultural circumstances, from something being impure to becoming an instrument of purification.

> ... the sanctity of a thing is due to the collective sentiment of which it is the object. If, in violation of the interdicts which isolate it, it comes in contact with a profane person, then this same sentiment will spread contagiously to this latter and imprint a special character upon him. But in spreading, it comes into a very different state from the one it was in first. Offended and irritated by the profanation implied in this abusive and unnatural extension, it becomes aggressive and inclined to destructive violences: it tends to avenge itself for the offense suffered. Therefore, the infected subject seems to be filled with a mighty and harmful force which menaces all that approaches him; it is as though he were marked with a stain or blemish. Yet the cause of this blemish is the same psychic state which, in other circumstances, consecrates and sanctifies. But if the anger thus aroused is satisfied by an expiatory rite, it subsides, alleviated; the offended sentiment is appeased and returns to its original state. So it acts once more as it acted in the beginning; instead of contaminating, it sanctifies. As it continues to infect the object to which it is attached, this could never become profane and religiously indifferent again. But the direction of the religious force with which it seems to be filled is inverted: from being impure, it has become pure and and instrument of purification (EF:460).

We should not be surprised that, in the final analysis, Durkheim correlated these two different faces of the sacred with two different aspects of collective well-being and disharmony.

> ... the two poles of the religious life correspond to the two opposed states through which all social life passes. Between the propitiously sacred and the unpropitiously sacred there is the same contrast as between the states of collective well-being and ill-being. But since both are equally collective, there is, between the mythological constructions symbolizing them, an intimate kinship of nature. The sentiments held in common vary from extreme dejection to extreme joy, from painful irritation to ecstatic enthusiasm; but, in any case,

there is a communion of minds and a mutual comfort
resulting from this communion. The fundamental pro-
cess is always the same; only the circumstances col-
or it differently. So, at bottom, <u>it is</u> <u>the</u> <u>unity</u> <u>and</u>
<u>the</u> <u>diversity</u> <u>of</u> <u>social</u> <u>life</u> <u>which</u> <u>make</u> <u>the</u> <u>simultan-</u>
<u>eous</u> <u>unity</u> <u>and</u> <u>diversity</u> <u>of</u> <u>sacred</u> <u>beings</u> <u>and</u> <u>things</u>*
(EF:460).

Let us now finally turn to consider the last stage of gener-
ic symbolic process--namely, the reunification of the com-
pounding series of polarities through ritual transformation
of opposites into a new and vital synthesis--in terms of
Durkheim's description of oblation and totemic commensal
sacrifice.

d. The <u>Positive</u> <u>Cult</u>: <u>Oblation</u> <u>and</u> <u>Sacrificial</u> <u>Communion</u>

The final phase of generic symbolic process generally
centers on rituals which reconcile opposites, which transform
diversity into unity, which restore harmony and wholeness to
divided and suffering consciences and consciousnesses. Release
and liberation from negative being is achieved through the
symbolic mechanism of victimage, which leads to collective
reunion. These symbolic transformations often center around
mythic or ancestral commemorations, representations of ideal
models of perfection and aspiration, oblations and sacrifi-
cial offerings, and a kind of sacred commensality which sig-
nifies some basic kind of consubstantiality. Durkheim noted:

In the form which it takes when fully constituted,
a sacrifice is composed of two essential elements:
an act of communion and an act of oblation. The wor-
shipper communes with his god by taking in a sacred
food, and at the same time he makes an offering to
his god (EF:384).

Now, as we have seen, ascetic separation is always the
prelude to mystical reunion, for these are best viewed as sim-
ply two basic phases of the same overall symbolic process.
Negative or ascetic rites have always served to separate, to
prepare the moral subject for the coming metamorphosis. As
such, they signify the acknowledgement of guilt, of separa-
tion, of privation, which intensifies the tension between the

two poles of life, and thus, which helps propel the to-be reborn subject forward. Without the positive pole, there is no goal, no viable purpose or meaning to the trials of ascetic preparation. This is precisely the cause of the spiritual void so deeply felt in all cultures touched today by ascetic Protestantism. We are left hanging in moral space, as the goal drops out and Utilitarian logics alone remain. These are truly post-traditional cultures, "beyond belief," beyond hope. But Durkheim clearly noted:

> If it (the negative cult) orders the worshipper to flee from the profane world, it is to bring him nearer to the sacred world. Men have never thought that their duties toward religious forces might have been reduced to a simple abstinence from all commerce; they have always believed that they upheld positive and bilateral relations with them (EF:366).

Further, the shedding of the old self is a prerequisite to rebirth. Combining these factors, as Kenneth Burke has observed, we see that the "principle of perfection" (akin to the self-equilibrativeness presumed by structuralists) inherent in symbolic systems necessitates a sacrificial victim on which to displace the collectively incurred guilt. As Burke proposes (eg.1966, 1970, 1973), victimage is expiatory; Christianity, of course, has developed this generic necessity to the highest degree with the representation of Christ as the "Perfect Victim." Burke says: "If action is to be our key term, then drama, if drama, then conflict, if conflict, then victimage" (1966:545). In other words, the collective release provided by sacrificial victimage generally serves as a prelude to some renewed form of communion and freedom. In its essential form this is the dramatic or dialectical structure of human symbolic action.

Now, it is precisely the mediatory function of the sacrificial oblation as a bridge between separated spheres of being which is the final prerequisite for the transformation of the profane into the sacred. Sacrificial victimage is the vehicle for the extension of the moral bond. For example, after reviewing various ceremonies of the Australian

aborigines such as scattering of a certain type of sacred dust, of letting blood flow from the veins directly onto sacred sites, and so forth, Durkheim noted the importance of these oblations or sacrificial offerings to the sacred forces:

> The interest of this system of rites lies in the fact that in them we find, in the most elementary form actually known, all the essential principles of a great religious institution which was destined to become one of the foundation stones of the positive cult in the superior religions: this is the institution of sacrifice (EF:377).

Indeed, we know what importance the Durkheimians placed upon the institution of sacrifice by Hubert and Mauss's great monograph on the subject (1964).

Here, Durkheim again paid homage to what he called Robertson Smith's revolution in understanding the nature of sacrifice (see however Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Throughout The Elementary Forms Durkheim kept up a running conversation, partly laudatory and partly critical, with Smith's work.

> We know what a revolution the work of Robertson Smith brought about in the traditional theory of sacrifice. Before him, sacrifice was regarded as a sort of tribute or homage, either obligatory or optional, analogous to that which subjects owe to their princes. Robertson Smith was the first to remark that this classic explanation did not account for two essential characteristics of the rite. In the first place, it is a repast: its substance is food. Secondly, it is a repast in which the worshippers who offer it take part, along with the god to whom it is offered. Certain parts of the victim are reserved for the divinity; others are attributed to the sacrificers, who consume them.... Now, in a multitude of societies, meals taken in common are believed to create a bond of artificial kinship betwen those who assist at them. In fact, relatives are people who are naturally made of the same flesh and blood. But food is constantly remaking the substance of the organism. So a common food may produce the same effects as a common origin. Acccording to Smith, sacrificial banquets have the object of making the worshipper and his god communicate in the same flesh, in order to form a bond of kinship between them. From this point of view, sacrifice takes on a wholly new aspect. Its essential element is no longer the act of renouncement which the word sacrifice ordinarily expresses; before all, it is an act of alimentary communion (EF:377-78).

But Durkheim, proceeding to criticize Smith on various points,
suggested that, for example, the oblations Australian abori-
gines offered up were part of the complex symbolic web of re-
ciprocity which serve to bond together tribes and their gods.
The seasonal cycle of death and rebirth of flora and fauna
corresponded to a moral cycle of a crisis of confidence and
rebirth of hope in men in the viability of the relationship
between gods and men.

> ... Vegetation dies every year; will it be reborn?
> Animal species tend to become extinguished by the
> effect of natural and violent death; will they be
> renewed at such a time, and in such a way   as is
> proper? Above all, the rain is capricious; there
> are long periods during which it seems to have dis-
> appeared forever. These periodical variations of na-
> ture bear witness to the fact that at the the cor-
> responding periods, the sacred beings upon whom the
> plants, animals, rain, etc. depend are themselves
> passing through grave crisis; so they, too, have
> their periods of giving way. But men could not re-
> gard these spectacles as indifferent spectators.
> If he is to live, the universal life must continue,
> and consequently the gods must not die. So he seeks
> to sustain and aid them; for this, he puts at their
> service whatever forces he has at his disposition,
> and mobilizes them for this purpose. The blood flow-
> ing in his veins has fecundating virtues; he pours
> it forth. From the sacred rocks possessed by his
> clans he takes those germs of life which lie dormant
> there, and scatters them into space. In a word, he
> makes oblations. The external and physical crises,
> moreover, duplicate internal and mental crises which
> tend toward the same result. Sacred beings exist only
> when they are represented as such in the mind. When
> we cease to believe in them, it is as though they
> did not exist (EF:386).

Pursuing the argument with Smith, Durkheim argued that
the reciprocity implied in the continued viability of both
gods and human culture demanded that men reverse the flow
of energy, and periodically return some of the sacred sub-
stance back to the original source from which it was first
received. To clarify this reverse flow of energy, Durkheim
suggested:

> Let us return to the first act of the Intichuma, to
> the rites destined to assure the fecundity of the ani-
> mal or vegetable species which serves the clan as totem.

> This species is the preeminently sacred thing; in it
> is incarnated that we have been able to call, by meta-
> phor, the totemic divinity. Yet we have seen that to
> perpetuate itself it has the need of the aid of men.
> It is they who disperse the life of the new generation
> each year; without them, it would never be born. If
> they stopped celebrating the Intichuma, the sacred be-
> ings would disappear from the face of the earth. So in
> one sense, it is from men that they get their existence;
> yet in another way, it is from them that men get theirs,
> for after they have once arrived at maturity, it is from
> them that men acquire the force needed to support and re-
> pair their spiritual beings. Thus, we are able to say
> that men make their gods, or, at least, make them live;
> but at the same time, it is from them that they live
> themselves. So they are regularly guilty of the circle
> which, according to Smith, is implied in the very idea
> of a sacrificial tribute: they give to the sacred beings
> a little of what they receive from them, and they re-
> ceive from them all that they give (EF:382-3).

Indeed, so necessary and universal is this generic inner re-
ciprocal relationship between constitutive collective symbols
and group processes that Durkheim insists that oblation is
not a late product of civilization, but an original and con-
tinuing generic necessity.

> If the sacrificer immolates an animal, it is in order
> that the living principles within it may be disengaged
> from the organism and go to nourish the divinity. Like-
> wise, the grains of dust which the Australian detaches
> from the sacred rock are so many sacred principles which
> he scatters into space, so that they may go to animate
> the totemic species and assure its renewal. The gesture
> with which this scattering is made is also that which
> normally accompanies offerings.... We have seen that
> in order to have rain the Kaitish pour water over the
> altar, with the same end in view. The effusions of blood
> which are usual in a certain number of Intichuma are
> veritable oblations. Just as the Arunta or Dieri sprink-
> le the sacred rock or the totemic design with blood, so
> it frequently happens that in the more advanced cults,
> the blood of the sacrificed victim or of the worshipper
> himself is spilt before or upon the altar. In these ca-
> ses, it is given to the gods, of whom it is the prefer-
> red food; in Australia, it is given to the sacred spe-
> cies (EF:383).

Finally, let us turn our attention to commensal commun-
ion. Released from profane or negative status through the
mediation of the oblation, the worshippers then turn to cele-
brate their deliverance by replenishing their sacred energies.

By partaking of the sacred totem, they are mystically trans-
formed into a common flesh and spirit. Commensal celebration
creates a new moral bond; spiritual forces are renewed. The
cycle which we entered many pages ago is now completed.

> ... a whole series of preliminary operations, lustra-
> tions, unctions, prayers, etc., transform the animal
> to be immolated into a sacred thing, whose sacredness
> is subsequently transferred to the worshipper who eats
> it.... The alimentary communion is one of the essential
> elements of the sacrifice.... After the totemic animal
> has been killed, the Alatunja and the old men solemnly
> eat it. So they communicate with the sacred principle
> residing in it and they assimilate it. The only differ-
> ence we find here is that the animal is naturally sa-
> cred while it ordinarily acquires this character arti-
> ficially in the course of the sacrifice. Moreover, the
> object of this communion is manifest. Every member of
> a totemic clan contains a mystic substance within him
> which is the preeminent part of his being, for his soul
> is made out of it. From it came whatever powers he has
> and his social position, for it is this which makes him
> a person. So he has a vital interest in maintaining it
> intact, and in keeping it, as far as possible, in a
> state of perpetual youth. Unfortunately, all forces,
> even the most spiritual, are used up in the course of
> time if nothing comes to return to them the energy they
> lose through the normal working of things; there is a
> necessity of the first importance here which ... is the
> real reason for the positive cult. Therefore, the men
> of the totem cannot retain their position unless they
> periodically revivify the totemic principle which is
> in them; and as they represent this principle in the
> form of a vegetable or animal, it is to the correspond-
> ing animal or vegetable species that they go to demand
> the supplementary forces needed to renew this and reju-
> ventate it (EF:378-9).

The civil status and personhood are reaffirmed in the re-
creation of the moral subject through commensal celebration.
And, as we saw before, the rule governing such mystical re-
unification is "the part is equal to the whole."

> A man of the Kangaroo clan believes himself and feels
> himself a kangaroo; is by this quality that he defines
> himself; it is this which marks his place in the socie-
> ty. In order to keep it, he takes a little of the flesh
> of this same animal into his own body from time to time.
> A small bit is enough, owing to the rule: the part is
> equal to the whole (EF:379).

The cycle of rebirth completed, let us now rest.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EVOLUTIONARY TREE OF SOCIOCULTURAL LIFE

> The succession of societies cannot be represented
> as in a single plane; it resembles, rather, a tree
> with branches extending in diverging directions (R:19).

> The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's
> guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This meta-
> phor served as a logical axis for the classification
> of forms of human experience and entire social systems.
> The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant
> conditions of social and cultural life, while the bran-
> ches represented different types of society (LaCapra,
> 1972:12).

Preface. True to the nineteenth century tradition of thought,
Durkheim always married evolutionary perspectives with his so-
ciological framework. Biological and evolutionary metaphors
were "in the air," and found a ready adherent in the positiv-
ist Durkheim. Surely one of his key subterranean metaphors
was the "tree of social life." As Giddens (1971a,b,c, 1972a,b)
Lukes (1973), Nisbet (1974), and Hinkle (1976), among others,
have pointed out, evolutionism permeated all of Durkheim's
works. Lukes remarks that "It is interesting to note that Spen-
cer also often used the analogy of a tree to symbolize evolu-
tion" (1973:150,#49). Whether it be Durkheim's sociology of re-
ligion, knowledge, morality, law, etc., all his special studies
were articulated within a genetic and evolutionary framework.
Indeed, consideration of the progressive changes from primitive
to modern societies constituted both the departure and arri-
val points of Durkheim's sociology. It is important to emphasize
and explore the crucial role played by evolutionary images in
his sociological system, for Durkheim is still unfortunately
portrayed as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist searching for
the generic bases of social order and control. Careful analy-
sis of Durkheim's embrace of evolutionary thinking reveals the

need to distinguish between the following related, but sep-
arable, elements: his metaphor of the tree of sociocultural
life, his genetic approach and the importance of the primi-
tive sacral complex as the evolutionary womb of society and
culture, his methodological notion of a scale of progressive
evolutionary types, and his perceptions of general evolution-
ary processes seen, for example, in the "progressive division
of labor," the emergence of abstract, monotheistic religions,
and the growth of rational, universalizable thought. Here we
shall consider simply the substantive importance of Durkheim's
key evolutionary metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life.

As with most great thinkers, Durkheim's preoccupation
with progressive changes, especially on the world-historical
level, stemmed from deep concern and erudite reflection on
the basic forces transforming the society of his own day. In-
deed, as Durkheim himself indicated (eg. see "Les Principes
de 1789 et la sociologie," 1900, translated by Tiryakian, 1971,
and also in Bellah, 1973), one fruitful way of interpreting
the historical significance of his positivist sociology of
"moral facts" was as an attempt to institutionalize the cen-
tral values of the French Revolution. For decades after this
still-unresolved tempest, the contending forces continued their
bitter national fraticidal quarrels; foremost here were ques-
tions of the legitimate grounds of moral authority. Durkheim's
systematic study of the evolution of moral facts, and its ul-
timate pay-off--a positivist or "scientific" morality--served
as a powerful intellectual tool justifying the still-to-be in-
stitutionalized ideas of the French Revolution and the Franco-
Latin "Laic" Positivist Cultural Tradition. From his own spe-
cial world-historical perspective, Durkheim legitimized this
emerging morality as historically necessary. In short, Durk-
heim's life-work can be viewed as a profound attempt to con-
struct new bases of argument demonstrating the significance
and validity of these basic changes, and the emerging Positi-
vist morality.

I submit, therefore, that Durkheim was always centrally

concerned with societal, cultural, and personal evolution.
The transition from simple to complex societies, and the in-
dividual's changing position within that great historical
transformation, constituted one of the central axes of Durk-
heim's thought. As Benjamin Nelson (1969b,1972a) along with
Giddens, has rightly insisted, Durkheim's sociological out-
look was always "processual" through and through; that is,
he was centrally concerned with the prime constitutive and
transformative processes involved in basic world-historical
transformations, especially those on the road to modernity.
It is significant that Durkheim and Weber's macro-level con-
cerns converged on this point, for evolutionary thinking was
deeply embedded in their work.

Yet, the widely pervasive image of Durkheim as a "sta-
tic" thinker remains strong today. Why? An eye for irony would
help here, for the simple truth of the matter is this: he who
first helped rescue Durkheim also distorted his doctrine in
the very same process! I refer, of course, to Talcott Parsons
in his magisterial The Structure of Social Action. Recogni-
tion of Parsons' enormous influence in this regard is a pre-
requisite to understanding the curious fate of Durkheim's
doctrine in American sociology (see especially R. Hinkle,1960).
While Parsons must be granted his full due for the originality
and profundity of his heroic rescue of Durkheim from the igno-
minious clutches of the radical empiricists and reductionists,
nonetheless, Parsons must also assume responsibility for let-
ting his own drama shunt aside the real underlying evolution-
ary structure of Durkheim's system. Perhaps one of the first
keys to Parsons simultaneous "rescue" and subsequent distor-
tion emerges from the famous assertion early in his treatment
of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action: "Durkheim was
almost wholly concerned with ... "social statics." The prob-
lem of order is Durkheim's central problem from an early stage."
(1949:307). Although he admitted that Durkheim's first major
work, The Division of Labor in Society, was "ostensibly a
study of social differentiation," Parsons largely ignored his
crucial evolutionary matrix. In addition, Parsons generally

devalued the importance of The Division of Labor in Durkheim's
intellectual development; he especially slighted Durkheim's
theoretical insistence on the important role played by social
morphological changes underlying societal differentiation.
Parsons suggested that these factors merely represented "dead-
ends" in Durkheim's theoretical development. Similarly, Par-
sons largely ignored Durkheim's crucial underlying evolution-
ary perspective in his works dealing with the development of
religion, morality, law, logical thought, science, the family,
and so on. Parsons persisted throughout his discussion of the
rest of Durkheim's sociological work in portraying him as he
would have liked him to be--namely, an abstracted, static theo-
rist, perplexed by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma " and
searching, as Parsons himself did, for the generic bases of so-
cial order and control. I must insist, however, that real pro-
gress in understanding the potential significance of Durkheim's
work for the human sciences cannot come until this wholly mis-
leading image of Durkheim is finally set aside.

Recently, some perceptive observers have begun to raise
serious questions concerning the Parsonian orthodoxy on Durk-
heim's supposed aversion to change and historical thinking.
Anthony Giddens, for example, has pointedly and repeatedly
criticized Parsons on precisely this matter.

> Far from the "problem of order" having been "Durkheim's
> central problem from an early stage," it can perfectly
> well be said that it was not a problem for Durkheim at
> all. The central issue informing his writings was that
> of change ... he was preoccupied with the confrontation
> between the dissolving "traditional" and the emergent
> "modern" type (1972a:41).

Even the oblique refutation of Parsonian orthodoxy by one of
his own proteges, I mean Robert Bellah in his excellent arti-
cle "Durkheim and History" (1959), has not overcome the popu-
lar misportrayal of Durkheim as a static, abstracted theorist.
Nor has Parsons himself, even in his recent turn toward evo-
lutionary theory, yet given Durkheim his just due as one of
the great world-historical thinkers. And although Parsons re-
cently admitted (1973:157), in an isolated comment, that Durk-

heim must, indeed, he considered an evolutionary thinker, he
has as yet done little to restore Durkheim's name to the first
rank of world-historical thinkers, along with Weber and other
pioneers of modern social science.

A. The Tree of Sociocultural Life as a Metaphor of Multilineal
    Evolution

As we shall soon discover, one of the major underlying
reasons why Durkheim formulated this metaphor was to absolve
himself of the typical charges against the simple unilinear,
progressive evolutionary schemas characteristic of many nine-
teenth century thinkers. For example, Durkheim repeatedly criti-
cized Comte for treating the progressive evolution of "mankind-
in-general" as the subject matter of sociology (see especially
The Rules of Sociological Method). Indeed, one of Durkheim's
reasons behind his embrace of the metaphor of the evolutionary
tree of sociocultural life was to graphically portray the po-
tentially manifold lines take in societal evolution. The grow-
th of differentiated complexity was never simple nor uniform;
therefore, the image of the tree of social life was meant to
convey recognition of progressive as well as static or regres-
sive evolutionary lines, and as we shall soon see, of evolu-
tionary survivals as well as the leading edge of progressive
evolution. As always, the philosopher in Durkheim sought to
reconcile historical diversity with generic unity. Durkheim's
image of the manifold lines taken by general evolutionary pro-
cesses needs to be emphasized, I repeat, for, on the contrary,
even among those who grudgingly recognize Durkheim's evolution-
ism, many persist in portraying him as a rather typical, uni-
linear social evolutionist. While Durkheim took over the evo-
lutionism of the nineteenth century--the very leit-motif of
the time--he did so critically; and thus he must be ranked,
albeit tardily, as one of the pioneers of multilineal evolu-
tionary theory.

Although most readers, if not too deeply under Parsons
lingering spell, now recognize the crucial role of genetic-

evolutionary perspectives in Durkheim's work, until recently
one of his guiding metaphors remained submerged, largely hid-
den from public view. Among the few secondary interpreters
who must be given credit for having recognized the existence
of Durkheim's metaphor (eg. Alpert, 1939:197; J.A. Barnes,
1966:161; Wallwork, 1972:42; Lukes, 1973:149-50, 281 #27),
most neglected to develop its general significance within
Durkheim's system. In view of the typical ironies involved
in the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey,1974),
it is not surprising that one of the first observers to move
the metaphor of the tree of social life to center stage of
Durkheim's system is both young and a relative outsider to
the field of sociology. Given, however, his background as a
historian, it is perhaps understandable that Dominick LaCapra
has been the first, so far as I know, to repeatedly emphasize
the potency of Durkheim's evolutionary metaphor within his
doctrine.

> The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's
> guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This meta-
> phor served as a logical axis for the classification
> of forms of human experience and entire social systems.
> The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant
> conditions of social and cultural life, while the bran-
> ches represented different types of society (1972:12).

LaCapra rightly emphasizes that Durkheim's metaphor combined,
in one and the same image, both evolutionary continuity (the
roots and the trunk), and discontinuity and diversity (the
branches and fruits). LaCapra suggests the derivation of
these notions in this manner:

> In his guiding model of the tree of sociocultural life,
> Durkheim combined a flexible theory of invariance with
> a notion of different "social species" or types. His
> conception of the common trunk and its relation to ar-
> chaic societies owed much to Rousseau. His idea of ty-
> pological branches and its relation to history derived
> in large part from Saint-Simon (1972:195).

Now, perhaps one of the main reasons why so many obser-
vers have had difficulty spotting this seminal metaphor in
Durkheim's sociological system is due to its very ubiquitous-
ness. For while Durkheim explicitly formulated it, its perva-

sive influence can be seen almost everywhere beneath the sur-
face. The almost wholly implicit status of a key image, meta-
phor, or assumption is certainly not unusual; often it is the
rule rather than the exception. Many people feel no need to
spell out what they take to be obvious, and, of course, as
philosophers have often remarked, this is precisely the prob-
lem. Indeed, much of the potency of subterranean metaphors in
linking diverse phenomena would be lost if they were constant-
ly subjected to conscious and critical review. Whether speci-
fically correct or not, it is precisely this implicit connota-
tional load or metaphorical "penumbra" which often extends our
imagination, and leads us in new directions and to crucial in-
sights (see especially N.R. Campbell, 1920; N.R. Hanson, 1958;
M. Hesse, 1963; T.S. Kuhn, 1970).

However, at certain points Durkheim's guiding metaphor
did indeed surface to meet the reflective light of day. One
of the earliest statements can be found, appropriately enough,
in Durkheim's "Cours de science sociale: Lecon d'overture"
published in the Revue Internationale de l'enseignement in
1883. Noting that Durkheim rejected the conception of unilinear
evolution implied in Comte's famous law of the three stages,
LaCapra provides the following translation:

> Whatever Pascal may have said--and Comte mistakenly
> took up his celebrated formula--mankind cannot be
> compared to a man who, having lived through all past
> centuries, still subsists. Rather, humanity resembles
> an immense family whose different branches, which have
> increasingly diverged from one another, have become
> little by little detached from the common trunk to
> live their own lives. Besides, what assurance is there
> that this common trunk ever existed (1972:195)?

Again, in an important footnote halfway through his most ex-
plicitly evolutionary book, The Division of Labor, Durkheim
characteristically reflects:

> In speaking of one social type as being more advanced
> than another, we do not mean to suggest that the dif-
> ferent social types are stages in one and the same as-
> cending linear series, more or less elevated according
> to their historical places. It is, rather, certain that,
> if the genealogical table of social types could be com-
> pletely drawn up, it would resemble a tufted tree, with

> a single trunk, to be sure, but with diverging bran-
> ches. However, in spite of this tendency, the dis-
> tance between the two types is measurable; they are
> higher or lower. Surely we have the right to say of
> a type that it is above another when it began with
> the form of the latter and yet has gone above it.
> Such is certainly the case with a more elevated bran-
> ch or bough (DL:141-2, #21).

Indeed, close scrutiny of this passage reveals that Durkheim took the time to explicitly state his subterranean metaphor in order to absolve himself of unfounded charges of "unilineal evolution." The explanations Durkheim himself offered for this metaphor reveals that his intention behind this image was not merely to indicate evolution, but to portray progressive evolution in terms of a multilineal matrix, including regressive as well as leading lines.

The same image, repeated in Durkheim's neglected article "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (1901; see Tiryakian, 1964, and Jones and Scull, 1973), makes it clear that the metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life was intended to combine, in one root image, both evolutionary continuity and discontinuity.

> It is relatively easy to determine whether one social
> type is more or less advanced than another: one has
> only to see whether they are more or less complex, and
> as to the extent of similar composition, whether they
> are more or less organized. This hierarchy of social
> types, moreover, does not imply that the succession of
> societies takes on a unilinear form; on the contrary,
> it is certain that the sequence must rather be thought
> of as a tree with many branches all diverging in great-
> er or lesser degree. But, on this tree, societies are
> found at differing heights, and are found at differing
> distances from the common trunk. It is on this condi-
> tion that one looks at it in this way that one may
> talk in terms of a general evolution of societies
> (Jones & Scull, 1973:285-6).

In contrast to the simple varities abounding in his own day, Durkheim's own evolutionary perspective was more subtle and multilineal at its very heart. For although the tree of social life can have only one trunk, it has many branches reaching in different directions, and perhaps even incomparable fruits, issuing from many cross-fertilizations and unique graftings. Thus did Durkheim seek to reconcile historical diversity and essential sociocultural unity.

B.   Multilineal Evolution, SocioCultural Sedimentation,
          and Evolutionary Survivals

        All historical explanations must struggle with the
problem of assigning ratios to evolutionary continuity and
discontinuity. In terms of this basic problem, Durkheim's
key metaphor of the tree of social life carried two different,
though related, meanings. The first and most explicit conno-
tation, the genetic evolutionary sense of the metaphor, con-
veyed the image of a progressive mainline of societal evolu-
tion. The second and more implicit connotation conjured up
the image of different evolutionary strata layered and sedi-
mented together in a new working sociocultural complex. The
first sense of Durkheim's metaphor focussed attention on the
macro-level, on the leading edge of evolutionary progress,
while the second sense reminds us, on the micro-societal le-
vel, of the continuing role played in contemporary society
by certain sociocultural survivals held over from earlier
periods and types. Thus, the duality of his metaphor implied
that societal evolution could be compared to the tree of so-
cial life in a number of senses, for not only are contempor-
ary societies based upon the progressive achievements of the
present in overcoming the past, but some of the past contin-
ues to live on underneath the present.

        Put another way, Durkheim's metaphor conveyed the dual
sense of evolutionary stages and types on the one hand, and
evolutionary survivals on the other. The first implies direct
continuity with by-gone days. Yet both meanings, simultaneous-
ly opposed and related, were bound up with Durkheim's same
guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life.
Since this dual aspect of Durkheim's evolutionary thinking has
been little noted, let us now briefly explore this fruitful
ambiguity, especially in regard to the second sense of sur-
vivals or evolutionary holdovers from primitive or archaic so-
cieties once thought to be wholly passed over by the leading
edge of progressive evolution.

Now, one finds references to various sorts of hist-
orical holdovers scattered throughout Durkheim's work. For
example, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim spoke of folklore
as "... the debris of passed religions, unorganized survivals"
and offers the examples of "... celebrations of May Day, the
summer solstice or the carnival, beliefs relative to genii,
local demons, etc."(EF:51; see also 57). Moreover, Durkheim
observed that certain traces of primitive totemism can be dis-
covered even in the modern world.

> Though no visible traces of collective totemism remain
> in civilized countries, the idea that there is a con-
> nection between each individual and some animal, plant,
> or other object, is at the bottom of many customs still
> observable in many European societies.(Footnote: Thus
> at the birth of a child, a tree is planted which is
> cared for piously; for it is believed that its fate
> and the child's are united) (EF:191).

Further, in Primitive Classification, at the very end, Durk-
heim and Mauss insist that the primitive sacral foundations of
logical thought continue to this very day.

> But it is not the case that these remote influences
> which we have just studied have ceased to be felt
> today. They have left behind them an effect which
> survives and which is always present; it is the
> very cadre of all classification, it is the ensem-
> ble of mental habits by virtue of which we conceive
> things and facts in the form of coordinated or hier-
> archized groups (PC:88).

Now, although some who persist in viewing Durkheim only
as a anti-traditionalist positivist might think it strange,
those who wish to grasp the full complexity and profundity of
Durkheim's thought will not be surprised to discover that he
suggested that it is well that "... the past persists beneath
the surface of the present, even when they are at variance"
(PECM:174). Although he stood for the future against the "re-
pressiveness" of the past, nonetheless, Durkheim realistically
recognized that the present, past, and future cannot always
stand at war. Indeed, in contrast to those who railed against
the historical indecency of "irrational survivals," Durkheim
counseled: "Every social structure is full of these paradoxes"
(PECM:174). So strong was this seemingly paradoxical convict-

ion, that Durkheim proposed at the end of his profound lectures "Physique des moeurs et du droit" that "Old institutions never disappear entirely; they only pass into the background and fade away by degrees" (PECM:217).

Durkheim evaluated the continuing importance of evolutionary survivals in a number of different ways--those that are non-functional or functional only as a transition from old to new structures, and those that become functional in certain ways because they become traditional. It is difficult, of course, to discriminate among these various shades and grades of continuing functional importance; further, it must be noted that other sedimented modes of survival and transformation are possible than those explicated here. In the first sense, and perhaps the most predictable way as a positivist interested in overcoming the tenacious clutches of the past, Durkheim insisted that certain sociocultural traits lingering on from earlier societies no longer were appropriate to the changed structures of modern societies. Several types of examples could be offered, but Durkheim's critique of the legal institution of inheritance is representative:

> We have seen that inheritance ab intestat, a survival
> of the old right of family joint ownership, is today
> an archaic survival and without justification. It no
> longer corresponds to anything in our ethics, and could
> be abolished without disturbing the moral structure of
> our societies in any way (PECM:216).

Now, it was precisely these difficult distinctions between sociocultural forms that are to be judged as "archaic survivals" no longer corresponding to the present or emerging structure of modern societies, from those elements that are judged as still functional that underlies Durkheim's positivist attempt to build a new morality in terms of systematic evolutionary distinctions between "normal" and "pathological" social phenomena. Indeed, it is a common refrain in Durkheim, especially as he argued against traditionalists, that it is vain and useless to attempt to resurrect or preserve the past beyond its appointed hour.

Nonetheless, it is the same Durkheim who next argued,

in an almost imperceptible shift, that evolutionary survivals may serve an important transitional function in the progressive move from the old to new structures. For example, Durkheim's image of the tree of sociocultural life led him, in terms of his genetic investigations into the primitive roots of the legal notion of property, to conclude that its communal origins continue in various forms even today: "Since communal property is the stock from which the other forms sprang, we find traces of it in their structure as a whole" (PECM:168). Now, although this image of survivals from earlier times led Durkheim to declare that these continuities with the communal origin of property (eg. in legal inheritance) are archaic and do not fit the contemporary social structure and individualist achievement ethos of modern society, nevertheless, he also suggested that these earlier forms served as important transitional links between one notion of property and its successor.

> Inheritance is therefore bound up with archaic concepts and practices that have no part in our present-day ethics. It is true that this fact alone does not warrant our thinking it is bound to disappear. We sometimes have to keep such survivals, where they are needed. The past persists beneath the present, even when they are at variance. Every social structure is full of these paradoxes. We can do nothing to cancel what has been-- the past is a reality and not to be done away with. The earliest forms of society have provided a foundation for the most recent: it often occurs that a continuity of some sort has been kept up whereby the older forms in part are preserved to nourish the newer (PECM:174-5).

Here we see Durkheim employing both senses of his metaphor, for such survivals, though "archaic" remnants of the past, not only played an important transitional role, but also because the past lives on in attenuated form "beneath the surface of the present." Durkheim concluded, in regard to the same question of the proper role of the continuity of the communal basis of property, that:

> The old institutions never disappear entirely; they only pass into the background, and fade away by degrees. This one has played too great a role in history for it to be conceivable that nothing of it should survive. It would only survive, however, in a weakened form (PECM:217).

Indeed, Durkheim's passion for paradox, surpassed perhaps only by Weber, led him, again and again, to insist that "life is made of contradictions," that we cannot wholly extirpate the past, just as the future cannot be seized immediately. For example, in relation to the question of the continuation of the altruistic type of morality appropriate to primitive social solidarity in the isolated modern structural context of the army, Durkheim observed:

> ... the suicide of lower societies, in survival among us because the military morality itself is in certain respects a survival of primitive morality. (Footnote: ... which does not mean that it is destined to disappear forthwith. These survivals have their own bases for existence, and it is natural for some of the past to remain in the midst of the present. Life is made of these contradictions) (S:238).

Finally, Durkheim explored, in passing, the other main possibility that certain historical holdovers, because of their traditional status, continue to play a role of certain significance in maintaining contemporary sociocultural equilibrium. Durkheim cited, for example, the survival of certain food taboos, dating back at least to the Pentateuch, among the strict adherents of Judaic Law. Such religious interdictions, having lost much or all of their original reason for being, come to be identified with the Judaic religion as a special "way of life." Though of primitive tribal totemistic origin, yet, Durkheim noted, "it becomes necessary that they persist, in spite of their irrationality."

> Just as the individual type, the collective type is formed from very diverse causes and even from fortuitous combinations. Produced through historical development, it carries the work of circumstances of every kind which society has gone through in its history. It would be miraculous, then, if everything there were adjusted to some useful end.... There are some of them remaining without any use, and those whose services are most incontestable often have an intensity which has no relation to their utility, because it comes to them, in part, from other causes. The case is the same with collective passions. All the acts which offend them are not dangerous in themselves, or, at least, are not as they are made out to be. But, the reprobation of which these acts are the object still has reason for existing, whatever the origins of the sentiments involved, once they are made of a collective type, and especial-

ly if they are essential elements, everything which
contributes to disturb them, at the same time dis-
turbs social cohesion and compromises society. It
was not at all useful for them to be born, but once
they have endured, it becomes necessary that they
persist in spite of their irrationality.... Of cour-
se, reasoning in the abstract, we may well show that
there is no reason for a society to forbid the eat-
ing of such and such a meat, in itself offensive.
But once the horror of this has become an integral
part of the common conscience, it cannot disappear
without a social link being broken, and this is what
sane consciences obscurely feel (DL:106-7).

Besides describing the processes of sedimentation of old and
new cultural elements into a new working sociocultural complex,
Durkheim's profound observations make it clear that such vital
links with the past, though changed from their original func-
tion, take on new integrative significance as symbolizing the
very identity of the group itself; that is, they become true
"collective representations." This can only happen because so-
cial and cultural life is historically constructed and sedimen-
ted. In sum, Durkheim's image of the growth and decline of
various types of social life is really rather complex--old
elements that no longer correspond to current necessities can
and must give way, new elements constantly emerge; yet in the
process older elements may change in their prime functions and
gradually take on wholly different and perhaps even more import-
ant roles in the continuation and extension of the inherited
and constantly reconstructed sociocultural complex.

    As might be expected, however, lest Durkheim the posi-
tivist find his larger intentions misrepresented by his real-
istic attitudes toward historical complexities, he took pains
to absolve himself in the following footnote of potential mis-
casting as a conservative or closet traditionalist.

That does not mean that it is necessary to conserve
a penal rule because, at some given moment, it corres-
ponded to some collective sentiment. It has a raison
d'etre only if this latter is living and energetic.
If it has disappeared or been enfeebled, nothing is
vainer or worse than trying to keep it alive artifi-
cially, or by force. It can even be that it was ne-
cessary to combat a practice which was common, but
is no longer so, and opposes the establishment of new

and necessary practices. But we need not enter into
this casuitical problem (DL:107-8, #45).

But Durkheim's rhetorical device here of dismissing potential
inconsistencies in his own doctrine as mere "casuitical prob-
lems" will not suffice. For it is precisely these ticklish
dilemmas which generate so much of Durkheim's troubles in at-
tempting to systematically distinguish between "normalities"
and "pathologies" in relation to a series of evolutionary
types. Indeed, it is no accident that LaCapra's attention
was usurped by these implications, since he always added
"normality" and "pathology" as the companion keys, along
with the metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life, to
comprehending the foundations of Durkheim's sociology.

But, in any case, whatever the problems Durkheim genera-
ted for himself in other parts of his system, it should be
remembered that they came from a profound thinker's wrest-
lings with the eternal problems of historical diversity and
generic unity. That Durkheim could so intimately intertwine
past and present, progressive and evolutionary lines, histor-
ical holdovers and contemporary changes, in short, unity and
diversity, in one potent and resonating image of the evolu-
tionary tree of sociocultural life, is added testimony to
his dialectical genius.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX:
WOMB OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE

[In the beginning] religion comprises all, extends to all.
It contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs properly
religious, morality, law, the principles of political or-
ganization, and even science. Religion ... regulated the
details of private life (DL:135).

In primitive societies, criminal law is religious law....
Offenses against the gods are offenses against society
(DL:92).

... All laws come from the divinity; to violate them is
to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins which
must be expiated (DL:139).

If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt,
it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller
portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything;
everything social is religious, the two words are synony-
mous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scien-
tific functions free themselves from the religious func-
tion, and constitute themselves apart (DL:169).

Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to
reach common agreement that religion is the most primi-
tive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of
collective activity--law, morality, art, science, politi-
cal formation, etc. have emerged from it, by a series of
transformations. In the beginning, everything is religious
[1897](in Giddens, 1972a:161).

Religion contains within itself from the very beginning,
even if in an undistinct state, all the elements which in
dissociating themselves from it, articulating themselves,
and combining with one another in a thousand ways, have
given rise to the various manifestations of collective life.
From myths and legends have issued forth science and poet-
ry; from religious ornamentations and cults have come the
plastic arts; from ritual practice were born law and morals.
One cannot understand our perception of the world, of im-
mortality, of life, if one does not know the religious be-
liefs which are their primordial forms. Kinship started
as an essentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift,
and homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual,
communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on....

A great many problems change their aspects completely as
soon as their connections with the sociology of religion
are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at
tracing these connections [1899](1960:350-51).

It is through a religion that we are able to trace the
structure of a society, the stage of unity it has reach-
ed, and the degree of cohesion of its parts, besides the
expanse of the area it inhabits (PECM:160).

Religions are the primitive way in which societies become
conscious of themselves and their history. They are in
the social order what sensation is in the individual
                                            (PECM:160).

Durkheim was interested to discover in ... primitive reli-
gion that undifferentiated whole from which the elements
of society gradually differentiated.... With the example
of the Australian clan and its religious life, he under-
took to analyze the social analogue of the unicellular or-
ganism, the basic structural type from which all the other
social structures have differentiated (Bellah, 1959:456).

Religion ... constitutes the fount from which all other
institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society.
One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ulti-
mate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the prototype,
and ultimate source, of all conduct (Poggi, 1971:253).

In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed
he had found the seeds of all later developments of the
human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that
the original source of logical thought lies in the collect-
ivity, and that religion was the first seat of collective
consciousness. He held that science and philosophy, the
crowning achievements of reason, also have their genesis
in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man first
conceived of things being related to one another intern-
ally; it is through religion that men first grasped the
unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm of the
sacred embraces both the physical and the social world;
religious forces provide the nexus between things which
to the senses appear discrete and unconnected. Once man
began to think that what appears dissimilar to his senses
may have an internal unity, science and philosophy become
possible.... In brief, the dual aspects of religious for-
ces--their physical and moral aspects--made religion the
matrix from which the main seeds of civilization developed
                                        (Tiryakian, 1962:41-2).

[Durkheim's] ... historical studies pointed out that all
social institutions develop from a common sphere of life
which is the fountainhead, the primordial institution of
all human societies (Tiryakian, 1964:250).

> The fundamental categories of thought and ... science
> are of religious origin.... Up until a relatively advan-
> ced moment of evolution, moral and legal rules have been
> indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions.... Nearly
> all the great social institutions have been born in reli-
> gion (EF:466).

> Religion is the womb from which come all the leading
> germs of human civilization (EF:255).

> Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and
> even scientific thought were born of religion, were for
> a long time confounded with it, and have remained pene-
> trated with its spirit (EF:87).

> Between the logic of religious thought and that of scien-
> tific thought there is no abyss (EF:271).

> We have shown ... that the most essential ideas of the
> human mind--ideas of time, space, type and form, force
> and causality, and personality--those, in short, to which
> philosophers have given the name of 'categories,' and
> which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated with-
> in the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them
> from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages
> in the intellectual life of mankind [1913](in Giddens,
> 1972a:248).

Preface. "In the beginning," Emile Durkheim observed, "reli-
gion comprises all, extends to all" (DL:135). Throughout his
career, Durkheim suggested that "the elementary forms of reli-
gious life" served as the original and prime matrix out of
which all the other major cultural forms emerged. Durkheim
discovered that originally "religion pervaded the whole so-
cial life" (DL:141); religion, society, culture, and the in-
dividual were fused together in what I shall call the "primi-
tive sacral complex," or, for short, the "sacral womb." The
primitive or elementary sacral complex served as the prime
evolutionary womb of society and culture, as the original and
fundamental ground of civilizational process. "Religion is
the womb from which come all the leading germs of civilization"
(EF:255). Indeed, Durkheim's special sociologies--his studies
of religion, morality, law, logic and science, anomie, educa-
tion, the family, and so forth--all were anchored in the notion
of the primitive sacral complex as their prime genetic matrix.

I submit that the full significance of Durkheim's guiding para-
digm of the primitive sacral complex as the prime evolutionary
womb of society, culture, and person still awaits rediscovery
as a fundamental interpretive strategy in the human sciences.
Moreover, Durkheim's forgotten seminal paradigm represents a
needed complement and reinforcement for the work of the other
pioneering architect of the sociology of religion--I mean Max
Weber. This convergence of theoretical and evolutionary per-
spectives represents a most promising synthesis in the compara-
tive and historical sociology of religion and culture (eg. see
B. Nelson, 1973a).

Now, as we discovered in Chapter Four, Durkheim saw man
in generic terms as homo religiosus. Man is the sociocultural
animal who makes and remakes himself through the genetic medium
of collective symbolic process. Thus, human society itself ori-
ginates primarily through the creative medium of symbolic ritual.
Collective ritual overcomes the egoism inherent in human nature,
and by gathering people together and focussing social energies
in a kind of moral implosion, generates the first symbolic form
of collective self-consciousness. "Symbolism is 'necessary if
society is to become conscious of itself' and 'no less indispen-
sable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness;' in-
deed, 'social life in all its aspects and in every period of
its history is made possible only by a vast symbolism' " (Lukes,
1973:472). Further, when human sentiments reach a high degree
of intensity, they take on a religious aspect, that is, they
become objects of obligatory respect, founts of moral authority,
of legitimacy, of "sacredness." Through the creation of a pub-
lic symbolic process, embodied in what Nelson (1973a) terms a
"sacro-magical collective conscience,' we witness the awakening
of the phenomenological anchors of collective symbolism (cul-
ture)--namely, conscience and consciousness, and thus, in
turn, the creation of the person.

Two prime characteristics of the emergence of these ele-
mentary cultural forms are that they are: (a) socio-centric in
terms of reference and, at the same time, (b) governed by sacro-
magical rationales and practices. This means that structures of

conscience and consciousness, of prime rules and meanings, are simultaneously centered around social forms and permeated by religious rationales and magical rites. In sum, the collective foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority are grounded in the group and its religion; one might say that they are "fused" together. This is the basis of Mauss's famous notion of the sociological task as seeking out "total social facts" (eg. 1967). Here, we shall turn our attention to the high degree of <u>fusion</u> between these prime characteristics of early cultures.

But, since our focus has now shifted from generic to genetic-evolutionary perspectives, we shall also be concerned with the historical significance of the primitive sacral complex in which we may discover two opposed meanings. For the double historical significance of the sacral complex is that it both served as <u>the creative womb of human culture</u> and an <u>obstacle to progressive cultural evolution</u>. First, as a creative womb, Durkheim suggested that all the major cultural forms, and the even the notion of the person, are originally sacral creations. "The most essential ideas of the human mind ... were elaborated within the very center of religion" (in Giddens, 1972a:248). For behind the elementary phenomenologies or concrete ana-logics of mythical and ritual processes, Durkheim professed to discover the "contagiousness" of what might be called "sacred electricity" as the unifying principle of primitive cosmologies and ethical systems. What sensory experience separated, religion bound together (as in the root meaning of "re-ligare"). Without the "essentialism" provided by the invisible world, which cuts across all empirically separate domains, neither logic, nor the person, nor even society itself, or indeed, any other crucial cultural form, could be constructed. Indeed, the fusion of society, culture, and person with religion and magic was the mutual precondition of their very existence. This awarding of the first, and in a certain sense, highest, rank, to the sacral womb was Durkheim's boldest, least known, and, perhaps to some, most astonishing idea.

But, if the sacral womb served as the essential prin-
ciple of the fusion of society, culture, tradition, and per-
son into a coherent and meaningful pattern, then it has to
be acknowledged that it also served to con-fuse them. "It
[religion] contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs pro-
perly religious, morality, law, the principles of political
organization, and even science" (DL:135). Moreover, religious
sanctions permeated everyday life, they "regulated the de-
tails of private life" (DL:135), which means, of course,
since religion was collective, there was often no clear se-
paration between public and private spheres. Indeed, as Durk-
heim noted, "Originally religion pervades everything; every-
thing social is religious, the two words are synonymous" (DL:
169). If "charisma," to use Weber's parallel term, transform-
ed empirical diversity into moral and cognitive unity, it also
acted to imprison the former in the latter. "To primitive so-
cieties, criminal law is religious law.... Offenses against
the gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). Thus, the
struggle to disengage from the intrusive and all-embracing
claims of religious sanctions, the attempt to carve out auto-
nomous spheres for thought and action--in short, the release
from sacral control--becomes a key problematic for historical
investigation. For, subsuming all certain knowledge under
mythical and magical categories inevitably masks the autonomy
of the empirical world; submitting all questions of valid
judgement and action to the pressure of sacral and magical
controls inevitably represses diversity and innovation. "All
laws come from the divinity; to violate them is to offend the
divinity, and such offenses are sins which must be expiated"
(DL:139). Indeed, these are the type of insights which formed
the basis of the Enlightenment critique of religion, against
which Durkheim took up such an ambivalent position.

    Now, Durkheim proposed that as societies grow more
complex and differentiate, cultural forms and the notion of
the person also evolve. This differentiating co-evolution
means that the various departments of society, spheres of cul-

ture, and dimensions of the person grow increasingly autonomous. Living their own life alone, each element develops its own special physiognomy, and becomes governed by its own law.

> If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life.... Little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, and constitute themselves apart (DL:169).

The struggle of the various spheres of life to separate themselves out from their original fusion in the sacral womb becomes a central concern. Separation, division, differentiation, autonomization--all faces of the same process--become the roots of the historical problematic of secularization.

This historical dialectic of fusion and diffusion, of merger and division--two of the many faces of the eternal dialectic between the one and the many--constitutes an essential problematic of the comparative and historical sociology of religion to Durkheim. In his concern with the autonomization and rationalization of culture and person, Durkheim converged with Weber's great historical and comparative inquiries into the vicissitudes experienced by societies which attempt to prevent secularization by maintaining the fusion of the sacral complex or to accelerate diffusion and secularization.

But secularization always implies at least two related, though sometimes opposed, sociocultural processes. Religion becomes secularized, first, in the sense that the intensity of sacral images and sanctions, and the degree of social control exerted by sacerdotal institutions, are diminished or eroded in sociocultural evolution. But the second sense of secularization is equally crucial--namely, that sacral images and sanctions become progressively translated and sedimented into secular spheres.[1] This notion of secularization as cultural translation represents the crucial third term, or process, in the historical problematic of the relations between society and religion. For, if the archaic sacral complex served as the constitutive instrument and evolutionary womb of society, culture, and person, and if, on the contrary, much of progressive sociocultural evolution is accomplished only through separation from

the fusion demanded by religious norms and sacerdotal institutions, then secularization as translation mediates between these two apparently opposed processes. A primal unity anchored in religion, the separation and autonomization of the secular world, and then secularization as reciprocal translation become the three faces, or phases, of mainline world-historical process to sociologists of religion and culture.

It is precisely in his insightful recognition of the double significance of the primitive sacral complex and the double meanings of secularization that Durkheim overcame the prejudices against religion of his Enlightenment brethren, and which, albeit belatedly, constitutes his revolution in the human sciences. Thus, like his contemporary Max Weber, Durkheim viewed the intimate links between religion, society, culture, and the person as functioning sometimes as obstacles, sometimes as facilitators of sociocultural evolution. Although he did not possess Weber's sensitivity to the historical vicissitudes of this complex dialectic of release and control--best seen as struggles over claims to preeminent legitimate moral and intellectual authority--Durkheim was also fundamentally concerned with the ways in which religious rationales and ritual practices served to advance or retard cultures along the mainlines of increasing autonomization, rationalization, and universalization. We shall explore the latter processes more fully in the succeeding chapters.

It is appropriate, therefore, that when Durkheim came to announce his program in the prefaces to L'Annee sociologique he suggested to the several sciences of man: "A great many problems change their aspects completely as soon as their connections with the sociology of religion are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tracing these connections" [1899](1960:350). Yet, since Durkheim's death, few sociologists, and fewer still researchers in related areas, have heeded or, indeed, even recognized this crucial foundation of Durkheim's charter for sociology and the human sciences. What precisely does the notion of the primitive sacral complex imply? How did

Durkheim, an arch-positivist, come to grant religion both gen-
eric and genetic primacy? And what can Durkheim's seminal para-
digm of the primitive sacral complex mean to the systematic
study of the interrelations between religion, society, culture,
personal phenomenologies, and historical processes today?
We shall explore these and related questions in this chapter.

Before exploring the various phases in Durkheim's devel-
opment of the central significance of the primitive sacral com-
plex, let us first examine other observers' dawning recognition
of the importance of Durkheim's paradigm, and his genetic-evo-
lutionary presuppositions.

A. Precedents

Fortunately, the current renaissance in Durkheim studies
has shown some glimmering awareness of the centrality of Durk-
heim's notion of the primitive sacral complex. As Robin Horton
observes: "... people are mining the rich seams of his thought
as energetically as ever, and yet these seams show little sign
of exhaustion" (1973:271). This nascent recovery is even more
striking since it results from a converging series of largely
independent discoveries. Although influenced by the earlier
generation who "rescued" Durkheim (eg. Parsons, Alpert, Evans-
Pritchard, to mention only a few leaders) from the cudgels of
his less sympathetic critics, this current renaissance has
given Durkheim's life-work more systematic and detailed consi-
deration. In addition, many important articles and short pie-
ces have been newly translated. Slowly, a different picture of
Durkheim and his work begins to emerge; as Kenneth Burke said:
"A way of seeing is always a way of not seeing." This dictum
applies doubly to the present case. Since Durkheim rarely spel-
led out his fundamental interpretive logics, his evolving "lo-
gics-in-use," the "nuclear structure" of his work often remains
obscure. Consequently, even those who have recently rediscover-
ed Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral womb remain in-
clined to treat this notion only in passing. However, a few
theorists, boldly breaking with past neglect, and realizing

the evolutionary significance of this paradigm, have begun to incorporate Durkheim's original perspective into their own work.

A careful review of recent literature reveals a mounting series of what might be called "parenthetical" recognitions of Durkheim's thesis of the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex. For example, in 1959 in an important review of Durkheim's life-long concern with historical process (all the more remarkable since it came from within the Parsonian functionalist camp), Robert Bellah cited the programmatic passage from the second Annee preface, and remarked:

> Durkheim was interested to discover in religion, especially primitive religion, that undifferentiated whole from which the elements of society gradually differentiated.... With the example of the Australian clan and its religious life, he undertook to analyze the social analogue of the unicellular organism, the basic structural type from which all the other social structures have differentiated (1959:456).

Bellah also noted, in regard to the second Annee preface, that Durkheim actually undertook researches into these problems, especially in what I shall call the second and third phases of his development of the significance of the sacral womb (see Bellah, 1959:456).[1]

A year later, Joseph Neyer also cited the relevant section from the second Annee preface, but in a footnote, and without developing its implications (1960:67, #61).In 1962, Edward Tiryakian clearly perceived the centrality of Durkheim's paradigm:

> In presenting Durkheim's perspective on religion, our main interest has been to show the crucial role he attributed to religion in the development of human thought. In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed he had found the seeds of all later developments of the human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that the original source of logical thought lies in the collectivity, and that religion was the first seat of collective consciousness. He held that science and philosophy, the crowning achievements of reason, also have their genesis in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man first conceived of things being related to one another internally; it is through religion that men first grasped the unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm of the sacred embraces both the physical and the social

world; religious forces provide the nexus between things
which to the senses appear discrete and unconnected.
Once man began to think that what appears dissimilar to
his senses may have an internal unity, science and philo-
sophy became possible.... In brief, the dual aspects of
religious forces--their physical and moral aspects--made
religion the matrix from which the main seeds of civili-
zation developed (1962:41-2).

And in 1964, Tiryakian remarked, in passing, that Durkheim's

"... historical studies pointed out that all social institutions

develop from a common sphere of life which is the fountainhead,

the primordial institution of all human societies" (1964:250;

my emphasis). [1]

In 1965, Robert Nisbet, speaking of the analysis in The

Elementary Forms of representative rites, noted that " ... out

of these representative rites also came ... esthetic and rec-

reational activities .... The gradual disengagement of these

activities from the original religious matrix constitutes one

important phase of secularization of culture" (1965:87). [2] And

in 1967, Raymond Aron remarked that in Durkheim's eyes: "Reli-

gion is the original nucleus from which not only moral and re-

ligious rules in the strict sense have emerged ... but from

which scientific thought too has derived" (1967:61-2). [3] Also

in 1967, W.H. Stanner noted the significance of Durkheim's

claims for the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral com-

plex, citing Durkheim's defense of the autonomization of reli-

gious collective representations vis-a-vis the materialist

view of history in a book review in 1897 (1967:221). [4]

In 1971, Poggi utilized the telling phrase "religion as

the proto-institution" to characterize Durkheim's notion of

the genetic primacy of the primitive sacral complex, which he

described in these terms:

Religion ... constitutes the fount from which all other
institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society.
One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ulti-
mate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the proto-
type, and ultimate source, of all conduct (1971:253).

Poggi also cited the relevant section to Durkheim's preface to

the second volume of L'Annee sociologique. [5] In 1972, LaCapra,

in another revealing phrase, described the genetic-evolutionary

primacy of the sacral womb as a "primitive nebula" (1972:105) from which all the other cultural forms have emerged.[1] Also in 1971, Anthony Giddens noted in passing that "In his earliest writings, Durkheim commented on the importance of religion to society, recognizing it to be the original source of all subsequently evolved moral, philosophical, scientific, and juridical ideas" (1971a:105). And in 1972, Giddens proposed that one of the major propositions in The Elementary Forms was Durkheim's thesis that " ... representations created in religion are the initial source from which all subsequent forms of human thought have become differentiated" (1972a:20-1). Giddens further observed:

> In the collective representations of primitive religion, there are fused together nascent conceptions of science, poetry, and art. The various branches of intellectual activity only become differentiated out of this original set of representations with the growth of social differentiation in the division of labor and the consequent fragmentation of the integral conscience collective of primitive society. The differentiation of intellectual life accompanies the evolving differentiation in moral ideas (1972a:26).

And, finally, in 1973 Steven Lukes again cited the second Annee preface (1973:237), but without developing its significance. However, in regard to Durkheim's article published in the same volume "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena," Lukes remarks that it "... was a first, rather groping attempt, to see religion as a social phenomena, indeed, the primitive social phenomena, from which all others subsequently emerged" (1973:240). Of the same essay, Lukes further notes:

> What characterized religion was the inseparable unity of thought and action: it corresponded to a 'stage of social development at which these two functions are not yet dissociated and established apart from one another, but are still so confused with one another that it is impossible to mark a clear dividing line between them'
> (1973:242).

Lukes, too, noted Durkheim's argument that "the fundamental notions of science are of religious origin" (1973:444). Further, Lukes cited the neglected Annee book review in 1913 by Durkheim of his own Elementary Forms and a related work by Levy-Bruhl in which Durkheim clearly reiterated the dual generic

and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex (Giddens, 1972a:246-9 provides a translation). Finally, although ambivalent about Durkheim's evolutionary claims, Lukes acknowledged that "... the hypothesis that primitive and traditional religions contain the germs of scientific thinking is, in many ways, both challenging and plausible" (1973:449).[1] Finally, Neil Smelser noted in passing that "Religion was regarded by Durkheim as the undifferentiated parent of all succeeding cultural forms" (1976:111).[2]

Now, one remarkable thing about this mounting series of rediscoveries of Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture is not only that these were (apparently) independent, but that these various observers managed to cite relevant evidence from many different Durkheimian texts! [3] Again and again, which ever text or observer, revealing phrases such as fount, fountainhead, womb, matrix, nucleus, primordial institution, proto-institution, primitive nebula, and so forth, are invoked to describe the same fundamental insight of Durkheim. And yet, and this is the reason I cite so extensively, <u>none</u> <u>of</u> <u>these</u> <u>recent</u> <u>observers</u> <u>apparently</u> <u>recognized</u> <u>the</u> <u>full</u> <u>significance</u> <u>of</u> <u>Durkheim's</u> <u>paradigm.</u>[4]

Happily, however, at least two different sociocultural and evolutionary thinkers have gone beyond these preliminary or "parenthetical" recognitions, and have moved to consciously incorporate Durkheim's paradigm into their own interpretive frameworks. Their independent rediscovery has stimulated them to some powerful intellectual reformulations which are destined to have an important impact on the comparative sociology of religion, and upon the study of the evolving relations between religion, society, culture, and the person in general. First, in a most thoughtful essay, Robin Horton was one of the first to begin to properly emphasize the genetic-evolutionary nature of Durkheim's theses in the sociology of religion, morality, and knowledge.

Horton is most sensitive to Durkheim's thesis that "... we find the vital germs of the most elaborated sciences in the first stirrings of the most primitive religions" (1973:262).

Concentrating his attention on Durkheim's notion of the "way
in which primitive religious thought gives rise to the theoret-
ical sciences," Horton states:

> As I read Durkheim, the core of this sociology of
> thought is the thesis that most aspects of mental
> life have grown by differentiation and elaboration
> from a primitive religious basis. By 'most aspects,'
> I mean not only religion as moderns know it, but the
> arts, the theoretical constructions of the sciences,
> and, indeed, the very categories of logical thought
> (1973:258).

In an instructive comparison, Horton contrasts Durkheim's model
of the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral com-
plex with another classic paradigm deriving from the same gener-
al school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's notion of the chasm between prim-
itive and modern mentality. Rather than contrasting and dichoto-
mizing primitive (or sub-tribal and tribal) with modern (or civ-
ilizational) thought, Durkheim instead emphasized their funda-
mental evolutionary continuities. Where Levy-Bruhl entertained
a contrast/inversion schema, Durkheim worked out of a continui-
ty-evolution schema.

> To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation
> between 'primitive' and 'modern' in terms of contrast,
> and the transition between them in terms of inversion,
> while Durkheim sees the relation in terms of continuity,
> and the transition as a process of evolution (1973:270).

But so surprising to those of us who have been brought
up to believe the core of Durkheim's sociology of religion is
the sacred/profane dichotomy is Durkheim's contention that "...
our logic was born of this logic ... between the logic of reli-
gious and scientific thought there is no abyss" (EF:270), that
Horton was led to remark:

> Most readers are likely to be thoroughly puzzled by my
> exposition. For they have been brought up to believe
> that what I call Durkheim's subsidiary thesis is, in
> fact, his principal if not his only thesis. As for what
> I have taken as his primary thesis, this for many will
> be the first time they have heard of it. Some may even
> wonder if it isn't just a figment of my imagination!
> (1973:267).

Horton's point is well-taken, for so conditioned have we become
to the standard, truncated image of Durkheim's sociology of re-
ligion that we may well be reluctant to part with our prejudi-

ces! Horton concludes:

> ... orthodox modern social scientists tend to proclaim themselves disciples of Durkheim in their approach to the study of religion. But, in their actual analyses, they ignore the main theme of their master's work in this sphere, and extol an inconsistent minor theme....[1] This is a very odd situation (1973:276; my emphasis).

It is, indeed, a very odd situation; a problem for the history of sociological theory, and the sociology of knowledge. Why have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral complex?

Perhaps the most distinctive and potent effort yet made to incorporate aspects of Durkheim's notion of the centrality of the primitive sacral complex into a comparative and evolutionary sociocultural framework can be found in the 1973 essay "Civilizational Complexes and Inter-Civilizational Encounters" by Benjamin Nelson. From the perspective of an in-depth comparative and historical differential sociology of the changing foundations of claims to preeminent legitimate moral and intellectual authority, Nelson has distinguished three basic structures of conscience and consciousness on the world-historical level. His stated intention is "... to discriminate a series of patterns in the structures of consciousness, and the degree of collectivity or individuality in the forms of their representation" (1973a:91). Significantly, Nelson's path-breaking efforts have been inspired by the work of both Weber and Durkheim on primitive and archaic religion and culture. Nelson acknowledges the complementariness of these pioneer's perspectives: "Weber's frames need to be supplemented by reference to the works of Durkheim, Mauss, and Maine, especially the essay by Durkheim and Mauss on Primitive Classification, and Durkheim's ... Elementary Forms" (1973a:92). What Nelson has termed "Consciousness Type I"--a "sacro-magical collective conscience"--was directly influenced by Durkheim's notion of the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex, and the importance of "altruisme" as the suicidal "ideal type" which reveals its inner structure.

The first pattern of structures of consciousness is characterized by the predominance of collective acceptances of responsibility to make amends for collective wrongs or falls from a state of undividedness. The ruling supposition is that all lapses from unity in both macrocosm and microcosm have to be atoned by collective assumptions of liability, collective propitiations, sacrifices, commemorations.... The ruling instances of these sacro-magical forms may be found in all societal and civilizational complexes dominated by prescriptive etiquettes and rituals all oriented to the total fulfillment of laws believed to be ontological in character and to have their sanctions in the cosmic orders, the commands of the ancestors, the primordial traditions, that require they be preserved through literal performance of fixed obligations. A number of variations are possible in the social structural guarantees of these ritual performances. These differences do not, however, fundamentally alter the central supposition that the whole society is under total obligation to fulfill the ontological demands and to offer totalistic propitiations, placations, commemorations, if the harmonies of the cosmos are to endure ... or to be restored.... The central reality is the dominance of a sacro-magical structure which binds the entire community in ... expressions of the collective conscience
(1973a:91-2).

Surely we need deeply informed and bold extensions of our pioneer's paradigms, such as Nelson's, which help us to come to grips with the world-historical significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, person.

B. Durkheim's Genetic-Evolutionary Methodology

Why have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's central paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the evolutionary womb of society, culture, and person? Perhaps our neglect here stems from both our failure to adequately distinguish between analyses pitched at the generic and the genetic levels, and Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of the two approaches. Let us, therefore, briefly consider the "madness in Durkheim's method" in deliberately fusing his generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches in his paradigm of the sacral womb.

Stemming largely from the influence of the British anthropologists and American functionalists, the standard, truncated image of Durkheim's sociology of religion is that it was pitched primarily, or at least most intelligibly, on the generic or universal social structural level. The claim was that religion and ritual served multiple social functions--especially the promotion of social solidarity. Ever since Parsons proclaimed that Durkheim's central problem was the search for the generic bases of social order and control, and that Durkheim's central problem concerned "social statics," Durkheim's genetic- and evolutionary theses have languished in darkness. Durkheim's own claims for the genetic and evolutionary significance of his pilgrimage to the "elementary forms" have often annoyed (eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, W.H. Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973), or puzzled these theorists (eg. Bellah, 1973). The British anthropologists and American functionalists' search for the generic or universal structures of human society led them to persistently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; in short, their generic emphases swamped out Durkheim's genetic emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent "... tendency of secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's functional and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign to Durkheim's thought" (1971a:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's Elementary Forms has to be read genetically (1971a:114).

As early as 1895 in The Rules, Durkheim explicitly term-

ed his method "genetic" (R:138), and proposed the following interpretive canon: "One cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its complete development through all social species" (R:139). And in 1898, Durkheim prefacedhis _Annee_ essay on "Incest" with this methodological rule:

> In order to understand a practice or an institution, a juridical or moral rule, it is necessary to trace it as nearly as possible to its origin; for between the form it now takes and what it has been, there is a rigorous relationship. No doubt, as any institution is transformed during its course of development, the factors on which it largely depended for its existence have also varied. However, these transformations, in their turn, are likewise dependent on the nature of the point of departure. There are social phenomena, just as there are organic phenomena, and although the manner in which they must develop is not fatally predetermined by the properties which characterize them at their birth, these properties do not cease to have a profound influence on the entire course of their history [1898](1963:13).

Now, it must be acknowledged that much of the confusion and neglect was unintentionally assisted by Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary analyses. As Tiryakian reminds us,"The French _elementaire_ signifies not only 'elementary' as in a scale of complexity, but also 'fundamental' or 'basic' (1962:19). It is precisely in these terms that Durkheim's British anthropological critics have charged him with confusing "earliest" and "simplest" (eg. Lukes, 1973:456). Even so, the logic underlying Durkheim's "conflation" of his search for the universal or generic essence of human society with his genetic investigations into the evolution of society and culture remains opaque to many. For example, contrasting what he takes to be Weber's comparative and historical investigations into the world-religions with Durkheim's crucial experiment focussed on a single "elementary form," William Runciman contends that the latter's sociology of religion was "fundamentally misconceived" (1969:187; 191). But Runciman, and others, fail to perceive that _by_ _fusing_ _his_ _generic_ _and_ _genetic-evolutionary_ _investigations_ _into_ _the_ _na-_ _ture_ _and_ _development_ _of_ _society_ _and_ _culture_, _Durkheim_ _sought_

to find a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, in
which there would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were,
between symbolic forms and social forms, between the substra-
tum of social morphological processes and superstructural so-
cial physiological or symbolic cultural processes.

Where collectively symbolic representations are deeply
inter-fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durk-
heim felt he had discovered the "monocellular" (see Bellah,
1959:456-7) form of sociocultural life; the template, as it
were, from which all complex sociocultural forms have evolved.
Thus, the generic links between religion, society, and culture
which Durkheim thought he had discovered in Australian abori-
ginal religion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connect-
ions. Durkheim himself went to great lengths in the introduct-
ion to The Elementary Forms to explain his seemingly peculiar
method. To those who might object to his conflation of generic
with genetic analyses, he rhetoricized: "But why give them
[the elementary forms] a sort of prerogative? Why choose them
in preference to all others as the subject of our study? It is
merely for reasons of method"(EF:15). He then justified his
genetic methodology in these terms:

> Everytime that we undertake to explain something human,
> taken at a given moment in history--be it a religious
> belief, a moral precept, a logical principle, an esthet-
> ic style, or an economic system--it is necessary to com-
> mence by going back to its most primitive and simple
> form, to try to account for the characteristics by which
> it was marked at that time, and then to show how it de-
> veloped and became complicated little by little, and
> how it became that which it is at the moment in question
> (EF:15).

Thus, Durkheim's approach was always processual--it is simply
mistaken to portray Durkheim as a static, abstracted thinker
searching for the generic bases of social order and control.
For it is absolutely crucial to realize that Durkheim's causal
model--substructural social morphological processes and super-
structural collectively representational processes--led him
to always return to the simplest case, the clearest connection
between these two halves of human society. For here "All is
reduced to that which is indispensable, to that without which

there could be no religion. But that which is indispensable is
that which is essential--that which we must know before all
else" (EF:18).

Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified
his characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolution-
ary analyses by likening them to Descartes' "first ring" (EF:
16) of certainty. For, in the last analysis, Durkheim's confla-
tion derived from his cultural tradition--it was the sociologi-
cal equivalent of the Cartesian method of systematic doubt,
and return to first principles as the only sure road to object-
ive certainty. Moreover, Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary
presuppositions were basically those of the Enlightenment (see
Cassirer, 1951). "He [Durkheim] simply took it as axiomatic
that there is an identity between simplicity and evolutionary
priority" (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his conflation of generic
and genetic in this perspective, we should no longer wonder
that only in terms of the most "elementary" forms--in both
senses--did Durkheim believe that he could surely uncover gen-
eric sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably inter-
fused with genetic-evolutionary ones. "Primitive civilizations
offer privileged cases because they are simpler ones" (EF:18).
And again, "In the primitive religions, the religious fact
still visibly carries the mark of its origins" (EF:20). Those
who persist in reading Durkheim's fundamental investigations
as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahistori-
cal, functional propositions, must continue to neglect Durk-
heim's own logic and method, and his insistence that the in-
timate relations between society, culture, and person are e-
volutionarily constructed. As Giddens rightly notes: "There
is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and
their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is con-
tingent upon the level of advancement of society" (1972a:27).

Indeed, Durkheim clearly saw, as did Weber, that as
societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance sys-
tems. In the general evolutionary passage from "mechanical" to
"organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a whole series of

progressive sociocultural shifts in the content, form, and direction of development of collective symbolic forms, which more or less corresponded to underlying social morphological differentiations. From The Division of Labor, through Primitive Classification to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim never wavered from his primary concern (see Horton, 1973; Giddens, 1971a,b;1972a, b;1973) with the transformation of the concrete, tribal, fused, sacral-magical collective consciousness into ever-more abstract, autonomous, differentiated, rational, and universalizable cultural symbolic forms. Indeed, toward the end of his life, Durkheim (with Mauss) turned his attention explicitly to the sedimentation and diffusion of universalizable symbolic forms on the inter-societal level as these became the basis of civilizational bonds (see Chapter Seven).

In these terms, the genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sacral complex becomes clearer--for it served as the prime evolutionary matrix out of which all the other major social, cultural, and phenomenological forms progressively emerged. When he announced his program of detailed research into the world-historical creativity of the sacral womb in the preface to the second volume of L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim acknowledged that awarding it primacy might surprise some:"The according of first rank to this set of phenomena has produced some astonishment, but it is these phenomena which are the germ from which all the others ... are derived" [1899](1960:350). Lest he be misunderstood,[1] Durkheim hastened to add:

> But it must be understood that the importance we thus attribute to the sociology of religion does not in the least imply that religion must play the same role in present day societies that it has played at other times. In a sense, the contrary conclusion would be more sound. Precisely because religion is a primordial phenomenon, it must yield more and more to the new social forms which it has engendered. In order to understand these new forms, one must connect them with their religious origins, but without thereby confusing them with religious phenomena, properly speaking (1960:352-3).

A decade and a half later, after devoting his energies to his school's famous journal L'Annee sociologique,Durkheim's Elementary Forms represented the culmination of his program of

detailed, multi-disciplinary research into the genetic and e-
volutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex. Toward
the end of this masterwork, Durkheim concluded:

> ... We have established the fact that the fundamental
> categories of thought, and consequently, of science,
> are of religious origin. We have seen that the same is
> true for magic and consequently for the different pro-
> cesses which have issued from it.... It has long been
> known that up until a relatively advanced moment of e-
> volution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguish-
> able from ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then,
> it may be said that nearly all the great social insti-
> tutions have been born in religion (EF:466).

If we still wish to lay claim to Durkheim's "charisma-on-depo-
sit" (see McCloskey, 1974), or if we hope to understand the
complex relations between religion, society, culture, person,
and historical process, can we any longer afford to continue
slighting Durkheim's seminal paradigm of the generic and gen-
etic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral womb?

C. Phases in Durkheim's Development of the Notion of
the Primitive Sacral Complex

Preface. Durkheim's awareness of the significance of the gen-
eric and genetic evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral
complex evolved over the years in a series of distinguishable
phases. In the first phase, Durkheim's "laic" positivism led
him to portray religion, defined as the preeminent form of
the "collective conscience" (DL:85), largely in negative terms.
Using juridical indexes to discern the stages in evoluion of
the "moral life," Durkheim first distinguished religion by its
obligatory, "repressive," character. But it must always be re-
membered that primitive legal systems were "repressive," ac-
cording to Durkheim, because "mechanical solidarity" was deep-
ly embedded in traditional religious rationales and magical
duties. Indeed, Durkheim repeatedly described transgressions
in primitive cultures as a type of "religious criminality."

However, as he investigated further, Durkheim's opin-
ion clearly shifted. By his own admission, 1895 was a crucial
turning point. Reading Robertson Smith and lecturing on reli-

gion, Durkheim discovered how religious phenomena could fit
more positively into his own sociological program. In his of-
ten repeated series of lectures "Physique generale des moeurs
et du droit," Durkheim constantly reworked his early emphasis
on the "repressiveness" of early religions by exploring the
creative embeddedness of primitive juridical forms such as
property, taxes, contract, and so on, in archaic sacral and
magical rationales. And in the great L'Annee sociologique,
Durkheim both announced his special program to the human sci-
ences, and carried much of it out through his own essays and
the inspiration and direction he gave to the other members of
the Annee school, most notably Marcel Mauss (see Paul Honig-
sheim, 1960).

In third phase, which centers, of course, on The Elemen-
tary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Durkheim's program
and his own systematic insight into Australian aboriginal reli-
gion and rite yielded a profound and exquisitely wrought theory
of the generic and genetic-evolutionary creativeness of the
sacral womb. So central had the dual significance of the prim-
itive sacral complex become to Durkheim's system, that he
never tired of repeating (eg. vis-a-vis Levy-Bruhl), that there
is no gap in continuity between these stages in sociocultural
evolution! Let us now explore the first phase in Durkheim's
development of the notion of the world-historical centrality
of the primitive sacral complex as womb of society and culture.

1. The Early Phase: Religion in Primitive Society as Repressive

Durkheim cannot really be said to have had a sociology
of religion in his early phase. As Lukes rightly observes,
Durkheim's early writings on religion were rather "thin and
inconclusive" (1973:238). At this stage, his nascent sociology
of religion was really only an adjunct to his concern with law
and morality, and what little there was was often negative.
Basically, Durkheim's early view of religion was two-fold.
First, he saw religion as the "preeminent form of the collective
consciousness" (DL:285). Second, as the basis of "mechanical sol-
idarity," religion was "repressive." Using law as an objective

index to determine the state of the "moral life," Durkheim
found that "... in primitive societies, criminal law is reli-
gious law" (DL:92). Penal law in "mechanical solidarity" was
viewed as "religious criminality," as transgressions against
religiously sanctioned collective norms. In his early phase,
Durkheim's critical positivism held the upper hand in deter-
mining his largely negative image of primitive religion as
both "repressive" and "regressive."

Perhaps Durkheim's first explicit statements on the so-
ciological nature of early religions are to be found in his re-
view of Spencer's Ecclesiastical Institutions, which appeared
as part of an 1886 review essay entitled "Les Etudes de Science
Sociale" (translated by R.A. Jones, 1974). Of this essay, Lukes
has remarked:

> In 1886, he had written of religion as having, together
> with law and morality, the role of assuring the equili-
> brium of society and adapting it to external conditions
> and of its being a "form of social discipline," merely
> a form of custom; he also saw the idea of divinity as
> serving to 'symbolize traditions, cultures, collective
> needs,' and argued that the sociologist must look at
> what 'the symbol conceals and translates' (1973:238).

Jones has also noted some of the important continuities
and discontinuities between this early essay and Durkheim's
Elementary Forms. For instance, Durkheim was already insisting
that we must attempt to translate the symbolic meaning of rite
and myth through some type of sociological analogy.

> What ought to concern us is not the symbol but what
> the symbol stands for and expresses. What is thus hid-
> den under this wholly superficial phenomenon could per-
> haps be discovered if we could compare it with others
> which resemble it in certain ways. Indeed, what differ-
> ence is there between religious prescriptions and the
> injunctions of morality? They are both addressed to the
> members of the same community, are supported by sanc-
> tions that are sometimes identical and always analogous;
> finally, the violation of both arouses in conscience the
> same feelings of anger and disgust (1974:212).

Further, Durkheim argues that "laws, morality, religion, are
the three great regulating functions of society" (1974:213).
The essential function of each is moral discipline of the ego.

> Religion is therefore only a form of custom, like law
> and manners. What distinguishes this form from all the

> others is that it imposes itself not only on conduct
> but on the conscience. It dictates not only acts, but
> ideas and sentiments.... Religion commences with faith,
> that is to say, beliefs accepted or submitted to with-
> out discussion (1974:212-13).

Thus, religion is, at root, irrational, and when reflection is awakened "It [religion] can remain a collective discipline only if it imposes itself upon all spirits with the irrestible authority of habit" (1974:213). Surprisingly, Durkheim rejected Spencer's notion that "... evolution presumes an increasing role for reason and free inquiry to the detriment of custom and prejudice" (Jones, 1974:207).

> It is far from true, as Mr. Spencer thinks, that the
> place and importance of custom are going to diminish
> with civilization.... A society without prejudices
> would resemble an organism without reflexes: it would
> be a monster incapable of living. Sooner or later,
> therefore, custom and habit will recover their rights;
> it is this that authorizes us to presume that religion
> will survive the attacks upon it. As long as there are
> men who live together, there will be among them some
> common faith. What one cannot foresee and what the fu-
> ture alone can decide, is the particular form in which
> that faith will be symbolized (1974:213).

Thus, even at this early date, Durkheim began to separate himself from the general nineteenth century view of religion as, at best, an immature stage which had to be overcome. For religion is identified in 1886 with tradition, custom, and a common faith, and the need for these is perennial. Finally, we should note that Durkheim saw here that "... if one penetrates beneath the surface ... one discovers everywhere the same development, and at the origin, the same germ" (1974:211).

Let us turn next to The Division of Labor, published in 1893. Here, Durkheim characterized religion as the "eminent form of the collective conscience" (DL:285). And, as Lukes notes (1973:239), there was "also an inclusive and unpursued definition of religion" in these terms:

> ... the sole characteristic that all such ideas as reli-
> gious sentiments equally present seems to be that they
> are common to a certain number of people living togeth-
> er, and that, besides, they have an average intensity
> that is quite elevated. It is, indeed, a constant fact
> that, when a slightly strong conviction is held by the
> same community of men, it inevitably takes on a reli-

ious character. It inspires in consciences the same
reverential respect as beliefs properly religious. It
is, thus, very probable ... that religion corresponds
to a region equally central in the common conscience
(DL:169).

However, Durkheim admitted the provisional nature of such a
view: "It remains, it is true, to circumscribe this region, to
distinguish it from that to which penal law corresponds, and
with which, moreover, it is often wholly or in part confused.
These questions are left to study" (DL:169).

Speaking of the "physiological" characteristics of "me-
chanical solidarity," Durkheim said "... religion pervades the
whole society, but that is because social life is made up al-
most exclusively of common beliefs and of common practices
which derive from unanimous adhesion a very particular inten-
sity" (DL:178). This social intensity means that one might
term primitive culture a "conscience collective," since "all
consciences vibrate in unison" (DL:152). In "mechanical soli-
darity" "... all consciences are composed of practically the
same elements" (DL:135). "Everybody professes and practices
the same religion; schisms and dissents are unknown; they
would not be tolerated" (DL:135). Clearly, Durkheim was here
constructing an evolutionary "ideal type," rather than an
accurate description of the diversity of all primitive cul-
tures. Thus, "solidarity which comes from likeness is at its
maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops
our whole conscience and coincides at all points with it" (DL:
130). In short, Durkheim argued that "... social life comes
from a double source, the likenesses of consciences and the
division of labor. The individual ... in the first case ...
becomes part of the collective type" (DL:226; see also Lukes,
1973:151-2; Giddens, 1971b, 1972a; Chapter Eight of this dis-
sertation).

As is well known, Durkheim chose law, and specifically
types of punishment, as his positivist index to the evolving
stages of the "moral life." Underlying this choice was the
presumption that "law reproduces the principal forms of social
solidarity" (DL:68). Durkheim termed "repressive" the type of

religiously sanctioned collective punishment appropriate to "mechanical solidarity." "The similitude of consciences gives rise to juridical rules which, with the threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon all. The more pronounced this is, the more complete is social life confounded with religious life" (DL:226). Giddens summarized Durkheim's theses well:

> This dominance of the individual by the collectivity is indexed by the nature of the punishment which is meted out when a man deviates from the rigidly specified codes of conduct which are prescribed by the conscience collective. Repressive sanctions are collective both in their source, and in their expression. A repressive sanction is a response to the highly intense emotions which are generated in the majority of individuals when a man transgresses the ideals embodied in the conscience collective. It is an expression of anger on the part of the community, the avenging of an outrage to morality (1972a:6).

Thus, "repressive" law is "diffuse," that is, "the whole society participates in it" (DL:76). Primitive penal law is not explicitly formulated because "... the rule is known and accepted by everybody." Further, primitive penal law is stationary, conservative: "... in lower societies, law ... is almost exclusively penal; it is likewise very stationary. Generally, religious law is always repressive; it is essentially conservative" (DL:78).[1] Therefore, primitive penal law is often ritually and magically stereotyped: "We know what a large place in the repressive law of many peoples ritual regimentation, etiquette, ceremonial, and religious practices play" (DL:72). In sum, religiously sanctioned "... repressive law corresponds to the heart, the very center of the common conscience" (DL:113).

Whether or not Durkheim "... vastly overstated the role of repressive law in pre-industrial societies" (Lukes, 1973: 159; see also Sheleff, 1975), is not our prime concern here.[2] What we are concerned with is elucidating Durkheim's evolving notion of the sacral complex as a central interpretive "ideal type," a useful heuristic in the human sciences. What most interests me here is Durkheim's thesis that the greater the degree of penetration of legal norms by sacral rationales and magical sanctions, the greater the repressiveness of the pun-

ishments _for transgressions_. What is at issue here, as Nelson (1973a) clearly saw, was _the degree of collectivity or individuality in the logics of moral responsibility_. That is why punishment was first an act of collective vengenance against the wrong-doer by the outraged sacral-magical common conscience; it was a demand for an "expiation of the past" (DL:88).

> When we desire the repression of a crime, it is not
> that we desire to avenge it personally, but to avenge
> something sacred.... M ost often we represent it in the
> form of one of several beings: ancestors, divinity.
> That is why penal law is not simply religious in ori-
> gin, but, indeed, always retains a religious stamp.
> It is because the acts it punishes appear to be at-
> tacks upon something transcendent (DL:100).

Durkheim's use of the word "expiation" here is most important. For in the primitive sacral complex, "... offenses against the gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). _Because the structures of responsibility for maintaining harmonious relations between micro and macrocosm were primarily collective, violations of religious interdictions were considered criminal because they were, in effect, sacrilege involving the fate of the whole society_. "Everybody is attacked; consequently, everybody opposes the attack" (DL:107). Indeed, in terms of the sacral-magical collective conscience, as Nelson (1973a) has termed it, it is believed that "... all laws ... come from the divinity; to vio-late them is to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins which must be expiated" (DL:139).

For these and other reasons, Durkheim argued that "it is certain that penal law was religious in its origin" (DL:92). Durkheim provided the following summary of the sacerdotal foundations of primitive penal law.

> It is an evident fact in India and Judea, since the
> law practived there was considered revealed. In Egypt,
> the ten books of Hermes, which contained the criminal
> law with all the other books relative to the government
> of the state, were called sacerdotal and ... from ear-
> liest times the Egyptian priests exercised judicial
> power. The same was the case in ancient Germany. In
> Greece, justice was considered an emanation from Zeus,
> and the sentiments a vengenance from God. In Rome, the
> religious origins of penal law are clearly shown both
> by old traditions, and by the juridical terminology it-
> self (DL:92).

In the sacral complex, then (which may include archaic socie-
ties also)[1], many criminal acts are actually delictions which,
by violating the law of the gods, disturb the harmonious rela-
tions between macrocosm and microcosm. Such delictions or tran-
sgressions constitute public sacrilege, since they put in jeo-
pardy the fate of the whole society.

> ... in lower societies, the most numerous delicts are
> those which relate to public affairs; delicts against
> religion, against custom, against authority, etc. We
> need only to look at the Bible, the laws of Manou, at
> the monuments which of the old Egyptian law, to see
> the relatively small place accorded to prescriptions
> for the protection of individuals, and, contrariwise,
> the luxuriant development of repressive legislation,
> concerning the different forms of sacrilege, the omis-
> sion of certain religious duties, the demands of cere-
> monial, etc. At the same time, these crimes are the
> most severely punished (DL:93).

Durkheim later counterposed "religious criminality" with "human
criminality" in his elaboration of his earlier thesis in his
Annee essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" [1900](1973). Clear-
ly, Durkheim was building up a positivist counterpoint to the
"repressiveness" of religion in traditional societies, where:

> ... because all the prescriptions that it lays down are
> commandments from God, so to speak, under his direct
> sov͜reignity, they all owe to this origin an extraordi-
> nary prestige which renders them sacrosanct. Thus, when
> they are violated, public conscience does not content
> itself with a simple reparation, but demands expiation
> which avenges it. Since what gives penal law its pecu-
> liar character is the extraordinary authority of the
> rules which it sanctions ... law which is agreed to be
> the word of God Himself cannot fail to be essentially
> repressive. We have even been able to say that all pen-
> al law is more or less religious, for its very soul is
> the sentiment of respect for a force superior to the
> individual man, for a power in some way transcendent,
> under some symbol which it makes penetrate into conscien-
> ces, and this sentiment is also the basis of religiosity.
> That is why, in general fashion, repression dominates
> all law in lower societies. It is because religion com-
> pletely pervades juridical life, as it does, indeed, all
> social life (DL:140-1).

It is about this point that we first encounter Durkheim's
earliest formulation of the notion of the sacral complex:

> Religion comprises all, extends to all. It contains, in
> a confused mass, besides beliefs properly religious,
> morality, law, the principles of political organization,
> and even science. Religion ... regulated the details of
> private life (DL:135).

Indeed, "Religion, the eminent form of the common conscience,
originally absorbed all representative functions with practi-
cal functions" (DL:285). It is not, surprising, then, that in
such a situation where crime is religious, or should we say,
"sacrilegious":

> ... there exists a luxuriant criminality, peculiar to
> those societies ... delicts against religious faith,
> against ceremonial, against traditions of all sorts,
> etc. The real reason for this development of repressive
> rules is that this moment in the evolutionary scheme
> the collective conscience is extensive and strong,
> since labor has not yet divided (DL:146).

But this homogeneity, this fusion, cannot last. Inevita-
bly, the various cultural forms begin to differentiate and au-
tonomize themselves from their fused embeddedness in the pri-
mal sacral complex. With the division of labor, the progres-
sive "extension of the radius of social life," the "efface-
ment of the segmental type of society," and so on and so forth
(see Chapter Four), the structures of collective responsibili-
ty begin to erode, and sacral rationales become secularized.
Indeed, Durkheim argued that "The more or less complete dis-
sociation between law and religion is one of the best signs
by which we can recognize whether a society is more or less
developed than another" (DL:142). This is so because the
grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shift
from the group and its religious tradition to the individual.

Thus, Durkheim's perception of progressive moral evolu-
tion was intimately bound up with the passage from collective
to individual structures of responsibility. Indeed, he held
it as axiomatic that "... the more one closely approaches the
origins of religious development, the more ritual and mater-
ial practices surpass in importance purely moral beliefs and
precepts, whereas the latter become more predominant in the
religions of civilized peoples" (Soc:230). Through progress-
ive sociocultural evolution, collective representations shift

in content from concrete, magically stereotyped, tribal, "re-
pressive," sacral norms to increasingly abstract, universali-
zable, rational civilizational collective representations.

> At the same time as religion, the rules of law become
> universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at first
> to local circumstances, to particularities, ethnic, cli-
> matic, etc., they free themselves little by little, and
> with the same stroke become more general. What makes
> this increase of generality obvious is the uninterrupted
> decline of formalism. In lower societies, the very ex-
> ternal forms of conduct are predetermined even to the de-
> tails. The way in which man must eat, dress in every sit-
> uation, the gestures he must make, the formula he must
> pronounce, are precisely fixed. On the contrary, the fur-
> ther one strays from the point of departure, the more mo-
> ral and juridical prescriptions lose their sharpness and
> precision. They rule only the most general forms of con-
> duct, and rule them in a very general way.... Civiliza-
> tion has a tendency to become more rational and more lo-
> gical ... that alone is rational which is universal.
> What baffles understanding is the particular and the con-
> crete (DL:289).

So closely do Durkheim's views on sociocultural evolu-
tion here complement Weber's (ie. the decline of sacral-magical
formalism and stereotyping, etc.), that they both attributed a
key role in this process of progressive rationalization and
universalization of certain cultural forms to the evolving no-
tions of the gods themselves (see Weber, 1963). The evolution
of law, of conscience and consciousness, of society and cul-
ture, are, in short, all intimately bound up with religious
evolution.

> The fact which perhaps best manifests this increasing
> tendency of the common conscience is the parallel tran-
> scendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean
> the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not
> distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods,
> only sacred beings without their sacred character being
> related to any external entity as their source.... Little
> by little, religious forces are detached from the things
> of which they are at first only the attributes, and be-
> come hypostatized. Thus is formed the notion of spirits
> or gods who, while residing here or there as preferred,
> nevertheless exist outside of the particular objects to
> which they are specifically attached. By that very fact,
> they are less concrete.... They remain very near us, con-
> stantly fused into our life.... The Greco-Latin poly-
> theism, which is a more elevated and better organized
> form of animism, marks new progress in the direction of

> transcendence. The residence of the gods becomes more
> sharply distinct from that of men.... But it is only
> with Christiantiy that God takes leave of space; his
> kingdom is no longer of this world. The dissociation
> of nature and the divine is so complete that it degen-
> erates into antagonism. At the same time, the concept
> of divinity becomes more general and more abstract,
> for it is formed, not of sensations, but of ideas. The
> God of humanity is necessarily less concrete than the
> gods of the city or the clan (DL:288-89).

It has not been sufficiently noticed that Durkheim maintained
this view of moral and religious evolution throughout his
career; clearly, the very structure of his essay (with Mauss)
on Primitive Classification is genetic and evolutionary, as
is so much of The Elementary Forms.

One crucial outcome of this progressive moral and reli-
gious evolution was the gradual erosion of collective struct-
tures of moral and intellectual authority, and thus, the dis-
appearance of "religious criminality." Having so closely iden-
tified religion with strong and extensive states of the tri-
bal collective conscience, Durkheim argued that as the latter
is eroded by the division of labor, penal law is increasingly
separated from religious interdictions. "... religious crimi-
nality ended by completely departing, or almost completely de-
parting, from penal law" (DL:164); thus, "... a whole world
of sentiments cease to count among the strong and defined
states of the common conscience" (DL:159).

> ... if there is one truth that history teaches us be-
> yond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a
> smaller and smaller portion of social life. Origin-
> ally, it pervades everything; everything social is re-
> ligious, the two words are synonymous. Then, little by
> little, political, economic, scientific, functions
> free themselves from the religious function, constitute
> themselves apart, and take on a more and more acknow-
> ledged temporal character. God, who was at first pre-
> sent in all human relations progressively withdraws
> from them; he abandons the world to men and their dis-
> putes.... The individual feels himself less acted upon;
> he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity. In
> short, not only does not the domain of religion grow
> at the same time and in the same measure as temporal
> life, but it contracts more and more. This regression
> did not begin at some certain moment of history, but
> we can follow its phases since the origins of social
> evolution. It is, thus, linked with the fundamental

conditions of the development of societies, and it shows
that there are a decreasing number of collective beliefs
and sentiments which are both collective enough and
strong enough to take on a religious character.... The
average intensity of the common conscience becomes pro-
gressively enfeebled.... The same law of regression ap-
plies to the representative element of the common con-
science quite as much as to the affective element (DL:
169-70).

It is interesting to note, finally, that Durkheim appeared ra-
ther sanguine about the progressive secularization of culture
at this point. Let us now turn to the next stage in Durkheim's
development of the paradigm of the primitive sacral complex.

2.   The Second Phase: Durkheim's Breakthrough to a Sociology
        of Religion

        The second phase of Durkheim's developing interest in
the sociology of religion is perhaps the most important and
least known. This phase covers roughly the decade from 1895 to
1905. His last years at Bordeaux and first years at Paris were
most creative--they were the "breakthrough" years. But since
the bulk of Durkheim's efforts were invested during this time
in teaching and building L'Annee sociologique, we still have
great difficulty in bringing the depth and scope of these a-
chievements into clear focus. I must emphasize that this phase
of development of Durkheim's concern with the creativity of
the primitive sacral complex deserves more attention than it
has yet received. For it was during this period that the foun-
dations (still often unperceived--see Chapter Four) of Durk-
heim's sociology of religion and knowledge were laid down, and
detailed, inter-disciplinary research into the crucial role of
the primitive sacral complex begun.[1] During this phase, the
sociology of religion moved from a peripheral position, as mere-
ly an adjunct to his sociology of law and morality, to the cen-
ter stage of Durkheim's program for the human sciences. In
short, during this fertile, but half--invisible period, Durkheim
moved away from his earlier negative view of religious pheno-
mena toward viewing the sacral complex as the very womb, the
creative matrix of human society, culture, and person.

Space does not here permit detailed examination of all
the documents which appear in rapid succession in this phase;
we shall now merely note some highlights. While the end of this
second phase may be movable, the beginning is more definite--
1895. For Durkheim himself acknowledged that his discovery of
the works of the English anthropologists of religion, especial-
ly Robertson Smith, which were integral parts of his first lec-
ture course on religion in 1894-95, served as turning points in
his career. Of this breakthrough to a sociology of religion,
Steven Lukes observes: "The work of Robertson Smith and his
school offered Durkheim an overall perspective on religion,
which he then transformed in light of his own theoretical pre-
occupations" (1973:239). Durkheim himself noted:

> It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view of
> the essential role played by religion in social life.
> It was in that year that, for the first time, I found
> the means of tackling the study of religion sociologi-
> cally. This was revelation to me. That course of 1895
> marked a dividing line in the development of my thought,
> to such an extent that all my previous researches had
> to be taken up afresh in order to be made to harmonize
> with these new insights.... [This reorientation] was
> entirely due to the studies of religious history which
> I had undertaken, and notably to the reading of the
> works of Robertson Smith and his school (in Lukes, 1973:
> 237).

Apparently, none of Durkheim's 1894-95 lecture notes survive
(Lukes, 1973:238). However, it appears that Durkheim had found
in Robertson Smith's theory of religion "... the means of tack-
ling the study of religion sociologically." Especially import-
ant, Lukes suggests, were Smith's "... emphasis on the social
functions of totemic rituals and ... the central idea of the
divinization of the community" (1973:239; see also 238). Clear-
ly, much of Durkheim's later Elementary Forms was foreshadow-
ed in Smith's Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (see
also Durkheim, PECM:180, and EF; see Chapter Four).

The importance of Durkheim's breakthrough to a rudi-
mentary sociocultural theory of religious process cannot be
exaggerated; for the new importance attached to religious
symbols even began to make Durkheim alter his underlying cau-
sal model. It has not been sufficiently recognized that his

growing understanding of religious processes led Durkheim to acknowledge the autonomization of collective representations. But this shift comes through very clearly in a book review in 1897 of Labriola's exposition of historical materialism. Durkheim explicitly rejected the Marxist claims, denied that his reductionism derived from Marxism, and insisted instead on the autonomization of collective representations, using religion as his prime example.

> Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement that religion is the most primitive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of collective activity--law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc.--have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. In the beginning, everything is religious.... It is indisputable that, at the outset, the economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life is, by contrast, luxuriant and all-pervasive. Why could it not follow from this, and is it not more probable, that that the economy depends much more upon religion than the former does upon the latter (in Giddens, 1972a:161-2)?

As Lukes (1973:62) and Jones (1974) note, this declaration represents a decisive shift from Durkheim's position in 1886 when he maintained that "... the role of the conscience collective is limited to acknowledging facts without producing them," and even his 1893 position vis-a-vis Fustel de Coulanges (DL:179). Thus, it was during the seminal 1897-99 period that Durkheim, under the new influence of sociology of religion, seeing that his causal model needed to be enlarged, first began to emphasize the autonomization of collective representations and the significance of the sacral complex (see also Book Three, Part I). I believe this coincidence to be more than accidental. Of this momentous shift, Lukes observes: "Largely as a result of his preoccupation with religion, he became more and more interested in the sphere of beliefs and ideals, and in the sociological explanation of the attribution of moral values" (1973:419).

In the same year, Durkheim published Suicide which also emphasized the importance of "collective representations," and the role of religions in primitive and modern suicides. For example, in Book Three, Chapter One, after insisting that

"... collective tendencies have an existence of their own"
(S:309), Durkheim outlined his theory of culture. He remark-
ed that "Religion is ... the system of symbols by which a so-
ciety becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic
way of thinking of collective existence" (S:312). Indeed, ear-
lier Durkheim had interpreted altruistic suicides in precise-
ly these terms. Altruistic suicide was used by Durkheim as an
objective index revealing the nature of the social bond pecu-
liar to traditional societies rooted in ties of "blood and
soil." The fact that the altruistic suicide regards self-sac-
rifice as obligatory--a moral duty and perhaps even a privi-
lege--signifies that the individual is here submerged in the
"sacral-magical collective conscience." Self-sacrifice, or the
systematic eradication of the ego in certain religions, implies
a state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the
"pantheistic" structure of society itself. Since religion was
the symbolic way in which society crystallized self-conscious-
ness, it follows, said Durkheim, that "mechanically integrated"
societies, in which the individual counts for little, should
express these social and cultural realities in pantheistic re-
ligious projections.

But it was in the Annee sociologique, volume two (1897-
1898), published in 1899, that Durkheim first explicitly an-
nounced his program of detailed research into the genetic-evo-
lutionary significance of the primitive sacral complex. In the
preface to the second volume, as many have noted but few have
developed, Durkheim stated:

> This year, as well as last, our analyses are headed by
> those concerning the sociology of religion. The accord-
> ing of the first rank to this sort of phenomenon has
> produced some astonishment, but it is these phenomena
> which are the germ from which all others--or at least
> almost all others--are derived. Religion contains in
> itself from the very beginning, even if in an indistinct
> state, all the elments which in dissociating themselves
> from it, articulating themselves and combining with one
> another in a thousand ways, have given rise to the var-
> ious manifestations of collective life. From myths and
> legends have issued forth science and poetry; from reli-
> gious ornamentations and cults have come the plastic arts;
> from ritual practice were born law and morals. One can-

not understand our perception of the world, our philoso-
phical conceptions of the soul, of immortality, of life,
if one does not know the religious beliefs which are
their primordial forms. Kinship started out as an es-
sentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift and
homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual,
communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on.... A great
many problems change their aspects completely as soon
as their connections with the sociology of religion are
recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tra-
cing these connections (1960:350-51).

And indeed, Durkheim's efforts and those of the Annee school
were "aimed at tracing these connections" between modern social
and cultural phenomena and their origins in the primitive and
archaic sacral complex. As Durkheim himself acknowledged of his
own work: "My previous researches had to be taken up afresh in
order to harmonize with these new insights," so too did Durk-
heim expect his new "ideal type" of the sacral complex to re-
orient investigations in the human sciences. And the main site
in which Durkheim worked out his program was the Annee itself.

Indeed, in the same volume of the Annee in which his
seminal program was first announced, Durkheim also offered a
tentative essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena."
This lead article should be seen as Durkheim's first and ad-
mittedly preliminary attempt to "... view religion as a social
phenomena, indeed the primitive social phenomena, from which
all others subsequently emerged" (Lukes, 1973:240). Lukes
rightly reports that Durkheim's approach to religion at this
point was still "largely pre-ethnographic."

... Durkheim had not yet become "saturated" with the
technical and first hand literature, and in particu-
lar he was not yet, as he later became, a "veteran of
Australian ethnology." Indeed, the greater part of Aus-
tralian ethnographic work, which aroused an immense a-
mount of interest among European scholars, really dated
from the later 1890's. At this early stage, Durkheim's
approach was largely formal and rather simpliste: he
worked out a number of hypotheses about the nature of
religion and its role in social life, and he set out a
range of questions for the sociology of religion to con-
front. Subsequently, his treatment of relgion was to be
considerably more nuanced and complex, and in contact
with a rich and detailed mass of empirical detail (1973:
240).

The results of Durkheim's deepening saturation in this "rich

and detailed" Australian ethnography as he sought to demonstrate the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral complex began to appear in rapid succession thereafter in L'Annee sociologique. In 1898, there appeared the essay "La Prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines" (translated in 1963 by Sagarin). In 1899, as noted, there was his essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena." In 1900, Durkheim's development, extension, and refinement of his earlier argument concerning "religious criminality" and related topics appeared under the title "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (translated 1973 by Jones and Scull).[1] Also, in the school year 1900-01, Durkheim lectured for the first time on "Les Formes elementaires de la religion." In 1902, the untranslated article "Sur le totemisme" appeared. In 1903 Durkheim and Mauss wrote the great monograph Primitive Classification (translated by Rodney Needham, 1963). In 1905, Durkheim published the essay "Sur l'organization matrimoniale des societies australiennes" (see also Bellah, 1959, Lukes, 1973). Truly, a most productive period, with a major monograph appearing almost every year!

Clearly, Durkheim was intent on elaborating the primitive sacral complex as the central interpretive "ideal type" for the human sciences. However, in addition to these many important essays, Durkheim and his colleagues contributed a massive outpouring of book reviews on diverse subjects of interest not just to sociology, but to all the sciences of man. Space does not here permit detailed review of this fascinating and seminal scholarship,[2] but Durkheim's fundamental outlines of the centrality of the sacral complex begin to emerge rather clearly. For example, the moral authority of certain beliefs and social practices take on the character of "sacredness," and it is the moral community which is the carrier of legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness. The organizing opposition between "sacred" and "profane" appeared in the article on defining religion in 1899. The embeddedness of primitive kinship bonds in sacral symbols, the root-

edness of social and legal obligations in religious rationales
and magical formulas, the embeddedness of primitive logic   in
collective mythological symbolism, the compounding binary sys-
tem of symbolic equations being extended to all of existence,
and so on and so forth, all first emerged during this highly
creative period of group research into the significance of
the sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person.

For illustrative purposes, one of the most revealing
shifts in Durkheim's attitude toward the "repressiveness" or
creativeness of the sacral complex can be found in his explan-
ations of the sacral bases of legal phenomena such as property,
contract, taxes, and so on. These shifts are especially note-
worthy because they represent a clear continuity with Durk-
heim's earlier sociology of law, prior to the 1895 breakthrough.
Durkheim developed these ideas in his often-repeated series of
lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit" which, as
Lukes tells us, reached their definitive form in the 1898-1900
lecture series at Bordeaux (portions of these lectures are
translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals). For exam-
ple, after defining the right of property as essentially rest-
ing on "the right to exclude others from use of things" (PECM:
142), Durkheim characteristically explained the origin of this
specific right in sacral terms. For only the sacred can serve
as the source of exclusionary taboo. Careful readers will note
that here, as elsewhere, Durkheim often argued as much from
an implied analogy as from historical fact.

> ... the thing appropriated is a thing distinct from com-
> mon property. Now this feature is also shared by all re-
> ligious and sacred things. Whenever we have a religious
> ritual, the world over, the feature that distinguishes
> the sacred entities is that they are withdrawn from gen-
> eral circulation; they are separate and set apart. The
> common people cannot enjoy them. Those who have a kin-
> ship, as it were, can alone have access to them--that is,
> those who are sacred as they are: the priests, the great,
> and the magistrates.... It is these prohibitions that lie
> at the foundation of what is called taboo.... Taboo is the
> the setting apart of an object as something consecrated,
> as something belonging to the sphere of the divine. By
> virtue of this setting apart, it is forbidden to appro-
> priate the object of taboo under pain of sacrilege....
> We can see how close the connection is between this con-

cept and that of ownership. Around the thing appropria-
ted, as around the sacred thing, a vacuum formed....
Therefore, we are right in supposing that the origins
of property are to be found in the nature of certain
religious beliefs. Since the effects are identical,
they can in all liklihood be attributed to similar cau-
ses (PECM:143-4).

Taxes also, Durkheim suggested, may have a sacral ori-
gin. For instance:

> ... the sacrilege that a man thinks he is committing
> against the gods by the very fact of tilling and break-
> ing up the soil is, in truth, committed against society,
> since society is the reality hidden behind these mythi-
> cal concepts. It is therefore, in a way, to society that
> man makes his sacrifices and offers up the victim....
> These sacrifices, these first fruits of all kinds, are
> the earliest form of taxes. First, they are debts paid
> to the gods; they then become tithes paid to the priests,
> and this tithe is already a regular tax that later on is
> to pass into the hands of the lay authorities. These
> rites of atonement and propitiation finally become what
> amounts to a tax, although unsuspected. The germ of the
> institution is there, however, and is destined to devel-
> op in the future (PECM:162-3).

Durkheim offered a similar genealogy for the emergence
of the legal institution of consensual contract. Originally, he
he contended, sacred oaths were the binding force for the ex-
change of obligations. "The consensual contract is a contract
by solemn ritual" (PECM:194).

> The wills can effect a bond only on condition of declar-
> ing themselves. The declaration is made by words. There
> is something in words that is real, natural, and living
> and they can be endowed with a sacred force, thanks to
> which they compel and bind those who pronounce them. It
> is enough for them to be pronounced in ritual form and
> in ritual conditions. They take on a sacred quality by
> that very act. One means of giving them this sacred char-
> acter is the oath, or invocation of a divine being.
> Through this invocation the divine being becomes the
> guarantor of the promise exchanged. Thereby the promise
> becomes compulsive, under threat of sacred penalties of
> known gravity. For instance, each party pronounces some
> phrase that binds him and a formula by which he calls
> down upon his head certain divine curses if he should
> fail in his undertaking.... sacrifices and magical rites
> of all kinds reinforce still further the coercive force
> of the words uttered (PECM:182).

Indeed, it is interesting to note that, even in our own secular-
ized era, legal oaths retain the character of a divinely guaran-

teed conditional self-curse (eg, swearing on the Bible). The
importance of primitive sprachlogik (see also Cassirer, 1953-
1955-1957) and ritual stereotyping in undergirding contracts
is developed further by Durkheim in terms of Roman law and
culture.

> This, then, seems to be the origin of contracts made in
> all due and solemn formality. One of their features is
> that they are binding only if the parties make an under-
> taking by a formula, solemn and agreed, which cannot be
> evaded. It is the formula which binds. This is the dis-
> tinctive sign by which we recognize a main feature of
> magical and sacred formulas. The juridical formula is
> only a substitute for sacred formalities and rites.
> When certain definite words, arranged in a definite se-
> quence, possess a moral influence which is lost if they
> are different or merely pronounced in a different se-
> quence, we can be certain that they possess or have pos-
> sessed a sacred significance and that they derive their
> peculiar powers from sacred causes. For it is only the
> sacred phrase which has this effect upon things and up-
> on human beings. With the Romans especially, one fact
> tends to show clearly that the origin of the contract
> had a sacred character; this is the custom of the sacra-
> mentum. When two contracting parties were in disagree-
> ment on the nature of their respective rights and du-
> ties, they deposited a sum of money in a temple ... this
> was the sacramentum. The one who lost his case also for-
> feited the sum he had deposited. This means that he was
> fined to the benefit of the deity, which argues that his
> project was held to be an offense against the gods. These
> gods were, then, party to the contract*(PECM:182-3).

Durkheim then sketched out the stages in the evolution of the
rights of contract as it became progressively secularized and
assumed its present form. Since, again, Durkheim saw that
"juridical formalism is only a substitute for sacred formali-
ties and rites," we see that:

> Had it not been for the existence of the contract by
> solemn ritual, there would have been no notion of the
> contract by mutual consent. Nor would there have been
> any idea that the word of honor, which is fugitive and
> can be revoked by anyone, could be thus secured only
> by magic and sacred processes.... The binding force,
> the action, are supplied from without. It is religious
> beliefs that brought about the synthesis; once formed,
> other causes sustained it, because it served a purpose
> (PECM:194).

Illustrations could be multiplied, but perhaps these
suffice to indicate the brilliance of Durkheim's insight into

the sacral origins of legal, institutional, and other cultural
forms, and the enduring fascination of his description of certain crucial sociocultural processes. We now see the nature
and power of Durkheim's new interpretive perspective, and how
far he had come, after the breakthrough of 1895, in exploring
the cultural creativeness and evolutionary centrality of the
primitive sacral womb. Indeed, it is, perhaps, not too much
to suggest that Durkheim's emerging sociology of religion rested on this crucial paradigm.

3. The Third Phase: The Primitive Sacral Complex as Womb of
    Society and Culture

        Durkheim's third phase centers, of course, on The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, published in 1912. In a
very real sense this masterpiece represented the culmination
of Durkheim's program announced in the preface to the second
Annee sociologique, which was first carried out by Durkheim
himself and his co-workers in the pages of this famous "collective representation" of the Durkheimian school in France.
Early in The Elementary Forms, we see Durkheim proclaiming:
"Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even
scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a
long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated
with its spirit" (EF:87); he then proceeded to substantiate
these claims in detail. Indeed, the very core of Durkheim's
exhaustive examination of Australian aboriginal religion as
the site for his crucial experiment into the genetic and evolutionary creativity of the sacral complex was his premise
that only primitive religion was capable of imposing moral
and conceptual unity upon empirical diversity; in short, of
transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Thus, primitive rite and
myth provided the crucial foundation, the template, as it were,
which subsequent cultural forms only elaborated. "The fundamental categories of thought ... and science are of religious
origin.... All the great social institutions have been born
in religion" (EF:466).

This third and culminating period opens roughly around 1906, with Durkheim's lecture course on "La Religion: Origines" (see Stanner, 1967:225; Lukes, 1973:581). By this time, Durkheim had become thoroughly "saturated" with the ethnographic literature on Australia and North America. In 1907, Durkheim delivered his paper "The Determination of Moral Facts" in which he, as Parsons noted years ago, widened out his moral theory to include desirability as well as obligation. In 1909, Durkheim published the first part of his forthcoming Formes Elementaires. In this regard, Stanner tells us:

> Durkheim at first intended to publish under the title Elementary Forms of Thought and Religious Life. In 1909 three parts appeared as articles with titles consonant with that intention. The introduction, plus a part omitted from the book, was printed ... as 'Sociologie religieuse et theorie de la connaisance,' and versions of the second and third chapters ... as "Examen critique des systemes classiques sur les origines de la pensee religieuse.' I have not seen any explanation of the changes of title, but the effect was to obscure the second though in no way secondary object of study: an attempt to 'renovate the theory of knowledge' by a new examination of the categories. This was unfortunate because the book's longer perspective went far beyond religion. It looked in the direction of a grander sociology based on what might be called a natural positivist epistemology.... It was by means of this epistemology that in his view religion, morals, and even science could be conciliated (1967:227).

Further, Stanner, Lukes, and Giddens, among others, have all seen the importance of Durkheim's acknowledgement, early in The Elementary Forms, that in his first attempt at defining religious phenomena in the Annee article fifteen years years earlier, he had stressed the obligatory aspect to the neglect of religious ideas. Doubtless, this early stress on "constraint" came from his positivist emphasis, not so much on external indices, as upon the identification of religion with the "repressiveness" of archaic legal sanctions. In 1912, Durkheim said:

> It is by this that that our present definition is connected to the one that we have already proposed.... In this work, we defined religious beliefs exclusively by their obligatory character; but, as we shall show, the obligation evidently comes from the fact that these be-

liefs are the possession of a group which imposes them upon its members. The two definitions are thus in large part the same. If we have thought it best to propose a new one, it is because the first was too formal, and neglected the content of the religious representations too much (EF:63, #68).

Now, we shall not focus here on the sacred/profane opposition   (but see Chapter Four), but rather <u>on</u> <u>the</u> <u>ability</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>sacred</u> <u>principle</u> <u>to</u> <u>organize</u> <u>and</u> <u>energize</u> <u>the</u> <u>symbolic</u> <u>field</u>. It is through the notion of sacred forces, invisible yet immanent in the world, Durkheim argued, that men are first able to impose conceptual order upon the world--to mold empirical diversity into moral unity. Surely, Durkheim argued, there is nothing in the sensation of the lone, isolated ego which can supply this ordering principle. No, it is religious symbolism. In a most revealing and significant statement in his important address "Judgments of Value and Judgments of Reality" in 1911, Durkheim observed:

> Collective thought changes everything it touches. It throws down the barriers of the realms of nature and combines contraries; it reverses what is called the natural hierarchy of being, makes disparity equal, and differentiates the similar. In a word, society substitutes for the world revealed to us by our senses a different world that is the projection of the ideals of society itself (SP:94-5).

<u>This</u> <u>is</u> <u>the</u> <u>master</u> <u>thesis</u> <u>underlying</u> <u>Durkheim's</u> <u>Elementary</u> <u>Forms</u>.

Now, early in his masterwork, Durkheim discerned the sacral origins of art and writing in the totemic symbols and designs inscribed on the <u>churinga</u> and other sacred objects.

> It cannot be doubted that these designs and paintings also have an esthetic character; here it is the first form of art. Since they are also ... a written language, it follows that the origins of design and those of writing are one. It even becomes clear that men commenced designing, not so much to fix upon wood or stone beautiful forms which charm the senses, as to translate his thought into matter (EF:149).

Further, Durkheim suggested that the original anchors of kinship relations lay in a sacral bond. Of course, in <u>Elementary</u> <u>Forms</u> Durkheim saw totemism as symbolizing this social-sacral link.

> For the members of a single clan are not united to
> each other either by a common habitat, or by common
> blood, as they are not necessarily consanguineous and
> are frequently scattered over different parts of the
> tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from their
> having the same relations with the same categories of
> things, their practising the same rites, or in a word,
> from their participating in the same totemic cult.
> Thus, totemism and the clan mutually imply each other
> (EF:194).

Indeed, it is interesting to note that one of his most succinct
summaries of the sacral basis of the kinship bond appeared in
his lectures on the development of law and morals.

> All members of the same clan have within them, as it
> were, a particle of the divine being from which the
> clan is supposed to be descended. Thus, they bear the
> mark of a sacred symbol, and this is why they are bound
> to be defended, to have their death avenged, and so on
> (PECM:178).

The evolution of thought--indeed, the very categories
of logical thought itself--were seen to be of sacral origin.
In other words, "logical evolution is closely connected with
religious evolution" (EF:267).

> For a long time it has been known that the first sys-
> tems of representations with which men have pictured
> to themselves the world and themselves were of reli-
> gious origin. There is no religion that is not a cos-
> mology at the same time that it is a speculation upon
> divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born
> of religion, it is because religion began by taking the
> place of the sciences and philosophy (EF:21).

But how could this be so? What enabled religion to act as the
womb of society and culture? The answer is to be found in the
master thesis of Durkheim's stated earlier from 1911. The sym-
bolic potency of religious representations to embrace both ma-
terial and moral realms, emotion and cognition--this ability
to fuse opposites, separate similarities, in short, to turn
empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity--it was
this ability which lay at the heart of religion's unique po-
wer and evolutionary significance.

> We are now able to explain the origin of the ambiguity
> of religious forces as they appear in history, and how
> they are physical as well as human, moral as well as
> material. They are moral powers because they are made
> up entirely of the impressions this moral being, the

group, arouses in ... its individual members.... Their
authority is only one form of the moral ascendancy of
society over its members. But, on the other hand, since
they are conceived of under material forms, they could
not fail to be regarded as closely related to material
things. Therefore, they dominate the two worlds. Their
residence is in men, but at the same time, they are the
vital principles of things. They animate minds and dis-
cipline them, but it is also they who make plants grow
and animals reproduce. It is this double nature which
has enabled religion to be like the womb from which
come all the leading germs of human civilization. Since
it has been made to embrace all of reality, the physi-
cal world as well as the moral one, the forces that move
bodies as well as those that move minds have been con-
ceived in a religious form. That is how the most diverse
methods and practices, both those that make possible the
continuation of the moral life (law, morals, beaux-arts)
and those serving the material life (the natural, tech-
nical, and practical sciences) are either directly or
indirectly derived from religion * (EF:254-55).

Because the primitive religious force is represented
as a form of energy, a sort of "sacred electricity" (Weber used
similar analogies) which is highly fluid and flows in and out
of things, inevitably it acts to "con-fuse" them. Sacred ener-
gies overflow, they are "contagious," as Durkheim observed;
and whatever they touch becomes transformed in the same degree
by this "sacred contagion" (see also Chapter Four). All things
touched by the same sacred forces are conceived as possessing
the same essence--this becomes the elementary classificatory
principle.

> We have seen the facility with which the primitive con-
> fuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous
> things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see
> one of the causes which has contributed the most to fa-
> cilitating these confusions. Since religious forces
> are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening
> that the same principle animates very different objects
> equally; it passes from some into others as the result
> of either a simple material proximity or of even a sup-
> erficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals,
> plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men
> because they bear the name of the animal; the animals
> because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the
> plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks
> because they mark the place where the ceremonials are
> celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore consi-
> dered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one
> single religious principle ought to pass as having the

same essence, and as differing from one another only in
secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite
natural to arrange them in a single category, and to re-
gard them as mere variations of the same class, trans-
mutable into one another.
When this relation has been established, it makes the
phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken
by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical
life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings, in
spite of their natural differences? But we have seen that
these confusions and participations have played a role of
the highest utility in logic; they have served to bind to-
gether things which sensation leaves apart from one ano-
ther. So it is far from true that contagion, the source
of these connections and confusions, is marked with that
fundamental irrationality that one is inclined to attri-
bute it at first. It has opened the way for the scienti-
fic explanations of the future * (EF:364-5).

Thus, just as egos are moralized into forming a society, so too
is the world moralized, unified, made into an intelligible cos-
mos through the medium of sacral symbolism. I repeat: sacral
energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world,
serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage.

For instance, Durkheim proposed that the scientific no-
tion of "force," as that of "causality," is derived, ultimate-
ly, from religious notions such as "mana," the Sioux equiva-
lent "wakan," etc.; in short, "charismatic" energies flowing,
directing, and eventually condensing into spirits and gods.
"It is the first form of the idea of force" (EF:232).

In fact, the wakan plays the same role in the world,
as the Sioux conceive it, as the one played by the for-
ces with which science explains the diverse phenomena
of nature.... This, however, does not mean that it is
thought of as an exclusively physical energy; on the
contrary ... we shall see the elements going to make
up this idea are taken from the most diverse realms.
But this very compositenessof its nature enables it to
be utilized as a universal principle of explanation.
It is from it that all life comes.... The wakan is the
cause of all the movements which take place in the uni-
verse.... When the Iroquois says that the life of all
nature is the product of conflicts aroused between the
unequally intense orenda of the different beings, he only
expresses, in his own language, this modern idea that the
the world is a system of forces limiting and containing
each other and making an equilibrium.... So the idea of
force is of religious origin. It is from religion that
it has been borrowed, first by philosophy, then by the
sciences (EF:232-3).

Moreover, because the moral and the material, the cultural and the natural, are joined in a "... solid system whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically," the totemic system becomes a cosmological and moral system simultaneously. Totemism, as the most primitive religion Durkheim thought could be discovered, offers us a rudimentary explanation of the universe. "To a greater or less extent, all known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world" (EF:165).

> For the Australian, things themselves, everything which is in the universe, are a part of the tribe; they are considered elements of it, and so to speak, regular members of it; just like men they have a determined place in the general schema of society.... All known things will thus be arranged in a sort of tableau or systematic classification embracing the whole of nature (EF:166).

> Thus, the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are unified and vibrate sympathetically. This organization, which at first may have appeared to us as purely logical, is at the same time moral. A single principle animates it and makes its unity: this is the totem .... All the beings arranged in a single clan, whether men, animals, plants, or inanimate objects, are merely forms of the same totemic being.... All are really of the same flesh in the sense that all partake of the nature of the totemic animal (EF:175).

Thus, religion is seen as the great, original unifying principle in Durkheim's model of the sacral womb.

In contrast, for example, to Levy-Bruhl, who posited a "pre-logical" mentality, a non-Aristotelian logic, Durkheim posited the psychic unity of mankind, and thus perceived the fundamental sources of identity, of unity in diversity. This could never come from the senses alone.

> ... there is nothing in experience which could suggest these connections and confusions. As far as the observation of the senses is able to go, everything is different and disconnected. Nowhere do we see beings mixing their natures and metamorphosing themselves into each other. It is therefore necessary that some exceptionally powerful cause should have intervened to transfigure reality in such a way as to make it appear under an aspect that is not really its own.

> It is religion that was the agent of this transforma-
> tion; it is religious beliefs that have substituted
> for the world, as it is perceived by the senses, ano-
> ther different one. This is well shown by the case of
> totemism. The fundamental thing in this religion is
> that the men of the clan and the different beings whose
> form the totemic emblems reproduce pass as being made
> of the same essence. Now when this belief was once ad-
> mitted, the bridge between the different kingdoms was
> already built. The man was represented as a sort of
> animal or plant; the plants and animals were thought
> of as the relatives of men, or, rather, all these be-
> ings, so different for the senses, were thought of as
> participating in a single nature. So this remarkable
> aptitude for confusing things that seem to be obvious-
> ly distinct comes from the fact that the first forces
> with which the human intellect peopled the world were
> elaborated by religion. Since these were made up of
> elements taken from the different kingdoms, men con-
> ceived of a principle common to the most heterogeneous
> things, which thus became endowed with a sole and sing-
> le essence (EF:268).

Against the inevitable objections, Durkheim acknowledged:

> It is true that this logic is disconcerting for us.
> Yet we must be careful not to depreciate it: howsoever
> crude it may appear to us, it has been an aid of the
> greatest importance in the intellectual evolution of
> humanity. In fact, it is through it that the first ex-
> planation of the world has been made possible.... So
> it is far from true that this mentality has no con-
> nection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic....
> Between the logic of religious thought and that of
> scientific thought there is no abyss (EF:269,270,271).

Indeed, this was Durkheim's constant refrain throughout his

Elementary Forms--there is no gap in continuity between primi-

tive and modern thought (see especially Horton, 1973). This

thesis provides the evolutionary superstructure upon which his

great masterpiece was organized. When shall we finally come to

recognize his central intention was to reveal the generic and

genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex?

That this was indeed Durkheim's core thesis can be

seen from a most revealing contrast, drawn by Durkheim himself,

between his own work and that of his colleague Levy-Bruhl in a

book review which appeared in 1913 in L'Annee sociologique.

Although he acknowledged that they agreed on many points, most

notably that "primitive mentality is essentially religious,"

Durkheim also took pains to distance himself from Levy-Bruhl's

"contrast/inversion" schema, as Horton (1973) has termed the latter's description of the passage from primitive to modern thought.

> We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of human mentality, however different they may be, far from deriving from different sources, are created one by the other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type and form, force and causality, and personality--those in short, to which philosophers have given the name of "categories," and which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated within the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages in the intellectual life of mankind.... Although, therefore, human mentality has changed and evolved over the centuries in relation to society, the different types which it has successively manifested have each given rise to the other. The higher and more recent forms are not opposed to the lower and more primitive forms, but are created out of the latter (in Giddens, 1972a:248-9).

Once one grasps the depth and meaning of Durkheim's vision, the whole world becomes transformed; one experiences the light dawning, the gestalt switch which constitutes scientific revolutions. For that which had been once outcast, especially by Durkheim himself and his Enlightenment brethren, I mean the unintelligible, chaotic, and even frightening pole in the positivist faith--namely, the past and religion--were now rehabilitated, transformed into meaning and historical order. Levy-Bruhl, who also overemphasized the rationality of "modern man," simply had not yet broken with Enlightenment dogma. But Durkheim had, at least in his own mind, effectively reconciled religion and reason; and the prime alchemical instrument was the creativeness of the sacral womb. Primitive man brought order out of chaos through myth and ritual. While many prepared the way, this was one of the most crucial aspects of Durkheim's revolution in the human sciences (see also Lukes, 1973:474-5).

Now, it must be remembered that the creativeness of the primitive sacral complex was evolutionary as well as genetic. Indeed, it was his evolutionism which first led Durkheim to discover the creativenss of primitive religion in the first place. For example, as we noted in review of The Division of

Labor, Durkheim had already recognized the close relation be-
tween the evolution of the collective and individual conscien-
ce, and the evolution of the notions of the gods. For, much
like Weber in his profound sketch in The Sociology of Religion
(1963), Durkheim outlined the progressive passage from clan-
based exclusionary socio-religious bonds to universalistic or
civilizational symbolic bonds. Originally, said Durkheim, to-
temism served as the sacral base of the kinship bond, for only
those who had been similarly transformed in the ecstatic "col-
lective effervescence" and the communion sacrifice, and who
shared similar ancestral genealogies, could bond themselves
together in a functioning cult. But the commensal barriers of
clan particularism barred passage to a tribal or inter-socie-
tal symbolic bonds. Like Weber, then, Durkheim's key analyti-
cal variables here were the obstacles and facilitating chan-
nels for the progressive passages from particularistic to uni-
versalistic social and cultural bonds. For example, in speaking
of clan totemism, he proposed:

> ... it is the nature of the social environment which
> has imposed this particularism. In fact, as long as
> totemism remains at the basis of the cultural organi-
> zation, the clan keeps an autonomy in the religious
> society which, though not absolute, it always very
> marked.... The group of things attributed to each clan,
> which are a part of it in the same way the men are,
> have the same individuality and autonomy. Each of them
> is represented as irreducible into similar groups, as
> separated from them by a break of continuity, and as
> constituting a distinct realm. Under these circumstan-
> ces, it would never occur to one that these heterogen-
> eous worlds were different manifestations of one and
> the same fundamental force; on the contrary, one might
> suppose that each of them corresponded to an organi-
> cally different mana whose action could not extend be-
> yond the clan and the circle of things attributed to
> it. The idea of a single and universal mana could be
> born only at the moment when the tribal religion de-
> veloped above that of the clans and absorbed them more
> or less completely. It is along with the feeling of tri-
> bal unity that the feelings of the substantial unity of
> the world awakens.... Totemism is essentially a federa-
> tive religion which cannot go beyond a certain point of
> centralization without ceasing to be itself (EF:225-6).

Having noted the resistance of clan particularism to
extension of the socio-religious bond, Durkheim next explored

some special channels which facilitated the spread of "religious internationalism." Cross-clan sexual totemism, tribal initiation rites stemming from the "organization of the tribe into phatries, matrimonial classes ... and the exogamic interdictions attached to them" (EF:319), become "veritable tribal institutions." Mythologies grow up around special heroes or sponsoring ancestors of these intra-tribal institutions. Such gods struggled, as the clans themselves struggled for structural and cultural supremacy; in the clash, and in the new order of reconciliation, one god emerged supreme.

> ... the authority of each of these supreme gods is not limited to a single tribe; it is recognized equally by a number of neighboring tribes.... There are very few gods for a relatively extended geographical area. So the cults of which they are the object have an international character. It even happens sometimes that mythologies, intermingle, combine and make mutual borrowings (EF:325).

The passage from the ancestral geniuses to the idea of a tribal god was accomplished through the medium of the civilizing heroes as a transitionary third term (EF:328). Here:

> ... the clans were, in a sense, the fragments of the divine body. Now is this not just another way of saying that the great god is the synthesis of all the totems and consequently, the personification of the tribal unity?... Thus an international mythology was established, of which the great god was quite naturally the essential element.... So his name passed to it.... The internationalization of the totems opened the way for that of the great god.... This culminating idea is united without any interruption to the crudest beliefs which we analyzed to start with. In fact, the great tribal god is only an ancestral spirit who finally won a preeminent place. The ancestral spirits are only entities forged in the image of the individual souls whose origin they are destined to explain. The souls, in their turn, are only the form taken by the impersonal forces which are found at the basis of totemism, as the individualize themselves in the human body. The unity of the system is as great as its complexity (EF:332).

Finally, again emphasizing the importance of "religious cosmopolitanism" in extending the social bond from the sub-societal to the civilizational level, and consequently, in helping to build universalistic and universalizable structures of conscience and consciousness, Durkheim concludes:

So it is far from true that religious internationalism
is a peculiarity of the most recent and advanced reli-
gions. From the dawn of history, religious beliefs have
manifested a tendency to overflow out of one strictly
limited political society; it is as though they had a
natural aptitude for crossing frontiers, and for diffu-
sing and internationalizing themselves. Of course, there
have been peoples and times when this spontaneous apti-
tude has been held in check by opposed social necessi-
ties; but this does not keep it from being real and ...
very primitive (EF:326; see also 473-4).

In sum, I submit that, almost a decade and a half after
first announcing his program, Durkheim had demonstrated the gen-
eric and genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sa-
cral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person to the
several human sciences. Should we not now, after many decades
of nelgect, turn our attention to Durkheim's revolution in the
human sciences?[1]

D. Shifts in the Connotational Load Carried by the Term "Reli-
       gion" in Durkheim's System of Sociology

Paradigmatic terms often depend for their symbolic poten-
cy on a series of connotations which they accumulate over the
years. In general, the greater the connotational load, the great-
er the number of diverse meanings a paradigmatic term may em-
brace. Indeed, we often witness the "proteanization" of para-
digms, of symbolically charged terms as they become capable of
embracing myriad meanings, and thus, of transforming empirical
diversity into moral and conceptual unity. Seen in this light,
the potency of Durkheim's sociology of religion depended, to a
large extent, upon the multiplicity of meanings or connotation-
al load which it carried. Thus, perhaps it would be helpful if
we attempted to sort out some of the separable meanings of the
term "religion" which Durkheim managed to conflate, or tie to-
gether.

The first and most general way in which Durkheim utili-
zed the term "religion" was in the common sense meaning of the
term--he variously spoke of "religion as such," "religion pro-
perly considered," and so on. This everyday, unreconstructed
connotation implied the usual elements of sacredness, cosmic

principles or divinities directing life, attempts by men to
represent and communicate with these generative and directive
forces, the problems of evil, institutions and religious spe-
cialists--in short, the system of reciprocal relations between
macrocosm and microcosm. Indeed, the key elements of Durkheim's
explicit definition of religion--namely, sacredness and the
moral community (Lukes, 1973)--centered on just these general-
ly accepted meanings of "religion as such."

However, it was precisely against these generalized
background connotations that Durkheim directed his initial po-
sitivist revision of the meaning and referent of religious sym-
bolism and action. As a positivist, Durkheim ruled out of court
--even before proceedings began--the usual theological and meta-
physical claims put forward by most religions. For he proposed:

> [Men] invent by themselves the idea of these powers
> with which they feel themselves in connection, and
> from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way
> in which they were led to represent them under forms
> that are really foreign to their nature and to trans-
> figure them by thought (EF:239-40).

References could be multiplied; but Durkheim never wavered from
his positivist denial of a transcendental meaning to religion.[1]
Indeed, such transcendental truth claims had to be rejected out
of hand, for as the French moral and intellectual reformers
well knew, such "essentialist" appeals blocked their own "laic"
program to construct an "existential" conscience and conscious-
ness. Against the dominant claims of those wayward incumbents
of "office charisma" (to utilize Weber's term) who maintained
a monopoly over definitive interpretation of the "Book of Reve-
lation," the French and Latin "laic" moral reformers and pro-
phets raised the existential claims of "personal charisma" and
the certainties to be read in the "Book of Nature." Thus, in
short, in the modern world religion became reduced to morality,
and theology to anthroposociology.

I cannot here enter into a detailed examination of Durk-
heim's positivist reduction of religious phenomena. Indeed, the
question is most complex, and Durkheim's treatment often surpri-
singly subtle.   But let us agree that any adequate explanation
of human action must include both a set of interpretive symbol-

ic equations by which one sphere or level is to be linked with
another, and a series of transformation terms which link consti-
tutive processes. In these terms, the Marxist, Durkheimian,
Freudian, Weberian, functionalist, structuralist interpreta-
tions, to mention only some of the leading contenders, all meet
the basic criteria of in-depth interpretations of human action.
However, at least one other crucial interpretive canon should
be immediately introduced--namely, the phenomenological injunc-
tion to attempt to discern the multiple meanings actors them-
selves bestow upon their own actions. Clearly, from the various
"distortive" perspectives, the stated intentions of those who
generate and sustain religious action can and must be set aside
in favor of "lower levels" (the spatial metaphor is revealing),
the "unconscious" or "latent functions." Doubtless, there is
much that cannot be explained in terms of "conscious" intention;
there is much that escapes us, and which must be imputed by
"outside" observers. But what, then, is to be the relation be-
tween "unconscious" and "conscious" levels, between "latent"
and "manifest functions," between "sub" and "superstructures?"
This fundamental dilemma is analogous to the problem faced by
physicists and neurophysiologists in relating the so-called
"primary" and "secondary qualities."

On what grounds, for instance, did Durkheim claim that
"... the error concerns the letter of the symbol employed, not
the reality of the fact symbolized" (EF:299). It has not suffi-
ciently emphasized to this point that the special method which
allowed Durkheim to transmute base theism into sociological
gold--which allowed him to acknowledge that "... I can only
add that I myself am quite indifferent to this choice [between
God and society as the religious referent], since I see in the
Divinity only society transfigured and symbolically expressed"
[1906](SP:52)--was an ingenious and unreflective use of ana-
logy. This can be seen most clearly in his lectures on the
sacral and magical bases for the origin and evolution of such
legal categories as property, contract, and so forth. For ex-
ample, Durkheim argued that there was a fundamental similarity
between the private appropriation of an object or place and

the rather unusual "set apartness" of "sacred" things and pla-
ces. Only rarely did he enunciate one of his most fundamental
interpretive principles: "Since the effects are identical,
they can in all liklihood be attributed to the same causes"
(PECM:143-4).

Inevitably, however, the "reductionistic" position in-
volves one in various unforeseen difficulties. As William Kolb
(1953), Evans-Pritchard (1965), Ricoeur (1970), and many others
have pointed out over the years, if people did not believe in
the reality and efficacy of their actions, they simply would
not pursue them; as a consequence, the "distortive" theorists
would be deprived of their complex and ingenious sets of inter-
pretive symbolic equations. Unwittingly, Durkheim himself ack-
nowledged this dilemma years ago: "It is undoubtedly true that
if they were able to see that these influences which they feel
emanate from society, then the mythological system of interpre-
tations would never be born" (EF:239). Nevertheless, he still
insisted on the unique truth of his own systematic insight:
"But social action follows ways that are too circuitous and
obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex.
to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes" (EF:239).
Lukes reports that in 1914, at a conference, Durkheim was ask-
ed directly this question by Gustave Belot:

> Durkheim, Belot insisted, was (despite his claims to
> the contrary), maintaining that all religions were
> false, in so far as they did not accept his own theory.
> Who, asked Belot, would continue to pray, if he knew
> he was praying to no one, but merely addressing a col-
> lectivity that was not listening? Where, he continued:
> 'is the man who would continue to take part in commun-
> ion if he believed that it was no more than a mere sym-
> bol, and that there was nothing real in it' (1973:518)?

Doubtless there are many subtleties not addressed here, but,
ultimately this dilemma comes down to the fact that even the
"distortive" theorists who reduce religion down to the "lower
levels" must end up by laying claim to some special dispensa-
tion for their own uniquely inspired alchemies. So tenuous do
these alchemies become sometimes, so dependent are they upon
the special faiths which inspired them, that they all run the
very real risk, as Raymond Aron remarked of Durkheim's inter-

pretation, of "making their object vanish" (1970:52). And, of
course, if one does not succeed, any of the other contending
reductions will only be to glad to assist in making their com-
petitors' objects of interpretation vanish. Indeed, few have
remarked upon the irony of this cacophany of competing "ulti-
mate interpretations" (but see Ricoeur, 1975); perhaps we
would be best advised to set each against the other, and let
the Hobbesian struggle of each against all resolve the "battle
royal" of the reductionists. In sum, Durkheim must be consider-
ed a positivist whose central problem in this regard was to
"... rediscover the reality of religion after having elimina-
ted the supernatural from it" (Aron, 1970:51). Further, besid-
es eliminating the generic intention from religious action and
the prime referent of religious symbolism, Durkheim added the
characteristic historical charge, stemming from the various
"Enlightenments," that religion traditionally held man in in-
tellectual and moral "servitude;" that religions, in short,
were always, by their very nature, "repressive." Indeed, as
noted before, in any all-embracing cosmological system "...
law which is agreed to be the word of God Himself cannot fail
to be repressive" (DL:141). Thus, the initial thrust of Durk-
heim's critical sociology of religion was typical for his day;
it coincides with the usual "Enlightenment" charges that "reli-
gion is neither good nor true," as Benton Johnson has lucidly
summarized this position.

However, after saying all this, it is important to re-
cognize that from this point on Durkheim parted company with
his anti-metaphysical, anti-clerical, rationalist "Enlighten-
ment" brethren. His dialectical genius as one of the great mo-
dern moral philosophers takes over; for Durkheim next mounted
an equally ingenious "rescue campaign" to "save the phenomena"
of religion. Indeed, is it not curious that neither of the
twin architects of the modern sociology of religion (the other
being the "religiously unmusical" Max Weber) themselves believ-
ed in the reality of religious action, only in its human signi-
ficance? Instead of wholly setting aside religion as neither
good ("repressive") nor true ("superstition, the lie of the

priests"), Durkheim attempted to transmute religious thought
and action into acceptable metaphors and beneficial consequen-
ces. His first step was to insist that religion cannot simply
be a total illusion, because all men have believed in it in
one form or another throughout history. Thus, to refute those
"distortive" theorists who argue that religion is illusion and
bad, Durkheim appealed to the universality of religious beliefs.
"It remains incomprehensible that humanity should have remain-
ed obstinate in these errors through the ages, for experience
should have very quickly proven them false" (EF:257).

The second stage in Durkheim's positivist and "laic"
program to "save the phenomena" of religion without its meta-
physical and hierocratic base, was rooted in the very real in-
sight that it is the "moral community" which is the cultural
carrier of intellectual and moral legitimate authority, of,
in a word, "sacredness."

> From our point of view, these difficulties vanish. Reli-
> gion ceases to be an inexplicable hallucination and takes
> a foothold in reality. In fact, we can say that the be-
> liever is not deceived when he believes in the existence
> of a moral power upon which he depends and from which
> he receives all that is best in himself: this power ex-
> ists, it is society. When the Australian is carried out-
> side himself and feels a new life flowing within him
> whose intensity surprises him, he is not the dupe of an
> illusion; this exaltation is real and is really the ef-
> fect of forces outside of and superior to the individual.
> It is true that he is wrong in thinking that this in-
> crease of vitality is the work of a power in the form
> of some animal or plant. But this error is merely in re-
> gard to the letter of the symbol ... and not in regard
> to the fact of its existence. Behind these figures and
> metaphors ... there is a concrete and living reality.
> Thus, religion acquires a meaning and a reasonableness
> that the most intransigent rationalist cannot misunder-
> stand (EF:257).

Durkheim thus came to see religion as the prime symbolic medium
by which societies first attained self-consciousness of them-
selves as a group. "Before all, it is a system of ideas with
which the individuals represent to themselves the society of
which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations
which they have with it" (EF:257). Or as Giddens lucidly sum-
marizes: "Religion is the symbolic self-consciousness of so-

ciety, but in a form which is not truly accessible to the
very men who create it" (1972a:21).

The third stage by which Durkheim conferred new signi-
ficance on his positivist transformation of religion into the
symbolic self-consciousness emerging from the creativeness of
generic sociocultural process was the one we are primarily in-
terested in here--namely, the unique distinction of having ser-
ved as the primal creative womb of society, culture, and per-
son. Thus, instead of being viewed primarily as "repressive"
and "regressive," primitive and archaic religions now became
cast as the central evolutionary matrix for all human society.
What lent this proposition a paradoxical air--especially com-
ing from a life-long "laic" positivist--was that this implied
the evolution out of religion of the very cultural forms with
which the former is so often opposed--namely, logic and scien-
ce, indeed, rational thought itself. An extraordinary sugges-
tion! While religion and science may oppose each other in the
modern world as competing bases for legitimate intellectual
and moral authority, in their common origins in the primitive
sacral complex they were as one. Rather than the over simple
rationalist equation of evolutionary progress with seculari-
zation, Durkheim insisted that the achievements of primitive
religions were an integral part of cultural evolution (see
especially Robin Horton, 1973).

However, in the symbolic underground of this positiv-
ist moral philosopher's thought, I propose that Durkheim's
dialectical drive took him even further in attempting to re-
concile these apparent opposites. For Durkheim's dialectical
genius led him to attempt to transmute religion, through the
evolutionary process, into reason. The alchemical instrument
was, of course, the notion of the primitive sacral complex as
the womb of society and culture. Now, remember that one of
the positions often held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren,
against which he polemicized so vigorously, was the supposi-
tion that "Reason" is a generic human faculty, embedded
deep within the lone, isolated, abstract ego. On the contrary,
Durkheim argued, the fundamental categories of human thought,

and even the notion of the person itself, are social and cultural and historical constructions. As societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems; and, as Durkheim proposed, collective representations, once born in the primitive sacral complex, tend to become increasingly abstract, autonomous, universalizable, and rational as they reach civilizational levels. And, of course, public symbols and moral rules were the preconditions for the awakening of individual conscience and consciousness. In sum, Durkheim argued that the autonomization of the person, and rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse, proceed together on the world-historical level (see E. Leites, 1974; B. Nelson, 1973a). In short, what I suggest is that, by a complex and often circuitous series of more or less implicit symbolic equations and cultural-historical transformations, Durkheim's reconstructed positivist system tended to transmute religion into reason. Indeed, if one understands this complex transformational sequence, we can begin to fathom why Durkheim so assiduously pursued the construction of sociology as the "science of the moral life --for sociology was itself destined to become the new form of societal self-consciousness, the new fount of legitimate "laic" moral and intellectual authority, the new ground of "sacredness." Lukes, among others, has noted this crucial dialectical transformation: "... as a cognitive enterprise, religion was, if not quite defunct, certaintly moribund. Sociology was its successor" (1973:476).

Thus, Durkheim's positivist paradox was made possible only by the combination of his dialectical genius and his moral earnestness. For although he set aside the generic religious intention, he simultaneously sought to save the moralizing effects of religious action by transmuting the religious core into his own sociological system--I mean quite literally. Yet, in any such profound series of symbolic transformations and intellectual alchemies, traditional connotational loads linger on. Now, it was precisely by redirecting these lingering meanings of religion in the traditional sense, by submitting them

to his own ingenious series of symbolic transmutations, that Durkheim's dialectical genius appeared to triumph in overcoming such potent traditional oppositions. If, in the final analysis, we cannot give ourselves completely over to his reductions and positivist symbolic equations, can we not, at least, follow his brilliant analytical leads into the world-historical significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person?

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions,
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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VOLUME II

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June 1978

CHAPTER SEVEN

DURKHEIM ON CIVILIZATIONS AND INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL PROCESS

> Collective representations are the result of an im-
> mense cooperation, which stretches out not only into
> space but into time as well; to make them, a multi-
> tude of minds have associated, united, and combined
> their sentiments; for them, long generations have ac-
> cumulated their experience and their knowledge (EF:29).

> Civilization only expresses a collective life of a spe-
> cial genre, the substratum of which is a plurality of
> interrelated political bodies acting upon one another.
> International life is merely social life of a higher
> kind, and one which sociology needs to know (1971:813).

One of the most important and least explored aspects of
Durkheim's system of sociology was his continuing concern with
the civilizational level of sociocultural analysis. In terms
of his basic explanatory model, Durkheim proposed significant
parallel developments on the micro and macro levels of socio-
cultural process. His concern with the emergence of collect-
ively symbolic representations out of specific social morpho-
logical conditions on the micro societal level led him to
postulate, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and con-
tinuing parallel between social morphological differentiation
and differentiation of the corresponding collective represen-
tations. This parallel evolutionary differentiation implied a
series of key processual dimensions, including the movement
from concrete to abstract symbolism, from parochial or tribal
to universalizable representations, from the fused embedded-
ness of symbols in the primitive sacral complex to the differ-
entiated autonomy of symbols, spheres, and persons, and so on.
It is sad, but not surprising, that since the relations between
societal and civilizational levels have vanished not only from
secondary accounts of Durkheim's sociology but from the con-
temporary sociological horizon as well, the critical constitu-

tive sociocultural processes underlying these world-histori-
cal developments should also be slighted by subsequent gene-
rations of sociologists.

Durkheim's deep interest in sociocultural processes led
him to investigate linkages between social morphological pro-
cesses and cultural symbolic forms not merely in terms of
their most elementary forms, where the essential links could
be seen most clearly, but also in terms of their more complex
forms, especially in terms of civilizations and inter-civili-
zational processes. Indeed, from his first great book to his
last, Durkheim was centrally concerned with broad evolution-
ary passages from the simplest, most primitive levels of so-
ciocultural process to modern complex civilizations. At var-
ious points in various works, Durkheim referred to certain
collective representations (eg. Christian individualism, Car-
tesian rationalism, etc.) which had become historically sedi-
mented into Western civilization. In short, just as Durkheim
recognized a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less
fluid to crystallized collective representations, so too he
postulated a vertical continuum of sociocultural processes
ranging from the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive
collective representations to the most differentiated, uni-
versal, autonomous cultural symbols on the macro-level of
sociocultural process.

In The Division of Labor, for instance, Durkheim pro-
posed that the "progressive effacement" of segmental society
implied a parallel transformation of concrete and localized
symbolism into more general, abstract, unifying collective
representations.

> In a small society, since everyone is clearly placed in
> the same conditions of existence, the collective environ-
> ment is essentially concrete. It is made up of beings
> of all sorts who fill the social horizon. The states of
> conscience representing it have the same character.
> First, they are related to precise objects, as this ani-
> mal, this plant, this natural force, etc. Then, as every-
> body is related to these things in the same way, they af-
> fect all consciences in the same way. The whole tribe,
> if not too widely extended, enjoys or suffers the same ad-
> vantages or inconveniences from the sun, heat, or cold,

from this river, or that source, etc. The collective
impressions resulting from the fusion of all these in-
dividual impressions are then determined in form as
well as in object, and, consequently, the common con-
science has a defined character. But it changes its
nature as societies become more voluminous. Because
these societies are spread over a vaster surface, the
common conscience is itself obliged to rise above all
local diversities, to dominate more space, and conse-
quently to become more abstract. For not many general
things can be common to all these diverse environments.
It is no longer such an animal, but such a species...
not this forest, but forest in abstracto (DL:287).

This movement from concrete, highly specific collective
representations, especially those symbolizing the group itself
in all its special particularities, is paralleled, given the un-
derlying progressive social morphological differentiation, by
another closely related evolutionary passage from highly part-
icularized, formalized symbolisms, to increasingly generalized
rules of conduct. Given the "repressiveness" of what I have
earlier termed "the primitive sacral complex," Durkheim saw
a progressive evolution of morality from highly ritualized,
stereotyped, formalizable rules of specific conduct, to more
flexible, generalized, rationalized, and more individualized
forms of morality. As the index of the progressive effacement
of the segmental type of tribal society in the face of the in-
ternationalization of social life, Durkheim looked to the de-
cline of stereotyping formalism and the rise of generalizable
rules of conduct. In short, the inevitable breakdown of seg-
mental tribal society, and thus the cult upon which it rested,
under the pressure of the ineluctable law of the progressive
extension of the "radius of social life," meant that particu-
laristic or tribal barriers to the internationalization of
moral rules and conceptual meanings are increasingly attenua-
ted.

At the same time as religion, the rules of law become
universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at
first to local circumstances, to particularities,
ethnic, climate, etc., they free themselves little
by little, and with the same stroke become more gen-
eral. What makes this increase of generality obvious
is the uninterrupted decline of formalism. In lower
societies, the very external form of conduct is pre-

> determined even to the details. The way in which man
> must eat, dress in every situation, the gestures he
> must make, the formula he must pronounce, are precise-
> ly fixed. On the contrary, the further one strays from
> the point of departure, the more moral and juridical
> prescriptions lose their sharpness and precision. They
> rule only the most general forms of conduct, and rule
> them in a very general manner, saying what must be done,
> not how it must be done (DL:289).

One of the clearest indices of this progressive move-
ment from concrete, particularized, ritually stereotyped form-
alisms to abstract, increasingly universalistic symboliza-
tion, Durkheim argued, can be found in the progressive trend
toward transcendental, universal, and monotheistic gods. The
breakdown of the primitive sacral-magical complex is a key
process in religious evolution.

> The fact which perhaps best manifest this increasing
> tendency of the common conscience is the parallel tran-
> scendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean
> the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not
> distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods,
> but only sacred beings.... But little by little, reli-
> gious forces are detached from the things of which they
> were first only the attributes, and become hypostatized.
> Thus is formed the notions of spirits or gods who, while
> residing here or there as preferred, nevertheless exist
> outside of the particular objects to which are more spe-
> cifically attached. By that very fact they are less con-
> crete... The Graeco-Latin polytheism ... marks new pro-
> gress in the direction of transcendence. The residence
> of the gods becomes more sharply distinct from that of
> man. Set upon the mysterious heights of Olympus, or
> dwelling in the recesses of the earth, they personally
> intervene in human affairs only in intermittent fashion.
> But it is only with Christianity that God takes leave of
> space; his kingdom is no longer of this world. The dis-
> sociation of nature and the divine is so complete that
> it degenerates into antagonism. At the same time, the
> concept of divinity becomes more general, and more ab-
> stract, for it is formed, not of sensations, as origin-
> ally, but of ideas. The God of humanity necessarily is
> less concrete than the gods of the city or the clan
> (DL:288-9).

It is significant that Durkheim's description of the evolu-
tion of the gods, and the corresponding evolution of law and
morality, parallels Weber's insights into the development of
early religions. Both Durkheim and Weber--especially in his
magisterial The Sociology of Religion (1963 and 1968)

--viewed the progressive tendency toward religious universalism, and the corresponding decline of the primitive stereotyped sacral-magical collectivized structures of conscience and consciousness, as one of <u>the</u> critical processes in sociocultural evolution. In contrast to Durkheim, however, Weber searched for the specific historical preconditions allowing specific cultural carriers of universalizing religious tendencies to breakthrough the primitive cosmological and ritual consciousness. Significantly, even though Durkheim viewed these cumulative series of specific historical breakthroughs abstractly, as constituting generic evolutionary processes, nonetheless, at certain points, he did acknowledge the uniqueness of Christian universalism, for example (see also Book Three).

While Durkheim abstractly viewed widening religious universalism as a generic evolutionary process in <u>The Division of Labor</u>, two decades later in <u>The Elementary Forms</u> he took greater care to explain how this tendency came about. At first, it might appear that Durkheim's turn to wider-than-societal frames such as universalistic religions and civilizations might prove inconsistent with the foundation theorem of his school. For how is it possible to link universalistic cultural forms to their functions in a specific social body? In other words, how are we to anchor collective representations on the civilizational level to a geographically determinable social morphological substratum, when such symbols by definition transcend tribal and national boundaries? In <u>The Elementary Forms</u> Durkheim answered by moving from the micro, intra-societal level to the macro-evolutionary, inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal level. On the intra-societal level, as our investigation of his basic causal model demonstrated, Durkheim proposed that cultural forms symbolized the collective relationships of people brought into sustained interaction. Now, as once before when he moved from the intra-societal level of competition to the international division of labor, on the inter-societal or civilizational level Durkheim extended the underlying logic of the collectively symbolizing process to include

the increasingly universalistic relations between members of
different societies; or, as he would say, members of a new in-
ternational social life.

> ... If religion is the product of social causes, how
> can we explain the individual cult and the universal-
> istic character of certain religions? If it is born
> in foro externo, how has it been able to pass into the
> inner conscience of the individual and penetrate there
> ever more and more profoundly? If it is the work of
> definite and individualized societies, how has it been
> able to detach itself from them, even to the point of
> being conceived as something common to all humanity
> (EF:472)?

Durkheim answered that the increasing cosmopolitanism of reli-
gious life and symbols is a consequence of his basic law--the
ever-increasing extension of the radius of social energy and
collective life.

> Neighboring tribes of a similar civilization cannot
> fail to be in constant relations with each other. All
> sorts of circumstances give an occasion for it: besides
> commerce, which is still rudimentary, there are marria-
> ges; these international marriages are very common in
> Australia. In the course of these meetings, men natu-
> rally become conscious of the moral relationship which
> united them.... If sacred beings are formed which are
> connected with no geographically determined society,
> that is not because they have an extra-social origin.
> It is because there are other groups above these geo-
> graphically determined ones, whose contours are less
> clearly marked: they have no fixed frontiers, but in-
> clude all sorts of more or less neighboring and rela-
> ted tribes. The particular social life thus created
> tends to spread itself over an area with no definite
> limits. Naturally, the mythological personages who cor-
> respond to it have the same character; their sphere of
> influence is not limited; they go beyond the particu-
> lar tribes and their territory. They are the great in-
> ternational gods. Now there is nothing in this situa-
> tion which is peculiar to Australian societies. There
> is no people and no state which is not part of another
> society, more or less unlimited, which embraces all the
> the peoples and all the states with which the first comes
> in contact, either directly or indirectly; there is no
> national life which is not dominated by a collective life
> of an international nature. In proportion as we advance
> in history, these international groups acquire a certain
> importance and extent. Thus we see how, in certain cases,
> this universalistic tendency has been able to develop it-
> self to the point of affecting not only the higher ideas
> of the religious system, but even the principles upon
> which it rests (EF:473-4).

Alongside these parallel passages in sociocultural evo-
lution from concrete, tribal, sacrally legitimated collective
symbols to the later abstract, general, universalizable, dif-
ferentiated, and secularly autonomous spheres of complex cult-
ures, Durkheim posited a critical corollary movement--namely,
the evolutionary emergence of logical thought itself . Here,
Durkheim's view of universalization, abstraction, differentia-
tion, autonomization, and rationalization was parallel in many
ways to Weber's view of the increasing rationalization of all
departments of life. In contrast to those who presumed that
the structure of logical thought was inherent in human nature,
Durkheim set out one of the most significant and overlooked
postulates of his entire system--namely, that the very struct-
ures of rational thought, and, in turn, the rationales under-
lying modern individualism, are themselves sociocultural his-
torical constructions. Given the inevitable extension of the
radius of social life, and therefore progressive social morpho-
logical differentiation, then the corresponding differentia-
tion and extension of collectively symbolic cultural forms
served as critical vehicles for the elaboration of rational-
ity and individualism. In other words, the widening of the so-
cial bond and rationalization of morality and thought proceed
together on the world-historical level. It is, Durkheim argued,
only the fact that these sociocultural constructions are so
deeply sedimented in the very nature of modern complex civili-
zation that we fail to perceive their historical character.

> It has often been remarked that civilization has a
> tendency to become more rational and more logical.
> The cause is now evident. That alone is rational
> which is universal. What baffles the understanding
> is the particular and the concrete. Only the gener-
> al is well thought of. Consequently, the nearer the
> common conscience is to particular things, the more
> it bears their imprint, the more unintelligible it
> also is*(DL:289-90).

Now, one of Durkheim's basic dichotomies in this regard was
the opposition between concepts and sensations. Here, this
root dichotomy takes on a genetic-historical character, for
Durkheim identified primitive thought with localized sensations,

and logical thought with more generalized, differentiated, and abstracted social relationships.

> That is why primitive civilizations affect us as they do. Being unable to subsume them under logical principles, we succeed in seeing only bizarre and fortuitous combinations of heterogeneous elements. In reality, there is nothing artificial about them. It is necessary only to seek their determining causes in sensations and movements of sensibility, not in concepts. And if this is so, it is because the social environment for which they are made is not sufficiently extended. On the contrary, when civilization is developed over a vaster field of action, when it is applied to more people and things, general ideas necessarily appear and become predominant there. The idea of man, for example, replaces in law, morality, in religion, that of Roman, which being more concrete, is refractory to science. Thus, it is the increase of volume in societies and their greater concentration which explains this great transformation (DL:290).

True to his fundamental postulates, Durkheim here expressed his seminal notion that logical or rational and universally valid thought is itself an evolutionary emergent--a sociocultural historical construction--rather than a generic given. In his conclusion to his masterpiece, The Elementary Forms, published almost two decades after The Division of Labor, Durkheim suggested:

> If logical thought tends to rid itself more and more of the subjective and personal elements which it still retains from its origin, it is not because extra-social factors have intervened; it is much rather because a social life of a new sort is developing. It is this international life which has already resulted in universalizing religious beliefs. As it extends, the collective horizon enlarges; the society ceases to appear as the only whole, to become a part of a much vaster one, with undetermined frontiers, which is susceptible of advancing indefinitely. Consequently, things can no longer be contained in the social moulds according to which they were primitively classified; they must be organized according to principles which are their own, so logical organization differentiates itself from the social organization and becomes autonomous. Really and truly human thought is not a primitive fact; it is the product of a history* (EF:493).

Given the great value placed by Durkheim on these higher level evolutionary emergents--especially rationality and individualism--one might conclude that such sociocultural achieve-

ments are consciously won. However, true to his positivist commitments, and in direct contrast to spiritualistic or ethical philosophers who portray humanity as striving to reach ever-higher civilizational levels, Durkheim forcefully argued that these results are more or less mechanically produced. Far from serving as a conscious goal, these civilizational achievements are themselves mechanical results of ever-increasing social intensity, energy, social morphological differentiation and the progressive division of labor.

> Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of the changes which are produced in the volume and in the density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity which is imposed upon men. It is because there is, for them, no other way of living in the new conditions in which they have been placed. From the time that the number of individuals among whom social relations are established begins to increase, they can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, harder work, and intensification of their faculties. From this general stimulation, there inevitably results a much higher degree of culture. From this point of view, civilization appears, not as an end which moves peoples by its attraction for them, not as a good foreseen and desired in advance ... but as the effect of a cause, as the necessary resultant of a given state. It is not the pole towards which historical development is moving and to which men seek to get nearer in order to be happier or better, for neither happiness nor morality necessarily increases with the intensity of life. They move because they must move, and what determines the speed of this march is the more or less strong pressure which they exercise upon one another, according to their number (DL:336-7).

Toward the end of his life, Durkheim took greater care to develop the notion of civilization as the highest international level of sociocultural complexity. First, it is necessary to distinguish between several meanings of civilization, especially the meaning of "high" and "low" culture as implied in the phrase "state of civilization" as contrasted with the notion of sociocultural complexity. For example, in The Division of Labor, and even as late 1906, Durkheim still used the term civilization in the first sense:

> Civilization is the result of cooperation of men in
> association through successive·generations; it is es-
> sentially a social product.... Civilization is the as-
> sembly of all the things to which we attach the high-
> est price; it is the congregation of the highest human
> values (SP:54).

Second, Durkheim was often critical of other sociologists at-
tempts to define civilizations in the second sense as a level
of sociocultural complexity. He contended "... that these at-
tempts, although conducted by scciologists of worth, have giv-
en only vague, indecisive results of little utility" (R:88,#10).
For example, in "Two Laws of Penal Evolution", Durkheim argued
that "... the same society can no more change its type in the
course of its evolution, than an animal can change its species
during its own lifetime" [1900] (1973:288), and then followed
with this footnote:

> This is why it does not seem to us to be very scienti-
> fic to classify societies according to their degree of
> civilization, as both Spencer and Steinmetz have done.
> For one is then obliged to classify one and the same
> society into several social species, according to the
> political structure it has successively assumed or ac-
> cording to the degree of civilization which it has pro-
> gressively passed through. What would one say of a zoo-
> logist who classified the same animal into different
> species in this fashion? And yet a society has even
> more than does an organism a definite character, unique
> to itself, in certain respects, from the beginning to
> the end of its existence; consequently, a system of
> classification which fails to recognize this fundamen-
> tal unity seriously distorts reality. One can, of cour-
> se, distinguish in this fashion between social states,
> not societies; and social states separated thus from
> the permanent substructures which binds them one to ano-
> ther, rest on a foundation of air. It is therefore the
> analysis of this infrastructure, and not the changing
> ways of living which it sustains, which alone can pro-
> vide the basis for a rational classification (1973:307,
> #2).

And in the second edition of his Rules (1901), Durkheim brief-
ly reviewed efforts such as those of the Germans Vierkandt and
Steinment (the latter which he published in the Annee sociolo-
gique) as deficient for "... classifying not social species,
but historical phases, which is quite different" (R:88). Clear-
ly, Durkheim's own thought, still beset by biological analo-

gies, had not settled on a clear articulation of the sociological meaning and significance of "civilization."

It was not until 1913 that Durkheim, with the help of Mauss, turned attention to a fuller elaboration of this important concept in their joint "Sur la notion de civilisation" published in the last Annee sociologique to appear with Durkheim at the editorial helm. Having just completed detailed analyses and explanations of the key intra-societal functions of collectively representational processes in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim next turned his attention to analysis of the inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal horizons implied in the passage from concrete, stereotyped formalisms, fused and sacralized symbols toward universalizable cultural forms. With this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level of sociocultural process the growing recognition of the importance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural forms marks a new and significant phase in Durkheim's development, albeit one which was cut short by the impending doom of World War I. Later, Mauss extended their original joint paper (see B. Nelson, 1971), and thereafter, the new thrust of Durkheimian sociology influenced some of the finest writing in the historical and social sciences produced in France (see especially the Annales...) during this era (see R. Rhodes, 1974).

Durkheim and Mauss began their important and overlooked "Note on the Notion of Civilization", only recently brought to our attention by Benjamin Nelson (1971), by observing that if the foundation theorem of their school was applied too narrowly, then crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic cultural forms constituting civilizational complexes would, unfortunately, be slighted.

> One of the rules we follow here is that, in studying
> social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we
> take care not to leave them in the air but always to
> relate them to a definite substratum, that is, to a
> human group occupying a determinate portion of geogra-
> phically representable space. But, of all these groups,
> the largest--that which comprises all of the others in
> itself and which consequently comprises all forms of
> social activity--is, it would appear, that which forms

the political society: tribe, clan, nation, city,
state, and so on. It seems, then, on first view,
that collective life can develop only within polit-
ical organisms having definite contours, within
strictly marked limits, that is to say, that the
national life is the highest form of social pheno-
mena and sociology cannot know one of a higher or-
der.   There are, nonetheless, phenomena which do
not have such well-defined limits; they pass beyond
the political frontiers and extend over less easily
determinable spaces. Although their complexity ren-
ders their study difficult, it nonetheless behooves
us to acknowledge their existence and to indicate
their place within the bounds of sociology (1971:809).

Ethnography and prehistory, Durkheim suggested, have stood
almost alone in "... directing our attention to this perspect-
ive," in contrast to both history, which has tacitly embra-
ced the nation state as its basic unit of analysis, and socio-
logy, which has looked either to sub-national social group-
ings or to an abstracted "humanity" (eg. see Durkheim's re-
peated criticisms of Comte on this matter in The Rules).

Now, this important recognition of certain potential
limitations in the basic explanatory rule of their school re-
presents not so much an abandonment of this rule on the part
of Durkheim and Mauss, as a crucial turning point in the ex-
tension of their basic interpretive logics to new and more
significant levels of complexity. Durkheim had previously
prepared the way for this important extension by his early in-
sistence that universal, abstract, and rational collective re-
presentations take on increasing significance in sociocultural
evolution in that they come to symbolize the new emerging inter-
national social life. Universalizable symbols--those capable
of constituting civilizational complexes--express public re-
cognition of the growing bonds between members of diverse so-
cieties.

Social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a
social organization do exist: they extend into areas
that reach beyond the national territory or they devel-
op over periods of time that exceed the history of a
single society. They have a life which is some ways
supranational (1971:810).

Durkheim and Mauss utilized the Indo-European family
of languages to illustrate the significance of these crucial
inter-societal, inter-temporal matrices of complex sociocul-
tural life. If we limit ourselves simply to societal or sub-
cultural analyses, we inevitably cut ourselves off from these
wider horizons. This failure becomes more critical when we
realize that, in general, higher levels of complexity exert
greater influence on lower levels through time than vice versa.

> ... it has been recognized that phenomena which pre-
> sent this degree of extension are not independent of
> one another; they are generally linked in an inter-
> dependent system. It often occurs that one of these
> phenomena involves the others and reveals their exist-
> ence.... All peoples who speak an Indo-European lang-
> uage have a common fund of ideas and institutions.
> There exist not merely isolated instances, but also
> complex and interdependent systems, which without be-
> ing limited to a determinate political organism are,
> however, localizable in time and space (1971:810).

Durkheim and Mauss assigned the term "civilization" to these
higher order of translocal sociocultural facts, and defined
them thus: "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu
encompassing a certain number of nations, each national cult-
ure being only a particular form of the whole" (1971:811).
However, these theorists proceeded further, and noted the here-
tofore neglected advantages of the civilizational perspective.

> All sorts of problems, neglected until now, could be
> connected with this subject. One could ask what are
> the diverse conditions which determine variations in
> the areas of civilizations, why have they stopped here
> or there, what forms they have taken and what factors
> determine these forms. As Ratzel has shown, these ques-
> tions that are asked concerning political frontiers
> could be posed equally well with respect to symbolic
> frontiers (frontieres ideales) (1971:812).

Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss's deep concern with the evolution-
ary emergence of these ascending orders of "symbolic frontiers"
led them to conclude:

> ... civilization only expresses a collective life of a
> special genre, the substratum of which is a plurality
> of interrelated political bodies acting upon one ano-
> ther. International life is merely social life of a
> higher kind, and one which sociology needs to know.
> ... The exclusion of sociology from these studies would
> never have been considered if it were not still

> believed that to explain a civilization one need
> merely ask whence it comes, from what it has bor-
> rowed, and by what means it has passed from one
> point to another. In reality, the true manner of
> understanding all this is to determine the causes
> of which it is the result, that is to say, what col-
> lective interactions of diverse orders produced it
> (1971:813).

Further, Durkheim and Mauss emphasized the differential
susceptibility of various structural and cultural elements to
inter-cultural and evolutionary sedimentation into the socio-
cultural process on the civilizational level.

> Furthermore, not all social phenomena are equally apt
> to internationalize themselves. Political jurisdictions,
> juridical institutions, the phenonena of social morphol-
> ogy constitute part of the specific character of each
> people. On the other hand, the myths, tales, money, com-
> merce, fine arts, techniques, tools, languages, words,
> scientific knowledge, literary forms, and ideas--all of
> these travel and are borrowed. In short, they result
> from a process involving more than a determinate society
> (1971:812).

Durkheim and Mauss emphasized here a critical dimension in
inter-civilizational process, for by their very nature, high-
er level cultural forms symbolizing links between diverse so-
cieties must rise above all tribalistic particularities to an
increasingly universalizable level. A year earlier in the con-
clusion to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to dis-
tinguish universality (or universalizability) from generality,
or the degree of extension of a concept.

> The universality of the concept should not be confused
> with its generality; they are very different things.
> What we mean by universality is the property which the
> the concept has of being communicable to a number of
> minds, and in principle, to all minds; but this com-
> municability is wholly independent of the degree of its
> extension. A concept which is applied to only one ob-
> ject, and whose extension is consequently at the mini-
> mum, can be the same for everybody: such is the case
> with the concept of a deity* (EF:482, #9).

Thus, a universalizable cultural form is one which is capa-
ble of symbolizing inter-societal, inter-temporal phenomena;
universalizable symbols lie at the very heart of the civili-
zational bond. Durkheim and Mauss developed further this cru-
cial criterion of degrees of potential universal communicabil-

ity or universalizability among the various social facts as
more or less successful candidates for incorporation into
the civilizational process. They noted that certain types of
cultural elements, by their very nature, are predisposed to
this very important process of inter-cultural and inter-tem-
poral sedimentation.

> It is justifiable, then, to ask on what this unequal co-
> efficient of expansion and internalization depends. These
> differences are not determined solely by the intrinsic
> nature of the social phenomena, but also by the diverse
> conditions influencing societies. A certain form of col-
> lective life, then, may or may not be susceptible to in-
> ternationalization depending on these circumstances.
> Christianity is essentially international, but there have
> also been strictly national religions. There are some
> languages which are spread across vast territories; there
> are others which serve to distinguish nationalities, as
> is the case with those spoken by the great peoples of
> Europe (1971:812).

Durkheim and Mauss's potentially profound contribution
here to the sociological theory of collective representations
as key constitutive sociocultural processes on the civiliza-
tional level needs only the notion of cultural-historical
traditions to become one of the most valuable perspectives
in the human sciences of the future.[1]

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERSON THROUGH HISTORY

Introduction. At the outset, a paradox presents itself: how
is it possible that the Durkheim who is portrayed as radical-
ly anti-individualist was also the very same thinker whose
central value in the modern world was the human person? How
could Durkheim deny the individual independent status, and
then enshrine him at the core of modern culture? How could
Durkheim, at one and the same time, authorize society as the
foundation of human life, and then apotheosize the "modern
cult of the individual"? Do these seemingly contradictory po-
sitions not bespeak of an ineradicable inconsistency in Durk-
heim's thought which vitiates its value?

   Rather than demonstrating Durkheim at his worst, how-
ever, perhaps these positions reveal him at his best. For, as
always, Durkheim sought to dialectically reconcile such anti-
nomies in terms of a new and higher sociocultural synthesis.
In transcending the limits of these received dichotomies,
Durkheim sought to build a new foundation for the human scien-
ces resting on the twin anchors of socio-logic and evolution-
ary progress. Problems in understanding this apparent combi-
nation of opposites are really ours, not Durkheim's. For we
are so much the heirs of a strong tradition of individualism,
of atomism and logical nominalism, that we implicitly assume
there to be an inherent, ineradicable antagonism between the
individual and society. As Louis Dumont (1965, 1970) suggests,
our rather unique presuppositions may blind us to differing
notions of personhood in other cultures; moreover, they may
blind us to the sometimes destructive results of our own deep-
est moral commitments.

   Stemming especially from Enlightenment notions of "nat-
ural reason," "natural rights," and the "social contract," we

tend to believe that the individual precedes society, that
the individual is self-sufficient, and that social norms and
cultural rules serve mainly to restrict the natural freedom
of individuals. Indeed, freedom is often portrayed primarily
in negative terms such as liberation, as shedding of controls,
release from the "ancient servitudes," from the irrational
constraints of blood, soil, tradition, and Church. Thus, our
modern negative images of freedom as release from control
rest on two essential corollaries: the notion of a self-sub-
sistent ego which is the real source of moral virtue and the
foundation of certain knowledge, and a state of nature in
which this ego dwells. Freedom today, therefore, implies the
release of the individual ego from irrational traditional so-
cial constraints, and return to its pre-established interior
harmonies. Conceived with this rhetorical bias, then, freedom
in positive terms means largely the spontaneous acting out of
impulse and primary process, of total simultaneous integration
of body and mind, of immediate consummation of desire. In the
1970's, at least in America, the Religion of The Self is deep-
ened through the endless pursuit of myriad ingenious "thera-
peutics" designed to shed all distorting external constraints,
and to restore the Self to its natural harmony. Starting from
the lone, isolated ego, solipsism becomes the tacit epistem-
ology, and narcissism our lived ethic.

The sources of this vast "transvaluation of values" are
many; but their very diversity and pervasiveness reinforces
the dynamic mainline of development. The intimate linkage be-
tween "Reason" and "Individual" in Rationalist and Utilitar-
ian philosophy alike, and between the "Individual," subject-
ivity, and the inner emotions of angst in Romantic and Ideal-
istic philosophy and art, both placed great emphasis on the
generic individual. And Durkheim spoke of his own countrymen
as "lone wolves, given to a fierce individualism, and suspi-
cious isolation." But what these various cultural traditions,
in their common opposition to the social organicism and inter-
personal ethics of the lingering Catholic cultural tradition,
had placed so high, Durkheim placed low with his notion of

the irrationality and insatiability of the pre-social ego.

Now, it may help to recall that the critical problem faced by the pioneers of early modern cultures was a compelling response to massive crises of human certainty and certitude. In the transitional passage to the modern era, haunting questions widely asked included: "How shall I know if I am saved? How do we know anything to be true? How shall we gain certain knowledge?" During that time which Huizanga called "the waning of the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed "the Counter-Renaissance," skepticism, fideism, and probabilism, and so forth held the day. Against this background, various priestly and prophetic figures, various ascetics and mystics, rose up to proclaim new and mighty objective certainties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certitude in the human subject, such pioneers of early modern cultures as Luther, Calvin, the spiritual radicals, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, and so forth (whatever their myriad other differences), all relied on a deeply interior faith, or feeling, the inherent rationality of the human mind, or some inner experience of an equally irreducible sort. In these parallel solutions, the religion of the "inner light" and the significance of the Self was raised to new heights. Thus, for example, Luther's response to the feeling of pervasive evil, of total guilt, and anxiety about his own salvation led him to the doctrine of justification by faith alone (sola fide). Descartes' response to skepticism and the reigning "fictionalism" of the Church establishment was to have recourse to a rigorous mathematical clarity anchored in the irreducible self-consciousness of the ego (cogito, ergo sum). And in a slightly different manner, Calvin's notion of the predestined elect and the Puritan's "automachia" (Bercovitch, 1975) reinforced the same trend. With these pioneers of the modern moral universe, there begins that momentous "journey into the interior" which also pervades Montaigne's essays, Pascal's frightened existential loneliness and conversion, the Elizabethan's melancholic malaise seen in Hamlet's anxiety without a true "objective correlative," Leibnitz's mon-

ads, Hobbes' atomism and nominalism, Locke's empiricism, the Scottish moralists' "common sense" and the unbridled egoism of the Utilitarian reformers, Rousseau's romanticism of feeling, and on through the various metamorphoses of the Transcendental Self of the idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and so many others. In the modern era, then, the anchor of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shifts decisively away from the intelligibility of the natural world mirrored in man's reason (logos), from tradition, from Church, from community, to the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible Subject.

In his profound extension of Durkheim's work on the evolution of the person through history, Marcel Mauss, after tracing the progressive sedimentation of the notion of personhood, for instance, speaks of the importance of the philosophy of the Transcendental Ego in the last couple of centuries.

> However, the notion of the person had to undergo yet another transformation to become what it has become in less than one and a half centuries, the category of the ego. Far from being the primordial, innate idea, clearly inscribed since Adam in the most profound depth of being, here it continues almost to our day, slowly raising itself, clarifying, specifying, identifying itself with knowledge of the self, with the psychological consciousness (1968:477).

We enter here a new moral universe. Not only is this moral subject autonomous, but it is also, and this proved decisive, self-reliant by virtue of the "personal charisma" of its own "inner light." The same notion lay, of course, at the heart of the "Protestant principle;" truth and freedom in the "Protestant Era" (Tillich, 1957) came to be seen as the inherent possession or discovery of this moral subject, this intellectual and self-sufficient monad. Here again, Mauss, after Durkheim, sounds an important theme in the cultural-historical connections between religion and secular ideas which brings us close to Weber and which we shall explore at greater length in Book Three. For Mauss explicitly suggests some crucial connections between the sec-

tarian currents of the post-Reformation period and the Roman-
tic-Idealistic philosophers and moralists.

> The importance of the sectarian movements in the form-
> ation of political and philosophical thought through-
> out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not
> be exaggerated. There the questions of individual lib-
> erty, of individual conscience, of the right to commun-
> icate directly with God, to be one's own minister, to
> have an internal God, were posed. The notions of the
> Moravian Brethren, of the Puritans, the Wesleyans, the
> Pietists, are those which form the base on which the
> notion of the person-ego, ego-conscience, is establish-
> ed and is the primordial category there (1968:478).

After secularization, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic
angst and Idealism remained rooted in the residues of this
"inner light mysticism" in terms of each individual's private
"stock of reason" granted him by nature, the Romantic Self,
and so on (see especially Benjamin Nelson, 1965c).

Hence, to a great extent, modern ethics, as well as mod-
ern epistemology largely rest on this hidden, though funda-
mental, notion of the autonomous and self-reliant "inner
light." Therefore, conventional epistemological distinctions
between rationalism and empiricism, for instance, are not
fully revealing in these terms. For the common foundations
of these major modern cultural traditions are based on a new
sense of self, a new moral and intellectual subject; in truth,
a New Model Man. Indeed, only on such a basis could so much
be set aside, and modern philosophy predicate itself on the
autonomous, isolated, self-subsistent ego, floating in space,
endowed with rationality, and able to directly intuit or ex-
perience the essential structures of the world. It is on such
a basis that the ill-fated program of constructing a presup-
positionless philosophy has failed, again and again.

Against this whole background, then, Durkheim took up
an entirely different stance, a revolutionary position. He
argued: "We have no justification for supposing that our mind
has within it at birth, completely formed, the prototype of
the elementary frameworks of classification" (PC:8). But the
deeply embedded notion of the generic ego endowed with a self-
guiding rationality shining by virtue of its own inviolable

"inner light" was difficult for Durkheim's socio-logic to dislodge because this counter-logic was ultimately rooted in a rhetorically inspired counter-ethic. Durkheim was in-sightful to observe that the religion and epistemology of the Self is a modern cultural institution; for the generic ego as the prime repository of an innate moral sense and a calculus of rationality depends on the prior negation of tradition and the delegitimation and stripping away of the authority of culture. Perhaps this is what is felt by so many to be at stake in these "realist" versus "nominalist" debates--namely, the implicit (and I believe misleading) symbolic equation between rationality, individualism, and freedom. In his program to dissolve the presumption of a ne-cessary connection between nominalist premises, on the one hand, and rationality, freedom, and the value of the human person on the other, Durkheim had to move first against the unwarranted conflation of ego and person, and insist instead on the social construction of personhood, rationality, and freedom.

Perhaps we might term Durkheim's revolution in this forensic context the "social realism breakthrough," or the enshrinement of a "social reality principle" (eg. see B. Nelson, 1962). Now, as we discovered earlier in this Book (see also Book Three, part I), Durkheim set out to unravel the received systems of symbolic equations on both the gen-eric and genetic-evolutionary levels. On the first level of universal or generic elements, Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex rhetorically incorporated the autonomous ego of the Utilitarians, Rationalists, and Romantics alike, but at a lower level. By inverting its high valuation, Durkheim transformed the ego into the negative pole of his world-view. The socially constructed person was counterposed to the or-ganic ego as the soul had once been contrasted with the body. Ego is to person as body was to soul. Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with social norms and the moralized per-son, on the one hand, and the profane with dispersed egos en-gaged in mundane, self-centered, merely utilitarian tasks on

the other. Thus, on the abstract, generic level, Durkheim
regarded the pre-social individual or organic ego as the neg-
ative carrier of insatiable and egoistic passions (or at
least, as the locus of privatized passions). On the same lev-
el, he portrayed society as the source of moral discipline,
legitimate authority, reason, concepts, universalizable rules,
and so on and so forth.

Now, in one sense Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation
of a key image of his opponents (even though inverted) must
be considered a clever, though ultimately misconceived, for-
ensic device since he thereby admitted in the backdoor some
of the very elements against which he had so resolutely tak-
en up arms in the first place (see also Book Three, part I).
Nonetheless, in a different way, Durkheim's distinctions rep-
resented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens provides an
important clue to the deeper significance of Durkheim's ef-
forts in distinguishing between the generic ego and the socio-
culturally and historically constructed person when he in-
sists: "Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach
'liberal individualism,' regarded as a conception of the char-
acteristics of the modern social order, from 'methodological
individualism'" (1971b:210).

The deeper intellectual and cultural ramifications of
Durkheim's revolution in thought become more clear and com-
pelling if we recognize that for centuries the progressive
mainlines of European thought had tacitly presumed there to
be necessary inner logical, ethical, and historical connect-
ions between so-called "methodological individualism" and
atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism) and its suppo-
sed epistemological correlates of Pragmatic or Utilitarian
empiricism, and its ethical correlates of individual freedom,
liberal democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man" (see
also Lukes, 1968, 1969, 1973). Thus, on the generic level,
Durkheim set out to dissolve these symbolic equations by
first denying isolated egos these claimed virtues and assign-
ing them instead to society and culture. As Lukes notes "...
[Durkheim] sought ... to cut the conceptual knot that has fre-

quently been held to tie methodological individualism to liberalism, asserting both the autonomy of sociology and the sacredness of the individual" (1969:19). The generic ego became the repository of negative, rather than positive, values such as insatiable sensual appetites, irrationality, and so forth--in short, of anomie and egoisme.

On the historical level, Durkheim insisted: "It is only by historical analysis that we can discover what makes up man, since it is only in the course of history that he is formed" (DHN:325). Recall, again, that one of the positions held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren against which he polemicized so vigorously and successfully (eg. see The Elementary Forms) was the supposition that "Reason" is a generic human faculty, embedded by nature within the isolated, abstract Ego. On the contrary, Durkheim argued, the fundamental categories of human thought itself, and indeed the very notion of the person, are social and cultural and especially historical constructions. Indeed, Durkheim's key thesis which we shall presently explore is that the person emerges through history.

On the genetic-evolutionary level, Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social conditions at the two ends of history. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self is necessarily submerged in the group; it is permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective conscience. In evolutionary terms, we witness the progressive awakening of structures   of conscience and consciousness, or the emergence of the person. Individual autonomy and responsibility progressively emerge with societal differentiation. Indeed, the de-collectivization of structures of responsibility forms a central theme throughout all of Durkheim's sociology. Far from being embedded in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person is rather a critically important sociocultural historical construction.

But how could the individual be at one and the same time considered basically amoral and the evolutionary object

and expression of a higher morality? No real paradox obtains,
however, since Durkheim's philosophical notion of the pre-so-
cial or organic ego was couched on the generic or universal
level, while, on the other hand, his notion of moralized in-
dividualism as a sociocultural emergent was cast on the evo-
lutionary and historical level. The first image represents a
generic given, while the second image concerns the construct-
ion of the autonomous moral conscience and consciousness as
the preeminent value of the modern world. Durkheim clearly
saw that instead of being primarily rooted as fixed faculties
in the generic ego, modern universalistic and rational class-
ificatory systems had undergone a long and difficult evolution
which they could not themselves adequately explain in terms
of their own premises. Modern science and philosophy, of
course, have great trouble explaining their own histories in
terms of their own special premises; Hegel saw this clearly.
The inner key to the evolution of societies and their symbol-
ic systems is the link between the extension of the social
bond, widening fraternization, and rationalization and univer-
salization of classificatory systems, and thus, of the founda-
tions of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual
authority. Scientific rationality, and even the logic upon
which it rests, then, is itself a comparatively modern cultur-
al institution!

Those who uncritically embrace the conventional por-
trait of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching
for the generic bases of social order and control may find
themselves puzzled by the fact that Durkheim did not urge a
return to the "value consensus" of primitive "mechanical sol-
idarity." After all, to Durkheim, wasn't society all and the
individual nothing? Isn't this position inherently conserva-
tive? On the contrary, as an Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim's
central value was the autonomy and rationality of the human
person. What he called "moral individualism," as embodied for
example in Christian ethics, especially in its Protestant
varieties and certain secular variants (eg. "The Rights of
Man," see his "Individualism and the Intellectuals," transla-

ted by Lukes, 1969) was his central value system. At no
point did Durkheim urge a return to the "repressive" prim-
itive sacral-magical complex.

Like his rhetorical opponents, Durkheim retained the
modern cult of the human person (la personne humain)as the
prime source of value integration in modern "organic soli-
darity." Durkheim's perennial moral dialectic between person,
society, and history led him to seek to balance these rela-
tionships in a way never before fully achieved--namely, by
rescuing both the moral solidarity of archaic societies and
the respect for the person generated by societal differentia-
tion and the division of labor. The dialectical balance he
sought can be found neither in the "excessive individualisms"
of modern society, nor in the "insufficient individuation"
of "mechanical solidarity."

In sum, instead of the pre-social individual as the
prime carrier of modern values, Durkheim polemicized against
his opponents' enshrinement of the organic ego, the lower and
lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amoral, egocentric,
driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly destruct-
ive. In the process, Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of
derivation of autonomous individualism from "realist" rather
than "nominalist" premises. Hence, Durkheim's insistence on
a negative image of the isolated generic ego, and his trans-
ference of the source of moral goodness to society, coupled
with his corresponding postulate that moral individualism,
far from being a human universal, is rather a sociocultural
historical construction, snapped apart the tacit, but deeply
rooted, prevailing presupposition of certain necessary inner
links between logical nominalism and moral and political au-
tonomy. Durkheim thus severed the inner symbolic links between
these doctrines in mediating between preceding cultural tradi-
tions by rejecting certain points and incorporating others in
a revised form in a new and more compelling model. A bold and
powerful doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the
still pervasive presumption of the necessity of the inner sym-
bolic connections which Durkheim set out to dissolve, has

still to be understood in its full significance. I repeat:
<u>Durkheim</u> <u>demonstrated</u> <u>the</u> <u>possibility</u> <u>of</u> <u>derivation</u> <u>of</u> <u>auto-</u>
<u>nomous</u> <u>or</u> <u>moralized</u> <u>individualism</u> <u>from</u> "<u>realistic</u>" <u>or</u> "<u>so-</u>
<u>cially</u> <u>organic</u>" <u>premises</u>. This was one of Durkheim's most
profound revolutions in the human sciences.

Now, the long-standing critique of Durkheim as a kind
of Platonizing metaphysician of society--an extreme hyposta-
tizing social realist--persists in the still popular render-
ing of Durkheim as stridently anti-individualist (but see
Chapter Four of this Book). Against this misleading image,
Anthony Giddens rightly suggests:

> Most secondary observers of Durkheim have failed to
> connect his analytical discussion (and rejection) of
> individualism as a methodological approach to social
> theory with his developmental conception of the emer-
> gence of individualism as a morality brought into be-
> ing by the growth of the differentiated division of
> labor.... Durkheim is often regarded as being fervent-
> ly anti-individualist. But his works contain a vigor-
> ous defense of individualism--understood in a speci-
> fic way.... Durkheim's writings represent an attempt
> to detach "liberal individualism" regarded as a con-
> ception of the characteristics of the modern social
> order, from "methodological individualism" (1971b:210).

Hence, the misleading, but still pervasive, image of Durkheim
as hostile to individualism must now give way to more subtly
inflected distinctions drawn between the various meanings as-
signed by Durkheim to the term "individual" on both the gen-
eric and genetic-evolutionary levels (see Chapter Two; also
Lukes, 1973:21-2; Giddens, 1971b:217).

This final chapter of Book One on the emergence of the
person through history strives to pull together the various
strands of our review of the substantive "nuclear structure"
of Durkheim's work on both the generic and genetic-evolution-
ary levels as presented thus far;   and it also serves as a
transition between these considerations and the potent ambig-
uities to be discovered in switching from Durkheim's first to
second schema of suicide as developed in Books Two and Three.
It also helps to set up our investigation into the historical
and cultural roots of anomie and egoisme in Book Three. In our

present synthetic effort, the essence of our analysis centers on these theses:

> (1) the person, as contrasted with the ego, is socially and culturally constructed;
>
> (2) as societies evolve, so too does the notion of the person;
>
> (3) greater social fraternization, and the corresponding extension of the social bond, coupled with greater rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse, leads to greater autonomization of the person.

In light of the preceding chapters, then, let us turn first to consider crucial facets and phases in the generic phenomenologies of personhood. Then we shall move to our main consideration here--Durkheim's notion of the evolution of the person through history.

A. Generic Phenomenologies of Personhood

Preface. What is the person? What is personhood? Person, persona, impersonate. From such associations, Norman O. Brown weaves a highly negative view of the person which is very different than Durkheim's position. Noting the standard etymological and social psychological perspectives, Brown (1966) begins his discussion of personhood in terms of the persona as a mask, a disguise, used by actors--that is, characters or roles--in a social drama.

> Personality is persona, a mask. The world is a stage, the self a theatrical creation.... The self does not belong to its possessor.... It is all psychodrama.... Personality is a social fiction, and name a magical invocation of a particular role in social drama.... Character is not innate: a man's character is his demon, his tutelar spirit; received in a dream. His character is his destiny, which is to act out his dream.... The dream stuff out of which personality is made is not private, but social; a collective dream.... The only soul is the group-soul, and this consists of nothing but group functions.... Personality is not innate, but acquired. Like a mask, it is a thing, a fetish or commodity.... Stereotypes. All personality is rigid.... Names and personalities are fixed by archetypal persons and situations; the voices coming through the masks are always ancestral voices.... The ego is public relations. ... In the Last Judgment, the apocalyptic fire will burn

> up the masks, and the theater, not leaving a rack be-
> hind. Freud came to give the show away.... The ego is
> a "me-fabrication," a piece of illusion (Maya), which
> disintegrates at the moment of illumination.... The
> insane are closer to the truth.... (Ch. 5, Love's Body,
> 1966).

Assuming that separation is the root of evil, and thus deny-
ing the "social reality principle," dwelling instead in intra-
psychic primary process, and preparing for an imminent apoca-
lypse of the body, it is no wonder that Brown's metaphysics
and ethics leave the notion of the person little existential
or historical validity.

1. Ego and Person

Contrary to Brown's position, the first step toward a
viable sociocultural understanding of personhood is to system-
atically distinguish between ego and person. We shall here
take the term "ego" to refer to that centered bundle of drives
in each organism which is concerned primarily with survival--
with food, dominance, sex, flight, and so forth. Hence, we
may justifiably speak of the pre-social or organic ego. The
person, on the other hand, as designated by a name for in-
stance, is a sociocultural emergent, not to be primarily un-
derstood in biological or even bio-psychological terms. The
ego is given, the person is constructed. Since sociocultural,
the notion of the person implies a primary concern with the
internalization and objectivation of rules and meanings, with
questions of morality and knowledge, right and wrong, truth
and error. In his later works, Durkheim was careful to make
this crucial distinction between ego and person.

> We say our individuality and not our personality. Al-
> though the two words are often used synonymously, they
> must be distinguished with the greatest possible care,
> for the personality is made up essentially of supra-
> individual elements (DHN:339).

Years later, Paul Henri Chombart de Lauwe still had to attempt
to clarify this crucial distinction:

> Durkheim's insistence on the existence of society in-
> dependently of the sum of individuals is related to his
> subsequent position that the individual is only a recep-
> tacle and that the important thing is the emergence of

the person. Many errors concerning Durkheim's socio-
logy come, we believe, from the lack of attention
given to this cardinal distinction between the in-
dividual and the person, and to the transition from
one to the other (1966:239, #2).

And in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim remarked:

It is not at all true that we are more personal as
we become more individualized. The two terms are in
no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more
than they imply one another. Passion individualizes,
yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially
individual; yet we are more personal the more we are
freed from our senses and able to think and act with
concepts. So those who insist upon all the social
elements of the individual do not mean by that to
deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to
confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8).

Thus, the image of man as homo duplex, as two levelled,
lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociocultural vi-
sion of morality, religion, and knowledge. Civilized man is
"double." On the lower level, there is the organic ego; on
the upper story there is the socialized person informed and
directed by collective moral rules and intellectual concepts.
Social man is superimposed over top of physical man. These
images remain the valid core of Durkheim's doctrine of man
as homo duplex; indeed, while I shall differ from Durkheim
in regard to his negative characterization of the organic
ego (see Book One, part I), I do consider some such distinct-
ion between ego and person as a foundation theorem for the
human sciences. Indeed, the mind/body Cartesian dualism can
then become resolved on a higher and different level. For
as Mauss proposed, the person is a category of the human
spirit (le esprit humain).

2. Conscience and Consciousness

At the very core of the notion of personhood are found
the twin notions of conscience and consciousness (see Chapter
Three of this Book). If we adopt a sociocultural phenomenolo-
gy of the person, we shall investigate how structures of con-
science and consciousness are constructed through a deepening
awareness of good and evil, right and wrong, and of truth and

error. Since structures of conscience and consciousness are
key anchors to group process, Durkheim anchored the awaken-
ing of moral rules and intellectual concepts in terms of
group implosions. Egos are moralized and turned into subjects
by contact with strong social and cultural energies. When a
"critical mass" is reached, a moral implosion occurs, cultur-
al energies generated and released, and egos are transformed
into persons. Culture redirects nature; culture is to nature
as person is to ego. Thus, awareness of good and evil, of
truth and error, right and wrong, awakens through collective
symbolic process. Conscience and consciousness are the key
phenomenological poles of cultural process.

   Now, Durkheim's usage of the ambiguities inherent in
the French terms conscience and representation implied both
noun and verb-like aspects of sociocultural and phenomenolo-
gical process. The intimate linkage between conscience and
consciousness in terms of the noun and verb-like meanings
of representation--as both cultural object and process--is
a crucial perspective which is central to the human sciences.
The fruitful ambiguities inherent in these key Durkheimian
terms led him to a fundamentally different, and more profound,
perception of sociocultural and phenomenological process than
the perspectives today which split apart the cultural object,
generating group, constitutive symbolizing process, and phe-
nomenological experience. Durkheim saw these as primarily
relational, as merely separable elements in the on-going hu-
man equation.

   Thus, in Durkheim's foundational sociocultural theory,
the logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellect-
ual judgment are always and everywhere intimately intertwin-
ed. The moralities of thought and the logics of action are
always linked together and to the structure and process of
collectivities. For instance, Durkheim suggested:

> Even if we believe that religious and moral represen-
> tations constitute the essential elements of the idea
> of the soul, still we do not mean to say that they
> are the only ones. Around this central nucleus are
> grouped other states of consciousness having this same

> character, though to a slighter degree. This is the
> case with all the superior forms of the intellectual
> life, owing to the special price and dignity attribu-
> ted to them by society. When we devote our lives to
> science or art, we feel that we are moving in a cir-
> cle of things that are above bodily sensations....
> This is why the highest functions of the intelligence
> have always been considered specific manifestations
> of the soul (EF:298-99, #123).

Indeed, the twin notions of conscience and consciousness con-
stitute key links in Durkheim's system between different his-
torical forms of society and culture and different phenomen-
ologies of the person on the one hand, and Durkheim's corres-
ponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of mo-
rality, religion, and knowledge on the other. And we propose,
in general, that fundamental changes in the structures of
conscience often precede fundamental changes in the structures
of consciousness. Therefore, one central facet of sociocultur-
al inquiry should focus on basic shifts in the collective
foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority.

3. Collective Symbolic Process

Now, Durkheim proposed: "Social life in all its aspects,
and in every period of its history, is made possible only
through a vast symbolism" (EF:264). Man makes himself through
the genetic medium of collective symbolic process. Man is the
creature who dwells within his own images. The evolution of
culture and the evolution of man are contemporaneous. Culture
is like social DNA, for it serves as a symbolic guidance sys-
tem. Every society has a symbolically expressed system of know-
ledge and values. Culture is the prime symbolic meaning and
directive system of a group. Collective symbolic forms pro-
vide ready-made classificatory and interpretive frameworks
for individual thought, feeling, and group action. Culture
structures decision, and organizes and energizes human action.
Societies and persons are constructed and sustained only
through the action of long-term collective symbolic processes.
Public process is symbolic process over time and space.

Now, the key link between what Durkheim called substruct-

tural social morphological process and superstructural sym-
bolic process was his notion of "moral or dynamic density."
Durkheim postulated that "collective effervescence" leads
to a kind of "moral implosion" which results from the in-
tense interaction. When a "critical mass" is reached, a
kind of communion ensues; the resulting fusion into a com-
mon consciousness generates extra-ordinary energies which
transform the isolated and privatized ego into a socially
in-formed person.

> With animals, the organism assimilates social facts
> to it, stripping them of their special nature, and
> transforms them into biological facts. Social life
> is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and parti-
> cularly in higher societies, social causes substitute
> themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiri-
> tualized (DL:346).

The organic cage is left behind; man ascends "from the king-
dom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (Engels, in Evans-
Pritchard, 1965: 61). The center of the individual's exist-
ence thus comes to revolve not around private passions, but
around public prescriptions. With this implosion and crystal-
lization into symbolic consciousness, society and culture are
born as entirely new levels of emergent world-activity.
Through this evolutionary breakthrough, society and culture
are energized, thereafter to redirect organic activities.
Through this communion or fusion process, the duality of hu-
man nature is constructed, and the person--as opposed to the
ego--emerges. Society and person are twin-born; they are mu-
tual co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the mid-wife.
In sum, society and culture become the center of moral and
conceptual life, having their key phenomenological anchors
in the newly created person's conscience and consciousness.

In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed specifical-
ly that human society is first created through the symbolic
medium of religious ritual. This symbolic process concentrates
and intensely focusses social and psychic energies (as a so-
lar mirror collects the rays of the sun), and generates the
first form of group self-consciousness. Mythical and ritual
symbolism play a critical creative role in the making of con-

science and consciousness, for what was private becomes open,
public and generative.

> It is only by expressing their feelings by translating
> them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that
> the individual consciousnesses, which are by nature
> closed to each other, can feel that they are communica-
> ting and are in unison (DHN:335).

These key representations are not merely neutral representa-
tive devices, but, as Bellah (1973) suggests, they are emi-
nently creative--for they constitute the group. They serve
as "constitutive symbolism." Acting as the collectively re-
presentational symbols of group self-consciousness, gradual-
ly they become the very foundation of a continuing moral and
cognitive community over time, what we might term a cultural
tradition. Because thinking implies use of communicable con-
cepts, the mind is, to a great extent, an impersonal and pub-
lic activity. As Durkheim proposed:

> The distinguishing feature of the concept, as compar-
> ed with a sensation or image, is its impersonality;
> it is a representation which ... is common and commun-
> icable. It can pass from one mind to another; it is
> by means of concepts that minds communicate. Now a
> representation can only be common to all the members
> of a single group if it was elaborated by them in com-
> mon, if it is the work of the community. And if con-
> ceptual thought has a very special value for us, it is
> is precisely because, being collective, it is replete
> with all the experience and science that has been ac-
> cumulated by the community over the course of centur-
> ies (in Giddens, 1972a:249).

And Lawrence Krader usefully summarizes Durkheim's dialectic
between personality and impersonality.

> In Durkheim, the person takes the form of that which
> is most impersonal in us; the person and the indivi-
> dual are counterposed, and the person is defined by
> his participation in the universal quality of human
> reason. It is by his universal reason and will that
> man becomes a person, and not as an individual act,
> having (only) a relative autonomy in his social mil-
> ieu; Durkheim here follows the Kantian notion of hu-
> man reason as a synthetic a priori in his own metho-
> dology. The person is therefore an abstraction, being
> neither an individual nor a particular entity, but a
> point in social space at which different lines of so-
> cial relations intersect, an objective social pheno-
> mena, universal in its phenomenality (1968:483).

Further,   social interaction is always symbolic in-
teraction--belief and act are joined in fundamental sociocul-
tural process. Imagination and symbol are the key mediating
terms. The key nexus between our inner and outer lives are
these symbolically carried impersonal moral rules and intel-
lectual concepts, these structures of conscience and con-
sciousness. If it is important to note that society depends
for its continued existence upon the persons it has created,
the converse is equally true. Collective myth and ritual pro-
vide a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature." If moral-
ized persons are not to lapse back into the scattered egoisms
of pre-social organic nature, they can sustain themselves
only by dipping back again and again into the very fount of
their existence--namely, collectively effervescent, energi-
zing, and redirecting symbolic process. Sociocultural life
rises and falls in an oscillating rhythm. Thus, the moralized
person's commitment to his newly found obligations and des-
tiny also ebbs and flows with the decline and rise of the in-
tensity and "fittingness" of sociocultural symbolism. The
continued viability of prime significant symbols, as a cultur-
al genetic medium, is vital to the continued viability of
both society and moralized person. We thus see a periodic re-
newal of self and society through ritual celebration; and
such collective ceremonial replenishes our moral natures. It
publicly revalidates our sense of self as a socially con-
structed and valuable personage; it revalidates our civic
status as a personality. Durkheim never separated sociocul-
tural process from phenomenological process.

Now, symbols serve as "time binders" holding groups to-
gether through time and space. In terms of the elementary
stages of these processes, Durkheim assumed that:

    (1) structures of conscience and consciousness are so-
          cioculturally and historically constructed, and thus
         remain for a long time connected and even confounded
         with the structure and process of groups;

    (2) the systems of morality and knowledge which are dom-
         inant first emerge in most systematic form out of
         the womb of religion and ritual.

Thus, the two inner constitutive principles of the construction of over-arching systems of moral and cognitive classification are that these are first: (a) sociocentric, and (b) sacro-magical. Indeed, the linkage of the form of symbolic systems to the structure and process of collectivities, and the linkage of their content to sacral outlooks and magical protocols, are two interpretive principles central to the human sciences. Both Durkheim and Weber were most sensitive to this inner linkage of legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness to the structure of groups and to their religious and legal systems.

Again, we propose that fundamental changes in the structures of conscience, of the collective grounds of right and wrong, generally precede fundamental changes in the structures of consciousness, of truth and falsity. And since the awakening and guiding of structures of conscience and consciousness--as prime phenomenological processes--are largely dependent upon religious symbolic forms, should we not then tend to seek out the changing foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority in terms of shifting religious images and sanctions? If we would know how persons are formed and reformed, should we not also look to the ways in which "souls" are conceived and reformed? Again, is the connection between these two not the notion that the person is a category of the human spirit?

4. Origins of Structures of Conscience

Society and person are mutual co-creations through that symbolic genetic medium which we call culture. Religious symbols, which by their very nature seek to establish definite and obligatory relationships between the human microcosm and the macrocosm, act as prime guidance systems. The cult is the original and prime matrix of culture (Pieper, 1963); it creates "cosmos" out of "chaos."

Now, tension is produced in the symbolic field, and conscience and consciousness organized and energized, by the compounding series of symbolic oppositions between the "sacred"

and the "profane." Such positive and negative categories are central to human imagination and action because they inform us what is "right and wrong," "true and false." The key to understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal significance of the oppositions between "sacred" and "profane" is to be sought in the symbolic sets of equations by which society, culture, and person are progressively constructed and reconstructed. Life becomes progressively organized around these two poles of positive and negative energies, like magnetic poles attracting and repelling us. The whole of existence becomes valorized through a ramifying series of symbolic equations linking different experiences together.

Now, as is true of all levels of reality, without this tension between incompatible energies or positions, no energy would flow. Difference energizes; diversity is generative. Energy flows only if there is a gap, a difference between positions. Without this fundamental and constitutive tension, the symbolic cosmos called culture would prove impossible. The tension between good and evil, between right and wrong, is the driving force in the symbolic field of society, and within the person, for it constitutes the two opposing "magnetic" poles of structures of conscience and consciousness. Energy flows generated by this deepening tension between the "sacred" and the "profane" serve to organize and energize the basic decision matrices of societies and persons. Here is a crucial key to a fundamental theory of motivation. Theories of personality which omit reference to this fundamental organizing tension deep within the very structure of personality are in that measure inadequate. For if human experience was merely neutral or homogeneous, we would find ourselves devoid of reason for choice, and therefore, action. If human reality lacked elementary invidious distinctions--between good and evil, order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher and the lower, positive and negative, the beautiful and the monstrous, the creative and destructive, the way forward and the way back--we would lack the basic organizing tension which energizes and directs human action. Systems built around the

notions of avoidance of pain and tropisms toward pleasurable stimuli (eg. behaviorism) are cast on the level of the organic ego, and thus must fall back on the weakest kind of mind/ body analogies to describe these higher level processes. Every society and person make some such crucial series of distinctions between these and other fundamental polarities for without these compounding series of oppositions we stand paralyzed. In general, then, the deeper the tensions generated by the oppositions between these symbolic and phenomenological poles, the deeper the development of the person as moral agent and intellectual subject.

Always and everywhere, positive and negative aspects of these basic polarities are expressed in terms of opposing poles in conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral right and wrong, so insistent because they involve not merely the fate of on-going social relations but ultimate destinies as well, are always intimately intertwined with questions of consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality rather than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and persons place themselves under positive obligations to affirm as true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable those phenomena judged as "sacred" to the group. To Durkheim, the "sacred" means values constitutive to the group. Sacredness here implies hierarchical value, moral authority, and obligatory respect due to high position on the scale of values, the ability to repel the profane, and a certain "contagiousness" or tendency to spread. But it is important to remember that sacred and profane are relationally defined; their dichotomous existence is interdependent. Their contrast is necessary, much as the contrast between figure and field is essential for clear perception. These positive injunctions generate goals and values which are carried through imagination, and internalized in the emerging personality structure, and established in the institutions of the group.

Now, one of the basic classificatory principles is that things of unequal value must be separated. The boundary lines between the pure and the impure, between order and chaos,

must be constantly maintained and periodically realigned.
Dirt, weeds, noize, chance, ugliness, etc., these and other
similar negative phenomena which threaten the clear outlines
and meaningful patterns of our axial coordinates must be con-
trolled, interdicted, and revised. These demarcations are
like survey markers on the base map of culture; but these
cultural maps are not solely cognitive, but moral, emotional,
and imaginative as well. As such, the passage from the profane
to the sacred requires a whole series of rites which trans-
form the moral subject. Rites are collective moral therapeu-
tics which, by realigning the mutual relations between human
microcosm and macrocosm, regenerate the moral community, and
thus, provide a resustenance of our moral natures. As van Gen-
nep clearly recognized, these symbolic therapeutics proceed
in at least three main phases; he also noted the important
"pivoting of the sacred" along various situational and tem-
poral axes.

If harmony is to be maintained, the relationships between
sacred and profane in terms of the alignment of the microcosm
with the macrocosm must be continuously regulated and reaf-
firmed. Through ascetic regulatory rites we reestablish and
reinforce the boundaries separating the sacred from the pro-
fane. Naturally, because of their source and power, these in-
terdictions spread to the whole of sociocultural life. Time,
space, objects, events, people, and so on--indeed, all as-
pects of life and existence--become classified, separated,
and relationships rearticulated in terms of the compounding
oppositions between the sacred and the profane. The whole
world becomes valorized--society progressively imputes posi-
tive, negative, and neutral valences to all details of exist-
ence. Hence, structures of conscience and consciousness are
constantly assigned ever greater responsibilities--that of
discerning the moral valences of actions which had been pre-
viously left outside the moral universe. And, of course,
those who "take a lease on charisma" as Weber once remarked,
those who professionally demarcate or realign the boundaries
between sacred and profane become the arbiters of moral and

intellectual legitimacy. Distinctions and qualifications become more sophisticated, more rationalized, more systematic, and internally consistent, more comprehensive. Some virtuoso may even practice full-time asceticism as a life-vocation, and may engage in charismatic competitions to determine who can most systematically turn away from all that is branded profane, all that is a diverting temptation from the "one and true path" (eg. the early Egyptian eremites).

Since sacral and magical taboos come to permeate early tribal life, they come to constitute the early foundations of structures of conscience. Questions of right and wrong, of truth and error, become inextricably bound up with the ascent to a cosmic consciousness which is then reflected in the mirror of daily life in the human microcosm. Defilement, pollution, sin, and guilt come from violating the boundaries between sacred and profane. Disturbances of the harmonious relations between micro and macrocosm bring extreme culpability--for in bringing illness, death, attack by enemies, catastrophic weather, etc., evil threatens the whole society. Thus, the first forms of deviance are those of the "religious criminal," whose violations of norms laid down by the collective conscience are considered sacrilegous. Profaneness and deviance are intertwined, as the conscience counsels us to flee from negative status.

Since questions of apportioning moral responsibility, of assigning sin and guilt, are always central, the negative or ascetic rites take on a special significance. All societies and persons find themselves negatively obligated to avoid falsity, evil, destructiveness, and regions of unreality. Those who follow the positive normative prescriptions gain in self-esteem, and their sense of self-worth and contributions to moral order are often publicly validated. Those who violate, or congenitally follow negative prescriptions, lose in status and self-esteem. They may be branded or "labelled" as failures and, at worst, as dangerously destructive "deviants." As Robert Merton once observed, every society has its own peculiar set of "moral alchemies," especially for

the assignment of guilt and negative status. Thus, as Benja-
min Nelson (1964) observes, culture also acts as a symbolic
economy--that is, every society is engaged in the production
and distribution of valued symbols of varied worths. Anxiety,
fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate defilement or abandon-
ment are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate. Thus,
by its very nature, deviance is linked with the profane, and
the profane is also dependent, as Poggi (1972) clearly saw,
upon the prior definition of the sacred. As Mary Douglas
(1966) observes, "purity and danger" are relational.

Indeed, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1966) has noted for years,
the negative is crucial to human symbolicity. For only through
the negative, in the sense of prohibition and moral command,
is man moralized. Man takes on a moral personality through the
negative, through abstention and purification. That is why
Durkheim emphasized the importance of the negative rites, of
the ascetic movement toward separation and withdrawal. "Ascet-
icism is an integral part of human culture" (EF:356). For the
suffering inherent in the negative thrust means that the in-
dividual rises above the profane; in other words, culture
moralizes nature. And, indeed, when we see that the analogy
is often the sacred is to the profane as culture is to nature
as person is to ego, the importance of these negative associa-
tions becomes apparent. In considering asceticism good, Durk-
heim valued most the self-discipline it creates, for it mor-
alizes the recalcitrant ego (see Nisbet, 1974). Culture, the
realm of moral rules and concepts, of obligatory and authori-
tative sacredness, dominates nature, and reorders the ego and
its insatiable passions. This process implies the reordering
of the world, the overcoming of nature by symbolic culture,
a reestablishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great
"Yea and Nay" of all things. And, as fasting increases our
hunger for the "Bread of Life," so, too, privation, abstinence,
and suffering increase the tension to consummate the posi-
tive pole of sociocultural life.

Since the origin of these separations or interdictions
which we project outward and imprint upon the world is really

culture-and-mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred
and profane lies within man himself. The taboo as interdic-
tion is first and foremost a phenomenological injunction to
keep separate things of unequal value which man directs to-
ward his own conscience and consciousness, toward his own
imagination and will. Since magical sanctions revenge viola-
tion of taboo in an automatic fashion as if by mechanical
retribution, it is only religious sanctions involving socio-
cultural and psychological punishment which lead to the de-
velopment of the person. There is no "sin" in magic, and
therefore no need for redefinition of self and internaliza-
tion of guilt. Only in religious sanctions do we discover a
deepening of the interior life, the perpetual reconstruction
of will and imagination. Here we might recall Ricoeur's no-
tion of the stages of development of the moral conscience
from stain to sin to guilt (1969). We see that the conscious-
ness of wrong-doing progressively shifts away from external,
accidental violations to internal, intentional acts. Weber
(1963) also clearly saw the crucial world-historical signi-
ficance of religion and the notion of ethical-legal orders
and the evolution of the images of gods for the development
of the notion of sin as intentional, and involving indivi-
dual moral culpability. Only much later do we see the emer-
gence of a prospective moral conscience. The psychodynamics
of sin and guilt, of intention and act, of retribution and
salvation, and so on, are crucial to the construction in
layers of the moral personage, the deepening of the levels
of self. For this whole phenomenological-symbolic complex
leads to intensified examinations of conscience, the search-
ing of the soul for intentional commissions and unintention-
al omissions, for the determination of the moral valences
of future actions, for the determination of degrees of guilt
and the development of therapeutic modes for its exoneration
and purgation; in short, it leads to greater ethical self-
awareness. The progressive attachment of individuals to a
"cosmos of obligations" leads to greater integration of the
personality structure, observed Weber; it enabled, in the

realm of law for instance, a man's word to serve as his bond,
as the signature to a contract binds. In sum, the emergence
of complex religious and ethical-legal systems, and their e-
volution in terms of patterning the microcosm after the mac-
 rocosm played a crucial role in the in-depth integration of
structures of conscience and consciousness.

Almost inevitably these struggles between good and e-
vil take on a dramatic character. Indeed, it is primarily
in terms of a symbolic struggle that a dramatic design first
emerges. And it is primarily in terms of dramatic designs
that conscience and consciousness take up their parts or iden-
tities as persona, as participants in the cosmic drama or
"Divine Comedy." Symbolic process, and thus the structure of
human action, inevitably takes on an inherently dramatic (or
perhaps rhetorical-dialectical) character, and generally pro-
ceeds in at least three distinguishable phases. First, binary
polarities create tension in the symbolic field and in the
phenomenological field. Second, symbolic equations link to-
gether different experiences in a resonating system charged
with multiple levels of meaning. Finally, transformations
resolve the tension and create a new and higher unity.

"Right thinking" and "right acting" in this drama are
judged in terms of our fidelity to our cosmically assigned
roles, to the degree to which we pattern ourselves after the
ancestors, the divine exemplars, or the founding fathers.
The closer we pattern ourselves after the models of essential
order, the closer the harmony between microcosm and macrocosm.
Self and model become intertwined, much as socialization re-
quires in-depth role models. The sensitive striving after fi-
delity to the cosmic models, of faithful patterning ourselves
after the divine exemplars, deepens the structures of inter-
iority, of will and imagination, of internal life-long con-
sistency of character.

Now, by virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual
commensality or the commemorative dramatic representations
or mimetic reenactments of primordial founding deeds, sacral
symbols become historicized. Sacral symbols become attached

to durable social sentiments and collective memories. In the
ramifying dialectic between symbol, sentiment, and inter-gen-
erational sociocultural process, the horizons of conscience
and consciousness are stretched into the past and into the
future. If society and person are to perdure, they must be-
come rooted in inter-generational collective symbolic forms.
If symbols are to survive and evolve, they must become dur-
able, beyond the reach of the effervescent moment; they must
become historicized. Similarly, the construction of the per-
son rests upon temporal extensions of the horizons of rules,
meanings, obligations, concepts, models, and so on, through
time and space. The person becomes progressively attached
not merely to a specific group, but to a continuing moral and
and cognitive community stretching out indefinitely into
time and place. The person becomes historicized and deepened
through identification with myths of origin, and the corol-
lary notions of destiny and salvation. The person becomes
anchored in a temporal process of beinnings and ends which
transcend his isolated existence and give life meaning in
terms of a compelling dramatic design which redeems the sense
of aimless flux from insignificance and invests it with ul-
timate purpose (Nelson, 1964).

In certain extraordinary periods, when the shared
structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority
shift, such changes are most powerful when they strike deep-
ly into the axial structures of conscience and conscious-
ness. In such shifts, the sedimented layers of cultural tra-
ditions are reorganized. In such times of crisis, we attempt
to locate the source of evil, of disorder, of suffering and
disharmony in terms of "theodicies," couched in terms of
falls from "undividedness," of failure to remain faithful
to the prime exemplars, or by wandering from the "paths of
truth and righteousness." As a general rule, all basic mor-
al and intellectual positions originally rest on negations;
they exist first in denial. They are relational--that is,
rhetorical. When beset by crises of uncertainty, by paraly-
zing conflict, we simultaneously seek to construct "theodi-

cies" (explanations of the sources of evil, of disorder, of how things came to fall apart), and "therapeutics" (recipes for restoring wholeness, harmony). As we proceed to "diagnose" our personal troubles and collective calamities, we build up a whole resonating system of symbolic associations which link symptoms to causes, and a system of transformational processes which explain how our prior system of "theodicies" and "therapeutics" went astray. Again, questions of sin and guilt, of intention and act, are fundamental, for the grounds of their ascertainment and assuagement largely determine our collective therapeutics. The whole periodic process of determining "theodicies" and "therapeutics" raises consciousness to new heights and conscience to new depths in the search for verity and fidelity. The deepening and reordering of these twin structures in times of crisis, especially through prophetic pronouncements, often comes to constitute the prime guidance systems of societies and persons through the informing and inspiring medium of cultural traditions which act as carriers of this central charismatic cultural capital. This, roughly, is the generic dialectical process which Durkheim postulated between symbol and sentiment, communitas and history, charismatic and ordinary moment, between self and society.

5. Origins of Structures of Consciousness

Just as the logics of the construction of systems of morality ultimately rest on a compounding series of oppositions between the "sacred" and the "profane," so too the construction of systems of thought rests on refining and extending such oppositions throughout nature and society. The construction of elementary systems of consciousness proceeds through the extension of a system of symbolic equations throughout the whole of human experience. Since logic implies necessary connection, the first forms of conscious connection are those of value, of differentiating between experiences of unequal value, and reconnecting those of equal value. All logic is originally ana-logic; to a great extent mental

discourse remains analogical and phenomenological. The exten-
sion of value, and hence meaning, through fundamental guiding
metaphors is crucial to both the symbolic "machinery" of the
mind, and to cultural historical processes. Experience is
first (and fundamentally) linked to experience, image to im-
age, value to value, and only later are abstracted proposi-
tions connected to essential governing principles. Therefore,
on the most elementary levels, truth and error depend ulti-
mately on the closeness of connection to our notions of good
and evil. Primary process is not so much logical or alogical
as phenomenological, that is, analogical. As Ricoeur (1969)
proposes, "the symbol gives rise to thought."

Analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for connec-
tion between disparate things, for the extension of meaning
and experience, and the integration of knowledge and value
into a compelling dramatic design. They allow us to link to-
gether spearate things and events into a new and meaningful
relationship which was not apparent before our sewing them
together. Analogy and metaphor enable us to build up systems
of relationships over time and through space, to order events
into a meaningful sequence, and to communicate our concepts
to others through appeal to similar experience. Recognition
of phenomenological similarities or differences, and the
construction of inner or essential comparisons, serve as bas-
ic logicsof classification, of constituting systematic rela-
tionships on the elementary level. As Levi-Strauss (1966)
observes, we start with a "science of the concrete;" we start
where we are, for where else can we start?

Now, if systematic comparison and contrast are sure
signs of intelligence at work, then the most elementary forms
of classification proceed in terms of systematic extensions
of crucial orienting "world-metaphors" (eg. see S. Pepper,
1942). Classification is first analogical; for example, lang-
uage itself is built up extending a series of root phenomeno-
logical metaphors from one situation to another, by transla-
ting and retranslating basic guiding images into various man-
ifestations. This is a crucial aspect of semiology. The more

seminal the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with potential meaning will the root metaphor become. In this spinning out process, a whole web of related meanings is gradually constructed, and the whole language can be seen to hang together on a surprisingly small number of cognitive and experiential pegs. Indeed, images come before words; an extended search through a good dictionary should convince one of the centrality and origin-ality of these root images, and the significance of the systems of symbolic equations in which whole rafts of words and phrases are interdefined. Literary meaning, too, is built up out of such compounding series of symbolic equations and transformations. Noting this universality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking devices, Northrop Frye has remarked on "the similarity between the units of literature and of mathematics--the metaphor and the equation."[1] Indeeed, all other forms of knowledge and cultural expression emerge out of their own special types of equational structures and sequences--religious mythologies, sacramental rituals, legal systems, poetry and literature, mathematics, and so on through the natural and social sciences.

Now, the systems of classification which we call primitive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding together moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a more or less coherent and compelling system. In such cosmological classifications, the body, human society, and the natural environment are used analogically as bases, as resonating microcosms of one another. For example, the body is often portrayed as a microcosm of the universe and parts of the body are mapped and correlated with astronomical configurations. One of the most sophisticated elaborations of this primitive type of intertwining can be found in the Chinese system of acupuncture, which is rooted in Taoist notions of energy flows which organize the universe and which are mirrored in the human body. Homeopathic medicine and even psychoanalytic therapeutics can be seen to rest also on not too dissimilar kinds of symbolic and structural correspondences. Hence, certain analytical, or perhaps anamorphical, dimen-

sions come to cross-cut knowledge, belief, imagination, and action.

Since logic implies mutually intelligible discourse and necessary connection, it is important not to impose contemporary notions of the rules of formal or so-called "symbolic logic" on other types of linkages. There are many types of "logic" or connection; just as formal philosophical logic does not invalidate socio-logic or bio-logic, so too we in the human sciences must take care not to impose our own "logics" on primitive cultures. We should set aside Levy-Bruhlian notions of a "pre-logical" mentality which does not abide by Aristotelian canons; for as Durkheim often argued "There is no gulf, no gap in continuity between these elementary forms of classification and our own." Now, if we accept the postulate of the psychic unity of mankind, then our problem becomes to understand the stages of construction of consciousness, of the emergence of "rational logics" from other types of connections which are primordial. Since all logic implies necessary connection, primitive logics are primarily moral logics which are both (a) socio-centric, and (b) sacral-magical. In this sense, the "moralities of thought and logics of action" are formed in terms of domestic and ritual metaphors. As Mauss and Durkheim discovered in Primitive Classification, logical relations are first, in a very real sense, domestic relations; that is, connections between members of the same class or group. The inner morality of primitive logics is familial; members of the same tribe or family share the same classifications. And since domestic relations are rooted primarily in sentiment, it is not surprising that these other (ana)logical relations should emerge out of, and become suffused and directed by, social sentiments. Elementary analogics are rooted in socio-logics.

But these elementary logics are also mytho-logics. For these sentiments are intimately intertwined with, and indeed grow out of, the authority of the fused sacro-magical collective complex. Indeed, it is the obligatoriness, the collectivization of responsibility for reparation and disharmonies

between the microcosm and the macrocosm which makes these representations sacred. The more elementary these systems, the more these representations also function, in turn, as reglementations. Representations and regulations, of course, both rest on norms and rules. Logic regulates mental life, moral rules regulate the life of action. Mental and moral healers alike rely on "rules for the direction of the mind and soul." Indeed, one of the secret appeals of logic has always been its claims to offer regulative norms for mental and moral conduct. Shelley's notion that poets are the "legislators of mankind" is also relevant here. Because elementary systems of classification are constitutive for their groups, they also carry systems of ethics. As always, ethics and epistemics, conscience and consciousness, are intimately intertwined. The linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies that elementary structures of morality and knowledge will be made to line themselves up in parallel fashion. There is no escaping this attempt at harmonious alignment, for in primitive cultures, the structures of responsibility and representation are preeminently collective. Changes come through closer alignment, shifts, or severing of relations between microcosm and macrocosm, and between integration of systems of morality and knowledge. Indeed, it is this on-going dialectic of sentiment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination and morality, microcosm and macrocosm, culture and nature, which marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory systems. In sum, these systems of resonating symbolic equations are intimately connected with the legitimate foundations of moral and intellectual authority of collectivities.

In a deeper sense, it is religion which provides the "essential" reasons for phenomenological linkages which are later seized upon by formal logics. Just as egos are moralized into forming persons and society, so too is the world moralized, unified, and made into an intelligible and meaningful cosmos through the "contagion" of sacral symbolism. Sacral energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world, serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage.

Flowing in and out of dissimilar objects, transforming disparate events, a separate world of real "essences" is postulated behind the world of sensory appearance and diversity. Things touched by the same energies--in terms of fundamental metaphorical notions of "like attracts like" and "the part is equal to the whole"--are thus to be classed together; this is another fundamental classificatory principle. The additional rule that things of unequal value must be separated then becomes subsumed under this more fundamental determination of "invisible, essential" inner connections. Thus, besides symbolic equations, the elementary elaboration of structures of consciousness depends upon series of symbolic inner transformations by which the "essential" ground is manifested in the phenomenal appearance. As Kenneth Burke notes, all interpretation requires that we ascertain not only symbolic equations--or "what goes with what"--but also symbolic transformations--or "from what to what," that is, a whole series of complex sequential equations which link separable phases, movements, cycles of terms, etc., to one another in a meaningful pattern or dramatic design. As Levi-Strauss observes, totemism serves as a complex equational and transformational structure of communications which converts phenomenological diversity into moral and conceptual unity; it transforms "chaos" into "cosmos." In short, structures of consciousness attempt to ground the existential in the essential which then converts the obligatory into the desirable.

These systems of moral and intellectual classification are "mytho-socio-logical" in that world, self, and society are pulled together in a "solid system all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically." In building a center to moral life, intellectual action moves through a progressive extension of symbolic equations originally rooted in the positive/negative, sacred/profane oppositions. Through progressive extension of ramifying analogies, these compounding systems of classification are interwoven more and more tightly; they become "cross-indexed." Indeed, the degree of complexity, cross-indexing, and internal consistency serves as

basic criteria for judging the comparative degree of cultur-
al complexity as represented in the central classificatory
system. Redundancy, as in all systems of communication,
serves an important function. We constantly rotate the sym-
bolic matrix, each time tying in yet another thread in the
emerging cosmological fabric. These symbolic linkages contin-
ue to grow until "the whole world is covered like a gnosis
or cabbala."

But if these analogical and transformational systems
first grow out of concrete phenomenological experience, they
also reveal a tendency to separate, to grow by their own au-
tonomous rules. Since primitive classification systems are
largely built on: (a) phenomenological analogies, (b) the fu-
sion of cognitive, moral, and affective categories, (c) so-
ciocentrism, and (d) sacral-magical protocols, philosophy and
then modern scientific systems will emerge only where: (a)
classifications become progressively rooted in abstract, "es-
sential" principles which are true by their very nature, in-
stead of by relation (eg. see J. Gittleman, 1974:83), (b)
where structures of conscience and consciousness become more
or less separated, and the latter granted some legitimate
institutionalized autonomy and authority, (c) where these
categories become detached from their original or prime group
status referents, (d) and in which questions of truth and fi-
delity are resolved primarily by recourse to rational and
evidential canons rather than by collective recourse to tra-
ditional magical <u>praxis</u>. Although first born in the clan and
its totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to
evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connections
with the restrictive structures of group and religion. There
is no possibility of passages from "sciences of the concrete"
to abstract sciences, however, with a out trans-historical, or
trans-mundane or transcendental, grounding of the necessary
lawfulness and regularity of phenomenal patterns; here the
passages to modern science rest on specific sorts of "essen-
tialisms" (eg. see Whitehead, 1925). Passages to modernity
come about through expansion of structures of fraternization,

and the resolution of conflict over alternate anchors of moral and intellectual authority and responsibility in terms of wider universalization, autonomization, and hence, rationalization. It should be emphasized that one of the hidden keys to understanding the growth of cultural complexity comes from the suppleness or differential ease with which classificatory matrices of various groups can progressively encompass the widening diversity of experience and empirical fact. This differential ability, as we saw in the previous chapter, to universalize symbolic systems, proves to be a critical factor in later sociocultural evolution.

Having outlined the construction of generic phenomenologies of personhood, let us next turn to consider Durkheim's elaboration of his crucial insight that the notion of the person emerges through history. I wish to emphasize at the outset that we shall be concerned here solely with elucidating only Durkheim's notions of the emergence of the person. Doubtless, many other interpretive perspectives could be brought to bear on this profound process to yield a more complete understanding. Our present effort, however, may be considered a preliminary contribution toward such a project, and to that end our main hope here is merely to bring into full relief precisely what Durkheim's theory of the historical emergence of the person specifically claimed. This careful delimitation of our task here is doubly necessary, for Durkheim himself never wrote systematically on this subject.

B. The Emergence of the Person Through History

Introduction. A crucial element of Durkheim's doctrine is the
the notion that the person, as a sociocultural construction,
emerges through history. Unfortunately, Durkheim never sys-
tematically formulated this insight as a central theme of
his work. Doubtless, Durkheim's doctrine would have fared
better if he had explicitly developed this theme. It should
be clearly understood that we make no claim here to offer a
comprehensive explanation of the emergence of the person
through history, but only Durkheim's potential contribution
to such an outline.

Now, Durkheim's contribution to this important study
is neither simple nor mechanical; rather, it is multi-faceted
and often suprisingly subtle. For we shall discover that Durk-
heim, in turn, explained the emergence of the person in terms
of societal differentiation as a general evolutionary process,
in terms of the construction of the notion of the individual
soul in the primitive sacral womb, in institutional terms of
the growing power of the centralized state as guarantor of
individual rights vis-a-vis traditional intermediate groups,
in cultural terms with special focus on the civilizational
significance of Christian individualism, in philosophical
terms vis-a-vis Utilitarian and Romantic philosophies of the
self, and in terms of the modern institutionalized "cult of
the individual" as the base of the modern value system. Let
us now turn to explore each of these "laminated" notions as
they converge to constitute Durkheim's contribution to the
understanding of the emergence of the person through history.

1. Societal Differentiation and Individuation

Preface. Durkheim postulated a general evolutionary connec-
tion between societal differentiation and individuation. He
assumed that increasing social morphological differentiation
increasingly frees the individual from the constraints of
"mechanical solidarity." Now, it might be helpful to brief-
ly recall that Durkheim saw two basic forms of social soli-
darity, two fundamentally different types of social being at
the two ends of human history. The first type--"mechanical
solidarity"--implies the fusion of individuals into a primi-
tive sacral-magical collective conscience and consciousness.
The individual's sense of self is submerged in his group ties
and traditional obligations; he or she really has no indepen-
dent life apart from the group. The second type of solidari-
ty, the modern type, rests on "organic" social bonds which
imply the progressive differentiation of occupational tasks
leading to a continuously ramifying kind of interdependence.
Repetitive identity and differentiated interdependence (eg.
DL:129-31) are therefore the two basic forms the social bond
may take. Unity through identity, or unity through diversity;
a primitive fused identity or advanced differentiated inter-
dependence--these are the two "ideal types" which Durkheim
sketched broadly over the flow of history.

Given this interpretive focus on individuation within
the content of societal differentiation, Durkheim always
searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the struc-
tures of moral and intellectual responsibility marking pro-
gressive passages from the first to the second type of soli-
darity. In his early formulations, Durkheim's processual no-
tion of increasing "moral or dynamic density" and the "law
of the progressive extension of the radius of social (inter-
actional) life" are central. As noted in Chapter Four of
this Book, Durkheim postulated a complex series of sequential
equations running something like this: greater population
density within a given geographic area (the population/terri-
tory ratio) held together by increasingly comprehensive and

efficient infra-structural transportation and communications
networks, leads to greater degrees of "moral or dynamic den-
sity" or sustained increases in "the quantity, intensity,
and diversity of social relationships." Such increased inter-
action leads to greater competition for resources between
members of the society, while increased intra-societal com-
petition leads to greater specialization and occupational
differentiation. These typical socio-economic responses to
long-term changes in supply and demand lead almost inevita-
bly to greater total productivity, which accelerates, in
turn, the progressive division of labor by increasing the
potential for population growth, and the extension of key
transportation and communications networks. This progressive
"extension of the radius of social life" leads, in turn, to
greater social energies and intensities and sociocultural
change which continues progressively onward in a kind of
self-stimulating feedback cycle. Hence, the generic micro
sociocultural process of increasing social intensities leads,
on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad constitu-
tive historical processes linking the progressive division
of labor, moral evolution, and the emergence of the person
through history.

Let us look first to the state of "primitive indistinc-
tion" which Durkheim postulated as characteristic of the
place of the individual in "mechanical solidarity." Then we
shall explore Durkheim and Spencer's differing notions of the
nature of archaic society, consider "altruisme" as the early
type of suicide which most clearly reveals the inner nature
of the tribal social bond, note Durkheim's suggestion that
the "chief" represents the emergence of the first individual
type, compare and contrast Durkheim and Toennies on the na-
ture of primitive and modern societies, consider Durkheim's
discussion of some of the obstacles to progressive division
of labor, review his notion of the division of labor and so-
cietal differentiation, and finally, his idea of universal-
ization process in relation to the evolution of the person.

a. Durkheim's Notion of "Mechanical Solidarity"

At this early stage, having first conceived as a grad-
uate student that his essential life-project centered on the
shifting relations between individual and society, in his
dissertation Durkheim thought of individuation and differen-
tiation as corollary central processes; he also regarded
them as a sufficient explanation of the emergence of the per-
son through history. The smaller and more intense the social
life, the less individuation--at root, it was really a rath-
er simple equation. Yet, even at this point, Durkheim quali-
fied his thesis. Later, his emphasis shifted from the notion
that the individual became progressively freed from the con-
straints of primitive society to the seminal idea that the
very notion of the individual (eg. the soul, see EF) is so-
cially constructed. In these terms, "mechanical solidarity"
implied the primitive social and cultural state in which the
individual was almost wholly submerged in the group, and his
nascent conscience permeated by traditional, collective, sac-
ro-magical rationales and prescriptive etiquettes.

In adopting repressive penal law as an external, posi-
tive index to the inner nature of primitive social solidari-
ty, Durkheim observed: "In determining what fraction of the
juridical system penal law represents, we, at the same time,
measure the relative importance of this solidarity" (DL:109).
For it is in the nature of penal law that "... the rules it
sanctions express the most essential social likenesses" (DL:
105). Indeed, here is to be found a "... social cohesion
whose cause lies in a certain continuity of all particular
consciences to a common type which is none other than the
psychic type of society" (DL:105).

It is important to emphasize that, from the beginning,
Durkheim conceived of these relations between individual and
society from the point of view of shifting historical rela-
tions in this bond not solely in external structural terms
but also in terms of conscience and consciousness. The dis-
tinction, as we might say today, is not merely ecological-demo-

graphic and structural-institutional but also cultural and
phenomenological as well. For Durkheim notes the existence
of two types of consciences in man; indeed, in observing
that man is double, Durkheim sounds a crucial note which
pervades his later work.

> There are in us two consciences: one contains states
> which are personal to each of us and which character-
> izes us, while the states which comprehend the other
> are common to all society. The first represent only
> our individual personality, and constitute it; the se-
> cond represent the collective type, and, consequently,
> society, without which it cannot exist.... Although
> distinct, these two consciences are linked one to the
> other since, in sum, they are only one, having one and
> and the same organic substratum. They are thus soli-
> dary. From this results a solidarity sui generis,
> which, born of resemblances, directly links the indi-
> vidual with society (DL:105-6).

However, at this early state, Durkheim had not distinguished
the process of individuation from personalization.

Now, secondary observers over the years would have
served us better had they emphasized more that Durkheim chose
penal law as the external index revealing the inner nature of
the relationship of the individual to the traditional sacro-
magical collective conscience. It is a collective identity
rooted in ancestral myths and in magical rites (see especial-
ly Chapter Six of this Book) which repressive law seeks to
protect and revenge.

> ... It is this solidarity which repressive laws ex-
> presses.... It is this force which penal law protects
> against all enfeeblement, both in demanding from each
> of us a minimum of resemblances without which the in-
> dividual would be a menace to the unity of the social
> body, and in imposing upon us the respect for the sym-
> bol which expresses and summarized these resemblances
> at the same time that it guarantees them (DL:106).

It is the commonness of these mythical identities and collec-
tive ritual responsibilities which define the strength of the
the collective conscience, and thus of mechanical solidarity.
Violations of these collective identities and responsibili-
ties are considered sacrilegious because they threaten the
fate of the whole society; that is why early penal law is so
repressive, and the first type of criminal the "religious

criminal."

> There exists a social solidarity which comes from a
> certain number of states of conscience which are com-
> mon to all the members of the same society. This is
> what repressive law materially represents.... The
> part that it plays in the general integration of so-
> ciety evidently depends upon the greater or lesser
> extent of the social life which the common conscience
> embraces and regulates (DL:109).

Thus, in the early type of social solidarity centered
on traditional sacro-magical themes and practices, Durkheim
viewed the individual as almost wholly submerged in the col-
lective conscience. Likeness, or identity, is demanded of
every member since individual violations or lapses from the
collective protocols and magical etiquettes may threaten
the whole group. But, again, at this early stage, Durkheim
considers collectivization and individuation as proceeding
in inverse proportion to the other. Again, at this stage,
Durkheim had not sufficiently distinguished between person-
alization and individuation. Mechanical solidarity, then, re-
fers simultaneously to an ecological-demographic, social in-
stitutional, cultural and phenomenological "ideal type" of
early society in which the moralities of thought and logics
of action are almost wholly collective.

> [In mechanical solidarity] ... what we call society
> is a more or less organized totality of beliefs and
> sentiments common to all members of the group: this
> is the collective type.... The first can be strong
> only if the ideas and tendencies common to all the
> members of the society are greater in number and in-
> tensity than those which pertain personally to each
> member.... But what makes our personality is how much
> of our individual qualities we have, what distinguish-
> es from others. This solidarity can grow only in in-
> verse ratio to personality. There are in each of us
> ... two consciences: one which is common to our group
> in its entirety, which, consequently, is not our self,
> but society living and acting within us; the other,
> on the contrary, represents that in us which is per-
> sonal and distinct, that which makes us an individual.
> Solidarity which comes from likenesses is at its max-
> imum when the collective conscience completely envel-
> ops our whole conscience and coincides at all points
> with it. But, at that moment, our individuality is nil.
> It can be born only if the community takes smaller
> toll of us.... If our ideal is to present a singular

and personal appearance, we do not want to resemble
everybody else. Moreover, at the moment when this sol-
idarity exercises its true force, our personality van-
ishes, for we are no longer ourselves, but the collec-
tive life (DL:129).

Thus, Durkheim's early conceptualization of his problem as
the degree of collectivization or individualization in the
structures of legitimate moral and intellectual responsibil-
ity and authority led him to assign the former designation
to primitive culture and the latter to modern society. I must
emphasize that Durkheim seemed to assume at this point, along
with many of his Enlightenment brethren, that if the indivi-
dual were simply freed from the irrationalities of tradition,
then the individual would naturally come to assume his own
physiognomy, his own rightful autonomy, and intellectual re-
sponsibility. This was, after all, at the heart of the dog-
matic claims of the French "laic" moral reformers. In his lat-
er work, Durkheim questioned this inherited faith more com-
pletely, and recognized that society constructs the person,
and that the historical relationship between individual and
society is not adequately conceptualized in terms of a simple
opposition between the presence and absence of collective
control.

It is about this point that Durkheim explained why he
chose the designation "mechanical solidarity" to characterize
this embeddedness of the individual in the sacro-magical col-
lective conscience. In the background of this analysis were,
of course, multiple polemics--against Spencer, Comte, and al-
so against Toennies.

> The social molecules which can be coherent in this way
> can act together only in the measure that they have no
> actions of their own, as the molecules of inorganic
> bodies. That is why we propose to call this type of
> solidarity mechanical. The term does not signify that
> it is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We
> call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which u-
> nites the elements of an inanimate body, as opposed to
> that which makes a unity out of the elements of a liv-
> ing body. What justifies this term is that the link
> which thus unites the individual to society is wholly
> analogous to that which attaches a thing to a person.
> The individual conscience ... is a simple dependent

> upon the collective types and follows all of its move-
> ments, as the possessed object follows those of its
> owner. In societies where this type of solidarity is
> highly developed, <u>the individual does not appear. In-
> dividuality is something which the society possesses.</u>
> Thus, in these social types, personal rights are not
> distinguished from real rights * (DL:130).

Shifting in mid-paragraph from the biological to legal analo-
gy, Durkheim here proposed that the individual in early socie-
ties is like a simple dependent, a possession of society. In-
deed, in his notion of altruistic suicide, Durkheim explored
this insight that primitive and archaic cultures permeated by
sacro-magical structures may bid their members to sacrifice
themselves for the welfare of the group.

In his lectures on "Physique generale des moeurs et du
droit," Durkheim reiterated this image of the collective pos-
session of the individual.

> How then it came that the individual could thus occupy
> himself with the pursuit of aims which were to such a
> degree foreign to his own private concerns? The answer
> is this: his private concerns were relatively unimpor-
> tant to him and his personality and everything that
> hung on it had slight moral weight. His personal views,
> his private beliefs and all his diverse aspirations as
> an individual seemed insignificant factors. What was
> prized, above all, were the beliefs held in common, the
> collective aspirations, the popular traditions, and
> the symbols that were an expression of them.... Absorb-
> ed, as he was, into the mass of society, he meekly gave
> way to its pressures and subordinated his own lot to
> the destinies of collective existence without any sense
> of sacrifice. This is because his particular fate had
> in his own eyes nothing of the meaning and high signi-
> ficance that we nowadays attribute to it. If we are
> right in that estimate, it was in the nature of things
> that it should be so; societies could only exist at
> that time by virtue of this subservience (PECM:55).

Besides altruisme, Durkheim also identified communism (see
Socialism, and Part II of Book Two of this dissertation) with
the collective sharing of property in primitive society.

> Communism, in effect, is the necessary product of this
> cohesion which absorbs the individual in the group,
> the part in the whole. Property is definitive only
> of the extension of the person over things. Where the
> collective personality is the only one existent, prop-
> erty must also be collective. It will become individual
> only when the individual, disengaging himself from the

mass, shall become a being personal and distinct, not
only as an organism, but also as a factor in social
life (DL:179).

Because of the essential likeness of everyone within the
the same culture, Durkheim perceived these groups as homogen-
eous repetitive units, "segemental societies" as he called
them. The horde, the clan, are composed by repetition of like
aggregates within them.

> This organization ... carries with it no other solidari-
> ty than that derived from likenesses, since the society
> is formed of similar segments and these in their turn
> enclose only homogeneous elements.... For segmental or-
> ganization to be possible, the segments must resemble
> one another; without that, they would not be unified.
> And they must differ; without this, they would lose
> themselves in each other and be effaced (DL:176).

Again, we must emphasize that the homogeneity here depends
on the common permeation of all individuals by the sacro-mag-
ical collective conscience.

> Originality is not simply rare there, but it has no
> place. Everybody professes and practices ... the same
> religion; schisms and dissent are unknown; they would
> not be tolerated. But, a this time, religion compris-
> es all, extends to all.... Religion regulates the de-
> tails of private life.... All individual consciences
> are composed of practically the same elements (DL:135).

> We know that, in them, religion pervades the whole so-
> cial life, but that is because social life is made up
> almost exclusively of common beliefs and of common
> practices which derive from unanimous adhesion a very
> particular intensity.... Because all social masses have
> been formed from homogeneous elements ... because the
> collective type was very developed there, and the in-
> dividual type in a rudimentary state, it was inevitable
> that the whole psychic type of society should take on
> a religious character (DL:178-9).

And thus, the moralities of thought and logics of action are
primarily collective.

> If there is one rule of conduct which is incontestable,
> it is that which orders us to realize in ourselves the
> essential traits of the collective type. Among lower
> peoples, this reaches its greatest rigor. There, one's
> duty is to resemble everybody else, not to have any-
> thing personal about one's beliefs or actions. In more
> advanced societies, required likenesses are less numer-
> ous... (DL:396).

Contrary to Nisbet's assertion (1965, 1974:30) that

Durkheim abandoned the mechanical/organic dichotomy, and
never returned to it again, we have seen that he anchored
his notion of altruistic suicide in this type, and that it
can be said that The Elementary Forms was an extended commen-
tary on this type of collective conscience and consciousness.
Indeed, in the very beginning to his final book, Durkheim a-
gain sounded the same notes in characterizing this type of
cultural and phenomenological bond as he had almost twenty
years earlier in The Division of Labor.

> Things are quite different in the lower societies. The
> slighter development of individuality, the small exten-
> sion of the group, the homogeneity of external circum-
> stances, all contribute to reducing the differences
> and variations to a minimum. The group has an intellec-
> tual and moral conformity of which we find examples in
> the more advanced societies. Everything is common to
> all. Movements are stereotyped; everybody performs the
> same ones in the same circumstances, and this conformi-
> ty of conduct only translates the conformity of thought.
> Every mind being drawn into the same eddy, the indivi-
> dual type nearly confounds itself with that of the race.
> And while all is uniform, all is simple as well (EF:18).

b. Durkheim Versus Spencer on the Nature of "Military Socie-
   ties"

Part of the intellectual intrigue of The Division of
Labor was the underlying forensic context , for Durkheim en-
tertained multiple polemics here. Spencer's schema of "mili-
tary and industrial societies" was as well-known to Durkheim
as Toennies' notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Now,
Durkheim agreed with Spencer that "... the place of the in-
dividual ... becomes greater with civilization" (DL:193).
But, as Jones remarks, it appears "... that Durkheim was most
critical [of Spencer] at precisely those points where two ap-
peared to have most in common" (1974a:346). Indeed, as Durk-
heim took pains to establish, such agreement (which misled
Toennies) was only apparent, for at many points their inter-
pretive frameworks were fundamentally opposed.

For instance, at first glance one might suppose that
Spencer's famous general evolutionary law would also describe
Durkheim's thesis of the movement from social likeness and

homogeneity to social differentiation. But Durkheim observed:

> Spencer has already said that social evolution, just
> as universal evolution, begins in a stage of more or
> less perfect homogeneity. But this proposition does
> not in any wise resemble the one we have just been de-
> veloping. For Spencer, a society that was perfectly ho-
> mogeneous would not truly be a society, for homogeneity
> is by nature unstable, and society is essentially a co-
> herent whole. The social role of homogeneity is com-
> pletely secondary; it may look towards an ulterior co-
> operation, but it is not a specific source of social
> life. At times, Spencer seems to see in societies such
> as we have just been describing only an emphemeral jux-
> taposition of independent individuals, the zero of so-
> cial life. We have, on the contrary, just seen that
> they have a very strong collective life, although sui
> generis, which manifests itself not on in exchanges
> and contracts, but in a great abundance of common be-
> liefs and practices. These aggregates are coherent, not
> in spite of their homogeneity, but because of it. Not
> only is the community not too weak; but we may even say
> that it alone exists. Moreover, these societies have a
> definite type which comes from their homogeneity. We
> cannot treat them as negligible quantities (DL:179, #12).

(For differing interpretations of Durkheim's treatment of
Spencer's ideas here, see Perrin (1975) and Jones (1975).

This disagreement between Durkheim and Spencer over
the nature of "mechanical" or "military" societies continued
on other fronts; it is especially significant for our present
purposes that many of the crucial differences between these
two pioneers of sociological theory centered on their esti-
mates of the way in which the individual was bonded to socie-
ty in primitive culture. Thus, although again Durkheim may
seemed to have started out from the same point as Spencer,
he began to draw the line rather quickly. For instance:

> With him [Spencer], we have said that the place of
> the individual in society, of no account in its ori-
> gins, becomes greater with civilization. But this in-
> contestable fact is presented to us under an aspect
> totally different from that of English philosophy,
> so that, ultimately, our conclusions are opposed to
> his more than they are in agreement (DL:193).

Specifically, Spencer's view of evolution led him to view
primitive societies as a loose collocation of individuals.
"Committed to such a view, Spencer had to regard primitive,
homogeneous societies as mere ephemeral juxtapositions of

individuals..." (Jones, 1974:346). Durkheim observed:

> First of all, according to him, this absorption of
> the individual into the group would be the result of
> force and of an artifcial organization necessitated
> by the state of war in which lower societies chroni-
> cally live. It is especially in war that union is ne-
> cessary to success. A group can defend itself against
> another group or subject it to itself only by acting
> together. It is necessary for all the individual for-
> ces to be concentrated in a permanent manner in an
> indissoluble union. But the only means of producing
> this concentration instantaneously is by instituting
> a very strong authority to which individuals are ab-
> solutely submissive. It is necessary that as the will
> of the soldier finds itself suspended in executing
> the will of his superior, so too does the will of cit-
> izens find itself curtailed by that of the government.
> Thus, it is an organized despotism which would anniha-
> late individuals, and since this organization is essen-
> tially military, it is through militarism that Spencer
> defines these types of society (DL:193).

While Spencer defined primitive societies as "military" be-
cause the autonomous individual was oppressed there, Durkheim
reversed the equation and began with the group instead of the
individual. As Jones observes:

> Durkheim's response argued that the effacement of the
> individual is characteristic, not of societies posses-
> sing a centralized authority, but rather of societies
> characterized by the complete absence of centraliza-
> tion. It is the homogeneous (or mechanically solidary)
> society in which the individual personality holds lit-
> tle sway, not because it is suppressed by some politi-
> cal or military force, but because as such "the indi-
> vidual" does not exist in such societies. For Durkheim,
> the emergence of centralized authority is not the sign
> of an impending suppression of individualism; rather,
> it is itself the first manifestation of individualism.
> The power granted to the despotic ruler frees him from
> the dictates of the group, and he is the thus the first
> personality to emerge as distinct from the social mass.
> ... The individual ... does not exist prior to the form
> of social organization and bring it into being; on the
> contrary, the "individual" is the consequence of some
> pre-existing state of social solidarity (1974a:347).

Now, the fundamental difference here between Spencer's
and Durkheim's position was, of course, that Spencer assumed
that the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible
individual enshrined in nineteenth century English Utilitar-
ian political and moral theory was to be found at the origin

of human society. The "natural rights" and "social contract"
theorists had, of course, developed this rhetorical fiction
in their struggles to disengage from control of Church and
State. As Jones remarks: "... Durkheim's opposition to the
view of rights as fixed in human nature was directed against
Spencer's notion that man "by nature" possesses the right to
free contract and equal exchange of value" (1974:347). Thus,
to Spencer, "industrial societies," based on free contrac-
tual relations among individuals in a market, were peaceful,
while primitive societies which repressed individual freedom
were "military." Durkheim, on the contrary, rejected the cor-
ollary notions of a morally autonomous ego in a state of na-
ture, and the idea of an early centralized state despotism.

> We have seen, on the contrary, that this effacement
> of the individual has as its place of origin a social
> type which is characterized by a complete absence of
> all centralization. It is a product of that state of
> homogeneity which distinguishes primitive societies.
> If the individual is not distinct from the group, it
> is because the individual conscience is hardly at all
>   distinguishable from the collective conscience. Spen-
> cer and other sociologists with him seem to have inter-
> preted these distant facts in terms of very modern i-
> deas. The very pronounced contemporary sentiment that
> each of us has his own individuality has led them to
> believe that personal rights cannot be restrained to
> this point except by a coercive organization. We cling
> to them so firmly that they find it inconceivable for
> man to have willingly abandoned them. In fact, if in
> lower societies so small a place is given to indivi-
> dual personality, that is not because it has been re-
> strained or artificially suppressed. It is simply be-
> cause, at that moment of history, it did not exist
>   * (DL:193).

Extending his counter-logics, Durkheim also moved to
refute the egoism/altruism evolutionary schema of Spencer.
Now, Spencer and some of the later "Social Darwinists" some-
times claimed that egoism was basic, the elementary natural
state of mankind, and altruism only a recent development.
Durkheim inverted this notion by insisting that a wider so-
ciocultural perspective reveals altruism as elementary and
original, and egoism as a new social condition. Such a per-
spective became the framework for Durkheim's schemas of sui-

cide.

> ... we see how ... false is the theory which makes ego-
> tism the point of departure for humanity, and altruism
> only a recent conquest. What gives this hypothesis au-
> thority in the eyes of certain persons is that it ap-
> pears to be the logical consequence of the principles
> of Darwinism. In the name of the dogma of struggle for
> existence and natural selection, they paint for us in
> the saddest of colors this primitive inhumanity whose
> hunger and thirst, always badly satisfied, were their
> only passions; those somber times when men had no oth-
> er occupation than to quarrel with one another over
> their miserable nourishment. To react against those re-
> trospective reveries of the philosophy of the eighteenth
> century and also against certain religious doctrines, to
> show with some force that the paradise lost is not be-
> hind us and that there is nothing in our past to regret,
> they believe we ought to make it dreary and belittle it
> systematically. Nothing is less scientific than this
> prejudice in the opposite direction. If the hypotheses
> of Darwin have a moral use, it is with more reserve and
> measure than in other sciences. They overlook the essen-
> tial element of social life, that is, the moderating in-
> fluence that society exercises over its members, which
> tempers and neutralizes the brutal action of the strug-
> gle for existence and selection. Wherever there are so-
> cieties, there is altruism because there is solidarity.
> Thus, we find altruism from the beginnings   (DL:197).

Durkheim was then driven by this polemic to attempt to
more precisely define the sphere of the individual and the
personal. Though still confusing personality with individua-
tion, Durkheim sounded a note which he later elaborated in
"The Dualism of Human Nature" and The Elementary Forms that the
uniquely bodily locus of sensations is the foundation of in-
dividuality and individuation.

> ... conduct is egotistical in the measure that it is
> determined by sentiments and representations which
> are exclusively personal. If, then, we remember to
> what extent in lower societies the conscience of the
> individual is wrapped in the collective conscience,
> we may even be led to believe that it is a thing to-
> tally different from the individual himself, as Con-
> dillac would say. This conclusion, however, would be
> exaggerated, for there is a sphere of psychic life
> which, however developed the collective type may be,
> varies from one man to another and remains peculiar
> with each. It is that which is formed by representa-
> tions, by sentiments and tendencies which relate to
> the organism and to the state of the organism. It is
> the world of internal and external sensations and the

movements which are directly linked to them. This
first foundation of all individuality is inalienable
and does not depend upon any social state. Thus, one
must not say that altruism is born from egotism. Such
a derivation would be possible only through a creatio
ex nihilo. But, to speak vigorously, these two sides
of conduct are found present from the beginning in all
human consciences, for there cannot be things which do
not reflect both of these aspects, the one relating to
the individual alone, and the other relating to the
things which are not personal to him (DL:197-8).

Durkheim continued with this line of thought, developing a
notion of a shifting balance in sociocultural evolution be-
tween egoism and altruism, and concluded: "... individualism
has developed in absolute value by penetrating into regions
which were originally closed to it" (DL:198).

In short, while Durkheim and Spencer seemed to take
off from a common point of departure, at many points Durkheim
moved to reverse the underlying presuppositions of Spencer's
thought, especially in regard to the shifting evolutionary
relations between individual and society.

It is not necessary, then, with Spencer, to present
social life as a simple resultant of individual na-
tures, since, on the contrary, it is rather the lat-
ter which come from the former. Social facts are not
the simple development of psychic facts, but the se-
cond are in large part only the prolongation of the
first in the interior of consciences (DL:349).

Thus did Durkheim's social realism and careful evolutionary
investigations correct Spencer's nominalism. "Society does
not find the bases on which it rests fully laid out in con-
sciences; it puts them there itself" (DL:350).

c. Altruisme as an Index to Mechanical Solidarity

Whereas in The Division of Labor Durkheim mainly took
repressive penal law as his prime external index, in Suicide
he focussed on altruistic suicide as revealing the collective
nature of the archaic social bond. Altruistic suicide serves
as a prime illustration (see especially Part I, Book Two) of
the active acceptance of overwhelmingly strong cultural sanc-
tions of self-abnegation in "mechanical solidarity. However,
Durkheim did occasionally speak in his first book of altruisme

in relation to suicide.

> We find altruism from the beginning of humanity and
> even in a truly intemperate form. For these priva-
> tions that the savage imposes upon himself in obedi-
> ence to religious tradition, the abnegation with
> which he sacrifices his life when society demands
> such sacrifice, the irrestible desire of the widow
> of India to follow her husband to the grave, of the
> Gaul not to survive the head of his clan, of the old
> Celt to free his companions from useless trouble by
> voluntary death--is not all this altruism (DL:197)?

Thus, altruisme implies that the individual in primitive and
archaic societies with low degrees of segmentation, and gov-
erned by traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to
sacrifice himself for the group as a duty and an honor. To
Durkheim, for the individual to emerge as a full-fledged en-
tity in his own right--as an intellectually responsible and
morally autonomous person--the sacro-magical collective prescriptive
etiquettes must first recede.

According to Durkheim's heuristic "ideal type," in
primitive society the individual is more or less submerged
in the group. The collective conscience takes precedence o-
ver the rudimentary individual conscience in the public mo-
res. Indeed, the individual there is so permeated and pene-
trated by the collective conscience that if tradition demands
self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide embraces self-homicide
as a duty, perhaps even a privilege to be competed for. In
contrast to egoistic suicide, the altruist considers self-
sacrifice for the group an obligation, a moral duty which
fulfills his own nature.

In this sense, altruistic suicide was utilized by Durk-
heim as an objective index revealing the inner nature of the
social bond peculiar to traditional societies rooted in ties
of "blood and soil" and religion. Altruistic suicide is tes-
timony to the low degree of individuation in mechanical sol-
idarity.

> For society to be able thus to compel some of its mem-
> bers to kill themselves, the individual personality
> can have little value. For as soon as the latter be-
> gins to form, the right to existence is the first con-
> ceded to it.... But there can be only one cause of this

feeble individuation itself. For the individual to
occupy so little place in collective life he must be
almost completely absorped in the group, and the lat-
ter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the
parts to have so little life of their own, the whole
must indeed be a compact, continuous mass.... As they
consist of a few elements, everyone leads the same
life; everything is common to all, ideas, feelings,
occupations. Also, because of the small size of the
group, it is close to everyone and loses no one from
sight; consequently, collective supervision is con-
stant, extending to everything, and thus more readily
prevents divergences (S:220-221).

In a real sense, altruistic suicide is the ultimate expres-
sion of "mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really
has little life apart from his group, sacrifices himself for
his group when deemed necessary. This extreme sense of moral
obligation is due not only to external conditions in which
such groups often find themselves, but primarily to the ex-
treme degree of penetration of the collective conscience by
sacral and magical sanctions. Durkheim refers to altruisme
in these terms as "... a state of impersonality which may be
regarded as a moral characteristic of primitive man" (S:223).
Hence, primitive cultures exist in a "state of impersonality"
because the person has little autonomous status there.

In such situations, the individual is submerged in the
dictates of the sacro-magical collective conscience. Indeed,
Durkheim suggests that self-sacrifice and the systematic e-
radication of the ego in certain archaic religions implies a
state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the
"pantheistic" structure of such societies. Since religion is
the symbolic way in which society first crystallized self-
consciousness, it follows, argued Durkheim, that "mechanical-
ly integrated" societies, in which the lone individual counts
for little, should express these social and cultural reali-
ties in terms of pantheistic religious projections. As the
individual counted for little in society, so, too, the ego
counted for little in religion. Indeed, Durkheim's insight
here would lead us to expect that societies that had not o-
vercome segmental bases,   tribalistic structures of frat-
ernization, and collective sacro-magical moralities of

thought and logics of action would probably never construct European notions of the autonomy and moral value of the individual person.

d. <u>The</u> <u>Chief</u> <u>as</u> <u>the</u> <u>Emergence</u> <u>of</u> <u>Individual</u> <u>Physiognomy</u>

One of Durkheim's interesting insights into the general evolutionary process of individuation was his suggestion that "... Chiefs are the first personalities to emerge from the social mass" (DL:195). With the chief as the administrative focus of the collective conscience, as it were, we witness the emergence of process by which an individual, in representing the mass, rises above and takes on an individual physiognomy. Hegel also saw the ruler as the collective representation of his community, in which the principle of individuation is impersonality. "The youth goes forth from the unconscious life of the family and becomes the individuality of the community" (1967:493). It is precisely this dialectic of individuation through becoming the symbolic representation of the community--that is, the incarnation of an impersonal type--which we shall meet again and again.

Now, it is important to emphasize that Durkheim's notion of mechanical solidarity is not refuted by the rise of larger political units; rather, it is confirmed. As noted in Chapter Six of this Book, perhaps the closest fusion between religious, ritual, and political structures occurred in the archaic empires of the ancient world. Indeed, it is precisely under such conditions, rather than in the primitive case, that mechanical solidarity and the "sacral womb" reach their paradigmatic level.

> If in some types of societies, the directive power has so much authority, it is ... because this authority emanates directly from the common conscience, and it is great because the common conscience itself is highly developed.... It is under these conditions that mechanical solidarity reaches its maximum power, for the action of the common conscience is stronger when it is exercised, not in a diffuse manner, but through the medium of a defined organ (DL:181).

Durkheim later explored some of these processes at length in

his interesting essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (translated by Jones and Scull, 1973). Here, Durkheim foreshadowed his later analysis by observing:

> ... primitive peoples do not at all present this absence of centralization that we have just observed. There are some, on the contrary, subservient to an absolute power. The division of labor has then made its appearance among them. But in this case, the tie which binds the individual to the chief is identical with that which in our days attaches the thing to the person. The relations of a barbarous despot with his subjects, as that of a master with his slaves, of a father of a Roman family with his children, is not to be distinguished from the relations of an owner with the object he possesses. In these relations there is none of the reciprocity which the division of labor produces. They have with good reason been called unilateral. The solidarity that they express remains mechanical. The whole difference is that it links the individual, not more directly to the group, but to the image of the group. But the unity of the whole is, as before, exclusive of the individuality of its parts
> *(DL: 180).

In sum, where religion and political-legal structures are fused, the individual is depersonalized by submergence in the collective image of the group.

Now, Durkheim later summarized this process of the subordination of the social mass under all sorts of traditional collective sacro-magical injunctions to the centralized image of the group in these terms:

> Individuals, instead of subordinating themselves to the group, were subordinated to that which represented it, and as the collective authority, when it was diffuse was absolute, that of the chief, who is only its organized incarnation, naturally took on the same character (DL:195).

In this dialectic between individuation and attachment to an impersonal image, on the one hand, and between center and periphery on the other, the social mass, especially in emerging large scale political units, becomes subordinated to a specific individual who focusses and incarnates the existence of the group. The chief becomes the first individual in history, according to Durkheim, to separate himself from the social mass only because he serves as an the image of an impersonal type, a collective representation of the group.

> It is a general law that the eminent organ of every
> society participates in the nature of the collective
> being that it represents. Where society has a reli-
> gious, and, so to speak, superhuman character, whose
> source ... lies in the constitution of the common con-
> science, it necessarily transmits itself to the chief
> who directs it and who is thus elevated above the rest
> of men. Where individuals are in simple dependence
> upon the collective type, they quite naturally become
> dependent upon the central authority in which it is
> incarnated. Indeed, the right of property which the
> community exercises over things in an undivided way
> passes intact into the superior personality who finds
> himself thus constituted (DL:180).

Here Durkheim suggests that the collective or "undivided"
rights of ownership pass over into the next political stage
as the undisputed possession of all the goods and people of
the realm by the political chief. Thus, by an imperceptible
evolution, the chief, as the collective representation or
figurehead of the group, becomes endowed with all the tradi-
tional prerogatives once jealously held by the group itself
for itself. But, the dialectics of this very process lead
to an inversion for the figure who symbolically incarnates
the group then comes to usurp or claim these powers and pos-
sessions as his own, often hereditary, right and privilege.

Possessing deep insight into this interesting dialec-
tic and reversal, Durkheim then cautioned us:

> Rather than dating the effacement of the individual
> from the institution of a despotic authority, we must,
> on the contrary, see in this institution the first
> step made towards individualism. Chiefs are the first
> personalities who emerge from the social mass. Their
> exceptional situation, putting them beyond the level
> of others, gives them a distinct physiognomy and ac-
> cordingly confers individuality upon them. In domina-
> ting society, they are no longer forced to follow all
> its movements. Of course, it is from the group that
> they derive their power, but once power is organized,
> it becomes autonomous and makes them capable of per-
> sonal activity. A source of initiative is thus opened
> which had not existed before then. There is, hereafter,
> someone who can produce new things and even in certain
> measure, deny collective usages. Equilibrium has been
> broken (DL:195).

However, by extension, would not also shamans, medicine men,
magicians, priests, prophets, and so forth, who serve as in-

carnations of sacred collective forces, also be capable of "breaking the equilibrium"? Would they also not qualify as social sites for the emergence of individual physiognomy as much as chiefs?

e. Durkheim Versus Toennies on The Division of Labor and Community and Society

Two classics of modern historical sociocultural theory appeared within five years of each other toward the close of the nineteenth century--Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1897) and Emile Durkheim's De la division du travail social (1893). Comparing and contrasting these two classics not only demonstrates how two pioneer sociological theorists came to grips with similar historical processes, but also how their analyses reveal fundamentally different attitudes and commitments. Recently, a fascinating exchange between Durkheim and Toennies has been translated (see Aldous, 1972), which is not only important in terms of the history of social science, but also because it reveals the conflict between these thinkers as spokesman for different cultural traditions. While Durkheim and Weber never collided in public (see Part I, Book Three), Toennies and Durkheim's mutual book reviews reveal basic differences as they confronted each other's formulation.

Throughout his life Durkheim was involved on multiple polemical fronts against opposing cultural traditions. Take, for example, The Division of Labor; as noted, Durkheim was here engaged in polemics against not only Spencer and Comte, but also against Toennies. It is interesting to note, however, in light of the preceding section, that Toennies saw Durkheim's whole sociology as merely "a modification of Spencer's." Now, Durkheim's critique of Toennies' schema in Community and Society falls into at least two categories: valuations of the past versus the present, and the problematic relations between the individual and society through history. First, Durkheim acknowledged that Toennies' notion of "Community" was very similar to what he called "mechanical soli-

darity."

> ... Gemeinschaft is the community. It constitutes an
> absolute unity which is incompatible with the distinc-
> tion of parts. To merit the name community ... a group
> is not a collection of individuals differing from one
> another; it is a mass, undifferentiated and compact....
> It is an aggregate of minds so strongly cohesive that
> no one is able to stir independently of the others....
> It is a community where ... communism is carried to the
> highest point of perfection. The whole alone exists;
> it alone has a action sphere peculiar to itself (1972:
> 1193).

We might recall here that Durkheim's original problem was how
to combine the solidarity found in traditional communities
with the respect for the individual found in modern "civil so-
ciety." So, in contrast to the Romantics, he could not simply
look back to the past, for he was not willing to give up cer-
tain positive values found mainly in modernity. The past to
him meant high social solidarity, which was good, but it also
meant the submergence of the individual in the traditional
collective conscience. But this problem of disengagement from
lingering hierocratic control confronted the French "laic"
moral reformers far more than it did the German Romantics and
Idealists.

Now, in terms of Toennies' notion of modern society,
Durkheim remarked:

> Individual minds, far from merging within Gesellschaft,
> are differentiated and even opposed to each other. While
> the first form of society is that which Hegel prefers,
> one recognizes in the second the theory of Bentham....
> Thus, while in Gemeinschaft the whole had primacy over
> the parts, now under Gesellschaft, the parts are given
> precedence over the whole. The latter is formed only by
> the juxtaposition of the separate parts. That is why,
> while the composition of Gemeinschaft is organic, that
> of Gesellschaft is mechanical (1972:1196).

Durkheim next stated that he decisively differed from Toennies
in regard to the latter's theory of Gesellschaft. Toennies' im-
age of modern society is predominantly negative; if he painted
the traditional community in warm tones, modern society would
be filled in cold tones. Moreover, Toennies was pessimistic
about the fate of the individual and the future of social re-
lations in modern Gesellschaft. Toennies' typology seemed to

Durkheim, as Durkheim's typology seemed to Parsons, to be too dichotomous, as if the two parts had little inner or developmental relation to one another. Durkheim described what saw as Toennies' analysis of modern society, and responded negatively to Toennies' pessimism, likening it to Spencer's vision. Here enters another complexity, for while Durkheim saw Toennies' description of modern society as similar to Spencer's, Hobbes', or Bentham's, Toennies and Spencer themselves placed different valuations on the matter. In short, Spencer's sanguine or optimistic view is countered by Toennies' pessimism or negative view, while Durkheim opposed both or tried to mediate between the two. With Spencer, he wished to preserve modern individualism, yet with Toennies (against Spencer) he wished to emphasize the crucial importance of social solidarity or Gemeinschaft relations in modern society. Against Toennies, and with Spencer, Durkheim recognized the impossibility of any return to the earlier type of social solidarity built upon likeness and submission to traditional sacro-magical rationales and practices. Benjamin Nelson has said of these multiple interactions that:

> The most critical fact about the Durkheimian view is its awareness of the immense challenges confronted by men and groups in the phase of organic solidarity when they seek to coordinate and synchronize their activities and functions. Unlike Spencer, Durkheim does not fancy that the simple breakdown of the unit and its unities assures to each and all the ultimate consummation and satisfaction. Unlike Toennies, he recognizes that in the development of society new sorts of solidarity to have to be evolved, achieving new kinds of communitarian and individuating structures of consciousness and function, if the trends and tendencies toward anomie and normlessness in complex societies are to be moderated (1972:120).

Now, Durkheim himself stated in this regard that:

> It [Gesellschaft] is very similar to Spencer's industrial society. It is seen in the reign of individualism.... The regime of status is, under Gesellschaft replaced by the regime of contracts. Since individual wills are no longer absorbed in the collective will but are placed opposite one another in the full sense of their independence, the only thing that could put an end to this state of war is a treaty of peace con-

sciously signed ... agreement or contract. The immanent and unconscious law of Gemeinschaft is now replaced by a deliberate law, a contractual law. Property also individualized becomes mobile and money appears. It is the era of commerce, of industry, of great cities, of free exchange and of cosmopolitanism. In sum, one sees that the society which Toennies paints at this moment is the capitalistic society [as described by] ... the socialists; and, in fact, the author often borrows the somber colors ... from Karl Marx and from LaSalle (1972: 1196).

Of course, two of the main influences on Toennies conception of modern society were Hobbes and Henry Sumner Maine. Of the latter's influence on Toennies, Nelson remarks:

Maine was not unaware of the losses incurred in the course of the passage from what I have called the tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood. Progress had been purchased at a price. The close and compelling loyalties of the kindred group of real or assumed brothers ... had been displaced by a new world of economic relations. Primitive communalism and cooperation had given way to impersonal competition where each was assumed to be free to assert his self-interest without immediate regard as to the concern for others. Laissez-faire, which embodied the belligerency permissible in primitive society only between distinct kindred groups, had triumphed over customary fraternalistic relations. Everywhere that the village community had been allowed to disintegrate precipitously, melancholy effects had been the result.
Maine's notions undergo both a loss and a gain at the hands of Toennies. Under the names of Gemeinschaften and Gesellschaften, Tonnies describes opposed structures of wills and social relationships. Gemeinschaften comprises groups that are expressions of organic nonreflective wills. Associational forms, Gesellschaften, originate in a negation of the Gemeinschaften. The market and industrial relations of complex societies are characterized by transitory, segmental, and calculating relationships. Actually, Toennies went beyond these simple formulations in his later less well-known studies, but he never quite integrated the social group analysis and his cultural analysis.... A little known book review of Toennies book by Durkheim detects a critical limitation in Toennies argument (Nelson, 1972: 117).

One might add that detailed analysis of their mutual critiques reveals that both seem critically aware of the other theorist's flaws, and equally oblivious of the weaknesses in their own theses.

Let us next turn to briefly consider the political frame-

works or overtones of their respective analyses. It is most
significant, again, that both Durkheim's The Division of La-
bor and Toennies' Community and Society revolved around the
relations between the individual and society, or in slightly
different terms, between communism, socialism, and individual-
ism. As Mauss tells us (1958:32), Durkheim originally drafted
his dissertation as "The Relationship Between Individualism
and Socialism," while Toennies first subtitled his book "A
Study of Communism and Socialism Considered as Empirical
Forms of Civilization." These titles throw light, in turn, on
the differences between Durkheim's political sociology and
that of Toennies. Thus, for instance, Durkheim proposed that
secondary groups such as occupational associations should be
endowed with both power and moral legitimacy to stand between
the lone individual and the powerfully centralized state.
Mauss tells that Durkheim thought:

> ... it necessary to grant the professional group a
> portion of the ancient political and property rights
> which domestic groups had, if the individual is not
> to be alone in the face of the State and live in a
> kind of alternation between anarchy and servitude
> (1958:33).

Of Toennies' quasi-Hobbesian theory of the relations between
the individual and the modern state, Durkheim observed:

> It is necessary that this state be strong to contain
> all the individual wills, all the individual interests
> that no longer are bound one to the other, all the un-
> chained lusts. One now understands the subtitle ....
> Communism is the regime of Gemeinschaft, as socialism
> is that of Gesellschaft.... But while the socialists
> hail Gesellschaft, the regime of their preference as
> the ideal end of progress, Toennies sees in it only the
> inevitable consequence of social evolution, and even
> suggests it may be the forerunner of society's final
> dissolution. He speaks of Gesellschaft without enthu-
> siasm.... It is indispensable that the state form and
> develop in order that Gesellschaft be able to endure;
> but, on the other hand, it is able to exercise on the
> members of society only a mechanical action which can-
> not last indefinitely. By completely artifical coercion
> it is able to restrain for a time all the internal con-
> tradictions, all the discords that work within the so-
> ciety, but sooner or later they will end by breaking
> out. There is true power only in the extent to which
> it represents common ideas and interests. For as Gemein-

schaft declines, the number of these common ideas and
the importance of common interests also becomes pro-
gressively fewer. The state of internal war that socie-
ty discloses cannot fail sooner or later to produce, as
natural consequences, the rupturing of all social bonds
and the decomposition of the social organism. Thus, the
life of society comprises two great phases, communism
and socialism, but the latter is the beginning of an
end more or less close*(1972:1197).

Now, let us recall that Durkheim and Toennies used the
term "mechanical" to refer to societies at the two opposite
ends of history. Durkheim used "mechanical" to refer to a so-
ciety based on likeness, in which the individual stood merely
as a repetitive, mechanical part submerged in the traditional
collective conscience. Toennies, on the other hand, used me-
chanical to refer to an impersonal, atomized aggregate of in-
dividuals pursuing their own self-interests in the market so-
ciety. This interesting inversion of terms led Durkheim to
put his finger on the very point at which he differed from
Toennies.

> The point where I part company with him [Toennies] is
> with his theory of Gesellschaft.... Gesellschaft would
> be characterized by a progressive development of indivi-
> dualism that the State could forestall only for a time
> and by artificial procedures. It [society] would be es-
> sentially a mechanical aggregate; all that would still
> remain of the truly collective life would result not
> from internal spontaneity, but from the impetus of the
> State.... It is society as Bentham imagined it (1972:
> 1198).

Of course, Durkheim opposed the idea that modern society was
either artificial or forced. As we shall see in Part II, Book
Two, Durkheim believed that the progress of organic solidarity
was spontaneous and harmonious. As Giddens observes:

> The main theme of The Division of Labor is that modern
> complex society is not, in spite of the declining sig-
> nificance of traditional moral beliefs, inevitably tend-
> ing towards disintegration. Instead the "normal" state
> of the differentiated division of labor is one of organ-
> ic stability. This does not mean, however,(as Durkheim
> considered Toennies' analysis to imply), that the inte-
> grating effect of the specialized division of labor can
> be satisfactorily interpreted in the mode of Utilitar-
> ianism, as the result of multifarious individual con-
> tracts (1971c:191).

On this matter, Durkheim himself stated:

> Now, I believe that all the life of great social ag-
> glomerations is as natural as that of small aggrega-
> tions. It is neither less organic nor less internally
> activated. Beyond purely individual actions there is
> in our contemporary societies a type of collective ac-
> tivity which is just as natural as that of the less ex-
> tended societies of former days. It constitutes a dif-
> ferent type, but between the two species from the same
> genus, as diverse as they are, there is not a differ-
> ence in their basic natures. In order to prove it, a
> book is necessary.... There is so little continuity
> between these two types of societies that it is impos-
> sible to conceive how they could be part of the same
> development (1972:1198).

The book was, of course, The Division of Labor in Society.
Durkheim then criticized Toennies' description of Gesell-
schaft as purely ideological, and suggests that a "better way"
would have been to empirically study juridical structures, as
he himself was doing in the drafts of his first great book.

> But, in what does the collective life of Gesellschaft
> consist? The method the author follows ... is complete-
> ly ideological.... Toennies elaborates concepts more
> than he observes the facts about the phenomena deline-
> ated by his concepts. He proceeds dialectically, mak-
> ing those distinctions and those symmetrical classi-
> fications of concepts so dear to the German logician.
> A better way to reach his goal would have been to pro-
> ceed inductively ... to study the Gesellschaft pheno-
> mena through law and mores appropriate to it which
> would reveal its structure. But ... one cannot fail to
> recognize in this book truly forceful thinking and an
> uncommon power of organization (1972:1198).

Let us now turn to Toennies' reply to Durkheim.

Toennies' response to Durkheim's critical review was
brief but cogent. Toennies' reply appeared in 1896 in brief
comments on Durkheim's The Division of Labor. His review is
noteworthy because he expressed surprise at Durkheim's usage
of his terms "mechanical" and "organic" in a reverse manner,
he insisted that his intentions have not been adequately re-
cognized, and from his own special perspective, Toennies saw
Durkheim's sociology as basically congruent with Spencer's,
and finally, he revealed a critical attitude toward Durkheim's
work which probably derives from the conflict between their
respective cultural traditions.

First, Toennies protests that his presentation of organically and mechanically integrated social structures is not merely the reverse of Durkheim's.

> What I referred to were the possible kinds of positive attitudes of people toward each other, hence those of the individual toward the social entirety. My types are as follows: the entirety is perceived and considered as a goal--as a natural whole; or the entirety is perceived and considered as a means for individual goals and consequently as an intentionally devised tool (1972:1199).

Toennies thus started from the individual's perceptions and the content of his will while, on the contrary, Durkheim started from the social and cultural structures and related these back to the individual. Toennies continues:

> I understand both kinds of structures in a sense completely different from that of Durkheim, Barth, and all other sociologists known to me. I understand them in the the first range according to their ... _esse objectivum_, and I am delineating the progressive rationalization and externalization of these relations which derive from these _esse objectivum_ and reach their climax in the conceptions of the universal society and the universal state. This doctrine of mine is basically indifferent toward the theory that the _esse formale_ of the social life or that of _Gesellschaft is organic_ (1972: 1199-2000).

Thus, Toennies reiterated that his starting point and central focus were very different from Durkheim's. Implying that Durkheim was centrally concerned with the structural relations between individual and society through history, Toennies started with the individual's perception of the essential goal of his life-activity. Toennies' perspective is valuable in itself and because Durkheim largely ignored phenomenological approaches, and because Toennies' approach influenced both Weber's typologies and his notion of _verstehen_.

Then, Toennies' pointed out that Durkheim appeared to slight the negative features of the progressive division of labor. "I objected several times to his failure to consider the negative side of the entire evolution" (1972:2000). Of course, Durkheim did see a negative side to the breakdown of the division of labor in terms of the forced and anomic divisions of labor (see Part II, Book Two). Thus, Durkheim's view

of the negative consequences was simply not what Toennies saw; Durkheim ignored the Romantics' charges of impersonalization, and assumed that specialization of functions was necessary and good (eg. see DL:402-3). Toennies' sardonic summary of Durkheim's theses went like this:

> The essential subject of Durkheim's work is the moral value of the division of labor; he expects public opinion to turn increasingly toward the goal of making the division of labor an object of obligation. Thus belonging to positive and current morals, it unfolds its real (natural) moral value. The author is defending the division of labor against the reproach of diminishing human personality. The entire sociology of Durkheim is a modification of Spencer's sociology. In the way this perspective is criticized as well as in several other commentaries, I found some thoughts I agree with (1972:2000).

These observations raise a crucial question in regard to the emergence of the person through history. Toennies rightly saw that Durkheim took pains to defend the division of labor against the charge of diminishing human personality (DL:402-3), but clearly this very charge lay at the heart of the Romantics' critique of progress. Toennies and other thinkers in the Romantic tradition (see Part I, Book Three),
stood for the life of the Spirit, for the Faustian universality of the whole man. The integrated personality and the deepened interior life versus the narrow, fragmented, functionalized bureaucrat--it was this opposition between life and death death, Spirit and Mechanism--which lay behind Weber's haunting plaint at the close of his Protestant Ethic... book. It also lay behind Toennies' subsidy of the whole personalism of community, of the warm, extended primary group relations. The organicism of personality thus was associated with the organicism of early community versus the impersonalized atomism of market society which necessitated the rationalization and specialization of personality and social structure.

Let us conclude this brief review of the confrontation between Toennies and Durkheim by reflecting on the differences between their usages of the key terms "organic" and "mechanical." Perhaps this might reveal key outlooks of their respec-

tive cultural traditions. In essence, by the term "mechanical" Toennies implied impersonality, atomized Utilitarian social relations, while to Durkheim "mechanical" implied forced likeness, repetition as in a machine, and a low degree of individuation as in a flock or birds or school of fish turning with a single movement. By "organic," Toennies roughly meant undifferentiated, personalistic, stable, communal social relations found in traditional village communities, while Durkheim meant complex differentiation and interdependency of function.

f. Obstacles to the Progress of Organic Solidarity

Although Durkheim's general evolutionism did not lead him to Weberian insights into the differential preconditions for specific historical breakthroughs, recognition of obstacles to the progress of organic solidarity was not wholly absent from his work. For example, Durkheim did acknowledge that that clan particularism, the force of tradition and heredity, and so forth were obstacles which had to be overcome if the division of labor was to perform its function of liberating the individual from the sacro-magical collective conscience. Indeed, at one point, in an important footnote, Durkheim acknowledged the possibility of crucial exceptions to his highly generalized notion that the division of labor, the effacement of the segmental type of society, economic development, and the liberation of the individual necessarily and everywhere go hand in hand. Let us briefly explore these "Weberian" emphases.

Noting how the new builds on the old--ie. occupational functions on class and caste lines--Durkheim adopted an almost Weberian emphasis in observing that organic solidarity had to breakthrough the restrictive clan barriers to open up wider arenas of exchange and universes of discourse.

> In a general way, classes and castes probably have no other origin nor any other nature; they arise from the multitude of occupational organizations being born amidst the pre-existing familial organization. But this mixed arrangement cannot long endure, for between the two states that it attempts to reconcile, there is an

> antagonism which necessarily ends in a break. It is
> only a very rudimentary division of labor which can
> adapt itself to those rigid, defined moulds which
> were not made for it. It can grow only by freeing
> itself from the framework which encloses it. As soon
> as it has passed a certain stage of development, there
> is no longer any relation either between the immutable
> number of segments and the steady growth of functions
> which are becoming specialized, or between the heredi-
> tarily fixed properties of the first and the new apti-
> tudes that the second calls forth. The social mater-
> ial must enter into entirely new combinations in order
> to organize itself upon completely different founda-
> tions. But the old structure ... is opposed to this.
> That is why it must disappear. The history of these
> two types shows in effect that one has progressed on-
> ly as the other has retrogressed (DL:182-3).

Here Durkheim clearly stated that the division of labor must
breakthrough older and narrower structures, that it faces con-
flict, that it does not proceed automatically and ineluctably,
that it may be blocked by the rigidity of clan and familial
based occupational differentiation. Now, the underlying rea-
son for this resistance of familial structures to progres-
sive and impersonal functionalization of occupational tasks
is the rootedness of the clan in the collective conscience.

> Examples are numerous where this neutralizing influence
> of the common conscience on the division of labor can
> be directly observed. As long as law and custom make a
> strict obligation of the inalienability and communism
> of real estate, the necessary conditions for the divi-
> sion of labor do not exist. Each family forms a com-
> pact mass, and all devote themselves to the same occu-
> pation, to the exploitation of the hereditary patrimony.
> Among the Slavs, the Zadruga is often increased to such
> proportions that great misery becomes prevalent. Never-
> theless, as domestic spirit is very strong, they gen-
> erally continue to live together, instead of taking up
> special occupations outside such as mariner and mer-
> chant. In other societies, where the division of labor
> is more advanced, each class has determinate functions,
> always the same, sheltered from all innovation. Else-
> where, there are entire classes of occupations whose
> cultivation is more or less forbidden to citizens. In
> Greece, in Rome, industry and commerce were scorned ca-
> reers. Among the Kabyles, certain trades like those of
> butcher, shoemaker, etc. are held in low esteem by pub-
> lic opinion. Specialization, thus, cannot move in these
> directions. Finally, even with those peoples where eco-
> nomic life has already attained some development, as
> with us during the days of the old corporations, func-

tions were regulated in such a way that the division of labor could not progress. Where everyone was o- bliged to manufacture in the same manner, all indivi- dual variation was impossible (DL:284-5).

Further, closely allied to the segmental structure of mechanical solidarity was the force of heredity and ascribed status systems. In his concern for the liberation of the in- dividual from the fused common concience, Durkheim saw a se- ries of factors holding back the de-collectivization of struc- tures of moral and intellectual responsibility, and thus, in turn, the development of differentiated occupational respon- sibility.

> Race and individuality are two contradictory forces
> which vary inversely with each other. As long as we
> only continue to follow in the path of our ancestors,
> we tend to live as they have lived, and remain adamant
> to all innovation.... The obstacle that progress meets
> in this quarter is even more difficult to surmount than
> that coming from a community of beliefs and practices.
> For the latter are imposed upon the individual only
> from without and by moral action, whereas hereditary
> tendencies are congenital and have an anatomical base.
> Thus, the greater the part of heredity in the distri-
> bution of tasks, the more invariable the distribution,
> the more difficult, consequently, the advances of the
> division of labor are, even when they are useful....
> A great many facts tend to prove that, in the begin-
> ning, heredity had a considerable influence over the
> division of social functions (DL:304-5).

Now, a special case of this retarding influence of heredity and ascribed status on occupational differentiation and the liberation of the individual is the caste division of labor.

> As soon as the division of labor appears in character-
> istic fashion, it is fixed into a form transmitted by
> heredity. Thus castes grow up. India offers the most
> perfect model of this organization of work, but it is
> found elsewhere. With the Jews, the only functions
> which were sharply separated from others, sacerdotal
> functions, were strictly hereditary. It was the same
> at Rome for all public functions, which implied reli-
> gious functions, which were the privilege of the patri-
> cians alone. In Assyria, Persia, Egypt, society is di-
> vided in the same manner. When castes tend to disap-
> pear, they are replaced by classes, which, in order to
> keep their close exclusion and privileges, rely on the
> same principle (DL:306).

Thus, clans, castes, and classes all constitute obstacles to

the differentiation of function, to the division of social labor on an open and universalistic base of natural aptitude and technical competence. The cultural thrust toward universalism and individual achievement underlies the progressive division of labor to Durkheim.

> For the division of labor to be able to develop, men had to succeed in shaking off the yoke of heredity, progress had to break up castes and classes. The progressive disappearance of these latter tends to prove the reality of his emancipation, for we cannot see how, if heredity had lost none of its claims over the individual, it could have been weakened as as institution.... What is certain is that faith in heredity, formerly so intense, has today been replaced by an almost opposed faith. We tend to believe that the individual is in large part the son of his work, and even to scorn the bonds which attach him to him to his race and make him depend upon it (DL:308).

Durkheim's observations here about obstacles lead us to a most significant footnote in which he acknowledged that there might be important exceptions to his general law of differentiation and individuation. Indeed, this admission of the insufficiency of his general evolutionary schema leads us directly to Weber's investigations into the complex and shifting series of relations which advance or retard evolutionary breakthroughs. Perhaps Donald Nielsen has put the significance of Durkheim's acknowledgement that the division of labor, effacement of segmental type, and economic development do not necessarily go hand in hand most succinctly:

> ... a high degree of differentiation and division of structure and function do not necessarily imply or carry with them a full and total thrust toward universalization and fraternization and the makings of newer senses of brotherhoods, community, self, and world. We err grievously if we suppose that every time we perceive differentiated structures at work we are seeing a society which has undergone extensive cultural modernization (1973:108-9).

Durkheim himself observed:

> But it may well happen that in a particular society ... the division of economic labor may be greatly developed, although the segmental type may be strongly pronounced there. This seems to be the case with England. Great industry and commerce appear to be as developed there as on the continent, although the cellular system is still

> very marked, as both the autonomy of local life and
> authority of tradition prove.... It is sufficient,
> then, that some sort of circumstance excite an urgent
> need of material well-being with a people for the di-
> vision of economic labor to be developed without the
> social structure visibly changing. One must not judge
> the place of a society on the social ladder according
> to its state of civilization, especially of its econo-
> mic civilization, for the latter can be only an imita-
> tion, a copy, and conceal a social structure of infer-
> ior species. The case, if it is true, is exceptional.
> It appears, however (DL:282, #30).

Besides opening the way for a discussion of Weber's work,
Durkheim's admission here of exceptions to his general law
means, as Nielsen suggests, that some societies may break
with the sacro-magical collective structures of conscience
and consciousness independently of structural differentia-
tion. Conversely, even with societies which are differentia-
ted institutionally, the failure to break with either sacro-
magical praxis and classificatory systems rooted primarily
in the collectivity, constitute prime obstacles to moderniza-
tion.

These multiple possibilities are true in cultural
spheres as well as in the division of labor. Although science
and philosophy were symbolically associated in Durkheim's En-
lightenment France with the over-coming of religion, magic,
and superstition and the liberation of the individual, again
Durkheim acknowledged that these processes are not necessary
and inevitable and universal developments.

> In Athens, intellectual development--scientific and
> philosophical--was far greater than in Rome. Now, it
> is held that science and philosophy and collective
> thinking develop in the same way as individualism.
> True, they very often accompany it, but that is not
> inevitably so. In India, Brahminism and Buddhism have
> a very learned and subtle metaphysic--the Buddhist
> religion rests on a whole theory of the world. The
> sciences were developed to a high degree in the tem-
> ples of Egypt. We know, however, that in the case of
> both India and Egypt, there was an almost complete ab-
> sence of individualism. It is this fact more than any
> other that goes to prove the pantheistic nature of
> these metaphysics and religions: they attempted to
> give the pantheism a kind of rational and charted
> faith. Clearly, a pantheistic faith is not possible
> where individuals have a lively sense of their indi-

viduality (PECM:58).

Here, again, Durkheim connected pantheistic religious and meta-
physical projections with the pantheistic structure of socie-
ty--namely, with the penetration of culture by traditional
sacro-magical collective structures of morality and thought.
Finally, Durkheim considered the possibility that the devel-
opment of philosophy and speculative thought are not necessarily
correlated with the development of individualism. For the e-
mergence and establishment of autonomous spheres for the in-
dividual are preeminently practical, ie. structural, proces-
ses.

> ... for the Athenian, the matter of practical life was
> reduced to something insignificant. He lived a life of
> leisured pursuits. In such a setting there comes a re-
> markable flowering of science and philosophy. Once
> they flower, they may, to be sure, inspire an indivi-
> dualist movement, but we cannot say they derive from
> it. It is possible, of course, that speculation, open-
> ing out in this way, may not have this result and that
> it remains in its essence conservative. In that case,
> it is taken up with making a theory of the state of
> things as they exist or perhaps with a commentary on
> it. Such, in the main, is the nature of sacerdotal
> speculation: and even Greek speculation as a whole had
> this same tendency over a long period. The political
> and moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do
> more than reflect in their systems the political struc-
> ture of Sparta and Athens respectively.
> Finally, one last reason that prevents our measuring
> the degree of individualism in a country by the devel-
> opment reached in the faculties of speculative thought.
> This is, that ~~individualism is not a theory~~: it lies in
> the region of practice, not in that of speculation. For
> it to be true individualism, it must make its mark on
> morals and social institutions (PECM:59).

In sum, while remaining for the most part on the general e-
volutionary level correlating societal differentiation and
individuation, Durkheim did occasionally descend to the his-
torical level of specific preconditions retarding or advan-
cing societies in different ways along one or other evolu-
tionary line. While more of this differential-historical ana-
lysis would have been desirable (see Part I, Book Three),
Durkheim did recognize a series of obstacles to progressive
division of social labor.

g. The Progress of Organic Solidarity

We propose here to treat the coming of organic solidar-
ity from a different point than normal. Instead of focusing
on the movement from one type of social organization to ano-
ther, we shall turn our primary attention to Durkheim's ori-
ginal and deepest concern--the shifting historical relations
between individual and society. If the significance of the
movement from mechanical to organic solidarity is viewed in
terms of background shifts in the relations between the per-
son's conscience and consciousness and systems of group mor-
ality, of shifts in the anchors of legitimate moral and in-
tellectual authority from the group to the individual, then
the deeper historical meaning of Durkheim's correlation of
societal differentiation and individuation may be read as
the de-collectivization of structures of morality and thought
and the emergence of the autonomous and responsible person.

Durkheim himself compared and contrasted the two types
in terms of their significance for the individual in these
terms:

> Whereas the previous type [mechanical solidarity] im-
> plies that individuals resemble each other, this type
> presumes their difference. The first is possible only
> in so far as the individual personality is absorbed
> into the collective personality; the second is possi-
> ble only if each one has a sphere of action which is
> peculiar to him; that is, a personality. It is neces-
> sary, then, that the collective conscience leave open
> a part of the individual conscience in order that spe-
> cial functions be established there, functions which
> it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended,
> the stronger is the cohesion which results from this
> solidarity. On the one hand, each one depends as much
> more strictly on society as labor is divided; and, on
> the other, the activity of each is as much more person-
> al as it is specialized.... The yoke that we submit to
> is much less heavy than when society completely con-
> trols us, and it leaves much more place open for the
> free play of our initiative. Here the individuality of
> all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Socie-
> ty becomes more capable of collective movement, at the
> same time that each of its elements has more freedom of
> of movement. This solidarity resembles that which we
> observe among the higher animals. Each organ, in ef-
> fect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And,
> moreover, the unity of the organism is as great as the

individuation of the parts is more marked (DL:131).
To the early Durkheim, then, societal differentiation im-
plied individuation because (a) the hold of the collective
conscience demanding collective acting out of responsibili-
ties is attenuated, and,therefore, a sphere for individual
moral and intellectual responsibility is progressively open-
ed up, and (b) because functional specialization demanded by
the division of social labor also requires greater use of in-
dividual capacities. The organic solidarity of complex socio-
cultural formations, then, depends upon the emergence of dif-
ferentiated individual responsibilities which knit the social
fabric together in a new and more interdependent way. As Durk-
heim later proposed "The division of labor unites at the same
time that it opposes; it makes the activities it differentia-
tes converge; it brings together those it separates." Organic
solidarity implies a complex, differentiated, interdependent
social bond--unity through diversity instead of unity through
identity. "The more one goes back in history, the greater the
homogeneity. On the other hand, the further one approaches to
the highest social types, the greater the development of the
division of labor" (DL:138).

Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim sounded the
same refrain from multiple perspectives--social morphological
differentiation requires greater diversity, and, thus, frees
the individual. Noting that small scale groups surround the
individual, Durkheim observed:

> But for it to be otherwise, would it not be enough for
> the society to be on a fairly large scale? There is no
> doubt that when it is small--when it surrounds every
> individual on all sides and at every moment--it does
> not allow of his evolving in freedom. If it be always
> present and always in action, it leaves no room for his
> initiative. But it is no longer the same case when it
> has reached wide enough dimensions. When it is made up
> of a vast number of individuals a society can exercise
> over each a supervision only as close and as vigilant
> and effective as when a surveillance is concentrated
> on a small number. A man is more free in the midst of
> a throng than in a small coterie. Hence, it follows
> that individual diversities can then more easily have
> play, that collective tyranny declines and that indivi-
> dualism establishes itself in fact, and that, with time,

the fact becomes a right   (PECM:61).

Having just reviewed some obstacles which Durkheim himself
cited to the progress of the division of labor, one might
question here his overly abstracted, general evolutionary
views on rights following on changed states of fact.
Durkheim then compared and contrasted mechanical and organic
solidarity in terms of changes in the volume, intensity, and
definition of the collective conscience (see also Giddens,
1972a:5).

> Not only, in a general way, does mechanical solidar-
> ity link men less strongly than organic solidarity,
> but also, as we advance in the scale of social evolu-
> tion, it grows ever more slacker. The force of social
> links which have this origin vary with respect to the
> following three conditions:
>
> (1) the relation between the volume of the common con-
> science and that of the individual conscience. The links
> are stronger as the first more completely envelops the
> second.
> (2) the average intensity of the states of the collec-
> tive conscience. The relation between volumes being e-
> qual, it has as much power over the individual as it has
> vitality.
> (3) the greater or lesser determination of these same
> states. That is, the more defined beliefs and practices
> are, the less place they leave for individual divergen-
> ces. They are uniform moulds into which we all ... couch
> our ideas and our actions. The consensus is then as per-
> fect as possible; all consciences vibrate in unison. In-
> versely, the more general and indeterminate the rules of
> conduct and thought are, the more individual reflection
> must intervene to apply them to particular cases. But it
> cannot awaken without upheavals occuring.... Centrifugal
> tendencies thus multiply at the expense of social cohe-
> sion and the harmony of its movements * (DL:152).

This is a crucial passage; close attention to it could have
avoided many subsequent misunderstandings among secondary in-
terpreters. Contrary to Parsons (1949) and J. Foskett (1939),
among others, who dropped out Durkheim's evolutionism and never
recognized the centrality of his notion of the primitive sac-
ral complex, Durkheim never meant to say that the main differ-
ence between mechanical and organic solidarity lay in the
presence or absence of shared values or a common value system.
Rather, as we see in the preceding quotation, he distinguish-
ed between the two in terms of their volume, intensity, ri-

gidity, and content. In other words, Durkheim contrasted a strong, repressive, highly stereotyped religious and magically dominated traditional tribal or communal value system with a modern secularized and individualized value system.

Since he linked religion with a "central region in the common conscience," we should not fail to note a crucial ambiguity in Durkheim's usage of the key terms "common conscience" or "collective conscience." Lack of recognition of Durkheim's special meanings for these terms has led many observers astray. In a series of key passages early in The Division of Labor (eg. 79-80), Durkheim acknowledged that the "conscience collective" could be viewed in two ways--as the generally diffused value and symbolic system of any society (eg. Parsons' generic Central Value System), and as the situation, most clearly represented by primitive mechanical solidarity, in which the logics of moral decision and intellectual judgment are primarily collective, traditional, and permeated by sacro-magical rationales and practices. Once again we encounter the conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary meanings in Durkheim's terms and system. However, it must be noted that Durkheim, remarking on this ambiguity ("the word we have just employed is not, it is true, without ambiguity," DL:80), intended that the term conscience collective be specifically reserved for the historical situation of early society, for the social situation of "the totality of social likenesses" (DL:80). Durkheim even observed that it might be better to designate a special term for this notion of "the totality of social similitudes"--whose clearest expression is primitive tribal culture (eg. DL:80). Unfortunately, he did not do so, and, hence, bequeathed us much confusion. But he did emphasize that "we shall employ the well-worn expression 'collective or common conscience,' but we shall always mean the strict sense in which we have taken it" *(DL:80).

In addition to this explicit proviso, Durkheim's intentions here are clear from the way in which he described the crucial transformations from mechanical to organic solidarity.

This is clearly seen in Part V of Chapter Five of Division, where Durkheim spoke of the role of religion in primitive society and its secularization and attenuation in organic solidarity (see also Chapter Six of this Book on the "primitive sacral complex").

> If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything; everything social is religious; the two words are synonymous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from their religious function, constitute themselves apart, and take on a more and more acknowledged temporal character. God, who was at first present in all human relations, progressively withdraws from them; he abandons the world to men and their disputes. At least, if he continues to dominate it, it is from on high and at a distance, and the force which he exercises, becoming more general and more indeterminate, leaves more place to the free play of human forces. The individual really feels himself less acted upon; he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity (DL:169).

It is, therefore, transformation and secularization of values, and not their disappearance, which constitutes the essence of the momentous historical shift in relations between the individual conscience and the common conscience.

> This is not to say, however, that the common conscience is threatened with total disappearance. Only, it more and more comes to consist of very general and very indeterminate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave open a place for a growing multitude of individual differences. There is even a place where it is strengthened and made precise: that is the way in which it regards the individual. As all the other beliefs and all the other practices take on a character less and less religious, the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We erect a cult in behalf of personal dignity which, as every strong cult, already has its superstitions (DL:172).

Anthony Giddens has emphasized this crucial aspect of Durkheim's ideas in succinct fashion:

> There is a fundamental distinction between "individuation" and "individualism." The growth of individuation presupposes a decline in the volume, intensity, and rigidity of the conscience collective: individuals are able to develop their own particular propensities and inclinations to the degree to which these are freed from the control of the moral homogeneity of the com-

> munity. But this in turn entails a transformation in
> the content of collective moral ideals: the decline
> of traditional religion and the emergence of what Durk-
> heim calls variously "moral individualism" or the "cult
> of the individual." The main thesis of The Division of
> Labor is that while individuation is a necessary con-
> comitant of the dissolution of traditional society, it
> implies, not the complete eradication of the conscience
> collective, but its transmutation in the form of the
> development of new moral ideals: those comprised in the
> "cult of the individual." Thus, the "cult of the indi-
> vidual" provides a moral validation of the specialized
> division of labor. The values and beliefs composing mor-
> al individualism, stressing as they do the dignity and
> worth of the human individual, emphasize that each man
> should develop his talents and capacities to their ful-
> lest extent (1972a:6-7).

Again, one cannot hope to understand why Durkheim viewed the
progress of the division of labor and the coming of organic
solidarity in such a virtuous light unless one sees him as
part of a long-term continuing cultural struggle with the
Catholic Hierocratic Cultural Tradition to de-collectivize
and secularize the foundations of morality and thought.

Against this background, we can better see why Durk-
heim saw the progressive division of labor in a moral light,
why he saw the coming of organic solidarity as liberating
the individual from archaic repression, and why he correla-
ted differentiation and individuation.

> If there are more things common to all, there are
> many more that are personal to each. There is, in-
> deed, every reason for believing that the latter have
> increased more than the former, for the differences
> between men have become more pronounced in so far as
> they are more cultivated.... special abilities are
> more developed than the common conscience. It is at
> least probable that, in each particular conscience,
> the personal sphere is much greater than the other
> >   (DL:153).

Individual diversities multiply as societal diversity increas-
es--this is Durkheim's fundamental law here. Along with this
parallel movement, Durkheim saw progressive extension of ju-
ridical protection for the individual. (We shall soon explore
the role of the State as a guarantor of individual rights).

> If all the individuals who make up society are today
> equally protected, no matter what their status, this
> tempering of customs is due, not to the appearance of

> a really new penal rule, but to the extension of the old one. In the beginning, it was forbidden to make an attempt upon the life of the members of the group; but this did not apply to children and slaves. Now that we no longer make this distinction, some acts which were not criminal have become punishable.... If, however, there is place for admitting that the respect of society for the individual has become stronger, it does not follow that the central region of the common conscience [religion] is more extended (DL:166-7).

Now, it is this emerging "cult of the individual" which comes with the progressive division of labor and organic solidarity which we are centrally concerned with tracing here. Indeed, Durkheim's central value in the modern world was precisely this "cult of the individual."

> It is, indeed, remarkable that the only collective sentiments that have become more intense are those which have for their object, not social affairs, but the individual. For this to be so, the individual personality must have become a much more important element in the life of society, and in order for it to have acquired this importance, it is not enough for the personal conscience of each to have grown in absolute value, but also to have grown more than the common conscience. It must have been emancipated from the yoke of the latter, and, consequently, the latter must have fallen from its throne, and lost the determinate power that it originally exercised (DL:167).

In other words, Durkheim saw a long-term transformation from the cult of the group and tradition to the cult of the individual; both were culturally sanctioned, however. Finally, we cannot fail to observe that Durkheim sounded occasionally a critical note concerning the emerging "cult of the individual" which may lead to extremes.

> It is thus ... a common cult, but it is possible only by the ruins of all others, and, consequently, cannot produce the same effects as this multitude of extinguished beliefs. There is no compensation for that. Moreover, if it is common in so far as the community partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If it turns all wills toward the same end, this end is not social. It thus occupies a completely exceptional place in the collective conscience. It is still from society that it takes all its force, but it is not to society that it attaches us; it is to ourselves. Hence, it does not constitute a true social link. That is why we have been justly able to reproach the theorists who have made this sentiment exclusively basic in their moral

<u>doctrine, with the ensuing dissolution of society</u> *
(DL:172).

We see Durkheim acknowledging simultaneously that the "cult of the individual" in modern society is culturally sanction- ed (else it could not be a "cult"), but one which is non-so- cial. <u>This curious state of affairs suggests that the egois- tic extremes of this cult may be connected with egoistic and anomic suicides</u>. We shall, of course, pursue this critical emphasis of Durkheim's, especially in terms of his multiple polemics against the opposing Anglo and Romantic notions of the individual.

Now, against the notion that differentiation necessar- ily implies dispersion, a dissolution of values, and a ren- ding of the social fabric (as implied by Comte, see Book Two), Durkheim repeatedly insisted:

> Social progress ... does not consist in a continual dissolution. On the contrary, the more we advance, the more profoundly do societies reveal the senti- ment of self and of unity.... It is the division of labor which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the principal bond of social aggregates of higher types
> (DL:173).

Durkheim thus came, in a slightly different way, to reiterate the essence of organic solidarity, in contrast to mechanical solidarity. Again, the crucial factors to Durkheim here were the de-collectivization of structures of conscience and con- sciousness and the emergence of the autonomous person.

> This social type rests on principles so different from the preceding that it can develop only in pro- portion to the effacement of that preceding type. In effect, individuals are here grouped, no longer ac- cording to their relations of lineage, but according to the particular nature of the social activity to which they consecrate themselves. Their natural mil- ieu is no longer the natal milieu, but the occupation- al milieu. It is no longer real or fictitious consan- guinity which makes the place of each one, but the function he fills (DL:182).

Durkheim saw both types as structured in terms of moral rules--only the duties demanded of the individual by the group were diammetrically opposed. Social life, moral life,

then, can take two fundamentally different forms.

> Social life comes from a double source, the likenes-
> ses of consciences and the division of social labor.
> The individual is socialized in the first case, be-
> cause, not having any real individuality, he becomes,
> with those he resembles, part of the same collective
> type; in the second case, because, while having a
> physiognomy and a personal activity which distinguish-
> es him from others, he depends upon them in the same
> measure that he is distinguished from them, and con-
> sequently upon the society which results from their
> union. The similitudes of consciences gives rise to
> juridical rules which with the threat of repressive
> measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon
> all. The more pronounced this is, the more completely
> is social life confounded with religious life, and
> the nearer to communism are economic institutions.
> The division of labor gives rise to juridical rules
> which determine the nature and the relations of divi-
> ded functions, but whose violation calls forth only
> restitutive measures without any expiatory character.
> Each of these bodies of juridical rules is, moreover,
> accompanied by a body of purely moral rules. Where
> penal law is very voluminous, common morality is very
> extensive; that is to say, there is a multitude of col-
> lective practices placed under the protection of public
> opinion. Where restitutive law is highly developed,
> there is an occupational morality for each profession.
> In the interior of the same group of workers, there ex-
> ists an opinion, diffuse in the entire extent of this
> circumscribed aggregate, which, without being furnish-
> ed with legal sanctions, is rendered obedience. There
> are usages and customs common to the same order of
> functionaries which on one of them can break without
> incurring the censure of the corporation. This moral-
> ity is distinguished from the preceding by differences
> analogous to those which separate the two corresponding
> types of law. It is localized in a limited region of
> society. Moreover, the repressive character of the sanc-
> tions attaching to it is much less attenuated. Profes-
> sional misdeed call forth reprobation much more feeble
> than attacks against public morality (DL:226-7).

It must be emphasized that Durkheim considered the modern

morality of organic solidarity just as moral as the shared

common conscience of societies permeated by religion and mag-

ic. For both attach the individual to the group; the type

and content of attachment merely differs in these two cases.

> The rules of occupational morality and justice, how-
> ever, are as imperative as the others. They force the
> individual to act in view of ends which are not strict-
> ly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compro-

mises, even where society relies most completely upon the division of labor, it does not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms, between which it can establish only external, transient contacts. Rather, the members are united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made. Each of the functions that they exercise is, in a fixed way, dependent upon others, and with them forms a solidary system. Accordingly, from the nature of the chosen task permanent duties arise. Because we fill some domestic or social function, we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no right to free ourselves. There is, above all, an organ upon which we are tending to depend more and more; this is the State. The points at which we are in contact with it multiply as do the occasions when it is entrusted with the duty of reminding us of the sentiment of common solidarity (DL:226-7).

In contrast to those who portray modern society as atomistic, Durkheim reminds us of the extensive interdependence occasioned by organic solidarity. And, in what may be the weak link in his theoretical chain (see also Books Two and Three), Durkheim presumed that the interaction necessitated by widespread economic interdependence inevitably will generate moral rules and a new form of stable social solidarity.

Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and, consequently, making mutual sacrifices, without tying themselves into one another with strong durable bonds. Every society is a moral society. In certain respects, this character is even more pronounced in organized societies. Because the individual is not sufficient unto himself, it is from society that he receives everything necessary to him, as it is for society that he works. Thus is formed a very strong sentiment of the state of dependence in which he finds himself.... On its side, society learns to regards its members no longer as things over which it has rights, but as co-operators whom it cannot neglect and towards whom it owes duties. Thus, it is wrong to oppose a society which comes from a community of beliefs to one which has a cooperative basis, according only to the first a moral character, and seeing in the latter only an economic grouping. In reality, cooperation also has its intrinsic morality * (DL:228).

Organic solidarity, then, has its own distinctive morality; because it frees the individual to develop his or her own talents, and liberates us from the repressive and narrow rules of societies rooted in blood and soil, its prime concern, as Durkheim saw it, was the individual.

> But it [the morality of organic solidarity] is not of
> same nature as the other. The other is strong only if
> the individual is not. Made up of rules which are prac-
> ticed by all indistinctly, it receives from this uni-
> versal, uniform practice an authority which bestows
> something superhuman upon it, and which puts it beyond
> the pale of discussion. The cooperative society, on the
> contrary, develops in the measure that individual per-
> sonality becomes stronger. As regulated as a function
> may be, there is a large place always left for personal
> initiative (DL:228).

Hence, organic solidarity depends upon individual diversity
and responsibility; it opens up new areas for individual ini-
tiative. It bonds individuals together in an interdependent
occupational network rather than in terms of a traditional
framework of collective sacral rationales and magical proto-
cols. Durkheim summarizes these differences in this manner:

> There are, then, two great currents of social life to
> which two types of structure, not less different, cor-
> respond. Of these currents, that which has its origin
> in social similitudes first runs on alone and without
> a rival. At this moment, it confounds itself with the
> very life of society; then, little by little, it cana-
> lizes, rarefies, while the second is always growing.
> Indeed, the segmental structure is more and more cover-
> ed by the other, but without completely disappearing
> (DL:229).

2. The Symbolic Construction of the Person: Dialectic of Impersonality and Personality

Preface. Without setting aside anything which has been said before, in this section we shall come at the same basic question from the opposite direction; we shall proceed in reverse or complementary gear. In his early writings, as we have discovered, Durkheim correlated historical individuation with societal differentiation, thus presuming that the liberation of the individual was a largely unproblematic process. But is increasing diversity alone sufficient to generate the person as a moral agent and intellectual subject? Although still necessary, Durkheim's initial framework suffered from the too simple equation of individuation with differentiation; this masked the hidden presumption that there lay ready to hand an autonomous, rational, indivisible substance which only had to be separated out or released in order to take on its full individual physiognomy. Hence, even though he spoke of the transformation rather than the disappearance of the common conscience, Durkheim's rhetorical animus lead him to view the process of de-collectivization and individuation as still primarily a negative process, while only secondarily did increasing competition and occupational diversity stimulate moral and intellectual individualism. In short, the latter process remained dependent on the former.

Yet, in his later writings, Durkheim overcame these hidden presumptions inherited from the Enlightenment by focusing more profoundly on the sociocultural construction, from the very beginning, of the person. Instead of evolutionary discontinuity and breakthrough, generic continuity moved to central stage of his thought. It was especially in The Elementary Forms that Durkheim developed the positive sociocultural logic of the construction of the person complementary to his earlier largely negative equation of de-collectivization with individuation in The Division of Labor. In this last work, Durkheim explored in great detail the symbolic construction of the notion of the soul, the relation of an

individual to his totem, and to the ancestors and spirits
which lay at the heart of the emergence of persons as inform-
ed centers of conscience and consciousness. Durkheim proposed
the emergence of the notion of the person under the aegis of
the notion of the individual soul. The origin of the notion
of personality was thus placed in the generating matrix of
the primitive sacral complex as the great womb of society
and culture.

In focussing on the generative relationships between
public symbols and phenomenological process, between the
growth of moral rules and intellectual concepts and the emer-
gence of the personality, Durkheim seized upon a profound dia-
lectic between impersonality and personality. The link be-
tween the impersonal, collective, communicable public sphere
and the private, personal sphere is symbolic process. As in
drama, the _persona_ is a mask or role, the individual person
first emerges in terms of a specific incarnation of a gener-
al soul substance. Hence, in a dialectical paradox, the indi-
vidual first emerges under the aegis of a generic type; only
later is the individual judged significant apart from his or
her participation in the collective essence. We see the same
process in reverse today; whenever a group or institution
takes on personal qualities, such as "Ma Bell" or "Uncle
Sam," the individual members participating in that collec-
tive identity are correspondingly de-personalized in the
same degree. That is, their own specific qualities are set
aside in favor of more or less compulsory adherence to the
homogeneous projected corporate image. Whereas Durkheim spoke
of mechanical solidarity to express this depersonalization,
today we speak of becoming social robots; the repetitiveness
remains. Kenneth Burke has clearly glimpsed the significance
of this universal process:

> Once you linger on this question of personality, you
> find it bristling with dialectical paradoxes, whereby
> the personal and the impersonal subtly change places
> (paradoxes that furtively invest humans with "divine"
> attributes, hence adding to the "mystifications" so
> important in rhetorical prodding). When a figure be-
> comes the personification of some impersonal motive,

> the result is a depersonalization. The person becomes
> the charismatic vessel of some "absolute" substance.
> And when thus magically endowed, the person transcends
> his nature as an individual, becoming instead the image
> of the idea he stands for (1962:273).

Now, Durkheim provided abundant illustrations of these dia-
lectical paradoxes which stood at the moment of the birth of
the person; for if, today, an individual can become deperson-
alized through this process of submergence in a collective
symbolic projection, it is equally true that the very notion
of the individual person could only first emerge out of the
very same process.

After considering the symbolic construction of the no-
tion of the person, we shall have the sufficient analytical
core to understand the complex processes governing the emer-
gence of personhood under the double movement of individua-
tion (de-collectivization and separation) and phenomenologi-
cal deepening and centering through symbolic processes. These
two complementary constitutive sub-processes must go together
in any adequate notion of the construction of the person.
After this section, then, and for the rest of our exploration
of the emergence of the person through history, we shall try
to keep in mind this double dialectic. For example, we shall
see that Durkheim viewed the State as an emancipator of the
individual, but after overcoming its rivals for the alle-
giance of the individual, the State, in turn, oppresses the
individual. And, further, Christianity and especially Protes-
tantism, comes to liberate the individual from the old law
and the hierocracy, but in the process of deepening the
structures of interiority, submit the individual, in turn,
to the destructive rigors of a new "iron cage," a new form
of invisible and self-reinforcing bondage. These are simply
some of the dialectical paradoxes which lead to the shift
from Durkheim's first to second schemas of suicide.

a. The Transitional Phase

        As noted in Chapter Six, Durkheim's thought underwent
a crucial transitional phase in his understanding of the evo-
lution of society, religion, and person in his middle period
--the later Bordeaux and early Paris years when his main ener-
gies were invested in building up L'Annee sociologique. With
his developing recognition of the creativeness of the primi-
tive sacral womb, Durkheim came to see better the relation
between the emergence of the notion of the person and reli-
gious symbolism. Here we can only consider a few representa-
tive illustrations of Durkheim's deepening awareness of the
dialectic of impersonality and personality.

        Now, in speaking of altruistic suicide, Durkheim noted
how society and culture in mechanical solidarity are so deep-
ly rooted in religious rationales and magical protocols that
the ensemble may be termed "pantheistic."

> The metaphysical and religious systems which form the
> logical settings for these moral practices give final
> proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has
> long been observed that they coexist generally with
> pantheistic beliefs.... [the] essential quality is the
> idea that what reality there is in the individual is
> foreign to his nature, that the soul which animates him
> is not his own, and that consequently he has no person-
> al existence. Inversely, where the principle of being
> is not fused with such doctrines but is itself conceiv-
> ed of in an individual form ... among monotheistic peo-
> ples like the Jews, Christians, Mahometans, or poly-
> theists like the Greeks and Latins, this form of sui-
> cide is unusual (S:226).

Durkheim here embarked upon the trail of a profound dialectic
between the evolution of the individual person and the devel-
opment of religious representations centering on shifts in
impersonality and personality. In general, where the "princi-
ple of being" is portrayed in impersonal form, the individual
is accorded little reality or value. Where, however, the in-
dividual person is valued in his or her own right, religious
representations tend to take on a personal physiognomy (see
Part I, Book Two).

        And in his Annee monograph on "Incest" published in
1898 (translated 1963), Durkheim first explored the dialecti-

cal relationship between the totem as the representation of the ancestor and the individual. Individual identity comes through identification with the ancestral totem, and thus, the ground of Being.

> The totem ... is the ancestor of the clan ... and all the members of the clan, having been descended from this unique being, are made of the same substance as himself. This substantive identity is even understood in a much more literal sense than we are able to imagine. One must in fact refrain from confusing the animal or the vegetable species, to which the totemic being is believed to belong, and this being itself. The latter is the ancestor, the mythical being, whence there came both the members of the clan and the animals or plants of the totemized species. The totemic being is therefore, an individual, but containing within itself the species and the entire clan. In fact, for the savage the fragments which can detach themselves from an organism do not cease to be a part of it, despite the material separation. Thanks to a far-off action whose reality is at no time questioned, a severed limb continues, it is believed, to live, separate from the body to which it formerly belonged. All that one contained is retained in the other. That is to say, the living substance, even though divided, retains its unity. It is complete in each of its parts, as if one were acting on the entirety (1963:86).

Hence, the clan is ontologically constituted, it is believed, through its continuing participation with the totemic being; splitting or separating from it do not decrease its potency. The same is true of the individual, Durkheim suggested, whose existence also derives from, and continues to be dependent upon, a similar type of ontological and symbolic participation.

> The same is true of each individual in relationship to the totemic being. The latter has been able to give birth to his progeny only in fragmenting it, but it is complete in each of the fragments and it remains identical in all of the divisions and subdivisions, down to infinity. It is therefore literal that the members of the clan consider themselves as forming a single flesh ... a single blood, and this flesh is that of the mystical being from whom they have all descended. These conceptions, strange as they appear to us, are not without a fundamental objective; for they only serve to express in a material form, the collective unity which is characteristic of the clan. A homogeneous and compact mass where these exist, so to speak, no differentiated parts, where each one lives like all

> and each resembles all--this is the clan. Such a
> group sees its own image in terms of a feeble in-
> dividuation, of which it has a vague consciousness,
> by imagining that its members are incarnations,
> hardly at all different, from one and the same prin-
> ciple; they are various aspects of the same reality,
> a single soul is several bodies (1963:87).

The analogies with the Christian notion of the mystical body
of Christ are certainly striking here; one wonders to what
extent this well-known theological doctrine may have influen-
ced Durkheim's formulation. In any case, Durkheim suggested
here that the primitive clan solved the perennial problem of
unity and diversity, and at the same time constituted itself
as a collectivity and the individuals within it, by portray-
ing themselves as parts of the totemic being.

Durkheim went on to speak in this context of the role
of the notion of the "blood-covenant," a seminal insight
which he learned from reading Robertson Smith (see Lukes,
1973). Here, a different sort of consubstantiality is seen:

> One practice particularly demonstrates ... the impor-
> tance which is then attributed to this con-substantial-
> ity, and at the same time, it goes to make us see what
> this common substance is. The physiological unity of
> the clan is ... far from absolute; it is a society
> where one can enter by a road other than birth. The
> formality by which a stranger is adopted and natural-
> ized into the clan consists of introducing into the
> veins of the neophyte some drops of the familial blood:
> what is called, according to the work of Smith, the
> blood covenant.... Since the community of blood suf-
> fices to form a foundation of this identity of nature,
> it is hence the blood that contains primarily the com-
> mon principle, which is the soul of the group and of
> each of its members. Nothing is more logical than this
> conception. For the chief functions that the blood ful-
> fills in the organism designate it for such a role.
> Life ends when it spills out; therefore, it must be the
> vehicle of life.... It follows that through this inter-
> mediary the life of the ancestor was propagated and dis-
> persed across the lives of his ancestors (1963:88).

Thus, besides the symbolic participation in a common totem,
individuals may participate in the clan by joining the same
stream of life symbolized by blood. As a principle of life,
then, the blood symbolizes the creative flow from the found-
ing
ancestor; it serves as a link to the ontological level.

> Thus, the totemic being is immanent in the clan; it is incarnate in each individual, and it is in the blood that it resides. It is in the very blood itself. But not only is this an ancestor, at the same time it is a god; protector born of the group, it is the object of a veritable cult, the center of the very religion of the clan. It is on this being that the destinies of so many of the individuals, as well as of the collectivity, depend. As a result, there is god in each individual organism (for he is complete in each) and it is in the blood that this god resides; from which it follows that the blood is a divine thing (1963:89).

Durkheim would later elaborate these insights in his The Elementary Forms.

In 1903, in Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss declared:

> If we descend to the least evolved societies ... we shall find an even more general mental confusion. Here, the individual loses his personality. There is a complete lack of distinction between him and his exterior soul or his totem. He and his fellow animal together compose a single personality (PC:6).

This passage shows that Durkheim had not yet fully arrived at the position of the symbolic construction of the person by society; for if the individual does not yet really exist, as he proposed earlier in The Division of Labor, how is it possible for him to lose his personality? What this suggests instead is that because the earliest structures of morality and knowledge were collective, traditional, and sacro-magical, the individual was bound to think in these terms also. The representational life, as well as moral life, was collective, and thus the individual's status was conflated or embedded in the group's identity. Toward the end of Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss noted how the emotion attached to such collective representations interfered with cognitive clarity.

> From another point of view, in order to be able to mark out the limits of a class, it is necessary to have analyzed the characteristics by which the things assembled in this class are recognized and by which they are distinguished. Now emotion is naturally refractory to analysis, or at least lends itself uneasily to it, because it is too complex. Above all, when

> it has a collective origin, it defies critical and ra-
> tional examination. The pressure exerted by the group
> on each of its members does not permit individuals to
> judge freely the notions which society itself has elab-
> orated and in which it has placed something of its per-
> sonality. Such constructs are sacred for individuals.
> Thus, the history of scientific classification is, in
> the last analysis, the history of the stages by which
> this element of social affectivity has progressively
> weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflective
> thought of individuals (PC:87).

In short, only when the structures of conscience and con-
sciousness are universalized and rationalized, in another one
of those fundamental dialectical paradoxes, does the person
attain a secure place to stand.

b. Individual and Totem

In The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life, Durkheim
explored the symbolic relationship between an individual and
his totem which granted the person civil status, and inform-
ed, directed, and energized structures of conscience and con-
sciousness. Elaborating his insights of fifteen years pre-
vious, Durkheim noted how the individual person came to take
on a sacred and permanent status through his or her connec-
tion with a totemic being. Through the symbolic symbiosis of
man and totem, the individual takes on a specific name and
unique physiognomy.

> Every member of the clan is invested with a sacred
> character.... This personal sacredness is due to the
> fact that the man believes that while he is a man in
> the usual sense of the word, he is also an animal or
> plant of the totemic species.... In fact, bears its
> name; this identity of name is therefore supposed to
> imply an identity of nature. The first is not merely
> considered as an outward sign of the second; it sup-
> posed it logically. This is because the name, for a
> primitive, is not merely a word or a combination of
> sounds; it is a part of the being, and even something
> essential to it. A member of the Kangaroo clan calls
> himself a Kangaroo; he is, therefore, in one sense,
> an animal of this species. So each individual has a
> double nature: two beings coexist within him, a man
> and an animal (EF:156).

Thus, by participating through symbolic mediations such as
a shared name and rituals, the individual is ontologically

and culturally constituted, and thus can take on an individual profile within the horizon of the group.

> In certain Australian tribes, and in the majority of tribes of North America, each individual personally sustains relations with some determined object, which are comparable to those which clan sustains with its totem.... The name of the thing also serves as the name of the individual. It is his personal name, his forename, which is added to that of the collective totem.... There is an identity of nature between the individual and the thing; now, an identity of nature implies one of name. Being given in the course of especially important religious ceremonies, this forename has a sacred character (EF:183-4).

Symbolic identification becomes participation; animal and man stand as alter egos.

> Between the individual and his animal namesake there exist the very closest bonds. The man participates in the nature of the animal.... The relationship of the two is even so close that it is believed that in certain circumstances, especially in the case of danger, the man can take the form of an animal. Inversely, the animal is regarded as a double of the man, as his alter ego. The association of the two is so close that their destinies are frequently thought to be bound up together: nothing can happen to one without the other's feeling a reaction. If the animal dies, the life of the man is menaced. Thus, it comes to be a very general rule that one should not kill the animal nor eat its flesh. On its side, the animal protects the man and serves him as a sort of patron. It informs him of possible dangers and of the way of escaping them; they say that it is his friend. Since it frequently happens to possess marvellous powers, it communicates them to its human associate, who believes in them.... This confidence of an individual in the efficacy of his protector is so great that he braves the greatest dangers and accomplishes the most disconcerting feats with an intrepid serenity: faith gives him the necessary courage and strength. However, the relations of a man with his patron are not purely and simply those of dependence. He, on his side, is able to act upon the animal. He gives it orders; he has influence over it   (EF:185-6).

By becoming identified, then, with a specific totemic animal, the individual becomes separated out from his fellows, and becomes constituted as a active agent by tapping into a extra-human source of power.

Thus, the individual first emerges in symbolic connec-

tion with an impersonal, non-human type. Durkheim said:

> The primitive has a certain incapacity for thinking
> of the individual apart from the species; the bonds
> uniting him to the one readily extend to the other;
> he confounds the two in the same sentiment. Thus,
> the entire species becomes sacred for him (EF:186).

For our present purposes, however, instead of saying that
the individual is at first confounded with the group, it may
be preferable to propose that the individual first only emer-
ges in symbolic connection with the group type, as a special
incarnation of the general essence. Indeed, only in this way
is individuation made possible as a subsequent process.

> The same principle is applied in the one case to the
> clan and in the other to the individual. In both cases
> we find the same belief that there are vital connec-
> tions between the things and the men, and that the
> former are endowed with special powers, of which their
> human allies may also enjoy the advantage. We also
> find the same custom of giving the man the name of the
> thing with which he is associated and of adding an em-
> blem to this name. The totem is the patron of the clan,
> just as the patron of the individual is his personal
> totem (EF:187).

c.   The Emergence of the Notion of the Soul as the Foundation
       of Personhood

One would not have predicted that the Durkheim who in
1893 argued that individuation was dependent upon de-collec-
tivization and separation out from the fused, sacro-magical
collective conscience of archaic society would come, in his
later years, to anchor the first emergence in this very same
primitive symbolic structure. The very notion of the indivi-
dual first emerged under the aegis of the religious notion
of the soul, Durkheim proposed in The Elementary Forms. As
with religion itself, Durkheim had first to establish that
the notion of the soul was generic, a human universal.

> Just as there is no known society without a religion,
> so there exist none, howsoever crudely organized, where
> we do not find a whole system of collective represen-
> tations concerning the soul, its origin and destiny....
> The idea of the soul seems to have contemporaneous with
> humanity itself (EF:273).

Then, Durkheim observed that, to the Australians, each indivi-

dual is seen as a new reincarnation of a previous soul; there is a fixed "pool of souls" into which each generation dips and returns.

> ... the souls which, in each generation come to animate the bodies of newly born children, are not special and original creations; all these tribes hold that there is a definite stock of souls, whose number cannot be augmented at all, and which reincarnate themselves periodically. When an individual dies, his soul quits the body in which it dwelt, and after the mourning is accomplished, it goes to the land of the souls; but after a certain length of time, it returns to incarnate itself again, and these reincarnations are the cause of conception and birth. At the beginning of things, it was these fundamental souls which animated the first ancestors, the founders of the clan. At an epoch, beyond which the imagination does not go, and which is considered the very beginning of time, there were certain beings who were not derived from any others. For this reason, the Arunta called them the Altjirangamitjina, the uncreated ones, those who exist from all eternity (EF:280-81).

Now, since the ancestors, the founders commemorated and apotheosized in the group myths, are sacred, those individuals in which they are reincarnated are sacralized also, that is, given civic status and a separate and meaningful identity as valued personages.

> ... each individual is considered as a new appearance of a determined ancestor: it is this ancestor himself, come back in a new body and with new features. Now, what were these ancestors? In the first place, they were endowed with powers infinitely superior to those possessed by men today, even the most respected old men and the most celebrated magicians. They are attributed virtues which we may speak of as miraculous.... It was they who gave the earth the form it has at present. They created all sorts of beings, both men and animals. They are nearly gods. So their souls also have a divine character. And since the souls of men are these ancestral spirits reincarnated in the human body, these are sacred beings too (EF:282).

It is, then, the collective participation in the founding ancestor's patrimony which enables both group and individual to exist. They view themselves, quite literally, as not only spiritual but genetic heirs. All members of the group are con-substantial with him.

... tradition puts the origin of each clan, not in a

> number of ancestors, but only two, or even in one.
> This unique being, as long as he remained single,
> contained the totemic principle within him inte-
> grally, for at this moment there was nothing to
> which this principle could be communicated. Now,
> according to this same tradition, all the human
> souls which exist, both those which now animate
> the bodies of men and those which are at present
> unemployed, being held in reserve for the future,
> have issued from this unique personage; they are
> made of his substance (EF:283).

The sacred substance is thus transmitted from generation to
generation; and it is this spiritual-genetic continuity which
enables group and individual to act as moral agents in the
world and with each other. They are contemporaneous on the
spiritual level; they partake of the same vital substance.

> Thus, there is a perfect spiritual continuity be-
> tween the generations; it is the same soul which is
> transmitted from a father to his children and from
> these to their children, and this unique soul, al-
> ways remaining itself in spite of its successive
> divisions and subdivisions is the one which animated
> the first ancestor at the beginning of all things
> (EF:292).

Each generation, therefore, shares genetically in the sacred
center; each is genetically consubstantial.

Now, the Australians cherished certain symbolic objects
called churinga, which served as mediators between the ances-
tors, the individual, and the totemic animal.

> ... there is a mystic, religious principle in each
> new-born child, which emanates from an ancestor of
> the Alcheringa. It is this principle which forms the
> essence of each individual, therefore, it is his soul
> or in any case the soul is made of the same matter
> and the same substance.... The idea of the totem and
> that of the ancestor are even so closely kindred that
> they sometimes seem to be confounded.... In a word,
> the ancestors are the fragments of the totem.... But
> if the ancestor is so readily confused with the to-
> temic being, the individual soul, which is so near
> the ancestral soul, cannot do otherwise. Moreover,
> this is what actually results from the close union of
> each man with his churinga.... The churinga repre-
> sents the personality of the individual who is be-
> lieved to have been born of it.... It also expresses the
> totemic animal.... Thus, the churinga is at once the
> body of the ancestor, of the individual himself, and
> of the totemic animal.... These three beings form a
> solid unity. They are almost equivalent and inter-

changeable terms (EF:288, 290).

Durkheim then summarized the thrust of his thought in terms of the emergence of the individual person under the title of reincarnated soul in these terms:

> Since no other souls than these exist, we reach the conclusion that, in a general way, the soul is nothing other than the totemic principle incarnate in each individual (EF:282).

The soul, then, to Durkheim, was first seen as an individualized incarnation of the same general totemic principle under which the group came to symbolically conceive of itself. The construction of a collective conscience and the awakening of individual conscience are corollary, contemporaneous processes; both are dependent upon the same symbolic processes of projection, crystallization, and retrojection. Self and society are twin-born, and symbolic culture acts as the prime genetic medium.

Now, these processes illustrate Durkheim's insistence that phenomenological processes are intimately intertwined with social and cultural processes. It makes little sense to oppose the individual to society, and society to culture, since these poles of the human microcosm work with, not against, each other; they are continuing mutual co-creations. Here, Durkheim noted that collective representations must become individualized in a unique fashion in each person if they are to really take hold of each individual's full inner life.

> But in penetrating into these individuals, it must inevitably individualize itself. Because the consciousnesses, of which it is thus an integral part, differ from each other, it differentiates itself according to their image, since each has its own physiognomy, it takes a distinct physiognomy in each (EF:282).

And in "The Dualism of Human Nature," after noting that "once the group has dissolved and the social communion has done its work, the individuals carry away within themselves these great religious, moral, and intellectual conceptions that societies draw from their hearts during their periods of greatest creativity" (DHN:336), Durkheim proposed:

In mingling with our individual lives in this way,
however, these various ideals are themselves indivi-
dualized. Because they are in a close relation with
our other representations, they harmonize with them,
and with our temperaments, characters, habits, and
so on. Each of us puts his own mark on them; and this
accounts for the factthat each person has his own
particular way of thinking about the beliefs of his
church, the rules of common morality, and the funda-
mental notions that serve as the framework of concep-
tual thought (DHN:336-7).

Here we witness the individualization of collective represen-
tations, the particularization of shared symbols in terms of
each person's own special outlook and moral and intellectual
physiognomy.

Now, it is in this way that we see Durkheim unfolding
the dialectic of impersonality and personality. For the in-
dividual to emerge as an independent center of action and
thought in his own right, he must first participate through
symbolic mediators in the collective essence. Only through
this collective, impersonal participation is later individua-
tion--special unique incarnations--possible at all.

So the individual soul is only a portion of the collec-
tive soul of the group; it is the anonymous force at
the basis of the cult, but incarnated in an individual
whose personality it espouses; it is mana individuali-
zed.... If the soul is a particular form of the imper-
sonal principle which is diffused in the group, the
totemic species and all the things of every sort which
are attached to these, at bottom it is impersonal it-
self. So, with differences only of degrees, it should
have the same properties as the force of which it is
a special form, and particularly, the same diffusion,
the same aptitude for spreading itself contagiously
and the same ubiquity. But, quite on the contrary, the
soul is voluntarily represented as a concrete definite
being, wholly contained within itself and not communi-
cable to others; it is made the basis of our personal-
ity. But this way of conceiving the soul is the pro-
duct of a late and philosophic elaboration. The popu-
lar representation, as it is spontaneously formed from
common experience, is very different, especially at
first. For the Australian, the soul is a very vague
thing, undecided and wavering in form, and spread over
the whole organism.... So it has a diffusion, a conta-
giousness and an omnipresence comparable to those of
the mana. Like the mana, it is able to divide and du-
plicate itself indefinitely, though remaining entire
in each of its parts; it is from these divisions and

duplications that the plurality of souls is derived. On the other hand, the doctrine of reincarnation, whose generality we have established, shows how many impersonal elements enter into the idea of the soul and how essential those are. For if the same soul is going to clothe a new personality in each generation, the individual forms in which it successively develops itself must all be equally external to it, and have nothing to do with its nature. It is a sort of generic substance which individualizes itself only secondarily and superficially (EF:299).

This, then, is the dialectic--something internal depends for its existence upon something external; something individual and unique depends upon something generic and universal. The individual first emerges as an emanation from, and then returns to, the collective, impersonal, "pool of souls" in which each generation is successively clothed. It is this double movement of emanation and return which illustrates the dialectic of impersonality and the growth of personality.

> ... the existence of individual souls, when once admitted, cannot be understood unless one imagines an original supply of fundamental souls at the origin of things, from which all the others were derived. Now these archetype souls had to be conceived as containing within them the source of all religious efficacy; for, since the imagination does not go beyond them, it is from them and only from them that all sacred things are believed to come, both the instruments of the cult, the members of the clan, and the animals of the totemic species. They incorporate all the sacredness diffused in the whole tribe and the whole world, and so they are attributed powers noticeably superior to those enjoyed by the simple souls of men (EF:313).

Thus, "the individual, the soul of an ancestor which he reincarnates or from which he is an emanation, his churinga, and the animals of the totemic species ... are partially equivalent and interchangeable things" (EF:301). These things are intimately linked symbolically because all necessarily partake of the respect bestowed by the group on its own constitutive collective representations. The same collective sentiments are attached to each.

> So all these various objects, whether real or ideal, have one common element by which they arouse a single affective state in the mind, and through this, they become confused. In so far as they are expressed by

one and the same representation, they are indistinct. This is how the Arunta has come to regard the churinga as the body common to the individual, the ancestor and even the totemic being. It is his way of expressing the identity of the sentiments of which these different beings are the object (EF:301).

True to his basic hermeneutic of interpreting sacral representations as symbolic equations or translations of social realities, Durkheim then argued that the notion of the immortality of the soul was a metaphorical representation of the continuity of the clan over many generations.

> The primitive does not have the idea of an all-powerful god who creates souls out of nothing. It seems to him that souls cannot be made except out of souls. So those who are born can only be new forms of those who have been; consequently, it is necessary that these latter continue to exist in order that others may be born.... In fine, the immortality of the soul is the only way in which men were able to explain the fact which could not fail to attract their attention; this fact is the perpetuity of the group. Individuals die, but the clan survives. So the forces which gave it life must have the same perpetuity. Now these forces are the souls which animate individual bodies; for it is in them and through them that the group is realized. For this reason, it is necessary that in enduring, they remain always the same; for, as the clan always keeps its characteristic appearance, the spiritual substance out of which it is made must be thought of as qualitatively invariable. Since it is always the same clan with the same totemic principle, it is necessary that the souls be the same, for souls are only the totemic principle broken up and particularized. Thus there is something like a germinative plasm, of a mystic order which is transmitted from generation to generation and which makes ... the spiritual unity of the clan through all time (EF:304).

Finally, just as Durkheim noted earlier how the totemic principle becomes individualized in each consciousness and consciousness, so too he next noted the emergence of a "... protecting genius who is attached to each individual" (EF:314). Here, "... a sympathetic bond unites each individual to his protecting ancestor" (EF:315).

> The individual soul is only another aspect of the ancestral spirit ... this serves after a fashion, as a second self.... At bottom, it is one soul in two bodies. The kinship of these two notions is so close that they are sometimes expressed by one and

> same word.... The individual totem is merely the out-
> ward and visible form of the ego or personality, of
> which the soul is an inward and invisible form (EF:316).

Here, we see the emergence of the notion of an individual
guardian spirit, the daemon of the Greeks, for example.
Hence, at one and the same time, the ancestor or founding
hero or demi-urge serves as a principle of generic imperson-
ality and highly individualized personality. "... the genius
is another form or double of the soul of the individual" (EF:
311).

> Thus, the individual totem has all the essential char-
> acteristics of the protecting ancestor and fills the
> same role: this is because it has the same origin and
> proceeds from the same idea. Each of them, in fact,
> consists in a duplication of the soul. The totem, as
> the ancestor, is the soul of the individual, but ex-
> ternalized and invested with powers superior to those
> it is believed to possess while within the organism.
> Now this duplication is the result of a psychological
> necessity; for it only expresses the nature of the
> soul which is ... double. In one sense, it is ours:
> it expresses our personality. But at the same time,
> it is outside of us, for it is only the reaching into
> us of a religious force which is outside of us. We can-
> not confound ourselves with it completely, for we at-
> tribute to it an excellence and a dignity by which it
> raises far above us and our empirical individuality.
> So there is a whole part of ourselves which we tend to
> project into the outside. This way of thinking of our-
> selves is so well established in our nature that we
> cannot escape it, even when we attempt to regard our-
> selves without having recourse to any religious sym-
> bols. Our moral consciousness is like a nucleus about
> which the idea of the soul forms itself; yet when it
> speaks to us, it gives the effect of an outside power,
> superior to us, which gives us our law and judges us,
> but which also aids and sustains us.... Everything
> goes just as if we really had two souls; one which is
> within us, or rather which is us; the other which is
> above us, and whose function is to control and assist
> the first one (EF:316-17).

c. Conclusion: Soul and Person

"The idea of the soul was for a long time ... the popu-
lar form of the idea of personality" (EF:305). Thus did Durk-
heim trace the emergence of the notion of the individual per-
son under the aegis of impersonal concepts and rules.

> ... the notion of the person is the product of two
> sorts of factors. One of these is essentially imper-
> sonal: it is the spiritual principle serving as the
> soul of the group. In fact, it is this which constitutes
> the very substance of individual souls. Now, this is
> not the possession of any one in particular: it is a
> part of the collective patrimony; in it and through it,
> all consciousnesses communicate. But, on the other
> hand, in order to have separate personalities, it is
> necessary that another force intervene to break up and
> differentiate this principle: in other words, an indi-
> viduating factor is necessary. It is the body that ful-
> fills this function. As   two bodies are distinct
> from each other, and as they occupy different points
> of space and time, each of them forms a special center
> about which the collective representations reflect and
> color themselves differently. The result is that even
> if all the consciousness in these bodies are directed
> towards the same world, to wit, the world of ideas and
> sentiments which bring about the moral unity of the
> group, they do not all see it from the same angle; each
> one expresses it in its own fashion (EF:305-6).

Thus, as in his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, to
Durkheim the impersonal, shared, collective moral and intel-
lectual meanings which lay at the basis of personality are
individualized by the body. As noted in the first chapter of
this Book, moral rules and intellectual concepts are general;
the individualizing principle is the body.

> Of these two equally indispensable factors, the form-
> er is certainly not the less important, for this is
> the one which furnishes the original matter of the i-
> dea of the soul. Perhaps some will be surprised to see
> so considerable a role attributed to the impersonal
> element in the genesis of the idea of personality. But
> the philosophical analysis of the idea of person, which
> has gone so far ahead of the sociological analysis, has
> reached analogous results on this point. Among all the
> philosophers, Leibnitz is one of those who have felt
> most vividly what a personality is; for above all, the
> monad is a personal and autonomous being. Yet, for Leib-
> nitz, the contents of all the monads are identical. In
> fact, all are consciousnesses which express one and the
> same object, the world; and as the world itself is only
> a system of representations, each particular conscious-
> ness is really only the reflection of the universal con-
> sciousness. However, each one expresses it from its own
> point of view, and in its own manner. We know this dif-
> ference of perspectives comes from the fact that the
> monads are situated differently in relation to each other
> and to the whole system which they constitute (EF:305-6).

Along with Kant, Durkheim saw the personal as anchored in
the impersonal, in shared concepts and moral rules; in
short, in universal Reason. Thus, it is not merely differ-
ence, separateness, or uniqueness which constitutes the es-
sence of individual personhood, but also the phenomenologi-
cal deepening and centering of active structures of con-
science and consciousness. Therefore, there are two comple-
mentary poles in the symbolic construction of the person;
there are two crucial processes which proceed simultaneously
or reciprocally extend one another--namely, individuation
in the sense of separation and deeper participation in sym-
bolic, and universalizable, culture.

> Kant expresses the same sentiment, though in a dif-
> ferent form. For him, the cornerstone of the person-
> ality is the will. Now, the will is the faculty of
> acting in conformity with reason, and the reason is
> that which is most impersonal within us. For reason
> is not my reason; it is human reason in general. It
> is the power which the mind has of rising above the
> particular, the contingent, and the individual, to
> think in universal forms. So from this point of view,
> we may say that what makes a man a personality is
> that by which he is confounded with other men, that
> which makes him a man, not a certain man. The senses,
> the body and, in a word, all that individualizes is,
> on the contrary, considered as the antagonist of the
> personality by Kant. This is because individuation is
> not the essential characteristic of the personality.
> A person is not merely a single subject distinguished
> from all the others. It is especially a being which is
> attributed a relative autonomy in relation to the en-
> vironment with which it is most immediately in contact.
> It is represented as capable of moving itself.... Now
> our analysis permits us to see how this conception was
> formed and to what it corresponds (EF:306).

It is in this sense that we come to speak of the individual as
an active whole, an indivisible and self-moving center of
thought, feeling and action. I _am_ a person, I _have_ a body.

> In fact, the soul, a symbolic representation of the
> personality, has the same characteristic. Although
> closely bound to the body, it is believed to be pro-
> foundly distinct from it and to enjoy, in relation
> to it, a large degree of independence. During life,
> it may leave it temporarily, and it definitely with-
> draws at death. Far from being dependent upon the
> body, it dominates it from the higher dignity which
> is in it. It may well take from the body the outward

> form in which it individualizes itself, but it owes
> nothing essential to it. Nor is the autonomy which
> all peoples have attributed to the soul a pure illu-
> sion; we now know what its objective foundation is.
> It is quite true that the elements which serve to
> form the idea of the soul and those which enter into
> the representation of the body come from two differ-
> ent sources that are independent of one another. One
> sort are made up of the images and impressions coming
> from all parts of the organism; the others consist in
> the ideas and sentiments which come from and express
> society. So the former are not derived from the latter
> (EF:307).

In sum, Durkheim reminded us that individuation and person-
alization are complementary, rather than identical, proces-
ses. We shall, in turn, hold Durkheim to this crucial recog-
nition of the double dialectic of impersonality and person-
ality in Books Two and Three as we explore his notions of
egoistic and anomic suicide in relation to the modern sta-
tus of the individual; we shall especially hold to the re-
cognition that the construction of the individual person
is a symbolic, and not merely mechanical social morphologi-
cal, process. And, thus, as in a following section on the
contribution of Christian culture to the emergence of the
individual person through history, we shall look especially
for cultural sanctioning of extreme forms of individualism.
Here, Durkheim summarized his basic position in this manner:

> Whatever we receive from society, we hold in common
> with our companions. So it is not at all true that
> we are more personal as we are more individualized.
> The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense,
> they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion
> individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations
> are essentially individual; yet we are more personal
> the more we are freed from our senses and able to
> think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon
> all the social elements of the individual do not mean
> by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely
> refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation
> (EF:307).

Finally, contrary to those who persist in portraying him as rad-
ically anti-individualist, we can do no better than to cite
Durkheim's concluding footnote to this profound section on
the symbolic construction of the notion of the person in
terms of the idea of the soul.

> For all this, we do not deny the importance of the indi-
> vidual factor: this is explained from our point of
> view just as easily as its contrary. If the essential
> element of the personality is the social part of us,
> on the other hand there can be no social life unless
> distinct individuals are associated, and this is rich-
> er the more numerous and different from each other they
> are. So the individual factor is a condition of the im-
> personal factor. And the contrary is no less true, for
> society itself is an important source of individual
> differences (EF:308, #128).

Contrary to some, Durkheim did not postulate a Platonic so-
ciety floating in space; rather, as we discovered in Chapter
Four of this Book, Durkheim always acknowledged that it is
only through interaction of individuals that society is pos-
sible. As a corollary, shared, public culture must become
internalized within the personality structure, if it is to
be effective socially and phenomenologically; conversely,
as   internalized in specific individuals, it is refracted
in a unique light and individualized. Then, such individual-
ized and altered ways of feeling and thinking may then come,
in turn, to contribute something new and significant to the
group.   As   Durkheim himself said:

> ... just as society exists only in and through indi-
> viduals, the totemic principle exists only in and
> through the individual consciousnesses whose associa-
> tion forms the clan. If they did not feel it is them,
> it would not exist; it is they who put it into things
> (EF:283).

> Just as there is no society without individuals, so
> those impersonal forces which are disengaged from
> the group cannot establish themselves without incar-
> nating themselves in the individual consciousnesses
> where they individualize themselves. In reality, we
> do not have two different developments, but two dif-
> ferent aspects of one and the same development (EF:302).

Let us, therefore, lay this chimera to rest once and for all;
let us learn from Durkheim who never separated sociocultural
from phenomenological process.

3. The State as Guarantor of Individual Rights

Returning to Durkheim's earlier theme of the emancipation of the individual from the "despotisms of the group," let us briefly explore the historical role which Durkheim assigned the State as guarantor of individual rights. Now, as we noted in our discussion of obstacles to individuation through the progressive division of labor, the emergence of the person is not an automatic, mechanical process. There are many factors which may retard these advances such as clans, castes, and classes. These secondary groups resist differentiation and thus individuation; hence, their claims on the individual must be opposed by an equally strong force. Durkheim found this counter-vailing force in the State; he spoke of the "... individual rights that the State secures by stages, overcoming the resistances of collective particularism" (PECM:66). De-collectivism, and the liberation of the individual from the restrictive and narrow claims on his loyalty comes through shifting his protection and obligations to to a new and higher level, a centralized and autonomous level which cuts across multiple and conflicting social groups.

Proceeding on the principle that "... it is out of the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born" (PECM:63), Durkheim argued that individual rights emerged out of this tension between the centralizing State and traditional secondary groups. The State thus comes to stand alongside the division of labor as a prime instrument of individuation. Durkheim's discussion here looks back to his suggestion that the chief is the first individual person to emerge from the social mass, and forward to his discussions of the rise of socialism, of the new representative role which should be assigned to corporate groups in modern polity and society, and his extensive discussion of the complex and changing relations between law and governmental intervention in his essay on "Two Laws of Penal Evolution."

While these historical processes are most complex, we shall pursue Durkheim's contribution to their elucidation in

terms of the rather narrow frame of the State acting as the guarantor of individual rights vis-a-vis secondary groups. Although Durkheim's political sociology (see also Part II, Book Two) has been too often slighted by sociologists, some secondary observers, especially Bendix (1960a), Richter (1960), Giddens (1971b), LaCapra (1972), Lukes (1973), and Nisbet (1974), have noted the crucial role played by the State in Durkheimian sociology. Recognizing the importance Durkheim placed on "... the special relation between the rise of the political state and the emergence of the individual from what Durkheim calls the social mass" (1974:145), Nisbet devoted a section to discussion of the relation between the growth of the State and the emergence of the individual in Durkheim's sociology. Nisbet's discussion is valuable in that he placed Durkheim's argument within the context of eighteenth and nineteenth century sociopolitical theory (eg. Rousseau and Tocqueville), and because he detected a certain ambivalence in Durkheim's treatment.

> ... it is possible to see in Durkheim's political thought adequate recognition of the historical role of the political state in the West in, first, actually creating the seminal idea of individual positive rights, rights not to be abrogated by any internal association within the political order, and, second, by this very fact, a sphere of freedom unknown in simple societies where the local or functional association is supreme. In this respect, Durkheim's political thought is fully up to the mark in that long tradition of political thought in the West beginning with Plato and culminating in Rousseau and Austin that has stressed the profound role of the political state in providing the context of rights and liberties. But so is it possible also to see Durkheim in that other--related but different--tradition which reaches from Aristotle to Burke and Tocqueville and which, without denying the value, even necessity, of the state nevertheless recognizes, as the first tradition does not, the vital importance of institutional checks upon political power, division of authority, pluralism, localism, and the indispensable role of intermediate associations (Nisbet, 1974:150).

Durkheim's relation to Rousseau and the problem bequeathed by the Enlightenment in attempting to maintain a dualistic theory which places polity and society in separate

compartments has been profoundly explored by Reinhard Bendix. Bendix sees a hiatus between Durkheim's sociological and political theories: "The liberal tradition in its classical or Durkheimian version is characterized by a 'dualism' according to which society and government constitute two interdependent, but partially autonomous, spheres of thought and action"(1960a:189). "For Durkheim, it was the State alone which guarantees the 'moral existence' of the individual, and in his judgment the State was capable of having this effect because it is 'an organ distinct from the rest of society'"(1960a:200-01).

> The emancipation of the individual from the "despotism of the group" appears in the bulk of his work as a result of the increasing division of labor and the related attenuation of custom and law. Though as a political liberal Durkheim valued this "range of individual development," as a social philosopher he feared its consequences for social mobility where these consisted in the isolation of the individual and the loss of regulative norms of conduct (anomie). Accordingly, he sought to safeguard the individual against the dangers of anomie by his reintegration in the secondary groups of society.... Yet, at the same time, he called on the aid of the State to preserve individual liberties against the "despotism" with which these groups would seek to control the individual. Implicit in this approach is, therefore, a "dualism" whereby man's psychological and moral attributes are explained in terms of his membership in the society, while the society as a whole is characterized by an overall process (the increasing division of labor) which accounts among other things for man's capacity to alter these attributes through State intervention in the interest of justice. This incongruity between Durkheim's sociological and political theories was symptomatic of the liberal tradition in the nineteenth century (Bendix,1960a:188-89).

Then Bendix provides an extraordinarily cogent summary of the evolution of three types of relations between State and society in the West, leading up to the modern situation of highly centralized national power, the destruction of intermediate centers of authority, and the institution of national citizenship. Not the least of the virtues of Bendix's summary here is that it ties in Durkheim's political theory to that of Max Weber's.

The "great transformation" leading to the modern polit-
ical community made the decline of social solidarity
inevitable, because (if so complex a matter can be
stated so simply) no association based on a coales-
cence of interests or an ethnic and religious affilia-
tion could recapture the intense reciprocity of rights
and duties that was peculiar to the "autonomous juris-
dictions" of an estate society. The reason is that in
these "jurisdictions" or "law communities" as Max Weber
called them, each individual was involved in a "mutual
aid" society, which protected his rights only if he ful-
filled his duties. This great cohesion within social
ranks was above all a counterpart to the very loose in-
tegration of a multiplicity of jurisdictions at the "na-
tional" political level. In this respect, the absolu-
tist regimes achieved a greater integration though cen-
tralized royal administration and the people's loyalty
to the king, although the hereditary privileges appro-
priated by Church and aristocracy also subjected the
ordinary man to the autocratic rule of his local master.
Where such hereditary privileges replaced the "law com-
munities" of an earlier day, the privileged groups
achieved considerable social cohesion, but the people
were deprived of what legal and customary protection
they had enjoyed and hence excluded even from their
former passive participation in the reciprocity of
rights and obligations.
Modern political communities have achieved a greater
centralization of government than either the medieval
or the absolutist political systems, and this achieve-
ment has been preceded, accompanied, or followed by
the participation of all adult citizens in political
life (on the basis of the formal equality of the fran-
chise). The price of these achievements consists in the
diminished solidarity of all "secondary groups." This
"price" is a by-product of the separation between socie-
ty and government in the modern political community.
Whereas solidarity had been based on the individual's
participation in a "law community," or on his member-
ship in a privileged status group possessing certain
governmental prerogatives, it must arise now from the
social and economic stratification of society aided by
the equality of all adult citizens before the law and
in the electoral process (Bendix, 1960a: 201-2).

Durkheim did recognize this dilemma in his observation
that the State, too, can become despotic in turn if it has no
counter-vailing force, and thus, in his proposals for the en-
franchisement of professional-occupational groups (see Part
II, Book Two). Further, in Socialism, Durkheim focussed on
the double movement--the individualist and centralizing
"statist" tendencies--inherent in the French Revolution.

> The first resulted in having it admitted as evident
> that the place of individuals in the body politic
> should be exclusively determined by their personal
> value, and consequently of having traditional ine-
> qualities rejected as unjust. The second had the re-
> sult that the reforms judged necessary were consi-
> dered realizable, because the State was conceived as
> as the natural instrument of their realization. Be-
> sides, these principles are jointly responsible for
> another in the sense that the stronger the State is
> constituted, and the higher it is raised above all
> individuals, of whatever class or origin, the more,
> therefore, did all individuals appear equal through
> connection with it (Soc:102-3).

Thus, after the Revolution, only the central State survived
and grew stronger. Collective life was then caught between
two opposing forces--the central bureaucratic State on the
one hand, and the anomic, dispersed ego on the other. And
these opposing poles of modern life "fed off each other,"
as it were (see, for eg., S:389, and Part II, Book Two).

Having noted that the liberation of the individual by
the State from restrictive "collective particularisms" is a
double-edged sword which can work against, as well as for,
the individual, let us now turn to consider Durkheim's main
thesis here. In The Division of Labor, Durkheim sounded this
theme which he was to later develop in his lectures transla-
ted as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals--namely, that
respect for the individual grows along with State power.

> ... the place of the individual becomes greater and
> the governmental power becomes less absolute. But
> there is no contradiction in the fact that the sphere
> of individual action grows at the same time as that
> of the State, or that the functions which are not made
> immediately dependent upon the central regulative sys-
> tem develop at the same time as it (DL:220).

Now, Durkheim had here again to confront the modern liberal
notion that the State and the Individual are opposed to each
other as Society and the Individual. Thus, as we discovered
in Durkheim's discussion of Spencer's doctrine, there is pre-
sumed to be an inherent contradiction between the growth of
the power of the central State and the emergence of indivi-
dual rights and freedom. In liberal doctrine, the State was
seen as encroaching upon individual freedoms; "... the ideal

State of Spencer is really the primitive form of the State"
(DL:221).

> Do we not arrive here at a contradiction that cannot
> be resolved? On the one hand, we establish that the
> State goes on developing more and more; on the other,
> that the rights of the individual, held to be actively
> opposed to those of the State, have a parallel develop-
> ment. The government organ takes on an ever greater
> scale, because its function goes on growing in impor-
> tance and because its aims, that are in line with its
> own activity, increase in number; yet we deny that it
> can pursue aims other than those that concern the in-
> dividual. Now, these aims are by definition held to be-
> long to individual activity. If, as we suppose, the
> rights of the individual, the State does not have to
> establish them, that is, they do not depend on the
> State. But then, if they do not, and are outide its
> competence, how can the cadre of this competence go
> on expanding, in face of the fact that it must less
> and less take in things alien to the individual (PECM:
> 57)?

Here, again, we see the momentous import of Durkheim's shift
in the grounds of argument; for, in rejecting the "natural
rights" and "social contract" theories, Durkheim argued that
the notion of   personhood is a social construction, and
hence, that the notion of individual rights is a legal and
political construction.

> The only way of getting over the difficulty is to dis-
> pute the postulate that the rights of the individual
> are inherent, and to admit that the institution of
> these rights is in fact precisely the task of the
> State. Then, certainly, all can be explained (PECM:57).

Thus, with the shift in viewpoint we can extricate ourselves
from the ideological conflicts of modern political theory,
and we can also make better sense of the emergence of the
individual person and the growth of State power through his-
tory.

> We can understand that the functions of the State may
> expand, without any diminishing of the individual. We
> can see too that the individual may develop without
> causing any decline of the State, since he would be
> in some respects the product himself of the State,
> and since the activity of the State would in its na-
> ture be liberating to him. Now, what emerges, on the
> evidence of the facts, is that history gives sound
> authority for this relation of cause and effect as be-
> tween the progress of moral individualism and the ad-

> vance of the State. Except for abnormal cases ... the
> more the individual is respected (PECM:57).

> History seems indeed to prove that the State was not
> created to prevent the individual from being disturb-
> ed in the exercise of his natural rights: no, this
> was not its role alone--rather, it is the State that
> creates and organizes and makes a reality of these
> rights. And, indeed, man is man only because he lives
> in society (PECM:60-1).

In sum, against the Utilitarian and Kantian forms of indivi-
dualism which opposed the power of the State to the autonomy
of the individual, Durkheim began from the premise of man-in-
society and argued that the State creates rights.

> If we work on the premise that the rights of the in-
> dividual are not ipso facto his at birth; that they
> are not inscribed in the nature of things with such
> certainty as warrants the State in endorsing them
> and promulgating them; that, on the contrary, the
> rights have to be won from opposing forces that deny
> them; that the State alone is qualified to play this
> part--then it cannot keep to the functions of supreme
> arbiter and administrator of an entirely prohibitive
> justice, as the Utilitarian or Kantian individualism
> would have it (PECM:65).

Here we see in capsule Durkheim's theses--that rights are
natural only in society, hence are created by society, not
in opposition to it; that rights have to be won from oppo-
sing social forces which deny them; and that the State plays
a crucial historical role in establishing individual rights.

Durkheim elaborated his ideas in his lectures. Reiter-
ating his themes of The Division of Labor that societal dif-
ferentiation leads generally to individuation, and that "...
that individualism which establishes itself in fact, and ...
with time, the fact becomes a right" (PECM:61), Durkheim then
qualified this general law.

> Things can, however, only have this course on one
> condition: that is, that inside this society, there
> must be no forming of any secondary groups that en-
> joy enough autonomy to allow of each becoming in a
> way a small society within the greater. For then,
> each of these would behave towards its members as if
> it stood alone and everything would go on as if the
> full-scale society did not exist. Each group, tight-
> ly enclosing the individuals of which it was made up,
> would hinder their development; the collective mind
> would impose itself on conditions applying to the in-

> dividual. A society made up of adjoining clans or of
> towns or villages independent in greater or lesser de-
> gree, or of a number of professional groups, each one
> autonomous in relation to the others, would have the
> effect of being almost as repressive of any individual-
> ity as if it were made up of a single clan or town or
> association. The formation of secondary groups of this
> kind is bound to occur, for in a great society there are
> always particular local or professional interests which
> naturally   bring together those people with whom they
> are concerned. There we have the very stuff of associa-
> tions of a special kind, of guilds, of coteries of ever-
> y variety; and if there is nothing to offset or neutral-
> ize their activity, each of them will tend to swallow up
> up its members (PECM:61-2).

Here, then, is Durkheim's starting point--intense social in-
teraction leads to the development of moral interests, and
each group comes to exert, therefore, a compelling influence
over the individuals on whom it lays obligations. Each is
jealous of its own particular moral life; each lays upon its
members claims which exclude other obligations, wider inter-
ests. For example, of domestic society Durkheim remarked: ".
"... we know its capacity to assimilate when left to itself.
We see how it keeps within its orbit all those who go to make
it up and are under its immediate domination" (PECM: 61). As
with the illustration of altruistic suicide, then, Durkheim
viewed unchallenged group influence over an individual as
inherently repressive. Therefore, some force must oppose the
claims of secondary groups on the individual. The liberation
of the individual from the hold of tight, narrow, local scale
secondary groups must be won by the State.

> In order to prevent this happening, and to provide a
> certain range for individual development, it is not
> enough for a society to be on a big scale; the indivi-
> dual must be able to move with some freedom over a
> wide field of action. He must not be curbed and mono-
> polized by the secondary groups, and these groups must
> not be able to get a mastery over their members and
> mould them at will. There must therefore exist above
> these local, domestic--in a word, secondary--authori-
> ties, some overall authority which makes the law for
> them all: it must remind each of them that it is but
> a part and not the whole, and that it should not keep
> for itself what rightly belongs to the whole. The only
> means of avoiding this collective particularism, and
> all that involves for the individual, is to have a

> special agency with the duty of representing the o-
> verall collectivity, its rights and its interests,
> vis-a-vis these individual collectivities (PECM:61-2).

As noted from Bendix's observations earlier, it is the State
which, in overcoming the conflicting claims of various sta-
tus groups and law communities, elevates the individual to
the rank of citizen and then grants formal equality to all
adults through the franchise. The national centralizing State
then depends on the institution of national citizenship and
vice versa. Here, Durkheim observed of the State:

> These rights and these interests merge with those of
> the individual. Let us see why and how the main func-
> tion of the State is to liberate the individual per-
> sonalities. It is solely because, in holding its con-
> stitutive societies in check, it prevents them from
> exerting the repressive influences over the individual
> they would otherwise exert. So, there is nothing inher-
> ently tyrannical about State intervention in the dif-
> ferent fields of a collective life; on the contrary,
> it has the object and effect of alleviating tyrannies
> that do exist (PECM:62-3).

Nisbet, after Durkheim, offers the concrete historical exam-
ple of:

> ... the Cleisthenean reforms at the end of the sixth
> century B.C., with their reduction of the power of
> traditional society resting on kinship and their spe-
> cific granting to the individual of positive rights
> they had not previously known... (1974:147).

The emancipation of the individual, and the creation of in-
dividual rights and protection of the dignity of the human
person, then, is one of the prime functions of the growth
of the State in history, according to Durkheim.

> ... the State must deploy energies equal to those
> for which it has to provide a counter-balance. It
> must even permeate all those secondary groups of
> family, trade, and professional associations, Church,
> regional areas, and so on ... which tend to absorb
> the personality of their members. It must do this in
> order to prevent this absorption and free these in-
> dividuals, and so as to remind these partial socie-
> ties that they are not alone and there is a right
> that stands above their own rights. The State must
> therefore enter into their lives, it must supervise
> and keep a check on the way they operate and to do
> this it must spread its roots in all directions. For
> this task, it cannot just withdraw into the tribunals,
> it must be present in all spheres of social life and

make itself felt. Wherever these particular collective forces exist, there the power of the State must be, to neutralize them: for if they were left alone and to their own devices, they would draw the individual within their exclusive domination. Now, societies are becoming every greater in scale and ever more complex: they are made up of circles of increasing diversity, and of manifold agencies.... Therefore, if it is to fulfill its function, the State, too, must branch out and evolve to the same degree (PECM:65).

Here, then, was the liberal singing the praises of the interventionist State; the Enlightenment still lived on strongly in Durkheim as he everywhere saw the necessity of de-collectivization and the sanctioning of the Individual and Reason. Listen to his summary of this theme:

It is only through the State that individualism is possible, although it cannot be the means of making it a reality, except in precise conditions. We might say that in the State we have the prime mover. It is the State which has rescued the child from patriachal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State which has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyranny. It may take too violent a course, but the action becomes vitiated only when it is merely destructive. And this is what justifies the increasing scope of its functions (PECM:64).

Finally, it should be noted that Durkheim went beyond the assertion that the State played a merely negative role in emancipating the individual from the grip of secondary groups to propose that the State also played a positive role in the construction of the moral milieu to nourish a new notion of the individual. This new, positive conception is the right and dignity of the human person seen, for example, in "The Declaration of the Rights of Man." Durkheim said that the fundamental duty of the State "... is to call the individual to a moral way of life."

... our moral individuality, far from being antagonistic to the State, has on the contrary been a product of it. It is the State that sets it free. And this gradual liberation does not simply serve to fend off the opposing forces that tend to absorb the individual: it also serves to provide the milieu in which the individual moves, so that he may develop his faculties in freedom. There is nothing negative in the part played

> by the State. Its tendency is to ensure the most complete individuation that the state of society will allow. Far from tyrannizing over the individual, it is the State that redeems the individual from society. But whilst this aim is essentially positive, it has nothing transcendental about it for the individual consciousness, for it is an aim that is also essentially human.... It is not this or that individual that the State seeks to develop, it is the individual in genere, who is not to be confused with any single one of us. And whilst we give the State our cooperation--and it could do nothing without it--we do not become the agents of a purpose alien to us; we do not give up the pursuit of an impersonal aim which belongs to a region above all our own private aims but which nevertheless has close ties with them (PECM:69).

In contrast to the Romantic-Idealist philosophers (eg. Hegel), Durkheim contended that his notion of the liberating State had nothing mystic about it; it was not a transcendental entity floating above all individuals and over the nation.

> On the one hand, our concept of the State has nothing mystic about it, and yet, it is still in its essence individualistic. The fundamental duty of the State is laid down in this very fact: it is to persevere in calling the individual to a moral way of life (PECM:69).

Finally, Durkheim argued that the central State is today one of the prime upholders of the cult of the human person, of moralized individualism.

> If the cult of the human person is to be the only one destined to survive, as it seems, it must be observed by the State as by the individual equally. This cult, moreover, has all that is required to take the place of the religious cult of former times (PECM:69).

On the other hand, Durkheim also recognized, as Bendix and Nisbet observed, the danger of the reverse process--namely, that the centralized State, in turn, having conquered secondary institutions may itself become despotic without rivals. With no competitors, the State then threatens to reabsorb the mass of individual molecules.

> It will be argued, might not the State in turn become despotic? Undoubtedly, provided there were nothing to counter that trend. In that case, as the sole existing collective force, it produces the effects that any collective force not neutralized by any counter-force of the same kind would have on individuals. The State itself then becomes a leveller and repressive. And its

> repressiveness becomes even harder to endure than that of small groups, because it is more artificial. The State, in our large scale societies, is so removed from individual interests that it cannot take into account the special or local conditions in which they exist. Therefore, when it does attempt to regulate them, it succeeds only at the cost of doing violence and distorting them. It is, too, not sufficiently in touch with individuals in the mass to be able to mould them inwardly, so that they readily accept its pressure on them. The individual eludes the State to some extent --the State can only be effective in the context of a large scale society--and individual diversity may not come to light. Hence, all kinds of resistance and distressing conflicts arise (PECM:63).

Here, we see a more somber note enter into Durkheim's discussion of the role of the State in regard to the liberation of the individual; for Durkheim recognized that the State's power could cut both ways, for _and_ against the individual. Durkheim's basic problem in this context, then, became the balancing off of State and secondary groups against one another, each serving not only to check the other's weakness but to contribute in a complementary manner its own strengths.

> ... small groups do not have this drawback. They are close enough to things that provide their raison d'etre to be able to adapt their actions exactly and they surround their individuals closely enough to shape them in their own image. The inference to be drawn is simply that if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by those secondary groups.... It is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone, nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born. Here again we see the significance of these groups. Their usefulness is not merely to regulate and govern the interests they are meant to serve. They have a wider purpose; they form one of the conditions essential for the emancipation of the individual*(PECM:63).

And as we shall discover in Part II of Book Two, Durkheim became less sanguine about the beneficence of the State. Indeed, Durkheim sounded the note in these lectures that we shall find greatly amplified later in _Suicide_ and the preface to second edition of _The Division of Labor_: we are suffering from a malaise; the cure is the national enfranchisement of occupational groups.

> Our present malaise has the same origin as the social
> malaise we are suffering from. It is due to the lack
> of secondary organs intercalated between the State and
> the rest of society.... These organs seem necessary to
> prevent the State from tyrannizing over individuals:
> it is now plain that they are equally essential to pre-
> vent individuals from absorbing the State. They liberate
> the two confounded forces, whilst linking them at the
> same time.... We can see how serious this lack of in-
> ternal organization is ... it involves ... a profound
> loosening and an enervation ... of our whole social and
> political structure. The social forms that used to serve
> as a framework for individuals and a skeleton for the
> society, either no longer exist or are in course of be-
> ing effaced, and no new forms are taking their place.
> So that nothing remains but the fluid mass of indivi-
> duals. For the State itself has been reabsorbed by them.
> Only the administrative machine has kept its stability
> and goes on operating with the same automatic regularity
> (PECM:106).

Now, since Durkheim himself directly linked the modern social
malaise with its political counterpart, we shall do so also.
Since Durkheim acknowledged that when the pursuit of a value
--the emancipation of the individual by the State--goes to
extreme, it may end in disaster, we too shall look for the
unanticipated negative consequences of extreme individuation
pursued as a absolute value (see Books Two and Three).

4. <u>Law</u> <u>and</u> <u>the</u> <u>Person</u>: <u>The</u> <u>Development</u> <u>of</u> <u>Individual</u> <u>Prop-</u>
<u>erty</u> <u>and</u> <u>Contract</u>

One of the most fascinating and least explored areas
in Durkheim's work is his evolutionary sociology of law con-
tained primarily in his lectures "Physique generale des moeurs
et du droit." We shall trace here the coming of individual
property and contract as "objective correlatives" of the gen-
eral emergence of the individual through history. For, as
Durkheim himself noted of the frequent failure of French in-
dividualism to resist lapsing into authoritarian regimes af-
ter an orgy of revolution:

> ... in order to set up an individualistic moral code,
> it is not enough to assert it or to translate it into
> fine systems. Society, rather, must be so ordered that
> this set-up is made feasible and durable. Otherwise,
> it remains in a vague doctrinaire state (PECM:60).

One can hardly conceive of the emergence of the modern notion
of individualism, especially as it emerged out of the Anglo-
American democracies, without its anchors in the free indivi-
dual control of property and freedom of contract. Indeed,
these socio-economic-legal-political processes are one of a
piece; was not the cry "free markets make free men"?

Rejecting again Utilitarian explanations of the origin
of property, and Locke's legitimation of property in terms
of individual labor, Durkheim began with the collective own-
ership of land in traditional agricultural societies. He
then traced some main steps through which property, too, be-
came de-collectivized.

> ... precisely because property, in its origins, can
> only be collective, it remains to explain how it be-
> came something individual. How is it that individuals
> thus grouped together, attached to an identical group
> of things, came to acquire separate rights over sepa-
> rate things? The land holding cannot, in principle, be
> broken up: it forms a single unit, and that is the unit
> of inheritance; and this indivisible unit is imposed
> upon the group of individuals. How does it happen that,
> in spite of this, any individual should have been able
> to reach the point of having a property of his own?
> As we might guess, this individuation of property could
> not come about without involving other changes in the
> situation between things and persons. For as long as

the things preserved this moral superiority over persons, as it were, it was impossible for the individual to become their owner and establish his own command over them (PECM:164-5).

Thus, instead of starting with the natural rights of individuals to hold separate property, Durkheim began with the socio-historical fact of the collective holding of land. Since the land was indivisible as a hereditary unit, how did it come to be divided, held, or controlled by individuals?

Durkheim saw a two-fold process. First, there was the emergence of an individual as head of the group (eg. patriarchal power). Then there was the development of moveable forms of property. The first change was analogous to the emergence of the chief from out of the social mass, and the second to the shift away from land as the basis of wealth.

> To begin with, it was enough for one of the members of the family group to be raised in some rank in some way--by a chain of circumstances--for him to be lent a prestige that none of the others had and to make him the representative of the family group. In consequence, the ties binding the things to the group bound them direct to this privileged personality. And since this individual embodied in himself the whole group, men and things, he was in fact invested with an authority that placed things as well as men under his dominance, and thus an individual property came into existence. This change was achieved with the coming of paternal, and more especially, patriarchal, power....
> It is not alone people, traditions and sentiments that happen to find expression in his person. It is, too, above all the patrimony, with all the concepts attaching to it. The Roman family was made up of two kinds of elements: the head of the family, on the one hand, and on the other the rest of the family, called the familia, which comprised at once the sons of the family and offspring, the slaves and all things or property. All that was of moral or religious significance in the familia was, as it were, concentrated in the person of the head of the family. This is what gave him such a supreme position. The family's center of gravity thus became displaced. It passed from the things it was vested in to a given person. Henceforward, an individual came to be an owner, in the full sense of the word, since the things were subject to him, rather than he to them (PECM:165-6).

Just as the chief or patriarch was lifted above the group, so, too, the collective possessions which had possessed him

earlier now became part of his possession. As a symbolic rep-
resentative of the group, his person came to absorb the pos-
sessions and property of the group; they became part of his
collective patrimony.

The second cause--the development of moveable property
as the basis of wealth--largely depended on the development
of industry and commerce. As long as land was the productive
base of society, it was withdrawn from individual use; the
linkage of land to kinship barred treating land as a commod-
ity for sale on a market (see also Karl Polanyi, 1944).

> This second cause was the development in the sphere of
> personal or moveable property. Indeed, it was only land-
> ed property that had a sacred character. This had the
> effect of withdrawing it from being within the disposal
> of individuals and so made a communal system necessary.
> Personal or moveable property, on the other hand, was
> in itself, as a rule, of profane nature. However, so
> long as industry remained solely agricultural, personal
> property played only a secondary and auxiliary part;
> moveables were hardly more than adjuncts or annexes of
> landed property. This was the center to which all that
> was moveable in the family gravitated, things as well
> as people. It kept all things within its sphere of ac-
> tion and thereby prevented them from acquiring any le-
> gal status in keeping with their particular features,
> and from developing within them of some new right. Also,
> any earnings that members of the family could make out-
> side the family community flowed into this family patri-
> mony and was merged with the rest of the property, on
> the theory that the accessory follows the principal
> (PECM:166).

While real estate was hedged about with all kinds of tradi-
tional constraints and prohibitions, moveable property com-
ing from trade and manufactures was considered comparatively
profane, did not directly involve the fate of the group, and
thus was able to develop in a freer fashion under the con-
trol of individuals. The individual was allowed to dispose
of such "personal property," as opposed to "real property,"
according to his discretion, because it did not involve the
fate of the collective patrimony.

> With time, however, and with the progress of trade and
> industry, the personal or moveable property took on
> greater importance; it then cut away from this landed
> property of which it was only an adjunct; and became

an autonomous factor in economic life. Thus a fresh
nucleus was made outside real estate, and so did not
of course have its characteristic features.... Nothing
tied them to any given point in space; nothing made
them immovable. This meant that they depended directly
only on the person of the one who acquired them....
It is clear, in the light of present day laws, that
real estate and moveable property are quite different
in nature, and this reflects the separate phases in
the evolution of the law. The former is still loaded
with prohibitions and obstacles which are mementoes of
its ancient sacred character. The latter has always
been freer, more flexible, more entirely left to the
discretion of individuals. Real as this duality may
be, we must not lose sight of the fact that the one
type of property issued from the other. Personal prop-
erty, as a distinct entity in law, was formed only as
a result of landed property and on its pattern: it is
a weak reflection, an attenuated form of it. It was
landed property as an institution which first estab-
lished a bond sui generis between groups of persons
and certain given things. Once that had been done,
public opinion was quite naturally ready to admit that,
as social conditions changed, bonds similar in main
might link things with personalities in place of col-
lectivities (PECM:167).

Thus, collective ownership established the bond between

things and men because it was hedged about with sacredness;

after this legal precedent, a similar bond between men and

things emerged, only in terms of non-landed property. Fin-

ally, as Durkheim noted in the following summary of his the-

ses here, the sacredness invested in the collective holding

of land passed over into the individual person.

Originally, property was related to land, or at least
the distinguishing features of landed property extend-
ed even to moveables, owing to their lesser importance;
these features, by virtue of their sacred nature, im-
ply of necessity communalism. Here, then, we have the
starting point. Then, by a dual process, individual own-
ership splits off from collective ownership. The concen-
tration of the family, on the other hand, which estab-
lished patrimonial powers, causes all these sacred vir-
tues ... to issue from the person of the head of the
family. From now onwards, it is man who stands above
things, and it is a certain individual in particular
who occupies this position, that is, who owns or pos-
sesses. Whole categories of profane things take shape
independently of the family estate, free themselves of
it, and thus become the subject of the new right of
property, one that is in its essence individual. Then
again, the individualizing of property followed from

> landed property losing its sacrosanct quality--a
> quality which was absorbed by the human being (PECM:
> 168).

Now, Durkheim proposed a similar evolution for the
emergence of individual contract. Originally, as we saw in
Chapter Six, the contract was guaranteed by external ritual
formulas; it was regarded as sacred because the gods were
thought to be a party to the contract. Indeed, "juridical
formalism is only a substitute for sacred formalities and
rites" (PECM:182). As with property, while sacro-magical
anchors serve to establish contract as a legal institution,
as these fade in force other concepts come to the fore. What
becomes especially central to the evolving institution of
contract is the notion of intention, of freely given mutual
consent, of the individual as a responsible moral agent in
his own right. Thus, instead of external guarantees, the in-
dividual's word becomes his bond. As Weber (1963) observed,
the evolution of gods as ethical-legal deities, and the cor-
responding "attachment of the individual to a cosmos of ob-
ligations" is of great importance for the evolution of cul-
ture; it enables, for instance, an individual's universalis-
tic commitment to honesty and equity to secure for him a new
legal status, including the right to enter into individual
contracts. And, of course, one of the central themes of clas-
sical sociology, echoed in Durkheim's concern with the evol-
ving relations between de-collectivization and legal sanc-
tions in The Division of Labor, has been the passage from
"status to contract" (Maine).

Again, versus Spencer and the Utilitarians (recall
Durkheim's emphasis on the non-contractual elements in con-
tract in Division), Durkheim argued that "... nothing has
fluctuated so much in the course of time as the idea of free-
dom of contract" (PECM:67). And then he outlined his thesis
concerning the parallel evolution of the value placed on in-
dividual intentionality and the development of individual
consensual contract.

> With the Romans, the contract came into force at the
> moment when its text was declared and it was the phra-

> sing of the text that governed the engagements enter-
> ed into and not the intention behind the words. Later,
> the intention began to come into the reckoning, and
> the contract made under material duress was no longer
> held to be regular. Some forms of moral pressure like-
> wise began to be ruled out. What brought about this
> development? The answer is, that people began to have
> a far loftier idea of the human person and the small-
> est attempt on his freedom became more intolerable.
> Everything points to this development not having end-
> ed yet, and to our becoming even more severe in this
> matter (PECM:67-8).

Now, Durkheim began with two traditional legal forms from
which consensual contract emerged--namely, the real contract
(so-called because it focussed on the transfer of a material
object or possession) and the ritual contract. In both these
forms it is the external transfer of a thing or the external
formula which is the force which binds, which makes the con-
tract. The consensual contract emerges by degrees from the
socio-legal foundation which these types established.

> The consensual contract (or contract by mutual con-
> sent) in the final analysis is, as it were, a point
> of convergence where the real contract and the rit-
> ual contract meet in their process of development.
> In the real contract there is the transfer of a thing
> and it is this transfer that gives rise to the obliga-
> tion; in receiving a certain object that you hand to
> me, I become your debtor. In the contract by ritual,
> no performance takes place; everything takes place by
> words, usually accompanied by ritual gestures....
> Our word, once given, is no longer our own. In the
> solemn agreement or contract by ritual, this transfer
> had already been achieved, but it was subject to the
> magic-religious processes ... which alone made the
> transfer possible since it was these ceremonies that
> gave an objective character to the word, and to the
> resolve of the promisor. Once this transfer sheds the
> ritual that was previously a condition of it and is
> rid of it, once it constitutes the whole contractual
> act in itself, then the consensual contract has come
> into existence (PECM:196).

Then, for the passage to consensual contract, Durkheim post-
ulated a continuing process of simplification and seculari-
zation. Once the form was established, the different uses
it was put to led to changes in its structure and in its
internal guarantee.

Now, given the contract by ritual as an existing fact,

this process of cutting down and simplifying was
bound to come about of itself. On the one hand, we
see a diminishing of the verbal or other ritual cere-
monies was brought about by a kind of decline from
within, under the pressure of social needs that call-
ed for greater speed in the process of exchanges. On
the other hand, the practical effects of the contract
by ritual could be got adequately by means other than
those of ceremonies; it was enough for the law to de-
clare as irrevocable any declaration of the will pre-
sented as such: this simplification was the more eas-
ily allowed of, since in the natural course of time
the practices that had accumulated had lost a great
part of their meaning and early authority (PECM:196-7).

Now, Durkheim connected these early forms of contract
to the early structure of society in which the individual
counted for little. Civil and criminal law were not clearly
distinguished; the most heinous crimes, as we saw in Chapter
Six, were crimes against religious authority, which demanded
expiation by the sacro-magical collective conscience. The in-
dividual who was wronged in an agreement, who could not col-
lect debts, had little recourse except self-help. He could,
for instance, post himself outside the door of the debtor,
calling public attention to the deliction and, ultimately,
even die there and haunt his nemesis.

The system of real contract and the ritual contract
correspond to a stage in social evolution in which
the right of individuals commands only a slight meas-
of protection.... It is true that the defaulting debt-
or often was sentenced to a penalty such as whipping,
imprisonment, or fine.... But the rule was still un-
known whereby the true sanction is one of compelling
the contracting party to keep his word, or to make
good the loss or injury inflicted on the other party
by failing to honor an undertaking. In other words,
penal sanctions at this stage are only applied in re-
spect of a contract where it appears to be an offense
against the public authority: the way in which it af-
fects the individual does not enter into consideration.
For loss or injury in private cases there is no provi-
sion (PECM:197-8).

Then Durkheim noted that not only external sanctions--the
outer structure of the contractual right--have been modified
in the course of time to yield the consensual contract, but
the internal structure also. The traditional forms of con-
tract were largely unilateral--one party gave and the other

received. For consensual contract to emerge, there must be the possibility of bilateral relations, of mutual give and take.

> In the beginning, the formal or ritual contract, like the real contract, could only be unilateral.... To create a bilateral bond, that is, in order that there shall be an exchange in the course of the contract, in order that each contracting party shall be both debtor and creditor at once, there had to be two separate contracts, independent one of the other, for the role assigned to each was entirely different. There was of necessity an actual transposition. The one who spoke first as stipulator or creditor later on spoke as debtor or promisor, and vice versa. The independence of the two processes was such that the validity of the one was entirely distinct from that of the other....
> The consensual contract alone was able at a single stroke to create the two-way track of bonds that we find in any reciprocal agreement. For the greater flexibility of the system allows any contracting party to play at one and the same time the dual role of debtor and creditor, of stipulator and promisor. As a man is no longer under compulsion to adhere strictly to a definite formula, the reciprocal obligations can be contracted simultaneously. The two parties declare at one and the same time that they consent to the exchange on the conditions agreed between them (PECM:199-200).

Akin to the greater flexibility of bilateral, mutual relations, was the emergence of bona fide contracts which were, quite literally, dependent on the reciprocal "good faith" of each party. Here, the possibility of "taking the role of the other" and the freedom from fixed, ritual formulas moved individual intentions to center stage. Will, intention, personal honesty, fidelity, trustworthiness--in short, the internalization of authority--became the foundation on which consensual contracts rested.

> Another new feature of some significance arose when consensual contracts became inevitably contracts in good faith (or bona fide). The name is given to contracts whose range and legal effects must be exclusively determined by the intent of the parties. The real contract and the consensual contract were not able to claim this characteristic, or at least, only very imperfectly. Indeed, in each case the obligation did not come about purely and simply from the consent given or from the demonstration of will. Another factor needed to bind the parties come into it. Therefore, this very factor which was indeed the decisive

> one, was bound deeply to affect the nature of the
> form of both these contracts; so it was impossible
> that these forms of contract should depend exclusive-
> ly or even mainly on what we might call the psycho-
> logical factor, that is, the will or intention (PECM:
> 200-01).

The reason that a new factor had to enter into these tradi-
tional forms of contract is that they both derived their
binding force from their form, rather than the mutual re-
solve of the parties directly involved. It is the formula
rather than the intention which binds and obligates.

> The role played by the thing in the real contract is
> filled by the words or the ritual used in the formal
> contract. Here, it is the words used and the gestures
> that make the obligation; it is these, too, that de-
> fine it. In order to know what the provisor or debtor
> is bound to give or to do, we must not consider his in-
> tent or that of the opposite party, but the formula he
> has used. The legal analysis, at least, has to start
> with the formula. Since it is the words that effect the
> binding, it is the words, too, that give the measure
> of the bonds forged.... The formula has a value in it-
> self ... has its own force, and this force could not
> depend on the wills of the contracting parties since,
> on the contrary, the formula produces its effects, me-
> chanically, as it were, no matter what the intentions
> of those using it.... For all these reasons, good faith
> and the intent of the parties hardly came into the
> reckoning, whether for real or ritual contracts
> (PECM:201).

Now, Durkheim suggests that a great change came with the e-
mergence of the consensual contract, a break through paral-
lel to societal differentiation and the erosion of sacro-
magically stereotyped and guaranteed mechanical solidarity.
Thus, just as altruisme is used by Durkheim as an index to
mechanical solidarity, so, too, he used the emergence of
consensual, bona fide contracts as a sign of the progressive
emergence of the individual person through history.

> From the time the consensual contract was established,
> however, it was a different matter. Here we no longer
> find anything intervening in the relation contracted
> and affecting its nature. Certainly, there are still
> words being used ... but these no longer have any force
> in themselves because they lack any sacred character.
> Their only value now is in giving expression to the
> wills they reveal and therefore in the end it is the
> state of these wills that decides the obligations con-

> tracted. The words in themselves are no longer of importance; they are only symbols to be interpreted, and what they signify is the state of the mind and will that inspired them.... What I am giving to another is my firm resolve to act in a specified way (PECM:202).

Hence, the emergence of consensual, bona fide contracts is significant not only in sociocultural terms, but also because it marks a new stage in phenomenological evolution; it helped create a new type of character structure.

> ... if a contract is to be achieved, the main thing is that it shall exist in the intention or will of the party to it. If the will is lacking on either side, there can be no contract. For what the one in fact is giving, is his intention of acting in a certain way, of transferring his ownership in a certain object; what the other declares, is his intention of accepting what is thus transferred to him. If the intention is absent, nothing remains but a form of contract empty of any positive content. All that is pronounced is words devoid of meaning and so, devoid of value.... The consensual contract had to be a bona fide contract, and now it could not be one of good faith except on condition of its being one by mutual consent (PECM:203).

In this way, Durkheim again used shifts in the foundations of legal institutions as reflecting shifts in the fundamental relations between society and culture; just as Durkheim never separated sociocultural from phenomenological process, so, too, he intimately linked social, cultural, legal, and phenomenological evolution. Again, his complex matricing of cultural processes should serve as a guide to us.

> We can see how far the consensual contract amounts to a revolutionary innovation in the law. The dominant part played in it by consent and the declaration of the will had the effect of transforming the institution. It differs from the earlier forms of contract from which it descends by a whole series of distinctive features. That is not all. The principle on which the institution in its new form rests, contains in itself the germ of a whole new development (PECM:203).

The principle involved here is, of course, the emergence of the autonomous and responsible person. Durkheim then briefly traced the ways in which free consent was made central to this new legal institution.

> The idea governing this development is that the consent is truly itself, and binds truly and absolutely

> the one who consents, only on condition that it has
> been freely given. Anything that lessens the liberty
> of the contracting party lessens the binding force
> of the contract (PECM:203).

Now, it must be emphasized that Durkheim had a keen grasp of the difficulties encountered in the evolution of free consensual contract; for various traditional, collective encumbrances and obstacles had to be overcome.

> To us this idea may seem a natural one but it only
> broke through very slowly and in the course of meeting
> with resistance of every kind. For centuries, the bind-
> ing force of the contract had been supposed to reside
> outside the parties, in the formula pronounced, in the
> gesture made, in the thing delivered. Given this fact,
> the worth of the bond contracted could not be made to
> depend on what might have occurred in the depths of con-
> sciousness of the contracting parties, or on the condi-
> tions in which their resolve was taken (PECM:204).

Thus, various coercive pressures, the conditions in which the contract was formulated and agreed upon, and so on, became the background for passing judgment on the legal validity of contracts; anything blocking the free consent of the parties came under scrutiny. But, eventually, it was not merely the degree of responsibility or free will involved which determined the validity of the contract, but the nature and degree of undeserved injury to one party by another. Equity and justice--expressed in terms of a broad sympathy for human suffering--changed the conditions of validity of consensual contracts.

> It is therefore not the amount of a greater or lesser
> freedom that matters; if contracts imposed by con-
> straint, direct or indirect, are not binding, this does
> not arise from the state of the will when it gave con-
> sent. It arises from the consequences that an obliga-
> tion thus formed inevitably brings upon the contrac-
> ting party. It may be, in fact, that he took the step
> that has bound him only under external pressure, that
> his consent has been extracted from him. If this is
> so, it means that the consent was against his own in-
> terests and the justifiable needs he might have under
> the general principles of equity. The use of coercion
> could have had no other aim or consequence but that of
> forcing him to yield up some thing which he did not
> wish to do, to do something which he did not wish to
> do, or indeed of forcing him to one action or the oth-
> er on conditions he did not will. Penalty and distress

have thus been undeservedly laid on him (PECM:206).
Durkheim next links our notions of equity and justice with
an emerging broad sympathy for human suffering in general,
the same sort of sentiments which lie behind the modern
"cult of the individual" or our institutionalized respect
for the rights and dignity of the human person.

> The feelings of sympathy that we usually have for
> our fellow creatures are outraged when suffering is
> inflicted on someone when it is in no way deserved.
> The only kind of infliction that we find just is a
> penalty, and the penalty presupposes a culpable act.
> Any act must therefore seem immoral to us that caus-
> es injury to a fellow man who has otherwise done noth-
> ing to alienate our ordinary human sympathies. We de-
> clare it to be unjust. Now an unjust act could not be
> sanctioned by law without inconsistency. This is why
> any contract in which pressure has a part becomes in-
> valid. It is not at all because the determining cause
> of the obligation is exterior to the individual who
> binds himself. It is because he has suffered some un-
> justified injury, because, in a word, such a contract
> is unjust. Thus, the coming on the scene of contract
> by mutual consent, together with an increase in human
> sympathies, inclined the minds of men to the idea that
> the contract was only moral and only to be recognized
> and given sanction by society, provided it was not
> merely a means of exploiting one of the contracting
> parties, in a word, provided it was just (PECM:207).

In sum, "... just as the consensual emerged from the ritual
contract" so the objectively equitable contract succeeded
the consensual contract. This whole legal process, then, un-
derlies, reinforces, and acclerates the emergence of the in-
dividual person through history.

5. Christian Universalism and the Sanctification of the Person

In the passage from Judaism to Christianity, we witness a momentous dialectic between universalism and individualism. For the breakdown of Jewish ritual-legal particularism and the breakthrough to a universalistic "faith structure of consciousness" was closely allied with a new sanctification of the individual person. It is important for our present purposes to recognize that Durkheim emphasized the moral creativity of Christian culture in enlarging the sphere of operation of the individual conscience. And since conscience is inherently a phenomenological cateogory, the coming of Christianity has great significance for phenomenological, as well as sociocultural, evolution.

The phenomenology of Christian individualism, as both Durkheim and Weber noted, was a powerful, even decisive, force in sanctioning an autonomous sphere for the individual person, over against the traditional collective claims of "blood and soil." For as Nelson (1973a) has observed, the prime sociocultural significance of Christianity was that it decisively broke through the tribal sacro-magical collective conscience of the archaic "sacral complex," and extended the new socio-religious bond to all "brothers" in the faith. Whereas post-exilic Judaism anchored its collective identity in the traditional Mosaic law and ritual prescriptions designed to insure ethnic purity, Christianity broke through these restrictive tribal bonds and extended its message of salvation to all men. Whereas the Judaism of the Pharisees and the Sadducees, of the scribes and rabbis, was restricted to the cultural heritage of an exclusive ethnic group, Christianity constructed a new type of socio-religious bond which cut across ethnic barriers and social statuses. Christianity constituted a new form of fraternization which cut across tribal and regional boundaries; it represented one of the first massive and sustained breakthroughs to a more universalistic "faith structure of consciousness." Paul's famous

proclamation sums up this simultaneous cross-cutting of territorial and socio-religious bonds, and the emergence of a new universalistic and internalized faith: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Jesus Christ" (Galatians, 3:28).

Now, in a striking convergence of perspectives concerning the world-historical significance of this awakening of new universalistic depths of conscience, both Durkheim and Weber saw this expansion to be of crucial evolutionary importance. The deepening of personal obligation, both in regard to abstract impersonal ideals and to interpersonal obligations, was seen as of prime importance in the in-depth construction of character structures. Indeed, Weber emphasized that "... the increased importance of an ethical attachment of individuals to a cosmos of obligations, making it possible to calculate what the conduct of a given person may be ... has the greatest importance" (1963:35-6). The progressive awakening of a universalistic conscience and consciousness, the deepening internalization of moral and ethical obligations, the heightened responsibility for one's own sins and salvation, the growing centrality of a more or less systematic phenomenology of intentions as the basis of casuistry (especially from Abelard on, see D. Luscombe, 1971; Nelson, 1973a; E. Leites, 1974), were all of critical significance in the evolutionary construction of the moral individualism so revered by Durkheim.

Indeed, we see here the subtle and continuing dialectic between universalism and individualism which made Christianity significant for Durkheim, Weber, and Troeltsch. For the Christian appeal to all men rests on a certain irreducible equality between them (all are children of one God, all are sinners, etc.). And the essential key to this new found equality is the potential internal response of each individual to the kerygma of the Gospel message--that is, the capacity for faith. "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you"

(Luke, 17:21). Here, the Pauline mission to the Gentiles proved crucial in its double emphasis on universalism and internal, individual faith commitment. The new Christian community, freed from Jewish collective ritual-legalism, was a community founded on individual belief in a universalistic and personalistic revelation, not on ethnic or territorial ties. As Nock (1938) emphasized, the growth of Christianity depended upon individual acts of conversion. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God" (John, 3:3). And Paul said in his second letter to the Corinthians: "Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new" (5:17). Inevitably, as Durkheim observed, this strong emphasis on conversion and internal faith paved the way for a profound deepening of the internal life, the life of the spirit, of la personne humain. The sensitive striving after fidelity to the divine model, of faithful patterning ourselves after the incarnated exemplar, inevitably deepens the structures of interiority, of will and imagination, of life-long consistency of character.

We see here another facet of the world-historical process of rationalization so central to Weber's perspective. Through the progressive internalization of ethical-legal norms, the personality structure becomes more integral, more consistent, and hence, as we discovered in the preceding section on legal evolution, more predictible and reliable. When notions of individual guilt and responsibility, of sin and the culpability of the individual conscience, come to be linked with a systematic casuistry of the prospective moral conscience and the sorting through of logic and evidence governing the choice of alternative moral judgments, then we witness a tremendous step forward in the emergence of the notion of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person. Further, in identifying the emergence of the individual conscience with the construction of a new level of in-depth integrated personality structures, Weber also

included, as a corollary process, the growing autonomization
of facts and individuals, and the greater degree of calcula-
bility and universalizability which accompanies these linked
processes. As we have seen, Durkheim, too, believed that the
autonomization of the person, and rationalization and univer-
salization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse
proceed together on the world-historical level. Recently, Ed-
mund Leites has described this crucial process with particu-
lar cogence:

> ... two of the most decisive advances in the philoso-
> phic and theoretical development of the norm of moral
> and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an ex-
> traordinary extension (in moral and religious matters)
> of "universalities in terms of reference and communi-
> ties of discourse".... Major advances in the articula-
> tion of the norm of autonomy have gone along with re-
> jections of moralities and theologies whose terms of
> reference and modes of argumentation are believed to
> be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cul-
> tures and traditions. What is sought are ways of deci-
> ding moral and religious matters which all reasonable
> men, whatever their history and culture, would accept
> and would have to accept, given the correctness of the
> procedures.... There are important cultural and civi-
> lizational linkages between: (1) the struggle for uni-
> versalities in terms of reference, and argumentation
> in moral and religious matters, and (2) the development
> of norms of individual autonomy (1974:97-8).

Besides Christianity, of course, there is the example of Soc-
rates, subsequent Greek philosophy, Stoic philosophy and Ro-
man law, all of which became fused together in medieval Eu-
rope. Indeed, as we saw in a previous section of this chap-
ter, Durkheim himself declared "Rationalism is only one of
the aspects of individualism ... each is the converse of
the other" (ME:12); Durkheim also noted the importance of
these developments in the Middle Ages (DL:163-4; see also
his discussion of Abelard in L'Evolution pedagogique en
France).

Let us briefly explore Durkheim's scattered comments
on the civilizational significance of Christian universalism
and individualism for the emergence of the person through
history. It is clear that Durkheim judged the Christian con-
tribution to be of momentous importance:

> But remarkable as Roman individualism may be, it is
> slight enough compared to that which developed within
> Christian societies. The Christian form of religion is
> an inward one: it consists of inward faith rather than
> outward observances, for a deeply held faith eludes
> any external constraint (PECM:58).

With Christianity, we witness a fundamental shift in the
grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority from
a traditional tribal-ritual structure of conscience and con-
sciousness to a new kind of cross-cutting socio-religious
bond in which all become "brothers in the faith," and in
striving to model themselves on the divine exemplar, deepen
the structures of interiority. "For Christianity ... it is
the mind, the <u>conscience</u> of man which is sacred and incompar-
able; for the soul is ... a direct emanation of divinity" (in
Lukes, 1973:387,#39). Durkheim recognized, as did Weber, that
the   fundamental Christian experience of conversion de-
manded a wholly different level of personality integration.

> True conversion is a profound transformation whereby
> the soul in its entirety, through turning in a com-
> pletely new direction, changes its position or stand-
> point, and consequently alters its perspective on the
> world (in Giddens, 1972a:207).

Christian conversion signifies, in historical perspective,
the phenomenological revolution implied in the shift in the
legitimate grounds of conscience and consciousness. The in-
dividual believer, freed from the restrictive bonds of tri-
bal and territorial religion, came to focus on his internal
states, his convictions, examination of conscience, prayer,
and so forth. Thus, Christianity demanded a great deal more
from the individual than previous religions; more than the
others, Christianity is, as Durkheim noted, an inward, in-
dividualistic religion, not only in practice but in doctrine.

> Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his
> thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that
> which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit.
> .... The most common rite is prayer; and prayer is an
> internal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue
> and piety do not consist in material acts, but in in-
> ternal states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a per-
> petual surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged
> to perpetually examine his conscience, he must learn
> to question himself, to analyze himself and scrutin-

ize his intentions: in short, to reflect upon himself.
Thus, of the two possible poles of all thought, nature
on the one hand, and man on the other, it is necessar-
ily around the second that the thought of the Chris-
tian societies and also consequently their system of
education, has come to gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a:
239-40).

Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the
very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process
of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nas-
cent conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than
adherence to the multiple religious cultures of Antiquity.

> In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective
> of communicating to the child a certain number of de-
> fined talents. These were either considered as a sort
> of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic val-
> ue of the individual, or else they were seen, as was
> the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools
> which an individual needed in order to play his role
> in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating
> into the pupil certain habits and items of knowledge.
> ... It was not a question of influencing the personal-
> ity in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity,
> but in clothing it in a sort of external framework,
> the differents parts of which could be created independ-
> ently.... Christianity, by contrast, very early on ac-
> quired the conception that there is in each of us an
> underlying mode of being from which forms of intelli-
> gence and sensibility derive, and in which they find
> their unity; and that it is this underlying mode of
> being which has to be reached if one really wants to
> carry out the work of the educationalist and to pro-
> duce a lasting effect. According to Christian belief,
> to shape a man is not to embellish his mind with cer-
> tain ideas or to allow him to acquire certain specific
> habits, but to create in him a general attitude of the
> mind and the will which makes him see reality in gen-
> eral in a definite perspective. And it is easy to un-
> derstand how Christianity came to hold this view. It
> is because ... in order to be a Christian, it is not
> enough to have learnt this or that particular item,
> to know how to discriminate between certain rites or
> pronounce certain formulas, or to know certain tradi-
> tional beliefs. Christianity consists essentially in
> a certain attitude of the soul, in a certain _habitus_
> of our moral being. To foster this attitude in the
> child is thus the essential goal of education (in
> Giddens, 1972a:206-7).

Now, this "certain _habitus_ of the entire moral being,"
this commitment to influencing the total personality in its

depths, was based upon the Christian notion of the "unity and intrinsic moral value of the self" (Wallwork, 1972:132).

> ... the goal of Christian education always involved directing the basic orientation of the self as a unified whole.... The important thing was the general disposition of the mind and the will of the whole personality. In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian concept of training the total personality distinguishes the whole of Western pedagogical instruction
> (Wallwork, 1972:132).

Modern Western education, even though now largely secularized, Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on the total personality, and on penetrating with transcendental values and moral habits the "inner, deep rececesses of the soul."

> For us the principal object of education is not to provide the child with a greater or lesser degree of items of knowledge, but to create within him a deep-lying disposition, a kind of perspective of the soul which orients him in a definite direction, not only during childhood, but for life.... Our conception of the goal has become secularized; consequently, the means employed must themselves change. But the abstract schema of the educational process has not altered. It is still a matter of descending into depths of the soul which Antiquity was unconscious of
> (in Giddens, 1972a:207-8).

Indeed, the deep religio-cultural sanction of individualism and the development of the interior life, the life of the human spirit, which came with Christianity, served as an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral individualism" which Durkheim held dear. This intimate historical and cultural connection between Christianity and individualism is most important for our present purposes (see Part I, Book Three).   Giddens remarks that:

> Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, is the immediate source from which modern moral individualism is derived.... Christian ethics provided the moral principles upon which the "cult of the individual" is founded, but now Christianity is becoming supplanted by sacred symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, in the events of the French Revolution, where freedom and reason were glorified.... The French Revolution gave the most decisive impetus to the growth of moral individualism in modern times (1971a:115-16).

Thus, Christian sanctions, especially in their later Protes-
tant forms, became secularized in the Enlightenment notions
of the "Individual" and universal "Reason," which were, ac-
cording to Max Weber, among the last great forms "charisma
has taken in its fateful historical course" (1968:1142). In
his review of Saint-Simon's historical analysis of the pas-
sage to the modern era, Saint-Simon, said Durkheim, saw the
Protestant Reformation (rather than the Italian Renaissance)
as the crucial opening wedge in the fundamental reorganiza-
tion of the "moralities of thought and logics of action" un-
derlying European social and cultural order. Especially im-
portant here was the individualistic "Protestant principle"
(Tillich, 1948) of free examination in matters of conscience
and inner faith.

> It was only in the sixteenth century that the forces
> antagonistic to the old system found themselves strong
> enough to come into the open.... At first these forces
> were directed against theological rule; Luther and his
> co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a power in
> Europe. At the same time in a general way, they under-
> mined theological authority by "destroying the princi-
> ple of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of
> examination, which--restrained at first within quite
> narrow limits--was to inevitably increase and ... fin-
> ally embrace an indefinite area." This two-fold change
> operated not only among peoples converted to Protes-
> tantism, but even among those who remained Catholic.
> For once the principle was established, it extended
> well beyond the conditions where it had first been pro-
> claimed. As a result, the bond which tied individual
> consciences to ecclesiastical power--although not shat-
> tered--was loosened and the moral unity of the social
> system definitely unsettled (Soc:151-2).

Saint-Simon, and Durkheim after him (see also Part II, Book
Two), also clearly perceived the spreading secularization of
this individualistic aspect of the Protestant Ethos into po-
litical revolution (see also, Jellinek, 1901, Weber, 1968).
In a curiously parallel movement, both this individualistic
drive and the trend toward political centralization proceed-
ed together (eg. see Soc:152). Eventually, as the struggle
deepened, the new "Protestant principle"--the new moralities
of thought and logics of action--of freedom of conscience
and rationalistic or mystical individualism which accompan-

ied it, became extended to their outer limits. "One sees the principle of the right of examination in religious matters extended to its extreme limit" (Soc:153). Hence, we see the progressive extension of individualism as an absolute principle into the legitimized egoism at the base of modern economies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim attacked so relentlessly with his notion of anomie and egoisme.

Finally, we should not fail to note that at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to the defense of the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, he rhetorically used the origins of Western individualism in Christian doctrine to invert the attacks of the Catholic conservatives against the "laic" Third Republic intellectuals and moral reformers.

> What, in any case, are we offered in place of this individualism that is so disparaged? The merits of Christian morality are extolled to us and we are subtly invited to rally to its support. But are those who take this position unaware that the originality of Christianity has consisted precisely in a remarkable development of the individualist spirit? While the religion of the Ancient City was entirely made up of material practices from which the spiritual element was absent, Christianity expressed in an inward faith, in the personal conviction of the individual, the essential conditions of godliness. It was the first to teach that the moral virtue of actions must be measured in accordance with intention, which is essentially private, escapes all external judgments and which only the agent can competently judge. The very center of the moral life was thus transferred from outside to within and the individual was set up as the sovereign judge of his own conduct having no other accounts to render than those to himself and to his God. Finally, in completing the definitive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, in abandoning the world to the disputes of men, Christ at the same time opened the way for science and freedom of thought. In this way, one can explain the rapid progress made by scientific thought from the date that Christian societies were established (Trans. by Lukes, 1969:26-7).

We shall follow Durkheim's own counsel in the rest of our exploration that "It is a singular error to present individualist morality as antagonistic to Christian morality; quite the contrary, it is derived from it" (1969:27). And we shall

ask how it was that, by adhering to the religion of the self and, thus, continuing the Christian heritage, modern cultural traditions came to exert extraordinary pressures on certain individuals ultimately issuing in suicide. In sum, we shall hold it as established, even in Durkheim's doctrine, that our modern ethos of individualism is ultimately derived from the belief systems and continuing phenomenological sanctions of Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular.

6. The Modern Cult of Moral Individualism

The emergence of the person through history finds its culmination in Durkheim's religion of la personne humain. As a nineteenth century liberal and positivist moralist, Durkheim's central value in the modern world was the cult of moral individualism. Far from being anti-individual, the de-collectivization of structures of morality and thought, and the emergence of the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible person lay at the heart of Durkheim's concern. Durkheim was critical of those who attempted to derive society from the association of autonomous individuals; but his criticism served only to demonstrate the possibility, indeed, the necessity, of deriving autonomous moral individualism from socially realistic or organic premises. Indeed, far from the individual being identified with the release of the lone ego from traditional social control, Durkheim repeatedly argued that the notion of the person--as a category of the human spirit--is a prime sociocultural and historical construction.

Now, Durkheim's remarks on the modern cult of moral individualism centered in the years 1897 and 1898 with the publication of Suicide, the definitive draft (see Lukes, 1973: 254, #5) of his lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit," and his revealing polemical article "Individualism and the Intellectuals" (trans. By S. Lukes, 1969; see also Bellah, 1973). In Suicide, Durkheim offers the following summary of his valuation of the emerging cult of the individual

and the religion of humanity.

> Not only is this aim [the exaltation of the human per-
> sonality] really one of the aims of modern societies,
> but it is a law of history that peoples increasingly
> detach themselves from every other objective.
> Originally, society is everything, the individual noth-
> ing. Consequently, the strongest social feelings are
> those connecting the individual with the collectivity;
> society is its own aim. Man is considered only an in-
> strument in its hand; he seems to draw all his rights
> from it and has no counter-prerogative, because nothing
> higher than it exists. But gradually things change.
> As societies become greater in volume and density, they
> increase in complexity, work is divided, individual dif-
> ferences multiply, and the moment approaches when the
> only remaining bond among the members of a single hu-
> man group will be that they are all men. Under such con-
> ditions, the body of collective sentiments inevitably
> attaches itself with all its remaining strength to its
> single remaining object, communicating to this object
> an incomparable value by so doing. Since human person-
> ality is the only thing that appeals unanimously to all
> hearts, since its enhancement is the only aim that can
> be collectively pursued, it inevitably acquires excep-
> tional value in the eyes of all. It thus rises far above
> all human aims, assuming a religious nature (S:336).

Here, we see Durkheim ground this "law of history" not merely
in terms of societal differentiation and individuation, but
also in terms of the need for an over-arching collective re-
presentation wide enough to encompass all of humanity itself.
Since all we share in common in the modern world is our hu-
manity itself, this becomes the central value and sacred col-
lective   representation. Later, we shall see that
Durkheim "rotated" his "analytical matrix" and offered other
reasons to ground this "cult of the individual." But, with
one eye to the Books to follow, I merely wish to raise now
the question of the possible relationship between this reli-
gion of the individual and anomic and egoistic suicides:
what do the pathologies of individualism have to do with the
religion of   individualism? Are they simply opposites, as
Durkheim sometimes suggests, or are they intimately related,
as he suggests at other points? These problems are crucial to
issues discussed in Books Two and Three of this dissertation.

Let us consider Durkheim's general evolutionary obser-
vations on the emergence of individualism in his lectures

translated as <u>Professional Ethics</u> and <u>Civic Morals</u> which
form a link to his earlier work in <u>The Division of Labor</u>.
Here, again, de-collectivization in terms of societal dif-
ferentiation and individuation is central.

> ... the further one travels in history, the more one
> is aware of the process of change. In the early stage,
> the individual personality is lost in the depths of
> the social mass, and then later, by its own efforts,
> breaks away. From being limited and of small regard,
> the scope of the individual life expands and becomes
> the exalted object of moral respect. The individual
> comes to acquire ever wider rights over his own per-
> son and over the possessions to which he has title;
> he also comes to form ideas about the world that seem
> to him most fitting and to develop his essential qual-
> ities without hindrance (PECM:56).

This development is inevitable, necessary, and legitimate to
Durkheim, of course. It cannot be reversed, for it lays at
the foundation of modern social institutions and cultural or-
der. It represents the culmination of the main line of devel-
opment of history; we cannot return to the past.

> Shall we find some people saying that the cult of the
> individual is a superstition of which we ought to rid
> ourselves? That would be to go against all the lessons
> of history: for as we read on, we find the human per-
> son tending to gain in dignity. There is no rule more
> soundly established. For any attempt to base social in-
> stitutions on the opposite principle is not feasible
> and could be convincing only for a moment: we cannot
> force things to be other than they are. We cannot undo
> the individual having become what he is--an autonomous
> center of activity, an impressive system of personal
> forces whose energy can no more be destroyed than that
> of cosmic forces (PECM:56).

Now, Durkheim was quick to emphasize, again, that this ideal
is a social ideal; the person is a social and cultural con-
struction and, thus, the cult of <u>la personne humain</u> has for
its central object not the concrete individual but the sym-
bol of humanity itself.

> What lies at the base of individual rights is not the
> notion of the individual as he is, but the way in which
> society puts the rights into practice, looks upon
> it and appraises it. What matters, is not what the in-
> dividual is, but how much he counts, and on the other
> hand, what he ought to be. The reason why he has more
> or fewer rights, certain rights and not others, is not
> that he is constituted in a particular way; it is be-
> cause

> society attributes this or that importance to him and
> attaches a higher or lower value to what concerns him.
> If all that affects the individual affects the society,
> the society will react against all that might diminish
> him. This would not only forbid the slightest offences
> against him, but even more, the society would hold it-
> self bound to work towards increasing his stature and
> towards his development (PECM:66-7).

In rejecting the nominalist biases of the "natural rights"
tradition, Durkheim argued that rights are social creations;
that the legal enfranchisement of, and respect for, the indi-
vidual person was a sociohistorical construction. Instead of
society itself being the prime value, it is the social sanc-
tioning of the autonomous human person, and his institution-
alized rights, which moves to center stage of social pro-
gress.

> ... the rights of the individual, then, are in a state
> of evolution: progress is always going on and it is not
> possible to set any bounds to its course. What yester-
> day seemed but a kind of luxury becomes overnight a
> right precisely defined.... Everything indicates that
> we are becoming more alive to what touches on the in-
> dividual personality (PECM:68).

 Now, as we saw in an earlier section, the individual's
rights emerge with, and are guaranteed by, the State in Durk-
heim's political sociology. Here, Durkheim suggests that mod-
ern democracy is the political system best suited to modern
individualism.

> Whilst the advances in democracy are thus made inevi-
> table by the state of the social milieu, they are promp-
> ted equally by our inmost moral concepts. Democracy in-
> deed, as we have defined it, is the political system
> that conforms best to our present day notion of the in-
> dividual. The values we attribute to individual person-
> ality make us loath to use it as a mechanism to be
> wielded from without by the social authority. The per-
> sonality can be itself only to the degree in which it
> is a social entity that is autonomous in action (PECM:
> 90).

It is significant that Durkheim here noted that democracy
and individualism are rooted in "our moral concepts" as well
as in the advanced organic division of labor. Further, demo-
cracy's superiority as a political system, Durkheim argued,
was that it encouraged a constant interchange of information

between the central administrative apparatus and the dispersed
citizenry (see also Giddens, 1971c; Lukes, 1973).

> To be autonomous means, for the human being, to under-
> stand the necessities he has to bow to and accept them
> with full knowledge of the facts. Nothing that we do
> can make the laws of things other than they are, but
> we free ourselves of them in thinking them, that is, in
> in making them ours by thought. This is what gives de-
> mocracy its moral superiority. Because it is a system
> based on reflection, it allows the citizen to accept
> the laws of the country with more intelligence and
> thus less passivity. Because there is a constant flow
> of communication between themselves and the State, the
> State is for individuals no longer like an exterior
> force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them.
> Owing to constant exchanges between them and the State,
> its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life
> does with that of the State (PECM:91).

Further, Durkheim noted that whereas the type of crimes
that were most severely repressed in archaic society "...
were those carried out against the family or religious or po-
litical orders" (PECM:111), today it is crimes against indi-
viduals which draw public concern. Whereas before "the suf-
fering of the individual made little impact on the feelings,"
today:

> ... it is individual suffering that is the hateful
> thing. The notion that a man suffers without deser-
> ving it is intolerable to us.... The reason is that
> these sentiments that center on man, the human being,
> become very strong, whilst those that link us direct
> with the group pass into the background. The group no
> longer seems to have value in itself and for itself:
> it is only a means of fulfilling and developing human
> nature to the point demanded by the current ideals.
> It is the supreme aim, compared with which all others
> are but of secondary value. That is why morals of in-
> dividual man have come to transcend all others (PECM:
> 112).

This shift testifies to an underlying shift in the grounds
of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. A similar
shift can be detected in terms of the general duties of man
to man, especially seen in the increase of homicide prohi-
bitions with the progress of civilization. Instead of the
dualistic in and out-group moralities of early societies,
we see the progress of the religion of humanity, of univer-

salistic moralities and obligations; again, we see Durk-
heim's inner equation between universalism and individual-
ism.

> The reason why homicide is prohibited nowadays under
> threat of the most severe penalties ... is that the
> human person is the object of a sacred respect that
> was formerly attached to very different things....
> There is no doubt at all that the respect and the
> value attached to the person by public opinion grow
> with civilization. Might we then not say that the
> homicide rate varies according to the relative posi-
> tion of the individual in the mounting scale of mor-
> al ends (PECM:113, 114)?

But it was really in his polemical article, published
during the Dreyfus controversy in France, that Durkheim most
explicitly stated his doctrine of the religion of humanity
and the cult of la personne humain. Now, in attempting to
turn back the conservative attack on the individualism of
the intellectuals, Durkheim had first to disengage his no-
tion of the grounds of moral individualism and civil rights
from their Utilitarian and Romantic variants (see also the
succeeding section). Durkheim began by distinguishing be-
tween egoism and moral individualism.

> ... once one has ceased to confuse individualism with
> its opposite, that is to say, utilitarianism, all
> these contradictions vanish as if by magic. The reli-
> gion of humanity has all that is required to speak to
> its believers in a tone that is no less imperative
> than the religions it replaces. Far from confining it-
> self to indulging our instincts, it offers us an i-
> deal which infinitely surpasses nature; for we do not
> naturally have that wise and pure reason which, dis-
> sociated from all personal motives, would make laws
> in the abstract concerning its own conduct. Doubtless,
> if the dignity of the individual derived from his in-
> dividual qualities, from those particular characteris-
> tics which distinguish him from others, one might fear
> that he would be enclosed in a sort of moral egoism
> that would render all social cohesion impossible. But
> in reality he receives this dignity from a higher
> source, one which he shares with all men. If he has
> the right to this religious respect, it is because he
> has in him something of humanity. It is humanity that
> is sacred and worthy of respect. And this is not his
> exclusive possession. It is distributed among all his
> fellows, and in consequence he cannot take it as a
> goal for his conduct without being obliged to go be-
> yond himself and turn towards others. The cult of

> which he is at once both object and follower does not
> address itself to the particular being that consti-
> tutes himself and carries his name, but to the human
> person, wherever it is found, and in whatever form it
> is incarnated. Impersonal and anonymous, such an end
> soars far above all particular consciences and can
> thus serve as a rallying point for them (1969:23).

Precisely because the religion of humanity is universal, it
may serve as a central focus for each individual; this ab-
stract, impersonal, altruistic religion of the human person
is the descendant of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man."

> The individual who is the subject of the ideals embod-
> ied in moral individualism is not the concrete indivi-
> dual, the particular personality, but "man" in general.
> The morality of the "cult of the individual" is compo-
> sed of those values given intellectual expression by
> the eighteenth-century philosophers and inspiring the
> French Revolution. These are values which emphasize
> the dignity of "man" in the abstract; as such, not on-
> ly do they not derive from the "egoism" of the utili-
> tarians, but they are its direct opposite. Egoism is
> the pursuit of self-interest. But these values imply
> sentiments of sympathy for others and for human suffer-
> ing. Precisely because they are created by society,
> they have a religious quality (Giddens, 1971b:213).

But, as we shall see, there may, indeed, be an unintended,
indirect connection between moral individualism and its de-
volution into egoism. Durkheim's rhetorical task in disenga-
ging individualism from Utilitarianism, however, made him em-
phasize their differences so as to deflect the attack of the
Catholic conservatives. Durkheim claimed:

> ... In short, individualism thus understood is the
> glorification not of the self, but of the individual
> in general. Its motive force is not egoism but sympa-
> thy for all that is human, a wider pity for all suf-
> ferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire
> to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for jus-
> tice. Is this not the way to achieve a community of all
> men of good will (1969:24)?

In short, moral individualism is altruistic, Utilitarian in-
dividualism is egoistic.

Moreover, Durkheim connected this altruistic, abstract
French moral individualism with Enlightenment "Reason." "This
cult of man has for its first dogma the autonomy of reason
and for its rite the freedom of thought" (1969:24). However,

again, against the anti-Dreyfusards, Durkheim felt compelled
to defend the liberal equation of "Individual" and "Reason"
from some of its extreme or destructive consequences.

> Now, it will be said, if all expressions are free, by
> what miracle will they then be harmonious? If they are
> formed without knowledge of one another, and without
> having to take account of one another, how can they
> fail to be incoherent? Intellectual and moral anarchy
> then would be the inevitable consequence of liberalism.
> Such is the argument, always being refuted and always
> reappearing, which the perennial adversaries of reason
> take up periodically.... Certainly, it is true that in-
> dividualism does not go without a certain intellectual-
> ism; for liberty of thought is the first of all liber-
> ties. But why has it been seen to have as a consequence
> this absurd self-infatuation which would confine each
> within his own desires and create a gap between men's
> minds (1969:24)?

To deflect these charges that individualism may lead to an
"absurd self-infatuation," Durkheim insisted that his own
type of individualism did not challenge all authority, but
simply demanded that "authority be rationally based."

> What it demands is the right of each individual to know
> those things that he may legitimately know. It does not
> sanction unlimited right to incompetence. Concerning a
> question on which I cannot pronounce with expert know-
> ledge, my intellectual independence suffers no less if
> I follow a more competent opinion. The collaboration of
> scientists is only possible thanks to this mutual defer-
> ence. Each science borrows continuously from its neigh-
> bors propositions which it accepts without verifying.
> The only thing is that my intellect requires reasons
> for bowing to the authority of others. Respect for au-
> thority is in no way incompatible with rationalism pro-
> vided that authority be rationally based (1969:24).

Durkheim then defended the Dreyfusards whose authority in
this matter came "... not because, as chemists or philolo-
gists, philosophers or historians, they attribute to them-
selves any special privileges" (1969:25), but rather because
"... being men they seek to exercise their entire right as
men and to keep before them a matter which concerns reason a-
lone" (1969:25). It was simply a problem of "... practical
morality concerning which every man of good sense is compe-
tent and about which no one ought to be indifferent" (1969:25).

Not only did Durkheim defend individualism by trying

to set aside the conservative equation of anarchy and ego-
ism, but he argued that the religion of humanity, the "cult
of moral individualism," is the only value system which can
integrate modern societies.

> Not only is individualism distinct from anarchy, but
> it is henceforth the only system of beliefs which can
> ensure the moral unity of the country. One often hears
> it said today that only a religion can bring about this
> harmony. This proposition, which modern prophets feel
> it necessary to utter in a mystical tone of voice, is
> really no more than a simple truism over which every-
> one can agree. For we know today that a religion does
> not necessarily imply symbols and rites in the full
> sense, or temples or priests. All this external appa-
> ratus is merely its superficial aspect. Essentially,
> it is nothing other than a system of collective beliefs
> and practices that have a special authority. Once a
> goal is pursued by a whole people, it acquires, as a
> result of this unanimous adherence, a sort of moral su-
> premacy which raises it far above private goals and
> thereby gives it a religious character (1969:25).

But, to Durkheim, there was no possibility of returning to
past religio-social organization. It is not enough, as the
Parsonians have done for several decades, to insist that
every society must have some over-arching value system which
functions as a religion; the question is what kind of value
system is needed in the twentieth century.

> On the other hand, it is clear that a society cannot
> hold together unless there exists among its members
> a certain intellectual and moral community. However,
> having recalled this sociological truism, one has not
> advanced very far. For if it is true that religion is,
> in a sense, indispensable, it is no less certain that
> religions change, that yesterday's religion could not
> be that of tommorow. Thus, what we need to know is
> what the religion of today should be (1969:25).

Durkheim claimed, of course, that only the religion of human-
ity was suited to serve as the central value system of modern
societies; indeed, it was made necessary by the very process
of societal differentiation, de-collectivization, and indivi-
duation traced earlier.

> Now, all the evidence points to the conclusion that
> the only possible candidate is precisely this religion
> of humanity whose rational expression is the indivi-
> dualist morality. To what, after all, should collec-
> tive sentiments be directed in the future? As socie-

> ties become more voluminous and spread over vaster
> territories, their traditions and practices, in order
> to adapt to the diversity of situations and constantly
> changing circumstances, are compelled to maintain a
> state of plasticity and instability which no longer
> offers adequate resistance to individual variations
> (1969:25-6).

Now, as Lukes observes, Durkheim's dialectical genius came
here to the fore in taking over the conservative's own argu-
ment, and turning it against them.

> Thus, by an ingenious inversion of the characteristic
> anti-Dreyfusard argument that the unity, indeed the
> very survival, of the nation were being threatened for
> the sake of one individual's rights, Durkheim argues
> that the "individualist, who defends the rights of the
> individual, defends at the same time the vital inter-
> ests of society." A religion which tolerates sacrilege
> loses its authority, and since the religion of the in-
> dividual is "the sole link which binds us one to an-
> other, such a weakening cannot take place without the
> onset of social dissolution" (1969:15).

Thus, only the religion of humanity, the "cult of moral in-
dividualism," is at the center of modern culture; contrary to
the Catholic conservatives, it is attacks on this religion
which endanger social stability.

> ... as a consequence of a more advanced division of
> labor, each mind finds itself directed towards a dif-
> ferent part of the horizon, reflects a different as-
> pect of the world and, as a result, the content of
> men's minds differ from one subject to another. One
> is thus gradually proceeding towards a state of af-
> fairs, now almost attained, in which the members of
> a single social group will no longer have anything in
> common other than their humanity, that is, the char-
> acteristics which constitute the human person in gen-
> eral. This idea of the human person ... is therefore
> the sole idea that survives, immutable and impersonal,
> above the changing tides of popular opinions; and the
> sentiments which it awakens are the only ones to be
> found in almost all hearts. The communion of minds can
> no longer form around particular rites and prejudices,
> since rites and prejudices have been swept away in the
> natural course of things. In consequence, there remains
> nothing that men may love and honor in common, apart
> from man himself. This is why man has become a god for
> man, and it is why he can no longer turn to other gods
> without being untrue to himself. And just as each of us
> embodies something of humanity, so each individual mind
> has something within it of the divine, and thereby finds
> finds itself marked by a characteristic which renders

> it sacred and inviolable to others. The whole of in-
> dividualism lies here * (1969:26).

While one cannot help but admire Durkheim's dialectical gen-
ius here, there is, perhaps, some justification in wondering
about his apotheosis of the fact that we moderns have nothing
in common anymore except the lowest common denominator--our
humanity itself. Can we today remain as sanguine as Durkheim
about the liberal anchoring of the modern world in our most
abstract and lowest common denominators? Is this not an in-
herently weak point of unity? Is this bond sufficient to at-
tach individuals to altruism and turn them away from egoism?
Just as Durkheim said that "the whole [the philosophy] of in-
dividualism lies here," may we not wonder if the crux of
Durkheim's later problems, especially in terms of the ambigu-
ities besetting his suicide schemas, might not also lie in
these tenuous, and often inverted, connections?

At this point, however, in the heat of battle, Durkheim
could not pause to trace some of the potential inversions of
his central value system. He insisted that the "cult of moral
individualism" is anchored in historical necessity.

> That is what makes it into the doctrine that is cur-
> rently necessary. For, should we wish to hold back its
> progress, we should have to prevent men from becoming
> increasingly differentiated from one another, reduce
> their personalities to a single level, bring them back
> to the old conformism of former times, and arrest, in
> consequence, the tendency of societies to become ever
> more extended and centralized, and stem the unceasing
> growth of the division of labor. Such an undertaking,
> whether desirable or not, infinitely surpasses all hu-
> man powers (1969:26).

Thus, those intellectuals who defended the civil rights of
unjustly treated individuals were, in fact, defending the
cultural foundation of modern social organization.

> We are now in a better position to understand the rea-
> son why certain people believe that they must offer an
> unyielding resistance to all that seems to threaten the
> individualist faith. If every attack on the rights of
> an individual revolts them, this is not solely because
> of sympathy for the victim. Nor is it because they fear
> that they themselves will suffer similar acts of injus-
> tice. Rather, it is that such outrages cannot rest un-
> punished without putting national existence in jeopardy.

> It is indeed impossible that they should be freely
> allowed to occur without weakening the sentiments
> that they violate; and as these sentiments are all
> that we still have in common, they cannot be weaken-
> ed without disturbing the cohesion of society. A re-
> ligion which tolerates acts of sacrilege abdicates
> any sway over men's minds (1969:27).

Since all we share in common in modern "organic solidarity"
is our common humanity itself, attacks on the religion of
the individual attack the very foundation of modern society.

> The religion of the individual can, therefore, allow
> itself to be flouted without resistance, only on pen-
> alty of ruining its credit; since it is the sole link
> which binds us to one another, such a weakening cannot
> take place without the onset of social dissolution.
> Thus, the individualist, who defends the rights of the
> individual, defends at the same time the vital inter-
> ests of society; for he is preventing the criminal im-
> poverishment of that final reserve of collective ideas
> and sentiments that constitutes the very soul of the
> nation. He renders his country the same service that
> the ancient Roman rendered his city when he defended
> traditional rites against reckless innovations. And if
> there is one country among all others in which the in-
> dividualist cause is truly international, it is our
> own; for there is no other whose fate has been so
> closely bound up with the fate of these ideas. We gave
> the most recent expression to it, and it is from us
> that other people have received it. We cannot, there-
> fore, renounce it today, without renouncing ourselves;
> without diminishing ourselves in the eyes of the world,
> without committing real moral suicide (1969:27-8).

Now, Durkheim was forced to acknowledge, however, that
many people still confused egoistic individualism with moral
individualism. And while he insisted that the latter is a so-
cial construction, cannot the same be said of the former?

> A verbal similarity has made it possible to believe
> that individualism resulted from individual, and thus
> egoistic, sentiments. In reality, the religion of the
> individual is a social institution like all known re-
> ligions. It is society which assigns us this idea as
> the sole end which is today capable of providing a fo-
> cus for men's wills. To remove this ideal, without put-
> ting any other in its place, is therefore to plunge us
> into that very moral anarchy which it is sought to a-
> void (1969:28).

In light of the ambiguities abounding in his treatment of
the causes and types of suicide (see Books Two and Three),
however, one is led to wonder whether the "moral anarchy"

marked by anomie and egoisme may not be ironically connec-
ted with this very religion of the self; whether the cultur-
al sanctioning of the individual as the source and founda-
tion of modern values, especially in the Romantic and Utili-
tarian traditions, might not lead to extreme, unforeseen,
and destructive outcomes. Durkheim himself had to criticize,
as we shall see in the following section, these two opposing
cultural traditions for basing individualist ethics on the
lone individual. Instead, Durkheim argued for social real-
ism and the derivation of moral individualism from cultural
values.

> This is how it is possible, without contradiction, to
> be an individualist while asserting that the individual
> is a product of society, rather than its cause. The rea-
> son is that individualism is itself a social product,
> like all moralities and all religions. The individual
> receives from society even the moral beliefs which de-
> ify him. This is what Kant and Rousseau did not under-
> stand. They wished to deduce their individualist ethics
> not from society, but from the notion of the isolated
> individual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from
> it resulted the logical contradictions of their system
> (1969:28, #1).

However, this passage and many to follow do acknowledge that
it was common for cultural values to sanction types of indi-
vidualism different from Durkheim's non-egoistic, abstract,
altruistic, religion of humanity. As Durkheim himself noted
in Suicide, then, even our egoism is, in large part, a pro-
duct of society!

Now, Durkheim himself admitted that even his own type
of rationalistic individualism, as derived from the eight-
eenth century Enlightenment and the French Revolutionary de-
clarations, was primarily negative. It was advanced primari-
ly as a rhetorical weapon to de-collectivize society; and be-
cause of the intensity of the struggle, this negativistic
thrust itself became destructive.

> All the same, we should not consider as perfect and
> definitive the formula with which the eighteenth cen-
> tury gave expression to individualism, a formula which we
> have made the mistake of preserving in an almost un-
> changed form. Although it was adequate a century ago,
> it is now in need of being enlarged and completed. It

>presented individualism only in its most negative as-
>pect. Our fathers were concerned exclusively with free-
>ing the individual from political fetters which ham-
>pered his development. Freedom of thought, freedom to
>write, and freedom to vote were thus placed among the
>primary values that it was necessary to achieve, and
>this emancipation was certainly the necessary condi-
>tion for all subsequent progress. However, carried a-
>way by the enthusiasm of the struggle, solely concern-
>ed with the objective they pursued, they ended by no
>longer seeing beyond it, and by converting   into a
>sort of ultimate goal what was merely the next stage
>in their efforts. Now, political liberty is a means,
>not an end. It is worth no more than the manner in
>which it is put to use. If it does not serve something
>which exists beyond it, it is not merely useless: it
>becomes dangerous. If those who handle this weapon do
>not know how to use it in fruitful battle, they will
>not be slow in turning it against themselves *
>   (1969:28-9).

While it is probable that Durkheim was issuing here a call

for a kind of party unity, over against the age-old anti-re-

publican threat from the monarchic and hierocratic forces in

France, is it not also possible that the achievement of a

largely negative kind of freedom might lead certain indivi-

duals to turn their extreme individualism against themselves

--namely, in suicide? Durkheim himself notes the disenchant-

ment that came after the achievement of the aspiration to

found the Third Republic; might we not apply Durkheim's rea-

soning in Suicide about the anomie of success to this vic-

tory of individualism and the resulting ennui?

>It is precisely for this reason that it has fallen to-
>day into a certain discredit. The men of my generation
>recall how great was our enthusiasm when, twenty years
>ago, we finally succeeded in toppling the last barriers
>which we impatiently confronted. But alas! disenchant-
>ment came quickly; for we soon had to admit that no one
>knew what to do with this liberty that had been so la-
>boriously achieved. Those to whom we owed it only made
>use of it in internecine strife. And it was from that
>moment that one felt the growth in the country of this
>current of gloom and despondency, which became stronger
>with each day that passed, the ultimate result of which
>must inevitably be to break the spirit of those least
>able to resist *(1969:29).

Like Saint-Simon after the French Revolution (see Socialism),

Durkheim wished to see rationalistic individualism move for-

ward from negative to positive expressions; hence, their
positivism. Here, Durkheim acknowledged that "individual
liberty is a delicate instrument," even a double-edged
sword which might unwittingly be turned against self as well
as to defend individual freedom.

> Thus, we can no longer subscribe to this negative i-
> deal. It is necessary to go beyond what has been a-
> chieved, if only to preserve it. Indeed, if we do not
> learn to put to use the means of action that we have
> in our hands, it is inevitable that they will become
> less effective. Let us, therefore, use our liberties
> in order to alleviate the functioning of the social
> machine, still so harsh to individuals, in order to
> put at their disposal all possible means for develop-
> ing their faculties unhindered, in order, finally, to
> work towards making a reality of the famous precept:
> to each according to his works! Let us recognize that,
> in general, liberty is a delicate instrument the use
> of which must be learnt, and let us teach this to our
> children; all moral education should be directed to
> this end (1969:29).

Thus, at a time when the moral foundations of the Third Re-
public were threatened, Durkheim issued a call to the ration-
alistic individualists to hold fast to their values, and also
to refine and extend them; to move beyond the negative thrust
of the past to positive reconstruction of the society in
terms of the classical French ideals. Might he not, had the
connections been made clear (as we shall attempt in the suc-
ceeding Books of this dissertation), in different circum-
stances, also issued a call to disentangle the negative and
destructive and unintended outcomes of this religion of the
self from its valid foundations? In other words, can we any
longer ignore the real contemporary relevance of the an-
cient wisdom that virtues, pushed to extreme, may become vi-
ces?

> It is a matter of completing, extending, and organi-
> zing individualism, not of restricting it or strug-
> gling against it. It is a matter of using and not sti-
> fling rational faculties.... In all these circumstances,
> does not our duty appear to be clearly marked out? All
> those who believe in the value, or even merely in the
> necessity, of the moral revolution accomplished a cen-
> tury ago, have the same interest: they must forget the
> differences which divide them, and combine their efforts
> so as to hold positions already won.... For today, the

urgent task, which must be put before all else, is
that of saving our moral patrimony; once that is se-
cure, we shall see that it is made to prosper
(1969:29-30).

Finally, in many of his statements in Suicide, it must
be noted that, for rhetorical reasons again, Durkheim could
not and did not acknowledge explicitly that moral individual-
ism and the religion of the self, even in their Utilitarian
or Romantic forms, might invert itself into "moral anarchy."
But here, of course, Durkheim argued normatively, in terms
of a projected ideal, not actuality.

> This cult of man is something ... very different
> from the egoistic individualism ... which leads to
> suicide. Far from detaching individuals from socie-
> ty, and from every aim beyond themselves, it unites
> them in one thought, and makes them servants of one
> work. For man, as thus suggested to collective affec-
> tion and respect, is not the sensual, experiential
> individual that each one of us represents, but man
> in general, ideal humanity as conceived by each peo-
> ple at each moment of its history. None of us wholly
> incarnates this ideal, though none is wholly a stran-
> ger to it. So we have, not to concentrate each sepa-
> rate person upon himself and his own interests, but
> to subordinate them to the general interests of hu-
> mankind. Such an aim draws him beyond himself; imper-
> sonal and disinterested, it is above all individual
> personalities; like every ideal, it can be conceived
> of only as superior to and dominating reality. This
> ideal even dominates societies, being the aim on which
> all social activity depends. This is why it is no long-
> er the right of these societies to dispose of this i-
> deal freely (S:337).

At its best, Durkheim's projection may be true; in the norm-
al case, however, it is hard to deny the devolution, inver-
sion, or extremity of most cultural-ethical ideals. Durk-
heim's condemnation of suicide as immoral because it "den-
ies the religion of humanity" may be commendable, but it is
insufficiently dialectical for our present purposes. What
is missing here is the ironic insight that, as he stated
elsewhere, "... even our immorality is part of our morali-
ty," that the religion of the self can become self-destruc-
tive; in short, that our virtues may also become the source
of our vices.

> Under these conditions, suicide must be classed among
> immoral acts; for in its main principle it denies this
> religion of humanity.... Society is injured because
> the sentiment is offended on which its most respected
> moral maxims today rest, a sentiment almost the only
> bond between its members, and which would be weakened
> if this offense could be committed with impunity. How
> could this sentiment maintain the least authority if
> the moral conscience did not protest its violation?
> From the moment that the human person is and must be
> considered sacred, over which neither the individual
> nor the group has free disposal, any attack upon it
> must be forbidden (S:337).

For our part, we cannot accept such an undialectical point
of view, and shall, instead, search out all those parts of
Durkheim's treatment of suicide which admit the ironic in-
sight. The notion that the modern cult of moral individual-
ism, when pushed to extreme, like all cults, ends in invert-
ing itself, shall serve as our basic guide in Books Two and
Three which follow. There, we shall explore the possibility
that anomic and egoistic suicides in the modern world ulti-
mately stem from cultural sanctions.

7.   Durkheim's Critique of Anglo Utilitarian and Romantic-
       Idealistic Notions of Individualism

     Before we begin our detailed exegesis of the logic
and structure of Durkheim's famous book, Suicide, we should
not fail to notice that Durkheim himself felt obliged in
various places to attempt to refute those traditions which
gave cultural sanction to individualism on nominalistic prem-
ises. Such traditions largely failed to meet his criteria for
dissolving the possible equation between individualism and
egoism--namely, the impersonal, altruistic marriage of the
abstract Individual and Reason projected by the French Cultur-
al Tradition. For example, Durkheim acknowledged:

> Doubtless it can happen that individualism is prac-
> tised in quite a different spirit. Certain people use
> it for their own personal ends, as a means of disguis-
> ing their egoism and escaping more easily from their
> duties toward society. But this deceptive misuse of in-
> dividualism proves nothing against it, just as the u-
> tilitarian fictions of religious hypocrites prove noth-
> ing against religion (1969:24).

For such traditions rooted individualistic ethics in the moral autonomy of the individual alone, and some Utilitarians, in equating egoism and individualism, went so far as to proclaim that competitive economic egoism inevitably leads to altruism, to the common good.

Here, Durkheim had to face the fact, quite apart from the arguments about methodology in the social sciences, that egoisme, anomie, and an individualism couched in ethical terms were often intimately intertwined. His normative protestations aside, the amoralism of the man in the state of nature of the eighteenth century philosophers was very close to anomie; this identification was, of course, the source of Parsons' linkage of anomie to the Hobbesian dilemma. Indeed, as we shall see, Guyau (1962) earlier used the term "anomie" in a laudatory way in approximately this sense. Hence, we shall watch with fascination as Durkheim, in Suicide, attempts to deal with this dilemma that values lead to vices, that good intentions lead to bad results; in short, that extreme individualism was (is) widely sanctioned by the dominant cultural values of the modern world.

As noted earlier in this chapter, Durkheim directed much of his polemical skill in The Division of Labor to refuting Spencerian liberal Utilitarian individualism. This nominalist position deduced society from the lone individual; but Durkheim argued, "... the psychologist who starts by restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find the non-ego." Association is a primary social phenomena which cannot be abstractly derived from self-interested contractual relations.

> If this important truth has been disregarded by the Utilitarians, it is an error rooted in the manner in which they conceive the genesis of society. They suppose originally isolated and independent individuals, who, consequently, enter into relationships only to cooperate, for they have no other reason to clear the space separating them and to associate. But this theory, so widely held, postulates a veritable creatio ex nihilo. It consists, indeed, in deducing society from the individual. But nothing we know authorizes us to believe in the possibility of such spontaneous genera-

tion. According to Spencer, for societies to be formed within this hypothesis, it is necessary that primitive units pass from the state of perfect independence to that of mutual dependence. But what can have determined such a complete transformation in them? Is it the prospect of the advantages presented by social life? But they are counterbalanced, perhaps more than counterbalanced, by the loss of independence, for, among individuals born for a free and solitary life, such a sacrifice is most intolerable. Add to this, that in the first social types social life is as absolute as possible, for nowhere is the individual more completely absorbed in the the group. How could man, if he were born an individualist, as is supposed, be able to resign himself to an existence clashing violently with his fundamental inclination? How pale the problematical utility of cooperation must appear to him besides such a fall! With autonomous individualities, as are imagined, nothing can emerge save what is individual, and, consequently, cooperation itself, which is a social fact, submissive to social rules, cannot rise. Thus, the psychologist who starts by restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find the non-ego (DL:279).

Here, we see one of the clearest expressions of Durkheim's social realism (see also Part I, Book Three). Indeed, if one starts from social realism, and then attempts to "get inside" the nominalist perspective, it is clear that egoistic individualism can and is socially created; that the Hobbesian dilemma is not natural but social; that social nominalism leads to a culturally sanctioned collocation of atoms trading goods on an international market. In such a moral universe, individual persons are enjoined to be egoistic; they are forced to act as if they were Robinson Crusoes. Durkheim pointed out the logical contradictions of such a world-view:

Collective life is not born from individual life, but it is, on the contrary, the second which is born from the first. It is on this condition alone that one can explain how the personal individuality of social units has been able to be formed and enlarged without disintegrating society.... It is not the absolute personality of the monad, which is sufficient unto itself, and could do without the rest of the world, but that of an organ or part of an organ having its determined function, but which cannot, without risking dissolution, separate itself from the rest of the organism. Under these conditions, cooperation becomes not only possible but necessary. Utilitarians thus reverse the natural order of facts, and nothing is more deceiving than this inversion (DL:279-80).

Durkheim didn't exclude the Idealist philosophers and ethi-
cists from his rebuttal of nominalistic individualism; he
accused them also of starting their ethical systems from the
absolute autonomy of the lone individual.

> As the utilitarians, the idealists have it [cooperation]
> consist exclusively in a system of economic relations,
> of private arrangements in which egotism is the only ac-
> tive power. In truth, the moral life traverses all the
> relations which constitute cooperation (DL:280).

Indeed, Durkheim saw the common foundations between the op-
posed camps of Romantic-Idealist and Anglo Utiltarian philo-
sophers in terms of the moral subsidy of the autonomous indi-
vidual. The Enlightenment, Durkheim recognized, started from
the ego in a state of nature, which was, from the sociologi-
cal point of view, inherently amoral.

> ... man is a moral being only because he lives in so-
> ciety, since morality consists in being solidary with
> a group and varying with this solidarity. Let all so-
> cial life disappear, and moral life will disappear with
> it, since it would no longer have any objective. The
> state of nature of the philosophers of the eighteenth
> century, if not immoral, is at least amoral. Rousseau
> himself recognized this (DL:399).

In his polemical article, "Individualism and the Intel-
lectuals," Durkheim was careful to distinguish his type of
rationalistic moral individualism from its Utilitarian and
Romantic variants. First, Durkheim attacked the "narrow ego-
ism" of the Utilitarian economists.

> In order to facilitate the condemnation of individual-
> ism, it has been confused with the narrow and utilitar-
> ian egoism of Spencer and the economists. This is to
> take the easy way out. It is not hard, in effect, to
> denounce as an ideal without grandeur that narrow com-
> mercialism which reduces society to nothing more than
> a vast apparatus of production and exchange, and it is
> only too clear that all social life would be impossible
> if there did not exist interests superior to the inter-
> ests of individuals. Nothing is more just than that
> such doctrines should be treated as anarchical, and
> with this attitude we are in full agreement. But what
> is admissible is that this individualism should be pre-
> sented as the only one that there is or even that there
> could be. Quite the contrary, it is becoming more and
> more rare and exceptional. The practical philosophy of
> Spencer is of such moral poverty that it now has scarce-
> ly any supporters. As for the economists, even if they

> once allowed themselves to be seduced by the simpli-
> city of this theory, they have for a long time now
> felt the need to temper the rigor of their primitive
> orthodoxy and to open their minds to more generous
> sentiments.... In truth, if individualism had no oth-
> er representatives, it would be quite pointless to
> move heaven and earth in this way to combat an enemy
> that is in the process of quietly dying a natural
> death (1969:20).

While Durkheim was certainly right in describing the shift
away from Utilitarian individualism among many intellectuals
(the "Social Gospel" movement in the United States and Fabian
socialism in Britain were two indicators of this shift), one
wonders if Durkheim would have been quite so sanguine about
the death of Utilitarian individualism had he survived into
the mid-twentieth century. Further, this passage is impor-
tant because Durkheim agreed with the conservatives here that
Utilitarian individualism is "anarchical;" yet, this movement
marked by a fundamental "moral poverty" itself emerged as an
ethically rooted and motivated reform movement.

After dismissing the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian
individualism, Durkheim turned to consider the other contend-
er--namely, Kantian Idealistic individualism.

> However, there exists another individualism over which
> it is less easy to triumph. It has been upheld by the
> great majority of thinkers: it is the individualism of
> Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualistes, that
> which the Declaration of the Rights of Man sought, more
> or less successfully, to translate into formula, that
> which is currently taught in our schools and which has
> become the basis of our moral catechism. It is true
> that it has been thought possible to attack this indi-
> vidualism under the cover of the first type, but that
> differs from it fundamentally and the criticisms which
> apply to the one could not be appropriate to the other.
> So it is far from making personal interest the object
> of human conduct, that it sees in all personal motives
> the very source of all evil. According to Kant, I am
> only certain of acting well if the motives that influ-
> ence me relate, not to the particular circumstances in
> which I am placed, but to my quality as a man in ab-
> stracto (1969:20-21).

Such a moral stance carried, of course, real moral grandeur.
For instead of justifying egoism, as the Utilitarians had
done, by arguing that the pursuit of self-interest inevita-

bly leads to the common good, that egoism regulated only by
competition leads to altruism, the Idealists and Rationalists
argued that egoistic judgments must be overcome through uni-
versalization.

> Conversely, my action is wicked when it cannot be jus-
> tified logically except by reference to the situation
> I happen to be in and my social condition, my class or
> caste interests, my passions, etc. That is why immoral
> conduct is to be recognized by the sign that it is
> closely linked to the individuality of the agent and
> cannot be universalized without manifest absurdity
> (1969:21).

However, when Durkheim was not engaged in polemics with the
right-wing, and he was simply trying to establish his own
"science of morality," he was less generous to the Kantian
categorical imperative (eg. see DL:412).

Another expression of this universalization of indivi-
dual wills as the basis of moral action was to be found in
Rousseau's Social Contract and his notion of the "general
will." Durkheim noted:

> Similarly, if according to Rousseau, the general will,
> which is the basis of the social contract, is infalli-
> ble, if it is the authentic expression of perfect jus-
> tice, this is because it is a resultant of all the par-
> ticular wills; consequently, it constitutes a kind of
> impersonal average from which all individual consider-
> ations have been eliminated, since, being divergent and
> even antagonistic to one another, they are neutralized
> and cancel each other out. Thus, for both these think-
> ers, the only ways of acting that are moral are those
> which are fitting for all men equally, that is to say,
> which are implied in the notion of man in general
> (1969:21).

Now, Durkheim insisted that the Rationalist and Idealist no-
tions of abstract, impersonal moral individualism are far re-
moved from the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian individualism
which confuses the ego and the person.

> This is far from that apotheosis of comfort and pri-
> vate interest, that egoistic cult of the self for
> which utilitarian individualism has been justly re-
> proached. Quite the contrary: according to these mor-
> alists, duty consists in averting our attention from
> what concerns us personally, from all that relates to
> our empirical individuality, so as uniquely to seek
> that which our human condition demands, that which we
> hold in common with all our fellow men. This ideal goes

> so far beyond the limit of utilitarian ends that it
> appears to those who aspire to it as marked with a re-
> ligious character. The human person, whose definition
> serves as the touchstone according to which good must
> be distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred....
> It has something of that transcendental majesty which
> the churches of all times have given to their Gods. It
> is conceived as being invested with that mysterious pro-
> perty which creates an empty space around holy objects,
> which keeps them away from profane contacts and which
> draws them away from ordinary life. And it is exactly
> this feature which induces the respect of which it is
> the object (1969:21).

And it is exactly this feature of Rationalist and Idealist
moral philosophy which must be examined to see if here, as
elsewhere, the high-sounding moral idealism and good inten-
tions may not lead to unanticipated, destructive results.
Surely when such a premium is put upon the individual person,
when man becomes god, then the balance between community and
self shifts decisively. In the third quarter of the twentieth
century, for instance, we see the "cult of the individual"
metamorphosing into the "cult of the self," into the "Religion
of the Self," with myriad therapeutics designed to rid the
Self of all unnecessary and artificial distractions. Durkheim
here argued in his normal tone of high-minded seriousness
that this extreme emphasis on the individual was balanced by
a corresponding emphasis on supra-individual norms and con-
cern with the community.

> Now, it is a remarkable fact that all these theorists
> of individualism are no less sensitive to the rights
> of the collectivity than they are to those of the in-
> dividual. No one has insisted more emphatically than
> Kant on the supra-individual character of morality and
> law. He sees them rather as a set of imperatives that
> men must obey because they are obligatory.... Now,
> Kantianism led to the ethics of Fichte, which was al-
> ready thoroughly imbued with socialism, and to the
> philosophy of Hegel whose disciple was Marx. As for
> Rousseau, one knows how his individualism is complemen-
> ted by an authoritarian conception of society. Follow-
> ing him, the men of the Revolution, in promulgating the
> famous Declaration of Rights, made France one, indivisi-
> ble, centralized, and perhaps one should even see the
> revolutionary achievement as being above all a great
> movement of national concentration. Finally, the chief
> reason for which the spiritualistes have always fought
> against utilitarian morality is that it seemed to them

to be incompatible with social necessities (1969:22).
Now, even granting that Durkheim was here involved in a rhe-
torical defense of rationalistic individualism against the
conservative right, one wonders about the oscillation in
such ethical systems between the individual and the central-
ized and often authoritarian State; indeed, Durkheim himself
counted this as one of the great problems of the modern era
(see Part II, Book Two). Durkheim himself stated "... there
is no reason of State which can excuse an outrage against the
person when the rights of the person are placed above the
State" (1969:21-22); but the problem remains nevertheless.
Thus, Durkheim was forced by the rhetorical situation, in defend-
ing French rationalistic "moral individualism" to: (a) set
aside as indefensible the Utilitarian equation of egoism with
individualism, and (b) argue that true individualism, such as
expressed in Kant, the Enlightenment, and the "Declaration of
the Rights of Man," was rooted in an abstract, altruistic
religion of humanity which, nonetheless, depended upon a
strong centralized State in which the relations between the
lone individual and the society's means of governance remain-
ed problematical. Of course, these were not merely philoso-
phical problems, for the moral demands and the culture of
the individual had changed the very foundations of modern so-
cial organization (a principle which we shall critically ap-
ply to Durkheim's theses in Part I of Book Two).

> One can see how grave this question is. For the lib-
> eralism of the eighteenth century which is, after all,
> what is basically at issue, is not simply an armchair
> theory, a philosophical construction. It has entered
> into the facts, it has penetrated our institutions and
> customs. It has become part of our whole life, and, if
> we really must rid ourselves of it, it is our entire
> moral organization that must be rebuilt at the same
> time (1969:22).

Now, when Durkheim permitted himself a few critical re-
marks on the uncertain empirical fate of his values, he ac-
knowledged some of the crucial difficulties in living out
"moral individualism." Indeed, did not Rousseau himself note
that although "... the Protestant is forced to be free, this

burden may be too great for some to bear"?

> Certainly, we do not propose to defend the way in
> which these different thinkers have set about combin-
> ing these two aspects in the construction of their sys-
> tems. If, with Rousseau, one begins seeing the indivi-
> dual as a sort of absolute who can and must be suffi-
> cient unto himself, it is obviously difficult then to
> explain how civil society could be established
> (1969:23).

Indeed, although earlier he used the example of Kant and
Rousseau to deflect the conservatives' equation of indivi-
dualism with anti-social egoism, Durkheim later admitted
some crucial flaws in their points of departure. Even though
their positions favored altruism and the religion of humani-
ty, their whole framework started from the pre-social autono-
my of the individual person.

> This is what Kant and Rousseau did not understand.
> They wished to deduce their individualist ethics not
> from society, but from the notion of the absolute in-
> dividual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from
> it resulted the logical contradictions of their system
> (1969:28, #1).

We might also add, besides "logical contradictions," social,
cultural, and phenomenological contradictions. One might as
well rephrase Durkheim's objection to the Utilitarian start-
ing point: if, instead of starting from the ego, one starts
from the absolute autonomy of the individual, how can one
emerge to find the embeddedness, the relationalness of the
person? If from ego you cannot emerge to find non-ego, then
from absolute autonomy you cannot emerge to find relational
interdependence. We have, here, then the first crucial fac-
tor in our second schema of suicide--namely, an extraordinar-
ily strong modern cultural sanction for absolute individual-
ism; this recognition shall prove crucial.

Now, one may find scattered throughout Durkheim's
works critical references to both the Utilitarian and Ideal-
ist-Romantic positions; we shall explore several passages
directly relevant to the second schema of suicide in Part
II of Book Three of this dissertation. Let us, now briefly
note, however, some of the few criticisms which Durkheim
permitted himself in his summary review of Rousseau's doc-

trine in his Latin dissertation Quid Secundatus politicae scientiae instituendae contulerit published in 1892 (translated by Ralph Manheim 1965). These criticisms are important for our present purposes because Rousseau combined so many different strains of thought; beginning as a republican Calvinist, he moved from the Enlightenment rationalism of the eighteenth century to the Romanticism of the nineteenth century. Hence, he mediates between all three major modern cultural traditions.   For example, Durkheim observed of Rousseau's philosophy of government that "The existence of a government is in such sharp contradiction with Rousseau's general principles of social philosophy that even the genesis of government is difficult to explain" (1965: 130). And, after noting the absence of intermediary institutions and the restriction of the "general will" to a realm of universals, Durkheim explained one of the crucial unresolved tensions in Rousseau's work in this way:

> This conception is itself a consequence of the fact that Rousseau sees only two poles of human reality, the abstract, general individual who is the agent and objective of social existence, and the concrete empirical individual who is the antagonist of all collective existence. He fails to see that, though in a certain sense these two poles are irreconcilable, the first without the second is no more than a logical fiction (1965:131).

Further, in his conclusion, after comparing and contrasting the various solutions of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau to the problem of relating absolute individualism to society and the state, Durkheim noted:

> Though the three thinkers agree that the social and the individual are dissimilar, we observe an increasing effort to root the social being in nature. But therein lies the weakness of the system. While ... social life for Rousseau is not contrary to the natral order, it has so little in common with nature that one wonders how it is possible. Rousseau says somewhere that respect for the legislator's authority presupposes a certain social spirit. But his remark applies still more to the establishment of a society. If, however, a society is formed of isolated, atomized individuals, one is at a loss to see where it comes from. Perhaps if Rousseau had granted a Hobbesian state of war we might understand why, with a view to ending it, men

should organize into a body and go so far as to recast
their original nature. But he cannot advance this ex-
planation because in his view the state of war is a re-
sult of life in common. And just as he fails to explain
how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms,
could come into being, he has great difficulty in show-
ing how it can possibly cast off its imperfections and
establish itself on a logical basis. So unstable is its
foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but
appear to us as a tottering structure whose delicate
balance can be established and maintained only by an al-
most miraculous conjunction of circumstances
(1969:137-8).

We shall also ask, in relation to anomic and egoistic sui-
cides (see Books Two and Three), whether or not the relation
between society and the absolutized individual, and the in-
ternal equilibrium within the latter, in the modern world is
not so delicate that it may be "maintained only by an almost
miraculous conjunction of circumstances."

Finally, let us recall that the first time Durkheim
used the term anomie in one of his own works it was directed
against the absolute individualism and apotheosis of the i-
magination among the Romantic artists (see also Part II,
Book Three for references to the Romantics). For the Roman-
tics (eg. see N. Frye, 1947) claimed special dispensations
for themselves; they were above rules and "normal morality."
In claiming special powers, the Romantic artists equated
divine inspiration with the individual imagination. Durk-
heim's acknowledgment of this pathology appeared in a foot-
note in the suppresed part of the introduction which Simp-
son included as an appendix to The Division of Labor.

> There is very often attributed to the aesthetico-
> moral activity a certain superiority. Now, the sen-
> timent of obligation, that is, the existence of duty,
> is in danger of being weakened in admitting that there
> is a morality, and perhaps a higher, which rests in
> the independent creations of the individual, which no
> rule determines, which is essentially anomic. We be-
> lieve, on the contrary, that anomie is the contradic-
> tion of all morality (DL:431, #21).

FOOTNOTES

BOOK ONE

#1, page 119--translation by Marsha R. and David McCloskey.

#I, pg. 146--I owe the Latin translation to Fr. James G. Goodwin, S.J., Professor of Sociology, Seattle University.

#1, pg. 164--Terry Clark (1968:88) observes how the Durkheimians also came to celebrate "periodical reunions" which generated a "veritable collective effervescence" and "collective representations."

#1, pg. 295--It is this second meaning of secularization as translation of religious symbols and ethical drives into secular spheres which underlies our Weberian insights into ethical sanctioning of the second schema of suicide which we shall construct in Book Three. Unfortunately, space does not permit a full Weberian investigation into the historical-cultural origins and development of these sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability.

#1, pg. 298--If there was one sociologist of religion best situated to discover the significance of Durkheim's notion of the primitive sacral complex, it was Robert N. Bellah, student of Parsons, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, consider the fact that in neither his 1964 article on "Religious Evolution" nor his 1973 Introduction did Bellah develop his earlier insights. It is one indication of how powerful conceptual blinders can become that even when personally presented, in 1976, with a draft copy of this chapter, Bellah still failed to comprehend the significance of Durkheim's seminal paradigm.

#1, pg. 299--Yet, to the best of my knowledge, Tiryakian has not incorporated this paradigm into his other work.

#2, pg. 299--But see Nisbet's insistence in the same work that "... it remains true that the long-range significance of Durkheim's study of religion ... is not so much developmental ... as it is what can best be described as micro-sociological" (1965:94). Nisbet hadn't changed his structural emphasis in 1974:168; yet, see 1974:170 where he again notes the evolutionary emphasis on religion, but makes little of it; all in all, a curious performance of recognition and then tossing the insight away.

#3, pg. 299--See also Aron (1967:109); Aron's ambivalency toward the Durkheimians is revealed in his critical stance throughout this volume; so that one suspects to gain a sym-

pathetic perspective from which to interpret Durkheim,
Aron comes to America and views Durkheim through Parsons'
eyes. Thus, to a large measure, both Durkheim and Weber
were favorably mediated to their respective countrymen
through Parsons' reconstruction in his The Structure of
Social Action.

#4, pg. 299--See also Stanner (1967:219), who, true to the
neo-functionalism of anthropology, neglects Durkheim's
genetic-evolutionary emphasis."Fundamentally, it was the
failure to break with historicism that prevented the pro-
position from emerging clearly as one of identity [of
religious and social thought]" (1967:221).

#5, pg. 299--See also Poggi (1971:242) "Religion was ... not
just one institution among others, but rather the para-
digm, the matrix, and ultimate support of all institu-
tions." Also, Poggi sums up the Durkheimian relationship
between religion and other institutions in this way: "Re-
ligion is the paradigmatic, proto-, and meta-institution"
(1971:250).

#1, pg. 300--Although clearly sensitive to Durkheim's general
evolutionary perspective, LaCapra felt constrained to re-
interpret (eg. 1972:107-117) Durkheim's theses in terms
of Mauss, Levi-Strauss, and Victor Turner. Significantly,
LaCapra cited as evidence rather obscure and previously
untranslated material, rather than from classics such as
The Division of Labor, L'Annee preface, or The Elementary
Forms. Apparently, this prime translated material had be-
come so burdened over the years with obfuscatory secon-
dary interpretations that it became almost impossible to
recover the full meaning of Durkheim's paradigm. The
problem lies not with the paradigmatic text but with our
distorting secondary filters.

#1, pg. 301--Significantly, both Giddens and Lukes, surely
two of the most sensitive and prolific recent reinterpre-
ters of Durkheim's work, addressed the problem of the
generic and genetic role of religion in Durkheim's
thought without bothering to formulate his central para-
digm.

#2, pg. 301--Yet, once again, in several chapters devoted to
Durkheim's methodology, Smelser neglects Durkheim's fusion
of his generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches in his
seminal paradigm of the primitive sacral complex.

#3, pg. 301--Positively, it speaks well for the now well-docu-
mented objectivity of Durkheim's model. Negatively, it
reflects badly on the inherent discontinuity, the built-
in loss, in the development of sociological theory. For
even when the model is recovered by one, they lose it;
without a full statement legitimating this model by a

contemporary leader in the discipline, the idea shall
continue to languish.

#4, 301--I call this sadly inevitable process the "routini-
zation of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974), and
apply it to Durkheim's notion of anomie as another para-
digmatic case (see appendix).

#1, 303--Horton has also wondered "why this striking aspect
of Durkheim's sociology of ideas has been so neglected
by posterity." It is a problem for the sociology of know-
ledge, and cultural processes.

#1, 309--When Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary emphases drop
from view, or are collapsed into his generic analyses of
religion, it appears that religion would have argued for
a return to primitive religion; but, as we shall see,
Durkheim viewed this situation as highly repressive.

#1, 315--There was a certain ambivalence toward repressive
religious law even in Durkheim's early phase. For the
positivists, the irrationalities of traditional society
were, of course, bad. But because Durkheim also postulat-
ed the need for moral discipline of the pre-social ego,
the repressiveness of primitive religion had a positive
evolutionary value. For religious rules attached the ego,
as Weber also noted, to a "cosmos of obligations."

#2, 315--Sheleff's argument does not impress me, largely, be-
cause he lacks recognition of the "nuclear" or paradigm-
atic structure of Durkheim's thought.

#1, 317--The crucial fact to recognize is that structural
differentiation and cultural transformation are not ne-
cessarily correlated. The archaic empires also were dom-
inated by sacro-magical collective structures of con-
science and consciousness (see Nelson, 1973a). Indeed,
such large scale empires (eg. advanced horticultural so-
cieties or agrarian empires) serve as the fullest expres-
sions of this structure of conscience.

#1, 321--Much of the work of the Annee circle focussed on
the primitive sacral complex and its cultural creativity
and evolutionary centrality; see, for eg. Honigsheim,
1960. In many ways, this literature remains unexplored.

#1, 326--See also Tiryakian (1964) for a discussion of this
neglected but important article.

#2, 326--A full-scale review of this literature would be fas-
cinating; for a check-list, see Honigsheim (1960).

#1, 341--Implied in Durkheim's notion of progressive cultur-
al evolution and societal differentiation was seculariza-

tion and the growing autonomy of spheres of life and persons. This evolutionary view implies that religion too has become differentiated from the other main societal and cultural forms in which it was formerly embedded. To the positivists religion was something to be overcome; but cannot religionists also take certain heart from this process? For if everything else is allowed to take on its own special nature, freed from sacral control, then does it not follow also that religion is freed to take on its own special nature?

#1, 342--Parsons' sleight-of-hand in inserting an "ultimate, non-empirical reference" as implied in Durkheim's sociology of religion was nothing short of remarkable; even more surprising, no one called him on it. See Parsons (1949).

#1, 364--In the original plan, this dissertation contained a systematic introduction to the methodology of interpreting cultural traditions; space limitations forced its deletion. However, for some references, see Parts I and II, Book Three.

#1, 395--See Frye, 1947:352 .

BOOK TWO

DURKHEIM'S FIRST SCHEMA OF SUICIDE

Synopsis. Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolve around
the problem of locating egoism and insatiable desires. I pro-
pose that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the
notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern
suicides, to the insight that anomie and egoisme are generat-
ed by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions.
Hence, absence/presence is the fundamental axis of this dis-
sertation; we shall explore each of these possibilities in
the following two Books.

In Part I of Book Two, we shall explore Durkheim's
first schema of suicide. This schema presumes absence of mor-
al constraint over the desires of the organic ego in the mod-
ern transitional crisis. This schema rests on Durkheim's doc-
tine of man as homo duplex; thus, both anomie and egoisme im-
ply the release of the inherently egocentric and insatiable
passions from the traditional moral discipline. Another key
to Durkheim's schemas was his evolutionary framework. Thus,
modern "moral anarchy" contrast with altruisme and fatalisme
in traditional societies. Altruisme and fatalisme represent
the repressive discipline of "mechanical solidarity" which
keeps the ego's passions in rigid check.

The first two polar types--egoisme versus altruisme--
connote self versus group primacy. Altruisme refers to the
primitive, archaic, or traditional society in which the in-
dividual is made to feel morally obligated to sacrifice him-
self for the welfare of his group. Altruisme is used by Durk-
heim as a visible, objective index revealing the inner nature
of the social bond of archaic societies, that is, of the in-
ter-dependence found in "mechanical solidarity." By contrast,

egoisme refers to the state of "moral anarchy" in the contemporary transitional era in which there is no effective moral discipline over the infinite passions of the organic ego. Analogously, fatalisme implies passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate, while anomie implies the release of the insatiable desires of the organic ego.

However, it should be noted that the weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acts merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of the inherent egoism and insatiability of the organic ego. Thus, we must distinguish between two phases in the origin of anomie and egoisme--breakdown and breakthrough. Durkheim's central concern was not so much with the breakdown of norms as with the breakthrough or eruption of an "infinity of dreams and desires." Thus, even in the first schema, the basic problem is not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the presence of destructive egocentric passions.

In Part II of Book Three we shall explore Durkheim's explanations of the causes of the modern crisis, and his remedies. Now, anomie and egoisme are historically specific; they represent not so much the generic breakdown of social order and control (Parsons' "Hobbesian dilemma") as the release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Anomie and egoisme stand as objective, outward indices of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the transitional era, prior to the full institutionalization of "moral individualism" and "organic solidarity." To curb the modern "infinity sickness," Durkheim suggested constructing social structural supports for the new type of moral individualism appropriate to emerging "organic solidarity."

The specific historical causes of the modern transitional crisis include the Industrial and French Revolutions. The rapid displacement of secondary groups in these "twin revolutions" meant that the individual is caught between the centrifugal pull of his own egocentric, anarchic passions on the one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of

the modern state on the other. There were too few secondary
groups standing between the central State and the lone in-
dividual to effectively moralize egos as the family, guild,
local community, and religion had once done. This malintegra-
tion not only strained the institutional structure, but also
released the egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic
ego. To remedy modern "moral anarchy," Durkheim proposed to
reconstitute professional groups as a regular part of social
life.

Proceeding chronologically, starting with his analyses
of the anomic and forced divisions of labor, we shall consid-
er Durkheim's analysis of socialism as a historically speci-
fic response to the rise of market capitalism. Finally, we
shall review his remedial proposal for increasing the "moral
mechanics" of professional groups, and the enfranchisement
of these intermediate associations on the national political
level.

PART I

ANOMIE AND EGOISME AS CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF HISTORICAL SOCIAL CONSTRAINT OVER THE ORGANIC EGO

<u>Preface</u>.   The richness of Durkheim's <u>Suicide</u> is still not fully perceived. Involved in an exceedingly complex argument, the subtlety of which is too often ignored, Durkheim first proposed that anomie and egoisme are generated by the <u>absence</u> of crucial social and cultural factors. His first schema rests on the tacit image of human nature as inherently ego-istic and insatiable, and on an evolutionary schema of the two types of solidarity found in human societies at the two ends of history. His first schema concerns the <u>breakdown</u> of effective legitimate social and cultural constraints over the unsocialized or organic ego in the modern transitional crisis, prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity." This breakdown of moral discipline releases the floods of ego-istic and insatiable passions characteristic of the pre-social half of <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u>. Egoisme and anomie, as the primary forms of the "moral anarchy" endemic to the modern world, contrast with the altruisme and fatalisme seen in primitive or archaic societies. There the "repressive" social and moral discipline of "mechanical solidarity" holds the ego's natural passions in rigid check by subordinating the individual to the fused, sa-cro-magical "collective conscience." Thus, altruisme implies active acceptance of group primacy, while fatalisme implies resignation to one's collectively assigned fate. The entire first schema is graphically summarized in Figure 4.

The first schema emphasizes the historical importance of long term structural transformations. To illuminate these we shall draw especially on <u>The</u> <u>Division</u> <u>of</u> <u>Labor</u>, <u>Socialism</u>, <u>Pro-fessional</u> <u>Ethics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Civic</u> <u>Morals</u>, among other shorter pieces.

Figure 4. Durkheim's First Schema

Axis Ia. <u>Homo</u> <u>Duplex</u>
(generic desires of
organic ego)

Axis IIa.

<u>Control   Release</u>
Axis IIIa.
Active/Passive   Active/Passive

Axis IIb.

Mechanical
Solidarity   *Altruisme/Fatalisme*

Axis Ib.

<u>Sociocultural</u>
<u>Evolution</u>

Contemporary
Transitional   *Anomie/Egoisme*
Crisis

The Future:

Organic
Solidarity   *"The Golden Mean"*
via
Corporations

To remedy these modern forms of "moral anarchy," Durkheim, contrary to some portrayals of him as a conservative primarily concerned with value consensus, order and social control, never argued for a regression back to the earlier religiously sanctioned "repressive" type of social solidarity. Such a return is neither possible nor desirable, according to Durkheim. Rather, to curb the modern "infinity sickness," Durkheim first argued that we must move forward by constructing social structural supports for the new type of "moral individualism" appropriate to emerging "organic solidarity."

By contrast, Durkheim's second implicit schema rests on the notion that anomie and egoisme are generated by the <u>presence</u> of culturally sanctioned drives for absolute individualism and "progress and perfection." To curb these "infinities of dreams and desires" is much more difficult than in the first schema, and requires more than piecemeal reforms. For such drives for autonomy and perfection lay permanently embedded in the ethos of European civilization. Such drives constitute our most distinctive virtues, as well as our vices. Now, the image of modern egoisme and anomie as generated by the <u>absence</u> of something social is the only one perceived and pursued so far by most sociologists. The discovery of the second schema may well represent a landmark in the history of sociological theory. For it shall afford us the opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to substantively link two of the master paradigms of two great pioneers of modern sociology--namely, Durkheim's <u>Suicide</u> with Weber's <u>The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism</u>.

I wish to emphasize at the outset, however, that Durkheim's masterpiece remains ambiguous at many points (see also Book Three). At no point did he attempt to summarize these schemas as I shall do. <u>Nor did he ever outline anything similar to the many other schemas that abound on reinterpreting the logic of Suicide</u> (see appendix). Therefore, the fact remains that Durkheim's underlying schemas in <u>Suicide</u> must be constructed and interpreted in accordance with the underlying

"nuclear structure" of his thought outlined in Book One. This is precisely where most previous interpretations of his typology of suicide have broken down (see, for example, Whitney Pope, 1976). We must perform both systematic "stratigraphies" and systematic "topographies." Having undertaken the first task in Book One, we now turn to take up the latter task of detailed exegesis in Book Two.

Now, although egoisme and anomie are two central concepts in Suicide, Durkheim began with neither. Instead, he spent all of Book One outlining his intentions, giving a positivist definition of suicide, arguing for a purely sociological explanation, eliminating counter-claims to causal priority (eg. psychopathic states, race, heredity, cosmic factors, imitation), defending his inverted method of considering causes before descriptions, and his use of statistics as prime sets of evidence. In over a hundred carefully argued pages, Durkheim revealed his deductive method, his positivist premises, his use of objective indices to reveal the state of the "moral life," and his characteristic method of argumentation by elimination of counter-claims (see Alpert, 1939). Durkheim began Suicide as a battling positivist. He sardonically noted that "Although sociology has been in vogue for some time ... it must be confessed that results up to this point are not really proportionate to the number of publications nor the interest which they arouse" (S:35). Of course, the present work was destined to become the most famous vindication of Durkheim's own program for this growing social science.

Durkheim's introduction provides us with a characteristic foretaste of what was to come: the seemingly strange combinations of opposing elements in his sociology such as deductive rationalism coupled with statistical empiricism, the positivist's anti-metaphysical passion for facts and "Science" coupled with the positivist's equally strong passion for social and moral reform, and so on. Indeed, as we noted at the outset, one of the very hallmarks of Durkheim's thought is the attempt to bind together seemingly contradictory elements

in a new and viable synthesis which would overcome previous
antinomies. The measure of Durkheim's greatness are these per-
vasive dialectical reconciliations. The measure of his fail-
ure is the strength of these inherent polarities, and the
drift of modern events.

Throughout Book One, Durkheim characteristically remind-
ed us of the moral fervor and deeper concern underlying that
classic of modern sociology which has become all things to all
people--Suicide. Clearly, beyond any concern for establishing
sociology as an autonomous discipline, and establishing it on
a rigorously scientific basis through systematic examination
of suicide statistics, Durkheim was engaged in both a fundamen-
tal critique of modern society and an exploration of possible
remedies for moral reconstruction. His deeper purpose was to
take the "pulse of our moral life."

> There will emerge from our study some suggestions con-
> cerning the causes of the general contemporary malad-
> justment being undergone by European societies and con-
> cerning remedies which may reduce it.... Suicide as it
> exists today is precisely one of the forms through
> which the collective affliction from which we suffer
> is transmitted; thus, it will aid us to understand it
> (S:37).

Although it may sound strange to some at first, I propose that
suicide as such was not really Durkheim's prime concern in wri-
ting his famous book on the subject. Rather, as always, Durk-
heim was a positivist moral philosopher working sociological-
ly. What he really sought to do in Suicide was to provide an ana-
tomy and critique of the two dominant forms of modern "moral
anarchy." Comparative statistics and multivariate analysis
served merely as the means, the instrument of objective exam-
ination of the collective pathologies of modern civilization.
Although important, statistics concerning differential suicide
rates served merely as Durkheim's objective means for taking
the "pulse of our moral life." And what Durkheim's statis-
tics showed was that the "moral temperature" of modern socie-
ties was dangerously low. Taking a seemingly individual phe-
nomena such as suicide, Durkheim sought not only to demonstrate
beyond question its collective basis, but also to thereby lay

bare the two halves of the modern soul.

Durkheim's argument here rested on the premise that in-
dividual pathology must be explained sociologically--that is,
in terms of collective pathology. Any adequate therapeutic,
therefore, must also be collective, if we ever hope to cure
the individual manifestations. To this end, Durkheim proceed-
ed throughout the early part of Suicide to systematically e-
liminate all non-sociological explanations of suicide, this
seemingly most solitary of all human vocations. Durkheim sum-
med up his eliminations of counter-positions in these terms:

> We have shown that for each social group there is a
> specific tendency to suicide explained neither by the
> organic-psychic constitution of individuals nor by the
> nature of the physical environment. Consequently, by
> elimination it must necessarily depend upon social cau-
> ses and be in itself a collective phenomenon(S:145).

Inverting the normal inductive sequence, Durkheim began with a
purely sociological explanation of the social causes of self-
homicide.

> Disregarding the individual as such, his motives and
> his ideas, we shall seek directly the states of the
> various social environments (ie. religion, family, po-
> litical society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms
> of which the variations of suicide occur. Only then re-
> turning to the individual, shall we study how these
> general causes become individualized so as to produce
> the homicidal results involved (S:151).

I cannot now consider Durkheim's procedure here criti-
cally from the point of view of the philosophy of science
(see Toby Huff, 1975). Suffice it to say that the socio-logic
of his procedure in the early pages of Suicide is clear--for
Durkheim began with suicide rates instead of individual suici-
dal events (see, however, Jack Douglas, 1967). Hereafter this
insistence was to become a principle of positivist sociology--
that is, sociological explanation deals with rates, not indi-
vidual occurences. Explaining the differentials in rates a-
mong different groups thus becomes a central sociological prob-
lem. On the other hand, the casual reader may become misled
if he hastily concludes from such passages that Durkheim was
insensitive to psychological issues, or that he was not con-

cerned with individual manifestations of collective patholo-
gies. For, on the contrary, the use of objective statistical
indices was simply the positivist's chosen vehicle for pass-
ing from the exterior to the interior of the "moral life."

Durkheim himself anticipated many of these potential
charges against him when he exclaimed in a footnote in Sui-
cide:

> We do not expect to be reproached further ... with
> wishing to substitute the exterior for the interior
> in sociology. We start from the exterior because it
> alone is immediately given, but only to reach the in-
> terior (S:315, #12).

Not wishing to mistake the sign for the thing signified, we
shall, of course, follow Durkheim's lead here in focussing
attention primarily not upon statistics but upon his ration-
ales in explaining the historical development of differential
rates of suicide in modern European society. [1]

CHAPTER ONE

EGOISME

Preface. One need be neither a linguist nor a Durkheim
scholar to recognize that his first suicidal types--ego-
isme and altruisme--refer primarily to self or group pri-
macy, as Parsons (1949) among others has rightly noted. For
the contrast is as old as moral philosophy itself. It is
not surprising that Durkheim, as a positivist moral philo-
sopher working sociologically, as one deeply concerned
with the "chronic" "moral anarchy" of the modern world,
began by giving this ancient dichotomy a new historical
anchor and sociocultural meaning.

Given his doctrine of the inherent egoism and insatia-
bility of human nature (see Book One), it is clear that in
his first schema Durkheim identified these two moral cate-
gories with the two opposite ends of history. Altruisme re-
ferred to the primitive, archaic, or traditional type of
society in which the individual is made to feel morally ob-
ligated to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his group.
By contrast, egoisme referred to the state of "moral anar-
chy" in the contemporary transitional or "critical" era in
which no legitimate social mechanism constrained the natu-
ral egoism and insatiable passions seemingly embedded in
the pre-socialized ego. Thus, while altruisme implies group
primacy, this legitimate precedence of the group over the
individual is historically specific. And egoisme implies
not only the precedence of the individual over the group,
but also, in historical terms, the release of the inherent-
ly egoistic passions from their traditional restraints. Ano-
mie versus fatalisme, in turn, refers to the insatiability
of modern egoistic passions, in contrast to their rigid re-
pression in archaic "mechanically integrated society."

A further comparison between the two suicidal (and societal types) at the two ends of history is that the egoismic individual suffers, in his isolation, from a lack of objects or goals for his thought or action. On the other hand, the altruistic suicide's field of moral perception is so penetrated by the sacro-magical "collective conscience" that few thoughts of his own welfare are allowed to intrude. In turn, anomic suicides suffer from the "disease of the infinite," a morbid condition caused by the release of the insatiable passions inherent in the organic half of human nature. The anomic individual's lack of limits to his "dreams and desires" is historically contrasted with the extreme passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate in fatalistic suicide. In both sets, Durkheim postulated that society, as the only moral phenomena in nature, is capable of providing the amoral individual ego with both limits and goals (see also Giddens, 1971b).

Since Durkheim saw modern egoistic suicides as resulting from the release of the amoral organic ego from traditional social constraints, his first problem was to locate the main modern structural and cultural sites of this excessive or pathological form of individualism. Thus, in his chapter on egoistic suicide, Durkheim loosely linked the following factors: Protestantism and related individualisms, free inquiry, education, the liberal professions and well-off classes, despair, and, ultimately, suicide. It is significant that Durkheim began his exploration, not with an abstracted schema, but with historical and statistical correlations of these concrete social and cultural factors. We would do well to remember that such concrete historical facts served as the empirical points of departure for Durkheim's concern with "infinity sickness" in the modern world.

After loosely correlating such facts, however, Durkheim attempted to logically demonstrate that they are only outwardly associated. Actually, he said, they merely correspond to the same root transformation--the weakening of traditional beliefs. Such a linkage is typical of Durkheim, not merely

because he attempted to demonstrate a deeper, more historical-
ly rooted causal relationship than at first apparent, but also
because Durkheim repeatedly placed himself in "double binds"
by virtue of his multiple and sometimes conflicting cultural
commitments. Caught here between his positivism, "laic morali-
ty," and anti-clerical republicanism, and his over-riding con-
cern for social solidarity, Durkheim found an acceptable way
out in terms of his own historical group--the Jews. According
to Durkheim, Jews combined love of learning, professional sta-
tus and upward mobility with high social solidarity and the
lowest suicide ratesof any religious group. Let us now examine
Durkheim's developing logic more closely.

A. Confessional Group Influence on Suicide Rates

After deciding on the basis of comparative statistics
that "confessional influence is so great as to dominate" (S:
154) all other categories, Durkheim embarked upon an analysis
of the causes behind the differences in suicide rates of the
various religious groups. At the outset, we should note Durk-
heim's curious notion, perhaps derived from his positivism or
his early "mechanistic" emphasis (see Book Three), that reli-
gious beliefs per se play little causal role in generating
the differential suicide rates between Protestant and Catholic.

> ... they both prohibit suicide with equal emphasis; not
> only do they penalize it morally with great severity,
> but both teach that a new life begins beyond the tomb
> where men are punished for their evil actions, and Pro-
> testantism as well as Catholicism numbers suicide among
> them.... If Protestantism is less unfavorable to the
> development of suicide, it is not because of a differ-
> ent attitude from that of the Catholics.... Their dis-
> similar influence must proceed from one or more of the
> general characteristics differentiating them (S:157).

But whether or not these religious groups explicitly prohibit
suicide with equal severity is hardly the point. What should
be at issue is whether, and to what extent, these different re-
ligious cultures generate tensions reaching suicidal intensity.
It does not seem too harsh or summary a judgment to note that
Durkheim's positivism, at least at this point in his career,

generally allowed him to penetrate into the role of religious
    self
images, beliefs, and sanctions only insofar as necessary to
negate the content of religion as a crucial factor. This con-
stitutes one prime difference with his great sociological con-
temporary Max Weber, who also correlated Protestantism with
distinctive features of the modern world (see Book Three). Al-
though religious prohibitions of suicide hardly exhaust the
potentially relevant contributions of religious culture to
suicide, Durkheim hastily concluded that the difference under-
lying the differential between Protestant and Catholic suicide
rates must necessarily be found in the contrasting organiza-
tions of religious society.

Especially important here are the different ways in
which these groups envelop and direct the individual. Focus-
sing on types of religious organization, Durkheim argued that
the key difference between Protestant and Catholic society is
that the former favors individualism and free inquiry, while
the latter demands obeisance to traditional hierarchical auth-
ority.

> The only essential difference between Catholicism and
> Protestantism is that the second permits free inquiry
> to a far greater extent than the first. Of course, Ca-
> tholicism as an idealistic religion concedes far great-
> er place to thought and reflection than Greco-Latin
> polytheism or Hebrew monotheism. It is not restricted
> to mechanical ceremonies but seeks the control of the
> conscience. So it appeals to conscience, and even when
> demanding blind submission of reason, does so by employ-
> ing the language of reason. Nonetheless, the Catholic
> accepts his faith ready made, without scrutiny.... A
> whole hierarchical system of authority is devised, with
> marvellous ingenuity, to render tradition inviolable.
> All variation is abhorrent to Catholic thought (S:157-8).

Obviously, Catholic hierocratic control of the individual con-
science represented to Durkheim a survival of "repressive,
mechanical solidarity." Hardly concealing his anti-clerical,
"laic" morality, Durkheim noted that, by contrast, because the
Protestant is more "the author of his own faith," that the lat-
ter religion more closely corresponds with the type of indivi-
dualism appropriate to advanced types of social solidarity.

> The Protestant is far more the author of his faith.
> The Bible is put in his hand and no interpretation is
> imposed upon him. The very structure of the reformed
> cult stresses this state of religious individualism.
> ... What best proves that this freedom of inquiry pro-
> claimed by the founders of the Reformation has not re-
> mained a Platonic affirmation is the increasing multi-
> plicity of all sorts of sects so strikingly in contrast
> with the indivisible unity of the Catholic Church.
> We thus reach our first conclusion, that the proclivi-
> ty of Protestantism must relate to the spirit of free
> inquiry that animates this religion (S:158).

While granting a certain truth to Durkheim's argument, we need
not also acquiesce to some of the more questionable tacit pre-
suppositions here--especially the notions that the Reformation
leaders valued free inquiry for its own sake, or that free and
open public discourse and a sort of Enlightenment rationalistic
individualism equally pervades all Protestant denominations to-
day.

Durkheim's general law of societal and moral evolution--
that the autonomy of the individual person emerges with pro-
gressive societal differentiation and rationalization (see Book
One)--governs the next twist in his argument. For he proposed
that the need for free inquiry arises out of the breakdown of
traditional beliefs. Or, differently put, the erosion of the
all-embracing certainties provided by the shared sacro-magical
conscience of early culture requires the constant interven-
tion of critical intelligence. The progressive "effacement of
the segmental type of society" requires the individual to in-
creasingly assume responsibility for his own conduct, since
past directive norms, so often mechanically invoked, become
irrelevant to complex, changing circumstances.

> Free inquiry is only the effect of another cause. When
> it appears that men, after having received their faith
> ready-made from tradition, claim the right to shape it
> for themselves, this is not because of the intrinsic
> desirability of free inquiry, for the latter involves
> as much sorrow as happiness. It is because men hence-
> forth need this liberty. This very need can have only
> one cause: the overthrow of traditional beliefs (S:158).

Thus, Durkheim assumed that modern Protestant man has had this
individualism thrust upon him by historical necessity.

Now, I have argued for recognition of the significance
of Durkheim's ideas concerning the evolution of morality, of
conscience and consciousness (see Book One). That social dif-
ferentiation and autonomization of the person proceed togeth-
er on the world-historical level is a profound insight. How-
ever, it is, at most, a necessary, though insufficient, com-
plementary perspective to the far more difficult Weberian
task of detailed digging into the specific transformations
generating new forms of autonomy for the person. Of course,
the Reformation, and especially its secularized aftermath,
was one of those crucial transformations that rose to world-
historical significance. Hence, we ask: even granting that
the structural origin of the need for individual free inquiry
might be the recession of traditional beliefs, what new sour-
ces of legitimate moral authority broke through this heavy
and ancient tradition? It is this notion of specific histor-
ical breakthroughs that is so often conspicuous by its ab-
sence from Durkheim's evolutionary outlook (see also Book
Three). Surely no devout "laic" moralist like Durkheim would
admit, for instance, that the Catholic Church, to this day
the predominant congregation in France, simply rolled over
and acquiesced in the historical inevitability demanded by
the progressive division of social labor. On the contrary,
it was the very tenacity of this cultural tradition in France
in face of the centuries-long opposition from Huguenots, Jan-
senists, Enlightenment "philosophes," "laic" reformers, lib-
erals, socialists, Marxists, and so forth, that makes the
French tradition so tempestuous and anti-clerical. Unfortun-
ately, Durkheim's positivism and abstracted evolutionism--
themselves reflections of the process he sought to under-
stand--barred access here to analyses of specific historical
challenges to traditional religious legitimations of embedded
social structures.

> If they [traditional beliefs] still asserted themselves
> with equal energy, it would never occur to men to criti-
> cize them. If they still had the same authority, men
> would not demand the right to verify the source of this

authority. Reflection develops only if its development
becomes imperative, if certain ideas and instinctive
sentiments which have hitherto adequately guided con-
duct are found to have lost their efficacy. <u>Then re-
flection intervenes to fill the gap that has appeared,
but which it has not created.</u> Just as reflection dis-
appears to the extent that thought and action take the
form of automatic habits, <u>it awakens only when accepted
habits become disorganized.</u> It asserts its rights a-
gainst public opinion only when the latter loses
strength, that is, when it is no longer prevalent to
the same extent. If these assertions occur not merely
occasionally and as passing crises, but become chronic;
<u>if individual consciences keep reaffirming their auto-
nomy, it is because they are constantly subject to con-
flicting impulses, because a new opinion has not formed
to replace the old one no longer existing.</u> If a new sys-
tem of beliefs were constituted which seemed as indis-
pensable as the old, no one would think of discussing it
any longer. Its discussion would no longer be permitted;
for ideas shared by an entire society draw from this
consensus an authority that makes them sacrosanct and
raises them above dispute. For them to have become tol-
erant, they must first already have become the object
of less general and complete assent and have been weak-
ened by preliminary controversy * (S:158-9).

To be sure, there are many valuable insights into sociocul-
tural change in this passage. However, one detects beneath
the surface Durkheim's strongly positivist premises--namely,
the rationalistic belief that the use of individual reason,
as a substitute for tradition and collective control, emer-
ges to serve as an evolutionary "need" mechanically created
(see also Book Three). One cannot help feeling ambivalent
toward Durkheim's summary statement here:

... if it is correct to say that free inquiry once pro-
claimed, multiplies schisms, it must be added that it
presupposes them, for it is claimed and instituted as a
principle only in order to permit latent or half-de-
clared schisms to develop more freely (S:159).

Such theses may accurately describe the historical situation
in France; however, the complexities and paradoxes of complex
sociocultural processes lead me to begin to part company with
Durkheim here.

Durkheim's generalized propositions are next applied to
the specific problem of explaining the root reasons for the
differential in Protestant-Catholic suicide rates.

... if Protestantism concedes a greater freedom to in-
dividual thought than Catholicism, it is because it has
fewer common beliefs and practices. Now, a religious so-
ciety cannot exist without a collective credo and the
more extensive the credo the more unified and strong is
the society. For it does not unite men by an exchange
and reciprocity of services, a temporal bond of union
which permits and even presupposes differences, but
which religious society cannot form. It socializes men
only by attaching them completely to an identical body
of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as this
body of doctrine is extensive and firm.... The greater
concessions a confessional group makes to individual
judgment, the less it dominates lives, the less its co-
hesion and vitality. We thus reach the first conclusion
that the superiority of Protestantism with respect to
suicide results from its being a less strongly integra-
ted church than the Catholic Church * (S:159).

Again, Durkheim presumed that there are two main types of so-

cial solidarity: one based on a segmental society sharing an

obligatory sacro-magical culture, and the modern complex type

based upon occupational differentiation. Hence, there are two

distinct historical paths to societal unity: the "repressive"

type fused together through religious obligations, and the

"liberal" modern type linked through occupational diversifi-

cation and the market place as nexus. Further, he presumed

that the more the individual is released from the repressive

control of the archaic, fused conscience (represented by the

Catholic Church as an evolutionary holdover in the modern

era, especially in France), the less cohesion and vitality

in religious society. But such an explanation has certain

embedded flaws (eg. see Parsons, 1949). For one can hardly

believe that the modern social order is devoid of legitimi-

zing ethical foundations. Perhaps this is why Parsons, sensi-

tized to these problems by Weber, continued to insist on the

central importance of Durkheim's chapter on "Contractual Sol-

idarity" (eg. see Parsons, 1960a). Clearly, Parsons believed

that "contractual solidarity" is normatively underpinned by

the Protestant Ethos. And Durkheim appears to confuse organ-

izational diversity with religio-cultural unity; but these

are not necessarily congruent. To assert, for instance, that

Protestant organizational diversity (always a problematic

situation), was responsible for the emergence of modern reli-
gious individualism runs counter to the generally accepted
historical explanation that it was the "Protestant principle"
itself which underlay the increasing diversity of Protestant
denominations (eg. see Richard Niebuhr, 1929, William Haller,
1955).

Let us compare Durkheim's generalizations to those of
Weber on the same subject. It is not certain, for instance,
as Durkheim stated, that "The greater concessions a confession-
al group makes to individual judgment, the less it dominates
lives." For this abstract proposition, derived from Durk-
heim's general evolutionary schemas, neglects the crucial
historical fact that was so significant to Weber--namely,
that the "inner-worldly ascetic" of the Protestant sects re-
presented a New Model Man in world history--the secular monk
who tamed himself and the world for God's glory. The splin-
tered denominationalism of Protestantism was not the most
significant fact to Weber; rather, it was the creation of a
new rationalizing, individualistic order of lay ascetics and
mystics whose emerging ethos, when progressively secularized
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, trans-
formed the traditional social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic order. Thus, the very core of Weber's theses run coun-
ter to Durkheim's here; the latter's abstracted propositions
concerning the recession of the archaic common conscience and
the release of the organic ego are no match for the former's
historical insight that with Protestantism a new type of in-
depth integration of the personality and internalization of
sociocultural values was reached. Against Tawney and others,
Parsons rightly insisted in The Structure of Social Action
that Protestantism represented not simply the release of the
individual from traditional control, but also the imposition
and internalization of a new and even more rigorous type of
moral discipline and social control. And so significant are
these ethical sanctions for "inner-worldly asceticism," that
Parsons added, echoing Rousseau, this enforced freedom--this
absolute individualism and unending drive for perfection--may

have become too great a burden for some to bear.

Now, Weber argued that Catholicism never penetrated the personality structure the way Protestantism did (eg. 1963). While Durkheim's suggestion that Protestantism implies weakness in modern religious organization may seem warranted because its splintered denominationalism repels centralized control, nonetheless, it also neglects other important factors. For only in liberal Protestantism is there found the type of rationalistic or liberated individual Durkheim appears to have had in mind. In fundamentalist Protestantism there is neither the pervasive rationalism nor the weak organizational structure. Indeed, many conservative sects impose extremes of social discipline and mutual watchfulness that might repel a Catholic. In addition, the lack of central monocratic religious control does not allow one to summarily conclude, with Durkheim here, that religions "socialize men only by attaching them completely to an identical body of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as this body of doctrine is extensive and firm." While this may be true in Durkheim's evolutionary schema of archaic religion, such a proposition is manifestly not true of modern religion, for example in America, the most resolutely Protestant nation of the "Protestant Era." The absence of an established national church, and extreme denominational diversity, may simply mask an underlying religio-cultural unity, as in in America. Indeed, Weber (1973) himself observed that Protestantism in America pervades almost all aspects of life, and comes closest here to be a true "folk religion" in the sense of being tacitly shared as a common tradition by all.

Clearly, then, Durkheim's preliminary propositions concerning correlations between centrality of religious control and degree of religious penetration of society and personality are questionable. We must, therefore, regard with suspicion his first conclusion that the "superiority of Protestantism with respect to suicide results from its being a less strongly integrated church than the Catholic." For if egoisme, Protestantism, and suicide are linked, as Durkheim

proposed, it must be for other reasons than that "men kill
themselves because of loss of cohesion in religious society."

B.   The Anomaly of the Jews: High Intellectualism and
        Low Suicide Rates

        Durkheim next considered the seemingly anomalous case
of the Jews, who combined low rates of suicide with high in-
tellectual achievement, professional status, upward mobility,
and high economic achievement. As always, Jews appeared to
out-Protestant the Protestants! However, Durkheim proceeded
to detect here precisely the same factor protecting Jews
from suicide that appeared to account for the Protestant
proclivity--namely, social integration.

> ... the reproach to which the Jews have for so long
> been exposed by Christianity has created feelings of
> unusual solidarity among them. Their need for resist-
> ing a general hostility, the very impossibility of free
> communication with the rest of the population, has for-
> ced them into strict union with themselves. Consequent-
> ly, each community became a small, compact, and coher-
> ent society with strong feelings of self-consciousness
> and unity.... The Jewish church has thus been more
> strongly united than any other, from its dependence on
> itself because of being the object of intolerance. By
> analogy with what has just been observed apropos of
> Protestantism, the same cause must therefore be assum-
> ed for the slight tendency of the Jews to suicide....
> Doubtless they owe this immunity to the hostility sur-
> rounding them. But if this is its influence, it is not
> because it imposes a higher morality but because it o-
> bliges them to live in greater union (S:159-60).

Faced with the same intervening variable in both Protestan-
tism and Judaism, Durkheim was here forced to explain how
this same factor yet arises from different sources. Like We-
ber, then, for analytical purposes Durkheim used Jews as an
internal check. For while Jews share high intellectualism
with Protestant groups, Durkheim discovered that the crucial
differentiating factor between these two religious groups
having the highest and lowest suicide rates in Europe was
the varying degree of social integration. Durkheim argued
that the ostracism to which Jews were subjected in Christian
Europe reinforced the traditional "mechanical integration"

of Judaism as an earlier religio-cultural system.

> Besides, the ostracism to which they are subject is
> only one of the causes producing this result; the very
> nature of Jewish beliefs must contribute largely to it.
> Judaism, in fact, like all early religions, consists
> basically of a body of practices minutely governing all
> the details of life and leaving little room to indivi-
> dual judgment (S:160).

Now, as a "laicized" Jew, Durkheim noted that Judaism,
in combining modern rationalistic individualism and ancient
social solidarity, seems singularly free of the "diseases of
the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Certainly, it ap-
pears that Durkheim himself was free of these collective
pathologies; for his philosophy of "human finitude" (LaCapra,
1972) and the "golden mean" (see Book Three) as the norm for
health and happiness rendered him immune. But one wonders
whether other "laicized" Jews equally escaped, for it is un-
certain how far Judaism as a sociocultural system retreats
as Judaism as a religion recedes from the foreground of per-
sonal concern. In any case, in the following explanation of
Jewish intellectualism, note how much Durkheim's tacit "laic"
positivist rationalism intrudes, going so far as to slight
the crucial role of the Law and the rabbi in Jewish tradi-
tion; factors impossible for Durkheim not to be aware of,
coming as he did from a long line of rabbis!

> The Jew seeks to learn, not in order to replace his
> collective prejudices by reflective thought, but mere-
> ly in order to be better armed for the struggle. For
> him it is a means of off-setting the unfavorable posi-
> tion imposed on him by opinion and sometimes by law.
> And since knowledge by itself has no influence upon a
> tradition in full vigor, he superimposes this intellec-
> tual life upon his habitual routine with no effect of
> the former upon the latter. This is the reason for the
> complexity he presents. Primitive in certain respects,
> in others he is an intellectual and man of culture. He
> thus combines the advantages of the severe discipline
> characteristic of small and ancient groups with the
> benefits of the intense culture enjoyed by our great so-
> cieties. He has all the intelligence of modern man with-
> out sharing his despair * (S:168).

Thus, in terms of their similarities--high intellectualism,
achievement, and upward mobility--Jews differ from Protest-

tants in the historical conditions generating their respec-
tive desires for learning. Here "the exception proves the rule,"
for, in contrast to Judaism as a traditional "pariah reli-
gion," Protestants are forced to think for themselves be-
cuase of the breakdown of previous traditional normative
direction, according to Durkheim. Indeed, the case of the
Jews, Durkheim suggested:

> ... proves that if the suicidal tendency is great in
> educated circles, this is due, as we have said, to the
> weakening of traditional beliefs and to the state of
> moral individualism resulting from this; for it disap-
> pears when education has another cause and responds to
> other needs (S:168).

In addition, Durkheim held it as axiomatic that the higher
the intellectual life, professionalization, and upward mo-
bility, the greater the affliction by "diseases of the in-
finite."

> The liberal professions and in a wider sense, the well-
> to-do classes are certainly those with the liveliest
> taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual
> life.... Suicide is undeniably exceptionally frequent
> in the highest classes of society (S:165).

C. Suicide Increases With Knowledge: An Apparent Correlation

But Durkheim was faced with another problem: if sui-
cide generally increases with higher intellectualism, are we
then to conclude that greater knowledge itself is the cause?
Let us first summarize Durkheim's causal linkages so far. His
proposed sequence, at this point, goes like this: the uni-
versal social division of labor, ramifying occupational spe-
cialization, and the accompanying progressive social differ-
entiation, coupled with the corresponding "effacement of the
segmental type of society," and the accompanying recession
of the fused, sacro-magical collective conscience, means that
the individual ego is thrown back on its resources. The re-
sult of the erosion of traditional moral and social supports
is that the individual must, of necessity, bring his own ca-
pacity for reasoning to bear upon the mounting problems of
existence in complex society (see also Chapter Eight, Book

One); this was part of Durkheim's notion of the increasing substitution of individual rational consciousness for archaic collective consciousness. And, in turn, the exercise of individual reason acts a further solvent of traditional mores, and thereby increases the need for further self-education, in a reenforcing feedback process.

But the problematics inherent in Durkheim's symbolic equations that individual rational consciousness necessarily substitutes for the narrow and automatic dictates of the earlier conscience collective are revealed in this passage:

> Does the craving for knowledge to the degree that it corresponds to a weakening of common faith really develop as does suicide? The very facts that Protestants are better educated and commit suicide more than Catholics is a first presumption for this (S:164).

But, having seemed to have made the link between the educated intelligence of modern man and the type of modern despair which may lead to suicide, Durkheim took pains--as a post-Enlightenment liberal--to exonerate free inquiry and the individual quest for rational knowledge from blame in eroding social solidarity. We shall further investigate the inner nature of this apparent correlation in Book Three.

> The taste for free inquiry can be aroused only if accompanied by that for learning. Knowledge is free thought's only means of achieving its purposes. When irrational beliefs or practices have lost their hold, appeal must be made, in the search for others, to the enlightened consciousness of which knowledge is only the highest form. Fundamentally, these two tendencies are one and spring from the same source. Men generally have the desire for self-instruction only insofar as they are freed from the yoke of tradition; for as long as the latter governs intelligence it is all sufficient and jealous of any rival. On the other hand, light is sought as soon as customs whose origins are lost in obscurity no longer correspond to new necessities. This is why philosophy, the first synthetic form of knowledge, appears as soon as religion has lost its sway, and only then; and is then followed progressively by the many single sciences with the further development of the very need which produced philosophy. Unless we are mistaken, if the progressive weakening of collective and customary prejudices produces a trend to suicide, and if Protestantism derives its special predisposition to suicide from it, the following two facts should be

> noted: (1) the desire for learning must be stronger a-
> mong Protestants than among Catholics; (2) insofar as
> this denotes a weakening of common beliefs, it should
> vary with suicide (S:162).

And, of course, Durkheim's rule by which he rescued his cho-
sen cause is apparently confirmed by his statistics on dif-
ferences in popular education in Europe. It is striking that
both Durkheim and Weber utilized in their classics educa-
tional differentials between Protestants and Catholics as
supporting evidence for their theses.

> ... the level of primary instruction ... has a certain
> relevance to the extent of the desire for knowledge of
> a people as a whole. A people must feel this need very
> keenly to try to spread its elements among the lowest
> classes. Thus to place the means of learning within
> everyone's reach, and even to legally forbid ignorance,
> shows a national awareness of the indispensability of
> broadened and enlightened intelligence of the indivi-
> dual for the nation's own existence (S:163).

However, Durkheim's Enlightenment rationalism again in-
trudes on historical reality. Indeed, Durkheim himself knew
better, as he admitted in the following aside: "Actually,
Protestant nations have so stressed primary instruction be-
cause they held that each individual must be able to under-
stand the Bible" (S:163). This curious (and accurate) admis-
sion highlights Durkheim's underestimation of the signifi-
cance of the internal logics of different historical reli-
gio-cultural systems. Indeed, Durkheim's causal theses here
reveal more about his own core cultural commitments than a-
bout the original problem. Durkheim's explanations are them-
selves culture-bound. The goal of these "laic" reforming in-
tellectuals and public moralists was to wrest the schools
away from clerical control, especially that of the Jesuits,
and to inculcate there a new anti-metaphysical, rational,
and "laic" morality (eg. see Henri Peyre, 1960;. H. Tint,
1957; J.E.S. Hayward, 1960; LaCapra, 1972; Lukes, 1973). The
crux of their effort centered around building "... a nation-
al awareness of the indispensability of broadened and enlight-
ened intelligence of the individual for the nation's own ex-
istence."

Having reviewed the logic of Durkheim's argument so far, let us briefly summarize the empirical conclusions deriving from the evidence he had so carefully marshalled from generations of work in European "moral statistics" (see Jack Douglas, 1966; A. Giddens, 1965; Toby Huff, 1975). First, statistics showed that suicide was chronic and increasingly general in the modern era. Second, by almost all accounts, suicide is symptomatic of a basic breakdown in social and cultural solidarity. Third, Protestants appeared to have had the highest suicide rate of the three major European religious congregations; Jews had the lowest rate. Fourth, one of the distinguishing features of Protestantism, as contrasted with Catholicism, is the taste for free inquiry and rationalistic individualism. Fifth, the urban, educated, well-to-do classes have the highest suicide rates; for some reason, it appears that "poverty protects against suicide"! Sixth, although Jews share high intellectualism with Protestants, their love of learning derives from other historical necessities than is true of their more modern counterparts.

Now, true to his own special positivistic cultural commitments, Durkheim began to try to extricate himself from a potential difficulty implied in the preceding empirical conclusions. For he next argued that although the quest for knowledge and its highest form, modern science, are nominally associated with higher suicide rates, the apparent correlation is not causally significant. Indeed, according to Durkheim, far from reason and the individual representing the pathological agents, they are, on the contrary, the only real means of remedying European "moral anarchy."

> ... we see why as a rule suicide increases with knowledge. Knowledge does not determine this progress. It is innocent; nothing is more unjust than to accuse it, and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively. But these two facts result simultaneously from a single state which they translate into different forms. Man seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss of cohesion in religious society; he does not kill himself because of his learning. It is ... not the learning

he acquires that disorganizes religion; but the desire
for learning awakens because religion became disorgani-
zed. Knowledge is not sought as a means to destroy ac-
cepted opinions but because their destruction has com-
menced.... Faith is not uprooted by dialectic proof; it
must be already shaken by other causes to be unable to
withstand the shock of argument * (S:168-9).

Thus, Durkheim suggested that education and suicide are indi-
rectly correlated with a deeper transformation of European
society: the fading of "mechanical solidarity" and the lack
of any new and compelling order to replace it. In this situa-
tion of "collective asthenia," the ego has been thrown out,
alone, on its meager resources. If the isolated individual is
to survive the birth pangs of the modern world, his reflec-
tive intelligence must play an ever larger role in existence.

At this point, the outline of Durkheim's first schema
of suicide is unfolding fairly clearly: as the common con-
science of archaic societies recedes before the pressure of
the progressive division of labor, the pre-social ego is re-
leased from traditional forms of social constraint and must
confront the world on its own inadequate terms. As an ardent
positivist and post-Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim issued
an eloquent defense of the importance of knowledge and sci-
ence in the evolving social order, especially against Catho-
lics on the conservative right who trumpeted, in effect,
"look what has happened--we told you so!"

Far from knowledge being the source of the evil, it is
its remedy, the only remedy we have. Once established
beliefs have been carried away by the current of af-
fairs, they cannot be artificially reestablished. Once
the social instinct is blunted, intelligence is the
only guide left us and we have to reconstruct a con-
science by its means. Dangerous as is the undertaking,
there can be no hesitation, for we have no choice. Let
those who view anxiously and sadly the ruins of an-
cient beliefs, who feel all the difficulties of these
critical times, not ascribe to science an evil it has
not caused but rather which it tries to cure! Beware
of treating it as an enemy! It has not the dissolvent
effect ascribed to it, but is the only weapon for our
battle against the dissolution which gives birth to
science itself. It is not an answer to denounce it. The
authority of vanished traditions will never be restored
by silencing it; we shall only be more powerless to re-
place them (S:169).

Durkheim concluded his first chapter on egoistic sui-
cide by reiterating his arguments concerning the importance
of social cohesion in preventing suicides. His next task was
to begin to spell out some of the reasons why loss of social
cohesion or low social integration should lead to suicide.
Characteristically, his explanation was a good deal more sub-
tle than the common summaries or reductions. Noting that "in
general, religion has a prophylactic effect on suicide,"
Durkheim contended that:

> If religion protects man against the desire for self-
> destruction, it is not because it preaches the respect
> for his own person to him with arguments sui generis;
> but because it is a society. What constitutes this so-
> ciety is the existence of a certain number of beliefs
> and practices common to all the faithful, traditional,
> and thus obligatory. The more numerous and strong these
> collective states of mind are, the stronger the inte-
> gration of the religious community, and also the great-
> er its preservative value. The detail of dogmas and
> rites are secondary. The essential thing is that they
> be capable of supporting a sufficiently intense collec-
> tive life. And because the Protestant church has less
> consistency than the others, it has less moderating ef-
> fect on suicide * (S:170).

D. Egoisme as Lack of Social Integration

Durkheim next proceeded to explore further empirical
evidence that egoistic suicide results from loss of cohesion
in society. Specifically, he argued that the greater the de-
gree of integration of domestic and political society, the
greater their "coefficient of preservation." Of course, he
was heading for his famous summary that "Suicide varies in-
versely with the degree of integration in society." Let us
briefly explore Durkheim's causal propositions in chapter
three of Book Two.

> But if religion preserves men from suicide only because
> and insofar as it is a society, other societies proba-
> bly have the same effect. From this point of view, let
> us consider the family and political society (S:171).

As always, Durkheim's discussion is complex, and not without
some problems. I personally do not think that Durkheim's ex-
amples concerning domestic society, for instance, serve as

the best illustrations of his theses. For Durkheim's doc-
trines concerning marriage and womanhood are often inconsis-
tent; indeed, Barclay Johnson (1965:881) has suggested that
"So muddled and fluctuating a doctrine must have been made up
as circumstances required, quite after the fact." Barbara
Cashion (1970) also has been critical of Durkheim's implied
sociology of women. However, Cashion rightly emphasizes the
significance of the notion of insatiability underlying Durk-
heim's discussion. She observed that, to Durkheim, the pos-
sibility of divorce--which meant the opening up of potential-
ly unlimited emotional and sexual horizons--itself contribu-
ted to matrimonial anomie. Indeed, Cashion proposed that as
women become more liberated, they may also become as vulner-
able to anomie as men. With changing sex roles, "open mar-
riage," more divorces than marriages, and so on, Cashion
makes part of Durkheim's sociology of the family and marriage
look prescient when she concludes: "The roots of future mari-
tal anomie may be found in the decreasing responsibilities
and limitations of the marriage partners, and the increasing
wealth and freedom of the partners" (1970:78).

In any case, Durkheim chose domestic society as simply
another empirical confirmation of his basic thesis concerning
the importance of social integration. In these terms, the
following passage is one of Durkheim's most cogent statements
of the sociological principles governing the "laws" of the
"coefficient of preservation" in society, whether domestic,
political, or religious.

> The density of a group cannot sink without its vitality
> diminishing. Where collective sentiments are strong, it
> is because the force with which they affect each indi-
> vidual conscience is echoed in all the others, and re-
> ciprocally. The intensity they attain therefore depends
> on the number of consciences which react to them in com-
> mon.... Consequently, in a family of small numbers, com-
> mon sentiments and memories cannot be very intense; for
> there are not enough consciences in which they can be
> represented and reinforced by sharing them. No such pow-
> erful traditions can be formed there as unite the members
> of a single group, even surviving it and attaching suc-
> cessive generations to one another. Small families are
> also inevitably short-lived; and without duration no so-

> ciety can be stable. Not only are collective states weak
> in such a group, but they cannot be numerous; for their
> number depends on the active interchange of views and
> impressions, on the circulation of these views and im-
> pressions from one person to another; and, on the other
> hand, this very exchange is the more rapid the more per-
> sons there are participating in it. In a sufficiently
> dense society, this circulation is uninterrupted; for
> some social units are always in contact, whereas if there
> are few their relations can only be intermittent and
> there will be moments when the common life is suspended.
> Likewise, when the family is small, few relatives are
> ever together; so that domestic life languishes, and the
> home is occasionally deserted * (S:201-2).

Essentially, Durkheim proposed here that higher rates of sus-
tained interpersonal interaction act to create and sustain
both society and individuals. Hence, any factor that serves
to bind people more closely together through time and space,
that acts to increase the longevity and intensity of social
interaction, increases the "coefficient of preservation."
Thus, group process serves as Durkheim's first analytical key.
What remains to be explained, however, as too many sociolo-
gists have ignored, is why Durkheim thought lessened social
interaction and integration should lead to suicide.

> But for a group to be said to have less common life
> than another means that it is less powerfully integra-
> ted; for the state of integration of a social aggregate
> can only reflect the intensity of the collective life
> circulating in it. It is more unified and powerful the
> more active and constant is the intercourse among its
> members. Our previous conclusion may thus be completed
> to read: just as the family is a powerful safeguard a-
> gainst suicide, so the more strongly it is constituted
> the greater its protection * (S:202).

Durkheim next extended the same thesis to statistics
concerning suicides in relation to the integration of polit-
ical society. Basically, Durkheim argued that whenever pas-
sions are aroused by a great event or crisis in the public
or political life of a people, the tendency to centrifugal
egoism is checked. Egos are moralized, that is, brought in-
to sustained contact with a public life and ideal higher than
their own interest. The very act of bringing people together
thus increases the "coefficient of preservation."

... great social disturbances and great popular wars
rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit
and patriotism, political and national faith alike, and
concentrating activity toward a single end, at least
temporarily cause a stronger integration of society.
The salutary influence which we have just shown to ex-
ist is due not to the crisis but to the struggles it
occasions. As they force men to close ranks and con-
front the common danger, the individual thinks less of
himself and more of the common cause. Besides, it is
comprehensible that this integration may not be purely
momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate caus-
es, especially when it is intense (S:208).

Having explored comparative statistics in three differ-
ent sub-types of society, Durkheim then offered the following
explicit summaries of his theses.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
of religious society.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
of domestic society.

Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
of political society....

So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies in-
versely with the degree of integration of the social
groups of which the individual forms a part *(S:208-9).

This summary proposition is, of course, the most famous of
Durkheim's explicit theses in Suicide. It has served as the
basis, for instance, of Halbwachs' (1930) formulation, and
for Gibbs and Martin's (eg. 1964) later notion of "status
integration and suicide" (see appendix). Perhaps subsequent
sociologists have lavished attention on this single concise
formula because it was Durkheim's only explicit summary of
his very complex theses, or because it seemed to resonate
with American sociologists' concern with social integration,
disorganization, and social control. However, as we shall
soon discover, Durkheim's seminal formula concealed as much
as it revealed. For Durkheim did not mean by social integra-
tion, for example, what many of his followers presume in u-
sing the same term. Durkheim used "social" to refer not only
to what present sociologists term as "social," but to cul-
tural life as well. Moreover, the social and cultural spheres
together represented the "moral life" to Durkheim. Further,

Durkheim's critical notion of man as <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u> meant that
if sufficiently high rates of social interaction and cultural
intensity were not maintained, society itself was in constant
danger of lapsing back into a welter of autistic egos. Clear-
ly, most contemporary sociologists do not share Durkheim's
image of human nature. Therefore, for these and other reasons
which shall become apparent, their implicit explanations of
why lessened rates of social integration should lead to sui-
cide are often very different (see appendix). Durkheim's ex-
planation of egoisme and suicide, much less anomie, is simply
not yet understood in its full complexity. Let us now attempt
to unravel the twists and turns in Durkheim's developing the-
ory that suicide rates are inversely related to social inte-
gration.

E.   <u>Egoisme</u> <u>Explained</u>: <u>The</u> <u>Release</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Pre-Social</u> <u>Ego</u>
        <u>From</u> <u>Traditional</u> <u>Constraints</u>

> Society cannot disintegrate without the individual si-
> multaneously detaching himself from social life, with-
> out his own goals becoming preponderant over those of
> the community, in a word, without his personality tend-
> ing to surmount the collective personality. The more
> weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he
> depends on them, the more he consequently depends only
> on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct
> than what are founded on his own private interests. If
> we agree to call this state egoism in which the indivi-
> dual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the
> social ego and at its expense, we may call egoistic the
> special type of suicide springing from excessive indi-
> vidualism.
> But how can suicide have such an origin (S:209)?

Indeed, how can suicide be caused by the lack of social
integration? Why should social isolation precipitate suicide?
Contemporary sociologists seem so permeated by the group per-
spective that apparently they assume that the isolated indi-
vidual is almost inevitably crushed by the lack of enduring
social supports. But I do not believe that the answer is so
simple, and neither did Durkheim. For he next began to spell
out his basic explanatory logics. He began by introducing a-
nother key variable intervening between isolation and suicide

--namely, the lack of objects or goals for individual action (see Giddens, 1971b). The first reason, then, why lack of social integration underlies egoistic suicides is that the pre-social ego becomes demoralized, as it were, and as a result egocentricity asserts itself at the expense of the moral life found only in society and culture. The individual ego is a-moral, only society is moral. The pre-socialized or organic ego is unable, by itself, to rise above its own fatally circumscribed concerns. Let us now explore further how Durkheim's doctrine of morality and the dualism of human nature underlay his theses on suicide.

To his own question--"how can suicide be born of excessive individualism"--Durkheim gave this reply:

> First of all ... as collective force is one of the obstacles best calculated to restrain suicide, its weakening involves a development of suicide. When society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, considers them at its service, and thus forbids them to dispose willfully of themselves. Accordingly, it opposes their evading their duties to it through death. But how could society impose its supremacy upon them when they refuse to accept this subordination as legitimate? It no longer then possesses the requisite authority to retain them in their duty if they wish to desert; and conscious of its own weakness, it even recognizes their right to do so freely what it can no longer prevent. So far as they are the admitted masters of their destinies, it is their privilege to end their lives. They, on the their part, have no reason to endure life's sufferings patiently. For they cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply. There is, in short, in a cohesive and animated society a constant interchange of ideas and feelings from all to each and each to all, something like mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the individual on his own resources, leads him to share in the collective energy and supports his own when exhausted * (S:209-10).

Since contemporary sociologists commonly presume that the individual only becomes fully human when socialized, there seems to be little problem in assuming that when the process is reversed--when the individual becomes, in effect, deso-

cialized, that the isolated ego has lost its very reason for living. We have little trouble today in positing that social interaction and heightened social intensity energize the individual. Indeed, it is this tacit consensus which has helped give Durkheim's thesis on suicide its hallowed status as a classic over the last three-quarters century. For not only did his classic <u>Suicide</u> help establish the autonomy of sociology as a separate discipline, but it also provided the very paradigm of modern sociological structural theory--namely, that breakdown in social structure leads to breakdown in psychological well-being and balance. Would, however, most sociologists blink twice if it were pointed out that the very pioneer who was later enshrined as a founding father insisted that <u>this is only a secondary and insufficient explanation</u>?

The reasons we have so persistently misrepresented Durkheim's theses on suicide are rather simple at base. <u>We have neglected both his evolutionary framework and his doctrine of the dualism of human nature.</u> We have neglected to portray Durkheim as a moral philosopher who worked sociologically. Specifically, this meant that Durkheim conceived of suicide as a process involving two basic processes: the <u>breakdown</u> of traditional social control and the <u>breakthrough</u> of the directionless and proportionless passions of the pre-socialized ego. I repeat: the structural factor which most sociologists have taken as the decisive element of a sociological explanation of suicide--the breakdown of social integration--was not considered by Durkheim to be the critical factor. Rather, social isolation, lack of social cohesion, low social participation, low status integration, etc.--however one wishes to state the same reality--acted, in Durkheim's theory, <u>merely as the precipitating or releasing condition of the insatiable and self-centered passions of the organic ego</u>. In regard to the breakdown of social integration, Durkheim himself insisted:

> But <u>these reasons are purely secondary</u>. Excessive in-
> dividualism not only results in favoring the action of
> suicidogenic causes, but is itself such a cause. It not

> only frees man's inclination to do away with himself
> from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclina-
> tion out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a spe-
> cial suicide which bears its mark. This must be clear-
> ly understood for this is what constitutes the special
> character of the type of suicide just distinguished and
> justifies the name we have given it. What is there then
> in this individualism that explains this result *
> (S:210)?

We might have suspected that something was wrong with most of
our summaries of his theses, for if in his first type of sui-
cideDurkheim merely meant to refer to structural breakdown,
why then did he call it by that curious name--egoistic ?
Clearly, Durkheim meant by this designation to indicate that
with the loss of social cohesion, the ego grows ascendant,
and becomes demoralized. Durkheim's first suicidal type,
then, is, at root, caused by the release of this "excessive
individualism." But how can this be so? Is this really a so-
ciological explanation? The answer--an embarassing one to
sociological theory--is: no, at base, Durkheim's seemingly
purely sociological explanation of the root causes of egois-
tic suicide is not really sociological after all! (See also
Book Three for further evidence). Durkheim's answer to his
own question "What is there in this individualism?" is, in-
stead, derived from moral philosophy.

In this vein, Durkheim proceeded to consider the oft-
stated notion that man needs a transcending purpose, a rai-
son d'etre. But in its traditional form, Durkheim rejected
the usual formulation of this problem. To him the dilemma is
not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the
presence of destructive egocentric passions.

> It has sometimes been said that because of his psycho-
> logical constitution, man cannot live without attach-
> ment to some object which transcends and survives him,
> and that the reason for this necessity is a need we
> must have not to perish entirely. Life is said to be
> intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved,
> some purpose justifying life's trials. The individual
> alone is not a sufficient end for his activity. He is
> too little. He is not only hemmed in spatially; he is
> also limited temporally. When, therefore, we have no
> other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought
> that our efforts will finally end in nothingness, since

> we ourselves disappear. But annihalation terrifies us.
> Under these conditions one would lose courage to live,
> that is, to act and struggle, since nothing will remain
> of our exertions. The state of egoism is supposed to be
> contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too
> uncertain to have chances of permanence (S:210).

One cannot help but acknowledge that such a position enjoys
a certain resonance with us, even today. But it was not Durk-
heim's position.

As Durkheim proceeded to criticize this common argu-
ment, and to restate it in more acceptable form, we would do
well to observe Durkheim here at his rhetorical and dialecti-
cal best--a moralist philosophizing on the social and cultur-
al dimensions of man, often reaching profound and even poetic
insights into the human condition. That such a book as Sui-
cide should not only be considered a methodological classic,
but also a social philosophical classic, is testimony to the
genius of a founding father who combined, in a natural way,
what we rent asunder.

> In this absolute formulation, the proposition is vulner-
> able. If the thought of the end of our personality were
> really so hateful, we could consent to live only by
> blinding ourselves voluntarily as to life's value. For
> if we may in a measure avoid the prospect of annihala-
> tion, we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, what-
> ever we do. We may push back the frontier for some gen-
> erations, force our name to endure for some years or
> centuries longer than our body; a moment, too soon for
> most men, always comes when it will be nothing. For the
> groups we join in order to prolong our existence by
> their means are themselves mortal; they too must dis-
> solve, carrying with them all our deposits of ourselves.
> Those are few whose memories are closely bound enough
> to the very history of humanity to be assured of living
> until its death. So, if we really thirsted after immor-
> tality, no such brief perspective could ever appease us.
> Besides, what of us is it that lives? A word, a sound,
> an imperceptible trace, most often anonymous.... It is
> therefore untrue that life is only possible by its pos-
> sessing its rationale outside of itself (S:210-11).

Next, Durkheim imperceptibly shifted the grounds of
argument. He observed that there are a whole range of func-
tions that pertain only to the individual--namely, organic
needs. Now, the critical thing to note about such biological
functions is not only that they are individually circumscrib-

ed, but also that <u>they</u> <u>are</u> <u>limited</u> <u>by</u> <u>their</u> <u>very</u> <u>nature</u>. On the contrary, truly human (that is, sociocultural) functions not only have their purpose outside the ego, but also <u>they</u> <u>are</u> <u>potentially</u> <u>unlimited</u>. Man's estate, then, and his burden, is to live on these higher "civilizational" levels.

> These functions serve by merely serving him. Insofar as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many ideas, feelings, practices, unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political faith, science itself, are not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life is built and expanded not because of the demands of the cosmic environment, but because of the demands of the social environment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its own image, fills us with religious, political, and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this development by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge (S:211-12).

Thus, man is <u>the</u> cultural animal. The biological ego, once moralized, is changed--the human person is born (see Book One). Conscience is awakened, a higher mental life begins. And since this new moral and intellectual life, what Chardin (1961) called the "noosphere," emerges from society and culture, it continues to focus individual energies on cultural ideals.

> Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society, they have reference to it; rather they are society itself incarnated in each of us. But for them to have a <u>raison</u> <u>d'etre</u> in our eyes, the purpose they envisage must not be one indifferent to us. We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society itself. Contrariwise, in the same measure as we feel detached from society, we become detached from that life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do these rules of morality, these precepts of law binding us to all sorts of sacrifices, these restrictive dogmas exist, if there is no being outside of us whom they serve and in whom we participate? If its only use is to increase our chances for survival, it does not

deserve the trouble it entails. Instinct acquits itself better of this role; animals prove this. Why substitute for it a more hesitant and uncertain reflection (S:212)?

Not only is man called to this higher life, but, as Durkheim observed, this emergent evolution is not without costs to the ego. Certainly, there are benefits: the biological ego is introduced to a new morally superior and intellectually intense life. But, on the other hand, the higher moral life of human civilization is a difficult calling, for it involves not only anxiety and uncertainty, but suffering (see also Book Three). Higher life is a trial; if the individual loses the focus of this moral life, what purpose has he left? Why should the trial be endured?

> What is the end of suffering above all? If the value of things can only be estimated by their relation to this positive evil for the individual, it is without reward and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist for the believer firm in his faith or the man strongly bound by ties of domestic or political society. Instinctively and unreflectively they ascribe all that they are and do, the one to his Church or his God, the living symbol of the Church, the other to his family, the other to his country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do homage to it. So, the Christian ultimately desires and seeks suffering to testify more fully to his contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his divine model. But the more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a real participant in the religous faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself, the more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose * (S:212)?

Of course, one of the classic formulations of man's dilemma is the notion of homo duplex. Now, without this crucial distinction between ego and person, and the characterization of the pre-social ego as inherently egocentric, passionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim's theory of egoisme and anomie, and the corresponding need for constant moral discipline and goals for individual action makes little sense. For the image of man as homo duplex lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociological theory of morality,

religion, and knowledge. Civilized man, Durkheim posited, is
"double," and this dilemma is the source of our troubles. On
the one hand, there is the organic ego; on the other, there
is the moralized (socialized) person. Social man is superim-
posed over top of physical man.

> If ... as has often been said, man is double, that is
> because social man superimposes himself upon physical
> man. Social man necessarily presupposes a society which
> he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no
> longer feel in it existence and action about and above
> us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objec-
> tive foundation. All that remains is an artificial com-
> bination of illusory images, a phantasamagoria vanish-
> ing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can
> be the goal of our action. Yet this social man is the
> essence of civilized man; he is the masterpiece of ex-
> istence. Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence;
> for the only life to which we could cling no longer cor-
> responds to anything actual; the only existence still
> based upon reality no longer meets our needs. Because
> we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one
> which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no
> more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless.
> So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of,
> and we feel them lose themselves in emptiness. In this
> sense it is true to say that our activity needs an ob-
> ject transcending it. We do not need it to maintain our-
> selves in the illusion of an impossible immortality; it
> is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even
> partially lost without this losing its raison d'etre in
> the same degree. No proof is needed that in such a state
> of confusion the least cause of discouragement may easi-
> ly give birth to desperate resolutions. If life is not
> worth the trouble of living, everything becomes a pre-
> text to rid ourselves of it * (S:213).

It is not altogether clear whether Durkheim meant that with
the breakdown of social integration, and the corresponding
recession of cultural ideals, the moralized person finds him-
self bereft of reasons for existence, or whether the pre-so-
cial ego supersedes its socialized counterpart. It would seem
that Durkheim would not have named this type "egoistic" if he
did not mean to imply that, as society and the moralized per-
son fade in intensity and purpose, the individual lapses back
into the self-centered egoisms of nature. Yet, since both
meanings seem to be implied here, perhaps we can surmise that
his underlying doctrine had not yet been fully worked out

(see especially Book Three).

Next, Durkheim added a crucial qualification to this notion of social breakdown and cultural anemia--namely, that the specific forms taken by egoisme (and anomie) are determined by cultural or "national temperament." This insight shall serve as one important foundation for my second schema (see Book Three).

> One of the constitutive elements of every national temperament consists of a certain way of estimating the value of existence. There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see things in bright or somber lights. In fact, only society can pass a collective opinion on the value of human life; for this the individual is incompetent. The latter knows nothing but himself and his own little horizon; thus his experience is too limited to serve as a basis for a general appraisal.
> ... On the contrary, without sophistry, society may generalize its own feelings as to itself, its state of health or lack of health. For individuals share too deeply in the life of society for it to be diseased without their suffering infection. What it suffers, they necessarily suffer. Because it is the whole, its ills are communicated to its parts. Hence it cannot disintegrate without awareness that the regular conditions of general existence are equally disturbed. Because society is the end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us escaping it without a simultaneous realization that our activity is purposeless. Since we are its handiwork, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value
> (S:213-14).

This passage is most significant. For in addition to the suggestion that the tendency to egoisme is connected with certain "national temperaments," Durkheim here set out in ambiguous form his underlying causal model. "Society generalizes its own feelings of itself," whether healthy or sick. Durkheim's profundity, his tendency to anthropomorphize society, his Rousseauean undercurrents, all are to be found in this provocative passage. Yet it is not clear, again, which comes first: does society begin to breakdown, "feel" egos detaching themselves and wandering aimlessly around, and then "generalize" its own sickness, in a kind of on-going feedback cycle? Or, rather, do egos begin to successfully

resist social control and moral direction, break down the so-
cial bond, and so forth? Whatever Durkheim really intended to
say, his statements are often ambiguous in their deeper im-
port. However, we shall follow Durkheim in assuming that the
conditions precipitating egoistic suicides are "felt" on a
wider societal basis.

As Durkheim continued developing this line of thought,
his hypostatizing language ramified and deepened. Instead of
lone isolated egos, Durkheim spoke of the egoismic condition
as carried by definite "social currents" (see also Part I,
Book Three). These "social currents" seem to generalize the
breakdown of the social bond.

> Thence are formed currents of depression and disillu-
> sionment emanating from no particular individual but
> expressing society's state of disintegration. They re-
> flect the relaxation of social bonds, a sort of collec-
> tive asthenia, or social malaise, just as individual sad-
> ness, when chronic, in its way reflects the poor organic
> state of the individual. Then metaphysical systems and
> religious systems spring up which, by reducing these ob-
> scure sentiments to formula, attempt to prove to men the
> senselessness of life and that its self-deception to be-
> lieve that life has purpose. Then new moralities origin-
> ate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide
> or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a mini-
> mal existence. On their appearance, they seem to have
> been created out of whole cloth by their makers who are
> sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines.
> In reality they are an effect rather than a cause; they
> they merely symbolize in abstract language and systema-
> tic form the physiological distress of the body social.
> [Footnote: this is why it is unjust to accuse these
> theorists of sadness of generalizing personal impres-
> sions. They are the echo of a general condition]*(S:214).

While Durkheim is correct, to a certain extent, to insist on
a social structural approach to the origin of philosophical
and ethical perspectives, on the other hand, to insist cate-
gorically that systems of thought and moralities critical of
life and the world are always and everywhere, at root, simply
reflections of the "relaxation of social bonds" is to impose
a positivistic and limited model over the complexities and
paradoxes of historical process. Although Durkheim's basic
causal model here observed how changes become "culturally

generalized," and feedback to further alter individuals and society itself again, he did not here allow the possibility that such moral critiques may themselves lead, ultimately, to social structural transformations. In other words, he appeared to rule out of court that <u>the</u> <u>causal</u> <u>arrow</u> <u>may</u> <u>just</u> <u>as</u> <u>well</u> <u>lead</u> <u>from</u> <u>culture</u> <u>to</u> <u>structure</u> <u>as</u> <u>well</u> <u>as</u> <u>from</u> <u>structure</u> <u>to</u> <u>culture</u>.

At many places Durkheim's statements grew more ambiguous in terms of causal priority (see also Part I, Book Three). Indeed, I shall later marshall evidence from his own texts showing Durkheim himself saying that anomie and egoisme are caused by collective currents, that is, sanctioned by cultural ideals and values. It can hardly be imagined, in that case, why society would generalize and idealize these "exaggerated individualisms" and "drives for progress and perfection" if they lead to its own dissolution. But for now, Durkheim had not crossed over this bridge.

> As these currents are collective, they have, by virtue of their origin an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by that disintegration of society. Thus, at every moment that, with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social envirdment, he still submits to its influence. However individualized a man may be, there is always something collective remaining--the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he has no longer anything else with which to achieve it (S:214).

Almost inevitably, Durkheim's concern as a moral philosopher over modern "moral anarchy" and his keen empirical insight into the ravages of the modern "infinity sickness" led him away from his rather simple mechanical "structural feedback" model. Indeed, the contradiction implied in proposing that society, in effect, promotes its own destruction through self-homicide had apparently not occured to Durkheim. That some other factors might be operating here, in a rather different way than Durkheim's explicitly positivistic causal model allowed, can be seen by an insightful comment into the

empirical sanctioning of egoisme:

> Today neurasthenia is rather considered a mark of dis-
> tinction than a mark of weakness. In our refined socie-
> ties, enamoured of things intellectual, nervous members
> constitute almost a nobility (S:181).

The ambiguity of Durkheim's causal theory underlying
egoistic suicide can also be seen from the following summary,
in which egoisme is seen both as an effect of the "relaxa-
tion of social bonds" and as a cause of this "collective as-
thenia." Moreover, whether this type of suicide is called e-
goistic because the pre-social ego "asserts itself" in the
face of social ideals, or because the individual has only
himself and his localized interests to fall back on after
the "higher existence into which he had been initiated" faded
is not clear.

> Hence this type of suicide well deserves the name we
> have given it. Egoisme is not merely a contributing
> factor in it; it is its generating cause. In this case,
> the bond attaching men to life relaxes because that at-
> taching him to society is itself slack. The incidents
> of private life which seem the direct inspiration of
> suicide and are considered its determining causes are
> in reality only incidental causes. The individual yields
> to the slightest shock of circumstances because the
> state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide.
> ... as thought and activity develop, they increasingly
> overflow antiquated forms. But then he needs others.
> Because he is a more complex social being, he can main-
> tain his equilibrium only by finding more points of sup-
> port outside himself, and it is because his moral bal-
> ance depends on a larger number of conditions that he
> is more easily disturbed *(S:214-15, 216).

Durkheim thus concluded this chapter by outlining a balance
theory of psychological well-being. After being initiated in-
to the higher moral and intellectual existence of human cul-
ture, the person becomes increasingly dependent on more and
varied types of social and cultural life; indeed, "all life
is a complex equilibrium." When this complex balance becomes
upset, when the myriad points of mutual dependence become al-
tered, the internal psychological balance is correspondingly
upset. This notion of equilibrium and health and even virtue
as a balance or "golden mean" is fundamental to Durkheim's
perspective on normality and pathology.

Now, whether or not Durkheim's underlying causal model here is clear or consistent, one conclusion seems warranted: Durkheim's explanation of egoistic suicide is a good deal more inflected than most contemporary sociologists have recognized. By no stretch of the imagination can his developing theory be portrayed in the simplistic terms of the "social integration" hypothesis. Further, little has been said of the historical or evolutionary framework underlying Durkheim's first type. It should be noted, however, that Durkheim's entire work presumes an evolutionary perspective in which modern pathologies are historically grounded in terms of the recession of previous disciplines and the lacuna of new ones. But, more to the point, egoisme is relationally defined in terms of altruisme, Durkheim's second suicidal type, to which we now turn. Clearly, altruisme, by contrast with egoisme, serves as an "ideal type" of the kind of moral solidarity characteristic of primitive or archaic societies.

CHAPTER TWO

ALTRUISME AS OBLIGATORY SELF-SACRIFICE: CONSCIENCE IN
MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX

Preface. Altruisme is the opposite of egoisme in a number
of ways. First, as the terms connote, altruisme refers to a
condition in which group well-being takes precedence over
individual self-interest. Second, Durkheim attached specific
historical significance to these perennial opposites, for he
used them as "ideal types" to refer to differences in social
and cultural solidarity at the two ends of history. The in-
dividual in primitive society, according to Durkheim, is more
or less submerged in group life. The conscience collective
takes precedence over the rudimentary individual conscience
in public mores. Indeed, the individual is so permeated and
penetrated by the conscience collective that if tradition de-
mands self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide gladly embraces
self-homicide as a duty, perhaps even a privilege. In con-
trast to the first type of suicide, the altruistic suicide
considers self-sacrifice an obligation, a moral duty that
fulfills his own nature. This obligation is increased by the
"repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex," in which
magic and religion pervades all (see Book One).

   Once again, to adequately understand altruisme and e-
goisme one must differentiate between Durkheim's generic and
genetic-evolutionary notions of the individual (see Giddens,
1971b). As we noted in Book One, on the generic level Durk-
heim viewed man as homo duplex--each individual was split
between his physical and social selves. Ego is to person as
body is to soul. However, on the genetic-evolutionary level,
Durkheim posited that the autonomous person was a historical
emergent, that is, the notion of the morally autonomous per-

son with certain "inalienable rights" was a sociocultural
and historical construction. Basically, Durkheim proposed
that as the social morphological substratum differentiated,
the individual took on greater and greater autonomy. In a
corollary process, as differentiation proceeded, rationali-
ty and abstract thought ramified. Thus, the autonomy of the
person and the rationalization of the universe of "moral
discourse" proceeded together on the world-historical level
(see Book One).

Those who uncritically embrace the conventional image
of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching for
the generic bases of social order and control (Parsons,
1949; L. Coser, 1971), may find themselves puzzled by the
fact that Durkheim did not urge a return to the "value con-
sensus" of primitive society. After all, to Durkheim wasn't
soceity all and the individual nothing? Isn't this position
inherently conservative? Space allows me to merely note now
(however see appendix) that, as an Enlightenment liberal,
Durkheim's central value was the autonomy and rationality
of the individual person (see Chapter Eight, Book One). What
he termed "moral individualism," as embodied in Christian
ethics, especially in its Protestant varieties and their se-
cularized variants, especially "The Rights of Man" (eg. see
"Individualism and the Intellectuals," Jellinek, 1901, Weber,
1968), was his fundamental positive value. At no time did
Durkheim urge return to "mechanical solidarity;" at no point
did his so-called "social realism" ever lead him to urge the
submergence of the person in the group, as was the case in
archaic societies. At no point did he yearn to return to the
"repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex;" indeed,
wasn't this clear from his highly negative early image of
religion (see Chapter Six, Book One). In short, Durkheim's
perennial moral dialectic between person, society, and his-
tory led him to seek to balance these relationships in a way
never before fully achieved--namely, rescuing both the moral
solidarity of archaic societies and the respect for the per-

son generated by the progressive division of labor. Whether
he successfully resolved this eternal dilemma can only be an-
swered at the end of the present study.

Characteristically, Durkheim began this section by no-
ting that the dialectical balance he so ardently sought can
be found neither in the "excessive individualism" of modern
society, nor in the "insufficient individuation" of "mechani-
cal solidarity."

> In the order of existence, no good is measureless. A
> biological quality can only fulfill the purposes it is
> meant to serve on condition that it does not transgress
> certain limits. So with social phenomena. If ... exces-
> sive individuation leads to suicide, insufficient indi-
> viduation has the same effects. When man has become de-
> tached from society, he encounters less resistance to
> suicide in himself, and he does so likewise when social
> integration is too strong * (S:217).

Drawing his illustrations from a variety of texts on archaic
societies, Durkheim seized upon customs in which self-sacri-
fice was seen as a moral obligation. In such cases--old men,
women on their husband's death, servants after a leader's
passing--are required by ancient and venerable custom to com-
mit self-homicide.

> Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it
> it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but,
> on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails in
> this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished, u-
> sually, by religious sanctions.... We have seen that if
> such a person insists on living he loses public respect;
> in one case, the usual funeral honors are denied, in a-
> nother a life of horror is supposed to await him beyond
> the grave. The weight of society is thus brought to bear
> on him to lead him to destroy himself * (S:219).

Further, in contrast to egoistic suicide in modern societies
which is often legally proscribed, altruistic suicide is pos-
itively enjoined because it is symptomatic of "mechanical sol-
idarity."

> To be sure, society intervenes in egoistic suicide, as
> well, but its intervention differs in the two cases.
> In one case, it speaks the sentence of death; in the
> other, it forbids the choice of death. In the case of
> egoistic suicide, it suggests or counsels at most; in
> the other case it compels and is the author of condi-
> tions and circumstances making this obligation coercive
> (S:219-20).

Altruistic suicide is here used by Durkheim as a visible objective index revealing the inner nature of the social bond peculiar to primitive or archaic societies, those groups still rooted in ties of "blood and soil." Altruistic suicide serves as an an external visible symbol of the interdependence mandated in "mechanical solidarity." If the social bond is broken by death, the remaining relatives'first obligation is to maintain the former social bond as far as possible by themselves joining the same condition as the deceased. They have no other self-definition or value apart from their assigned roles. In death as in life, the social bond remains.

> This sacrifice then is imposed by society for moral
> ends. If the follower must not then survive his chief
> or the servant his prince, this is because so strict
> an interdependence between followers and chief, offi-
> cers and king, is involved in the constitution of so-
> ciety that any thought of separation is out of the ques-
> tion. The destiny of one must be that of the others
> (S:220).

Such "strict interdependence" is more understandable if we remember that even today kinship terms are relationally defined--the term "mother" having meaning only in relation to the terms "children" or "son" or "daughter." The leaving of children from the parental home can still be a traumatic experience today; there is often the feeling that "everything has changed," including oneself, and perhaps even that the reason for living may have vanished. This happens, even in so attentuated family circumstances as today because these roles and statuses are relationally defined, and functionally and normatively interdependent; and because these social definitions of self are so deeply internalized that they permanently alter the personality structure.

Durkheim continued developing this notion of the socially obligatory character of suicide in primitive society, observing that it is possible only where the individual is submerged in the traditional conscience collective.

> For society to be able thus to compel some of its mem-
> bers to kill themselves, the individual personality can
> have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to
> form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it.

> ... But there can be only one cause of this feeble in-
> dividuation itself. For the individual to occupy so
> little place in collective life he must be almost com-
> pletely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accord-
> ingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so
> little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a
> compact, continuous mass.... As they consist of a few
> elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is
> common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, be-
> cause of the small size of the group it is close to
> everyone and loses no one from sight; consequently, col-
> lective supervision is constant, extending to every-
> thing, and thus more readily prevents divergences
> (S:220-21).

Altruistic suicide, then, is the ultimate expression of
"mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really has lit-
tle life apart from his group, sacrifices himself when neces-
sary. This extreme sense of moral obligation is ^due not merely to
the social morphological and structural conditions in which
the group finds itself, but also to the extreme degree of
pentration of the conscience collective by sacral and magical
duties. From Durkheim's perspective, for the individual to e-
merge as a morally valuable and autonomous person in his own
right, the sacral-magical conscience collective must recede
as the social morphological substratum differentiates.

> The individual has no way to set up an envirdment of
> his own in the shelter of which he may develop his own
> nature and form a physiognomy that is his exclusively.
> To all intents and purposes indistinct from his compan-
> ions, he is only an inseparable part of the whole with-
> out personal value. His person has so little value that
> attacks upon it by individuals receive only relatively
> weak restraint. It is thus natural for him to be yet
> less protected against collective necessities and that
> society should not hesitate ... to bid end a life it
> values so little (S:221).

Durkheim then attached a label to this suicide typical
of "mechanical solidarity," defining it in evolutionary con-
trast to egoisme and modern society.

> We thus confront a type of suicide differing by inci-
> sive qualities from the preceding one. Whereas the lat-
> ter [egoisme] is due to excessive individuation, the
> former is caused by too rudimentary individuation. One
> occurs because society allows the individual to escape
> it, being insufficiently aggregated in some parts of
> even in the whole; the other, because society holds him

> in too strict tutelage. Having given the name of egoisme
> to the state of the ego living its own life and obeying
> itself alone, that of altruisme adequately expresses the
> opposite state, where the ego is not its own property,
> where it is blended with something not itself, where the
> goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one
> of the groups in which it participates. So we call the
> suicide caused by intense altruisme altruistic suicide.
> But since it is also characteristically performed as a
> duty, we shall call such a type obligatory altruistic
> suicide (S:221).

Now, even though Durkheim proceeded to state that "not every
altruistic suicide is necessarily obligatory," he acknowled-
ged that, even in optional situations, it is still a sign of
prestige or moral virtue.

> Though public opinion does not formally require them,
> it is certainly favorable to them. Since here not cling-
> ing to life is a virtue, even of the highest rank, the
> man who renounces life on least provocation of circum-
> stances or though simple vainglory is praiseworthy. A
> social prestige thus attaches to suicide, which receives
> encouragement from this fact, and the refusal of this
> reward has effects similar to actual punishment, al-
> though to a lesser degree. What is done in one case to
> escape the stigma of insult is done in the other to win
> esteem. When people are accustomed to set no value on
> life from childhood on, and to despise those who value
> it excessively, they inevitably renounce it on the least
> pretext. So valueless a sacrifice is easily assumed.
> Like obligatory suicide, therefore, these practices are
> associated with the most fundamental moral characteris-
> tics of lower societies. As they can only persist if
> the individual has no interests of his own, he must be
> trained to renunciation and an unquestioned abnegation;
> whence come partially spontaneous suicides. Exactly like
> those more explicitly prescribed by society, they arise
> from this state of impersonality, or as we have called
> it, altruisme, which may be regarded as a moral char-
> acteristic of primitive man * (S:222-23).

"Mechanical solidarity" is thus a "state of impersonality"
because the person has so little autonomous status there. Im-
personal altruisme was regarded by Durkheim as one of the
prime "moral characteristics of primitive man" because the
conscience collective (the impersonal or social part of cul-
ture and personality) pervades and dominates the individual
conscience and consciousness. Whether empirically grounded
in all traditional societies or not, Durkheim's schema

heightened the contrast between modern and traditional socie-
ties by setting up two heuristic "ideal types."

Now, as Durkheim noted, "altruistic suicide is a spe-
cies with several varieties" (S:222). One of the most reveal-
ing types is mystical or religious suicide . These closely
correspond with the sacral and magical character of tradi-
tional societies. Dominated by religious rationales and mag-
ical etiquettes, the mystical suicide, of which Hindu and
Buddhist India is "the classic soil," needs no stark precipi-
tating circumstances as spur on other altruistic suicides to
their honorable self-homicide.

> In the preceding examples, it [altruisme] caused a man
> to kill himself only with the concurrence of circum-
> stances. Either death had to be imposed by society as
> a duty, or some question of honor was involved, or at
> least some disagreeable occurence had to lower the val-
> ue of life in the victim's eyes. But it even happens
> that the individual kills himself purely for the joy
> of sacrifice, because, even with no particular reason,
> renunciation in itself is considered praiseworthy (S:223).

Durkheim further noted that such mystical suicides of reli-
gious "virtuousos" are the very prototype of "impersonalized
altruisme." The pantheistic urge to suppress or eradicate
the ego because it is an illusion is the opposite of the
modern attitude in which the ego, autonomous and alone, is
morally enshrined as an absolute value. In the former, the
ego is considered unreal; in the latter, the ego alone is
real; both are absolutized.

> We actually see the individual in all these cases seek
> to strip himself of his personal being in order to be
> engulfed in something which he regards as his true es-
> sence.... He feels that he exists in it and in it a-
> lone, and strives so violently to blend himself with
> it in order to have being. He must therefore consider
> that he has no life of his own. Impersonality is here
> carried to its highest pitch, altruisme is acute (S:225).

Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the implications of
Durkheim's linkage of pantheistic religious drives for the
eradication of the ego, and the "pantheistic" organization
of archaic societies. Now, it is understandable that Durk-
heim would emphasize these points, since to him religion was

merely the way in which society collectively represented it-
self to itself. It followed, then, that "mechanically inte-
grated" societies, in which the individual counted for lit-
tle, would tend to express these social and cultural condi-
tions in pantheistic projections. As the individual counted
for little in society, so, too, the ego counted for little
in religion. Salvation was neither deliverance nor redemp-
tion (see Weber, 1963), but rather eradication of individual
suffering through transcendence of the ego's desires. Indeed,
Durkheim's key insight here would lead us to expect that so-
cieties that had not overcome a segmental base and tribalis-
tic structures of fraternization would probably never con-
struct European notions of the autonomy and moral value of
the individual person.

Durkheim next explored some relations between the or-
ganization of primitive societies and primitive religious
ethics. These passages delineating the correspondence between
the primitive sacral complex, in which society and culture
are deeply embedded in religious rationales, and pantheistic
religious images, reveal the core of Durkheim's evolutionary
sociology of religion, knowledge, and morality.

> The metaphysical and religious systems which form the
> logical settings for these moral practices give final
> proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has
> long been observed that they coexist generally with
> pantheistic beliefs. To be sure, Jainism as well as
> Buddhism is atheistic, but pantheism is not necessari-
> ly theistic. Its essential quality is the idea that
> what reality there is in the individual is foreign to
> his nature, that the soul which animates him is not his
> own, and that consequently he has no personal existence.
> Now this dogma is fundamental to the doctrines of the
> Hindus; it already exists in Brahminism. Inversely,
> where the principle of being is not fused with such
> doctrines but is itself conceived of an individual
> form, that is, among theistic peoples like the Jews,
> Christiams, Mahommetans, or polytheists like the Greeks
> and Latins, this form of suicide is unusual. It is nev-
> er found there in a state of ritual practice. There is
> probably a relation between it and pantheism. What is
> this relation (S:226)?

Here Durkheim discovered a profound dialectical relation be-
tween the evolution of the individual person and the develop-

ment of religious representations centering on shifts in impersonality and personality (see also Chapter Eight, Book One). In general, where the "principle of being" is portrayed in impersonal form, the individual ego is accorded little reality or value. However, where the individual person is valued in his own right, religious representations accordingly take on, as it were, a personal physiognomy. But why? As one might expect, since we know that he treats religious representations as projections of society and the fused primitive conscience collective, Durkheim suggested that the underlying reason is that here society itself is structured, as it were, pantheistically.

> It cannot be conceded that pantheism produced suicide. Such abstract ideas do not guide men, and the course of history could not be explained through the play of purely metaphysical concepts. Among peoples as well as individuals, mental representations function above all as as expression of a reality not of their own making; they rather spring from it and, if they subsequently modify it, do so only to a limited extent.
> Religious conceptions are the products of the social environment, rather than its producers, and if they react, once formed, upon their original causes, the reaction cannot be very profound. If the essence of pantheism, then is a more or less radical denial of all individuality, such a religion could be constituted only in a society where the individual really counts for nothing, that is, is almost wholly lost in the group. For men can conceive of the world only in an image of the small social world in which they live. Religious pantheism is thus only a result and, as it were, a reflection of the pantheistic organization of society. Consequently, it is also in this society that we must seek the cause for this special suicide which everywhere appears in connection with pantheism (S:226-27).

Again, it is true, socioculturally, that religious conceptions are products of the social environment. However, I cannot fully endorse Durkheim's radically positivistic notion that "abstract ideas do not guide men," since, on the contrary, I believe that there is a constant interplay between conditions and intentions. Surely Weber taught us that images and ideas, when strongly sanctioned--that is, when they percolate through the imagination and penetrate the will-- definitely influence human action. In short, there is almost

always a constant dialectic between structure, culture, and personality systems, not simply the one-way causality here suggested by Durkheim when he argued that if religious conceptions "react upon their original causes, the reaction cannot be very profound" (see also Part I, Book Three). Durkheim's underlying model must be supplemented by Weber's.

Further, various comments by Durkheim look forward to the second schema in which all four types of suicide are seen as rooted in extreme forms of moral obligation. For instance, in the following passage, ostensibly devoted to showing that religious dogma per se counts for little in producing suicide, Durkheim acknowledged that Christian doctrine itself was significant in raising the moral worth of the individual person (see also Chapter Eight, Book One).

> ... the aversion to suicide professed and inspired by Christianity is well-known. The reason is that Christian societies accord the individual a more important role than earlier ones. They assign to him personal duties which he is forbiden to evade; only insofar as he has acquitted himself of the role incumbent upon him here on earth is he admitted or not to the joys of the hereafter, and these joys are as personal as the works which make them his heritage. Thus the moderate individualism in the spirit of Christianity prevents it from favoring suicide, despite its theories concerning man and his destiny (S:226).

Next, Durkheim compared the psychological attitude of the egoistic suicide with the altruistic type. He indicated two crucial aspects which we shall later retain--namely, that the altruistic suicide reveals an active acceptance of his collectively sanctioned moral obligation, while the egoistic type betrays a passive melancholy, the world-weariness or moral exhaustion akin to acedia. I believe, in turn, that the active-passive distinction applies equally well in contrasting anomie with fatalisme. In my second schema, both altruisme and anomie are active, while both egoisme and fatalisme are passive (see Part II, Book Three).

> While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing real in the world but the individual, the intemperate altruist's sadness, on the contrary, springs from the individual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One is detached

> from life because, seeing no goal to which he may at-
> tach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless;
> the other because he has a goal but one outside this
> life, which henceforth seems merely an obstacle to him.
> Thus, the difference of the causes reappears in the ef-
> fects, and the melancholy of the one is quite different
> from the other. The former consists of a feeling of in-
> curable weariness and sad depression; it expresses a
> complete relaxation of activity, which, unable to find
> useful employment, collapses. The latter [altruisme],
> on the contrary, springs from hope, for it depends on
> the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life.
> It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith ea-
> gerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of
> extreme energy * (S:225-6).

By extension, fatalisme also proceeds from the internaliza-
tion of collective sanctions, only here the individual finds
himself overwhelmed or oppressively regulated by the con-
science collective, and resigns himself passively to his as-
signed fate. Looking ahead to the second schema, then, we
see that both fatalisme and altruisme proceed from the same
source; they differ merely in their prime of expression.

Adding another comparison between egoistic and altrui-
stic suicide, Durkheim again emphasized that different lev-
els of societal complexity and corresponding systems of or-
ganized knowledge and morality are always in the background
of his discussion.

> One is related to the crude morality which disregards
> everything relating solely to the individual; the other
> is closely associated with the refined ethics which sets
> the human personality on so high a pedestal that it can
> no longer be subordinated to anything. Between the two
> there is all the difference between primitive peoples
> and the most civilized nations * (S:227).

Here we see Durkheim moving toward the second schema, in
which egoisme is generated not simply by the breakdown of
integration but by cultural sanctions, by modern "ethics set-
ting the individual on so high a pedestal that he may no
longer be subordinated to anything."

Observing that "in our contemporary societies, the in-
dividual personality becomes increasingly free from the col-
lective personality" (S:228). Durkheim turned to consider
the major example of suicide in the modern era in which the

the reverse is true. Altruistic suicides in the military
served, in Durkheim's "ideal typical" schemas, as the major
example of the evolutionary survival of primitive ethics in
the modern world. Durkheim finds in the modern soldier the
same quality of impersonality, of self-abnegation which he
thought characterized primitive moral solidarity. Unfortun-
ately, those few secondary discussions (eg. Parsons, 1949)
that mention altruistic suicide also tend to ignore its main
historical site--namely, primitive moral solidarity. They
have thus missed the important fact that Durkheim discussed
military suicides in the modern world largely as an illus-
tration of the survival of superseded moral patterns, espe-
cially to heighten the contrast with the contemporaneous,
but very different, egoisme.

> Of all elements constituting our modern societies, the
> army, indeed, most recalls the structure of lower so-
> cieties. It, too, consists of a massive, compact group
> providing a rigid setting for the individual and pre-
> venting any independent movement. Therefore, since this
> moral constitution is the natural field for altruistic
> suicide, military suicide may certainly be supposed to
> have the same character and derive from the same source
> (S:234).

> ... the causes of military suicides are not only dif-
> ferent from, but in inverse proportion to, the most
> determining causes of civilian suicide. The latter
> causes in the great European societies spring from the
> excessive individuation characteristic of civilization.
> Military suicides must therefore depend on the reverse
> disposition, feeble individuation or what we have call-
> ed the state of altruisme. Actually, those peoples a-
> mong whom the army is most inclined to suicide are also
> the least advanced, those whose customs most resemble
> the customs observed in lower societies. Traditionalism
> [is] the chief opponent of the spirit of individualism.
> ... As it guards against egoistic suicide, one readily
> understands that where it still has power, the civilian
> population has few suicides. But it has this prophylac-
> tic influence only if it remains moderate. If it ex-
> ceeds a certain degree of intensity, it becomes itself
> an original cause of suicide (S:236).

Surely, Weber and Durkheim would have agreed that "traditonal-
ism is the opponent of the spirit of modern individualism"
which, when gone to extreme, results in egoistic suicide.

Finally, Durkheim concluded this chapter on altruistic

suicide with the crucial observation that "every sort of
suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a
virtue." Clearly shading over now into his second and very
different schema that anomie and egoisme are caused by ex-
treme modern cultural sanctions, Durkheim next proposed that
both altruistic and egoistic suicides are perceived as the
carrying out of moral duties. Ultimately, we shall see that
all four types of suicide are geneated by extreme cultural
sanctions--that is, considered in both primitive and modern
societies as the logical, though extreme, outgrowths of deep-
ly internalized moral obligations.

> ... the motives of certain altruistic suicides reap-
> pear in slightly different forms as the basis of ac-
> tions regarded by everyone as moral. But is egoistic
> suicide any different? Has not the sentiment of indi-
> vidual autonomy its own morality as well as the oppo-
> site sentiment? If the latter serves as a foundation
> to a kind of courage, strengthening and even hardening
> the heart, the other softens it, and moves it to pity.
> Where the altruistic suicide is prevalent, man is all
> ready to give his life; however, at the same time, he
> sets no more value on that of another. On the contrary,
> when he rates individual personality above all other
> ends, he respects it in others. His cult for it makes
> him suffer from all that minimizes it even among his
> fellows. A broader sympathy for human suffering suc-
> ceeds the fanatical devotions of primitive times. Every
> sort of suicide is then merely the exaggerated or de-
> flected form of a virtue * (S:240).

Now, we shall consider Durkheim's critical insight
that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or
deflected form of a virtue" as an epigrammatic summary of my
second schema on Durkheim's theories of suicide (see Part
II, Book Three). Let us now turn to consider Durkheim's most
famous suicidal type--anomie--and see whether the same am-
biguities permeate its description.

CHAPTER THREE

ANOMIE AS THE RELEASE OF THE INSATIABLE DESIRES OF THE PRE-SOCIAL EGO FROM TRADITIONAL MORAL DISCIPLINE

<u>Preface</u>. Certainly it is true, as Talcott Parsons claims, that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly central concepts in contemporary social science" (1968a:316). However, as we have unhappily discovered (see also appendix), <u>the origins and meanings of this paradigmatic concept have often been faultily reported</u>. Moreover, its great cultural and historical significance has been slighted. Since Durkheim's passages on anomie are far from unambiguous, and further, since even some of the better secondary interpretations cannot be fully relied on to accurately reflect Durkheim's theoretical framework and historical intentions, great caution must be exercised in interpreting the essential structure and meaning of Durkheim's first theory of anomie.

At the outset, we need not engage in complex intellectual convolutions to wrench Durkheim's first schema into line with our own predelictions. For, as with egoisme and altruisme, we might simply start with the connotations of these words themselves. Fatalisme implies a pervasive sense of resignation to one's fate. Anomie, by contrast, implies not that amorphous and protean term "normlessness" (see appendix), but <u>rather the unleashing of desires beyond all order or meaningful limits</u>. Anomie here implies not so much the lack of order as the lack of limits, in the sense of classical Greek and Christian philosophy (eg. see Haydn, 1950). Moreover, Durkheim assigned these terms to two extremes at the two ends of history. Hence, anomie versus fatalisme represents the historical contrast between the insatiable passions released in our contemporary transitional era and the

ego's passive resignation to his collectively assigned fate in the "repressive" regime of traditional "mechanical solidarity."

As always, Durkheim's thought moved here on two levels simultaneously: the generic and the genetic. On the generic level, Durkheim posited the insatiable and egocentric passions of human nature. On the genetic-evolutionary level, he proposed that at one end of human history, the individual ego's naturally insatiable desires were held in rigid check by traditional subordination to the fused sacro-magical con-science collective. On the other hand, in the modern world there is no adequate social or cultural mechanism working to discipline individual egotistic desires. Therefore, in the modern transitional crisis, prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity," "diseases of the infinite" emerge, and "moral anarchy" threatens to reign over all. Let us now explore anomie more carefully.

A. Anomie: A Preview

Even though today anomie may be considered one of the paradigmatic concepts of sociology, nevertheless, the origin and complexity of Durkheim's arguments underlying his first notion of anomie remain misperceived. Instead of a mechanical, ahistorical, baldly sociologistical series of assertions concerning the need for integration of the individual into social groups, Durkheim's arguments were subtly inflected, and historically and philosophically grounded. Lest this subtlety and potential significance be lost in the welter of reductions and textbookish presentations, let us briefly outline the developing logic of Durkheim's argument concerning anomie.

(1) Durkheim assumed that the human ego is naturally passionate, undisciplined, and inherently insatiable. Hence, in his first schema, he located the source of the self-destructive forces of undisciplined insatiable passions in the organic or pre-social half of the individual.

(2) Durkheim further assumed a series of basic dualisms in regard to human nature, which mirror other "root dichotomies".

Paralleling a series of dichotomies such as: society/individual, sacred/profane, concepts/sensations, normal/pathological, science/mysticism, universals/variables, necessary/ contingent, and so forth, Durkheim added another root dichotomy: moral rules/sensual appetites (see also Lukes, 1973, and Book One). Of course, Durkheim then posited society as the only source providing the necessary collective discipline to counterbalance the inordinate sensual appetites of the inherently egocentric and passionate pre-social ego.

(3) Further, Durkheim assumed that every society regulates individual satisfaction through a social schedule stratified for various groups and occupations. This socio-economic schedule of the gratification of wants is, in a relatively stable society, accepted generally by each as legitimate, and each is relatively adjusted to his scheduled ratio of reward. This notion of the social schedule is one of the key foundations of the distribution aspect of economic systems. Durkheim's unexplored theorem holds great potential significance for theoretical economic sociology.

(4) Disturbances in social and economic equilibrium weaken the hold of collective moral discipline, thereby releasing the destructive energies and desires characteristic of all unlimited passions and morbid conditions. Each individual is then subjected to a more or less painful "moral reeducation." The moral legitimacy of ratios of expectation, especially the discipline holding individuals to their scheduled ratio of satisfaction, is upset; and even personal equilibrium is thrown out of adjustment. Contrary to most images of anomie, the consequent deregulation is merely the releasing and sustaining condition of Durkheim's central concern--the "diseases of the infinite."

(5) Finally, Durkheim observed that anomie is chronic in the most progressive segments of modern society. In these areas the moral legitimacy of traditional schedules is most insistently repealed, and thus egocentric passions reign by default. By contrast, in earlier, more stable societies, traditional social schedules restrain and regulate potentially insatiable desires. Today, however, no social mechanism works to discipline the "diseases of the infinite;" hence, we live in an age marked by "moral anarchy."

Unfortunately, when most contemporary interpreters of Durkheim's typology discuss the meaning of anomie, they tend to skip the key premises and crucial intervening steps in his argument, and collapse it down to the last condition of "deregulation." But Durkheim's central concern was not so much the breakdown of norms as with the breakthough of an "infinity of dreams and desires." The weakening hold of the collective discipline of traditional norms acted merely as the re-

leasing and sustaining condition of this egocentricity and insatiability. Now, in shifting to his second schema, Durkheim implicitly shifted the location of these egocentric and insatiable drives from that useful fiction--the pre-social ego--to absolutizing cultural sanctions. For locating such destructive drives in the organic ego put Durkheim in something of a bind, since then the crucial aspects of human action were derived from lower (ie. biological and psychological) levels, instead of from society and culture themselves. Society in the first schema is reduced to the passive role of restraining and redirecting organic drives, instead of the fully sociological position that society and culture are the key sources of the most significant features of human action. However, in the second schema, being led to the fully sociocultural position that sanctions which become absolute can cause tremendous tensions by such insights as "every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," we see that "drives for progress and perfection," "daily represented as virtues," act as solvents of traditional types of moral authority and social integration, and may lead, ultimately, to suicide.

B. The Generic Need for Limitation of the Passions
   of the Pre-Social Ego

Durkheim began his section on anomie with this brief observation:

> But society is not only something attracting the senti-
> ments and activities of individuals with unequal force.
> It is also a power controlling them. There is a relation
> between the way this regulative action is performed and
> the social suicide rate (S:241).

The initial key to explaining anomie and suicide, Durkheim suggested, is the lack of regulation or moral discipline (or as it might be said today, with a slightly different meaning, the lack of normative integration). Just as he began his analysis of egoisme with statistical correlations between this type and Protestantism, education, occupational achievement, etc., so, too, did Durkheim began his section on anomie with

important empirical insights correlating rises in suicides, commercial activities, and industrial and financial crises.

> If therefore industrial or financial crises increase suicides, this is not because they cause poverty, since crises of prosperity have the same result; it is because they are crises, that is, disturbances of the collective order. Every disturbance of equilibrium, even though it achieves greater comfort and a heightening of general vitality, is an impulse to voluntary death. Whenever serious readjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a sudden growth or to an unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self-destruction. How is this possible? How can something generally considered to improve existence serve to detach men from it (S:246)?

In order to explain this curious occurence--that men should take their own lives when things are getting better--Durkheim began to outline here what he took to be the underlying nature of human nature (see also Book One). He began by observing that desires must always be proportionate to what is possible if happiness is to be possible.

> No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means.... If his needs require more than can be granted, or even merely something of a different sort, they will be under continual friction or can only function painfully. Movements incapable of production without pain tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the impulse to live is merely the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken as the others relax (S:246).

Then Durkheim compared the organic needs of animals, which are physiologically limited, to the socially and culturally generated desires of human beings, which, because they move in the realm of the ideal, are potentially unlimited.

> In the animal, at least in a normal condition, this equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions. All the organism needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement should be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in its own resources is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its physical nature (S:246).

Thus, in contrast to man, organic life lives in a more or

less mechanically equilibrated balance with material condi-
tions.

But man has no such built-in limitations. Even though
we are part animal, we are also persons; and the major part
of our personhood, as opposed to our egos, is composed of
impersonal and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture.
In effect, man defines his own world. Sociocultural desires
enjoy no such natural automatic constraints.

> This is not the case with man, because most of his needs
> are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree.
> ... Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies
> nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection sug-
> gests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends crav-
> ing fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly
> sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot pass.
> But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort,
> or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being?
> Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his physiologi-
> cal constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies.
> The functioning of individual life does not require them
> to cease at one point rather than another; the proof
> being that they have constantly increased since the be-
> ginning of history, receiving more and more complete
> satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health
> (S:247).

Since "man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the king-
dom of freedom" through the genetic medium of symbolic cul-
ture, man himself must construct his own social schedule of
this ever-escalating scale of wants. Every society is thus
forced to negotiate a variable ratio between organically gen-
erated needs and socioculturally generated desires.

> Above all, how to establish their proper variations with
> different conditions of life, occupations, relative im-
> portance of services, etc.? In no society are they e-
> qually satisfied on the different stages of the social
> hierarchy. Yet human nature is substantially the same a-
> mong all men, in its essential qualities. It is not hu-
> man nature which can assign the variable limits neces-
> sary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as
> they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any
> external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is
> in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss * (S:247).

Having thus posited the notion of the pre-social ego as in-
herently insatiable (see also Book One), Durkheim proceeded
to set up society and cultural norms as the necessary coun-

terweight to these generically undisciplined egoistic pas-
sions. Sensual appetites, Durkheim said, can only be con-
strained by culturally generated moral rules. Thus, culture
(as a kind of social DNA) redirects biological processes.
Desocialized (that is, demoralized), the individual ego re-
verts back to generic type and, ultimately, destroys itself
in the fruitless and random passions so often seen in self-
destructive behaviors.

> But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it
> can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited de-
> sires are insatiable by definition, and insatiability is
> rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited,
> they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at
> their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable
> thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claim-
> ed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond
> assignable limits, and sets itself unattainable goals.
> But how can such an undetermined state be any more re-
> conciled with the conditions of mental life than with
> the demands of physical life * (S:247-8)?

Having set up the specter of the release of the floods
of passion inherent in the undetermined and random energies
of the organic ego, Durkheim then explored the necessity of
controlling such desires. The first requirement of morality
and knowledge (see Book One) is discipline and definition of
these potentially insatiable desires.

> ... the passions must first be limited. Only then can
> they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But
> since the individual has no way of limiting them, this
> must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative
> force must play the same role for moral needs which the
> organism plays for physical needs. This means that the
> force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience in-
> terrupted the state of equilibrium of the animal's dor-
> mant existence; only conscience, therefore, can furnish
> the means to reestablish it * (S:248).

The expansiveness inherent in such desires, whether or-
ganic or sociocultural, can be likened to the rapid diffusion
of all forms of energy. Energy, whether it be physical, so-
cial, or cultural, Durkheim argued, indefinitely expands its
radius of movement. Norms then become containers, as it were,
of this vital but always potentially dangerous expansion. As
with physical, so with sociocultural, energies; if desires

explode rapidly and massively, then destruction inevitably
results. With the coming of market capitalism, especially,
the almost infinite expansion of the scope of the market and
the range and depth of desires and cultural expectations
meant that the radius of energies destructive of self, world,
and society has been greatly expanded.

> Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily
> tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body
> of gas, provided no other matter resists its expansion,
> fills the immensity of space, so all energy--whether
> physical or moral--tends to expand itself without limit
> so long as nothing intervenes to stop it. Hence, the
> need for regulatory organs, which constrain the total
> complex of our vital forces within appropriate limits.
> The nervous system has this function for our physical
> being. This system actuates the organs and allocates
> whatever energy is required by each of them. But the
> moral life escapes the physical system. Neither our
> brain nor any ganglion can assign limits to our intel-
> lectual aspirations or to our wills. For mental life,
> especially in its more advanced forms, transcends the
> the organism.... Sensations and physical appetites ex-
> press only the conditions of the body, not ideas and
> complex sentiments. Only a power that is equally spiri-
> tual is able to exert influences upon spiritual forces.
> This spiritual power resides in the authority inherent
> in moral rules * (ME:40-1).

Yet, Durkheim's statements remain ambiguous and confusing at
many points. A logical point: if, as Durkheim says elsewhere
"the natural is necessary," and "only the universal is ra-
tional," then how can there be any moral appeal against the
clearly generic and natural constitution of human nature? I
had thought that, to Durkheim, what is natural and universal
could not, by definition, be pathological. However, the same
logical problem was endemic in the Enlightenment philosophes'
appeal to nature (see R.R. Palmer, 1947, Ernst Cassirer,
1951). Second, clearly Durkheim began to shade over into his
second schema. For he insisted that the "mental life" as well
as the physical must accept certain constraints. But, on the
other hand, how can even physical needs be potentially un-
limited? I thought they enjoyed the benefits of an automatic
equilbrium with the natural environment. If so, then the
Durkheimian "awakening of conscience" was a social and cul-

tural event of the first magnitude; man now became the cultural animal. If any insatiable passions or appetites are to be released, the source can only be society and culture. If the recession of traditional moral discipine over the supposed insatiability of the organic ego, especially in terms of economically expressed desires, releases the "diseases of the infinite," then how can intellectual and moral desires also be potentially unlimited but ignored in the present sociological explanation of rising suicide rates? In short, if man is, indeed, the cultural animal, and if culture grows increasingly rationalized, universalized, and more complex in evolutionary progress, then how can we avoid the conclusion that it is the growth of civilization itself which engenders these infinite aspirations? Specifically, how can we continue to slight the fact that, in the West especially, absolute individualism, crusades to master the world for "God's glory," and drives for unending and relentless "progress and perfection" became massively secularized from at least the seventeenth century onward? How can we ignore such crucial cultural historical facts in our investigations of the ravages of the modern "infinity sickness"? What happens when striving for religious infinities becomes displaced into the finite, into the "muddly actual"? Durkheim himself observed:

> All man's pleasure in acting, moving, and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he had advanced. However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal--or what is the same--when his goal is infinity * (S:248).

Can we any longer seriously hope to plumb the depths of Durkheim's insights unless we pursue, not moralistic philosophies of human nature pitched covertly on biological levels, but properly drawn sociocultural explanations, especially those couched in cultural-historical terms of the development in the West of both absolutizing individualism and a massive, sustained, and ethically subsidized "march toward the infinite"? Such commitments are so deeply embedded in our wills and imaginations and so deeply sedimented in our institutions and culture, that the universal tendency

toward lapsing into "historical amnesia" leads us to pitch
these symbolic drives at the generic bio-psychological lev-
els. Instead, we should undertake a full-scale exploration
of how we came to value individualism and "marches to the
infinite" above all else (see Part II, Book Three). Doubt-
less, there are many surprises here; yet guided by the an-
cient wisdom that virtues, gone to extreme, become vices,
can we any longer ignore the foundations and paradoxical
consequences of some of our own deepest commitments?

In any case, Durkheim must be given full credit for
his discerning insights, as a pioneering sociologist and
moral philosopher, into the phenomenological ravages wrought
by these "infinities of dreams and desires."

> Since the distance between us and it is always the same,
> whatever road we take, we might as well have made the
> motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances
> behind and our feelings of pride at the distance cover-
> ed can cause only deceptive satisfaction since the re-
> maining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pur-
> sue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to
> condemn onself to a state of perpetual unhappiness
> (S:248).

Durkheim next raised the important question of the nature
and role of hope in regard to societies where, for whatever
reason, the "marches to infinity" reign. Here, hope becomes
counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue us pre-
cisely when all reason for hope is gone (W. Lynch, 1966).

> Of course, man may hope contrary to all reason, and
> hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may
> sustain him for a time, but it cannot survive the re-
> peated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What
> more can the future offer him than the past, since he
> can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach
> the glimpsed ideal (S:248)?

It is significant that Durkheim introduced the idea of hope,
and its opposite--hopelessness or despair. For unfulfilled
expectations lie at the basis of revolt and suicide. As Durk-
heim noted, infinite expectations are, by definition, unat-
tainable. If hope is not for something real and attainable,
if we invest ourselves instead in the hopeless aspiration
toward infinites while remaining mired in the finite human

condition, then inevitably disillusionment and despair ensue.
Such an aspiration only masks a deeper hopelessness, a deep-
er estrangement, perhaps even alienation. Hope must be for
the possible, we must relearn how to imagine the real, if
hope is to perform its necessary function in human affairs.

Durkheim continued, almost epigrammatically pinning our
age in one revealing phrase.

> The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfac-
> tions received only stimulate instead of filling needs.
> Shall such action be considered agreeable? First, only
> on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly,
> for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half-
> veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending mo-
> tion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it
> is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the
> lack of ease which it entails. But it would be a mira-
> cle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever encounter-
> ed. Our thread of life on this conditions is pretty thin,
> breakable at any instant * (S:248).

The restlessness we feel, whether it be expressed in econo-
mic, artistic, or moral terms, is judged by Durkheim to be
both substantively and functionally irrational (see also La-
Capra, 1972). This lack of fit should lead us to expect that
they must then be supported by some tacit ethical commitments
which may have shifted from their original locus and inten-
tion to these inappropriate spheres. Our congenital lack of
ease--economic, artistic, moral, our dis-ease over the world
as it is given over to us--is deeply embedded, not so much
in our biological egos, as in our peculiar Western cultural
traditions. Because they are so much a part of us, like
breathing air, they become invisible.

C.   The Social Schedule as the Mechanism Regulating Wants

But how is this type of generic dis-ease to which Durk-
heim alludes controlled by society? Is there some basic so-
cial or economic mechanism regulating the satisfaction of
wants? That helps set us at ease by scheduling gratifica-
tion? Certainly, suggested Durkheim:

> Physical restraint would be ineffective; hearts cannot
> be touched by physico-chemical forces. So far as the
> appetites are not automatically restrained by physiolo-

gical mechanisms, they can be halted only by a limit that they recognize as just. Men would never consent to restrict their desires if they felt justified in passing the assigned limit. But, for reasons given above, they cannot assign themselves this law of justice. So they must receive it from an authority which they respect, to which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and as a whole, or thought the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law, and to set the point beyond which the passions must not go. Finally, it alone can estimate the reward to be prospectively offered to every class of human functionary, in the name of common interests * (S:248-9).

This passage represents a crucial transition in Durkheim's argument, for he had now begun to translate his abstract premises about the need for regulation of egoistic passions into a basic sociocultural rule. Since human hearts and minds cannot be moved by physical forces, only moral forces are adequate to the task. In moralizing the drives of the organic ego, and generating the desires of the socially constructed person, society constructs parameters for potential satisfactions. Desires within these forms and bounds are legitimate, those beyond are proscribed. Thus, with Max Weber, Durkheim's basic category of control is not power or constraint, but rather legitimate moral authority (as Giddens, 1972a notes). For the socioeconomic order to work, for the individual to be properly motivated, for culture to keep desires within acceptable limits and meaningful forms, certain ratios of satisfaction must be considered legitimate by all.

Specifically, this means that every society must construct some mechanism, accepted generally as legitimate, to regulate the appropriate levels of ratios of satisfaction of individuals in terms of a social schedule. This schedule will be stratified depending upon degrees of functional contribution and cultural honor. Thus, each status position will generally receive the approximate rewards considered legitimate, both by the larger society and by the receiving stratum itself.

> At every moment of history there is a dim perception,
> in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respec-
> tive value of different social services, the relative
> reward due to each, and the consequent degree of com-
> fort appropriate on the average to workers in each oc-
> cupation. The different functions are graded in public
> opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assign-
> ed to each, according to its place in the hierarchy.
> According to accepted ideas, for example, a certain way
> of living is considered the upper limit to which a work-
> man may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence,
> and there is another limit below which he is not will-
> ingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demean-
> ed himself. Both differ for city and country workers,
> for the domestic servant and the day-laborer, for the
> business clerk and the official, etc. Likewise the man
> of wealth is reproved if he lives the life of a poor
> man, but also if he seeks refinements of luxury over-
> much. Economists may protest in vain; public opinion
> will always be scandalized if an individual spends too
> much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even
> seems that this severity relaxes only in times of moral
> disturbance * (S:249).

Durkheim here introduced a theorem of major, yet largely un-
explored, significance for sociological and economic theory.
In Durkheim's theory of the social schedule underlying econo-
mic production, distribution, and consumption, price and in-
come ratios are based, to a large extent, on the social con-
tribution and cultural status of different occupations, and
on the belief in the legitimacy of their status and the ap-
propriate reward accorded each status.

> A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not al-
> ways legally formulated, which fixes with relative pre-
> cision the maximum degree of ease of living to which
> each social class may legitimately aspire. However,
> there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It
> changes with the increase or decrease of collective
> revenue, and the changes occuring in the moral ideas
> of society. Thus, what appears to be luxury to one pe-
> riod no longer does so to another; and the well-being
> which for long periods was granted to a class only by
> exception and superogation, finally appears strictly
> necessary and equitable * (S:249-50).

The Social Schedule of economic satisfaction, then, is a
generic socio-economic cultural institution. In turn, signi-
ficant changes in the social schedule should be registered
in the basic alterations of price and income structures.

Historical inquiries might benefit by including this crucial factor in the search for underlying causes of inflation or "price revolutions," for instance.

Throughout his account, Durkheim emphasized the importance of belief in the legitimacy of the sociocultural reglementation of wants. Raw power alone is not sufficient to maintain the internal order of the social schedule of incomes and prices (these two factors always being closely related). For people must believe in the rightness, the moral justness of the basic ratios of rankings and rewards.

> But it would be of little use for everyone to recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established by public opinion, if he did not also consider the distribution of these functions just. The workman is not in harmony with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his desserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has could not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more precise rule, must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit.... It is possible everywhere, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by superior authority, that is, by collective authority. For it can be established only by requiring of one or another group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and concessions in the name of the public interest * (S:250-51).

Today these are commonplaces of sociology--for all societies combine variable ratios of ascribed and achieved status. But, in general, the former predominates in traditional societies, while the latter predominates in modern societies. Indeed, the modern world is only possible if the highly restrictive social bonds of fraternization of primitive societies rooted in "blood and soil" are progressively set aside in favor of more universalistic bonds. In this world-historical process, the individual person emerges (see Book One), freed from the "too strict tutelage" of sib and cult. However, in terms of anomie, Durkheim suggested that the contemporary process of freeing or releasing the individual ego from traditional

moral constraints has gone to extreme; there must be a re-
dress of the balance.

Against the _laissez-faire_ economic moralists, Durkheim
countered that the first step toward real freedom is self-
control and the internalization of moral discipline (see also
Book One).

> It is not true, then, that human activity can be re-
> leased from all restraint. Nothing in the world can
> enjoy such a privilege. All existence being part of
> the universe is relative to the remainder; its nature
> and method of manifestation depend not only on itself
> but on other beings, who consequently restrain and reg-
> ulate it. Here there are differences of degree and form
> between the mineral realm and the thinking person. Man's
> characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is
> not physical, but moral; that is, social. He is governed
> not by a material environment brutally imposed on him,
> but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority
> of which he feels. Because the greater, better part of
> his existence transcends the body, he escapes the body's
> yoke, but is subject to that of society * (S:252).

Clearly, even the Durkheim of _Suicide_ was no crude Parsonian
type positivist. For he insisted that the constraint exercised
by the external environment is not the key to the human equa-
tion. Rather, man escapes the "body's yoke," and becomes fully
human only by embracing the "yoke of society," that is, the
moral legitimacy of the _conscience collective_. There is no
real contradiction in this Rousseauean position that one must
give up the primitive anarchy of desires in order to become
free through society, for Durkheim posits a constant dialectic
between release and control. One becomes free from the anar-
chic passions of the organic ego only through embracing the
moral self-discipline afforded by social norms. Indeed, it is
true as Evans-Pritchard (1965) said, paraphrasing Engels,
that Durkheim believed that "man ascends from the kingdom of
necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see also Book One).

In contrast to the moral anarchy of infinite, bound-
less, or indeterminate desires, Durkheim suggested that the
socioeconomic schedule helps to regulate, define, or limit hu-
man wants. Desires are given specific and meaningful form. De-
finition here means the same as in the definition of a concept

or word--namely, the staking out of discernible boundaries,
limiting, giving it, as Shakespeare said, "a name and a local
habitation." But Durkheim's first theory of anomie rests on
the perception that the traditional socioeconcmic schedule
must have broken down. Why else are we swamped today by an
"infinity of dreams and desires"? What else could be the
source of this "infinity sickness," this "moral anarchy" that
plagues the economic and artistic ethoses especially? Yet, as
a close look at the paradoxes of Western history reveals,
there is a basic difference between a system breaking down,
and a system being broken through, being delegitimized, and
then a new alternative and more dynamic system being construc-
ted in its place. But here Durkheim was concerned with the
stability given the person by a stable or slowly evolving so-
cial schedule.

> Under this pressure, each in his own sphere vaguely
> realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and
> aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects reg-
> ulations and is docile to collective authority, that is,
> has a wholesome moral constitution, he feels that is not
> well to ask more. Thus, an end and goal are set to the
> passions. Truly, there is nothing rigid nor absolute a-
> bout such determination. The economic ideal assigned
> each class of citizens is itself confined to certain
> limits, within which the deires have free range. But
> it is not infinite. This relative limitation and the
> moderation it involves makes men contented with their
> lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it;
> and this average contentment causes the feeling of calm,
> active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living
> which characterizes health for societies as well as in-
> dividuals. Each person is then ... in harmony with his
> condition, and desires only what he may legitimately
> hope for as the normal reward for his activity.
> Besides, this does not condemn man to a sort of immo-
> bility. He may seek to give beauty to his life; but
> his attempts in this direction may fail without causing
> him to despair. For, loving what he has and not fixing
> his desire solely on what he lacks, his wishes and hopes
> may fail of what he has happened to aspire to, withcut
> his being wholly destitute. He has the essentials. The
> equilibrium of his happiness is secure because it is
> defined, and a few mishaps cannot disconcert him *
> (S:250).

Exonerating himself from imputations of conservatism, Durkheim
thus made clear his essential kinship with the ancient moral

philosophy of the "golden mean." "Human experience sees the
condition of happiness in the golden mean" (DL:237). And, of
course, in the Nichomachean Ethics, a book Durkheim certainly
knew, Aristotle said: "Evil belongs to the indeterminate, good
to the determinate.... excess and deficiency characterize
vice, while the mean characterizes virtue" (1962:43; see also
Book Three of the present dissertation).

D. The Release of the Ego's Insatiable Passions in the Modern Transitional Crisis

> But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or
> beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily in-
> capable of exercising this influence; thence comes the
> sudden rises in the curve of suicides... (S:252).

Durkheim thus next observed that when the stability of society
and moral discipline are disrupted, the legitimacy of the so-
cial schedule is also challenged, whether implicitly or expli-
citly, and, as a consequence, becomes less able to restrain
and direct individual desires. Although in normal times, Durk-
heim suggested, people more or less accept the basic ratios
of reward, in extraordinary or revolutionary times these are
no longer inevitably regarded as just or legitimate. Raw po-
lice power is then needed to maintain and enforce the inequi-
ties in distribution. Taking his notion of stable and disrup-
ted social equilibrium from Saint Simon's idea of "organic"
and "critical societies," Durkheim argued that the latter
type of period is "abnormal."

> ... discipline can be useful only if considered just by
> the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained by
> only customs and force, peace and harmony are illu-
> sory: the spirit of unrest and discontent are latent;
> appetites superficially restrained are ready to revolt.
> This happened in Rome and Greece when the faiths under-
> lying the old organization of the patricians and pleb-
> ians were shaken, and in our modern societies when a-
> ristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascen-
> dancy. But this state of upheaval is exceptional; it
> occurs only when society is passing through some ab-
> normal crisis. In normal conditions, the collective or-
> der is regarded as just by the great majority of per-
> sons. Therefore, when we say that an authority is ne-
> cessary to impose this order on individuals, we certainly

> do not mean that violence is the only means of estab-
> lishing it. Since this regulation is meant to restrain
> individual passions, it must come from a power which
> dominates individuals; but this power must also be o-
> beyed through respect, not fear (S:251-2).

In short, the socioeconomic schedule of satisfaction of wants
will inevitably break down if enforced only by raw power. On-
ly widespread belief in the moral legitimacy of a set of ra-
tios of reward will suffice. Thus, just as contemporary stock
markets experience crises of confidence, so, too, the most
critical times which societies and their economies undergo are
when there is a widespread doubt or uncertainty concerning the
dominant system of legitimate authority; of course, revolu-
tions are one outcome.

However, one can hardly refrain from asking: given
Durkheim's philosophically and historically based schema of
release and control, precisely what are the historical sources
of the progressive breakdown of moral discipline, and thus the
release of   egocentric and insatiable desires in the modern
world? Could it also be that the release of such egocentric
and insatiable desires might themselves be the unanticipated
result of the extreme development of a certain peculiar type
of moral discipline? Is there a real historical possibility
that release of egocentric "infinities of dreams and desires"
may be normatively or culturally sanctioned? In other words,
that anomie and egoisme may be the result of the presence,
rather than the absence, of moral discipline? Perhaps there
are a series of historical paradoxes hidden here which remain
untapped by Durkheim's rather bland mechanical model underly-
ing his first schema. For it would seem that even Durkheim
himself might agree, since the legitimacy of moral authority
was his fundamental category here, that if the socioeconomic
schedule is   basically upset, then its traditional and re-
vered legitimacy must also come to be fundamentally challenged
by some group. How can we believe otherwise--that the legiti-
macy of the old ways and ratios of reward were simply eroded
by the mechanical progress of the division of labor? Often
these type of challenges are advanced on moral grounds, much

as the heralds of the new social and economic order ushered
in by international market capitalism were themselves moral
prophets appealing to a new structure of conscience formed in
the secularized air of ascetic Calvinism (eg. Adam Smith and
the Scottish moralists). Such moral challenges--the competi-
tion of one type of charisma against another--are most com-
plex symbolic sociocultural processes, which are not adequate-
ly portrayed in mechanical terms. For how can mechanical pro-
cesses include rhetorical processes, questions of moral legit-
imacy, and so forth? If moral challenges to existing legiti-
mate authority, and the progressive substitution of a new and
more rigorous system is the central problem, then the question
of the nature and source of egocentric insatiability might
change also. In short, why has the traditional social schedule
broken down? Was it because of the cumulative impacts of the
mechanically driven division of labor (see Part II of this
Book). Or was it, perhaps, due to a long series of rhetorical
challenges and conflicts between competing systems of moral
authority (see Book Three)?

   Whatever the causes, the result of this breakdown or
weakening of the moral legitimacy of the traditional social
schedule of satisfaction of wants is similar. The ratio as-
signed each group becomes disturbed, uncertain, unsatisfying.
The individual becomes deregulated, declassified, or, in Durk-
heim's terms, demoralized. Once it is released from collec-
tive moral discipline, the pre-social ego reverts to type.
And the intervening process of "moral reeducation" is inevi-
tably painful.

> In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something
> like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts
> certain individuals into a lower state than their pre-
> vious one. Then they must reduce their requirements,
> restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All
> the advantages of social influence are lost so far as
> they are concerned; their moral education has to be
> recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantan-
> eously to this new life and teach them to practice the
> increased self-repression to which they are unaccustom-
> ed. So they are not adjusted to the condition forced
> on them; and its very prospect is intolerable; hence,

the suffering which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they made a trial of it (S:252).

Paradoxically, this painful "moral reeducation" commences both when things change for the worse and for the better. But why should people grow unhappy when things rapidly get better? And conversely, why shouldn't poverty itself lead to despair and perhaps even to suicide? Our economic and materialist presuppositions regarding the logic of rising human expectations run into a brick wall here. Why should wealth--the epitome of individual success in modern society--lead to unhappiness so severe that men can no longer bear the afflictions of affluence?

> It is the same if the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs are regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint on aspirations * (S:252-3).

Thus, at the core of Durkheim's theory of anomie is the presumption that the immoderate desires congenital to human nature are released when individuals are morally deregulated in the wake of economic risis or social transformation. When the change is as fundamental as the wrenching metamorphosis from traditional to market society, this "state of deregulation or anomie" becomes chronic.

> If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the principles contolling the distribution of men among various occupations. Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion, become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to

> to them.... With increased prosperity, desires increase.
> At the very moment when traditional rules have lost
> their authority, the richer prize offered these appe-
> tites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and
> impatient of control. The state of deregulation or a-
> nomie is thus further heightened by passions becoming
> less disciplined, precisely when they need more disci-
> lining * (S:253).

In prolonged disruptions, then, the whole occupational scale
is upset. Deregulation leads to release of sensual appetites.
Individuals and groups act entirely for their own self-inter-
est. In this sense, anomie refers to the historical socio-eco-
nomic condition in which the traditional schedule of expecta-
tions has broken down so that sensual appetites are not merely
released but even stimulated.

Durkheim's sociological concern with the breakdown of
the traditional social regulation of wants is important. The
release of constantly escalating demands leads those not simi-
larly favored to resent others' advances. Indeed, perhaps one
of the key sociological supports underlying the upward wage-
price spiral in modern economies is precisely this pervasive
deregulation and continuing release of competing collective
egoisms. Perhaps inflation has a key sociocultural foundation.
This real possibility might have been explored had we suffi-
ciently noted Durkheim's thesis that the ratio of scheduled
rewards is relational--that is, relative deprivation is a key
motivating force.

> But then their very demands make fulfillment impossible.
> Overweening ambition always exceeds the results obtain-
> ed, great as they may be, since there is no warning to
> pause here. Nothing gives satisfaction and all this a-
> gitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appease-
> ment. Above all, since this race for an unattainable
> goal can give no other pleasure but that of the race it-
> self ... once it is interrupted the participants are
> left empty-handed. At the same time, the struggle grows
> more violent and painful, both from being less control-
> led and because competition is greater. All classes con-
> tend among themselves because no established classifica-
> tion any longer exists. Effort grows just when it has
> become less productive. How could the desire to live not
> be weakened under such conditions * (S:253)?

I propose that insatiable and escalating competition between

occupational groups is an independent contribution to infla-
tion. We would well to remember that market capitalism was
legitimized by the Enlightenment Utilitarian moralists as a
projection of the law of nature, the "war of each against
all," of "nature red in tooth and claw." If unending and un-
restrained competition becomes the accepted norm, then what
results is a kind of sanctioned anarchy, a legitimate socio-
economic civil war in which each group practices a kind of
extortion vis-a-vis other groups.

It is most interesting to observe that, contrary to
Merton and his legions of followers, Durkheim argued that pov-
erty acts to immunize against anomie because it serves as a
restraint in itself. The moral virtue of poverty which Durk-
heim emphasized, along with traditional religious moralists,
is that there is no ever-widening gulf between our efforts
and the hopes aroused by infinite aspirations. There is no
gulf, and therefore no widening despair, because the infinite
goals entertained by religious ascetics--by those who embrace
or "choose poverty" as St. Dominic counseled--are not to be
satisfied through economic means. Clearly, something crucial
must have changed or shifted for moral and religious drives
for "progress and perfection" to have been transformed or
translated into secular economic action. Normally, for those
mired in secular poverty there are no infinite aspirations.

> Poverty protects against suicide because it is a re-
> straint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have
> to depend upon resources to some extent; actual posses-
> sions are partly the criterion of those aspired to. So
> the less one has, the less he is tempted to extend the
> range of his need indefinitely. Lack of power, compel-
> ling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing ex-
> cites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the
> other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into
> believing that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing
> the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests
> the possibility of unlimited success against them. The
> less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limi-
> tation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so
> many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value
> of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching
> self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline,
> it prepares us to accept collective discipline with

> equanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may
> arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source
> of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why humani-
> ty should not improve its material condition. But though
> the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity
> is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten*(S:254).

Durkheim as a moral philosopher critical of the modern world
is clearly in the forefront here. Indeed, in contrast to the
traditional Western moral philosophy of "human finitude" and
the "golden mean" (eg. see LaCapra, 1972; Hadyn, 1950), the
modern world somehow has come to sanction the legitimacy of
unlimited aspirations, the rightness of an "infinity of dreams
and desires." Indeed, the stimulation of infinite desires is
the very cornerstone of modern economic growth. In this re-
gard it is interesting to recall that Keynes' diagnosis of the
underlying ills causing the Great Depression of the 1930's was
that demand was not being sustained on sufficiently massive
levels to absorb the productive capacity, and thus keep the
great industrial engine of modern economies going. One of the
meanings, therefore, of post-Keynesian economics is that the
traditional relations between supply and demand have been in-
verted. No longer can manufacturers rely on the practical com-
mon sense of people to recognize that they constantly need
new and ever-more superfluous consumer goods. Rather, through
massive, subliminally directed advertising, they seek to con-
vince consumers to believe that they constantly need these
proliferating product lines. Fashion changes and restyling are
part of the same process. Hence, one of the secrets underlying
much of the continuous expansion of the American economy since
World War II is the constant stimulation of an "infinity of
dreams and desires;" this underlies the high mass consumption
economy. (Incidentally, recognition of some of these mechan-
isms helping to fuel insatiable desires further weakens Durk-
heim's first notion that human nature is inherently insatia-
ble; if that were the case, manufacturers would be relieved
of much of the necessity of pumping billions of dollars an-
nually into media advertising!) The imperative underlying the
continual escalation of the contemporary social schedule be-

comes clear: <u>first</u> <u>create</u> <u>demand</u> <u>through</u> <u>advertising</u> <u>and</u> <u>other</u> <u>means</u>, <u>then</u> <u>gear</u> <u>up</u> <u>to</u> <u>supply</u> <u>the</u> <u>demand</u> <u>that</u> <u>you</u> <u>have</u> <u>just</u> <u>stimulated</u>. Such an inversion of the traditional rela-tions between supply and demand also helps to minimize risk and uncertainty, the old nemeses of businessmen and bureau-crats.

In a sense, Durkheim the rationalistic "laic" moralist was one with traditional metaphysics and moral theology when he noted that "the less limited one feels, the more intolera-ble all limitations appear;" and when he reflected that the "spirit of rebellion is the very source of immorality." It is interesting to note that religious philosophers have tradi-tionally given another name to that type of "moral immorali-ty" or "immoral rebellion" which Durkheim perceived at the very heart of anomie--namely, <u>acedia</u>. Etymologically, <u>ace-dia</u> means "not to yield," that is, not to yield to the will of God or to acquiesce in His system of world-order. Now, Merton's historical erudition alerted him to this older usage which he assigned, in the case of the medieval monk, to the category of "retreatism" (see appendix). In Durkheim's typol-ogy, this usage would roughly correpond with "fatalisme." However, there is another possibility here: for besides pas-sive resignation, there is also an alternative drive for ac-tive mastery and control. Merton, as did Zetterberg (1967) after him in speaking of a kind of "academic acedia," (eg. in the case of Darwin's or Weber's prolonged melancholia), saw the state as one of deepening apathy, "anhedonia," and even generalized despair. But the philosopher Josep Pieper has given another, deeper meaning, to <u>acedia</u>. Pieper proposed that the "contrary of acedia is man's happy and cheeful af-firmation of his own being, his acquiescence in the world and in God" (1963:39). The reason, then, why religious moralists have often seen "anomic acedia" as a form of metaphysical re-bellion is not only because of the challenge to "God's order" in an active sense, but also because of the tacit refusal to accept "God's gift" in the more passive sense. So, whatever

forms an obstacle to the fundamental acquiescence of the self
to its natural place in the cosmos--whether these be fundamen-
tally negative images of world or of self--can lead to <u>acedia</u>
as a corollary of anomie. And, of course, systems of cosmolo-
gy and ethics which would deny out of hand that man has any
natural place to stand are inevitably linked to various forms
of anomic self-destruction, also. What matters here most is
the possible attitude of primal hostility or fundamental ac-
ceptance of the world. Significantly, Pieper added that idle-
ness <u>and</u> the incapacity for leisure are twins in human des-
pair.

> Leisure is only possible when a man is at one with him-
> self, when he acquiesces in his being; whereas the es-
> sence of acedia is the refusal to acquiesce in one's own
> being. Idleness and the incapacity for leisure correspond
> with one another (1963:40).

It is a profound insight into the ravages of the "children of
despair" upon the modern mind and soul that there is a funda-
mental commonality underlying these two seemingly opposite and
unrelated states--namely, extreme energy <u>and</u> extreme paralysis.
<u>For</u> <u>the</u> <u>instantaneous</u> <u>and</u> <u>the</u> <u>endless</u> <u>are</u> <u>but</u> <u>two</u> <u>sides</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u>
<u>same</u> <u>gnostic</u> <u>coin</u> (eg. see W. Lynch, 1966). Differently put,
it comes down to the difference between "unreal city, under
the brown fog of a winter dawn" (T.S. Eliot), and "Soul, clap
its hands and sing" (W. B. Yeats).

The final element Durkheim added to the first install-
ment of his theory of anomie was that of time and historical
process. The socially and culturally carried moral discipline
that once helped constrain passionate desires is no longer
effective. For whatever reasons, the ego's sensual appetites
are released from the constraining mold of moral <u>reglementa-</u>
<u>tion</u>. Anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors
of the modern world, especially in commerce, industry, the
professions, among intellectuals, artists, the upper middle
and educated classes, and so on. At these specific sites, the
remaining strength of the traditional social schedules is
weakened to the greatest extent. At these locations, where ex-
ternalized desires and inward dreams are most insistently

individualized, the underlying reason is that the traditional social schedule is chronically upset, thus releasing the insatiable egoism inherent in human nature. By historical contrast, in earlier and more stable societies, traditional social schedules, enforced by a shifting network of insitutions (eg. kinship, religion, government, occupational groups, etc.), worked to constrain, regulate, and redirect individual wants. But today no social or cultural mechanism in "market society" works to discipline the always latent "diseases of the infinite." However, the historical situation is even further inverted. Whereas in earlier societies deviation from the traditional social schedule were punished as illegitimate, today no regulation is perceived as legitimate. In other words, the market itself became a deus ex machina by taking over the place of former ethical principles in working to regulate desires in a mechanical manner through egoistic competition. Indeed, this implicit recognition of the legitimization of insatiable desires, of a culturally sanctioned "longing for the infinite," lies at the very heart of Durkheim's second schema. When we couple Durkheim's keen phenomenological insight with the actual historical fact that the key ethical supports for market capitalism first emerged from the secularization of Calvinistic moral thought in the Scottish Enlightenment, the evidence becomes compelling: modern anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimized insatiability (themselves deflections of the earlier Calvinistic ethos). Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's notions underlying the historical transformation from earlier forms of moral reglementation to modern "moral anarchy."

Durkheim began by emphasizing two important facts. One, anomie is chronic, not intermittent, in the modern world. Two, anomie is most intense in the most advanced areas of commerce, industry, science, and so forth. We should always remember that Durkheim's empirical points of departure were the infinite drives for "progress and perfection," the infinities of

aspiration and ego seen in modern economic and intellectual
culture.

> If anomie never appeared except ... in intermittent
> spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social sui-
> cide rate to vary from time to time, but it would not
> be a regular, constant, factor. In one sphere of social
> life, however--the sphere of trade and industry--it is
> actually in a chronic state (S:254).

Durkheim noted that in traditional societies several
social institutions served to regulate satisfaction of indi-
vidual desires through the economic sphere. In medieval and
early modern European society, for instance, various levels
of government and occupational groups such as guilds re-
strained competition and thus regulated desires. However, in
modern societies, religion, government, and guild-like groups
have lost much of their regulatory power over economic life.
Indeed, in the Utilitarian doctrine, the political sphere was
to support and stimulate the market economy, but not to reg-
ulate or constrain it (see especially Elie Halevy, 1955).
Their heretical heirs, the critical radicals (ie. Marxists).,
merely moved one step further and freely reveled in economic
control by governments who committed all their resources to
economic modernization, industrialization, to "Taylorization"
and "electrification of the nation." Durkheim made the acute
observation that for all modern nations, socialist and capi-
talist alike, economic growth and industrial prosperity con-
stitute the central goal of economic and social life (see
also Part II of this Book).

> For a whole century, economic progress has mainly con-
> sisted in freeing industrial relations from all regu-
> lation. Until very recently, it was the function of a
> whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline.
> First, the influence of religion was felt alike by
> workers and masters, the poor and the rich. It consoled
> the former and taught them contentment with their lot
> by informing them of the providential nature of the so-
> cial order, that the sphere of each class was assigned
> by God Himself, and by holding out the hope for just
> compensation in a world to come in return for the ine-
> qualities of this world. It governed the latter, recall-
> ing that worldly interests are not man's entire lot,
> that they must be subordinate to other and higher inter-
> ests, and that they should therefore not be pursued with-

out rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over them and by the relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income in which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances (S:254).

Later in _Suicide_ Durkheim proposed to reappropriate the morality of occupational groups as a remedy for anomie (see Part II of this Book). Durkheim's occupational and economic remedies were based on the incisive political insight that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the individual became stranded between the huge and the small, between the remnants of the family and the modern state, with no effective intermediary institutions to intervene on his behalf (see Giddens, 1971c; Reinhard Bendix, 1960a). Durkheim's solution to the historical problem posed by his first schema depended on a structural remedy for both a structural _and_ a cultural problem; therein lay its essential weakness. Surely we cannot uncritically accept Durkheim's tacit notion that structural fusion inevitably leads to normative regulation. Here Durkheim took pains to emphasize that he was not an historical reactionary, that the socioeconomic and cultural context which nourished the guilds had passed. In facing up to the enormity of the modern problems of anomie, there is no real possibility of resurrecting antiquated forms inadequate to the present task.

> We do not mean to propose this organization as a model. Clearly, it would be inadequate to existing societies without great changes. What we stress is its existence, the fact of its useful influence, and that nothing today has taken its place. Actually, religion has lost most of its power. And government, instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the later leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue, and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it

any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. <u>On both sides, nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the implication of the dogma of economic material- ism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems. And as these theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike</u> * (S:255).

Now, if "industrial prosperity" is the "chief aim" of modern nations, this goal is itself the outcome of "public opinion." Clearly, then, the "dogma of economic materialism" must also then be a reflection of some deeply held ethical beliefs from which it derived its dogmatic or sacred status. In other words, it must be <u>culturally sanctioned</u>. Durkheim rightly noted that both the exponents of market capitalism and bureaucratic socialism share this underlying dogma, and the underlying logics of Utilitarianism. Now, the contrast between both these modern socioeconomic systems and all those preceding the modern world is most instructive. Karl Polanyi (1968) worked out a schema of the dominant rationales and or- ganizational logics of different historical types of econo- mic systems which may be of value here. As Polanyi observed, in primitive or "reciprocally" organized economies, this sphere of human action was subordinated to the ruling ration- ales of another institution--the kinship group. In archaic, agrarian "redistributive" economies, economic action was gov- erned by the fusion of political-religious-military ration- ales. The unique feature of "market capitalism" is that, for the first time in world history, the economy was freed from all traditional moral restraints. Purely Utilitarian economic rationales (atomism, the logic of means-ends efficiency, in- satiability, etc.), and the automatic balance mechanism of the "invisible hand" began instead to dominate all social ac- tion and cultural values. Everything became subordinated to the impersonal, mechanical, natural "iron laws" of the auto- matically self-equilibrating market. Instead of economic ac- tion being the means to the material survival of the group,

a momentous historical inversion of ruling moral rationales or dominant motivations took place. Economics, in terms of the semi-magical mechanisms of market capitalism, had been freed from its instrumental role, and had, instead, become elevated to the first rung of the hierarchy of sacred values. That this was done in the name of the liberation of the individual and the potential productive powers of modern societies does not change this devastating unintentioned (and far too often unacknowledged) result. Consequently, modern social institutions have been subordinated to the ethically sanctioned "iron laws" of the automatic market mechanism. The market itself became the chief means of social control and moral discipline. Moreover, the Utilitarian moralists positively enjoined "endless strivings."

> Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege. For this reason, even the purely utilitarian regulation of them exercised by the industrial world itself through the medium of occupational groups has been unable to persist. Ultimately, this liberation of desires has been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not overmuch excite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects *
> (S:255-6)?

Clearly, if the release of sensual appetites is "sanctified," if their restraint "seems like sacrilege," then they must be morally sanctioned; Durkheim's use of sacral metaphors here is no mistake.

Durkheim proceeded with his critical moral phenomenology of the despair induced in the economic arena by the frustration of constantly rising expectations (and one might add prices!)

> Such is the source of the excitement predominating in this part of society, and which has thence extended to the other parts. There, the state of crisis and anomie is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to bot-

tom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing
where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it,
since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Real-
ity seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of
fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned
but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn
becomes reality. A thirst arises for novelties, unfa-
miliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which
lose their savor once known. Henceforth, one has no
strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever
subsides and the sterility of the tumult is apparent,
and it is seen that all these new sensations in their
infinite quantity cannot form a solid foundation of
happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise
man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without hav-
ing constantly to replace them with others, finds in
them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty.
But the man who has always pinned all his hopes on the
future and lived with his eyes fixed upon it, has noth-
ing in the past as a comfort against the present's af-
flictions; for the past was nothing to him but a series
of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to him-
self was his expectation always to find further on the
happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in
his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or a-
head to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough
to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the end es-
cape the futility of an endless pursuit * (S:256).

Durkheim constantly expanded on this theme of the psycholo-

gical ravages of the "yearning for infinity," of the exhaus-

tion of the will and the collapse of the imagination through-

out his classic monograph on suicide, especially in the

chapter on "Individual Forms of Suicide." Durkheim then di-

rectly related this psychological condition to insatiability

and suicides in the economic arena.

We may even wonder if this moral state is not princi-
pally what makes economic catastrophes of our day so
fertile in suicides. In societies where a man is sub-
jected to a healthy discipline, he submits more read-
ily to the blows of chance. The necessary effort for
sustaining a little more discomfort costs him relative-
ly little, since he is used to discomfort and constraint.
But when constraint is hateful in itself, how can closer
constraint not seem intolerable? There is no tendency to
resignation in the feverish impatience of men's lives.
When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly
the point arrived at, how painful to be thrown back!
Now this very lack of organization throws the door open
wide to every sort of adventure. Since imagination is
hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it gropes at random.

Setbacks necessarily increase with risks, and thus cri-
ses multiply, just when they are becoming destructive
* (S:256-7).

Yet, Durkheim admitted that these "thirsts for novel-
ty," for ever-changing stimulation," "when constraint is
hateful in itself," are morally legitimized. In historical
and cultural terms, Durkheim clearly recognized that these
insatiable and egoistic passions cannot be adequately ex-
plained as inherent in human nature. For, contrary to Durk-
heim's underlying causal model in his first schema, if the
individual ego is simply released from traditonal moral dis-
cipline, then why should this amorality become sanctified?
No, "eternal dissatisfaction" is not simply due to the re-
lease of the organic ego from traditional reglementation.
Rather, embarking upon infinite quests, going back at least
to the ascetics and mystics of the Mediterranean deserts, and
to the sedimentation of Christianity in medieval Gothic cul-
ture (see Spengler's notion of "Faustian Man," 1922), have
been, and continue to be, preached and morally sanctified by
certain leading groups. These culturally and structurally
powerfully situated groups socialized masses of people over
a long period of time into internalizing these norms and im-
ages, if not as moral virtues at least as the means of suc-
cessful competition. Truly such drives are deeply embedded
in our cultural traditions.

> Yet these dispositions are so inbred that society has
> grown to accept them and is accustomed to think of them
> as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's
> nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to ad-
> vance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal.
> The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark
> of moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within
> unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack
> of rule from which they suffer * (S:257).

Again, if "these dispositions are so inbred that society has
grown to accept them as normal," and if it is claimed that
man's nature is to be "eternally dissatisfied," and, indeed,
if "the longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark
of moral distinction," how can we escape the conclusion that
egoisme and anomie are culturally sanctioned? That they are

themselves the result of moral obligations gone to extreme?
At this point, however, Durkheim did not deal with the prob-
lem of the origin of the "longing for infinity," these deep-
ly "inbred predispositions."

More importantly, the actual evidence here was forcing
Durkheim to shift on his analytical axes. For next he began
to acknowledge that if the "longing for infinity" comes only
from "unregulated consciences," nonetheless, these must be
considered new rationales of conscience because they, as
Durkheim ambiguously stated, "elevated to a rule the very
lack of rule from which they suffer." Thus, contrary to Durk-
heim's initial presumptions, the clear implication that e-
merges from careful review of his own analysis is that these
new structures of conscience are led by their inherited cul-
tural norms to actively resist traditional constraints and
to be self-regulating--to be self-interrogating, to have an
"internal gyroscope" as David Riesman once suggested of the
"inner-directed person"--much as the market mechanism that
supposedly governs all our fates is also supposed to be au-
matically self-equilibrating. The rejection of traditional
moral control and the elevation of absolute or atomistic in-
dividualism and the pursuit of infinite tasks within the
world became the new constitutive norms for modern con-
sciences, the very heart and soul of the "New Modern Man"
pioneering the "Brave New World." Clearly, market capital-
ism, Utilitarian theory, industrialization, professionaliza-
tion, and so on, as Weber (eg. 1968) demonstrated, have con-
tinuing ethical foundations. Among contemporary sociologists,
Talcott Parsons has for many years rightly insisted that mod-
ern economies are underlain by secularized Calvinistic ethics.

> The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress
> has become an article of faith.... Industrial and com-
> mercial functions are really among the occupations
> which furnish the greatest number of suicides. Almost
> on a level with the liberal professions, they sometimes
> surpass them; they are especially more afflicted than
> agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make
> their appearance felt most and where the fever of busi-
> ness has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what

was once the general constitution of the economic order. And the divergence would be greater yet if, among the suicides of industry, employers were distinguished from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken by the state of anomie. The enormous rate of those with independent means sufficiently shows that the possessors of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces subordination attentuates the effects of this state. At least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by those above them, and for this reason their desires are modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them (S:257).

Suicide can be seen as Durkheim's ironic epistle to the modern world. In The Division of Labor he refuted the Utilitarian's argument that we specialized in order to produce more in order to increase our happiness, saying that "nothing could be less certain." Indeed, much of his later analysis was foreshadowed in his early article "Suicide et natalite" (1888). In Suicide, Durkheim took this analysis several steps further. He asked, in effect, how it can be the case that if "drives for progress and perfection" are meant to make us happier, they often lead instead to dissatisfaction bordering on a kind of endemic loneliness and restlessness--in short, despair? Why is it that "the more we have, the more we want"? Is it really man's nature to be "eternally dissatisfied"? If so, then is it also man's nature to face eternal unhappiness? How could such a self-contradictory apparition survive? Durkheim as moralist raised these and other questions which we must now explore, keeping in mind that we must go beyond Durkheim himself in seeking answers.

E. Matrimonial Anomie: Divorce as Deregulation

A bit later in Suicide, Durkheim turned briefly from the mainline of his argument to illustrate yet another instance of anomic deregulation, specifically the release of insatiable passions or sensual appetites through divorce and other factors mitigating against the strength of the marriage bond. Although the specific details are different than in

economic anomie, matrimonial anomie involved the same basic
principle--namely, the weakening of moral discipline over
the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. As a basic so-
cial institution, marriage meant moral regulation of sensual
appetites to Durkheim. Divorce, on the other hand, "implies
a weakening of matrimonial regulation."

> The institution of divorce must itself cause suicide
> through its effect on marriage. After all, what is
> marriage? A regulation of sexual relations, including
> not merely the physical instincts which this intercourse
> involves but the feelings of every sort gradually en-
> grafted by civilization on the foundation of physical
> desire. For among us love is a far more mental than or-
> ganic fact. A man looks to a woman, not merely to the
> satisfaction of the sexual impulse. Though this natural
> proclivity has been the germ of all sexual evolution,
> it has become increasingly complicated with aesthetic
> and moral feelings, numerous and varied, and today it
> is only the smallest element of the total complex pro-
> cess to which it has given birth. Under the influence
> of these intellectual elements it has itself been par-
> tially freed from its physical nature and assumed some-
> thing like an intellectual one. Moral reasons as well
> as physical needs impel love. Hence, it no longer has
> the regular, automatic periodicity which it displays in
> animals. A psychological impulse may awaken it any time:
> it is not seasonal. But just because these various in-
> clinations, thus changed, do not directly depend upon
> organic necessities, social regulation becomes neces-
> sary. They must be restrained by society since the or-
> ganism has no means of restraining them. This is the
> function of marriage. It completely regulates the life
> of passion, and monogamic marriage more strictly than
> any other. For by forcing a man to attach himself for-
> ever to the same woman it assigns a strictly definite
> object to the need for love, and closes the horizon
> (S:270).

Certainly, Durkheim was right in observing that, on the human
level, love has many dimensions; it is at the same time,
physical, emotional, sociocultural, and moral. But, by the
very fact that socioculturally generated desires are now re-
cognized as working down to redirect organic needs, can it
be legitimately claimed that the release of biological desire
is the central cause of matrimonial anomie? Surely this ques-
tion has become even more urgent today, when there are often
more divorces (or "dissolutions of marriage") than marriages,

when "open marriage, "swinging," and one-parent families have become the norm for large segments of the population.

Now, one can hardly wish to maintain that physical sexual relations retain the central position in man as in lower animals. For, by definition, man is the cultural animal. Not only do culture and society restrict the immediate satiation of organic and sexual desires, but they also generate myriad other activities that tend to crowd out purely organic activities from the center stage of human concern. While being partially weakened in their purely organic state, these lower level needs are restricted, redirected, and differentially stimulated by special social conditions and cultural mandates. To maintain Durkheim's two level model of man with insatiable and egoistic passions erupting from lower organic levels, and controlled or released on higher sociocultural levels, is simply sociologically untenable. Rather, the true sociocultural position would be to reverse the causal sequence, and be primarily concerned instead with the subtle ways in which social influences and cultural sanctions feedback down and reorient lower biological and psychological levels.

In terms of the freer (at least traditionally) sexual partner--the man--Durkheim's view was that marriage acts to regulate and redirect organic urges. With the sociocultural transcendence of the periodic or seasonal mating systems of higher primates, Durkheim argued, the sexual horizon in man has become potentially unlimited. The function of marriage, then, is moral--to "regulate the life of passion," "to close the horizon."

> This determination is what forms the state of moral e-
> quilibrium from which the husband benefits. Being unable
> to seek other satisfactions than those permitted, with-
> out transgressing his duty, he restricts his desires to
> them. The salutary discipline to which he is subjected
> makes it his duty to find his happiness in his lot, and
> by doing so supplies him with the means. Besides, if his
> passion is forbidden to stray, its fixed object is for-
> bidden to fail him; the obligation is reciprocal. Though
> his enjoyment is restricted, it is assumed and this cer-
> tainty forms his mental foundation (S:270-1).

In contrast to the married man, the unmarried male enjoys no such moral reglementation of his sensual appetites. Inevitably, according to Durkheim, his inherently egoistic and insatiable passions are released from moral control--"he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing." This is the "Don Juan" syndrome.

> The lot of the unmarried man is different. As he has the right to form attachment wherever inclination leads him, he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing. This morbid desire for the infinite which everywhere accompanies anomie may as readily assail this as any other part of our consciousness; it very often assumes a sexual form which was described by Musset. When one is no longer checked, one becomes unable to check one's self. Beyond experienced pleasures one senses and desires others; if one happens almost to have exhausted the range of what is possible, one dreams of the impossible; one thirsts for the nonexistent. [Footnote: see the monologue of Faust in Goethe's work). How can the feelings not be exacerbated by such unending pursuits? For them to reach that state, one need not even have infinitely multiplied the experiences of love and lived the life of a Don Juan. The humdrum existence of the ordinary bachelor suffices. New hopes constantly awake, only to be deceived, leaving a trail of weariness and disillusionment behind them. How can desire, then, become fixed, being uncertain that it can retain what it attracts; for the anomie is twofold. Just as the person makes no definitive gift of himself, he has definitive title to nothing. The uncertainty of the future plus his own indeterminateness therefore condemns him to constant change. The result of it all is a state of disturbance, agitation and discontent which inevitably increases the possibilities of suicide
> * (S:271).

Now, according to Durkheim, divorce has a similar effect--it releases the potentially insatiable sensual appetites of the ego from matrimonial regulation. Instead of one definite object for their attentions, passions are suddenly opened up to an infinite series of possibilities with no restraining horizon.

> Divorce implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation. Where it exists, and especially where law and custom permit its excessive practice, marriage is nothing but a weakened simulacrum of itself; it is an inferior form of marriage. It cannot produce its useful effects to the same degree. Its restraint upon desire is weakened; since it is more easily disturbed and superceded, it controls passion less and passion tends to rebel. It

consents less readily to its assigned limit. The moral
calmness and tranquility which were the husband's
strength are less; they are replaced to some extent by
an uneasiness which keeps a man from being satisfied
with what he has. Besides, he is the less inclined to
become attached to his present state as his enjoyment
of it is not completely sure: the future is less cer-
tain. One cannot be strongly restrained by a chain which
may be broken on one side or another at any moment. One
cannot help looking beyond one's own position when the
ground underfoot does not feel secure. Hence, in the
countries where marriage is strongly tempered by di-
vorce, the immunity of the married man is inevitably
less. As he resembles the unmarried under this regime,
he inevitably loses some of his own advantages. Conse-
quently, the total number of suicides rise (S:271-2).

As always, Durkheim's explanations are ingenious. But we can
hardly follow him in his sociology of men and women. For, as
noted earlier, Durkheim's sociology of sex roles is a "mud-
dled doctrine." His sociology of marriage is certainly open
to serious question. Whereas traditional explanations of the
marriage bond stress the protection of the woman, and the
granting of moral and legal guarantees to her, Durkheim con-
tended that marriage actually works for the man's benefit,
since it helps restrain passions that the male could not
control otherwise by himself.

Thus we reach a conclusion quite different from the
current idea of marriage and its role. It is supposed
to have been originated for the wife, to protect her
weakness against masculine caprices. Monogamy, espe-
cially, is often represented as a sacrifice made by man
of his polygamous instincts, to raise and improve wo-
man's condition in marriage. Actually, whatever histor-
ical causes may have made him accept this restriction,
he benefits more by it. The liberty he thus renounces
could only be a source of torment to him. Women did not
have the same reasons to abandon it and, in this sense,
we may say that by submitting to the same rule, it was
she who made the sacrifice * (S:275-6).

After mentioning the supposed sacrifice of the woman's sex-
ual liberty in marriage, and the acceptance of an oftentimes
oppressive restriction of her horizon of emotional attach-
ment, Durkheim appended his famous footnote on the fourth
type of suicide--fatalistic--to which we now turn.

CHAPTER FOUR

FATALISME AND PASSIVE RESIGNATION IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSIVE MORAL REGLEMENTATION

Surely, fatalisme is the "neglected stepchild" of Durkheim's typology. No less a leading light than Talcott Parsons, in his famous The Structure of Social Action, managed to completely ignore fatalisme; the balance had not yet been redressed thirty years later in his 1968 Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences article on Durkheim. Accordingly, Dohrenwend's major task in 1959 was to somehow fit fatalisme into a Parsonian or normative framework. However, although Durkheim did not help us much in delineating the characteristics of fatalistic suicides, I trust that we can recognize how well it fits into his first underlying schema.

Clearly, fatalisme and anomie are opposites in at least two senses. First, as noted earlier, the very terms themselves give us strong clues as to their essential meaning. For just as anomie refers to the release of infinite desires, so does fatalisme refer to a sort of passive resignation to oppressive moral reglementation. I believe Durkheim chose the term fatalisme to imply what we commonly mean--namely, resignation to one's fate, whether it be assigned by blind chance or society and history. Fatalisme thus implies the extreme confinement of expectations in a narrow order, to a "claustrophobic" way of life. On the contrary, anomie signifies the ominous yet tempting presence of a constantly expanding horizon of desires, a constantly renewed diversity of stimulation, a constantly lifting or receding of constraints. Anomie is "Faustian"--for it presumes accelerating expansion to infinite horizons. Second, anomie and fatalisme are not merely generic opposites, but

historical ones as well. As Parsons noted that "altruisme
is on the same plane as mechanical solidarity," so,too,
should we note that the opposite of modern anomie is the
sociocultural and psychological state where the mandates
of the traditional collective conscience, rooted ultimate-
ly in sacral and magical rationales, fatally over-burden
the individual. With anomie the individual is deregulated,
with fatalisme he is over-regulated.

Just as Durkheim used the example of the army as an
illustration of altruistic suicide in the modern world main-
ly as an evolutionary holdover, so,too,he used the oppress-
ive matrimonial regulation of men and women as an example
of the survival of an over-bearing traditional collective
conscience. It must be emphasized, however, that the prime
historical location of both altruisme and fatalisme is tra-
ditional society (see, for example, Edward Banfield, 1967).
I repeat: altruisme and fatalisme always have a prime his-
torical referent, as do anomie and egoisme.

> ... there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic
> suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are
> opposites. It is the suicide deriving from excessive
> regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly
> blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive
> discipline. It is the suicide of very young husbands,
> of the married woman who is childless. So for complete-
> ness sake, we should set up a fourth suicidal type.
>
> But it has so little contemporary importance and exam-
> ples are so hard to find aside from the cases just men-
> tioned that it seems useless to dwell upon it. How-
> ever, it might be said to have historical interest.
> Do not the suicides of slaves, said to be frequent
> under certain conditions, belong to this type, or all
> suicides attributed to excessive physical or moral
> despotism? To bring out the ineluctible and inflexi-
> ble nature of a rule against which there is no appeal,
> and in contrast with the expression "anomie" we might
> call it fatalistic suicide * (S:276).

Indeed, the paucity of textual evidence here [1] leaves
us little choice other than to simply take Durkheim at his
word that he included fatalisme mainly for the sake of com-
pleteness and internal consistency. In explaining his appar-
ent lack of concern with fatalisme as a type, Durkheim con-

tended that it is of "little contemporary importance;" pre-
sumably because there are few sociocultural sites in the mo-
dern world where the ego is over regulated! Clearly, fatal-
isme is primarily of evolutionary significance. Fatalisme
and its twin, altruisme, are to be seen as different modes
of expression of the same fundamental cultural content--
namely, the over-whelming emphasis in primitive or archaic
societies on the predominance of the collective conscience
over the individual. The altruistic suicide actively accepts
the moral demand of self-sacrifice for the group, while the
fatalistic suicide passively resigns himself to the inevita-
bility of his collectively assigned fate. He does not strug-
gle with his inexorable destiny, he simply attempts to escape
from it by usurping his one last right and possession--the
refusal to live and submit to an awful fate. The altruistic
suicide thus deprives his oppressive group of its object of
extreme reglementation. If we apply, in turn, Durkheim's
crucial notion of the social schedule of satisfaction of
wants and expectations to altruisme and fatalisme, as did
Durkheim himself with anomie, a different picture than com-
monly presented emerges. And if we pull together the time
frames of both sets of suicide the schema again takes on a
different and perhaps more profound meaning. Indeed, we shall
undertake this task in Book Three in exploring the foundations
of Durkheim's second implicit typology of suicide.

But let us first turn to consider in some detail
Durkheim's own explanations of the origins of the modern
crisis of anomie and egoisme. This task shall occupy our at-
tention in Part II of this Book.

PART II: THE CONTEMPORARY TRANSITIONAL CRISIS

AND MODERN MORAL ANARCHY

> We are living precisely in one of those critical,
> revolutionary periods, when authority is usually
> weakened through the loss of traditional discipline--
> a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of anar-
> chy (ME:54).

Preface. Against abstracted formalizations of Durkheim's schemas of suicide, Anthony Giddens (see especially 1971a, b, c; 1972) has rightly emphasized that anomie and egoisme are historically specific. They represent not so much the generic possibility of breakdown of social order and control (the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"), as the release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Giddens argues that:

> ... "regulation" (society, social constraint) cannot
> simply be juxtaposed in an abstract and universal sense
> with "lack of regulation" (anomie). The notions of both
> egoisme and anomie must be understood within the scope
> of the general conception of the development of society
> presented in The Division of Labor. Seen in this con-
> text, egoisme and anomie are not simply functional prob-
> lems facing all types of society in equivalent degree:
> they are stimulated by the very moral individualism
> which is the outcome of social evolution. The dilemmas
> facing the modern form of society, Durkheim maintained,
> are not to be resolved through a reversion to the auto-
> cratic discipline found in traditional societies, but
> only through the moral consolidation of the differentia-
> ated division of labor, which demands quite different
> forms of authority from those characteristic of earlier
> types of society (1971a:117-118).

I cannot emphasize enough that Durkheim's dialectic of release and control was always evolutionarily grounded. Anomie and egoisme, as twin forms of modern suicide, stand as objective or outward indices of the social, cultural, and psychological "moral anarchy" plaguing the "critical" or transitional phase of modern society, prior to the full institu-

tionalization of "moral individualism" and "organic solidarity."

Since Durkheim's causal-evolutionary explanation of the roots of this transitional crisis is most complex, I shall here only sketch its general outlines. The key transformations underlying his first schema are social structural and morphological in nature. For Durkheim always linked these processes: on the general evolutionary level, the progressive division of labor, societal differentiation, and individuation are greatly accelerated and even disrupted by two recent historical events of epochal significance. First, there was the rapid expansion of industry and the corresponding internationalization of the market. Second, there was the cataclysm of the French Revolution. These "twin revolutions," as Nisbet (1967) calls them, were the prime historical causes of the modern transitional crisis. The displacement of secondary groups meant that the individual is caught between the centrifugal pull of his egocentric, anarchic passions, on the one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of the remote modern State on the other. To remedy this "moral anarchy," Durkheim proposed to reconstitute "professional groups" and their political enfranchisement on the national level.

Since we rarely place Durkheim's notions of anomie and egoisme in historical perspective, perhaps a brief recap of the general evolutionary processes which Durkheim posited as underpinning this transitional crisis might be helpful. Recall, first, Durkheim's complex series of sequential equations intervening between increasing moral density, his law of the continuous extension of the "radius of social life," and the progressive division of labor, and societal differentiation. First, greater population density within a given region (the population/territory ratio), linked together by growing transporation and communications networks, leads to greater degrees of "dynamic or moral density" or sustained "increases in the quantity, intensity, and diversity of social relationships" (Alpert, 1939:90-2). On the macro-level,

increased "moral density" (or sustained social intensities)
lead, in turn, to greater competition for resources among
members of the same society. Now, this increased intra-socie-
tal competition leads, in turn, almost inevitably, to greater
specialization and occupational differentiation. These typi-
cal socioeconomic responses to long-term changes in supply
and demand often result, as is generally agreed, in greater
productive efficiencies. Greater total productivity, in turn,
accelerates the division of labor by increasing the potential
for population growth and the elaboration and extension of
technologies, especially the key infrastructural transporta-
tion and communication networks. The progressive "extension
of the radius of social life" almost inevitably generates
greater social energies, and, therefore, greater economic and
sociocultural change. In short, Durkheim postulated a most
complex, spiralling feedback process (see Book One). Thus
were Durkheim's notions of progressive social morphological
and social institutional changes linked on the micro-societal
and macro-evolutionary levels.

Further, we should recall that the "progressive efface-
ment of the segmental type of society"   and culture
by these ramifying social morphological and institutional pro-
cesses led to two additional corollary transformations. The
breakdown of the early, fused, "sacro-magical collective con-
science," led to: (1) the progressive elaboration of increas-
ingly more abstract, rational, and universalizable cultural
forms, and forms of consciousness; (2) the evolutionary emer-
gence of the individual personality as morally worthy in its
own right (see especially Giddens, 1971a, b). Indeed, it was
Durkheim's keen insight, as Nelson (1973a) and Leites (1974)
have discovered, that the autonomizing of the person, and
rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral
and intellectual discourse proceed together on the world-
historical level. In other words, the very structures and
logics of rational thought and, in turn, the rationales of
the autonomous individual person, are simultaneous sociocul-

tural constructions.

Perhaps the Parsonian notion of progressive evolutionary differentiation can initially help to illuminate Durkheim's general evolutionary view of the modern transitional crisis. Since Durkheim first indicated that everything progresses "mechanically," Parsons' mechanistic metaphors of equilibrium and strain in the differentiating social system are helpful here as guides. What are the proximate causes, according to Durkheim, of the contemporary crisis of anomie and egoisme? And what is the way out of this "moral anarchy?" Now, if the social division of labor normally produces "organic solidarity," then how is it possible for the contemporary social and economic system to become "pathological"? Essentially, Durkheim argued that two recent transformations have radically altered the conditions of social existence in European culture, and thus fatally disrupted the generally beneficial evolutionary differentiation process. First, there was the radical destruction of the ancien regime in the French Revolution, plus its uncertain aftermath. Second, there was the Industrial Revolution involving the rapid growth of large-scale industry, and the progressive internationalization of the market. These "twin revolutions"--the French and the Industrial--are the twin historical keys to Durkheim's notion of the contemporary crisis. Nisbet notes:

> The breakup of the old order--an order that had rested on kinship, land, social class, religion, local community, and monarchy--set free, as it were, the varied elements of power, wealth, and status that had been consolidated for centuries. Dislocated by revolution, scrambled by industrialism's inexorable march, fomented by the new voices of reaction and radicalism, these elements tumbled across the political landscape of nineteenth century Europe in search of new and more viable contexts (1965:20).

In his underlying notion of societies marked by an evolving and shifting equilibirum and societies torn by crisis --a view of the "historical process as oscillation between varying states of order and chaos" (LaCapra, 1972:202)--Durkheim was basically influenced by Saint-Simon's notion of "organic" and "critical" societies. LaCapra suggests:

> ... Durkheim's concepts of normality and pathology were
> more sophisticated versions of Saint-Simon's ideas of or-
> ganic and critical periods in history. Like Saint-Simon,
> Durkheim believed modern society to be, in significant
> ways, pathological. He discussed at length and with ap-
> parent agreement Saint-Simon's model of evolution in
> Western Europe in terms of a growing conflict between a
> religio-military and a scientific-industrial type of so-
> ciety. In France, this had culminated in the great Revo-
> lution.... The Revolution had destroyed the old order,
> but had miscarried in the creation of the new. It gave
> birth to the highest ideals of modern society, but it
> did not specify and establish these ideals in institu-
> tions and rational beliefs. At the start of the nine-
> teenth century, after the Revolution had run its course,
> the basic problem of a new social order was presented in
> the same terms as in 1789. Only the problem had become
> more urgent (1972:204-5).

It is, however, important to also remember that Durkheim op-
posed neither of these twin transformations, since both rep-
resented, in condensed form, the necessary culmination of
long-term evolutionary changes. What was bad about them was
instead the astonishing and violent speed with which they
destroyed the old order. The basic problem was the destruc-
tive rapidity and massiveness of these changes. Too much had
happened too fast; as a result, the old ways were justifiably
gone, but nothing adequate had yet grown up to take their
place. Modern society was thus caught in a moral and institu-
tional vacuum, a historical void in which the inherent "mor-
al anarchy" of the organic ego was left free to expand.

> ... we are going through precisely one of these criti-
> cal phases. Indeed, European society records no crisis
> as serious as that in which European societies have been
> involved for more than a century. Collective discipline
> in its traditional form has lost authority, as the diver-
> gent tendencies troubling the public conscience and the
> resulting general anxiety demonstrate. Consequently, the
> spirit of discipline itself has lost its ascendancy....
> For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact
> that the relationships between its parts are exactly reg-
> ulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious articu-
> lation of its various functions assured by effective dis-
> cipline, and if, in addition, society lacks the unity
> based upon the commitment of men's wills to a common ob-
> jective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the
> least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter.
> As a result, under present conditions, it is above all

the faith in a common ideal that we must seek to elicit
(ME:101-2).

Yet, there could be no question, as the French conser-
vatives and some of the German romantics wished, of reviving
the old order; it was gone forever, in the blink of an eye,
as it were. Such nostalgia was foreclosed by the very "mech-
anicalness" of the historical process, according to Durkheim.
It was neither possible nor desirable to go back. Yet, the
full depths of the tragedy of modern man, as Durkheim per-
ceived our continuing predicament, is that there was nothing
viable to take the place of traditional order. Especially,
there were few secondary groups standing between the central
State and the lone individual to effectively moralize egos
as the family, guild, and archaic religions had once done.
This "malintegration" or lack of effective sociocultural and
socioeconomic coordination not only "strained" the remaining
institutional structure, but most importantly, released the
egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic ego. In the
last analysis, anomie refers both to the <u>historical</u> <u>break-
down</u> of traditional moral discipline and direction, and the
<u>breakthrough</u> <u>and</u> <u>release</u> of the "infinity sickness" of the
pre-socialized ego.

Although the specific details of his remedies and the
tenor of his early optimism changed, from the beginning to
the end of his career Durkheim rarely wavered from his abi-
ding concern with the destructive dimensions of the modern
transitional crisis. Indeed, as the crisis deepened, on the
eve of World War I Durkheim melancholically reflected:

> The old ideals and the divinities which incarnate them
> are dying because they no longer respond sufficiently
> to the new aspirations of our day; and the new ideals
> which are necessary to orient our life are not yet
> born. Thus, we find ourselves in an intermediary period,
> a period of moral cold which explains the diverse mani-
> festations of which we are, at every instant, the uneasy
> and sorrowful witnesses [1914] (in Bellah, 1973:xlvii).

At the mid-point of his career (the period in which we are pres-
ently most interested), Durkheim argued: "The change in moral
temperament thus betrayed bears witness to a profound change

in our social structure. To cure one, therefore, the other
must be reformed" (S:387). In Suicide, Durkheim attempted
to determine, in effect, the "moral temperature" of the mod-
ern world. And he found us, in this advanced stage of cri-
sis, to be "pathologically ill," beset by an endemic moral
"malaise." The high suicide rate of certain groups conclu-
sively demonstrated that this "moral anarchy," although ab-
normal in macro-evolutionary terms, was nevertheless embedded
in the very nature of the modern world. At the conclusion to
Suicide Durkheim remarked:

> Thus, a monograph on suicide has a bearing beyond the
> special class of facts which it particularly embraces.
> The questions it raises are closely connected with the
> most serious practical problems of the present time.
> The abnormal development of suicide and the general un-
> rest of contemporary societies spring from the same caus-
> es. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths
> manifests the state of deep disturbance from which civi-
> lized societies are suffering, and bear witness to its
> gravity. It may even be said that this measures it. When
> these sufferings are expressed by a theorist they may be
> considered exaggerated and unfaithfully interpreted. But
> in these statistics of suicide they speak for themselves
> .... The only possible way to check this current of col-
> lective sadness is by at least lessening the collective
> malady of which it is a sign and a result (S:391).

As with all moral philosophers, Durkheim sought to offer us,
from a sociologistical perspective on societal health and
pathology, both what we might call a "theodicy"--an explana-
tion of how we got into our present predicament--and a
"therapeutic"--or a prescription to remedy our pervasive
sense of malaise.

Now, I make no claims here to present new material
from the corpus of Durkheim's work, or basically new perspec-
tives on this aspect of his work. Rather, I shall primarily
offer a systematic exegesis of Durkheim's basic series of ex-
planations of the specific historical causes of the modern
crisis of anomie and egoisme. To a great extent, it has been
this persistent slighting of the important historical back-
ground of Durkheim's thesis on anomie that has continued to
lead so many astray (eg. see McCloskey, 1974, 1976a). Certain-

ly, it is strange that we do not yet have a systematic account of Durkheim's attempt to explain the roots of the modern crisis. Further, while Durkheim's analytical and prescriptive work on the modern transitional crisis is largely consistent, he continually added new facets to his argument over the years. Perhaps it is best, therefore, if we approach his developing argument chronologically, starting with his analyses of the anomic and forced division of labor. Then we shall consider his analysis of socialism as a historically specific critical response to the rise of market capitalism. Finally, we shall review his remedial proposals for increasing the "moral mechanics" of professional groups, and the enfranchisement of these intermediate associations on the national political level. As we proceed, we should pay special attention to the deficiencies in Durkheim's causal-historical explanation of anomie and egoisme as the release of the presocialized ego from the constraint of traditional moral discipline in the modern transitional crisis.

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions,
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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VOLUME III

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June 1978

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ANOMIC DIVISION OF LABOR

> It has been said with justice that morality ... is
> going through a real crisis.... Profound changes have
> been produced in the structure of our societies in a
> very short time; they have been freed from the segmen-
> tal type with a rapidity and in proportions such as
> never have been seen in history.... The morality which
> corresponds to this social type has regressed, but with-
> out another developing quickly enough to fill the ground
> that the first left vacant in our consciousnesses. Our
> faith has been troubled; tradition has lost its sway;
> individual judgment has been freed from collective judg-
> ment. But, on the other hand, the functions which have
> been disrupted in the course of the upheaval have not
> had the time to adjust themselves to one another; the
> new life which has emerged so suddenly has not been able
> to be completely organized, and above all, it has not
> been organized in a way to satisfy the need for justice
> which has grown more ardent in our hearts (DL:408-9).

Preface. In Book Three, Chapter One, of The Division of La-
bor in Society, Durkheim presented his analysis of the anomic
division of labor. This type is the first abnormal form endem-
ic to the contemporary transitional crisis prior to the full
institutionalization of "organic solidarity" and the "cult of
the individual." Giddens reminds us:

> The analysis given in The Division of Labor demonstrates
> that organic solidarity is the essential basis of the
> modern social order; there can be no return to the form
> of solidarity which is typical of traditionalism. It is
> fundamentally important to recognize, however, that or-
> ganic solidarity, at the present juncture, is emergent,
> rather than fully institutionalized. The modern world
> is still in a transitional phase (1972a:10).

While the progressive division of social labor, on the world-
historical level, normally creates unity through diversity--
by putting into ever-more dependent contact various special-
ized occupations--nonetheless, in contemporary economic life
this is not the case. Industrial and commercial crises (eg.

the business cycle, conflict of labor and capital, class con-
flict, etc.) serve as stark testimony to an abnormal disrup-
tion of the normally integrative powers of the social divi-
sion of labor. In parallel fashion, Durkheim noted, the same
process occurs in the field of science, for the unity of
science is lost as scientific labor grows progressively spe-
cialized.

Yet, against Comte and others, Durkheim also argued
that the modern anomic deregulation of industry and the in-
ternationalization of the market are due to "effects inherent
in the division of labor." Against the Utilitarian econo-
mists, on the other hand, Durkheim contended that the divi-
sion of labor is not merely material in its effects but _moral_
as well. Although agreeing with the Socialists that the modern
economic world is beset by crisis, internal contradictions,
and a kind of legitimized egoistic anarchy, Durkheim refused
to believe that simply tying economic life to the central
government was an adequate solution, since the "State" is too
far removed from the daily details of life. Only the "corpor-
ation" (in the French sense) could hope to adequately regu-
late the anti-social (amoral) elements of modern economic ac-
tion. Let us now look more closely at this first installment
of Durkheim's notion of the modern transitional crisis in
terms of the anomic division of labor.

A. The Moral Creativity of Organic Solidarity

As a background to the problem of the anomic division
of labor, however, let us first recall that one whole axis
of Durkheim's argument in The Division of Labor maintained
that there are two basic types of social solidarity. "Mechan-
ical solidarity" implied the fusion of individuals into a
primitive sacral-magical collective consciousness. "Organic"
social bonds, on the contrary, implied the progressive dif-
ferentiation of occupational tasks leading to a sort of ram-
ifying interdependence. Identity and differentiated interde-
pendence are therefore the two fundamental forms the social

bond may take.

> ... this mechanism is not identical with that which
> serves as a basis for sentiments of sympathy, whose
> source is resemblance. Surely there can be no solidar-
> ity between others and us unless the image of others
> unites itself with ours. But when the union results
> from the resemblance of two images, it consists in an
> agglutination. The two representations become solidary
> because, being indistinct, totally or in part, they
> confound each other ... and they are solidary only in
> the measure in which they confound themselves. On the
> contrary, in the case of the division of labor, they
> are outside each other and are linked only because
> they are distinct (DL:62).

Thus, unity through identity, or unity through diversity,
are the two basic modes of construction of the social bond.
Although always and everywhere composed of both types (con-
tra Nisbet, 1965), in evolutionary terms the social bond was
originally based on the first type of relationship, and then
progressively extended through the second type. In the first
case, the social bond was highly particularistic or tribal,
and thus exclusionary (see Nelson, 1969a, 1973a), magically
stereotyped, and so on (see Chapter Six, Book One). On the
other hand, the world-scale complexity of modern life is on-
ly possible if the social bond is progressively extended
through the medium of what Durkheim called the "organic" or
differentiating division of social labor. Here, as elsewhere,
biological analogies (eg. see P. Hirst, 1973) guided Durk-
heim's "ideal typical" evolutionary constructions.

> The difference between these two types of social ar-
> rangements is as great as that which separates the or-
> ganization of certain colonies of polyps from that of
> superior animals. In the first, each of the associated
> individuals hunts on his account, in his own right; but
> what he catches is deposited in a common store, and he
> cannot have his share of the community wealth, that is
> to say, he cannot eat without all the society eating at
> the same time. On the contrary, among vertebrates each
> organ is obliged in its functioning to conform to rules
> designed to put it in harmony with the others; the ner-
> vous system assures this conformity. But each organ, and
> in every organism each tissue, and in every tissue each
> cell, maintain themselves apart, freely, without being
> dependent on the others. Each major part of the organism
> has its own special food. The distance is no less consi-
> derable between the two societal concepts which have been

so frequently likened (Soc:71).

As emphasized earlier (see Book One), as the progres-
sive elaboration of ever-more complex social morphological
structures proceeds on the intra-societal level, Durkheim
posited a corresponding shift on the inter-societal level.
The segmental type of social structure breaks down as "tri-
bal" structures coalesce into larger units. As always, Durk-
heim posited a very close correlation between the progres-
sive social morphological extension of the social bond, and
the evolutionary passage from "tribal" to "civilizational"
symbolism (eg. see Chapter Seven, Book One).

> ... organized structure, and thus, the division of la-
> bor, develops as the segmental structure disappears.
> Hence, either this disappearance is the cause of the
> development, or the development is the cause of the
> disappearance. The latter hypothesis is inadmissble, for
> we know that the segmental arrangement is an insurmount-
> able obstacle to the division of labor, and must have
> disappeared at least partially for the division of labor
> to appear. The latter can appear only in proportion to
> the disappearance of the segmental structure. To be sure,
> once the division of labor appears, it can contribute
> towards the hastening of the other's regression, but it
> is in evidence only after the regression has begun. The
> effect reacts upon the cause, but never loses its qual-
> ity of effect. The reaction it exercises is, consequent-
> ly, secondary. The growth of the division of labor is
> thus brought about by the social segments losing their
> individuality, the divisions becoming more permeable.
> In short, a coalescence takes place which makes new
> combinations possible in the social substance (DL:256).

Normally, the progressive division of labor and the re-
sulting social differentiation, according to Durkheim, is
healthy and creative, not only because it breaks down the
early archaic "repressive," fused, sacral-magical complex,
but also because it creates a new and powerful type of social
solidarity. This new type of extended or universalistic so-
cial bond also moralizes egos, but in a different way-- in-
stead of fusing them into a conscience collective, it differ-
entiates them into inter-dependent occupational specializa-
tions in the socioeconomic web of modern life. And since the
only real point of identity we now share in the organic or
complex type of solidarity is our common humanity itself, the

"cult of the individual" and "Reason" emerge as the prime forms of legitimate moral authority.

> ... not only does the division of labor present the character by which we have defined morality; it more and more tends to become the essential condition of social solidarity. As we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given him, to collective group usages, become loose. More mobile, he changes his enviroment more easily, leaves his people to go elsewhere to live a more auto-nomous existence, to a greater extent forms his own ideas and sentiments. Of course, the whole common con-science does not, on this account, pass out of exis-tence. At least there will always remain this cult of personality, of individual dignity ... which today is the rallying point of so many people (DL:400).

Although the differentiated unity of the "organic" so-cial bond is extended "mechanically" (that is, social morpho-logically and institutionally), it also is simultaneously a moralizing process. The social division of labor creates a new type of extended social bond, and thus, a new and richer base for both intelligence and morality.

> As intelligence becomes richer, activity more varied, in order for morality to remain constant, that is to say, in order for the individual to remain attached to the group with a force equal to that of yesterday, the ties which bind him to it must become stronger and more numerous. If, then, he formed no others than those which come from resemblances, the effacement of the segmental type would be accompanied by a systematic debasement of morality. Men would no longer be sufficiently obligated; he would no longer feel about and above this salutary pressure of society which moderates his egoism and makes him a moral being. This is what gives moral value to the division of labor. Through it, the individual becomes cognizant of his dependence upon society; from it comes the forces which keep him in check and restrain him. In short, since the division of labor becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it becomes, at the same time, the foundation of moral order (DL:400-01).

At this point, it becomes necessary to introduce a little noticed distinction Durkheim made between two types of conscience collective and the prime historical referent of each (see also Book One). Early in The Division of Labor, Durkheim acknowledged that the conscience collective could be viewed in at least two different ways--as the generally dif-

fused value and symbolic system of any society (ala Parsons'
generic Central Value System), or as the special historical
situation represented most clearly by primitive "mechanical
solidarity," in which the logics of moral decision and in-
tellectual understanding were primarily collective and tradi-
tional. The distinction is important, yet our failure (eg.
see Parsons, 1949, Foskett, 1939) to recognize the evolution-
ary dimension of Durkheim's thought means that we have collap-
sed the latter into the former. Wallwork is one of the few to
note the importance of Durkheim's distinction between la con-
science collective and la conscience sociale.

> The spontaneous emergence of a common life together and
> of shared rules within smaller institutions in pluralis-
> tic societies is an exceedingly important subtheme run-
> ning through Durkheim's early writings, the theme which
> leads him to draw a careful distinction between la con-
> science collective ou commune on the one hand, and la
> conscience sociale on the other. The former refers to
> the system of ideas or norms held in common throughout
> an entire society, while the latter and more inclusive
> term refers not only to beliefs and norms held in common,
> but also to institutionally engendered rules held by
> some but not all of the members of the larger collectiv-
> ity (1972:84).

Durkheim himself remarked on the ambiguity of the term con-
science collective when he observed: "The word we have em-
ployed is not, it is true, without ambiguity" (DL:80), and
observed, in passing, that it might be better to designate a
special term for his notion of the "totality of social like-
nesses" whose clearest expression is primitive tribal cul-
ture. Unfortunately, he did not do so, and thus bequeathed us
much confusion. Yet, it is worth noting the distinctions
which Durkheim did make:

> As the terms collective and social are frequently taken
> for one another, one is led to believe that the collec-
> tive conscience is the whole social conscience, that is,
> that it extends as far as the psychic life of society,
> although, especially in advanced societies, it is only
> a very restricted part of the social conscience. Judi-
> cial, governmental, scientific, industrial, in short,
> all special functions are of a psychic nature, since
> they consist in systems of representations and actions.
> They are, however, clearly outside the common conscience
> * (DL:80, in Wallwork, 1972:84).

Wallwork draws out the implications of Durkheim's distinction for our present task of understanding why Durkheim placed such importance on the role of professional groups in the modern "organic" or differentiated social division of labor.

> Each of these functionally specific groups has its own morality "... so that morality is diversified with social conditions ... there is one morality for each social stratum of the society." Gurvitch is essentially correct, then, when he states: "... whereas in mechanical solidarity, it is a matter of identical collective beliefs, in organic solidarity it is a matter of collective beliefs differentiated in subgroups." From this analysis proceeds Durkheim's observation that subgroups constitute extraordinarily important moral communities in advanced societies. Such groups, by spontaneously generating shared norms and enforcing these obligations by their authority, are, as it were, the moral equivalent in advanced societies of the collective or common conscience in primitive tribes since these groups are now primarily responsible for the specific duties that regulate most of our day-to-day activities in the family, the workshop, the university, and so forth.... The rules of such secondary group formations are thus the natural complement of the highly general, abstract principles shared throughout modern societies, and protected by public opinion at large. It is in this way that Durkheim succeeds in demonstrating that the rise of individualism, specialization, and differentiation does not necessarily lead to the normally dispersive consequences envisaged by Toennies (1972:84-5).

Finally, the evolutionary division of social labor is both necessary and desirable, since our occupational obligations also serve simultaneously to moralize us. From this "mechanical" necessity, Durkheim didn't hesitate to derive moral obligation and individual duty. Durkheim's anti-romanticism is evident here; there is no critique of the oppressive forces of "mechanism," and the fragmentation of man through the modern economic process, for example, as there was in Marx or Weber.

> ... our duty is not to spread our activity over a large surface, but to concentrate it and specialize it. We must contract our horizon, choose a definite task and immerse ourselves in it completely, instead of trying to make ourselves a sort of creative masterpiece, quite complete, which contains its worth in itself, and not in the services it renders.... We do not

cling to very much when we have no determined objec-
tive, and, consequently, we cannot very well elevate
ourselves beyond a more or less refined egotism
(DL:401-2).

Thus, in contrast to Weber's latent hoped-for "Faustian" uni-
versality (see Part I, Book Three on his cultural tradition),
Durkheim viewed specialization as good because it moralizes
the ego by attaching it to a group.

B. The Conflict Between Labor and Capital: The Separation
     of Producer and Worker

As the social bond is progressively extended, the in-
tensity of solidarity is also attenuated (Nelson, 1969a).
This attenuation of the intensity of primary group relation-
ships is especially marked in revolutionary times, when the
lingering remnants of the earlier type of solidarity based
on fused identity are ripped loose from the changing social
fabric. Moral discipline and social coordination then rapidly
fade. However, at the beginning of the section on the anomic
division of labor, Durkheim took pains to emphasize that con-
flict and anomic deregulation are not inherent in the pro-
gressive division of social labor. Against Espinas, Comte,
and others, Durkheim insisted that "division (differentia-
tion) is not necessarily dispersion." Indeed, since there are
two basic ways to social unity--primitive fused identity and
advanced differentiated interdependence--Durkheim always
searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the struc-
tures of responsibility which marked the passage from the
first to the second type of solidarity.

Here Durkheim acknowledged that the division of social
labor can have negative or "pathological forms" because coor-
dinating or integrating links become disrupted in the general
evolutionary process of de-collectivization.

> Up to now, we have studied the division of labor only
> as a normal phenomenon, but, like all social facts,
> and, more generally, all biological facts, it presents
> pathological forms which must be analyzed. Though norm-
> ally the division of labor produces social solidarity,
> it sometimes happens that it has different, and even

contrary results. Now, it is important to find out what
makes it deviate from its natural course, for if we do
not prove that these cases are exceptional, the division
of labor might be accused of logically implying them.
Moreover, the study of these deviant forms will permit
us to determine the conditions of existence of the norm-
al state better. When we know the circumstances in which
the division of labor ceases to bring forth solidarity,
we shall better understand what is necessary for it to
have that effect. Pathology, here as elsewhere, is a
valuable aid to physiology.... The first abnormal case
is furnished by industrial or commercial crises, by
failures, which are so many partial breaks in organic
solidarity.... Certain social functions are not adjusted
to one another. But, insofar as labor is divided more,
these phenomena seem to become frequent.... The conflict
between capital and labor is another example, more strik-
ing, of the same phenomenon (DL:353-4).

In terms of the growing conflict between labor and capital as
a "pathological exception" to the normally beneficent pro-
gress of the division of labor, Durkheim sketched these his-
torical phases. First, in the guild system of the middle
ages, worker and employer worked and lived side by side. Sec-
ond, with the growth of commerce and cities in the fifteenth
century:

... the occupational circle is no longer a common or-
ganization, it became an exclusive possession of the
masters, who decided all matters.... From that time, a
sharp line was drawn between masters and workers ...
quarrels became numerous. But, even then, conflict was
not everlasting. The workshops did not contain two op-
posing classes (DL:354-5).

Third, in the seventeenth century, with the growth of large
industry, and international extension of the market:

... the third phase of this history of the working
classes begins.... The worker is more completely sep-
arated from the employer.... At the same time that
specialization becomes greater, revolts become more
frequent.... Warfare becomes more violent (DL:355).

But Durkheim, relying on Levasseur, provided us with only
the barest overview of this growing conflict.

C. Durkheim's Polemic Against Comte and the Need for a
Value Consensus to Integrate Industrial Society

Durkheim differed from Comte in prescribing solutions
for the anomic deregulation of industrial relations. Since
the early segmental type of society had been broken through
forever, there could be no question of restoring the old so-
cial bond in "mechanical" terms. One could not hope to resur-
rect the conscience collective for modern society (see DL:
80). Neither would mere overt or external regulation suffice,
whether from the government, as the socialists wished, or in-
creased moral regulation, as Comte and other conservatives
proposed. Only a concrete, living society, such as that pro-
vided by occupational groups which are in continuous contact
with both producers and consumers, producers and workers,
would be capable of regulating and moralizing these twin sets
of relations. "In order that the sentiment of our state of
dependence be effective, it would be necessary for it also to
be continuous, and it can be that only if it was linked to
the very practice of each special function" (DL:361). In con-
trast to Comte and others, Durkheim wished no return to the
kind of "repressive" moral regulation characteristic of the
fused, sacro-magical, collective conscience of early "mechan-
ical solidarity." To regulate egos and moralize them into
consciences, Durkheim argued that what was needed was not an
overarching moral consensus--a Parsonian Central Value Sys-
tem--enforced by some hierarchical institution, whether it
be the Church, a bureaucratic state, or a Saint-Simonian
Council of Industrialists and Scientists.

> ... since we have shown that the enfeeblement of the
> collective conscience is a normal phenomena, we cannot
> consider it as the cause of the abnormal phenomena that
> we are studying. If, in certain cases, organic solidar-
> ity is not all it should be, it is certainly not because
> mechanical solidarity has lost ground, but because all
> the conditions for the existence of organic solidarity
> have not been realized (DL:364-5).

In his introduction to Durkheim's lectures on social-
ism, Alvin Gouldner rightly suggested: "Durkheim is unmistak-

ably conducting a polemic against Comte for having overstressed the need for moral consensus in maintaining social stability" (1958:15). Gouldner continues:

> In Comte's view, the increasing division of labor in
> modern society threatened its social cohesion. For it
> brought with it a 'fatal disposition towards a funda-
> mental dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests'
> .... The increasing division of labor was, in this ana-
> lysis, subversive of social stability because it under-
> mined the fundamental requisite of order, namely, the
> consensus of moral beliefs.... Comte failed to see that
> the social solidarity produced by the division of labor
> with its web of interdependence, was gradually being
> substituted for the earlier solidarity which had rested
> mainly on shared moral beliefs (1958:13-14).

Actually, in The Division of Labor, Durkheim moved rhetorical-
ly on at least three separate fronts simultaneously in rela-
tion to the question of the creative or disorganizing effects
of the social division of labor. Besides rejecting Comte's
and the conservatives' argument for an enforced moral consen-
sus, Durkheim also rejected both the Socialists and the Util-
itarians' positions alike since they both devalued the moral
aspects of socioeconomic action. Gouldner rightly notes:

> Durkheim was engaged on several fronts simultaneously:
> on the one hand, opposing the socialists and the utili-
> tarian individualists' neglect of moral elements, and,
> on the other, opposing Comte's overstatement of the con-
> temporary significance of moral norms in a society with
> an advanced division of labor (1958:13).

Durkheim criticized the Utilitarian moralists in these terms:

> ... we are led to consider the division of labor in a
> new light.... The economic services it renders are pica-
> yune compared to the moral effect it produces, and its
> its true function is to create in two or more persons a
> true feeling of solidarity (DL:56).

Rather, Durkheim argued that mutual reglementations emerged
in "organic solidarity," acting to pull the new social fabric
together.

> Because they have misunderstood this aspect of the phe-
> nomena, certain moralists have claimed that the division
> of labor does not produce true solidarity. They have
> seen in it only particular exchanges, without past or
> future, in which the individual is thrown on his own re-
> sources. They have not perceived the slow work of con-
> solidation, the network of links which little by little

have been woven and which marks something permanent of organic solidarity (DL:366).

In this rhetorical context, Giddens provides a useful summation (see also Lukes, 1973):

> The modern world is still in a transitional phase. This is what has misled both the idealist and utilitarian thinkers. The former still cast their eyes back to previous times, seeking to reestablish the moral consensus of traditional societies.... The utilitarians ... have developed their theories on the basis of generalizing from other areas of society where the traditional moral forms have been dissolved but have not yet been replaced by new moral prescriptions. This is particularly the case with certain sectors of industrial life, which are anomic ... which have broken away from the moral bonds of traditionalism, but which have not yet become subject to new and more appropriate regulation (1972a:10).

Insisting that social scientists put systematic analysis before instant remedies, Durkheim summed up his argument toward the end of his first great book:

> ... the remedy for the _evil_ is not to seek _to resuscitate traditions_ and practices which, no longer corresponding to present conditions of society, can only live an artificial false existence. What we must do to relieve this anomie is to discover the means for making the organs which are still wasting themselves in discordant movements harmoniously concur by introducing into their relations more justice by more and more extenuating the external inequalities which are the source of the evil. Our illness is not then, as has often been believed, of an intellectual sort; it has more profound causes. We shall not suffer because we no longer know on what theoretical notion to base the morality we have been practicing, but because, in certain parts of its functions, this morality is irremediably shattered, and that which is necessary to us is only in process of formation.... Because certain of our duties are no longer founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has resulted which will be repaired only insofar as discipline is established and consolidated. In short, _our first duty is to make a moral code for ourselves_ * (DL:409).

D. <u>Pre-Organic</u> <u>Solidarity</u> <u>and</u> <u>Deregulation</u> <u>of</u> <u>Relations</u>
   <u>Between</u> <u>Worker</u> <u>and</u> <u>Employer</u>, <u>Consumer</u> <u>and</u> <u>Producer</u>

But, today the normal equilibrium between worker and
employer, between consumer and producer, has been fatally
disrupted, Durkheim argued. Such inter-dependent groups have
been separated from one another, thus breaking off the normal
moral regulation exerted by each upon all. "The relations of
the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of
anomie." Because the economy is caught in a transitional cri-
sis, and because old moral relationships, mutual obligations
and duties have been swept away by the impact of the twin
revolutions, society, too, is affected.

> Today there are no longer any rules which fix the num-
> ber of economic enterprises, and, in each branch of in-
> dustry, production is not exactly regulated on a level
> of consumption.... What is certain is that this lack of
> regulation does not permit a regular harmony of func-
> tions. The economists claim, it is true, that this har-
> mony is self-established when necessary, thanks to rises
> or declines in prices which, according to needs, stimu-
> late or slacken production. But, in every case, this is
> established only after ruptures of equilibrium and more
> or less prolonged disturbances. Moreover, these distur-
> bances are naturally more frequent as functions are more
> generalized, for the more complex an organization is,
> the more is the need of extensive regulation felt
> (DL:366-67).

Because the intimate links between those who are engag-
ed in different phases of the same overall economic process
are snapped in modern market economies, not only is there
conflict between labor and capitalists, but also crises of
overproduction occur. With the internationalization of the
market and production for sale instead of production primari-
ly for "household" use (see K. Polanyi, 1968, Weber, 1968),
the intimate links between producers and consumers were also
snapped. This hiatus leads to the plagues of the business
cycle, constantly expanding desires, unemployment, recession
and so forth.

> The anomic condition of the division of labor, which is
> reflected both in occurence of industrial crises and in
> class conflict, is directly connected with the mode in
> which the expansion of occupational differentiation de-

stroys the integrity of the local community. In the
traditional community, production is oriented to a
specific, and known, set of local needs.... With the
growth of the division of labor, however, and the
formation of a large-scale market, each of these con-
ditions becomes undermined. A dislocation is intro-
duced between producer and consumer, because there is
no longer a direct tie between the volume of produc-
tion and the known needs of the market: thus crises
of overproduction occur (1972a:10).

Durkheim's insight into the economic and political
foundations of the modern order was keen. He saw that many
of our problems stemmed from the unanticipated consequences
of the breakdown of old moral bonds. The bond of "tribal
brotherhood" that marked primitive and peasant economies was
now broken through; the "neighborhood ethic" (as Weber call-
ed it, 1968) was dissolved in the rush to modernity. Rapid,
large-scale industrialization, and the internationalization
of the market, not only came to dominate economic action,
but social and cultural life as well. The supposedly self-
equilibrating market was mechanically driven; and this eco-
nomy-as-natural-machine made social relationships mechanical
in turn. Freed from traditional mutual constraints--the stub-
bornly interpersonal ethics of early society--social rela-
tionships became impersonal, abstracted, calculating, uncer-
tain, even anomic. These are among the "costs" we pay in the
epochal transformation from "tribal brotherhood to universal
otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a).

As the market extends, great industry appears. But it
results in changing relations of employers and employ-
ees. The great strain upon the nervous system and the
contagious influence of great agglomerations increase
the needs of the latter. Machines replace men; manufac-
turing replaces hand-work. The worker is now regimented,
separated from his family throughout the day.... These
new conditions of industrial life naturally demand a
new organization, but as these changes have been accom-
plished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict
have not yet had the time to be equilibrated (DL:370).

However, even here, Durkheim's primary concern was mor-
al. He emphasized that the negative consequence of this ano-
mic deregulation--this lack of constraining and directing,
mutual, inter-personal moral discipline--was the release of

egotistic and infinite desires. Thus, even the anomic divi-
sion of labor, then, cannot be portrayed simply in terms of
the breakdown of moral consensus or the breakdown of struc-
tural integration. From the first Durkheim saw this structur-
al breakdown as simultaneously also a breakthrough and a re-
lease of the potentially insatiable appetites of the organic
ego.

> In so far as the segmental type is strongly marked,
> there are nearly as many economic markets as there are
> different segments. Consequently, each of them is very
> limited. Producers, being near consumers, can easily
> reckon the extent of the needs to be satisfied. Equili-
> brium is established without any trouble and production
> regulates itself. On the contrary, as the organized
> type develops, the fusion of different segments draws
> the markets together into one which embraces almost all
> society. This even extends beyond, and tends to become
> universal, for the frontiers which separate peoples
> breakdown at the same time as those which separate the
> segments of each of them. The result is that each indus-
> try produces for consumers spread over the whole surface
> of the country or even of the entire world. Contact is
> then no longer sufficient. The producer can no longer
> embrace the market in a glance, nor even in thought. He
> can no longer see its limits, since it is, so to speak,
> limitless. Accordingly, production becomes unbridled
> and unregulated. It can trust only to chance, and in the
> course of these gropings, it is inevitable that propor-
> tions will be abused, as much in one direction as ano-
> ther. From this come the crises which periodically dis-
> turb economic functions. The growth of local restricted
> crises which result in failures is in all liklihood an
> effect of the same causes * (DL:369-70).

In regard to the negative aspects of occupational spe-
cialization--of workers becoming simply cogs in the great e-
conomic machine--Durkheim disagreed with those who argued
that a generalized education is necessary. Against all human-
istic and Faustian dreams of universality, Durkheim contended
that specialization was good since it limited the horizons of
the undisciplined ego. Over-regulation and deregulation were
bad also; what was needed was the ancient wisdom of the
"golden mean." Durkheim took care to absolve the division of
social labor itself from any necessary complicity: "The pre-
ceding has removed one of the most serious charges brought
against the division of labor." Durkheim denied that there is

any inherent contradiction in the division of labor which, through progressive occupational specialization, may make the worker more interdependent and organically solidary, may also make him simultaneously into a mere machine, to degrade and dehumanize him. True to his basic conviction that certain types of diversity can create unity, and the organic ego needs "circumscribed tasks and limited horizons," Durkheim argued that what we need to remedy the anomic division of labor is to give the individual worker a clearer and stronger sense of the purpose and place of his functional contribution to the total "social organism." Greater complexity requires greater organizational clarity. Few would dispute this proposition, merely whether it adequately describes all the key aspects of the problem.

> What resolves the contradiction is that, contrary to what has been said, the division of labor does not produce these consequences because of a necessity of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances. In order for it to develop without having such a disastrous influence on the human conscience, it is not necessary to temper it with its opposite. It is necessary and it is sufficient for it to be itself, for nothing to come from without to denature it. For, normally, the role of each special function does not require that the individual close himself in, but that he keep himself in constant relations with neighboring functions, take cognizance of their needs, of the changes which they undergo, etc. The division of labor presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to them. He is, then, not a machine who repeats his movements without knowing their meaning, but he knows that they tend ... towards an end that he conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that he is serving something. For that, he need not embrace most portions of the social horizon; it is sufficient that he perceive enough of it to understand that his actions have an aim beyond themselves (DL:372-3).

While there are many possible criticisms of Durkheim's explanations here, Lukes' short summary is especially cogent:

> The only trouble with this account of anomie is that, although it pinpointed the central ills of capitalism—unregulated competition, class conflict, routinized, degrading, meaningless work—it characterizes all of them as "abnormal." This procedure tended to hinder any full-scale investigation of their causes (which were as-

sumed not to be endemic), especially given the evolutionary optimism Durkheim espoused at this stage. They were to be explained by the temporary and transitional lack of the appropriate economic controls, the appropriate norms governing industrial relations, and the appropriate forms of work organization--a lack that would in due course be remedied by allowing the operation of interdependent functions to produce its natural consequences (1973:174).

But this was not all, for Durkheim added another chapter "On the Constrained Division of Labor" to which we now turn.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FORCED DIVISION OF LABOR

<u>Preface</u>. The essential problem underlying the "forced or
constrained division of labor"--the class war--is structured
inequality. Constraint here means inequality in the "external
conditions of life." With the progressive effacement of the
segmental "mechanically integrated" type, the substitution of
"organic solidarity" signals that fewer inherited inequali-
ties will be crucial in social and economic life. Impersonal
and universalistic standards are implied in the epochal
transformation of "tribal brotherhoods" into "universal other-
hoods" (Nelson, 1969a). As the social bond is progressively
extended, hierarchies rooted in "blood and soil" become less
salient, and individual merit and achievement supposedly come
more to the fore. Most modern sociologists believe this not
only to be a correct historical analysis, and that such
changes are inevitable, but also that these are necessary and
morally right. Justice, a prime concern of both critics of
the <u>ancien</u> <u>regime</u> and the industrial regime, is only possible
when the external conditions of existence are equal for all.
Thus, each person's occupation and functional contribution
will be spontaneously matched to his inherited abilities.
Here Durkheim presumed that "all external inequalities endan-
ger organic solidarity." Steven Lukes helpfully observes:

> Durkheim conceived of inequality in two broad ways:
> first, as the misallocation of individuals to social
> roles; and second, as a lack of reciprocity or equi-
> valency in the exchange of goods and services (1973:175).

Giddens also usefully summarizes the almost Mertonian aspects
of this second strand of Durkheim's argument on the "patholo-
gical" nature of the modern transitional crisis:

> The elimination of the anomic division of labor is impossible while there are still major inequalities in the distribution of opportunities for occupational achievement. Moral regulation of the division of labor only becomes adequately developed insofar as it is spontaneous, which means that individuals have to be able to fill occupational positions which accord with their talents and capabilities, and which, therefore, they will accept as legitimate.... But this situation of equality of opportunity cannot prevail where the class system inhibits the chances of large masses of attaining positions commensurate with their abilities.... The forced division of labor can be abolished if the hereditary transmission of property is ended.... Durkheim does not envisage a society in which either private property or inequality will be eliminated. Both will persist, but the existing relation will be reversed: instead of of the former determining the latter, access to material rewards will be governed by the distribution of natural inequalities. There are "internal" (biological) inequalities, of capacity and aptitude which, according to Durkheim, are ineradicable. "External inequalities," on the other hand, can and will become dissolved with the further development of the division of labor--"labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities' (Giddens, 1972a: 11-12).

Thus, because Durkheim's notion's here are, in a number of ways, close to the functionalists' theory of social stratification, it shares many of their limitations.

In this chapter, Durkheim argued normatively, deductively, and almost functionally that normally the progressive division of labor produces "organic solidarity" and, thus, interdependent social health. Durkheim presumed that only under abnormal circumstances was it possible for power to come to dominate and distort social and economic organizations. (Neither Marx nor Weber similarly deluded themselves that domination played so little generic role in human affairs). But Durkheim's primary stance as a moral philosopher led him always and everywhere to presume that social relations were primarily moral relations. If so, then how could obligation and legitimate moral authority be rooted in pure power or domination? Power was only a secondary aspect of social life to Durkheim (however, see M. Richter, 1960; Bendix, 1960a;

and Giddens, 1971c). To Durkheim, the social or moral order is fundamentally ideal. Applying this basic bias to the study of the division of labor, Durkheim argued:

> ... For the division of labor to produce solidarity, it is not sufficient that each have his task; it is still necessary that this task be fitting to him....
> If the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives rise to anxiety and pain instead of producing solidarity, this is because the distribution of social functions on which it rests does not respond, or rather no longer responds, to the distribution of natural talents (DL:375).

In the forced division of labor, "constraint alone ... links them to their functions.... Consequently, only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is possible" (DL:376). Here "... civil wars arise due to the manner in which labor is distributed" (DL:374).

To emphasize the contrast between the pathological forms of the anomic and constrained division of labor, Durkheim further developed his thesis that in the spontaneous division of labor, all functions are harmoniously adjusted to each other.

> The case is quite otherwise when it is established in virtue of purely internal spontaneity, without anything coming to disturb the initiative of individuals. In this condition, harmony between individual natures and social functions cannot fail to be realized at least in the average case. For if nothing impedes or unduly favors those disputing over tasks, it is inevitable that only those who are the most apt at each kind of activity will indulge in it. The only cause determining the manner in which work is divided, then, is the diversity of capacities. In the nature of things, the apportioning is made through aptitudes, since there is no reason for doing otherwise. Thus, the harmony between the constitution of each individual and his condition is realized of itself .... Constraint begins when regulation, no longer corresponding to the true nature of things, and accordingly, no longer having any basis in customs, can only be validated through force.... The division of labor produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in proportion as it is spontaneous... No obstacle ... prevents them from occupying the place in the social framework which is compatible with their faculties. In short, labor is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities * (DL:376-7).

One fears, however, that Durkheim invested here in the pro-

gressive division of labor such virtues that his normal case
where "harmony between individual natures and social func-
tions cannot fail to be realized" was endowed with special
magical, life-giving qualities. As Hayward observed:

> Social harmony and solidarity come from below, were
> immanent in the various groups and associations which
> constituted society rather than transcendent and super-
> personal. It was spontaneous, implicitly natural and
> rational, rather than the artefact of a hypostatized
> supreme will. It was unity in diversity, the infinite
> complexity of special interests and groups extending
> far beyond the reach of the state (1960:30).

Again, Durkheim appeared to have endowed the "naturally har-
monious" division of social labor with spontaneous, self-e-
quilibrating qualities, at least as questionable as those
which the Utilitarian moralists bestowed upon the "invisible
hand" of the market. I simply do not believe that either the
generic or historical evidence demonstrates that any basic
sociocultural process is marked by such quasi-metaphysical
and ethical powers. On the contrary, social, economic, and
cultural life is a "long and a hard row"; these on-going
processes are beset by constant conflict, uncertainty, com-
peting claims for priority, power, and legitimating moral
authority. Even science, perhaps the only cultural form
which can truly claim to be cumulative, is won only by much
trial and error (eg. see Popper, 1963).

Even Durkheim's qualifications do not basically modify
the quasi-magical potencies which he seemed to impute to the
division of labor. Although he insisted that perfect spon-
taneity is only possible when the "external conditions of
existence are equal," nonetheless he also admitted: "It is
true that this perfect spontaneity is never met with any-
where as a realized fact" (DL:378).

> Perfect spontaneity is, then, only a consequence and
> another form of this other fact--absolute equality in
> the external conditions of the conflict. It consists,
> not in the state of anarchy which would permit men to
> freely satisfy all their good or bad tendencies, but
> in a subtle organization in which each social value,
> being neither overestimated nor underestimated by any-
> thing foreign to it, would be judged at its true worth.

> ... All external inequality compromises organic soli-
> darity (DL:379).

But if the economic moralists were unjustified in beginning
with perfectly competitive markets, for instance, as an ana-
lytical baseline, why was Durkheim any more justified in pre-
suming absolute equality and spontaneity in the external con-
ditions of existence as the natural or normal state? <u>Both</u> <u>of</u>
<u>these</u> <u>notions</u> <u>are</u> <u>merely</u> <u>useful</u>, <u>legitimizing</u> <u>fictions</u> <u>for</u>
<u>the</u> <u>underlying</u> <u>ethical</u> <u>imperative</u>. As Durkheim himself admit-
ted, this normative notion is nowhere to be found in actual-
ity. It is rather, like the self-equilibrating market and
"civil society," <u>an</u> <u>ideal</u> <u>to</u> <u>be</u> <u>consummated</u>. These notions
stand not as "ideal types" in the Weberian sense, but rather
as ideal standards, states of desirable social or economic
health, as norms from which all deviations are to be critical-
ly judged.

Durkheim's normative concerns are seen again in the sec-
tions which follow where it is argued that the remedial task of
"advanced societies is a work of justice." Closing the gap
between the ideal of perfect spontaneity and social harmony,
and the sad actualities of the transitional crisis is the
task which many liberals, including Robert Merton (1938) in
his own way, took as their prime directive program. As Mer-
ton's development of this special aspect of Durkheim's notion
of anomie demonstrates, this drive to eliminate all vestiges
of structured inequality has become the implicit social, ed-
ucational, economic, and political program of the liberal so-
cial scientists (see appendix). In this sense at least, Durk-
heim's critique was prophetic. But even here, it is clear that
this imposition of ever-widening standards of universalism
has encountered stiff resistance, not only from entrenched
upper classes in various regions, but especially from lower-
middle strata which feel threatened by this incursion of an
"interventionist" liberal elite (eg. forced school bussing in
the 1970's in America). A universal otherhood, a consensually
based egalitarian society, it must be acknowledged, is the
normative ideal demanded over the past few centuries by a

strategically located upper and upper-middle class (see, for example, Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975). Universalistic cultural logics are not necessarily universally shared.

As a French positivist moral reformer, and part of the contemporary intellectual elite, Durkheim, of course, shared many of these same political passions.

> The task of the most advanced societies is, then, a work of justice.... Just as the ideal of lower socie-ties was to create or maintain as intense a common life as possible, in which the individual was absorb-ed, so our ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so as to assure the free development of all our socially useful forces.... Because the seg-mental type is effaced and the organized type develop-ed, because organic solidarity is slowly substituted for that which comes from resemblances, it is indis-pensable that external conditions become level.... Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so we need justice (DL:387-8).

Certainly, Durkheim's first installment of his explana-tion of the transformations underlying his first schema of anomie and egoisme was more complex than commonly perceived. LaCapra rightly argues that we should try to recapture the "full range of Durkheim's concept of anomie" (1972:136). He also correctly observes that beneath Durkheim's notion of a structural and normative breakdown in modern economy and so-ciety was the image of the release of amoral and insatiable passions.

> In the first edition of The Division of Labor, Durk-heim did provide sufficient grounds for rejecting any attempt to identify anomie with a total absence of in-stitutions, norms, or values--a situation which in Durkheim's usage of the term "anomie" constituted only an extreme case. The Durkheimian definition of anomie was the absence of consensually limiting norms
> (1972:136-7).

And, finally, LaCapra also rightly notes how, in historical terms, it was the new moral and institutional system of West-ern Europe and America which itself raised and sanctioned un-limited economic expectations. This is a crucial insight into the second schema of anomie, in which Durkheim fundamentally shifted on his analytical axes.

... institutions or ideologies might be anomic in the sense that they imposed <u>limitless</u> assertion or expansion, which for Durkheim was invariably bound up with substantive irrationality in the larger society.... In <u>The Division of Labor</u>, as in <u>Suicide</u>, Durkheim treated as anomic an institutional system which structurally imposed limitless maximizing activity upon members of society: a profit-oriented market economy * (1972:137).

Lukes (1973:172-78) critically reviews Durkheim's theories here, including the potent objections of Friedmann and others. As for the present study, the limitations in Durkheim's early formulation of the nature and causes of our modern pathology are that it was really neither institutional, nor cultural, nor historical. Durkheim provided no detailed historical and structural critique like that of Marx, nor did he offer a cultural analysis of the moral underpinnings of market capitalism as did Weber. Perhaps he neglected to do so because he was primarily a moralist, and was often forced, by the very logic of his multiple polemics, to embrace the faulty notion that the organic division of labor naturally and normally produces moral solidarity. Durkheim sometimes overburdened his evolutionary metaphysic. As Friedmann remarked, history has not proven his initially sanguine view correct; and indeed, Durkheim himself grew more pessimistic over the years (see "Dualism of Human Nature"). In any case, let us follow Gidden's insistence that the anomic and forced divisions of labor be considered together.

> If his treatment of the forced division of labor is neglected, then his discussion of the anomic division of labor is seen in a false light. It is this neglect of his analysis of the forced division of labor which has helped to foster the misconception that he failed to concern himself with the sources of conflict in modern societies (1971c: 511).

Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's analysis of socialism as a historically specific response to the destructive aspects of the spread of market capitalism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DURKHEIM'S ANALYSIS OF SOCIALISM: A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC
RESPONSE TO THE GROWTH OF MARKET CAPITALISM

> The essential feature of communism is the peripheral
> position it assigns economic functions in social life;
> while socialism places them as centrally as possible.
> The society envisioned by communists is ascetic; while
> socialist society would be essentially industrial. These
> are two opposing attributes that one should always keep
> in mind to prevent confusion (Soc: 107).

Preface. Marcel Mauss (1958:32) told us that early on Durk-
heim had posed his essential sociological problem in terms of
the "relationship between individualism and socialism." After
finishing his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim turned to study
socialism itself as a doctrine (see Mauss in Gouldner, 1958;
also Lukes, 1973). Also, in 1893, Durkheim published a "Note
on the Definition of Socialism," and gave lectures on the his-
torical development of socialism at Bordeaux in 1895-6. These
lectures, however, abruptly ended with analysis of Saint-Si-
mon, as Durkheim turned his full energies toward developing
L'Annee sociologique and other demanding tasks. So we are
left with a tantalizing fragment here.

Although incomplete, this effort was still brilliant,
and provides us with invaluable insights into the period and
its doctrines, and also into Durkheim's own ambivalent atti-
tudes. Durkheim addressed here a massive and sustained criti-
cism of specific modern structural transformations, centered
around the historical relations between economy, polity, and
society. Durkheim's abstracted causal-evolutionary model was
forced here to come to grips with the complexity of specific
modern historical changes. Durkheim focussed in these intro-
ductory lectures on Saint-Simon, the founder of positivism

and sociology, and one of the prime intellectual forces in French socialist theory.

Now, Durkheim often appeared to agree with many of Saint-Simon's brilliant schematic analyses of the causes of the transformation from medieval to modern society. To Durkheim, perhaps the key to Saint-Simon's doctrine was his historical analysis of the modern crisis as involving the break down of the old social order and the struggling to be born of a new order based on industry and science. Characteristically, however, Durkheim differed from Saint-Simon on the moralization and apotheosis of industry. "We know that Saint-Simon's error consisted in wishing to construct a stable society on a purely economic foundation" (Soc:274). As always, Durkheim argued that society must constrain and redirect individual "anomic" appetites.

> This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him it appears that the way to realize social peace is to free economic appetites of all restraint on the one hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For such appetites cannot be appeased unless they are limited, and they cannot be limited except by something other than themselves. They cannot be regarded as the only purpose of society since they must be subordinated to some end which surpasses them, and it is only on this condition that they are capable of being really satisfied * (Soc:241-2).

As always, Giddens provides a useful summary:

> (Socialism) ... is historically specific, and is tied to a very particular combination of social conditions: those which are identified in The Division of Labor as being the transitional phase between mechanical and organic solidarity. Socialism is a response to the state of deregulation of industry. Socialism has appeared for the reason that "in the most advanced societies of present-day Europe, production appears to be unrelated to consumption needs".... The significance of socialism is two-fold: it recognizes that the advanced societies are passing through a major stage of transition which demands the emergence of new social forms; and it perceives that some kind of regulation or control of the "free" play of market forces is necessary in the nascent society. The limitation in socialist doctrine is that the regulation which it advocates is purely economic in character. The conception of the abolition of the "political" and of the disappearance

of the "state" really implies that the "state" should
have only economic functions, that in Saint-Simonian
terms, government should be the "administration of
things, and not the administration of men." But, in
Durkheim's view, in advocating this conception, so-
cialism shares the premise of its main opponents,
Utilitarianism and political economy, holding that
society can be treated as an economic process. The
only important difference is that, while the latter
believe that this operates spontaneously, the former
consider that economic life has to be consciously di-
rected. The disjunctions and conflicts in the division
of labor are not simply to be explained in terms of
too much economic regulation (political economy), or
too little (socialism), but derive from the very pre-
dominance of the "economic" over the "social;" more
specifically, that not merely economic change, but the
moralization of economic relationships, is what is de-
manded (1972a:13-14).

A.   The Dual Nature of Socialism

Durkheim recognized the dual ambitions of socialism as
an ethical doctrine and political movement--for it was (is)
simultaneously an attack upon, and appeal to, structures of
conscience and consciousness. Resolving to study socialism
scientifically, Durkheim wisely refused to trade debating
points with this reform movement, since it represented a
morality "aspiring to a complete remodeling of the social or-
der." "All these fine refutations are a veritable work of
Penelope, endlessly beginning again, because they touch so-
cialism from without.... They blame the effects, not the cau-
ses" (Soc:44). Indeed, it was (is) this duality of ambition
which marks most socialist doctrines, especially in their
Marxist-Leninist or Maoist forms, as closed circles of thought
and action. It is interesting to note that it was precisely
this impermeability to contradiction which led Karl Popper,
in his famous The Logic of Scientific Discovery (see also
1963), to postulate new evidential canons (i.e. "falsifia-
bility") for the conduct of scientific inquiry. Durkheim re-
cognized the simultaneous moral and intellectual drives of
socialist theory, and wisely declined to enter into their
closed circle.

It is a fervor that has been the inspiration of all
these systems; what gave them life and strength is
a thirst for a more perfect justice, pity for the
misery of the working classes, a vague sympathy for
the travail of contemporary societies, etc. Social-
ism is not a science, a sociology in miniature--it
is a cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by
men who most keenly feel our collective malaise.
Socialism is to the facts which produce it what the
groans of a sick man are to the illness with which
he is afflicted, to the needs that torment him (Soc:41).

Since their prime point of departure is moral criti-
que, socialists often regard as morally tainted all those
who decline to embrace their fevered ambitions; for does not
refusal to enter into their critique and utopia imply accep-
tance of the economic and social evils all around us every-
where? For my own part, I think not; I confess that I agree
with Durkheim that socialism is hardly the answer to these
problems. It does not provide a cure, but should itself be
seen as a symptom (not a cause) of our modern travail. Al-
though socialists pride themselves on being the prime criti-
cal movement of the day (for example, the still lingering
symbolic equations of radicalism and Marxism in many univer-
sities even today), and many who are not themselves social-
ists also still respond in their conditioned fashion to these
cliches, I must insist that from a historical and cultural
perspective, <u>Marxist</u> <u>social</u> <u>theory</u> <u>simply</u> <u>does</u> <u>not</u> <u>go</u> <u>far</u>
<u>enough</u>! It is far too conventional, too loaded down with tra-
ditional symbolic equations, too dependent on its apparent
enemies for emotional charge and polemical direction, too
dependent on its opponents for its prime premises, and so on
and so forth. Perhaps the central flaw of socialist theory
is that it rhetorically incorporated key premises of its op-
ponents--I mean the Anglo Utilitarian economists.

Karl Polanyi (1944, 1968) clearly saw that Marx
made a fatal mistake by incorporating Ricardian economic
theory into his system. For Marx's economic materialism in-
directly strengthened the key premise of Utilitarian ethics
and political economy. Polanyi said: "The societal approach
personified in Marx was sapped by the economistic element in-

herited from the classics" (1968:134). This mistaken rhetor-
ical incorporation was also indirectly strengthened by the
inverted incorporation of Hegelian dialectic. Durkheim also
recognized the crucial links between the socialist and in-
dividualist Utilitarian moral and social philosophers; in
short, between the "philosophical radicals" (see Halevy,
1955) and their heretical heirs, the "critical radicals."

Instead of debating the socialists and the Utilitar-
ian individualist and materialist philosophers on their own
grounds, Durkheim wisely chose to study socialism "from the
outside."

> We will regard socialism as a thing, a reality--we
> will attempt to determine what it consists of, when
> it began, what transformations it passed through, and
> what has determined those transformations.... We are
> going to study it as we did suicide, the family, mar-
> riage, crime, punishment, responsibility, and religion
> (Soc:44).

With these cautions in mind, let us turn to Durkheim's
very careful definition of socialism, and its difference from
communist theory.

B. Durkheim's Definition of Socialism

Durkheim defined socialism in these terms: "We define
as socialist every doctrine which demands the connection of
all economic functions, or certain among them, which are at
the present time diffuse, to the directing and conscious cen-
ters of society" (Soc:54). This was an unusual and insight-
ful definition, for Durkheim made the relations between the
economy and polity the crux of his definition. Setting aside
the discussion of classes as secondary, Durkheim also recog-
nized that there were two types of socialism--depending upon
whether the demands for linking economy to polity came from
the top down (eg. Bismarck's Germany) or from the bottom up
(eg. China).

> Socialism ... is above all an aspiration for a rear-
> rangement of the social structure by relocating the
> industrial set-up in the totality of the social organ-
> ism, by drawing it out of the shadow where it was func-
> tioning automatically, summoning it to the light and to
> the control of consciousness. One can see that this as-
> piration is not felt uniquely by the lower classes but
> by the state itself which, as economic activity becomes
> a more important factor in the general life, is led by
> force of circumstances, by vital needs of the greatest
> importance, to increasingly supervise and regulate these
> economic manifestations. Just as the working masses tend
> to approach the state, the state also tends to be drawn
> toward them, for the single reason that it is always
> further extending its ramifications, and its sphere of
> influence. Socialism is far from being an exclusively
> workingman's affair! Actually, there are two movements
> under whose influence the doctrine of socialism is form-
> ed: one which comes from below and directs itself toward
> the higher regions of society, and the other which comes
> from the latter and follows a reverse direction.... At
> root, each is only an extension of the other, as they
> mutually imply each other, they are merely two different
> aspects of the same organization.... The result is two
> different kinds of socialism: a worker's socialism or a
> state socialism, but the separation is a simple differ-
> ence of degree.... They are varieties of the same genus
> (Soc:61-2).

Durkheim's insight here was keen: he rightly noted that the
problem with modern societies--a problem deeply felt by so-
cialists and other contemporary social critics--was that the
economy was fundamentally separated from the polity and from

the society. Socialists, of course, wished to link them a-
gain, as did Durkheim though in a different way. This common
insight is of fundamental historical importance, for the
great world-historical significance of the "Great Transform-
ation," as Karl Polanyi (1944) suggested, was the unprece-
dented separation of the economy from other basic institu-
tional processes, and, indeed, the inversion of previous mul-
ti-institutional relations that characterized international
"market capitalism." This unprecedented cleavage and inver-
sion must be neither assumed to be normal or inevitable (cer-
tainly no one would presume that it is unproblematic). Rath-
er, its historical uniqueness cries out to be explained (see
especially, Polanyi, 1944, 1968; Weber, 1958a,1968; Nelson,
1969a, 1975a).

C. The Contrast Between Socialism and Communism

In addition to his unconventional definition of social-
ism, Durkheim offered an invaluable series of theoretical and
historical contrasts of the former with communist theory,
with which it is commonly identified. On the basis of his
previous definition, Durkheim insisted that socialism appear-
ed rather recently in history. Communism, on the other hand,
is ancient and generic. Choosing between these two systems of
thought and moral reconstruction is potentially very impor-
tant, Durkheim argued, for their respective "theodicies" and
"therapeutics" are very different.

> ... it is highly material to determine the epoch when
> socialism began to appear.... It is essential to fix
> the moment when this cry was uttered for the first time.
> For if we see it as a recent fact related to entirely
> new social conditions, or, on the contrary, as a simple
> recurrence--at most a variation of the lamentations that
> the wretched of all epochs and societies have made heard
> --we will judge its tendencies quite differently. In the
> second case, we will be led to believe that these griev-
> ances can no more be terminated than human misery can
> end. They will be thought of as a kind of chronic illness
> of humanity... (Soc:42-3).

The initial basic similarity between these two systems of
thought and moral reconstruction, Durkheim observed, which

has often led to their conflation, is <u>their</u> <u>mutual</u> <u>opposi-</u>
<u>tion</u> <u>to</u> <u>economic</u> <u>egoism</u>.

> Both are concerned with the dangers that private inter-
> est can present to the general interest. Both are impell-
> ed by this double feeling that the free play of egoisms
> is not enough to automatically produce social order, and
> that, on the other hand, collective needs must outweigh
> individual convenience.... In short, communism and so-
> cialism have this similarity: they both oppose radical
> and intransigent individualism (Soc:75-6; see also Lukes,
> 1973:250).

Let us briefly explore some of the contrasts between so-
cialist and communist theory as seen by Durkheim. Now, Durk-
heim took as prototypes of communist theory such classics of
political literature as Plato's <u>Republic</u>, Thomas More's <u>Uto-</u>
<u>pia</u>, and so on; in other words, critical and utopian works
that have appeared sporadically throughout history. By con-
trast, Durkheim observed that the word "socialism" was only
coined around 1835, apparently in one of Robert Owen's groups
in England. To communist theorists, wealth is bad, anti-so-
cial, the very paradigm of egoism. Of Plato's outlook, Durk-
heim said: "... wealth and all that relates to it is the pri-
mary source of public corruption. It is the thing that, stim-
ulating individual selfishness, sets citizens to struggling
and unleashes conflict which ruin states" (Soc:68). Commun-
ist theory, then, to Durkheim, is abstracted, generic, moral-
istic, ahistorical--it is primarily a socio-economic-politi-
cal critique directed at the egoism inherent in human nature.
It is not a critique directed at the flaws of a historically
specific socio-economic system, as socialist theory is.

> ... the fundamental communist idea ... is that private
> property is the source of selfishness and that from
> selfishness springs immorality. But such a proposition
> does not strike at any social organization in particu-
> lar ... it applies to all times and all countries....
> Communism holds to a common authority of abstract moral-
> ity.... What it questions are the moral consequences of
> private property in general and not--as does socialism--
> the expediency of a specific economic organization ap-
> pearing at a particular time in history (Soc:73).

As ahistorical moralists, communist moral philosophers
propose that the cause of social evil and suffering is the

generic egoism of human nature. Thus, their theodicy--or explanation of how evil came to reign--is very different from that of the socialists. According to Durkheim, the fundamental question communist theorists ask is:

> What are the sources of selfishness and immorality?
> ... The question is eternal.... Egoism is too essential
> to human nature to be uprooted from it--as desirable as
> that might be. But in the measure that one sees it as
> an evil, one knows that it is a chronic illness of hu-
> manity (Soc:74).

Communist theory attempts to maintain the close-knit inter-personal ethics of tribal brotherhoods; it wishes to extend the primary group, as it were, throughout the whole social system. Because this is so difficult, given man's egoism, u-topias are the prime form of expression of communistic dreams (see B. Nelson, 1954, 1958, 1972a). In a tribal brotherhood, where each man is a brother to every other, where there is no "mine and thine," charity and the ethics of the neighborhood reign as dominant inter-personal norms. In a fine phrase, Durkheim termed communism a type of "compulsory fraternity" (Soc:89), since each is obliged to share with all.

> To ameliorate misery is not to organize economic life,
> and communism does naught but push charity to the point
> of suppressing all property. It arises from a double
> feeling: pity for the wretched and fear of the anti-so-
> cial greed and hate which the spectacle of wealth can
> rouse in their hearts. Under its most noble form, it
> expresses a movement of love and sympathy. Socialism
> is essentially a process of economic concentration and
> centralization (Soc:89).

Durkheim further noted that because of their fundamental critique of economic egoism and their embrace of "compulsory fraternity," communist theorists take as their prime model the type of social conditions in which inter-personal ethical obligations rule all--namely, in primitive tribal society. Indeed, obligatory sharing between kinship groups is the ruling principle of reciprocity (Polanyi, 1968) in primitive economies. Communist theory, then, is basically retrogressive in that it wishes to return to the inter-personal obligations of the family and the neighborhood, of the tribal brotherhood, a primal ground of undifferentiated unity before

the fall. Socialism, on the other hand, realistically accepts the modern, impersonal, mass-scale, international order generated by market capitalism, and seeks to transform this into a new type of less oppressive universal otherhood.

> The theoreticians of communism have their entire thinking oriented not toward the future, but toward the past. They are retrogressive. What they demand is not that one hasten the revolution--but that one turn back. It is behind them that they seek their models. Thus, the Platonic city does nothing but openly reproduce the ancient organization of Sparta, that is to say, what was most archaic in the constitutional forms of Greece ... the successors of Plato have merely repeated the master. It is the primitive peoples whom they offer us as an example (Soc:79).

Steven Lukes provides the following useful summationof Durkheim's outline of communist theory:

> ... he (Durkheim) contrasted socialism with communism, by which he meant utopianism--radical demands for justice, or equality, occuring sporadically throughout history, and typified by Plato, More, and Campanella. Communism was anti-industrial (putting 'industrial life outside the state'), in favor of private production and communal consumption, ascetically opposed to all wealth and abundance, and in favor of small-scale homogeneous societies in which desires are few and horizons narrow
> (1973:250).

Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim continued to build up a series of contrasts between modern socialism and timeless communist theory based on "tribal brotherhood."

> Communism views the respective situations of poor and rich in general, independent of any consideration about the state of commerce and industry, and in the way each contributes to it. So its demands apply to all societies where inequalities exist, whatever the economic regime. Socialists, on the contrary, are concerned only with the particular part of the economic machine that we call the workers, and with the relationships they maintain with the rest of the structure. Communists treat poverty and wealth in abstracto, on logical and moral grounds; socialists examine the conditions in which the non-capitalist workingman exchanges his services (Soc:88-89).

"To equate socialism and communism is to equate contrary things" (Soc:70), Durkheim insists.

> For the first, the economic organ must almost become the controlling branch of society; for the second, one could not be far enough removed from the other.... For communists, the state can fulfill its role only if it is com-

pletely insulated from industrial life; for socialists this role is essentially industrial and the connection could not be too complete. To the former, wealth is malevolent and must be put away from society; to the latter, on the contrary, it is bad only if it is not socialized. Without doubt--and this is deceiving--in both there is to be regulation, but it must be noted that it operates in opposing ways. Here, it aims to elevate industry by binding it to the state; there, to elevate the state by excluding it from industry (Soc:70).

Their basically opposed opinion of economic activity, then, leads socialism and communism to propose very different solutions to the problem of linking society, economy, and state. Since communist theorists view economic action as inherently egoistic and anti-social, as corrupting public morals, they wish to exclude it from the state and banish its baneful influence as much as possible from public life. Production is to be private, distribution and consumption public, as in some primitive societies. Socialism, on the other hand, because of its modern nature and tacit acceptance of Utilitarian premises, similarly apotheosizes economic and technological growth, and therefore strives to integrate more closely the economy, state, and society.

It is true that both systems allocate types of activity to the collective sphere which according to individualist concepts would belong in the private realm, and undoubtedly this has contributed to the confusion. But here again they are sharply contrasted. According to socialism, strictly economic functions--activities productive of services (commercial and industrial)--must be socially organized, but consumption is to remain private.... Quite to the contrary, in communism there is consumption that is communal and production which remains private
(Soc:70-1).

Again and again Durkheim drives home the same point--communism and socialism are two different theoretical and historical species.

... far from being able to contain the two kinds of doctrines in one definition, they contradict each other in essential characteristics. Whereas communism consists of an excommunication of economic activities, socialism, on the other hand, tends to integrate them more or less tightly into the community, and it is by this tendency that it is defined. For one they could not be relegated far enough from the essential branches of public life;

for the other, they had to be its center of gravity. For the first, the job of the state is specific, primarily moral, and it can acquit itself only if withdrawn from economic influences. For the second, it must before all serve as a unifying bond between the various industrial and commercial relations, for which it would act like a commercial sensorium (Soc:72).

According to Durkheim's unique and insightful contrasts, communist and socialist theory are two very different types of doctrines corresponding to two different ideals and evolutionary levels. Socialism is historically specific:"... it is only countries with developed industry that it impugnes" (Soc:73). Being "heretical" heirs of the Utilitarian radicals, the socialists apotheosize economic growth and rationalization while excoriating industrial and market capitalism; communists, on the other hand, anathematize economic activity altogether.

> The two sets of problems are entirely different. On one side, you set out to judge the moral value of wealth in the abstract and deny it; on the other, one asks whether a kind of commerce and industry harmonizes with the conditions of existence of the peoples practicing it, and if its normal or unhealthy. Thus, while communism concerns itself only occasionally with so-called economic arrangements and modifies them only to the degree necessary to place them in keeping with its principles (the abolition of private ownership), socialism, inversely, touches private property only indirectly, to the degree required to change it so that it may harmonize with the economic arrangements--the essential object of its demands (Soc:73).

> To so regulate the productive operations that they cooperate harmoniously--that is the formula of socialism. To regulate individual consumption in such a way that is everywhere equal and everywhere moderate--that is the formula of communism. On the one side, one wishes to establish regular cooperation of economic functions with each other and also with other social functions, so as to lessen friction, to avoid loss of energy, and to obtain the maximum return. On the other side, one seeks only to prevent some from consuming more than others. On the one case individual interests are organized; in the other, they are suppressed. What is there in common between these two programs (Soc:88)?

Durkheim further distinguished between the underlying intentions of communist and socialist theoreticians. These mounting series of incisive contrasts are illuminating not

only because they allow us to distinguish modern from ancient
characteristics of social criticism, but also because they
help us to see the commonalities between the two dominant op-
posing socioeconomic systems of the modern world. The common
opposition of socialism and communism to economic individual-
ism, Durkheim noted:

> ... gives them a certain family resemblance which ex-
> plains the confusion so often created. But in reality,
> the (economic) particularism which these two schools
> oppose is not the same. One school labels anti-social
> everything which is private property in a general way,
> while the other considers dangerous only the individual
> appropriation of the large economic enterprises which
> are established at a specific moment in history. There-
> fore, their significant motives are not at all the same.
> Communism is prompted by moral and timeless reasons; so-
> cialism by considerations of an economic sort. For the
> former private property must be abolished because it is
> the source of all immorality; for the latter, the vast
> industrial and commercial enterprises cannot be left to
> themselves, as they affect too profoundly the entire e-
> conomic life of society. Their conclusions are so dif-
> ferent because one sees the remedy only in a suppression,
> as complete as possible, of economic interests; the
> other, in their socialization. They only resemble each
> other, therefore, in a vague tendency to attribute to
> society a certain predominance over the individual; but
> there is nothing in common in their reasons for assert-
> ing this predominance--nor about the situations produc-
> ing these assertions, nor in the ways it is expected
> that such predominance will manifest itself (Soc:75).

Now, socialism, Durkheim insisted, is historically spe-
cific--it is a critical response to the increasing separation
of the economy from polity and society in the modern transi-
tional era. Because socialist theory is a massive and sus-
tained criticism of the ill-effects of international market
capitalism, Durkheim presumed that it responds to a deep and
divisive gap in the structure of modern societies.

> ... because socialism is bound to a socially concrete
> setting, it reveals itself at once as a social and en-
> during tendency. For the sentiments it expresses--being
> general--manifest themselves with persistence so long
> as the conditions which created them have not disappear-
> ed. And this is also what gives socialism a practical o-
> rientation. The situation to which it corresponds, being
> recent, is too harsh to tolerate or be declared incur-
> able. It is not an inveterate disease, like human immoral-

> ity in general.... Right or wrong, men have not yet had
> time to accustom themselves to modern conditions....
> Thus, in whatever way we view communism and socialism,
> we perceive contrast rather than identity. The problem
> they pose is not the same; the reforms demanded by them
> contradict more than they resemble each other.... These
> are two orders of historical fact which must be studied
> separately (Soc:74-75, 76).

Because they arise from different "theodicies," Durkheim cor-
rectly argued that their respective "therapeutics" are also
basically different. However confused these types may become
in the popular mind, Durkheim emphasized their prime histori-
cal and theoretical differences. Indeed, because of these
crucial differences, "there is a place for both communism and
socialism precisely because they are not oriented in the same
direction" (Soc:91).

In sum, Durkheim always saw the modern crisis histori-
cally--his problem was not the abstract "Hobbesian dilemma"
as Parsons would have it, but rather the release of atomistic
individualism and an "infinity of dreams and desires" in the
modern transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. I
must emphasize that, contrary to Parsons (1949), Durkheim
did not perceive anomie and egoisme to be caused by the gen-
eric absence of social control or moral discipline over the
pre-social ego. Parsons was led astray here, as he was in his
mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as a communist thinker (see
Part I, Book Three), because he abstracted Durkheim's work,
and insisted that Durkheim's prime concern was not change
but rather "social statics." Now, Durkheim shared certain as-
pects of both the socialist and communist critiques. With the
communists, he too portrayed human nature as inherently ego-
istic and economic activity as amoral (this also led Parsons
astray). With the socialists, Durkheim saw the need for prac-
tical measures to socialize egoistic economic activity, espe-
cially as these problems were exacerbated by the historical
nature of the modern crisis generated by the separation of
the economy from the polity and society. This is why Durkheim
talked about politically enfranchising occupational groups.

D.   Changes in Eighteenth Century Communist Theory:
       Seeds of Socialism

       How, then, did socialist theory arise from communist
theory? While contrasting them in many important ways, Durk-
heim next explored some of the key transitional links between
eighteenth century communist theory and nineteenth century
socialist theory.

> ... still we know that, in spite of everything, some
> relationship does exist between these two doctrines. The
> sentiments that are at the root of communism, being of
> all times, are also of ours.... But they do not disap-
> pear completely just because they are not vigorous e-
> nough to give birth to a system which states them me-
> thodically (Soc:89).

Recall first that Durkheim considered socialism to be histor-
ically grounded in the separation of the market from occupa-
tional, political, and social control, which occurred in the
late nineteenth century. More specifically, Durkheim dated
its emergence to the special conditions generated by the con-
volutions of the French and Industrial Revolutions. Now, one
of the virtues of Durkheim's brief historical sketch here is
that he portrayed the developmental problem in terms of pre-
conditions and breakthroughs. For example, before socialism
could emerge, the following conditions must obtain:

> Big industry is in process of development; the impor-
> tance attributed to economic life is sufficiently es-
> tablished by the fact that economics began to be con-
> sidered a science; the state is secularized and the
> centralization of French society is accomplished (Soc:80).

       Although communism was still the predominant critical
social doctrine of the eighteenth century, Durkheim suggested
that we encounter there:

> ... the two important seeds of socialism. First, a sen-
> timent of protest against traditional social inequali-
> ties; and second, a conception of the state which allows
> it the broadest of rights. Applied to the economic or-
> der, the first of these factors gave birth to the desire
> to modify the system, and at the same time the second
> furnished the means and the necessary instrument to a-
> chieve these modifications (Soc:107).

A new note was sounded in eighteenth century communist theo-
ry, Durkheim suggested. Theorists like Rousseau, Morelly,

Mably, etc. "... were more morally imperative, more saddened, disturbed by their own societies, and they betrayed a stronger and more generalized concern for social justice" (Lukes, 1973:251). A few theorists, such as Linguet, Necker, and Graslin, turned critical attention to the sad realities of modern industrial life, "... but at first it is only among a few rare writers that the feeling of protest ... left the sphere of philosophical abstractions to address itself to economic reality" (Soc:99). And even their conclusions were rather "timid and conservative" (Lukes, 1973:251), for they assigned the state only a "negative role."

> In short, a hope for a more just social order and an idea of the state's rights which, together are the seeds of socialism, but which were limited at the time to only rudimentary wishes--that is all we find in the eighteenth century (Soc:101).

Durkheim then posed two important historical questions: (1) "Where does this double seed come from, how was this new concept of justice and the state constituted; (2) What prevented it from leading to the socialist consequences it implied?" (Soc:102) The form of these historical inquiries is important, for here Durkheim searched not only for the specific origins and carriers of different values, but also for the preconditions acting as obstacles to breakthroughs, a typically Weberian procedure. In this way one can build a comparative check into studies of historical development. Durkheim's answer to the first question is that this "double seed" was an outgrowth of the "double movement"--the individualist and statist tendencies--of the French Revolution itself.

> It is evident that these ideas are none other than the two fundamental principles on which all the political transformations of 1789 rest. They are the result of the double movement from which the Revolution sprang: the individualist movement and the statist movement. The first resulted in having it admitted as evident that the place of the individuals in the body politic should be exclusively determined by their personal value, and consequently of having traditional inequalities rejected as unjust. The second had the result that the reforms judged to be necessary were considered realiza-

> ble, because the state was conceived as the natural in-
> strument of their realization. Besides, these principles
> are jointly responsible for each other in the sense that
> the stronger the state is constituted, and the higher it
> is raised above all individuals, of whatever class or o-
> rigin, the more, therefore, did all individuals appear
> equal through connection with it. This is where the two
> tendencies sprang from. They were born for the sake of
> the political organization and with a view to modifying
> this organization. They appeared to have so little con-
> tact with economic reality because they were formed under
> altogether different influences.... It is political i-
> deas which are the center of gravity of the system
> (Soc:102-3).

But what happened to these dynamic individualist and
statist forces? Why didn't they immediately produce social-
ist consequences?

> Arising in connection with the political organization,
> these two ideas were applied to it, they stimulated the
> transformations which are the work of the Revolution,
> but they were hardly extended beyond it. How is this?
> Since these tendencies are precisely those from which
> revolutionary events derived, we might suppose that be-
> fore they could cause economic changes they had to
> transform the political structure.... For these facts
> to produce their social or socialist consequences, they
> had first to produce their political consequences
> (Soc:107, 105).

Thus, Durkheim's model of explanation, when confronted with
actual historical problems of interpretation, converged with
Weber's--for before socialism could demand the closer linking
of the economy to the central state, these dynamic forces
first had to transform the political order itself. Given this
precondition, these same forces then extended their dynamic
demands to the complex relations between economy and polity,
on the one hand, and to society on the other. This sort of
historical reasoning is vastly superior to Durkheim's earlier
general evolutionary abstractions in The Division of Labor.
We should now hold him to these more adequate forms of ex-
planation in terms of interpreting the sources of anomic and
egoistic suicide.

E. Saint-Simon's Explanation of the Origins of the Indus-
    trial System and the Modern Transitional Crisis

> The entire doctrine of Saint-Simon hinges upon the fol-
> lowing problem: 'What is the social system required by
> the present situation of the European peoples?' To ans-
> wer this question, Saint-Simon examines history. It re-
> veals that modern societies carry within themselves two
> social systems--not only different but contradictory--
> which have been developing in opposite directions since
> the early Middle Ages. One has as its key military force
> and the unreasoned prestige of faith; the other, indus-
> trial capacity and the freely accepted authority of the
> learned. Temporally, one is completely organized for
> war, for depravation--the other for peaceful production.
> Spiritually, the former systematically turns men's minds
> away from all that is earthly, whereas the latter cen-
> ters them on things of this world. Such an antagonism
> precludes mixing and eclectic solutions.... A society
> cannot be consistent and stable as long as it rests con-
> currently on two principles so manifestly contradictory.
> It cannot be in equilibrium unless it is organized com-
> pletely in a homogeneous fashion--that is, unless all
> collective forces move in the same direction and around
> a single and identical center of gravity. It is there-
> fore necessary to choose firmly between the two systems.
> Either wholly restore one, or else extend the other to
> the entirety of social life (Soc:179).

Preface. Durkheim clearly agreed with much of Saint-Simon's

explanation of the origins and problems of the industrial sys-

tem--"... it cannot be posed with greater profundity" (Soc:

160). Durkheim's fulsome praise of Saint-Simon is important

in itself, but doubly so for our present purposes because

here Saint-Simon is acknowledged to have provided a brilliant

historical explanation of the origins and causes of the con-

temporary crisis underlying anomie and egoisme. Indeed, Durk-

heim himself never provided as detailed or subtly inflected

an historical-causal explanation of the roots of the modern

crisis.

According to Saint-Simon, the two key forces growing

up in the womb of medieval "organic" society which were des-

tined to transform it from within were the "commune" and the

growth of scientific or positive knowledge. The first notion

represents a significant convergence with Weber (1968), who

also pointed out the importance of the Occidental city as an "oath-bound confederation." The new Western commune represented a new structure of human fraternization, and thus a key phase in the world-historical extension of the social bond. Equally important was the extension and theoretical systematization of scientific knowledge in providing the "positive" logics of modern thought and action, instead of hierocratic direction and control. In this Saint-Simon showed himself to be a true son of the French Enlightenment. As a follower of Condorcet, Saint-Simon believed the growth of scientific knowledge to be the prime historical mover. Knowledge was the causal agent of historical change; the great law of "progress" ruled man's destiny (eg. see Soc:138-40). In essence, Saint-Simon wished to more explicitly link these two related historical trends: "To reorganize European societies by giving them science and industry as bases--that was the objective he never lost sight of" (Soc:123).

In contrast to the reforming "critical" philosophies of the eighteenth century, however, Saint-Simon's philosophy was to be "positive."

> [The eighteenth century philosophes of the Encyclopedia] .... were above all critical. It demonstrated that the old systems of ideas was no longer in harmony with the new discoveries of science, but it did not say what it ought to be. It was a weapon of war, made to destroy, not to reconstruct. But today reconstruction is needed. 'The philosophy of the eighteenth century was critical and revolutionary, while that of the nineteenth will be inventive and organizational' (Soc:130).

Now, sociology was to be the theoretical instrument to this practical end of "positive" social and moral reconstruction. Although other sciences were ready to be used, "social physiology," conceived on the model of the natural sciences, had to be constructed by Saint-Simon and his great protege, Comte. Saint-Simon clearly believed, Durkheim relates, that "In times of trouble and crisis, when a new system of common beliefs is straining to be worked out, it is philosophy that must direct this elaboration" (Soc:130). Without this overriding intention, French positivism and sociology itself

might never have been born. Indeed, Saint-Simon's typically
rationalistic belief that thought itself must direct action
and the new social order is clearly seen:

> 'Every social regime is an application of a philosophic
> system, and consequently it is impossible to institute
> a new regime without having previously established the
> new philosophic system to which it must correspond'
> (Soc:131).

Durkheim concluded:

> A definite social crisis had stirred his thought, and it
> was entirely to solve it that his efforts were bent. His
> entire system, consequently, has a practical ... objec-
> tive.... Although he was the first to have a really clear
> conception of what sociology had to be and its necessity
> ... he did not create a sociology. He didn't use the me-
> thod, whose principles he had so firmly stated, to discov-
> er the laws of evolution--social and general--but in or-
> der to answer a very special question--of entirely imme-
> diate interest--what is the social system required by the
> condition of European societies on the morrow of the Rev-
> olution (Soc:146)?

How did the present crisis come to be? To answer these
and other questions, Saint-Simon turned back to the womb of
Western culture in the so-called "Middle Ages," and proceeded
to offer a brilliant retrospective analysis of the birth of
the modern world. Saint-Simon saw European society, especial-
ly after the French Revolution, as caught between two oppo-
sing types of social organization--the lingering structures
of medieval "organic" society, on the one hand, and the mod-
ern industrial, urban, scientific system still straining to
be born on the other. The troubles of the contemporary age,
according to Saint-Simon, were due to the transitional cri-
sis of European society. The notion of alternating "organic"
and "critical" periods was central to Saint-Simon's histori-
cal perspective. Thus, the prime point of departure for
Saint-Simon's historical explanations of the origins of the
industrial system and our modern crisis was the religio-mil-
itary system of the "Middle Ages."

> ... the social system revolved completely around two
> centers of gravity, distinct but closely related. On
> the one hand, there were the chiefs of the army, who
> constituted what is since called feudalism, and to whom
> all of secular society was closely subjected. All prop-

erty was in their hands, and workers ... were dependent
on them. On the other hand, there were the clergy, who
controlled the spiritual direction of society generally.
... Their doctrines and decisions served as guides to
opinion; but what overwhelmingly established their au-
thority was their absolute mastery over general and par-
ticular education. In other words, the entire economic
life of society depended on the lords, and all intellec-
tual life on the priests. The first rule supremely over
productive operations, the second over consciences. Thus
all collective functions were strictly subordinated ei-
ther to military power or religious authority, and this
double subjugation constituted the social organization.
... This two-pronged supremacy was based on the nature
of things (Soc:148).

Taking this as his original analytical anchor, Saint-
Simon then began to detect contrary forces growing up within
the bosom of the older religio-military system. After Saint-
Simon, Durkheim enunciated the following hermeneutical prin-
ciple: "It is a general rule that the apogee of a social
system coincides with the beginning of its decadence. In the
eleventh century, spiritual and temporal powers were defin-
itely established; never was the authority of clergy and
lords more undisputed" (Soc:149).

But coming into existence at that very moment were two
new social forces. Being opposed to the preceding ones,
they entered into struggle with them, gradually destroy-
ing them, and thus disintegrated the system whose parts
had been bound together only because they were all sub-
jected to the all-powerful action of the double author-
ity. These two forces were the free commune and exact
science (Soc:149).

As Weber did in his monograph on The City (1968), Saint-Simon
focussed on the emerging social organization of the oath-
bound confederations, the new urban economic and political
entities. Starting first in the eleventh and twelfth century
Renaissance (centered in France), Saint-Simon observed:

... with the twelfth century began the great movement
of the emancipation of the commune. Villages ... were
freeing themselves from seigneurial tutelage. And they
were totally composed of artisans and merchants. A whole
segment of the economic structure thus found itself de-
tached from the others who until then were forcing their
control on it. Transformed into a special, relatively in-
dependent organ, henceforth the villages were going to
live their own lives, to pursue their particular inter-

> ests--outside of any military influence.... Liberated
> industry was going to be able freely to realize its own
> nature.... A new force, sui generis, had entered the
> heart of the social body, and as by nature and origin
> it was foreign to theold organization--and could only
> disturb it--it was inevitable that its very presence
> would disconcert the latter's functioning, and would
> develop only by destroying it (Soc:149-50).

Among the important aspects of the Renaissance of the twelfth
century was the re-introduction of classical literature and
philosophy. The Arabs were the prime conduits for the trans-
mission of Greek philosophy, and their oftentimes sophisti-
cated development of this classical tradition helped generate
a "rational structure of consciousness" (see Nelson, 1973a)
within the old feudal system. In the new urban confedera-
tions, a new institution and professional group was arising
--namely, the university and the scholastic philosophers.

> Gradually, in opposition to the clergy, a new body was
> forming, which like the preceding one aimed at direc-
> ting the intellectual life of society. These were the
> scholars who, in their relation to the clerical class
> were exactly in the same situation as were the enfran-
> chised communes--that is, the corporation of artisans
> and merchants--vis-a-vis feudalism. Thus two seeds of
> destruction were introduced into the theological feudal
> system, and from that moment the two forces which were
> the source of its strength began to grow weaker (Soc:150).

For centuries, these "seeds of destruction"--the urban
commune as a new form of voluntaristic fraternization, and
rational philosophy--continued growing in strength, until
the massive dislocations and religious wars of the sixteenth
century. "Although the conflict never ceased, it was some
time before it produced visible results. The old system was
too solidly entrenched, and too resistant, for obscure caus-
es to immediately manifest their action through exterior and
apparent effects" (Soc:150). Saint-Simon's keen insight into
the complexities and dialectics of sociocultural process led
him to recognize these crucial "subterranean processes" run-
ning beneath the long-distorted Enlightenment images of the
so-called "dark ages." Durkheim noted: "He (Saint-Simon)
keeps repeating that this arrangment of European societies
establishes itself spontaneously because it alone correspond-

ed to the state of civilization" (Soc:148). Indeed, Saint-
Simon not only granted the medieval period its due in the
rise of Western civilization, but he insisted that in its
social organization it fitted the needs of the day, and,
moreover, represented a necessary phase in human progress.
Along with later sociocultural historians such as Fustel de
Coulanges, Saint-Simon, said, Durkheim, saw the real under-
lying creativity of this period (see also Durkheim, 1938).
Durkheim gave to Saint-Simon the honor of being one of the
first post-Revolutionary thinkers to view the middle ages
objectively, without the partisan polemic so characteristic
of French and other reformers.

> It is through failing to recognize the importance of
> this subterranean process that one so often sees the
> Middle Ages as a dark era in which a veritable intel-
> lectual night reigned, and that consequently nothing
> about it was related to the period of light which fol-
> lowed. In reality, it was the Middle Ages which paved
> the way for modern times. It contained them in embyro
> (Soc:150).

Rightly sensing the moral and religious component in these
developing changes, Saint-Simon saw the Protestant Reforma-
tion (rather than the Italian Renaissance) as the crucial
opening wedge in the fundamental reorganization of the "mor-
alities of thought and logics of action" underlying European
social and cultural order. Especially important here was the
individualistic "Protestant principle" (eg. see Tillich,
1948) of free examination in matters of faith and conscience.

> ... it was only in the sixteenth century that the for-
> ces anatagonistic to the old system found themselves
> strong enough to come into the open.... At first these
> forces were directed against theological rule; Luther
> and his co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a
> power in Europe. At the same time in a general way, they
> undermined theological authority by 'destroying the prin-
> ciple of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of
> examination which--restrained at first within quite nar-
> row limits--was to inevitably increase and ... finally
> embrace an indefinite area.' This two-fold change opera-
> ted not only among peoples converted to Protestantism,
> but even among those who remained Catholic. For once the
> principle was established, it extended well beyond the
> conditions where it had first been proclaimed. As a re-
> sult, the bond which tied individual consciences to the

ecclesiastical power--although not shattered--was loosen-
ed and the moral unity of the social system definitely
unsettled (Soc:151-2).

Saint-Simon also clearly perceived the spread of seculariza-
tion of this Protestant individualism into political revolu-
tion. In a curiously parallel movement, both this individual-
istic drive and the trend toward political centralization
proceeded together,· especially in France and England.

> The entire sixteenth century was seized by this great
> intellectual revolution. But it was at its close that
> the struggle--begun against spiritual power--proceeded
> against temporal power. It took place almost at the
> same time in France and England. In both countries it
> was led by the common people, with one of two branches
> of temporal power as leader. With the English, feudal-
> ism placed itself at their head to combat royal author-
> ity; in France, royalty made itself their ally against
> feudal strength.... Here Richelieu, then Louis XIV shat-
> tered seigneurial power; there, the Revolution of 1688
> broke out, limiting royal authority as much as possible
> without overturning the old organization. The final re-
> sult of these events was a weakening of the military
> system in its entirety (Soc:152).

Eventually, as the struggle deepened, the new "Protes-
tant principle"--the new "moralities of thought and logics
of action"--of freedom of conscience and rationalistic in-
dividualism which accompanied it, were extended to their
outer limits. Such a process of dialectical polarization is
almost as inevitable as the routinization of charisma. Thus,
we see the progressive extension of individualism as an ab-
solute principle into the legitimized egoism at the base of
modern economies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim
attacked so relentlessly with his notions of anomie and ego-
isme.

> In the eighteenth century, the shocks had gone so deep,
> the feudal order's resistance became so weak, that the
> attack on it became generalized, and directed against
> the whole of its organization. One then sees the princi-
> ple of the right of examination in religious matters ex-
> tended to its extreme limit *(S:153).

Durkheim summed up Saint-Simon's account of the separation
or differentiation out of these new elements crucial to the
emerging social order in these terms:

The history of the old system .. up to the eve of the
Revolution, shows us a spectacle of an uninterrupted
decadence. But at the same time that this regressive
progress was developing, another was occuring in re-
verse direction with no less significance. Industrial
and scientific forces, once formed, did not manifest
themselves exclusively by destructive effects, that is,
by overthowing the old social order they gave rise to
another. They did not limit themselves to detaching
consciences and individual wills from the center which
until then ... had made a single body of them. But to
the degree they acquired more energy, they themselves
became foci of common action and centers of organiza-
tion. Around them gradually formed the social elements
which the old forces--more or less powerless to keep
them subordinate--were allowing to escape. Under these
new influences, a new social system was slowly arising
in the bosom of the old, which was disintegrating.
As long as the arts and crafts had been narrowly subor-
dinated to the theological and military authority, hav-
ing to serve as instruments for ends which were not
their own, they had been impeded in their progress. But
as soon as they began to be free--thanks to the libera-
tion of the common people--they took flight and devel-
oped so quickly that they soon became a social force to
be reckoned with. Little by little all society fell in-
to dependence upon then, because nothing was any longer
possible without them. Military force itself was subjec-
ted to them, once war became a complex and costly thing,
once it demanded not merely native courage and a certain
disposition of character, but money, machines, arms.
More and more, improvements in industry, the inventions
of science, and finally, wealth, were proving more vital
to success in arms than innate bravery (Soc:153-4).

Focussing on these rising middle classes, the prime

carriers of the new religious individualism, capitalism, and

urban life, Saint-Simon further observed that the bourgeoisie

increasingly became part of, and then progressively trans-

formed, the administrative apparatus of political and legal

institutions.

But when a class acquires greater importance and re-
spect, when the functions it fulfills become more es-
sential, it is inevitable for it to wield greater in-
fluence on the direction of society and increased po-
litical authority. This is in fact what occured. Little
by little, one sees representatives of industry admit-
ted to governmental councils, playing a greater and
greater part, and as a result having a larger share in
determining the general course of society. It is in Eng-
land that this phenomena manifests itself. Gradually,
the common people--the classes which fulfill only econo-

> mic functions--obtain first a voice in the tax vote,
> then a deliberative voice, and then the exclusive right
> to vote on budgets. They substitute themselves for the
> old temporal power in one of its most important functions,
> and are able henceforth to act in conformity with their
> own interest in the direction of society; they modify
> its orientation, since they have altogether different
> ends than the military classes. In other words, the so-
> cial system began to revolve around a new center
> (Soc:154-5).

In addition to the administrative control over tax revenues,
the growing cities began to gain control over their own sys-
tem of the administration of justice in the municipal tribun-
als.

> Once the villages were freed, one of the rights consid-
> ered most important to achieve was the administration
> of justice.... From this moment the industrial class had
> a judiciary organ which was its own, in harmony with its
> special nature, and which contributed to complete the
> system which was in process of formation.... This spon-
> taneous organization ... extended to every detail of
> collective life, to the whole mass of population which
> it affected in an entirely new way. Before the libera-
> tion of the communes, the people--in secular matters--
> had as their only continuing leaders the chiefs of the
> army. But with enfranchisement, they gradually became
> detached, and organized under the leaders of the arts
> and crafts (Soc:155).

Further, Saint-Simon emphasized the importance of the changes
in the technology of warfare and the innovation of national
armies in this overall development.

> ... It is especially due to the institution of permanent
> armies that this new grouping of social forces could
> separate itself completely from the old and become inde-
> pendent.... From this moment on, the task of soldiering
> was a special function, separated from the remainder of
> the population. As a result, the 'mass of people had no
> longer any connection with the military heads. It was
> organized only industrially' (Soc:155-6).

Science, too, became increasingly separated from its
prime locus--scholastic theology; gradually, natural and mor-
al philosophy became autonomous. Scientific scholars increas-
ingly moved to the center stage by becoming advisers to the
new national monarchs, who required their skills in govern-
ing and in military and public works projects (eg. Leonardo
da Vinci's involvement with Ludovico Sforza and Caesare Bor-

gia). Out of this liason between scientists and monarchs,
scientific academies--the first modern scientific institu-
tions--were eventually born. Saint-Simon took this close al-
liance as a model for his ideal "positive" society.

> Just as with industry, science, as it grew, developed
> an organization appropriate to its own character, and
> very different, consequently, from that permitted by
> theological authority. Scholars became esteemed person-
> ages whom royalty more and more made a habit of consult-
> ing. It is as a result of these repeated consultations
> that great scientific bodies were gradually established
> at the pinnacle of the system. These were the academies
> (Soc:156).

Durkheim (after Saint-Simon), summed up these twin socio-eco-
nomic and religio-cultural developments in this way:

> The results of this double evolution can be summarized
> as follows: in the measure that the ancient social sys-
> tem gave way, another was formed in the very bosom of
> the first. The old society contained within itself a
> new society, in process of formation and everyday acquir-
> ing more strength and consistency. But these two organ-
> izations are necessarily antagonistic--they result from
> opposing forces and aim at contradictory ends. One is
> essentially aggressive and warlike; the other, essen-
> tially pacifist.... One has conquest for its aim, the
> other, production. Similarly, in spiritual affairs the
> first calls on faith and imposes beliefs which it puts
> beyond discussion. The second calls on reason and even
> trust--it requires a type of intellectual subordination
> essential to rationality. Thus, these two types of so-
> cieties could not exist without contradicting each other.
>
> ... The old morality and law were discredited in the
> new world which was arising; but a new juridical and
> moral order, without which the new system could not be
> considered organized, did not come into being automati-
> cally. Thus, scientific industrial society reached out
> for an appropriate social organization which was not
> yet in existence. To succeed, it had both to overcome
> the inertia of the old and to shape the new. As long
> as this two-fold result was not achieved, it was inevi-
> table that disorganization and conflict would be severe
> and would affect the whole of society * (Soc:157; 158).

I must emphasize that Durkheim enunciated here a crucial in-
sight which I should like to hold him to in later causal ex-
planations--namely, that the old order must be broken through
by a new innovation, a new way whether it be techological or
ethical, and then subsequently spread and become institution-

alized, as the old system begins to break down under the
pressure. Lack of recognition of this Weberian principle
often leads historians astray, as it does Durkheim's abstrac-
ted general evolutionism (see Part I, Book Three). We must
lay aside the old notion of slow, inevitable progress. Our
real challenge here is to marry general and specific evolu-
tionary explanations in sociological theory; specifically,
this means linking Durkheim and Weber (see Part I, Book
Three). One cannot hope, for instance, to adequately explain
the origins and significance of anomie and egoisme except by
seeing them against the background of the breakthrough of old
medieval casuistries of moral decision (see Nelson, 1969a,
1973a, 1973b) by the new Protestant "moralities of thought
and logics of action" (see Part II, Book Three). Hence, on
the mainline of world-historical evolution, our interpretive
image should be of breakthroughs and breakdowns.

However, the French Revolution's net effect was de-
structive, observed Saint-Simon. It was necessary, but not
sufficient, for while it broke down the old order, it failed
to create something new and viable in its place. Thus, the
transitional crisis between the two types of social order was
prolonged and even exacerbated.

> Such was the situation on the eve of the Revolution, and
> out of it the Revolution was born.... 'A civil and moral
> revolution which had gradually developed for more than
> six centuries engendered and necessitated a political
> revolution.... If one insists on attributing the French
> Revolution to one source, it must be dated from the day
> of the liberation of the communes, and the cultivation
> of exact sciences began.' A two-fold need gave rise to
> it: the need of being extricated from the past, and the
> need to organize the present; the Revolution met only
> the first of these needs. It succeeded in striking the
> final blows at the old system. It abolished all that re-
> mained of feudalism--even royal authority--and all that
> survived from the old temporal power. It gave to freedom
> of conscience the juridical consequences it implied,
> whereas before it had only the weight of moral sanction
> (Soc:158-159).

The incompleteness of the Revolution, Durkheim explained in
his _Professional Ethics and Civic Morals_, was the prime rea-
son why France to his day continued to oscillate back and

forth between individualism and despotic monarchies. In
sweeping away the past, its influence was largely negative;
what was next needed was "positive" social action. Our con-
temporary crisis deepens, for the old way is gone forever,
but the new order is not yet mature.

> But on the land thus cleared, the Revolution built noth-
> ing new. It asserted that no one was obliged to accept
> the old beliefs but did not attempt to elaborate a new
> body of rational beliefs that all minds could accept.
> It destroyed the foundations on which political author-
> ity rested, but failed to establish others of any sta-
> bility. It proclaimed that political power was not to
> belong to those who had monopolized it until then, but
> did not assign it to any definite organ. In other words,
> it neglected to state what it was for.... An action so
> exclusively destructive, far from attenuating the cri-
> sis which had given rise to it, could only make the e-
> vil more acute and intolerable. For the absences of or-
> ganization from which industrial society suffered be-
> came far more perceptible once all that remained of the
> old had disappeared. The weak cohesion of this dawning
> society became a much graver social peril once the old
> social bonds were completely destroyed.... 'No longer
> having anything that was agreed upon, people separated
> and became enemies. It was a struggle of all whims, a
> battle of all imaginations'.... This was one indication
> of the partial miscarriage of the Revolution. As a so-
> ciety so disoriented cannot live, one soon sees reborn
> from their ashes certain of the destroyed institutions.
> Royal authority was reestablished. But these revivals
> of the past did not constitute a solution. So the prob-
> lem is posed on the morrow of the Revolution, at the
> start of the nineteenth century, in the same terms as
> on the eve of 1789, only it has become more pressing.
> The denouement is more urgent if one does not wish to
> see each crisis produce another, exasperation the
> chronic state of society, and finally, disintegration
> more or less the result. One must take a stand. Either
> completely restore the old system or organize the new.
> It is precisely this that is the social question
>   (Soc:159-60).

F. Durkheim's Critical Reflections on Saint-Simon's Doctrine: Economics as Amoral Activity

Durkheim repeatedly acknowledged Saint-Simon's historical analysis of the historical roots of our contemporary crisis as profound (eg. Soc:160); however, he also insisted that it contained a basic flaw. For, Durkheim charged, Saint-Simon sanctified the very type of activity that was symptomatic of modern "moral anarchy." Saint-Simon wished to deregulate economic appetites, he apotheosized economic desires. Saint-Simon wished to enshrine the very amoral element against which Durkheim's "philosophy of finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) was fundamentally opposed. In these terms, the problem Durkheim next set himself was outlining the kind of decentralized democratic socialism which, through the social interactional medium of occupational groups, would act to restrain and morally discipline these egoistic and insatiable appetites. Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's critique of Saint-Simon's doctrine, for it reveals, once again, the depth of Durkheim's concern with anomie and egoisme as an "infinity of dreams and desires."

Granting Saint-Simon's historical insight, Durkheim restated his generalized moral argument, and his philosophy of "human finitude" versus the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. He carried this critique and philosophy through at least four major books--The Division of Labor, Socialism, Suicide, and Moral Education.

> As we view it, it cannot be posed with greater profundity. The originality of this historic analysis is that Saint-Simon very correctly felt that the changes spontaneously produced in European societies since the Middle Ages had not simply acted upon this or that particular characteristic ... but that the social organism had been affected to its very foundations. He understood that the liberal movement of which the Revolution was only the culmination, but which had been incubating for centuries before it--had not merely the effect of unchaining citizens from burdensome shackles as an end in itself. He saw the dissolution of the old order of things that had resulted, that this dissolution had not solved the central problem, but was making such a solution more immediately necessary. He understood that to reorganize

society it was not enough to destroy the old system of forces which united it, and that once this destruction is accomplished social equilibrium itself--as essential as it might otherwise be--in its turn becomes precarious, is maintained only by a miracle, and can fall with the slightest wind. Consequently, it is necessary to rebuild on new foundations according to a plan which is not simply a reproduction of the old. Thus the great contemporary questions are found to be related to the whole course of our historical development (Soc:160).

Again, Durkheim took pains to acknowledge that Saint-Simon was the first major liberal thinker in France after the Revolution to offer a critically objective view of the Revolution, while still resolving to carry on its work.

Saint-Simon judges the work of the Revolution with independence--sometimes every severity ... (yet) it would be a mistake to see a condemnation in his criticism. First, he postulates the principle that it was necessary and inevitable; our history ... is but its long preparation. Further, he reproaches the men of the Revolution for having overthrown the ancient institutions without determining what to put in their place.... In short, he objects not its having been, but to its not having been all that it might (Soc:161).

In a fascinating account (Soc:161-4) which we cannot include here, Durkheim reviews Saint-Simon's explanation of why the Revolution miscarried, or rather, stopped halfway. "What prevented it from ending on positive results?" In essence, Saint-Simon blames the influence of a specific occupational group--the lawyers, a group he personally encountered in jail during the Revolution and Reign of Terror. Their mentality was too critical, too linked to the past, too abstract to generate a truly "positive society."

Now, Saint-Simon's life-task was to get the new system up "on its feet." Thus, at the root of his historical analyses, was a very practical problem: "Granted that our present societies contain within them two different, and even contradictory social systems--one which is becoming weaker and weaker, and the other emerging more and more--how can the crisis resulting from their antagonism be solved" (Soc:167) The complex details of Saint-Simon's cascade of reform proposals need not detain us here. What is most important for

our present purposes is that Saint-Simon proposed that industry and economic activity must become sanctified and centralized. "Society must become a vast production company" (Soc: 173). However, instead of arguing for <u>laissez-faire</u> (the separation of political from economic functions), Saint-Simon strove to link the economy much more closely with the polity. At the same time, the State's role was not to repress industrial activity, but to socialize it.

> This is where Saint-Simon distinguished himself from the system of the classic economists. For them economic life is completely outside politics; it refers wholly to the individual. For Saint-Simon it is the whole substance of politics; not only is there a politics of economic interests, but there is no other. 'Politics is the science of production' (Soc:179).

Durkheim acknowledged some important similarities between individualist and socialist theory; but in the end, they differed on the proper relations between society, economy, and polity.

> Historically, socialism does not spring from economics, but is derived from a similar source. Born at almost the same time, the two systems should obviously correspond to the same social state they express differently. ... Not only did we find in both the same tendency to cosmopolitanism, the same sensuous and utilitarian tendency, but further, the fundamental principle on which they rest is identical. Both are industrialist; both proclaim that economic interests are social interests. The difference is that Saint-Simon, and all subsequent socialists, conclude that since economic factors are the substance of common life, they must be organized socially, whereas the economists refuse to subject them to any collective control and believe they can be arranged and harmonized without prior reorganization (Soc:238).

According to Durkheim, Saint-Simon saw correctly, along with the Utilitarian individualist economists, that industrial activity could no longer be subordinated to the remnants of the traditional social and political order. But he erred in apotheosizing this dynamic, even demonic, force.

> Saint-Simon demonstrated that the powers which had dominated industry until the present were going into decline and that this decline was inevitable. From this he concluded that it did and should tend toward complete enfranchisement, toward absolute liberation, that it was no longer to be subordinated to anything which would

surpass it, that henceforth it was to be its own end,
and draw from itself its own rule (Soc:239).

Durkheim next launched into his chief objection against
this apotheosis of amoral economic activity. He emphatically
rejected the notion that such activity can be self-regulating.
Hence, the central postulate of a self-equilibrating market
mechanism balancing production and consumption, supply and
demand, was also ruled out of court. Nothing in nature, Durk-
heim contended, can be freed of the need for limitation.

> But this conclusion was premature. To assume that the
> particular state of subjection in which industry had
> formerly been held could not be in agreement with the
> new conditions of collective life, does not imply that
> every other type of dependence would be devoid of rea-
> son. It can well be that the transformation now neces-
> sary does not consist in suppressing all subordination,
> but in changing its form--not in making industrial in-
> terests a kind of unlimited absolute beyond which there
> is nothing, but rather in limiting them in a different
> manner and spirit than formerly. Not only does this hy-
> pothesis deserve examination, but in fact is easy to
> understand that in any social organization, however
> skillfully ordered, economic functions cannot cooperate
> harmoniously nor be maintained in a state of equilibrium
> unless subjected to moral forces which suppress, contain,
> and regulate them (Soc:239).

Unfortunately incorporating the portrayal of economic motiva-
tion and action projected by his opponents--the Utilitarian
ethical economists--Durkheim took economics as the very pro-
totype of amoral, egoistic activity (see also Part I, Book
Three). If there can be no question of the organic ego disci-
plining its own egoistic and insatiable sensual appetites,
how can there be any question that economic action based on
this ego can really be self-regulating? (Of course, to the
Utilitarians, the conclusion was precisely the opposite--
because the generic individual was self-guiding, possessed
of an innate "moral sense," the prime arena of individualis-
tic activity--the economy--would also be self-regulating, if
only the medieval state could be set aside. To them economic
demands were moral demands, while they were inherently amoral
to Durkheim). The very basis of Durkheim's "philosophy of hu-
man finitude" was that the insatiability of the pre-social

ego must always be constrained by moral discipline.

> ... It is a general law of all living things that needs
> and appetites are normal only on the condition of being
> controlled. Unlimited need contradicts itself. For need
> is defined by the goal it aims at, and if unlimited has
> no goal--since there is no limit. It is not true aim to
> seek constantly more than one has--to work in order to
> overtake the point one has reached, with a view only to
> exceeding the point at which one will have arrived. From
> another point of view, one might say that the persis-
> tence of a need or appetite in a living body can be ex-
> plained only if it secures some satisfaction for the be-
> ing who experiences it. But an appetite that nothing can
> appease can never be satisfied * (Soc:239-40).

It is important to recognize that Weber (1958a,1968) agreed
that functionally rational economic action (eg. Utilitarian
or pragmatic logics) is substantively irrational; and here
Durkheim made this absence of substantive or goal-directed
behavior one of the inner meanings of a-nomie as purposeless
in the sense of limitless action. Why so many would strive
so hard for "infinitely receding" goals with so little hope
of satisfaction is a most curious ethos, one which is wholly
inexplicable by Durkheim's notion of man as homo duplex, but
which was powerfully and brilliantly dissected by Weber. If
Weber explained the historical origins of the modern ethos
better than Durkheim, nonetheless, the latter provided a por-
trait, perhaps unsurpassed even by Freud, of the phenomeno-
logical torment implied in living out the mandates of modern
cultural traditions.

> Insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering.
> Whatever one does, it is never slaked. Every being
> likes to act, to move, and movement is life. But he
> must feel his action serves some purpose--that by
> walking he goes forward. But one does not advance when
> he proceeds without a goal--or what comes to the same
> thing--toward a goal situated in infinity. The distance
> is always the same, whatever the road, and no matter
> what the pace, one seems to be simply marking time. It
> is well-known that insatiability is a sign of morbidi-
> ty. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has taken
> a certain amount of nourishment; it is the glutton who
> cannot be satisfied. Healthy people enjoy motion, but
> at the end of exercise, they like to rest. The deambu-
> latory maniac experiences the need of perpetually mov-
> ing without stop or rest; nothing satisfies him. In
> its normal state sexual desire is aroused for a time,

then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there are no
limits * (Soc:240).

If only Durkheim had turned from his brilliant insights, in-
stead of reducing this substantively irrational "moral anar-
chy" to organic "pathologies," to the sociocultural-histori-
cal level which he seemed to champion, he might have broken
consciously through to the second schema. But his biological
analogies, and his genetic equation of society with rational-
ity and moral discipline led him in the wrong direction here.

Once again, it must be noted, however, that Durkheim's
own doctrine was ambiguous on this point. Man, he observed,
is less fettered by instinct than animals. A new life is a-
wakened in man, which cannot be satisfied by the old minimum
sustenance of innate drives. Even so, Durkheim admitted,
man's appetites are limited (see also Part I, Book Three).

> For beyond this indispensable minimum--which satisfies
> the need on the instinctive level--reflection, more a-
> lert, glimpses better conditions which appear as desir-
> able ends and which invite activity. Yet it is clear
> that appetites of this kind sooner or later meet a boun-
> dary they cannot overstep (Soc:241).

But socially and culturally generated desires face no such
inherent biological limitations. That which is generated by
society can only be constrained and redirected by society.
Certainly Durkheim would have spared us much trouble had he
made this central fact clearer, instead of portraying the
source of insatiable desires as the organic ego. For if so-
ciety is the ultimate source of values which encourage abso-
lute individualism and insatiable desires, then Durkheim's
dark doctrine of man as homo duplex falls into the back-
ground. Our prime sociological task here would then be to
discover the different ways in which historical types of so-
cieties energized, expressed, or repressed the limitless
possibilities of human culture. The way would then be open-
ed to the second schema.

> But how to fix the quantity of well-being, comfort,
> luxury, that a human being ought to possess. Nothing
> is found either in the organic or psychological con-
> stitution of man which sets a limit to such needs.
> The functioning of an individual life requires only

that he halt here rather than there, that he satisfy
himself at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that
such needs have continued to develop in the course of
history, and have found increasingly complete satisfac-
tion, and nevertheless the average state of health has
improved, and average happiness has not diminished. But
as there is nothing within an individual which con-
strains these appetites, they must surely be contained
by some force exterior to him, or else they would become
insatiable--that is, morbid. Either, knowing no limits,
they become a source of torment for man, irritating and
plaguing him in a pursuit without possible end, or there
must be, outside the individual, some power capable of
stopping them, disciplining them, fixing a limit that na-
ture does not * (Soc:241).

All of this Durkheim laid against Saint-Simon's apo-
theosis of industrial economy. Saint-Simon did not seem to
have understood, argued Durkheim, that by unleashing and
sanctifying these sensual appetites, he actually would have
fed the fires of "moral anarchy." His remedy would have only
aggravated the evil!

This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him
it appears that the way to realize social peace is to
free economic appetites of all restraint, on the one
hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling
them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For
such appetites cannot be appeased unless they are lim-
ited, and they cannot be limited except by something
other than themselves. They cannot be subordinated to
something which surpasses them, and it is only on this
condition that they are capable of being really satis-
fied (Soc:241-2).

Speaking to our ideal of affluence for all, our highest e-
conomic and democratic dream, Durkheim suggested that such
an ideal is an illusory and self-deceptive dream. For what
is the final standard of affluence? When shall we have
reached utopia? When is enough enough? Since these desires
are socially and culturally generated, and since society is
inevitably structured in some sort of hierarchy, the pheno-
mena of rising expectations, coupled with the sense of rela-
tive deprivation, creates a strong sociological pressure to-
ward constant inflation. Durkheim asked us to:

Picture the most productive organization possible and
a distribution of wealth which assures abundance to
even the humblest--perhaps such a transformation, at

> the very moment it was constituted, would produce an
> instant of gratification. But this gratification could
> only be temporary. For desires, though calmed for an in-
> stant, will quickly acquire new exigencies. Unless it is
> admitted that each individual is equally compensated ...
> there will always be some workers who will receive more
> and others less. So it is inevitable that at the end of
> a short time, the latter find their share meager compar-
> ed with what goes to the others, and as a result new de-
> mands arise, for all levels of the social scale. And be-
> sides, even apart from any feeling of envy, excited de-
> sires will tend naturally to keep outrunning their goals,
> for the very reason that there will be nothing before
> them which stops them. And they will call all the more
> imperiously for a new satisfaction, since those already
> secured will have given them more strength and vitality.
> This is why those at the very top of the hierarchy, who
> consequently would have nothing above them to stimulate
> their ambition, could nevertheless not be held at the
> same point they had reached, but would continue to be
> plagued by the same restlessness that torments them to-
> day (Soc:242).

This "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville

spoke (eg. see Nisbet, 1966, 1974), is the modern analogue of

what medieval "physicians of the soul" had called acedia, or

as Josef Pieper (1963) puts it, the "inability to acquiesce

in one's own being." As a moral philosopher, Durkheim saw

that rather than the root problem being the lack of affluence

as the Utilitarians argued, or even the burden of structured

inequality as Marxists and liberals like Merton (1938, see

appendix) argued, in the last analysis the problem is one of

moral legitimacy and of substantive rationality. The prior

question is: to what end shall we direct our lives, our ac-

tions, our thoughts, our desires? To what purposes, to what

end? These are the substantively rational questions that

Durkheim raised, and that we fail to answer in our daily mod-

ern anomic strivings.

> What is needed if social order is to reign is that the
> mass of men be content with their lot. But what is need-
> ed for them to be content is not that they have more or
> less but that they are convinced that they have no right
> to more. And for this, it is absolutely essential that
> there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge
> and which tells them what is right. For an individual
> committed only to the pressure of his needs will never
> admit he has reached the extreme limits of his rightful

portion. If he is not conscious of a force above him which he respects, which stops him and tells him with authority that the compensation due him is fulfilled, then inevitably he will expect as due him all that he demands. And since in our hypothesis, these needs are limitless, their exigency is necessarily without limit. For it to be otherwise, a moral power is required whose superiority he recognizes, and which cries out 'You must go no further' * (S:242-3).

Durkheim here explicitly acknowledged his subterranean hypothesis of man as homo duplex, but again he seems to have mixed the two different possible sources of insatiability. For if it is socially and culturally generated, then it has already been legitimized, especially in modern society. Our attention should then shift to uncovering the specific rationales mandating and legitimizing insatiable strivings and aspirations; from focus on the absence to the presence of norms--in short, from the first to the second schema.

Now, clearly the moral power above the individual that cries out "You must go no further" in traditional societies is very strong indeed. In traditional societies, the social schedule of satisfaction counseled the precedence of collective over individual interests, and resignation to one's collectively assigned lot, rather than insatiable individual striving. But, as noted earlier (see Part I of this Book), in modern society egoism and insatiability (whatever their source), are released from moral constraint and meaningful direction.

This is precisely the role played in ancient society by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint-Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be content with their situation, at the same time that it taught them that the social order is providential, that it is God Himself who has determined each one's share, and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of another world where everything will be balanced, whose prospect made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped them from feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, precisely because it held economic functions under its domination, contained and limited them. But even a priori, it is impossible to suppose that for centuries it was in the nature of economic interests to be subordinated but that in the future the roles will becomes so completely reversed. This would be to admit that the nature of things could

be completely transformed in the course of evolution. Undoubtedly, one can be certain that this regulatory function can no longer be exercised today in the same manner or spirit as formerly. The industrial organ, more developed, more essential than before to the social organism, can no longer be contained within the same bounds, subjected to a position so subordinate. But it does not follow from it that it should be freed of all regulation, liberated from all checks (Soc:234).

Durkheim then posed the historical problem created by the recession of traditional moral controls over the egoistic and insatiable desires of individuals in these terms: "What forces today play the moderating role of former times?"

The problem is to know, under the present conditions of social life, what moderating functions are necessary and what forces are capable of executing them. The past not only helps us to pose the problem--it also indicates the direction in which the solution should be sought. What, in fact, were the temporal and spiritual powers that for so long moderated industrial activity? Collective forces.... They had the characteristic that individuals acknowledged their superiority, bowed voluntarily before them, did not deny them the right to command. Normally, they were imposed not through material violence, but through their moral ascendancy. This is what accounted for the efficacy of their action. So today, as formerly, there are social forces, moral authorities which must exercise their regulating influence, and without which appetites become deranged and economic order disorganized. And, in fact, from the moment that this indispensable curb does not come from the inherent nature of individuals, it can only come from society. Society alone has the capacity to constrain and only it can do so without perpetually making use of physical constraint--because of the moral character in which it is clothed. In short, society, through the moral regulation it institutes and applies, plays, as far as superorganic life is concerned, the same role that instinct fills with respect to physical existence. It determines, and it rules what is left undetermined. The system of instincts is the discipline of the organism, just as moral discipline is the instinctive system of social life * (Soc:243-4).

Moving from his classical notion of the "golden mean" (see also Book Three), Durkheim counterposed his philosophy of human finitude to Saint-Simon's apotheosis of amoral economic action.

Now, it can be seen what, according to us, is Saint-Simon's mistake. He described perfectly the present

> situation, and made a careful history of it. He showed:
> (1) that industry had been, up to the present, placed
> under subordination to powers which rose above it; (2)
> that these powers retrogressed irretrievably; (3)·that
> this situation was unhealthy and is the cause of the
> crisis from which we suffer.... But did Saint-Simon
> properly interpret it? Noting the progressive weakening
> of the old powers, he concluded that our modern uneasi-
> ness is due to the fact that, not having disappeared,
> they still disturb industrial activity. It followed that
> their downfall had only to be hastened in order to as-
> sure industry the supremacy it had a right to, and that
> industry should be organized without subordinating it to
> anything--as if such an organization were possible. In
> short, it seems to us that he was mistaken about what,
> in the present situation, is the cause of the uneasiness,
> and in having proposed as a remedy, an aggravation of
> the evil (Soc:244-5).

Saint-Simon's basic error, argued Durkheim, was uncritically
accepting that abstraction "economic man," which leads us to
presume that social and economic activity are identical.
Durkheim rightly rejected this reduction of society to econo-
my, and thus reintroduced the key question of ends and legit-
imate goals, which the positivists' reduction of government
to technical questions (the "administration of things, not
men"), had obscured. One can only wish that Durkheim had been
able to further free himself (see Book Three) from the econo-
mistic fallacy (see especially Karl Polanyi, 1944, 1968).

> We know that Saint-Simon's error consisted in wishing
> to construct a stable society on a purely economic
> foundation. As he began by postulating in principle
> that there are only industrial interests, he was obliged
> to grant that they could be balanced through skillful
> management, but without the intervention of any factor
> of a different nature. It was sufficient to organize so-
> ciety in such a way that, by producing as much as possi-
> ble, it could satisfy the various requirements as com-
> pletely as possible. For it assumes that men's desires
> can be satisfied by a certain quantity of comfort, that
> in themselves they have a limit and are appeased once it
> is reached. But in reality all needs exceeding simple
> physical necessities are unlimited, for there is nothing
> within the organism that imposes a boundary. Therefore,
> in order for them not to be without end--that is, so
> that they are not forever unsatisfied--there must be for-
> ces outside of the individual, in society, which hold
> them in check, and with authority acknowledged by all--
> indicate what is the proper standard. And in order to
> thus contain and regulate economic forces, forces of

> another nature are required. It is indispensable that
> there exist in society powers other than those deriving
> from industrial capacity. These are moral forces *
> (Soc:274-5).

Durkheim rightly noted that the reduction of society to a-
moral economic action also seemed to bother Saint-Simon him-
self, or to capture only part of his own sense of need for
moral reform which he later expressed in his emphasis on re-
ligion.

> We saw ... that Saint-Simon, toward the end of his life,
> had become aware of the inadequacy of his system on this
> point, and had accentuated its religious character. The
> considerable development of religion in Bazard's system
> demonstrates that the School understood more and more
> the need to complete purely industrial organization by
> another which would rise above it. Actually, one of the
> functions of religion has always been to place a rein on
> economic appetites (Soc:275).

In all of Saint-Simon's doctrine, Durkheim exclaimed,
"Where is the bridle that curbs passions" (Soc:276)? Durkheim
explicitly rejected the notion that structural inequalities
alone are at the basis of our contemporary crisis. What was
needed, rather than simple structural reform, is the "estab-
lishment of moral powers capable of disciplining individuals"
(Soc:279).

> ... if it is admitted that the most essential thing is
> to refuse all social sanction to hereditary inequali-
> ties, that this should be the basis of social reorgani-
> zation, then needs are unleashed which cannot be satis-
> fied and new dissatisfactions created at the very moment
> when everything was believed pacified (Soc:278).

Therefore, Merton's (1938, 1949, 1957) anomie--which had
seemed supported by Durkheim's argument concerning the for-
ced division of labor--can now be seen to have been rejected
by Durkheim himself. For the problem of anomie is far deeper
than structured inequality (see appendix).

Speaking in terms that apply to Utilitarians, Marxists,
socialists, and liberal reformers alike, Durkheim incisively
recognized that each of these groups, no matter how violently
they might seem opposed, are actually prisoners of the same
historical premises. Rather than an epic struggle between the
forces of light and the forces of darkness, today left, mid-

dle, and right are actually only warring bedfellows!

> When one starts with the maxim that there are none but
> economic interests, one is their prisoner and cannot
> rise above them. Bazard tried in vain to subject them
> to a dogma which dominates them. But this dogma merely
> exposes them in another tongue.... When passions are
> overtly sanctioned, how can there be a question of lim-
> iting them? If they are hallowed they should be permit-
> ted to exist.... (Bazard) has strengthened industrial-
> ism instead of subordinating it. Such a doctrine could
> only end in a mystical sensualism, in an apotheosis of
> comfort, in the sanction of excess * (Soc:279).

Is it not ironic that Durkheim, who is mistakenly portrayed
as a conservative by left (eg. L. Coser, 1960, John Horton,
1964) and right (eg. Nisbet, 1965, 1974) alike, actually
transcended the rhetorical frames of his opponents and de-
livered a more far reaching critique of the modern world
than either?

Alas, Durkheim didn't seem to have recognized the full
implications of his mounting critique. His proposals for re-
form were largely structural and piecemeal. Had he reached
full clarity and <u>seen</u> <u>that</u> <u>anomie</u> <u>and</u> <u>egoisme</u> <u>are</u> <u>culturally</u>
<u>sanctioned</u> <u>by</u> <u>various</u> <u>forms</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>constitutive</u> <u>modern</u> <u>ethos</u>
(eg. the Protestant Ethos), and had he as great an eye for
historical irony as Weber, he might have concluded that, in
the modern world, <u>our</u> <u>virtues</u> <u>become</u> <u>our</u> <u>vices</u>!

> ... One will ask where, today, are the moral forces
> capable of establishing, making acceptable, and main-
> taining the necessary discipline?... Among the institu-
> tions of the old regime there is one that Saint-Simon
> does not speak of but which perhaps, if transformed,
> could suit our present state. These are the profession-
> al groupings or corporations. In all times they played
> the role of moderator, and moreover, if one takes into
> account the fact that they were suddently and violently
> destroyed, one has the right to ask whether this radi-
> cal destruction was not one of the causes of the evil.
> In any event, the professional grouping could well fit
> all the conditions we have set. On the one hand, because
> it is industrial, it will not weigh down industry with
> too burdensome a yoke; it is close enough to the inter-
> ests it will have to regulate not to heavily repress
> them. In addition, like every group formed of individuals
> united by ties of interests, ideas, and feelings, it is
> capable of being a moral force over the members who com-
> pose it. Let it be made a definite agency of society,

> whereas it is now merely a private association. Transfer
> certain rights and duties to it which the State is less
> and less capable of exercising and assuring. Let it be
> the administrator of affairs, industries, arts, that the
> State cannot manage through its remoteness from indus-
> trial things. Grant it the power necessary to resolve
> certain conflicts, to apply the general laws of society
> according to the variety of labor, and gradually, through
> the influence it will exercise, through the rapprochement
> that it will produce in the work of all, it will acquire
> the moral authority which will permit it to play this
> role of restraint--without which there could be no econo-
> mic stability (Soc:245-6).

It almost seems as if Durkheim had not followed out the full
ramifications of his own deepening critique, as if he stopped
short, and seized upon an answer that much of his own pheno-
menological and sociocultural anatomies of anomie and egoisme
had already set aside. In the following declaration, for in-
stance, Durkheim lapsed back into the framework of his first
schema.

> (This solution) declares, in the interest of both the
> necessity of a curb from above which checks appetites,
> and so sets a limit on the state of disarrangment, ex-
> citement, frenzied agitation, which do not spring from
> social activity, and which even make it suffer.... It
> is a question not of money or force; it is a question
> of moral agents. What dominates it is not the state of
> our economy, but much more, the state of our morality
> (Soc:246-7).

Let us now turn to consider his concrete proposals for struc-
tural reform that would lead to the elimination or control
of anomie and egoisme in the modern world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DURKHEIM'S THERAPEUTIC FOR THE MODERN CRISIS OF ANOMIE AND
EGOISME: THE "MORAL MECHANICS" OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

> The change in moral temperament ... bears witness to
> a profound change in our social structure. To cure one,
> therefore, the other must be reformed (S:387).

Preface. How could Durkheim, although close to the second
schema that the twin forms of our modern crisis--anomie and
egoisme--were culturally sanctioned, have failed to break-
through to explicit recognition of this ironic twist? What
held him back? Why did Durkheim persist in his first schema
that anomie and egoisme were generated by the slow evolution-
ary release of egoistic and insatiable passions, only recent-
ly compounded by the twin revolutions of the modern era? Not
only logic but Western history before and after Durkheim de-
monstrates the essential incompleteness of his first "theodi-
cy" and his only explicit "therapeutic." As Durkheim correct-
ly saw in his first implicit schema, the roots of our contem-
porary crisis run so deep--to the very constitutive logics,
models, and world-images of Western civilization--that the
"moral mechanics" of occupational groups are impotent to
stem the tide. One cannot hope to "mechanically" draw the
ego out of its state of "moral isolation," especially not
when our cultural models have sanctioned this extreme indivi-
dualism which we see in anomie and egoisme in the first
place!

To the present day, our crisis has continued to deepen;
and, if anything, it has been the Vietnam War and the pro-
longed environmental and energy crises which have finally be-
gun to bring home, at least to Americans, Durkheim's wisdom
of our essential finitude. Our "Faustian" and "Promethean"

aspirations shrink before this new limited horizon. In a certain fitting irony, just as the most "Promethean" nation (excepting China, perhaps) of the modern world broke through the space barrier and landed men on the moon, so, too, did

fixed horizons of many sorts spring to life on this limited planet. As "Faustian" morality depends on unlimited horizons and infinite resources, so, too, the end of infinite horizons marks the end of an era in human culture.

One might offer many possible answers to explain why Durkheim failed to breakthrough--for instance, his embeddedness in the Franco-Laic Positivist Cultural Tradition, his nineteenth century liberal republicanism, his own personality, or various other core commitments. But such reasons lead, in turn, only back to reconsideration of certain key premises that held Durkheim back--for example, his basic causal or explanatory model, his image of man as homo duplex, his materialist emphasis on social morphology and a naive faith in "moral mechanics," his devotion to biological analogies, his notion that micro-structural processes were the ultimate sources of moral life, his lack of a notion of cultural traditions on the civilizational level, and so on (see also Book One and Part I, Book Three). In any case, it is not uncommon for men of great vision to become prisoners of the very premises which constitute the virtue of their particular perspective. "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" wrote Kenneth Burke. In the end, of course, short of interrogating Durkheim himself, or at least watching over his shoulder as he worked, we shall never know the reason why. All we can now do is simply indicate how this road was seen, but never taken.

Since in the succeeding section I shall systematically analyze key limitations in Durkheim's logic, model, and specific arguments (see Book Three), at this point I shall address only his structural "therapeutic" for curing the transitional crisis of modern "moral anarchy." In barest outline, Durkheim proposed a structural-social interactional remedy for

moral reform. Reconstituted "corporations" (guild-like occupational groups), which would be close to worker and industrialist, to producer and consumer alike, would work to regulate economic conflict and social aspirations.

> In place of the class struggle and economic crises which were the symptoms of capitalism's inability to reconcile the needs of the individual and the prevailing social order, Durkheim advocated a reformist syndicalism.... Durkheim looked to the professional association rather than to the state to provide ... economic organization. ... He looked to the professional associations to regulate wages and conditions of work, provide pensions, and welfare services in diverse ways appropriate to the conditions prevailing in each profession (Hayward, 1960:32).

Due to their beneficent interactional or micro-structural processes, these socio-economic organizations would become part of the formal political life of the nation. As the base of a whole new network of publicly constituted secondary or intermediate groups, they would replace territorial habitation as the base of national representation. The state itself was incapable of exercising such moral reglementation, because it was too large, too distant. Hayward observed:

> Durkheim appreciated that though in its capacity as the defender of the rights and interests of all its citizens from group tyrannies, the state effectively prevented piecemeal despotisms, unless its power was counterbalanced, it too could become despotic.... This led him to conclude in Prudhonian vein that the power of the state 'should be limited by other collective forces, i.e. by secondary groups.... And it is out of the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born
> (1960: 36, #45).

The family, on the other hand, has become too weak. Raymond Aron sums up well here:

> The state is no longer capable of exercising this moral function because it is too remote from individuals. The family, on the other hand, has become too narrow and has lost its economic function; economic activity normally proceeds outside of the family, the place of work is not identified with the place of residence. Therefore, neither state nor family can exercise the controlling influence over economic life; it is professional groups, reconstituted corporations, which will serve as intermediaries between individuals and the state and which will be endowed with the social and moral authority to reestablish discipline, without which men give way to

the infinity of their desires * (1970:92).

Thus, Durkheim's sociology of morality, politics, and social and cultural process meshed in his structural proposals for the national political reconstruction of occupational groups as the basis for moral reform. LaCapra provides the following summary of Durkheim's position:

> Essential to his vision of modern social normality was a triangular model of the state, the corporative group, and the individual, existing in a dialectical balance. Durkheim's conception of the situation and needs of modern society was based upon an analysis of historical evolution in Western Europe. Corporative groups such as the commune, the guild, and the estate had become increasingly restrictive at the same time that their importance declined with the growing power of the central state. At first, the conflict between the state and the corporative groups had a positive function. For it was the concrete historical basis of individual rights. 'It is from the conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born.' But the extreme development of this process of rising state power and individual emancipation from increasingly oppressive secondary groups threatened to have negative consequences. It unintentionally culminated in a social situation in which the State, as the sole significant organized power, confronted the atomized individual. This confrontation 'had long since been prepared by progressive centralization under the ancien regime.' But 'the great change which the French Revolution accomplished was to carry this levelling process to a point hitherto unknown.' Without the counter-vailing protection of secondary groups, the individual liberties first won through the intervention of the State became both of dubious existential value and of uncertain duration in the face of state power. 'Thus, by a series of endless oscillations, we pass alternately from authoritarian regulation, which excessive rigidity makes impotent, to systematic abstention which cannot last because of the anarchy which it provokes.' Simultaneously, the largely uncontrolled development of the economy gave rise to classes whose relations were not based upon consensually accepted norms but upon unequal market power. The problem of modern society, according to Durkheim, was to create consensual institutions which viably realized the democratic values brought to the forefront of consciousness during the classical revolutions of the past (1972:211-12).

> The professional or corporative group was the crux of Durkheim's idea of a possible means of creating a tense balance among the elements of social justice and health in modern society.... Through functional decentraliza-

tion, the corporative group could simultaneously pro-
vide a counter-weight to the central state and a social
context in which communitas and a more cumulative arti-
culation of social and cultural experience might deepen.
Acting in accordance with the fundamental economic and
occupational functions of modern society, the corpora-
tive group would also have a role in the inheritance of
wealth, education, economic regulation, welfare servi-
ces, political representation and artistic creation.
Most important, it would be a center of genuine communal
commitment--a real existential group--with moral power
to restrain anomie and transcend egoism. In the corpora-
tive group, people would come to know one another and
enjoy what might be called a supplementary kinship
(1972:216-17).

Now, Durkheim's recipes for resolving the modern crisis
of anomie and egoisme evolved over many years. Apart from his
early review work (see Giddens, 1970), Giddens (1971c:488)
observes that "... the first edition of The Division of Labor
already contained a fragmentary analysis of the role of occu-
pational association" (eg. DL:227). Thereafter, his develop-
ing proposals are to be found, in sequence, in his lectures
"Physique des moeurs et du droit," translated in 1957 as
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, which were first de-
livered in 1896, and repeated at intervals up to 1912 (see
Lukes, 1973), but reached definitive form in 1898; his con-
clusion to Suicide published in 1897; and his famous preface
on occupational groups to the second edition of The Division
of Labor in 1902. Other works may contain relevant passages,
but these shall act as prime references for our present
study.

Hence, Durkheim's thought concerning possible struc-
tural reforms for resolving our modern crisis of anomie and
egoisme crowded around a decade (roughly 1892-1902) in the
middle of his intellectual career. It is striking to note
that in the fifteen years after his famous preface in 1902,
Durkheim gave little attention to his earlier reform propos-
als. As his interest in the evolving structures of knowledge,
morality, and religion deepened, his concern--perhaps because
of some subterranean effects of his insights into the second
schema of suicide--became deeper and shifted. As several ob-

servers have noted, Durkheim became increasingly pessimistic over our ability to resolve the modern crisis, as did his great contemporary, Max Weber. In 1912, in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim seemed to assuage his melancholy by relying on historical inevitability (incidentally, it was this passage that led Parsons to mistakenly conclude that Durkheim entertained a cyclical vision of historical process; see also Bellah, 1973, for great emphasis on Durkheim's hopes for moral reconstruction through collective effervescence).

> ... We are going through a state of transition and moral mediocrity.... The old gods are growing old or already dead, and others are not yet born. This is what rendered vain the attempts of Comte with the old historical souvenirs artificially revived: it is life itself, and not a dead past which can produce a living cult. But this state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last forever. A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formula are found which serve for a whole as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits (EF:475).

As they both grappled separately at ever-deeper and wider levels, trying to uncover the world-historical roots of our contemporary crisis, perhaps both Durkheim and Weber came to see our predicament in terms of an ironic double-bind-- namely, that the very elements which make us different in cultural-historical terms may also be the prime cause of our contemporary malaise. I do not think it over-stepping the evidential bounds to speculate, even strongly suggest, that toward the end of their lives both Weber (see, for example, Mitzman, 1969) and Durkheim came to see the essential truth of that old and wise aphorism: "Virtues, pushed to extreme, become vices."

Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's concrete proposals for practical reform--the reconstitution of occupational groups in national economic, political, and social life. We

shall begin with the reiteration of his thesis concerning
the spontaneous creation of morality through social interac-
tion.

A.   "Moral Mechanics" and Group Life

Since Durkheim's proposals for practical reform presum-
ed that moral regulation was spontaneously generated through
social interaction, let us first take another look at Durk-
heim's basic premises in this regard (see also Book One). The
theory of small-group processes that Durkheim neglected to
spell out in the conclusion to Suicide, or in the second edi-
tion preface to The Division of Labor, can be found briefly
stated in his lectures translated as Professional Ethics and
Civic Morals. It is a "law of moral mechanics," Durkheim ar-
gued, that putting individuals into close and sustained con-
tact inevitably generates moral reglementation. Indeed, to
Durkheim, society itself is a new level of association that
generates new products--collective representations and indi-
vidual conscience and consciousness.

> Man is only man because he lives in society. Take away
> from man all that has a social origin and nothing is
> left but an animal.... It is society that has raised
> him to this level above physical nature: it has achieved
> this result because association, by grouping the indivi-
> dual psychic forces, intensifies them. It carries them
> to a degree of energy and productive capacity immeasur-
> ably greater than they could achieve if they remained
> isolated one from the other. Thus, a psychic life of a
> new kind breaks away which is richer by far and more
> varied than one played out in the single individual a-
> lone.... The life thus freed pervades the individual
> who shares in it, and so transforms him. It is precise-
> ly because the group is a moral force greater to this
> extent than its parts, that it tends of necessity to
> subordinate them to itself.... Here is a law of moral
> mechanics * (PECM:60).

In short, given a long interactional sequence (see Book One),
in the end the new life created is the source of legitimate
moral authority that orients, regulates, and guides indivi-
dual thought and action. In a sense, of course, Durkheim was
correct, for intense and repeated social interaction does
tend to create an ethos--the "T groups," "encounter," and

"marathon" sessions so popular in the late 1960's and early 1970's testifies to this generic fact. And certainly, cultural models at least partially reflect group structure. Yet, the main question here is whether or not Durkheim's basic model is complete, and exhausts all other major factors and sequences; especially whether the "law of moral mechanics" is adequate to resolve the mounting crisis of anomie and egoisme.

It is interesting that Durkheim started these lectures by reemphasizing the importance of the link between social morphological or micro-interactional processes, and collectively representational (both normative and cognitive) symbolic processes.

> In general, all things being equal, the greater the strength of group structure, the more numerous are the moral rules appropriate to it, and the greater the authority they have over their members. For the more closely the group coheres, the closer and more frequent the contact of the individuals, and, the more frequent and intimate these contacts and the more exchange there is of ideas and sentiments, the more does a public opinion spread to cover a greater number of things. This is precisely because a greater number of things is placed at the disposal of all * (PECM:7).

Durkheim asks us to picture, on the contrary, a structural situation in which there is no direct and symbolic interaction; that is, where moral rules have no material or social morphological link.

> Imagine, on the other hand, a population scattered over a vast area, without the different elements being able to communicate easily; each man would live for himself alone, and public opinion would develop only in rare cases entailing a laborious calling together of these scattered sections. But when the group is strong, its authority communicates itself to the moral discipline it establishes, and thus, it follows, is respected to the same degree. On the other hand, a society lacking in stability, whose discipline is easy to escape and whose existence is not always felt, can communicate only feeble influence to the precepts it lays down....
> (PECM:7).

> A system of morals is always the affair of a group, and can operate only if this group protects them by its authority. It is made up of rules which govern individuals, which compels them to act in such and such a way and which imposes limits to their inclinations, and forbids

them to go beyond. Now there is only one power--moral,
and hence common to all--which stands above the indivi-
dual and which can legitimately make laws for him, and
that is collective power. To the extent the individual
is left to his own devices, and freed from all social
constraint, he is unfettered too by all moral con-
straint (PECM:6-7).

Underneath Durkheim's notion of the "law of moral me-
chanics" there lies hidden, of course, his doctrine of man
as homo duplex, and its portrayal of the pre-socialized in-
dividual as inherently recalcitrant to moral reglementation.

> There is no form of social activity which can do without
> the appropriate moral discipline.... The interests of
> the individual are not those of the group he belongs to
> and indeed there is often a real antagonism between the
> one and the other. These social interests that the in-
> dividual has to take into account are only dimly per-
> ceived by him: sometimes he fails to perceive them at
> all, because they are exterior to himself and because
> they are the interests of something that is not himself
> He is not consistently aware of them, as he is of all
> that concerns and interests himself. It seems, then,
> that there should be some system which brings them to
> mind, which obliges him to respect them, and this sys-
> tem can be no other than a moral discipline. For all
> discipline of this kind is a code or rules that lays
> down for the individual what he should do so as not to
> damage collective interests and so as not to disorgan-
> ize the society of which he forms a part. If he allows
> himself to follow his bent, there would be no reason
> why he should not make his way--regardless of everyone
> in his path (PECM:14).

Without direct social interaction, there can be no moral
discipline. Without moral reglementation, the pre-social ego
is left prey to anomie and egoisme.

> It is this discipline that curbs him, that marks the
> boundaries that tells him what his relations with his
> associates should be, where illicit encroachments be-
> gin, and what he must pay in current dues towards main-
> tenance of the community. Since the precise function
> of this discipline is to confront the individual with
> aims that are not his own, that are beyond his grasp
> and exterior to him, the discipline seems to him--and
> in some ways is so in reality--as something exterior
> to himself and also dominating him. It is this tran-
> scendent nature of morals that finds expression in pop-
> ular concepts when we find them turning the fundamental
> principles of ethics into a law deriving from a divine
> source. And the bigger the social group becomes, the
> more this making of rules becomes necessary. For, when

the group is small, the individual and the society are not far apart; the whole is barely distinguishable from the part, and each individual can therefore discern the interests of the whole to those of each one. But as the society expands, so does the difference become more mark-ed. The individual can take in no more than a small stretch of the social horizon; thus, if the rules do not prescribe what he should so to make his actions conform to collective aims, it is inevitable that these aims will become anti-social (PECM:14-15).

A few brief reflections seem warranted here, especial-ly in regard to Durkheim's presumption, as Gouldner has noted, "that patterns of social interaction form the basis upon which moral beliefs spontaneously develop" (1958:26). Among other things, it is this continuing micro-social or interac-tional foci that repeatedly led Durkheim astray. Contrary to Marks (1974, 1976), had Durkheim moved beyond this narrow in-sistence that social interaction is the ultimate source of cultural phenomena (see McCloskey, 1976a), he might have also broken through explicitly and systematically to the second schema. Certainly, his developing interest in civilizational processes (see Chapter Seven, Book One), could have led to a very different heuristic for interpreting the origin and de-velopment of anomie. Had he begun to systematically anchor his "theodicies" and "therapeutics" on the cultural-histori-cal level, Durkheim might have explicitly broken through to the second schema, and left us with a different, and perhaps more profound, heritage.

B. "Moral Particularism" and Occupational Groups

Durkheim next observed that, in every society, there appear two sets of moralities (see also Wallwork, 1972:84-5). First, there are general rules pertaining to the whole so-ciety--the common or "collective conscience." Then, second, there are moral rules specific to each group.

> There are as many forms of morals as there are different callings.... These different forms of morals apply to entirely different groups of individuals. These differ-ences may even go so far as to present a clear contrast. ... We find within every society a plurality of morals that operate on parallel lines (PECM:5).

As always, Durkheim saw moral particularism in evolutionary terms; thus, not only is it mistaken to accuse him of over-emphasizing normative consensus and ignoring normative conflict, but also (far from abstracting norms ala Parsons) Durkheim always historically grounded values.

Now, this "moral particularism" of increasingly specialized occupational groups constantly appearing in the progressive division of social labor poses a complex problem regarding the dual sets of relations between these multiple moral realities--this "moral polymorphism" and the central "social conscience" on the other. For Durkheim observed that the generalized public morality regards these specialized moral dilemmas and therapeutic recipes for resolving doubt with great unconcern.

> The distinctive features of this kind of moral and what differentiates it from other branches of ethics is the sort of unconcern with which the public consciousness regards it. There are no moral rules whose infringement ... is looked on with so much indulgence by public o-pinion. The transgressions which have only to do with the practice of the profession come in merely for a rath-er vague censure outside the strictly professional field. They count as venial.... They cannot be of deep concern to the common consciousness precisely because they are not common to all members of the society and because ... they are outside the common consciousness. It is exactly because they govern functions not performed by everyone, that not everyone is able to have a sense of what these functions are, of what they ought to be, or of what spe-cial relations should exist between the individuals con-cerned with applying them. All this escapes public opin-ion in a greater or lesser degree or is at least partly outside its immediate sphere of action. This is why pub-lic sentiment is only mildly shocked by transgressions of this kind. This sentiment is stirred only by trans-gressions so grave that they are likely to have wide general repurcussions (PECM:5-6).

Specific situations and specific moralities, general socie-tal concerns and a societal "common consciousness"--these are the two poles of the moral life of complex societies (see also C.P. Wolff, 1970). The main problem Durkheim set himself in this regard, then, was how to first regulate pre-viously deregulated spheres of modern life such as economic activity, and second, how to link or integrate all these

distinct special group moralities and needs with the "common conscience." He tried to resolve these conflicts with his proposal for national political enfranchisement of occupational associations.

> ... Whilst common morality has the mass of society as its sole substratum and only organ, the organs of professional ethics are manifold. There are as many of these as there are professions; each of these organs--in relation to one another as well as in relation to society as a whole--enjoys a comparative autonomy, since each is alone competent to deal with the relations it is appointed to regulate.... We see in it a real decentralization of moral life. Whilst public opinion, which lies at the base of the common morality, is diffused throughout society, without our being able to say exactly that it lies in one place rather than another, the ethics of each profession are localized within a limited region. Thus, centers of a moral life are formed which, although bound up together, are distinct, and the differentiation in function amounts to a kind of moral polymorphism (PECM:7).

Hence, each occupational situation demands its own special rules for regulating desire and conflict; if no reglementations emerge, it is because there is no sustained pattern of social interaction. Further, if no sustained interaction regulated by norms emerge, the insatiable desires of the pre-social ego are bound to be released.

> It is not possible for professional ethics to escape the fundamental condition of any system of morals. Since society as a whole feels no concern in professional ethics, it is imperative that there be special groups in society within which these morals may be evolved, and whose business it is to see that they be observed. Such groups are and can only be formed by bringing together individuals of the same profession or professional groups.... It can be said that professional ethics will be the more developed, and the more advanced in their operations, the greater the stability and the better the organization of the professional groups themselves
> (PECM:7,8).

Now, there is one arena of social life that has developed so explosively, thrown off all traditional constraints, and rejected all new attempts to regulate its life as the very principle of its existence, that the lack of moral regulation may be truly called anomic. And, of course, this anomic area is the economic and industrial arena.

C. <u>Economic</u> <u>Deregulation</u> <u>as</u> <u>Anomic</u> <u>Norm</u>

As we have already seen, Durkheim noted how modern industrial and economic life has become progressively freed from its traditional embeddedness in kinship, religious, and political controls (see also K. Polanyi, 1968). In Durkheim's day (prior to the advent of the welfare state), lack of regulation of economic action--between producer and consumer, worker and entrepeneur--had, of course, crucial societal consequences.

> ... There is a whole category of functions that do not satisfy this condition [of moral life] in any way: these are the economic functions, both industry and trade.... There is no corporate body set above all members of a profession to maintain some kind of unity, to serve as the repository of traditions and common practices and see they are observed at need. There is no organ of this description, because it can only be the expression of a life common to the group, and the group has no life in common ... at least, not in any sustained way.... Now, this lack of organization in the business professions has one consequence of the greatest moment: that is, that in this whole sphere of social life, no professional ethics exist.... Thus, there exists today a whole range of collective activities outside the sphere of morals and which is almost entirely removed from the moderating effects of obligations (PECM:9-10).

The curious thing about this disengagement of economy from polity and kinship, and the consequent release of infinite desires, is that <u>it</u> <u>is</u> <u>ideologically</u> <u>sanctioned</u>. Such anomie does not simply represent the breakdown of moral controls over the ego; it cannot be represented simply as the result of social breakdown, because it has been repeatedly sanctioned by the most dynamic cultural traditions of the modern world. The Utilitarian and individualist economists, observed Durkheim, have sanctioned what he saw as amoral economic activity; moreover, this is true of classical economists and socialist thinkers alike.

> Is this state of affairs a normal one? It has the support of famous doctrines. To start with, there is the classical economic theory according to which the free play of economic arrangements should adjust itself and reach stability automatically, without its being necessary or even possible to submit it to any restraining

forces. This, in a sense, underlies most of the social-
ist doctrines. Socialist theory, in fact, like classical
economic theory, holds that economic life is equipped to
organize itself and to function in an orderly way and in
harmony, without any moral authority intervening; this,
however, depends on a radical change in the laws of pro-
perty, so that things cease to be in exclusive ownership
of individuals or families and instead, are transferred
to the hands of society. Once this were done, the State
would do no more than keep accurate statistics of the
wealth produced over given periods and distribute this
wealth amongst the associate members according to an a-
greed formula. Now, <u>both these theories do no more than
raise a de facto state of affairs which is unhealthy, to
the level of a de jure state.... It is not possible for
a social function to exist without moral discipline.
Otherwise, nothing remains but individual appetites, and
since they are by nature boundless, and insatiable, if
there is nothing to control them they will not be able
to control themselves</u> * (PECM:10-11).

This is a most revealing passage! Moreover, the main cause
of the contemporary crisis of anomie is precisely this public
sanctioning of commercial and industrial action as the high-
est activity of society, along with the unprecedented expan-
sion of trade in the last hundred years or so.

> And it is precisely due to this fact that the crisis
> has arisen from which the European societies are now
> suffering. For two centuries economic life has taken
> on an expansion it never knew before. From being a se-
> condary function, despised and left to inferior classes,
> it passed on to one of the first rank. We see the mili-
> tary, governmental, and religious functions falling back
> more and more in the face of it. The scientific func-
> tions are alone in a position to dispute its ground,
> and even science has hardly any prestige in the eyes of
> the present day, except in so far as it may serve what
> is materially useful, that is to say, serve ... the
> business professions (PECM:10-11).

This unprecedented apotheosis of industrial and commer-
cial activity, freed from all previous moral discipline,
means that anomie--or an anarchy of insatiable warring ego-
isms--dominates the day. Indeed, market capitalism is a kind
of restrained civil war; legitimized extortion, a war of
"each against all." However, the important fact to here note
is that <u>both the individual drive for infinite perfection and
the sanctification of economic activity in the modern world
can hardly be attributed to the egoism of human nature.</u> For

it is precisely the peculiarly modern nature of economic ego-
ism and insatiability which needs to be explained, as Weber
saw, and not simply explained away.

> A form of activity that promises to occupy such a place
> in society taken as a whole cannot be exempt from all
> precise moral regulation, without a state of moral anar-
> chy ensuing. The forces thus released can have no guid-
> ance for their normal development, since there is noth-
> ing to point out where a halt should be called. There
> is a clash when the moves of rivals conflict.... The
> stronger succeed in crushing the not so strong, or at
> any rate in reducing them to a state of subjection. But
> since this subjection is only a de facto condition sanc-
> tioned by no kind of morals, it is accepted only under
> duress until the longed-for day of revenge. Peace treat-
> ies signed in this fashion are always provisional forms
> of truce that do not mean peace to men's minds.... If
> we put forward this anarchic competition as an ideal we
> should adhere to ... then we should be confusing sick-
> ness with a condition of good health.... A state of or-
> der or peace amongst men cannot follow of itself from
> any entirely material causes, from any blind mechanism.
> ... It is a moral task (PECM:11-12).

The dream acted out by the Utilitarian moral philosophers
was, of course, that the impersonal and universalistic self-
equilibrating market mechanism would itself act as the prime
instrument of social control and moral discipline of the in-
dividual. For what turned out to be the "moral anarchy" of
modern anomie was itself originally fashioned as a moral
task by these very same moralists! Indeed, the role of the
Scottish Presbyterian moral philosophers, and the English
non-conformists, in translating or secularizing Calvinistic
ethics into social and political norms simply has not yet
been fully understood; even Weber did little to help here.

Even though he did not perceive these Weberian-type
anchors for anomie, Durkheim had keen insight into the ram-
ifications of basing a society on the atomistic and ration-
alizing logics of the Anglo Utilitarian moral philosophers.

> From yet another point of view, this amoral character
> of economic life amounts to a public danger. The func-
> tions of this order today absorb the energies of the
> greater part of the nation. The lives of a host of in-
> dividuals are passed on the industrial and commercial
> sphere. Hence, it follows that, as those in this milieu
> have only a faint impress on morality, the greater

> part of their existence is passed divorced from any
> moral influence. How could such a state of affairs fail
> to be a source of demoralization? If a sense of duty is
> to take strong root in us, the very circumstances of our
> life must serve to keep it always active. There must be
> a group about us to call it to mind.... If we live amor-
> ally for a good part of the day, how can we keep the
> springs of morality from going slack in us? We are not
> naturally inclined to put ourselves out or use self-
> restraint; if we are not encouraged at every step to
> exercise the restraint upon which all morals depend,
> how should we get the habit of it? If we follow no rule
> except that of clear self-interest, in the occupations
> that take up nearly the whole of our time, how should
> we acquire a taste for any disinterestedness, or self-
> lessness or sacrifice? Let us see, then, how the unleash-
> ing of economic interests has been accompanied by a de-
> basing of public morality. We find the manufacturer, the
> merchant, the workman, the employee, in carrying out his
> occupation, is aware of no influence set above him to
> check his egotism; he is subject to no moral discipline
> whatever, and so he flouts any discipline at all of this
> kind   (PECM:12).

Clearly, Durkheim seemed here able to conceptualize the source
of egoism and insatiability only in terms of the release of
the pre-socialized individual or organic ego from traditional
moral discipline. But the very sanctification of economic in-
dividualism by the leading spokesman of Western culture in
the last two centuries demonstrates that such explanations
are misleading, or at best, seriously incomplete. What is
needed, rather, is a notion of a two-step process of break-
through and breakdown. First, the initial breakthrough, both
normative and structural--for example, the Weberian notion
of the "New Model Man," the visible saints of ascetic Protes-
tantism breaking forth from the medieval cloister to master
self, society, and the world for God's greater glory. It
could only have been some such unprecedented and massive and sus-
tained breakthrough to "inner-light, inner-worldly asceti-
cism and mysticism" that could have produced the modern world.
Only after the secularization and institutionalization of
various Protestant themes and sanctions do we find, as an un-
anticipated and extreme consequence, Durkheim's "isolated and
amoral action" on a massive scale. The second phase of this
dual process of breakthrough and release came with two dif-

ferent sets of groups and their experiences: (a) either the
running down or secularization of Protestant norms and sanc-
tions; (b) non-Protestant and non-Western groups whose way
of life and prime cultural values were disrupted by the in-
fluence of this powerful new ethos, or among those who come
to be permeated or unconsciously embrace aspects of the Pro-
testant Ethos. While Durkheim's critique of classical econo-
mic theory is insightful, his "theodicy" and "therapeutic"
are limited to describing the ravages of the second process.
Rightly noting that the new sanctification of the impersonal
and atomizing market mechanism as the new nexus of "civil so-
ciety" has broken through old moral norms, he unfortunately
concluded that the lack of sustained, direct social interac-
tion was the prime cause. On the contrary, in actual histori-
cal fact, the seeming lack of moral rules due to lack of
group cohesion is itself only a result; it is, at most, a
secondary and derived cause, not an original motive force.

> ... no professional activity can be without its own
> ethics.... It is the functions of the economic order
> alone that form an exception.... This moral anarchy
> has been claimed, it is true, as a right of economic
> life. It is said that for normal usage there is no
> need of regulation. But from what source could it de-
> rive such a privilege? How should this particular so-
> cial function be exempt from a condition which is the
> most fundamental to any social structure? Clearly, if
> there has been self-delusion to this degree amongst
> the classical economists, it is because the economic
> functions were studied as if they were an end in them-
> selves, without considering what further reaction they
> might have on the whole social order. Judged in this
> way, productive output seemed to be the sole primary
> aim in all industrial activity.... In some ways, it
> might appear that output, to be intensive, had no need
> at all to be regulated; that, on the contrary, the best
> thing were to leave individual businesses and enterpris-
> es of self-interest to excite and spur one another in
> hot competition, instead of trying to curb and keep
> them within bounds. But production is not all, and if
> industry can only bring its output to this pitch by
> keeping a chronic state of warfare, and endless dissat-
> isfaction amongst the producers, there is nothing to
> balance the evil it does * (PECM:15-16).

As a moral philosopher, Durkheim noted that Utilitarian
"moralities of thought and logics of action" are not substan-

tively rational; for they have no meaningful or achievable goals in sight. For as many have discovered, functional rationality and the logics of efficiency and infinite growth can be used to further any end whatsoever--it offers an indiscriminate calculus for "progress." Truly, the ideal of classical Utilitarian economic theory is goalless and thus, substantively irrational, for, as Weber (1958a,1968) showed, it is believed to be a valuable moral exercise in itself!

> Even from the strictly Utilitarian viewpoint, what is the purpose of heaping up riches if they do not serve to abate the desires of the greatest number, but, on the contrary, can only rouse their impatience for gain? That would be to lose sight of the fact that economic functions are not an end in themselves, but only a means to an end; that they are one of the organs of social life, and that social life is above all a harmonious community of endeavors, when minds and wills come together to work for the same aim.... Society has no justification if it does not bring a little peace to men--peace in their hearts and peace in their mutual intercourse. If, then, industry can be productive only by disturbing their peace and unleashing warfare, it is not worth the cost * (PECM:16).

> It is a strangely superficial notion--this view of the classical economists--to whom all collective discipline is a kind of tyrannous militarization. In reality, when it is normal and what it ought to be, it is something very different. It is at once the epitome and the governing condition of a whole life in common which individuals have no less at heart than their lives
> (PECM:29).

Thinking that it was primarily the erosion of traditional moral discipline over the organic ego that released anarchic and insatiable desires, Durkheim presumed that if strong enough patterns of structural integration could be built, then the organic ego could once again be socialized. Demoralized and thus, desocialized, egos were, it must be remembered, the result of the modern transitional crisis. Hence, anomie and egoisme could be overcome if the anomic deregulation of economic action could be structurally remedied. To this end, Durkheim turned to the task of reconstituting the professional group as the new basis of social, economic, and political organization.

> It is therefore extremely important that economic life
> should be regulated, should have its moral standards
> raised, so that the conflicts that disturb it have an
> end, and further, that individuals should cease to live
> within this moral vacuum where the life-blood drains
> away even from individual morality. For in this order
> of social functions there is need for professional eth-
> ics to be established, nearer the concrete, closer to
> the facts, with a wider scope than anything existing
> today. There should be rules telling each of the work-
> ers his rights, and his duties, not vaguely in general
> terms, but in precise detail, having in view the most
> ordinary day-to-day occurence (PECM:12-13).

Since moral rules express the life of a group, Durkheim pre-
sumed that where group life was strong, moral rules would
also be so; where social cohesion is low, normative direc-
tion and discipline also suffer. Therefore, since the eco-
nomic arena was so clearly anomic, the remedy was to restore
stability to the "corporations" (in the French sense).

> A system of ethics, however, is not to be improvised.
> It is the task of the very group to which they are to
> apply. When they fail, it is because the cohesion of
> the group is at fault, because as a group its existence
> is too shadowy and the rudimentary state of its ethics
> goes to show its lack of integration. Therefore, the
> true cure for the evil is to give the professional
> groups in the economic order a stability they do not
> now possess. Whilst the craft man or corporate body is
> nowadays only a collection of individuals who have no
> lasting ties with one another, it must become or return
> to being a well-defined and organized association. Any
> notion of this kind, however, comes up against histori-
> cal prejudices that make it still repugnant to most,
> and on that account it is necessary to dispel them
> (PECM:13).

Durkheim hoped that such professional "corporations" would
become veritable "moral milieux" for anomic, demoralized
egos.

> ... When we wish to see the guilds reorganized ... it
> is not simply to have new codes superimposed on those
> existing; it is mainly so that economic activity should
> be permeated by ideas and needs other than individual
> ideas and needs, in fine, so that it should be social-
> ized. It is, too, with the aim that the professions
> should become so many moral milieux and that these
> (comprising always the various organs of industrial
> and commercial life), should constantly foster the
> morality of the professions. As to the rules, although

necessary and inevitable, they are but the outward ex-
pression of these fundamental principles. It is not a
matter of coordinating any changes outwardly and mechan-
ically, but of bringing men's minds into mutual under-
standing. Moreover, it is not on economic grounds that
the guild or corporative system seems to me essential
but for moral reasons. It is only through the corpora-
tive system that the moral standard of economic life
can be raised (PECM:29).

On the other hand, Durkheim made it clear that, for him
at least, there could be no question of going back--it is
neither possible nor desirable to restore the old repressive
other-worldly discipline of archaic religious culture. But
clearly, Durkheim's view of the possible relations of reli-
gious attitudes toward economic activity was limited; for in-
stance, the ironic logic of Weber's thesis does not seem to
cross the threshold of consciousness here.

... Religion, which once partially assumed this role,
would now be unadapted to it. For the essential prin-
ciple of the only regulation to which it can subject
economic life is contempt for riches. If religion ex-
horts its followers to be satisfied with their lot, it
is because of the thought that our condition on earth
has nothing to do with salvation. If religion teaches
us that our duty is to accept with docility our lot as
circumstances order it, this is to attach us exclusive-
ly to other purposes, worthier of our efforts, and in
general, religion recommends moderation in desires for
the same reasons. But this passive resignation is incom-
patible with the place which earthly interests have now
assumed in collective existence. The discipline they
need must not aim at relegating them to second place,
and reducing them as far as possible, but at giving
them an organization in harmony with their importance.
The problem has increased in complexity, and while it
is no remedy to give appetites free rein, neither is it
enough to suppress them in order to control them. Though
the last defenders of the old economic theories are mis-
taken in thinking that regulation is not necessary today
as it was yesterday, the apologists of religion are wrong
in believing that yesterday's regulation can be useful
today. It is precisely its lack of present usefulness
which causes the evil (S:383).

D. The Lacuna of Intermediate Groups in the Modern Crisis

In Suicide, Durkheim briefly explored alternative reme-
dies for restoring social cohesion and resocializing the ano-
mic ego. In one of his typical "arguments by elimination,"
both modern political and familial organization are judged
inadequate to his task, because they are either too large
and remote (the State), or too small and closely-knit (the
family). Too large and too small, the State and the family
are not suited to the new and difficult task of generating
"moral milieux" and reglementation for the industrialized
masses. Durkheim here reiterated the basic problem facing us
in egoistic suicide.

> Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is
> not sufficiently integrated at all points to keep all
> its members under control.... It is because society,
> weak and disturbed, lets too many persons escape too
> completely from its influence. Thus, the only remedy
> for the ill is to restore enough consistency to social
> groups for them to obtain a firmer grip on the indivi-
> dual, and for him to feel himself bound to them. He
> must feel himself bound to them. He must feel himself
> more solidary with a collective existence which pre-
> cedes him in time, which survives him, and which encom-
> passes him at all points. If this occurs, he will no
> longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself, he
> will see that he is the instrument of a purpose greater
> than himself, he will see that he is not without signi-
> ficance. Life will resume meaning in his eyes, because
> it will recover its natural aim and orientation (S:373).

As always, Anthony Giddens sums up Durkheim's position well:

> In Durkheim's conception, the State must play a moral
> role as well as an economic role; and the alleviation
> of the malaise of the modern world must be sought in
> measures which are in general moral rather than econo-
> mic. The dominant position of the authority of religion
> in former times provided religious strata with a hori-
> zon for their aspirations, counselling the poor to ac-
> cept their lot and instructing the rich in their duty
> to care for the less privileged. While this order was
> repressive, containing human actions and potentialities
> within narrow bounds, it nevertheless gave a formal un-
> ity to society. The characteristic problem facing the
> modern age is to reconcile the individual freedoms
> which have sprung from the maintenance of the moral con-
> trol upon which the very existence of society depends
> (1971a:99).

Now, what groups, Durkheim asked, are best suited to-
day to take on the task of "reimpressing on man this salu-
tary sentiment of solidarity?" He first examined, but rejec-
ted, political society as too big and distant from everyday
experience.

> ... Our great modern states are too far removed from
> the individual to effect him uninterruptedly and with
> sufficient force. Whatever connection between our daily
> tasks and the whole of public life, it is too indirect
> for us to feel it keenly and constantly. Only when mat-
> ters of serious import are at stake do we feel our de-
> pendence on the body politic strongly (S:374).

> ... It remains true that the State itself has important
> functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose the sentiment
> of general utility and the need for organic equilibrium
> to the particularism of each corporation. But we know
> that its action can be useful only if a whole system of
> secondary organs exist to diversify their action. These
> secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384).

Durkheim then considered the family, but concluded that its
functions have been fundamentally altered by the change in
the size or scale of modern organizations.

> Changes have occurred in the constitution of the family
> which no longer allow it to have the same preservative
> influence as formerly. While it once kept most of its
> members within its orbit from birth to death and formed
> a compact mass, indivisible and endowed with a quality
> of permanence, its duration is now brief. As soon as the
> children's first growth is over, they often leave to com-
> plete their education away from home; moreover, it is
> almost the rule that as soon as they are adult they es-
> tablish themselves away from their parents and the hearth
> is deserted. For most of the time, at present, the fami-
> ly can be said to be reduced to the married couple alone,
> and we know that this union acts feebly against suicide.
> Consequently, since it plays a smaller role in life, it
> no longer suffices as an object for life. Not, certain-
> ly, that we care less for our children; but that they
> are intertwined less closely and continuously with our
> existence and so this existence need some other basis
> for being. Since we have to live without them, we also
> have to attach our thoughts and acts to other objects
>   (S:376).

Indeed, not only is the family now unsuited to the new task
of moral discipline on the societal level, but it is precise-
ly the breakdown of such intermediate organs of public life
that has intensified the contemporary crisis of anomie and

egoisme.

> But it is especially the family as a collective being which this periodic dispersion reduces to non-entity. Formerly, domestic society was not just a number of individuals united by bonds of mutual affection; but the group itself, in its abstract and impersonal unity. It was the hereditary name together with all the memories it recalled, the family house, the ancestral field, the traditional situation and reputation, etc. All this is tending to disappear. A society momentarily dissolving, only to reform elsewhere but under wholly new conditions and with quite new elements, has not sufficient continuity to acquire a personal aspect, a history of its own, to which its members may feel attachment. If men do not replace this age-old objective of their activity, as it little by little disappears from among them, a great void must inevitably appear in existence.... Once when each local environment was more or less closed to others by usages, traditions, the scarcity of communications, each generation remained in its place of origin, or at least could not move far from it. But as these barriers vanish, as these small environments are levelled and blended with one another, the individuals inevitably disperse in accordance with their ambitions and to further their interests into the wider spaces now open to them. No scheme can therefore offset this inevitable swarming of the bees and restore the indivisibility which was once the family's strength (S:377-78).

Having set aside both political and domestic society as too large and too small, respectively, to cope with the problem of moral discipline of the anomic ego on a massive societal scale, Durkheim continued searching for a group of appropriate scale, closeness to economic life, and interactional intensity. In short, he sought intermediate groups between the central State and the isolated and demoralized ego. "Is this evil incurable?" Durkheim asked:

> ... While religion, the family, and the nation are preservatives against egoistic suicide, the cause of this does not lie in the special sort of sentiments encouraged by each. Rather, they all owe this virtue to the general fact that they are societies, and they possess it only in so far as they are well-integrated societies (S:378).

The essential problem here, then, was what type of intermediate group shall be the most interactionally cohesive, and hence the most effective in constantly resocializing and moralizing egos.

... Nothing but a moral power can set a law for men; but this must also be sufficiently associated with affairs of this world to be able to estimate them at their value. The occupational group has just this two-fold character. Being a group, it sufficiently dominates individuals to set limits to their greed; but sees too much of their life not to sympathize with their needs. Of course, it remains true that the State itself has important functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose the sentiment of general utility and the need for organic equilibrium to the particularism of each corporation. But we know that its action can be useful only if a whole system of secondary organs exist to diversify the action. These secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384).

In his political sociology (see especially <u>Professional Ethics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Civic</u> <u>Morals</u>), Durkheim expounded his perception of the void created by the disappearance of traditional intermediary groups between State and family. Of course, the growth of the modern state and the modern economy are closely intertwined (see Karl Polanyi, 1944) on the one hand, and inversely related to the shrinkage of familial functions on the other. In <u>Moral</u> <u>Education</u>, Durkheim offered a brief summary of this development.

... We are living under quite special conditions. Indeed, with the exception of the school, there is no longer in this country any society intermediate between the family and the state--a society that is not merely artificial or superficial. All the groups of this kind, which at one time ranged from domestic society and political society--provinces, communes, guilds--have been totally abolished or at least survive only in very attenuated form. The provinces and the guild are only memories; communal life is very impoverished and now holds a secondary place on our consciousness (ME:232).

Durkheim further observed that it was the two-fold thrust of the French Revolution--the collectivist state-oriented drive on the one hand, and the individualist drive on the other--that actively worked to root out the traditional intermediate groups. In this historical process, the men of the Revolution only completed the work begun by the French monarchy.

The causes of this situation are well-known. In order to achieve political and moral unity, the monarchy fought all forms of moral particularism; it strove to reduce the autonomy of towns and provinces, to weaken their moral individuality so as to fuse them more easily and completely into the great collective personality

> of France. In this regard, the Revolution continued and
> completed the work of the monarchy. All groupings that
> were opposed to this great movement of national consol-
> idation--which was the essence of the revolutionary
> movement--anything that was an obstacle to the unity and
> indivisibility of the Republic was broken. Moreover,
> the spirit that animated the men of the Revolution became
> quite hostile toward intermediate groupings (ME:232-3).

Surely Rousseau expressed both the collectivist and indivi-
dualist antipathy toward traditional intermediary groupings
like parish, guild, commune, etc. In other words, what Durk-
heim's linkage of intermediary groups in European societies
showed was that the old anchors of social life in which both
individual personality and collective norm were simultaneous-
ly embedded needed to be reconstituted on the national level.
Here, Durkheim always held in the back of his mind the speci-
fic historical situation in the France he knew so well--name-
ly, the disappearance of local intermediate groups as viable
factors in social organization.

> Now this state of affairs constitutes a serious crisis.
> For morality to have a sound basis, the citizen must
> have an inclination toward collective life. It is only
> on this condition that he can become attached ... to
> collective aims that are moral aims par excellence.
> This does not happen automatically; above all, this in-
> clination toward collective life can only become strong
> enough to shape behavior by the most continuous prac-
> tice. To appreciate social life to the point where one
> cannot do without it, one must have developed the habit
> of acting and thinking in common.... If, on the con-
> trary, we are used only infrequently to acting like so-
> cial beings, it is impossible to be very interested in
> an existence to which we can adapt ourselves only im-
> perfectly (ME:233).

The remoteness of the central, bureaucratic State,
the lack of intermediate groups, the smallness of the fami-
ly, all these factors and more converged toward the same end
--namely, the modern type of individualism, leaving us "in-
clined to a more suspicious isolation," "to acting like
lone wolves."

> If, then, with the exception of the family, there is
> no collective life in which we participate, if in all
> the forms of human activity--scientific, artistic, pro-
> fessional, and so on, in other words, all that consti-
> tutes the core of our existence--we are in the habit of

> acting like lone wolves, our social temperament has only
> rare opportunities to strengthen and develop itself.
> Consequently, we are inevitably inclined to a more or
> less suspicious isolation. Indeed, <u>the weakness of the</u>
> <u>spirit of association is one of the characteristics of</u>
> <u>our national temperament. We have a marked inclination</u>
> <u>toward a fierce individualism, which makes the obliga-</u>
> <u>tions of social life appear intolerable to us</u> *
> <div align="right">(ME:233-34).</div>

It is worthy to note, once again, that when Durkheim began to
reflect upon the actual cultural-historical situation in Eu-
rope, inevitably he acknowledged that <u>extreme individualism</u>
<u>is itself normatively sanctioned in the modern world</u>. Al-
though it accompanied, and even accelerated, the passing of
traditional intermediate groups and moral order, <u>by no</u>
<u>stretch of the historical imagination can this sanctification</u>
<u>of individualism and economic growth be portrayed simply as</u>
<u>the mechanical result of the breakdown of social integration</u>
<u>and the release of the organic ego from traditional moral</u>
<u>discipline</u>. Once again, we see the structure of Durkheim's
first schema beginning to breakdown <u>from within</u>, especially
whenever he considered the actual cultural logics involved
and historical evidence.

Let us next turn to consider his first explicit propo-
sals which appeared in <u>Suicide</u>, concerning the virtues of na-
tional political enfranchisement of professional groups as
the remedy for the contemporary crisis of anomie and egoisme.

E. <u>The "Moral Mechanics" of Professional Groups as the Na-</u>
   <u>tional Solution to the Crisis of Anomie and Egoisme</u>

Having first put Durkheim's proposals for the reconsti-
tution of occupational groups in his own theoretical and his-
torical perspective, let us now briefly examine his first
outline of reform proposals which appeared in <u>Suicide</u>. Durk-
heim began here by observing that because of the closeness of
of the occupational group to the daily tasks of people, it is
ideally suited as an intermediary group to take on the mas-
sive task of moral reconstruction. Because it is already a
life lived in common, it also acts as a ready-made "moral

milieux."

> Since it consists of individuals devoted to the same
> tasks, with solidary or even combined interests, no
> soil is better calculated to bear social ideas and sen-
> timents. Identity of origin, culture, and occupation
> makes occupational activity the richest sort of material
> for a common life. Moreover, in the past the corporation
> has proved that it could form a collective personality,
> jealous, even excessively so, of its autonomy and its
> authority over its members; so there is no doubt of its
> capacity to be a moral environment for them. There is
> no reason for the corporative interest not acquiring in
> its worker's eyes the respectable character and suprem-
> acy always possessed by social interests, as contrasted
> with private interest, in a well-organized society.
> From another point of view, the occupational group has
> the three-fold advantage over all others that it is om-
> nipresent, ubiquitous, and its control extends to the
> greatest part of life (S:378-79).

In contrast to the great centralized, bureaucratic states of
the modern era, Durkheim suggested, occupational groups' in-
fluence is continous and deep. The corporation is the inter-
mediate association most likely to be able to successfully
draw "the ego out of his state of moral isolation."

> Its influence on individuals is not intermittent, like
> that of political society, but it is always in contact
> with them by the constant exercise of the function of
> which it is the organ and in which they collaborate.
> It follows the workers everywhere they go; which the
> family cannot. Wherever they are, they find it envelo-
> ping them, recalling them to their duties, supporting
> them at need. Finally, since occupational life is almost
> the whole of life, corporative action makes itself felt
> in every detail of our occupations, which are thus given
> a collective orientation. Thus, the corporation has ev-
> erything needed to give the individual a setting, to
> draw him out of his state of moral isolation, and faced
> by the actual inadequacy of the other groups, it alone
> can fulfill this indispensable office * (S:379).

Durkheim then proposed that, in order to have this
beneficial influence, corporations must be given a regular
and legitimate role in national political life.

> But for it to have this influence, it must be organized
> on wholly different bases from those of today. First, it
> is essential that it become a definite and recognized
> organ of our public life, instead of remaining a private
> group, legally permitted, but politically ignored. By
> this we mean that it must necessarily be made obliga-
> tory, but it must be so constituted as to play a social

> role instead of expressing only various combinations
> of particular interests. This is not all. For the frame
> not to remain empty, all the germs of life of such a
> nature as to flourish there must find their place in it.
> For this grouping to remain no mere label, it must be
> given definite functions, and there are some which it
> can fulfill better than any other agency (S:379).

Durkheim was highly critical of the meaninglessness of the frequent oscillations in French society during the past few centuries in swinging back and forth between its two modern poles--between authoritarian, collectivistic, bureaucratic "Caesaristic" regimes (eg. Napoleon), and the anarchy of "fierce French individualism." In effect, Durkheim asked: how should economic life be regulated? Instead of a top-down control of the anarchy of economic life, Durkheim characteristically sought a _via_ _media_ between these two extremes, by opting for the regulation of economic life from within the professional groups themselves.

> At present, European societies have the alternative of
> leaving occupational life unregulated, or of regulating
> it through the State's mediation, since no other organ
> exists which can play this role of moderator. But the
> State is too far removed from these complex manifesta-
> tions to find the special form appropriate to each of
> them. It is a cumbersome machine, made only for general
> and clear-cut tasks. Its ever-uniform action cannot ad-
> just itself to the infinite variety of special circum-
> stances. It is therefore compressive and levelling in
> its action. On the other hand, we feel how impossible
> it is to leave unorganized all the life thus unattached.
> In so doing, by an endless series of oscillations we al-
> ternately pass from authoritarian regulation made impo-
> tent by its excessive severity to systematic abstention
> which cannot last forever because it breeds anarchy.
> Whether the question is one of hours of work, or health
> or wages, or social insurance and assistance, men of
> good will constantly encounter the same difficulties.
> As soon as they try to set up some rules, they prove
> inapplicable to experience because they lack plausibil-
> ity; or at least, they apply to the matter for which they
> are made only by doing violence to it. The only way to
> resolve this antinomy is set up a cluster of collective
> forces outside the State, though subject to its action,
> whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater
> variety (S:379-80).

Now, these newly reconstituted "corporations" would become an extended family, as it were, within the bosom of mod-

ern economic life, for they would take on the old "carita-
tive" functions of the kinship community and the neighbor-
hood.

> To them falls the duty of presiding over companies of
> insurance, benevolent aid and pensions, the needs of
> which are felt by so many good minds but which we right-
> ly hesitate to place in the hands of the State, already
> powerful and awkward; theirs it should be likewise to
> preside over the disputes constantly arising between
> branches of the same occupation, to fix conditions with
> which contracts must agree in order to be valid, in the
> name of the common interest to prevent the strong from
> exploiting the weak, etc.... Here, in broad outlines,
> is what corporations should be in order to render the
> services rightly expected of them. When their present
> state is considered, of course, it is hard to conceive
> of their ever being elevated to the dignity of moral
> powers. Indeed, they are made up of individuals attach-
> ed to one another by no bond, with only superficial and
> intermittent relations, even inclined to treat each other
> as rivals and enemies rather than as cooperators. But
> when once they have so many things in common, when the
> relations between themselves and the group to which
> they belong are thus close and continuous, sentiments
> of solidarity as yet almost unknown will spring up, and
> the present cold moral temperature of the occupational
> environment, still so external to its members, would
> necessarily rise.... Thus, the social fabric, the mesh-
> es of which are so dangerously relaxed, would tighten
> and be strengthened throughout its entire extent
> (S:380-1).

However, Durkheim observed, his proposals for the res-
toration of professional groups on the national level ran
into long-standing prejudices, stemming especially from the
Revolution's antipathy toward guilds and other traditional
intermediary groups. But Durkheim argued that the very uni-
versality of intermediate groups throughout Western history
confirms their present necessity. Now, the key limitation
to the old guilds was their predominantly urban base. Durk-
heim then proposed that this be overcome by making them an
integral part of the national political organization. The
following passage sums up many of his theses here:

> This restoration, the need of which is universally
> felt, unfortunately has to contend with the bad name
> left in history by the corporation of the ancien re-
> gime. Yet is there not proof of their indispensability
> in the fact that they have lasted not merely since the

the Middle Ages but since Greco-Roman antiquity, than
of their uselessness in the fact of their recent abro-
gation? If occupational activity has been corporatively
organized, except for a single century (the nineteenth),
is it not probable that such organization is necessary,
and that if it was no longer equal to its role a hun·
dred years ago, the remedy was to restore and improve,
not radically to suppress it? Certainly, it had finally
become an obstacle to the most urgent progress. The old,
narrowly local corporation, closed to all outside influ-
ence, had become an anomaly in a morally and politically
unified nation; the excessive autonomy it enjoyed, making
it a state within a state, could not be retained while
the governmental organ, ramifying itself in all direc-
tions, was more and more subordinating all secondary or-
gans of society to itself. So the base on which the in-
stitutions rested had to be enlarged, and the institu-
tion itself reconnected with the whole national life.
But if similar corporations of different localities had
been connected with one another, instead of remaining
isolated, so as to form a ... single system, if all
these systems had been subject to the general influence
of the state, and thus kept in constant awareness of
their solidarity, bureaucratic despotism and occupation-
al egoism would have been kept within proper limits....
But by overthrowing existing order without putting any-
thing in its place, corporative egoism has only been re-
placed by a still more corrosive individual egoism....
By dispersing the only groups which could persistently
unite individual wills, we ourselves have broken the
appointed instrument of our moral reorganization *
                                                 (S:381-2).

Contrary to symbolic equations current among contemporary
liberals, Durkheim rightly saw that suicide and our modern
malaise does not spring wholly from the difficulties of con-
temporary existence. Rather, anomie and egoisme are often
embraced; this acedia or moral alienation is self-chosen.

   ... Just as suicide does not proceed from man's diffi-
   culties in maintaining his existence, so the means of
   arresting its progress is not to make the struggle less
   difficult and life easier. If more suicides occur today
   than formerly, this is not because, to maintain ourselves
   we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our legit-
   imate needs are less satisfied, but because we no longer
   know the limits of legitimate needs nor perceive the
   direction of our efforts. Competition is of course becom-
   ing keener every day, because the greater ease of com-
   munication sets a constantly increasing number of com-
   petitors at logger heads. On the other hand, a more per-
   fected division of labor and its accompanying more com-
   plex cooperation, by multiplying and infinitely varying

the occupations by which men can make themselves use-
ful to other men, multiplies the means of existence,
and places them within reach of a greater variety of
persons. The most inferior aptitudes may find a place
here. At the same time, the more intense production re-
sulting from this subtler cooperation, by increasing
humanity's total resources, assures each worker an amp-
ler pay and so achieves a balance between the greater
wear on vital strength and its recuperation. Indeed,
it is certain that average comfort has increased on all
levels of the social hierarchy, although not perhaps
always in equal proportions. The maladjustment from
which we suffer does not exist because the objective
causes of suffering have increased in number or inten-
sity; it bears witness not to greater economic poverty,
but to an alarming poverty of morality * (S:386-7).

Accordingly, Durkheim argued that these structural re-
forms to alleviate our "alarming poverty of morality" are not
only urgent but, indeed, required by the whole sweep of our
historical development.

The latter's chief characteristic is to have swept clean-
ly away all the older social forms of organization. One
after another, they have disappeared either through the
slow usury of time, or through great disturbances, but
without being replaced. Society was originally organi-
zed on the family basis; it was formed by the union of
a number of smaller societies, clans, all of whose mem-
bers were or considered themselves kin. This organiza-
tion seems not to have remained long in a pure state.
The family quite soon ceases to be a political division
and becomes the center of private life. Territorial
grouping then succeeds the old family groupings. Indi-
viduals occupying the same area gradually, then indepen-
dently of consanguinity, contract common ideas and cus-
toms which are not to the same extent those of their
neighbors who live farther away. Thus, little aggrega-
tions come to exist with no other material foundations
than neighborhood and its resultant relations; each one,
however, with its own distinct physiognymy; we have the
village, or better, the city-state and its dependent
territory. They become confederated, combine under var-
ious forms and thus develop more complex societies
which they enter however without sacrificing their per-
sonalities. They remain the elemental segments of which
the whole society is merely an enlarged reproduction.
But bit by bit, as these confederations become tighter,
the territorial surroundings blend with one another and
lose their former moral individuality. From one city or
district to another, the differences decrease. The great
change brought about by the French Revolution was pre-
cisely to carry this levelling to a point hitherto un-
known. Not that it improvised this change; the latter

had long since been prepared by the progressive central-
ization to which the ancient regime had advanced. But
the legal suppression of the former provinces and the
creation of new, purely artificial and nominal divisions
definitely made it permanent. Since then the development
of means of communications, by mixing the populations,
has almost eliminated the last traces of the old dispen-
sation. And since what remained of occupational organi-
zation was violently destroyed at the same time, all se-
condary organs of social life were done away with
                                                  (S:388-89).

Durkheim's general evolutionary thinking comes through clear-
ly here. After the Revolution, he observed, only the central
State survived and grew stronger. Collective life was then
caught between these two opposing forces--the central bureau-
cratic State and the anomic, dispersed ego. And these oppos-
ing poles of modern life "fed off each other" as it were.

Only one collective form survived the tempest: the State.
By the nature of things this therefore tended to absorb
all forms of activity which had a social character, and
was henceforth confronted by nothing but an unstable
flux of individuals. But then, by this very fact, it was
compelled to assume functions for which it was unfitted,
and which it has not been able to discharge satisfactor-
ily. It has often been said that the State is as intru-
sive as it is impotent. It makes a sickly attempt to ex-
tend itself over all sorts of things which do not belong
to it, or which it grasps only by doing them violence.
Thence the expenditure of energy which the State is re-
proached, and which is truly out of proportion with the
results obtained. On the other hand, individuals are no
longer subjected to any other collective control but the
State's, since it is the sole organized collectivity.
Individuals are made aware of their society and of their
dependence upon it only through the State. But since it
is far from them, it can exert only a discontinuous in-
fluence over them; which is why this feeling has neither
the necessary constancy of strength. For most of their
lives, nothing about them draws them out of themselves
and imposes restraint on them. Thus, they inevitably
lapse back into egoism or anarchy. Man cannot become at-
tached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees
nothing above him to which he belongs. To free him from
all social pressure is to abandon him to himself and de-
moralize him. These are really the two characteristics
of our moral situation. While the State becomes inflated
and hypertrophied in order to obtain a firm enough grip
upon individuals, but without succeeding, the latter,
without mutual relationships, tumble over one another
like so many liquid molecules, encountering no central
energy to retain, fix, and organize them * (S:389).

The vacuity of the modern organizing principle has seldom
been portrayed in such compelling images.

As always, Durkheim's overriding concern was to find a
workable, historically and philosophically grounded, via me-
dia, a way of reconciling the antimonies of modern collectiv-
ism and individualism. Whether he succeeded or whether the
forces of bureaucratic despotism and anomic egoism have prov-
ed too strong, the only true measure of Durkheim's greatness
was the difficulty of the task he undertook. Indeed, I be-
lieve his historical argument concerning the disappearance
of intermediary groups, the need to restore their role in
economic life, and the portrait of the oscillations between
the two opposing poles of modern life to be far more profound
and compelling than his abstract, theoretical argument con-
cerning the spontaneous "moral mechanics" of occupational
groups.

Many would agree with Durkheim that the scale of modern
economic and political life has grown so large that decen-
tralization is necessary. But Durkheim was careful to argue
that the only useful kind of decentralization would be "one
which would simultaneously produce a greater concentration
of social energies." Hence, the theoretical model we explored
in Book One always underlies Durkheim's specific reforms.

> To remedy this evil, the restitution to local groups of
> something of their old autonomy is suggested. This is
> called decentralization. But the only useful decentral-
> ization is one which would simultaneously produce a
> greater concentration of social energies. Without loos-
> ening the bonds uniting each part of society with the
> State, moral powers must be created with an influence,
> which the State cannot have, over the multitude of in-
> dividuals. Today, neither the commune, nor the depart-
> ment nor the province has enough ascendancy over us to
> exert this influence, as we see in them conventional la-
> bels without meaning.... We may regret the past, but in
> vain. It is impossible to resuscitate a particularist
> spirit which no longer has any foundation.... The only
> decentralization making possible this multiplication
> of centers of communal life without weakening unity is
> occupational decentralization. For, as each of these
> cadres would be the only focus of a special limited ac-
> tivity, they would be inseparable from one another and
> the individual could form attachments without becoming

solidary with the whole. Social life can be divided,
while retaining its unity, only if each of these divi-
sions represents a function.... The corporation must
become more than an assemblage of individuals who meet
on election day without any common bond. It can fulfill
its destined role only if, in place of being a creature
of convention, it becomes a definite institution, a col-
lective personality, with its customs and traditions,
its rights and duties, its unity. The great difficulty
is not to decree that the representatives shall be se-
lected by occupation and what each occupations share
shall be, but to make each corporation become a moral
individuality. Otherwise, only another external and ar-
tificial subdivision will be added to the existing ones
which we wish to supplant * (S:390-1).

Characteristically (and this is what many have missed),
beneath his model of "moral mechanics" and his proposals for
structural and moral reform, lay Durkheim's image of man as
homo duplex, and the organic ego as inherently egocentric
and even insatiable. The disappearance of secondary groups,
the hypertrophy of the State and the release of the desires
of the organic ego, and the consequent breakdown of social
cohesion--all this is ultimately important only because to-
gether they lead to "moral anarchy," to the "morbid fevers"
of anomie and egoisme in modern society.

... The chief role of corporations, in the future as
well as in the past, would be to govern social func-
tions, especially economic functions, and thus to ex-
tricate them from their present state of disorganiza-
tion. Whenever excited appetites tended to excel all
limits, the corporation would have then to decide the
share that should equitably revert to each of the coop-
erative parts. Standing above its members, it would have
all necessary authority to demand indispensable sacri-
fices and concessions and impose order upon them. By
forcing the strongest to use their strength with moder-
ation, by preventing the weakest from endlessly multi-
plying their protests, by recalling both to the sense
of their reciprocal duties and the general interest, and
by regulating production in certain cases so that it
does not degenerate into a morbid fever, it would moder-
ate one set of passions by another, and permit their ap-
peasement by assigning them limits. Thus, a new sort of
moral discipline would be established, without which
all the scientific discoveries and economic progress in
the world could produce only malcontents * (S:382-83).

Of course, Durkheim's explanation of suicide was in-
tended as an objective examination of the results of this

breakdown of secondary groups; for suicide offered an external sign which objectively revealed the internal moral change. Suicides were thus portrayed as indices of the "cold moral temperature" of contemporary societies. And, therefore, the only real "way of checking the current of collective sadness is by lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign and result."

> The abnormal development of suicide and the general unrest of contemporary societies spring from the same causes. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths manifest the state of deep disturbance from which civilized societies are suffering, and bears witness to its gravity. It may even be said that this measures it.... The only possible way, then, to check this current of collective sadness is by at least lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign and a result. We have shown that it is not necessary, in order to accomplish this, to restore, artificially, social forms which are outworn and which could be endowed with only an appearance of life, or to create out of whole cloth entirely new forms without historical analogies. We must seek in the past new germs of life which it contained, and hasten their development (S:391).

At the conclusion to <u>Suicide</u>, however, Durkheim purposely did not go into great detail concerning the shape of the past history of professional or occupational groups, nor into the shape of their possible futures. "Only after a special study of the corporative regime would it be possible to make the conclusions more precise" (S:391).

> Once the existence of the evil is proved, its nature and its source, and we consequently know the general features of the remedy and its point of application, the important thing is not to draw up in advance a plan anticipating everything, but rather to set resolutely to work (S:
>   (S:391-2).

And "set resolutely to work" Durkheim did, with his lectures on <u>Socialism</u> <u>and</u> <u>Saint-Simon</u>, and his lectures <u>Professional</u> <u>Ethics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Civic</u> <u>Morals</u>. But the culmination of this effort --the analysis of the historical nature of the corporation and its possible future--appeared only in 1902 with Durkheim's preface to the second edition of <u>The</u> <u>Division</u> <u>of</u> <u>Labor</u> <u>in</u> <u>Society</u>, to which we now turn.

F. "Quelques Remarques sur les Groupements Professionels"

Durkheim's classic preface--translated by Simpson as "Notes on Occupational Groups"--to the second edition of The Division of Labor is important for a number of reasons. First, he elaborated there the nature and historical development of professional groups, which fulfilled his promise at the conclusion of Suicide. Moreover, he admitted certain limitations in the theoretical outlines of his earlier argument. Not only must intermediate groups be brought together on a sustained basis, Durkheim now argued, but if moral rules are to work effectively to regulate anomic economic activity they must be considered as morally legitimate and binding by collective authority. Thus, his emphasis shifted from the "latent" benefits of "moral mechanics" to questions of the centrality of legitimate moral authority. Here, too, as with his historical analyses, Durkheim moved closer to Weber.

He began by noting that his basic "theodicy" and "therapeutic" had developed since the first edition of The Division of Labor.

> There is an idea undeveloped in the first edition, which it will be useful to bring into light and further determine, for it will clarify certain parts of the present work. It is the question of the role that occupational groups are destined to play in the contemporary order (DL:1).

He recalled to our attention the fact that modern economic life is afflicted by a "state of juridical and moral anomie." No occupational ethics govern economic life; thus, the insatiable desires of the amoral ego are released from moral discipline and direction. In terms reminiscent of Veblen (see Merton, 1949), Durkheim noted the ambiguity of the great stress placed upon individual success.

> We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon the state of juridical and moral anomie in which economic life actually is found. Indeed, in the economic order, occupational ethics exist only in the most rudimentary state.... The most blameworthy acts are so often absolved by success that the boundary between what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is just and what is unjust, has nothing fixed about it, but seems susceptible to almost arbitrary change by individuals. An

> ethic so imprecise and inconstant cannot constitute a
> discipline. The result is that all this sphere of col-
> lective life is, in large part, freed from the modera-
> ting action of regulation. It is this anomic state that
> is the cause ... of the incessantly recurrent conflicts,
> and the multifarious disorders of which the economic
> world exhibits so sad a spectacle. For, as nothing re-
> strains the active forces and assigns them limits they
> are bound to respect, they tend to develop haphazardly,
> and come into collision with one another, battling and
> weakening themselves (DL:1-2).

In contrast to his earlier summary formula in Suicide, Durk-
heim now observed that greater social cohesion alone is not
sufficient. To restrain human passions the moral rules that
emerge with structural integration must also become legiti-
mate, that is, they must be accepted as the bases of moral
authority.

> Human passions stop only before a moral power they
> respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting,
> the law of the strongest prevails, and latent or ac-
> tive, the state of war is necessarily chronic. That
> such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evi-
> dent, since it runs counter to the aim of society,
> which is to suppress, or at least moderate, war among
> men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a high-
> er law. To justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise
> its encouragement of individual liberty. Quite on the
> contrary, liberty ... is itself the product of regula-
> tion. I can be free only to the extent that others are
> forbidden to profit from their physical, economic, or
> other superiority to the detriment of my liberty. But
> only social rules can prevent abuse of power. It is now
> known what complicated regulation is needed to assure
> individuals the economic indepedence without which
> their liberty is only nominal * (DL:3).

In historical terms, one of the most striking things
to note about this "Hobbesian" war of "each against all" is
that this type of "moral anarchy," rather than being ancient
or generic, is actually rather recent. It is not so much a
generic flaw of human nature; one cannot simply blame that
old standby, the organic ego, for the "social costs" of the
modern economic and political order, for these are unique
in cultural evolution. Hobbes, for instance, took the easy
way out, blaming generic human nature for the aftermath of
the Puritan Civil War in England, as did Durkheim after the

French Revolution.

> ... What brings about the exceptional gravity of this
> state ... is the heretofore unknown development that
> economic functions have experienced for about two cen-
> turies. Whereas formerly they played only a secondary
> role, they are now of first importance. We are far from
> the time when they were disdainfully abandoned to the
> inferior classes. In the face of the economic, the ad-
> ministrative, military and religious functions have be-
> come steadily less important. Only the scientific func-
> tions seem to dispute their place, and even science has
> scarcely any prestige save to the extent that it can
> serve practical occupations, which are largely economic.
> ... Society is [now] ... essentially industrial (DL:3).

Since economic life has gravitated to the very center of

modern society, the crisis resulting from its anomic deregu-

lation deepens.

> A form of activity which has assumed such a place in
> social life evidently cannot remain in this unruly state
> without resulting in the most profound disasters. For,
> precisely because the economic functions today concern
> the greatest number of citizens, there are a multitude
> of individuals whose lives are passed almost entirely
> in the industrial and commercial world. From this it
> follows that as that world is only feebly ruled by mor-
> ality, the greatest part of their existence takes place
> outside the moral sphere (DL:3-4).

Once again, it is evident that Durkheim had been so taken by

his virtual identification of moral and social processes that

wherever he perceived the lack of the former, it could only

have been due to the paucity of the latter. Perhaps Durkheim

had become fixed on the second process subsequent to the

breakthrough of the individualistic, vocationally ascetic,

functionally rational ethos of modern capitalism. In many

ways, his lack of insight into the first (Weberian) process

obviated his discovery of the full implications of the second

schema of suicide which I have outlined, and shall soon ex-

plore. His committment to affixing the burden on homo duplex

barred recognition of the variability and historical unique-

ness of our modern moral and sociocultural dilemmas.

> Naturally, we are not inclined to thwart and restrain
> ourselves; if then, we are not invited, at each moment,
> to exercise this restraint without which there is no
> ethic, how can we learn the habit? If in the task that
> occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule

than that of our well-understood interest, how can we learn to depend upon disinterestedness, on self-forget-fulness, on sacrifice? In this way, the absence of all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects beyond the economic world, and consequently, weaken public morality (DL:4).

Durkheim next admitted a crucial limitation in his earlier core argument in the first edition of The Division of Labor.Group moral discipline only becomes effective if it is consecrated with the moral authority of the group, which must be embraced as legitimate.

> ... We have especially insisted upon showing that the division of labor cannot be held responsible--that it does not necessarily produce dispersion and incoherence, but that functions, when they are sufficiently in contact with one another, tend to stabilize, and regulate themselves. But this explanation is incomplete. For, if it is true that social functions spontaneously seek to adapt themselves to one another, provided they are regularly in relationship, nevertheless, this mode of adaptation becomes a rule of conduct only if the group consecrates it with its authority.... Only a constituted society enjoys the moral and material supremacy indispensable in making law for individuals, for the only moral personality above particular personalities is the one formed by collective life (DL:4-5).

But, in the last analysis, Durkheim's notion of "moral mechanics"--that moral rules spontaneously emerge from sustained patterns of social interaction--proved too strong for him to break away from. Integrate the amoral ego into social groups, and moral reglementation will inevitably emerge--this was Durkheim's unshakable belief, and the basis of his hope for social and moral reconstruction in the modern age.

> ... If anomie is an evil, it is above all because society suffers from it, being unable to live without cohesion and regularity.... For anomie to end, there must then exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed. Neither political society in its entirety, nor the State can take over this function; economic life, because it is specialized and grows more specialized everyday, escapes their competence and their action. An occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs, and able to follow all their variations. The only one that could answer all these conditions is the one formed by all the agents of the same industry, uni-

ted and organized into a single body ... the corpora-
tion or occupational group (DL:4).

G. The Nature and History of Professional Groups in
     European Society

The only way to fully understand Durkheim's reform pro-
posals for the national political enfranchisement of profes-
sional groups is to put these notions into their historical
context. The usual symbolic equation of the Enlightenment,
for example, was that guilds and other such intermediary
groups could only be retrogressive, that is, stand against
the mainline of social and economic progress.

> For the establishment of an occupational ethic and law
> in the different economic occupations, the corporation,
> instead of remaining a confused aggregate, without uni-
> ty, would have to become again a defined, organized
> group; in a word, a public institution. But any project
> of this sort runs afoul of a certain number of prejudi-
> ces which must be forestalled or dissipated (DL:7).

But Durkheim never proposed to "resuscitate the old corpora-
tion of the Middle Ages." For the old guilds were city based,
while, on the contrary, the new economic and political organ-
izations of the modern age are national and international in
scope. The municipal guilds were fiercely autonomous, inde-
pendent organizations, while the modern world is highly in-
terdependent. Hence, there were some basic changes to be
made in the form of professional groups before they could
become reconstituted as vital public institutions.

> Now, in the economic order, the occupational group does
> not exist any more than occupational ethics. Since the
> eighteenth century rightfully suppressed the old corpor-
> ations, only fragmentary and incomplete attempts have
> been made to bring them back with new foundations
> (DL:5).

Durkheim next considered the history of the profession-
al group as a secondary institution in the life of European
societies. Noting its existence in both the ancient socie-
ties of Greece and Rome, and throughout much of the Middle
Ages and the modern world up until the late eighteenth cen-
tury, Durkheim once again argued from the apparent univer-

sality of an institution to its present necessity: "So persistent an institution cannot depend upon a contingent and accidental existence" (DL:9). "If from the origin of the city up to the zenith of the Empire, from the dawn of Christian societies up to modern times, they have been necessary, it is because they answer durable and profound needs" (DL:9). But, as always, Durkheim took care to point out that the economic services rendered by such corporations as regularly constituted loci of social interaction and, thus, as a moralizing milieux that they are most important.

> If it is indispensable, it is not because of the economic services it renders, but because of the moral influence it can have. What we especially see in the occupational group is a moral power capable of containing individual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common solidarity in the consciousness of all workers, of preventing the law of the strongest from being brutally applied to industrial and commercial relations*
> (DL:10).

In outlining the historical "multifunctionality" of the Roman corporations, as not only economic and occupational associations, but also religious and mutual aid societies, Durkheim observed that once such groups are formed, inevitably moral rules grow up to encompass the whole of the social microcosm.

> Once the group is formed, a moral life appears naturally carrying the mark of the particular conditions in which it has developed. For it is impossible for men to live together, associating in industry, without acquiring a sentiment of the whole formed by their union, without attaching themselves to that whole, preoccupying themselves with its interests, and taking account of that in their conduct, This attachment has in it something surpassing the individual. This subordination to the general interest is, indeed, the source of all moral activity. As this sentiment grows more precise and determined, applying itself to the most ordinary and the most important circumstances of life, it is translated into definitive formula, and thus, a body of moral rules is in process of establishment (DL:14-15).

Durkheim argued that the corporations of guilds of the medieval commune also constituted a moral milieu for their members. In evolutionary terms, Durkheim argued that the "corporation has been an heir to the family" (DL:17). This is a most impor-

tant insight, complementing (as noted earlier) Weber's emphasis on the medieval city as an oath-bound confederation. It was a crucial phase in widening out the structures of fraternization in the West. In short, with the emergence of the voluntary medieval commune, a new community of occupational interests took the place of older communities of "blood and soil" as the base of social organization; in short, it represents a momentous extension of the social bond.

> ... Trades demand cities, and cities have always been formed and recruited principally from the ranks of immigrants, individuals who have left their native homes. A new form of activity was thus constituted which burst from the old familial form ... it substituted for the family in the exercise of a function which had first been domestic, but which carried no longer this character.... Just as the family has elaborated domestic ethics and law, the corporation is now the source of occupational ethics and law (DL:17-18).

But how should corporations be transformed to fit contemporary conditions? Essentially, Durkheim observed that, since the medieval guild was municipal--that is, based on city trade--now occupational groups should be enfranchised on the national political level since economic life has become, to such a great extent, national and international in scope. Since the internationalization of the market is the dominant trend, it follows that the old system of territorial representation should give way to national occupational representation as the base of the political process.

> But to succeed in getting rid of all the prejudices, to show that the corporative system is not solely an institution of the past, it would be necessary to see what transformation it must and can submit to in order to adapt itself to modern societies, for evidently it cannot exist as it did in the Middle Ages (DL:18).

Looking back, Durkheim noted that in Rome, the corporations eventually were annexed to municipal adminstration, and thus lost their independence. However, in the Middle Ages, the independent, voluntaristic commune and guild were the economic anchors of the new rising bourgeoisie. Citoyen and citizen were synonymous. Durkheim's convergence with Weber on the

question of the importance of the medieval commune as a key
intermediate step in the progressive evolutionary extension
of the social bond is most significant.

> ... Their place in the Middle Ages is quite another mat-
> ter. There as soon as the corporation appears, it is as
> the normal mould for that part of the population called
> to play such a considerable role in the State: the bour-
> geoisie or the third estate. Indeed, for a long time,
> the bourgeoisie and tradespeople are one and the same.
> .... The organization of trades and commerce seems to
> have been the primitive organization of the European
> bourgeoisie. When the cities freed themselves from the
> seigneurial power, when the commune was formed, the body
> of trades which had preceded and prepared this movement
> became the foundation of the communal constitution....
> We know from the history of our societies that the com-
> mune has become their cornerstone.... Since it was a
> combination of corporations, and was formed on the style
> of a corporation, it is the latter, in the last analysis,
> which has served as foundation for all the political
> system which has issued from the communal movement
> (DL:20-1).

The reason that the medieval corporation could not sur-
vive the birth throes of the modern world, Durkheim reasoned,
was that it was too narrowly based, too closely bound to the
peculiar economic structure of the independent city. As na-
tional industry grew, and the scope of the trading market in-
ternationalized, the guild or corporation as the prime secon-
dary organ became outmoded, retrogressive. Although the scale
had changed, the guild lingered on, fiercely trying to retain
its former autonomy. But because its municipal anchor no
longer fit the new scale of economic and political action,
the guild was rightly suppressed by national monarchies and
revolutionaries alike.

> In the Middle Ages, it was narrowly bound to the organ-
> ization of the commune. This solidarity was without in-
> convenience as long as the trades themselves had a com-
> munal character.... But it was no longer the same once
> great industry was born ... its field of action is limi-
> ted to no determined region; its clientele is recruited
> everywhere. An institution so entirely wrapped up in the
> commune as was the old corporation could not then be
> used to encompass and regulate a form of collective ac-
> tivity which was so completely foreign to the communal
> life.... But if the corporation, as it then existed,
> could not be adapted to this new form of industry, and
> if the State could not replace the old corporative dis-

cipline, it does not follow that all discipline would be useless thenceforward. It simply meant that the old corporation had to be transformed to continue to fill its role in the new conditions of economic life
(DL:22-3).

The key to the future of the professional corporation, then, argued Durkheim, is that it must simultaneously have both constant relations with economic life and with the political and administrative apparatus of the modern nation-state.

> What the experience of the past proves above all, is that the ... framework of the occupational group must always have relations with the framework of occupational life. It is because of this lack of relationship that the corporative regime disappeared. Since the market, formerly municipal, became national and international, the corporations must assume the same extension. Instead of being limited only to the workers of a city, it must enlarge in such a way as to include all the members of the occupation scattered over the territory, for in whatever region they are found, whether they live in the city or in the country, they are all solidary, and participate in a common life. Since this common life is, in certain respects, independent of all territorial determinations, the appropriate organ must be created that expresses and regularizes its function. Because of these dimensions, such an organ would necessarily be in direct contact with the central organ of the collective life
(DL:24).

State regulation of economic activity and occupational self-regulation must remain separate, Durkheim contended. For only the occupational association is itself close enough to the problems and details of occupational life to know them intimately, and thus, choose the appropriate remedies.

> If the function of making general principles of industrial regulation belongs to the governmental assemblies, they are incapable of diversifying them according to the different industries. It is this diversification which constitutes the proper task of the corporation. [Foonote: This specialization could be made only with the aid of elected assemblies charged to represent the corporation. ...] Economic life would thus be regulated and determined without losing any of its diversity (DL:24-5).

Instead of annexing the professional association to the State, as both the old regime and the socialists wished to do, Durkheim argued that its insertion into national political life as a linked network of independent secondary organs is

not only possible but necessary. The new scale of socioeconomic life demands a new corresponding countervailing force; and the proposed transformation of the occupational group and its national political enfranchisement removes the old objections to its retrogressive behavior, which Durkheim argued was merely a reflection of its earlier municipal origins.

> For that very reason, the corporative regime would be protected against that tendency towards immobility that it has often been charged with in the past, for it is a fault which is rooted in the narrowly communal character of the corporation. As long as it was limited to the city, it was inevitable for it to become a prisoner of tradition as the city itself. As, in a group so restricted, the conditions of life are almost invariable, habit exercises a terrific effect upon people, and even innovations are dreaded. The traditionalism of the corporations was thus only an aspect of the communal traditionalism, and had the same qualities. Then once it was ingrained in the mores, it survived the causes which had produced and originally justified it. That is why, when the material and moral concentration of the country, and great industry which is its consequence, had opened minds to new desires, awakened new needs, introduced into the tastes and fashions a mobility heretofore unknown, the corporation, which was obstinately attached to its old customs, was unable to satisfy these new exigencies. But national corporations, by virtue of their dimension and complexity, would not be exposed to this danger (DL:25).

Durkheim went even farther, and suggested that the "organized occupation or corporation should be the essential organ of public life" in the future. In this way, "organic solidarity" would become fully institutionalized, and the transitional crisis finally overcome.

> There is even reason to suppose that the corporation will become the foundation of one of the essential bases of our political organization.... Now that the commune, heretofore an autonomous organism, has lost its place in the State, as the municipal market did in the national market, is it not fair to suppose that the corporation also will have to experience a corresponding transformation, becoming the elementary division of the State, the fundamental political unity? Society, instead of remaining what it is today, an aggregate of juxtaposed territorial districts, would become a vast system of national corporations. From various quarters it is asked that elective assemblies be formed by occupations, and

> not by territorial divisions; and certainly, in this
> way, political ssemblies would more exactly express the
> diversity of social interests and their relations....
> But to say that the nation, in becoming aware of itself,
> must be grouped into occupations--does this not mean that
> the organized occupation or corporation should be the
> essential organ of public life (DL:27)?

And, of course, Durkheim saw this massive and integral insti-
tutionalization of the logic of "organic" or occupational
solidarity at the very heart of modern social organization to
be demanded by our very history: "Thus, the great gap in Eu-
ropean societies ... would be filled. It will be seen, in-
deed, how as advances are made in history, the organization
which has territorial groups as its base (village, city, dis-
trict, province, etc.) has become steadily effaced" (DL:27).
Thus, attempting to deal realistically and historically with
the modern crisis of anomie and egoisme, Durkheim, as a posi-
tivist moral philosopher, issued a call for us to embrace a
new type of extended social bond, a new form of "universal
brotherhood." The basic question remains, however: was this
solution adequate to the moral crisis of anomie and egoisme?
For many reasons, I think not.

To the end, Durkheim believed that his solution was a-
dequate because it created moral _milieux_ for the undisci-
plined organic ego. And, to the end, he believed that it was
the generic ego--man as _homo duplex_--that lay at the heart
of our problems. Can we today allow ourselves to be similar-
ly misled?

> ... it must not be thought that the entire function of
> the corporation is to make rules and apply them. To be
> sure, where a group is formed, a moral discipline is
> formed too. But the institution of this discipline is
> only one of the many ways through which collective ac-
> tivity is manifested. A group is not only a moral au-
> thority which dominates the life of its members; it is
> also a source of life _sui generis_. From it comes warmth
> which animates its members, making them intensely human,
> destroying their egotisms (DL:26).

FOOTNOTES

BOOK TWO

#1, pg. 543--I shall focus exclusively on Durkheim's ration-
ales here, rather than on his statistics, in contrast to
W. Pope (1976).

#1, pg. 630--Barclay Johnson has discovered other apparent
references to fatalisme (1965:887, #14); see also
Cashion (1970).

BOOK THREE

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

<u>Synopsis</u>.   In this Book,we shall critically reexamine the un-
derlying presuppositions of Durkheim's first schema of sui-
cide by comparing and contrasting them with the evolving
structure of Durkheim's thought which we delineated in Book
One; then, on the basis of this reexamination, we shall move
to his second schema of suicide.

In Part I, we shall first criticize Durkheim's doctrine
of <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u> in terms of the location of egoism and insa-
tiability. I propose that Durkheim's early image of the erup-
tion of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through
the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was a
mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, histori-
cally, and culturally. Even Durkheim himself shifted away
from this inadequate image in later years.

Then we shall review several shifts in Durkheim's caus-
al model away from his early positivistic notions of mechan-
istic, one-way causality toward the autonomization of collec-
tive representations. When this double task is completed, I
propose that we shall conclude that the first schema of sui-
cide, implicitly resting on these early notions of <u>homo</u> <u>du-</u>
<u>plex</u> and abstracted, mechanistic causality, should be set a-
side not only because such premises are logically flawed,
but also because they were later abandoned or modified by
Durkheim himself.

Next, we shall explore various transitions in Durk-
heim's work which reveal a progressive shift toward "cultural
realism" which are directly relevant to the second schema.
Further, because of the lack of historical specificity in

Durkheim's abstracted general evolutionism, we shall explore possible complementarities and convergences between his work and that of Max Weber. Hence, we shall assume a synthetic Durkheimian-Weberian analytical perspective before we begin to address the second schema. Then, we shall outline some criteria for a more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide. Finally, we shall explore other observers' insights into Durkheim's second schema.

In Part II of Book Three, we shall explore all four types of suicide as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both historical sets proceed from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression. In traditional societies, the common content of altruisme and fatalisme is absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule of satisfaction. Altruisme represents the active acceptance of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice for the welfare of the group. Fatalisme represents the opposite role of passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate.

Now, in modern societies caught up in the transitional crisis (pre-organic solidarity), both anomie and egoisme proceed from common sources--absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiability--precisely the reverse of the values of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and unending drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I call the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition.

When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams"--and collapse of the will and imagination in isolation and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals, etc. This ethos of _angst_ and the "journey into the interior" in which suicide becomes a vocation is sanctioned by what I shall call

the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition.

Together, these twin expressions of some of our highest callings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" which represent the two halves of the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "golden mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our prime vices.

PART I

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S KEY PREMISES

CHAPTER ONE

THE LOCATION OF EGOISM AND INSATIABILITY: A CRITIQUE
OF DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF HOMO DUPLEX

Preface. The problem of the location of egoism and insatia-
bility, "le mal de l'infini," which Durkheim empirically en-
countered on such a massive scale in the modern world, is
central to his schema of suicide. As we discovered in Book
One, the docrine of homo duplex--the generic opposition be-
tween ego and person, between sensual appetites and moral
rules, between percepts and concepts--lies at the very heart
of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology of morality
and religion, and his sociology of knowledge (see also Lukes,
1973:10). Clearly, in his first schema of suicide Durkheim
grounded egoistic individualism and insatiable desires in the
pre-socialized half of human nature--the organic ego. But, as
we have discovered in Book Two, at various points Durkheim's
theses also ambiguously suggest that egoism and insatiability
derive as much from the presence of modern cultural sanctions
as from the absence of traditional moral controls over the
pre-social ego in the modern era. Let us now explore the ir-
retrievable flaws in Durkheim's early image of the dualism
of human nature as these informed his first schema of suicide.

Logically, how does Durkheim's notion of the supposed
insatiable passions of the organic half of that strange and
divided creature--homo duplex--stand up? Can we accept this
part of Durkheim's explanatory model underlying his first
schema in Suicide? I think not. I propose that Durkheim's
image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable sensual pas-

sions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules--his rhetorically inspired "brittle synthesis" as Giddens (1971b:22) terms it--<u>was</u> <u>a</u> <u>mistake</u> <u>rhetorically</u>, <u>biologically</u>, <u>sociologically</u>, <u>historically</u>, <u>and</u> <u>culturally</u>. <u>Even</u> <u>Durkheim</u> <u>shifted</u> <u>away</u> <u>from</u> <u>this</u> <u>inadequate</u> <u>image</u> <u>in</u> <u>his</u> <u>later</u> <u>years</u>. Let us now critically explore these limitations in Durkheim's doctrine of man as <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u> as a prelude to our reformulation of his schemas of suicide.

However, let me first limit the potential scope of my criticism here. I do not wish, for instance, to deny the self-evident fact that man is a creature composed of multiple realities--for we are simultaneously physical, biological, psychological, sociocultural, moral-intellectual, and spiritual beings. Man is inherently ambiguous; man is a mystery. Certainly, in these and other related terms I would agree with Durkheim, and a whole tradition of thought, that man is, indeed, <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u> or <u>multiplex</u>. Yet, I find Durkheim's early postulate of the inherent insatiability of the organic ego unacceptable. And, therefore, his corresponding schema portraying anomie and egoisme as the release of the ego from traditional social control, while still very insightful as a description of a secondary phase process, needs to be reformulated.

Finally, I <u>do</u> consider Durkheim's later shift from the anomic to the alogic ego acceptable and even profound. For it means that, instead of assigning the <u>presence</u> of self-destructive drives to the generic organic ego, Durkheim merely imputed to it the <u>absence</u> of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts. Indeed, the reversal of the presence/absence polarity is crucial to the reformulation of these two very different schemas. In any case, I simply wish to put the reader on notice that my criticisms directed toward the underlying postulate of schema one do not alter my conviction that Durkheim's distinction between ego and person remains a foundation theorem for the human sciences.

A. Homo Duplex as a Rhetorical Mistake

To my mind, Durkheim should never have incorporated, at the very heart of his first schema, key images and premises of his opponents. While it is true (see, for example, R:121-4) that Durkheim took pains to distance himself from both the Utilitarians like Hobbes and Romantic pioneers such as Rousseau, nonetheless, he retained certain crucial aspects of their view of the pre-socialized, generic human ego. I believe, therefore, that Anthony Giddens is quite right when he states:

> ... Although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from methodological individualism is much more subtle and profound than has been assumed by many of his critics, what results is a brittle synthesis and essentially an unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and the very serious deficiencies which run throughout his works, however, have to be understood in the light of this attempt. As so often happens with a writer whose works are so strongly polemical in tone, <u>ultimately he was unable to abandon certain of the very premises of which he was most critical in the writings of his opponents</u> *(1971b:222).

Let us next briefly explore the prime example of this mistaken rhetorical incorporation--namely, Durkheim's view of the economy as the prime arena for egoistic and amoral activity.

1. Economic Deregulation as Anomic Norm: Durkheim's Devaluation of the Utilitarian Economy

The rhetorical incorporation and denial of value to the essential premises of his opponents was especially damaging to Durkheim's implicit sociology of economic life. Although ambiguous at several points, in the main Durkheim himself greatly neglected analysis of economic action, and treated it as the very paradigm of egoistic and amoral activity. This might seem surprising in light of Durkheim's sanguine view of the benefits of the organic division of social labor. But we must remember that even here Durkheim's central interest was not with the technological and economic aspects of the progressive division of labor. Rather, his prime con-

cern lay always with the beneficent effects of "moral mechanics" for occupational groups, and with the progressive extension, universalization, and rationalization of the social bond on the civilizational level. Durkheim was no social economist like Weber.

But why did Durkheim anathematize economic action as the very prototype of egoistic amorality? Because, as we discovered in Book One, as a moral philosopher Durkheim seized upon the ancient doctrine of man as homo duplex for his own special purposes. In so doing, he infused the two halves of this dichotomy with his own sociologistical and the individualist Utilitarian doctrines, respectively. Here Durkheim's tacit rhetorical strategy apparently was to invert the high valuation of that abstract, self-interested, calculating ego known as "economic man" in Utilitarian moral theory and political economy by identifying it with the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego. By uncritically incoporating this apotheosis of the secularized ascetic, the post-Reformation "New Model Man"--the isolated ego floating in the mechanical world of the self-equilibrating market--Durkheim accepted the historically unique Utilitarian image of economic action as a universal norm, much as the classical theorists themselves proclaimed. However, Weber's achievement lay in revealing the historical uniqueness of the ethos of market capitalism, and in revealing its unique normative presuppositions.

For example, in Socialism (53-4), Durkheim took the historically unique separation of the economy from polity and society as a generic given. But as Weber, Polanyi (1944, 1968), Nelson (1969a), and others have shown, this segregation of the different aspects of sociocultural process from one another is not universal, and thus not to be presumed but to be explained. Further, while Durkheim was certainly familiar with the works of many French, English, German and other economists, in Socialism he justified his neglect of economic categories and processes in these terms:

> We may speak of "economic things or functions" with-
> out having previously said what they consist of, or
> by what external sign one may recognize them. The
> fault is due to the science of economics, which has
> not clarified its own fundamental concepts better
> (Soc:57).

This neglect of economic action is more understandable
if we recognize that by his rhetorical incorporation and in-
version of the Utilitarian ego into his positivist moral so-
ciology, Durkheim effectively banished it from the social
and moral life. Due to his own peculiar polemical and cultur-
al commitments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with
social norms and the moralized person, and the profane with
dispersed egos engaged in mundane, self-centered, and purely
utilitarian tasks. In The Elementary Forms, for instance,
Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different worlds
of human experience: ordinary days spent by self-calculating
egos in dispersed practical activity, versus the extraordi-
nary feast days spent by moralized persons in concentrated
"collectively effervescent" ceremonial.

> On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual avo-
> cations which take the greater part of the attention.
> Every one attends to his own personal business; for
> most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the
> exigencies of material life, and the principal incen-
> tive to economic activity has always been private in-
> terest.... On feast days, on the contrary, these pre-
> occupations are necessarily eclipsed; being essential-
> ly profane, they are excluded from these sacred per-
> iods. At this time, their thoughts are centered upon
> their common beliefs, their common traditions, the mem-
> ory of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of
> which they are the incarnation; in a word, upon social
> things (EF:389-90).

Now, I propose that Durkheim made a basic rhetorical
mistake when he equated the ego and economic action, which
thus banished common, practical, economic action from the
all-important sphere of the moral and social. One of the few
secondary interpreters who has clearly seen this problem is
Gianfranco Poggi, who contends:

> Durkheim's view of labor as wholly profane, indivi-
> dual, and non-social, and his distaste for the mater-
> iality characteristic of the non-social realm --these

two tendencies bias even his approach to what he con-
siders the proper social realm by making it difficult
to deal adequately with social objects (1971:248).

Of the portion deleted from the preceding passage (EF:390),
Poggi says:

> It appears from this passage that for Durkheim, la-
> bor, i.e. productive activity, is inherently preso-
> cial and antisocial; it is socialized only margin-
> ally, through the inertia of associations and habits
> acquired in the properly social realm, which, how-
> ever, have in principle no direct bearing on econo-
> mic activity (1971:246).

Further, Poggi rightly sees that Durkheim's master equation
governing these symbolic alignments is his polar opposition
between the sacred and the profane. The essence of the dual-
ism of human nature (to Durkheim) is this sacred/profane di-
chotomy--ego is to person as body was to soul. Poggi sees
that homo duplex was a rhetorical mistake:

> ... Durkheim puts individual behavior per se on a
> wholly different plane from the social plane on which
> institutions function; it appears as a destructive or
> at best disruptive element in that functioning. Only
> by transcending his own individuality, by surrender-
> ing to the superiority of the norm and of society, can
> the individual correctly confront the social (norma-
> tive) realm.... Since he has equated the social with
> the normative, whatever opposes norms must be anti-
> social or non-social.... In fact, Durkheim is compel-
> led to argue, albeit mostly implicitly, that anomic
> behavior is ... mindless, expressing the blind vora-
> city of "the flesh." Noncompliance issues, in the
> last analysis, from the extent to which that ultimate
> embodiment of individuality, the physical organism,
> breaks through the layer of social/moral representa-
> tions laid over it by society. In deviance ... the
> beast within man bares his teeth, the lowest, vilest
> part of man attacks and negates the benevolent and
> austere authority of society.... Durkheim contemplates
> this subversion of the proper order of things with a
> moralistic shudder, and is led at times to speak of
> society's mission as that of freeing man from the hold
> of natural forces, of delivering him from the mindless
> greed of his senses. A kind of Cartesian mind/body
> dualism seems to lie behind this imagery.... An impli-
> cit naturalistic monism thus struggles in his thought
> with an implicit dualism, or perhaps even an implicit
> spiritualistic monism (1971:246-7-8).

Indeed, not only is Poggi's general critique well taken, but

also his concluding characterization of Durkheim's basic
philosophical position reveals clearly the multiplicity of
perspectives from which Durkheim's doctrine may be judged,
and the difficulty of finally placing him in any useful
category except perhaps that of master moral dialectician.

      Unfortunately, Durkheim's polemical overstatement led
him to tacitly embrace theses running directly counter to
some of his own basic premises. Surely his unjustified re-
mark that "The principal incentive to economic activity has
always been private interest" (EF:390) serves as a prime illus-
tration. Such a thesis is acceptable only if economic action
is to be primarily regarded from the biological or purely
Utilitarian perspective. Even in biological terms it may be
too reductionistic and mechanistic, as ethologists begin to
systematically report on the complex structures underlying
animal societies (see, for example, Wynne-Edwards, 1968).
I believe that Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation of the
apotheosized image of economic individualism as first devel-
oped by the Utilitarian wing of the Scottish moral philoso-
phers and English non-conformists to have been a fundamental
mistake. Instead of incorporating their moralization of atomis-
tic and mechanistic images of economy and society, and thus
far too easily serving his own polemical purposes by banish-
ing everyday practical activity from the realm of the moral,
Durkheim should have developed a fully sociological position
which would have rejected both the premises and the valuation
of egocentric economic activity as forwarded by the Utilitar-
ian reformers. Durkheim would then have found himself in the
position to re-incorporate the economic individual into socie-
ty, culture, and history. In sum, instead of accepting the
Utilitarians' apotheosis of modern economic deregulation as
anomic norm, Durkheim should have moved to a fully sociologi-
cal view of economic action. LaCapra has criticized Durkheim's
infusion of his doctrine of man as _homo duplex_ into economic
action in these memorable terms:

... in Durkheim's conception of economics, the mind-body dualism functioned to relegate economic activity to the sphere of the literally material and the individual. By the end of his life, Durkheim considered economic activity to be the profane par excellence. His entire conception of the problem not only failed to offer insight into the nature of economic institutions; it also ignored the moral and religious aspects of modern economic activity which Max Weber treated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1972:83).

2.   A Properly Durkheimian View of the Economy

It is significant that those members of the Annee school who worked as economic sociologists --I mean Francois Simiand, Maurice Halbwachs, and even Marcel Mauss--did not do their best work under the influence of Durkheim's early doctrine of homo duplex. For economic sociology simply becomes impossible if one brands economic action as inherently egotistic, utilitarian, and generically asocial--in a word, profane. Durkheim's mistaken rhetorical tactic unfortunately thus banished the economy from cultural and moral influence. However, had Durkheim followed consistently his own methodological postulates, he might have helped build a better theory of social economics (eg. see Neyer, 1960: 65). Again, it is important that those French economic sociologists such as Simiand and Halbwachs were mainly influenced by Durkheim's seminal remarks that economic wants and value are ultimately determined by public opinion--that is, culture.

But even Durkheim's occasional remarks on the social and cultural foundations of economic norms ran into considerable opposition from economists. And, in contrast to frequent pronouncements on the need for rapprochement between history and sociology, it is striking that Durkheim made few overtures to economics as a discipline. Lukes reports on one unhappy exchange in 1908:

> The economists, still largely hostile to the intrusive claims of sociology, were equally critical of Durkheim's methodological views. At a meeting of the

Societe d'Economique Politique in 1908, Durkheim advanced his views concerning the nature of economic phenomena and the relation of economics to the other social sciences. It was clear, he argued, that the scientific study of morality, of law, of religion, and art, were concerned with ideas. Was political economy any different: did it deal with phenomena "independent of opinion?" He maintained that economic facts could also be considered as matters of opinion, though this did not mean that they did not operate according to laws. The value of things depended not only on their objective properties but also on the opinion held concerning them. For example, religious opinion could affect the exchange value of certain goods, as could changes in taste. Again, wage-rates were a function of a basic standard of living, but this standard itself varied from period to period as a function of opinion. And certain forms of production (for instance, cooperation), expanded not because of their objective productivity but because of certain moral values ascribed to them by opinion. Thus, economics lost its preponderance and took its place beside the other social sciences and in close relation to them (1973:499-500).

Needless to say, Durkheim's reception was not enthusiastic, with some economists objecting that the "eternal laws of supply and demand" were not swayed by mere "public opinion."

In addition, in The Elementary Forms, after the summation that "... nearly all the great institutions have been born in religion," Durkheim appended a famous footnote containing seminal research suggestions:

Only one form of social activity has not yet been expressly attached to religion: that is economic activity.... Economic value is a sort of power or efficacy, and we know the religious origins of the idea of power. Also, richness can confer mana; therefore, it has it. Hence, it is seen that the ideas of economic value and of religious value are not without connection. But the question of the nature of these connections has not yet been studied (EF:466, #4).

At least one member of the Annee school, however, followed up on this seminal footnote. In his justly famous Annee monograph, The Gift, Marcel Mauss (1967) specifically referred to this suggestive footnote in proferring his work as "... an answer to the question already posed by Durkheim concerning the religious origin of the notions of economic value" (1967:

70). And Durkheim himself, in the same Elementary Forms, proposed what I believe to be a properly sociological view of economic activity:

> Even the material interests which these great religious ceremonials are designed to satisfy concern the public order and are therefore social. Society as a whole is interested that the harvest be abundant, that the rain fall at the right time and not excessively, that the animals reproduce regularly. So it is society that is in the foreground of every consciousness; it dominates and directs all conduct; that it is more living and active, and consequently more real, than in profane times (EF:390).

And Neyer (1960:76) rightly notes that in one of his last papers, "Judgements of Reality and Judgements of Fact," Durkheim explicitly suggested that the social (normative) foundations of economic value become one of the main fields for future sociological development. "In one of Durkheim's last papers ... economic value takes its place as one form of the "ideal" whose investigation constitutes the chief business of sociology, along with other systems of "value"--religious, moral, legal, and aesthetic." Neyer further observes that reconciling some of Durkheim's early and later views on the roots of economic value might prove difficult.

But perhaps the most explicit and useful of Durkheim's theses on the sociocultural roots of economic value and action can be discovered as early as Suicide (1897). Strangely, Durkheim's significant insights here have been largely ignored (except see the work of Simiand, Halbwachs, and Mauss), even by contemporary sympathetic sociologists interested in the normative foundations of economic action and theory (see, for example, Parsons, 1949; and Parsons and Smelser, 1955). As I argued earlier (see Book Two), Durkheim's thesis of the SocioEconomic Schedule of Satisfaction (see S:248-50) holds great unexplored potential significance for fundamental theory in economic sociology and comparative social systems.

The key passages in Suicide represent a crucial transition in Durkheim's argument concerning the source and operation of anomie and the insatiable passions of the pre-social-

ized ego, for there he translated his abstract premises about
the need for "reglementation" into a basic sociological rule.
In moralizing the ego, and directing the desires of the so-
cially constructed person, society and culture generate para-
meters for potential satisfaction. Basically, Durkheim propo-
sed that every society utilizes some sort of mechanism, ac-
cepted as legitimate, to regulate the ratios of satisfaction
of individuals in terms of a socioeconomic schedule of want
satisfaction. This social schedule is stratified for various
groups and occupations depending upon relative degrees of
functional contribution and/or cultural honor. This socioeco-
nomic schedule of the generation and regulation of desires
is, in a relatively stable society, accepted generally by each
person as legitimate, and each is comparatively adjusted to
their scheduled ratio of satisfaction. In contemporary socie-
ty, the workings of the socioeconomic schedule are made clear-
er by the universality of credit and automatic, electronic
accounting; for example, each month an employee may have his
paycheck automatically deposited in his bank account. The
amount received represents a more or less standard alloca-
tion of purchasing power to a worker in that occupation,
skill level, and so forth. Thus, each station in life re-
ceives approximately the rewards considered legitimate, both
by the larger society and by the group itself.

Now, the thesis of the importance of the Social Sched-
ule is one of the key sociocultural foundations of the dis-
tribution phase of economic process; it is a prime, generic
socioeconomic institution just as much as markets. If we ask,
for example, how are the productive, distributive, and con-
sumptive phases of economic process to be coordinated? How
are they to be directed? And, how are ratios and sequences
between different classes, groups, institutions, and sectors
to be negotiated? How is such agreement reached and conflict
resolved on a regular basis? To answer, as Utilitarian econo-
mists did for many years, in terms of homogenizing supply/
demand price mechanisms in ideally competitive markets is

to give no real, empirical answer at all. Economic sociologists should instinctively connect the legitimacy of wages and prices to institutions, to governing socioeconomic rationales, and ultimately, to long range cultural values. In short, the SocioEconomic Schedule is the generic price and income making institution.

Further, the social schedule can be viewed as a key variable mediating between various spheres of economic action and their societal bases. In essence, between the economic system and the cultural value system stands the stratification system. The social schedule serves to translate values into prices, and then, in turn, feedsback prices and production/distribution ratios into values. Price and income are based in Durkheim's theory of the social schedule on the degree of functional contribution of various groups, on their differential social and cultural status, on the belief in the legitimacy of these invidious ranks and the appropriate reward due each, and so on and so forth. If, in general, one grants the fact that wants are, in part, based upon socioculturally generated desires, and the values of goods and services rest upon group preferences, then at some point we must turn to explore the social schedules in which these desires and legitimizing values are embodied.

Space does not allow us to consider here such important questions as the degree of implicitness or explicitness of the social schedule, the bases of relative legitimacy (past, present, future), specialization and monopolies as ways of raising one's own groups percentage of the schedule, the economy as a symbolic process, and so forth. In regard to our present concerns, it is sufficient to note the crucial historical variations in the content of the social schedule, for as we noted in Book Two, Durkheim's four types of suicide are rooted in two very different types of social schedules in different societies at the two ends of history.

3. Ego and History: Parsons' Mistaken Image of Durkheim
        as a Communist Theorist

Even so brilliant an analytical theorist as Talcott
Parsons was unwittingly tripped by complications stemmming
from Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex. In his magisterial
The Structure of Social Action, Parsons asserted that Durk-
heim was best considered "... a communist [theorist] rather
than socialist" (1949:341). Parsons' portrayal of Durkheim
as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist like himself, possess-
ed by a negative image of human nature, and searching for
the eternal essence of human society (Parsons' Central Value
System), led him to identify Durkheim as a communist theor-
ist. Curiously, Parsons' misportrayal of Durkheim as a com-
munist and the popular misperception of Durkheim as a con-
servative (eg. see John Horton, 1964; Lewis Coser, 1960)
are intimately related.

But clearly, Parsons' assertion is mistaken, as Mel-
vin Richter (1960:208, #77) and Giddens (1971c:511) have in-
sisted. But what misled Parsons, and others after him? At
root, what is wrong here is that Durkheim's anti-individual-
ist polemic has not been explicitly connected with his doc-
trine of man as homo duplex, and his evolutionary perspect-
ive. Remember first that Parsons had portrayed Durkheim pri-
marily as a social theorist like himself--that is, concern-
ed with "social statics," not "dynamics;" one who searched
for the generic bases of social order and control (see also
the appendix). Since Durkheim viewed communist utopias, as
distinct from the historically specific critique of industrial socie-
ties by socialist theorists, as an eternal response to the
egoism inherent in human nature, Parsons naturally slipped
over into the misportrayal of Durkheim as standing theoreti-
cally with the communist camp.

An additional factor which led Parsons astray was that
Durkheim apparently agreed with communist theorists that the
root problem underlying economic anarchy (see Book Two) is
the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego. But what

Parsons apparently did not see was the extent to which Durkheim tried to transcend both the communist _and_ socialist theorists, on the one hand, _and_ the Utilitarian individualists on the other. As a positivist moral philosopher working sociologically, Durkheim's prime intention was to dialectically resolve impasses between opposing polarities in a new and compelling synthesis. Now, while Parsons did see that Durkheim rejected the doctrinal claims of both the Utilitarian economists and the socialists on the grounds that they similarly apotheosized the very moral anarchy to which he was so opposed, Parsons neglected to see that Durkheim agreed with the socialists that our present transitional crisis was historically specific, and derived basically from the modern separation of the economy from the polity. Durkheim spent many pages, as we have in part two of Book Two, comparing and contrasting communist and socialist theory, and specifically set aside communist "theodicies" and "therapuetics" as unsuited to the historical specifics of our modern crisis. So, misled by his neglect of Durkheim's historical perspective, Parsons seized upon Durkheim's generic doctine of _homo_ _duplex_, failed to see its genetic framework, and then mistakenly insisted that Durkheim embraced an ethical and political position which Durkheim himself explicitly rejected. But, as we have discovered, the fault does not lie with Parsons alone, for Durkheim's doctrine of the insatiability of the sensual appetites of the organic ego was also fundamentally flawed.

4. Conclusion

In truth, Durkheim's polemics against opposing cultural traditions were incomplete--I mean he simply did not go far enough in rejecting their shared images of the pre-socialized ego. Instead of acquiescing in the rhetorical bifurcation of man into egoistic organic and moral-social halves, Durkheim's dialectical sociologism should have led him to reject this cornerstone of modern thought altogether. But,

here as elsewhere, Durkheim's inherited Cartesian dualism
was reenforced by the oppositions between individual and so-
ciety embraced by Utilitarian and Romantic alike. And back
of these common oppositions may be detected the gnostic gulf
between Geist and Welt which permeates almost all these dis-
cussions. Unfortunately, Durkheim took over the notion of
the pre-socialized individual of his opponents, and simply
inverted the valuation.

Now, we would do well to recall that the intimate link-
age between "Reason" and the "Individual" in Utilitarian and
Rationalist philosophy, and between the "Individual" and the
subjectivity and emotional inner feeling of angst in Romantic
and Idealistic philosophy, both placed enormous emphasis upon
the generic elements of the abstracted, generic individual.
This was also true of French philosophy--Durkheim spoke of
his countrymen sometimes as "lone wolves," given to a suspi-
cious isolation and "fierce individualism"; this was especial-
ly true of the radical wing of the Enlightenment philosophes.
But what these cultural traditions, in their common opposi-
tion to the social organicism and inter-personal ethics of
the lingering Catholic cultural tradition, had raised so high,
Durkheim placed low. Yet, like them, Durkheim retained the
"cult of the (moralized) person" as the prime source of value
integration in modern "organic solidarity." Instead of the
pre-socialized individual as the prime carrier of modern val-
ues, Durkheim polemicized against the generic ego, the lower
and lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amoral, egoist-
ic, driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly des-
tructive. As noted earlier, in this process Durkheim demon-
strated the possibility of derivation of autonomous indivi-
dualism from "realistic" rather than "nominalist" premises.

However, in the last analysis, it is generally a prime
rhetorical mistake, especially when engaged in as significant
a civilizational debate as Durkheim was, to tacitly incorpor-
ate crucial premises of your opponents. For then the very
same premises one seeks to destroy in one's opponents come

back to haunt you also. Rhetorical incorporation is thus a
two-edged sword. The only real alternative is to refuse to
even to begin to enter into the other's closed conceptual
world, to reject crucial misleading premises altogether,
and to start to build up another world independently. I
propose that it only undermined Durkheim's radical new start
to incorporate the notion of the organic ego as the crucial
category, even if he did invert his opponents valuation by
assigning it demonic qualities. Ultimately, even though it
was a clever but misconceived rhetorical device, Durkheim's
rhetorical incorporation of a negative image of the pre-so-
cialized ego admitted in the backdoor some of the very ele-
ments against which he had so resolutely taken up arms in the
first place. As a consequence, Durkheim's highly significant
attempt at dialectical resolution failed on its own terms. Un-
fortunately, much of the rest of Durkheim's system suffered
as a result; especially his first explanation of the sources
of egoism and insatiability underlying modern forms of sui-
cide.

B.   <u>Homo</u> <u>Duplex</u> <u>as</u> <u>a</u> <u>Biological</u> <u>Mistake</u>

> Everyone recognizes that the needs of the body are
> limited ... physical pleasure cannot increase inde-
> finitely (DL:238).

Although his doctrine was not unambiguous, Durkheim
often equated the pre-socialized individual with the organ-
ic ego, with the bio-psychological level of existence. As
has often been said, man's inheritance is double--both bio-
logical and cultural. But Durkheim hypothesized (eg. see
Soc:242) that the source of limitless desires is the organ-
ic ego. At various points (see <u>Moral</u> <u>Education</u>), Durkheim
characterized the infant, driven by passionate and egotist-
ic desires, as an undisciplined being, almost an animal.
Durkheim's two-storied image of man tended to locate our
dark and self-destructive drives in the lower story, in the
organic ego. Thus, Durkheim often tended to revert back to
the very position which his own sociologistic logics had
previously confuted--namely, that the source of this crucial
"infinity of dreams and desires" was biological. In short,
Durkheim's positivist analogy with the older moral notions
of sin and evil anchored the latter in the sensual appetites.

However, clearly this notion of a pre-socialized in-
dividual is as much an abstraction as the more virtuous En-
lightenment images of the generic individual in the "state
of nature." Indeed, <u>Durkheim's</u> <u>polemics</u> <u>against</u> <u>the</u> <u>Utili-</u>
<u>tarian</u> <u>and</u> <u>Romantic</u> <u>individualists</u> <u>apply</u> <u>equally</u> <u>to</u> <u>his</u> <u>own</u>
<u>first</u> <u>image</u> <u>of</u> <u>man</u> <u>as</u> <u>homo</u> <u>duplex</u>. And if this deeply nega-
tive and accusatory image of human nature was a rhetorical
mistake, it is also a biological mistake as well. Why? First,
because this doctrine assumes that the organic ego is gener-
ic--that is, it is the same across all forms of life. But
if the ego is the organic entity which seeks first and fore-
most the survival of the organism, how can it be self-des-
tructive? Is life itself destructive, unharmonious? In gener-
al, I see little to be gained by anchoring explanations of

our present troubles retroactively in the self-destructive-
ness of either human or organic nature. Moreover, I see lit-
tle to be gained in anchoring explanations of specifically
human action in lower biological categories, largely because
biological phenomena are not specific to man. Generally speak-
ing, biology is a constant for man. One cannot then hope to
explain specifically human action in non-human terms; this
would be illogical. For what would be one's previous differ-
entia specifica of man-as-man?

If pressed, I would propose that the defining charact-
eristic of man as an evolutionary species is culture. Man is
the cultural animal; man is the creature who dwells in his
own images. To uncritically identify the human ego, much less
the human person, with animal egos, with the generic biologi-
cal ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself,
advances our understanding of ourselves and our rather uni-
que predicaments very little. How can we ignore the evident
evolutionary fact that if, indeed, man is a separate, highly
complex, and powerful species, then this multiple bio-psycho-
socio-cultural achievement must necessarily have radically
changed our organic egos? Even our organic constitutions have
been changed in this evolutionary process. In sum, reduction-
ism must be set aside, here and elsewhere. I repeat: man's
essence cannot be equated with the biological ego as such,
for such a symbolic equation does little or nothing to ex-
plain the uniqueness of man himself.

In truth, reductionistic explanations are largely
pseudo-answers, for they are too easy; instead of illumina-
ting, they merely explain away problems. One has the answer
before one begins; it is not necessary to penetrate the act-
ual details if one already possesses (or is possessed by)
THE ANSWER. Biological reductionism is so illogical because
it is so univocal--all the diversity of reality is forced
into one mold. Moreover, reductionism is non-empirical (un-
der the guise of a radical empiricism) because it simply ig-
nores the evidence; it constantly makes unwarranted jumps

from lower levels to higher levels and back again. Is it not
ironic that biological reductionism crept in the backdoor,
unseen, in one of the pioneering works of the very sociologi-
cal theorist who insisted that we recognize the emergent and
sui generis nature of society and culture?

Most important for our present purposes, however, is
the fact that Durkheim himself acknowledged that biological
needs are capable of being satisfied. Indeed, the instinc-
tually based sensual appetites, whether for food, sex, or
whatever, are the very model of satiability.

> Among animals this limitation comes of itself because
> the animal's life is essentially instinctive. Every in-
> stinct, in fact, is part of a chain of connected move-
> ments which unfolds its links under the impulse of a
> determinate stimulant, but which stops when it comes to
> an end. All instinct is bounded because it responds to
> purely organic needs and because these organic needs
> are rigorously defined. It is always a matter either of
> eliminating a definite quantity of useless or harmful
> substances which encumber the organism, or of introdu-
> cing a definite quantity of substances which repair what
> the functioning of the organs has destroyed. The power
> of assimilation of a living body is limited and this
> limits the corresponding needs. This limitation is there-
> fore built into the organism and controls its behavior.
> Moreover, the animal has no way of evading this pattern.
> The power of reflection is not yet developed enough to
> symbolize what is or what was and to set new goals for
> activity beyond those spontaneously achieved. This is
> whyexcesses are rare. When beasts have eaten enough to
> satisfy hunger, they seek no more. When sexual desire
> is met, they are in repose (Soc:240-1).

In the same vein, Durkheim repeatedly observed (eg. S:246)
that the organic needs of animals are physiologically and e-
cologically limited. That is, needs on the level of the or-
ganic ego are both formed and constrained by the amount of
resources available in any given environment, and by the in-
herent limitations in processing ability of any given organ-
ism. Thus, Durkheim rightly observed that animals live in a
state of equilibrium or relative balance both in terms of
their own built-in limitations, and the possible resources
or "carrying capacity" of their supporting habitats. There-

fore, I oppose one of Durkheim's theses to another, and propose that the disruptive element of insatiable desires cannot legitimately be blamed upon the organic ego and its sensual appetites, since they are doubly restricted.

Moreover, Durkheim noted that it is only when sensual appetites become morbid that they become insatiable. In the normal case, when needs are met, they become temporarily extinguished, as the rat psychologists say. How much, for example, can anyone of us eat? (It makes little sense to argue that since eating is a regularly recurring need, that it is therefore potentially insatiable). Now, those who eat beyond all reason (satiation) are soon faced with illness; they are treated medically in terms of glandular deficiencies, and so on. In the popular vernacular, the rhetorical question is: "ya got a tapeworm in there, buddy?" Those who pursue sexual stimulation beyond normal limits are also suspected of psycho-biological imbalance, Durkheim argued:

> It is well-known that insatiability is a sign of morbidity. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has taken a certain amount of nourishment; it is the glutton who cannot be satisfied. Healthy people like motion, but at the end of a period of exercise they like to rest. The demabulatory maniac experiences the need of perpetually moving about without stop or rest; nothing satisfies him. In its normal state sexual desire is aroused for a time, then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there are no limits (Soc:240).

As the "marginalists" in psychology and the theory of economic wants noted in the late nineteenth century, in the normal case each additional increment of "pleasure units" further extinguishes desire, so that one may plot a curve of rising and then rapidly falling economic "want." Influenced by the analogy with biological and psychological morbidity --that is, the lack of satiability or "marginal incrementalism" of wants--when Durkheim encountered an ethos of insatiable desires on such a massive scale in the modern world, his deep affinity with biological analogies led him to mistakenly assume that modern "moral anarchy" must be due to the same order of cause.   But, if insatiability is indeed a sign of morbidity, can this legitimately be considered as due to the

insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego breaking
through the upper-level of social constraint and moral dis-
cipline? Or, on the contrary, is the only legitimate socio-
cultural mode of explanation to explore the historically
specific sources of the <u>presence</u> of cultural sanctions for
absolute individualism and a legitimized "infinity of dreams
and desires?"

C.   Homo Duplex as a Sociological Mistake

Preface. Not only was Durkheim's first installment of his
doctrine of man as homo duplex a rhetorical and biological
mistake, but I believe it to have been a basic sociological
mistake as well. Why? Because if human conscience is basi-
cally different from animal instinct, then we ought to sear-
ch for the sources of egoism and insatiability in varying
cultural mandates rather than in terms of a residual hangover
from the biological order. Because sociologists ought to
reverse the causal order, and instead of acquiescing in the
old notion of the determination of human action by biology
and psyche, we should be demonstrating instead the ways
culture impinges on biological structure and processes. Be-
cause we ought to generate a sociological way of looking at
the generation of needs and desires, especially as these un-
derpin economic action. Because the progress of social sci-
ence depends upon the substitution of sociocultural explana-
tions for psychological and biological reductions. And be-
cause Durkheim himself later shifted his emphasis from the
insatiability of the ego to its privatized autistic exist-
ence. We shall explore this critical shift from anomos to
alogos in the following chapter. Let us now briefly explore
the sociological flaws in Durkheim's early doctrine of man
as homo duplex.

1.   Animal Instinct Versus Human Conscience

At various points in Suicide and other works, Durkheim
contended that man is not governed by the automatic, built-in,
limitations of animals' instinctually-based needs. While the
organic appetites of animals are constrained by internal phy-
siological or ecological equilibrium, the socially and cul-
turally generated desires of human beings are, because they
move in the realm of the ideal, potentially unlimited. The
relations of man to his environment are, for the most part,
socially and culturally defined, and thus, without built-in

automatic, natural limits. Even though we are part animal,
we are also part persons at the same time, and the major
part of our personality, as opposed to the privatized de-
sires of the organic ego, is composed of those impersonal
and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture. Sociocul-
tural desires thus enjoy a freedom unknown to nature, for
to a great extent, man defines his own world.

In a particularly cogent series of passages in Social-
ism, representative of his oft-repeated statements, Durkheim
observed that man was not limited in the same way as animals
because instinct does not play such an overweening role in
man's life. Rather, the "awakening of reflection," of con-
science, means that human desires are generated on another
level--the sociocultural historical level.

> But it is not the same with man, precisely because
> instincts play a lesser role in him. Strictly speak-
> ing, the quantity of material nourishment absolutely
> necessary for the physical sustenance of human life
> could be considered definite and determinable, al-
> though its determination is less precise than in the
> preceding cases and there is more room for a free com-
> bination of desires. For beyond this indispensable
> minimum--which satisfies the need on the instinctive
> level--reflection, more alert, glimpses better condi-
> tions which appear as desirable ends and which invite
> activity. Yet it is clear that appetites of this kind
> sooner or later meet a boundary they cannot overstep.
> But how to fix the quantity of well-being, comfort, lux-
> ury, that a human being ought not to pass? Nothing is
> found either in the organic or psychological constitu-
> tion of man which sets a limit to such needs. The func-
> tioning of an individual life requires only that he
> halt here rather than there, that he satisfy himself
> at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that such
> needs have continued to develop in the course of his-
> tory, and have found increasingly complete satisfact-
> ion, and nevertheless, the average state of health has
> not diminished. But as there is nothing within an in-
> dividual which constrains these appetites, they must
> surely be contained by some force exterior to him, or
> else they would become insatiable--that is, morbid.
> Either knowing no limits, they become a source of tor-
> ment for man, irritating and plaguing him in a pursuit
> without possible end, or there must be outside the in-
> dividual some power capable of stopping them, disciplin-
> ing them, fixing a limit that nature does not (Soc:241).

Further, Durkheim observed that in man's world, because it
is not physically limited, the goals we embrace are poten-
tially limitless. One of the hidden problems here, of cour-
se, is that if society is the only possible constraining
force, it is equally true that society and culture are also
the very source of the potentially insatiable desires in the
first place! For through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of
society, as we discovered in Book One, man "ascends from the
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom."

> In short,   society, through the moral regulation it
> institutes and applies, plays, as far as supraorganic
> life is concerned, the same role that instinct fills
> with respect to physical existence. It determines and
> it rules what is left undetermined. The system of in-
> stincts is the discipline of the organism, just as mo-
> ral discipline is the instinctive system of social life*
> (Soc:244).

Our basic problem then becomes: what is the nature and
source of these needs? If these are said to be biological in
nature, they are relatively unproblematic; and in any case,
we have already set this possibility aside. For organic needs
are the very paradigm of satiability, of "marginal increment-
alism." Alternatively, was it Durkheim's main view that be-
cause of man's higher level moral and intellectual existence,
potentially insatiable organic needs are released from lower
level instinctual controls? But this premise ("since in our
hypothesis these needs are limitless"--Soc:242) simply pre-
sumes that organic needs are also potentially insatiable.
But we have just seen that they are not; only in a morbid
state can organic needs become limitless. Then did Durkheim's
guiding premise become that it is not organic needs after all
erupting from lower levels that is the problem, but rather
that the root of our problem is an entirely new set of needs,
not biological at all, but sociocultural in origin? Durkheim
himself never made his position entirely consistent or clear.
For example, he stated:

> But in reality all needs exceeding simply physical ne-
> cessities are unlimited, for there is nothing within
> the organism that imposes a boundary. Therefore, in
> order for them not to be without end--that is, so that

> they are not forever unsatisfied--there must be for-
> ces outside of the individual, in society, which
> hold them in check, and, with authority acknowled-
> ged by all, indicate what is the proper standard *
>
> (Soc:275).

But, again, why are all needs exceeding physical necessi-
ties unlimited ? I repeat: what is the source of this insa-
tiability? Is it because organic needs, freed from strict in-
stinctual and ecological control in man, erupt and disorient
human egos? Or is it because there is an entirely new set of
supraorganic (sociocultural) desires, which overlay and re-
direct human strivings? Only the second possibility is socio-
logically significant.

Only the second possibility makes real sense if we remem-
ber that Durkheim himself insisted on grounding his argument
on the level of man's generic species essence--that is, man-
as-man, in contrast to lower biological forms, is character-
ized by an "awakened reflection," the growth of conscience
and consciousness, the striving for higher ideals than mere
survival, in short, all that marks the intense new sociocul-
tural life of this distinctive species. I wish to emphasize
that by first theoretically grounding his argument on the le-
vel of society and culture as general evolutionary emergents,
Durkheim indicates that these potentially insatiable desires
are not to be reduced to lower level organic needs. Rather,
the "awakening of conscience" signifies that such desires
are not idiosyncratic but are culturally generated, that is,
they are generally mandated aspirations. After all, man is
the cultural animal.

In sum, how can we hope to reconcile the social and
moral origins of the human individual with its supposed insa-
tiability? How can Durkheim legitimately seek to maintain
his stark dichotomy between the individual (as the amoral
source) and the social (as the source of moral rules), when
he himself argued that the very foundations of the human in-
dividual emerges in evolutionary terms only from sociocultur-
al processes? Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways, and
indeed, his opposition is much more consistent when he spoke

as if the amoral passions derived from the organic ego, that
the pre-socialized child is little better than an animal.
In that case, however, as noted earlier, I see little virtue
in identifying the human ego with the biological ego as such,
and thus pursuing the limited idea that our modern troubles
are really endemic to the human condition itself. Let us next
cast the explanatory problem in better terms.

2. <u>Which</u> <u>Way</u> <u>the</u> <u>Causal</u> <u>Arrow</u>: <u>From</u> <u>Biology</u> <u>to</u> <u>Culture</u>
      <u>or</u> <u>From</u> <u>Culture</u> <u>to</u> <u>Biology</u>?

     Durkheim's ascetic preoccupation with repressing the
inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recognition
of potentially more significant wider conceptual horizons.
Given the logic of his theoretical grounding of man's evolu-
tionary status as the first and only sociocultural historical
animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and bio-
logy is hereafter subject to critical review by the crucial
fact that, by definition, <u>man's sociocultural achievement has</u>
<u>changed the very structure of his organic inheritance</u>. What
we perhaps sometimes forget when we repeat the old formula
that man's inheritance is double--both biological and cultural
--is the critical fact that <u>the sociocultural level of man's</u>
<u>achievement feedsback down and alters even his psycho-biolo-</u>
<u>gical makeup and processes</u>.
     In other words, the proper sociological procedure should
be to reverse the causal arrow traditionally leading from bio-
logy to culture, for higher levels do influence lower levels.
Thus, even in terms of his biological constitution, man is
not simply an organism like any other, for even his organic
form and internal processes have been socioculturally alter-
ed. Unlike the many plants and animals which man has bred,
however, <u>man has made himself</u>. It used to be assumed, for exam-
ple, that the autonomic nervous system functioned independent-
ly of the central nervous system, which is why it was so named.
But we now know that mental concentration can alter and bring
under the control of the subject his heart beat rate, blood

pressure, even brain rhythms, and so on. But the spiritual
technologies first worked out by "other-worldly ascetics"
such as the Hindu yogis might have better alerted us to the
empirical fact that culture does influence biology. If man
is, by definition, the sociocultural animal, then we ought
to search for the ways in which our culturalness impinges
upon our naturalness; in short, the varied ways in which cul-
ture redirects biological form and processes. Not only does
culture and society restrict the immediate satiation of or-
ganic needs, but it also generates myriad other desires and
activities that tend to crowd out simply organic acts from
the center stage of human experience. In large part, these
same organic needs, while their imperiousness is weakened
(rather than being intensified by being released from pre-
vious instinctual controls), are redirected and rearticula-
ted by specific social conditions and changing cultural as-
pirations. To maintain Durkheim's two level model of man,
with insatiable and egoistic passions erupting from lower
organic levels, and either controlled or released on higher
sociocultural levels, is simply sociologically untenable.
Rather, the true sociocultural position would be to reverse
the causal flow and specify the social and symbolic mechan-
isms which feedback down and reorient lower psychological
and biological processes. Mauss's work, for example, on tech-
niques of the body (1973) is a largely ignored pioneering
work in this direction, as is the well known study by Zborow-
ski-- "Cultural Components in Responses to Pain" (1951).
On a theoretical level, McCluhan (1962, 1964) has offered
some important insights into the cultural and historical pat-
terning of sensory ratios, and on the impacts of changing
technological media on society and the image of man. And, of
course, Weber, in his Sociology of Religion (1963, 1968), and
his classic article "Religious Rejections of the World and
Their Direction" (1946) provides invaluable leads along these
lines. Further, much valuable information can be found in
the ethnological reports of anthropologists on the social pat-

terning of organic activities, as well as from the phenomeno-
logical philosophers and social scientists.

In retrospect, we need not feign surprise that, even as
a pioneer sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts
be explained socially, Durkheim's other concurrent role as a
positivist moral philosopher led him to surreptitiously con-
travene the very basic methodological rules that he himself
laid down as the foundation of the Durkheimian school. For,
by a sort of covert operation in the underground of his thought,
Durkheim's positivism led him here (however much he may have
rejected the religious identification) to link in his system
the source of modern human suffering to the "original sin" of
our biological inheritance embodied in the inordinate desires
expressed in the sensual appetites (the "world" and the
"flesh"). What is surprising is that so few have noticed how
inconsistent, especially in terms of his own methodological
strictures, Durkheim was in regularly assigning some of the
most dynamic elements of human action to that very abstraction
--the lone, isolated, organic ego--which he had so powerfully
criticized in the contract theorists and Utilitarian indivi-
dualists. Indeed, Durkheim's early dark doctrine got him in-
to the serious bind, as it does to all social thinkers who
unwittingly insist on basing society and culture on biologi-
cal reductions, of proposing that the most significant and
generative sources of human action are to be derived primar-
ily from such lower, non-human, or non-sociocultural levels.
Besides running directly counter to his own notion of socie-
ty as an evolutionary emergent, and social facts as sui gen-
eris phenomena irreducible to lower levels of reality, Durk-
heim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as
darkly destructive, egoistic, and insatiable, implicitly re-
duced society to the relatively passive role of constraining
or redirecting the really critical biologically innate de-
sires.

Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here--extend-
ing a key Cartesian logic embedded in his own cultural tradi-

tion, and rhetorically inverting the high valuation of the lone individual so insistently proclaimed by his constant polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of positivist moral science--barred complete and unconditional embrace of the fully sociological position. The only fully sociological position consistent with Durkheim's own stated methodology is that society and culture are to be considered as the crucially important generative and directive sources of the most significant aspects of human action. In sum, despite the evident cultural and polemical functions served by this doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknowledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of "root dichotomies," originally anchored in the same image, nonetheless, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher intruded too strongly here for us to follow him in his fundamental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as inherently insatiable.

3. A Brief Sociological Look at the Generation of Needs and and Desires

Since man "ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see Book One) through the "hyper-spiritual" genetic medium of symbolic culture, we make ourselves, in part, by constructing social schedules of the satisfaction of wants. Every society is engaged in negotiating a variable ratio in terms of available resources and the legitimacy of stratified wants, between organically generated needs (eg. food) and socioculturally generated desires (eg. status honor or charisma). For example, economic psychologies should become more sociocultural by contrasting two aspects of the general category of wants--I mean needs and desires. In general, needs can be considered "givens," which are relatively constant, and thus comparatively fixed in their origins and potential limits, while desires are socioculturally generated and, therefore, more variable from one society to another. Further, the character of the motivation behind each of these

types of wants differs markedly--for wants in relation to
survival needs may be viewed as stemming from "because of" mo-
tives, while sociocultural desires should be seen as "in or-
der to motives" (see Alfred Schutz, 1962). Thus, with needs
we act "because of" some antecedent condition depriving us or
forcing us, while with desires we act intentionally "in order
to" consummate some future wish. Figure 5 graphically depicts
these possibilities:

Wants $\longleftarrow$ $\begin{array}{l} \rightarrow \text{needs} \sim\!\!\sim\!\!\sim\!\!\sim \\ \rightarrow \text{desires} \end{array}$

The squiggly line drawn between needs and desires indi-
cates that every society is constantly engaged in negotiating
a variable ratio between the "given," relatively constant, and
limited subsistence needs, and its own self-generated, special,
and comparatively limitless cultural and social desires. It is
this multivalency of human motivation that creates so much of
the mystifying complexity of human action. In many societies,
for example, much economic effort is directed not only toward
subsistence needs but also toward the achievement of differen-
tial status and prestige. Even simple societies, supported by
little more than subsistence economies, regularly find enough
surplus to devote to religious and ritual sacrifice, and even
agonistic display (eg. the NorthWest Coast Indian "Potlatch").
Indeed, many have suggested over the years (eg. see Norman O.
Brown, 1959, or Gerhard Lenski, 1974) that the authority of
the sacred was necessary for the accumulation of economic sur-
pluses. On the other hand, even in our affluent economy, dom-
inated as we are by the almost unlimited and instantaneous
gratification of desires, at least one quarter of our popula-
tion
lives precariously on the subsistence margin. For the rest,
perennial problems such as food shortages, energy crises, in-
flation, and other unpleasantries of international market cap-
italism, rudely intrude, sometimes disastrously, upon the
reveries of the American Dream. In sum, the central proposi-
tion here again is that all societies are continuously enga-
ged in negotiating a variable ratio between organic needs

and sociocultural desires. Our sociocultural problem then be-
comes explaining the differential ways in which different ty-
pes of societies through history have negotiated these ratios,
and the differential evolutionary outcomes.

4 . The Progress of Social Science Depends on the Substitution
   of SocioCultural Explanations for Biological and Psycho-
   logical Reductions of Human Action

   As the first to teach a sociology course in France, as
the founder of the first modern school of sociology, as the
one who rightly insisted on the sui generis nature of social
facts, as one of the pioneers who rightly rejected biological,
psychological, and philosophical claims on human action so suc-
cessfully as to help establish sociology as a fundamental dis-
cipline, should we not have expected Durkheim to have been
among the first to recognize that sociology cannot progress
by being untrue to its main task? This is especially true in
regard to Durkheim's failure to bring full clarity to the un-
certain relation between his doctrine of homo duplex and his
schema of anomic and egoismic suicides in the modern world.
Indeed, this irony is compounded if we recall that the concept
of anomie in Suicide was hailed, along with the book itself,
as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration of the au-
tonomy of social facts. The irony is trebled if we remember
that several decades later Merton used Durkheim's anomie (or
at least his own minimally related version) to wage, once a-
gain, polemical battle against biological and psychological
redutions of social behavior; especially against the Utilitar-
ians, the instinct theorists and the behaviorists, and even
the Freudians (see the appendix to this dissertation). The
concept of anomie has been repeatedly employed in the cause
of attaining disciplinary autonomy by sharply criticizing
the non-sociological and "transparently defective" explana-
tions of social action. The great hidden irony, of course,
is that anomie itself has so often been based on either a
biological or psychological reduction!

Indeed, was it not one of Parsons' essential theses in his great The Structure of Social Action that the advance of social science depends upon the progressive over-coming of "naturalistic" (ie. physical, biological, psychological, geographical, etc.) reductions of human action? Instead of invoking easy answers that ignore more than they illumine, social science only truly grows through explanations drawn properly in terms of specific sociocultural elements. Strangely, Durkheim's concept of anomie has become thoroughly psychologized. Should we not, on the contrary, follow Durkheim's own advice to "explain the social socially," and thus attempt to account for anomie and egoisme in sociocultural terms, rather than smuggling in subterranean biological and psychological categories?

This need to explain the social socially is especially great in terms of economic theory. Consider, for example, the almost universal presumption that economic action depends upon material scarcity, and the corresponding inability to satisfy many basic needs. Although most economists include scarcity of resources of material goods in their basic definitions of economic processes, many unfortunately seem to miss some of the deeper relations between scarcity and affluence, between natural conditions and social "givens." It is not a law of nature that economically desirable goods must be scarce, for as we have discovered, the Scientific Techno-Cultural Revolution of the twentieth century (see Nelson, 1968; Daniel Bell, 1973, among others) has changed, to a great extent, this so-called "iron law." In an interesting article "Nature, Culture, and Scarcity," Manfred Stanley observes:

> If one were to ask for an expression, in a single sentence, of the main accomplishment and direction of the social sciences to date, a fair answer would be the progressive substitution of sociocultural explanations for those stressing the determinative influence of physical nature. It is thus ironic that so much of the explicit discussion of scarcity should still rest on the physical notion of natural resource deficiencies (1968: 855).

Even where material affluence abounds, socially desired and culturally valued goods and symbols shall probably be scarce. That is, socioculturally generated and directed desires, as opposed to organically given needs, precisely because they are "ideal" and thus potentially unlimited, work in various ways to limit and make scarce these potent values and symbols. Inevitably, there are varying degrees of social participation in the collective "sacred fount of being." In short, it is in the very nature of social values and cultural symbols to be more or less scarce, to imply invidious distinctions, and thus to be differentially distributed.

Indeed, there are two basic ways any group may attempt to raise their schedule of rewards: specialization and monopolization. The former concerns moral legitimacy, the latter structural position and material leverage. The first has to do with "social stocks of knowledge," and control of social "territories," while the second concerns control over natural resources and physical territories. Indeed, specialization and monopolization can be considered as two phases of the same overall socioeconomic process--namely, the resolution of competition and conflict in terms of the creation of material, "human capital," or symbolic scarcity. Through specialization one attempts to make "human capital" (knowledge and skills) scarce, while through monopolization one attempts to make natural environmental or technological resources, especially key communications and transportation nets, scarce. And, of course, one of the prime "latent functions" of social hierarchy or stratification systems is to make symbolically validated deeds or even one's own "being" "sacred."

Therefore, the notion of perennial economic scarcity must shift--for it does not seem quite as necessary that material goods and services be as scarce as constitutive symbols and values. In other words, above the level of needs as generic biological givens, one major function of material goods and even some services is to satisfy higher-level desires, to symbolically validate one's "pipeline to charisma."

Of course, when certain material goods and privileges come to symbolize key values, then they too shall probably undergo forced or artificial scarcity. Herein lies an important key to an in-depth understanding not only of primitive and archaic economies, but also to the great progress of modern economic systems. Hopefully, this shift in perspective concerning the deeper origins of scarcity should help to remove us from the humanly constructed "iron cages" of the reductionistic determinism plied by both the critical radicals (Marxists) and the Utilitarians. As Stanley suggests " ... any shift away from nature to culture in mode of explanation involves a retreat from the assumption of "iron determinism" toward that of relative freedom of choice" (1968:855-6).

The economy may thus be viewed as a key nexus between the material and symbolic spheres of society. In sum, every economy is simultaneously engaged in the production and distribution of desired goods, services, privileges, and valued symbols. All economies thus have dual functions, for through the economy we witness the allocation of desired material and symbolic resources. In these ways, societies create scarcity of various sorts, and so intensify mandated desires that may feedback and even take on the imperative psychophysical status of organic needs. Therein lies a key to the second schema of suicide as sanctioned by extreme cultural values.

D.   Durkheim's Shift From Anomos to Alogos

       My discovery of Durkheim's shift from a schema of ano-
mie and egoisme as caused by the absence of social constraint
toward one based on the presence of cultural sanctions, is
paralleled by the discovery of Durkheim's shift in emphasis
in his doctrine of homo duplex away from the presence of
insatiable desires in the pre-socialized ego to simply the
absence of moral rules and rational concepts. In terms of
the doctrine of homo duplex, then, the organic ego is more
significant for Durkheim's suicide schemas not so much as
the source of the crucial disorganizing insatiable drives,
but rather as merely representing the absence of universal-
izable moral rules and abstract concepts. The latter premise
is more acceptable to my mind, and, indeed, this is the di-
rection in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop. Thus,
there is an inverted correlation between these two parallel
polarities of presence and absence of insatiable desires
and cultural sanctions; for as Durkheim moved away from lo-
cating insatiable desires in the organic ego, the way was
opened to locate them in cultural values themselves.

       As we discovered in Book One, while Durkheim originally
grounded insatiablity in the pre-socialized ego, later he
tended to argue that the suffering inherent in the human con-
dition derives mostly from the impossibility of simultaneous-
ly satisfying the desires of both halves of human nature.
While egocentricity represented a constant negative factor
in both Durkheim's early and later notions of the dualism
of human nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or
alogical factor differed basically in the two versions. In
his early formulation, Durkheim anchored insatiability--as
the absence of determinate form and natural limit (the sine
qua non of morality)--in the dark and destructive desires
of the organic or pre-socialized ego. Whereas the earlier
notion implied the over-coming of the demonic drives of the
isolated organic ego, Durkheim's later doctrine (see DHN)
grew more pessimistic, tracing the source of the endemic

dis-ease of the human condition to the two warring halves
of human nature. Further, in the early doctrine, the insa-
tiable passions represent a chaotically expansive force,
while in the latter version the purely idiosyncratic ego
represented an inward turning, privatized existence, which
can only be pulled from its localized orbit by the intense-
ly powerful and impersonal energies of society and culture.

Now, in the first installment of this crucial doctrine,
the anomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contra-
diction of all morality" (DL:431). It seemed that sociocul-
tural nomos was actively opposed by anarchic, anti-nomian
forces bubbling up from the organic ego. In the latter form-
ulation, the relatively passive alogic of the pre-socialized
individual is opposed not so much to sociocultural nomos as
to the universal logos. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding metaphors
early in his career were order and chaos, or more precisely,
his root analogy was society is to the individual as order
 is to chaos. As so often happens, however, the very process
of unfolding new applications of a guiding analogy leads, by
the very nature of the ever-more diverse empirical properties
encountered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or
metaphorical "load." Toward the end of his career, especial-
ly in terms of The Elementary Forms and "The Dualism of Human
Nature," Durkheim's guiding rhetorical polarity seemed to
have shifted on its metaphorical axes from order versus
chaos to universality versus particularity;or, in other
words, from nomos versus anomos, to logos versus alogos.
Thus, instead of the anomic ego, in the latter version we
may speak of the alogic ego.

In the process of extending his root dichotomies (see
Book One), Durkheim's model shifted slightly but significant-
ly on its rhetorical axes. One of the first consequences
relevant to our present interests is that insatiability was
no longer the simple characteristic product of the inherent-
ly insatiable inordinate desires of the pre-socialized ego.
Rather than acting as the source of destructive desires, the

organic ego came to be portrayed primarily as circumscribed by its own inherent limitations, which are insurmountable without the intense fusion with society and energization by symbolic culture. The antagonism between the two halves of human nature was, of course, still present and even heightened. Now, rather than the insatiability of the non-social half of human nature being the cause of man's endemic inner torment, however, it was instead the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the conflicting demands of both the physically privatized organic ego and the claims of society on the moralized and rationalized person. These deepening oppositions between the privatized physical sensations and sensual appetites of the autistic experience of the organic ego versus   publicly communicable collective representations, expressed in terms of universalizable moral rules and rational concepts, moved to the center stage of Durkheim's thought. While his earlier concern with the insatiability of the pre-socialized ego faded in the background, it was portrayed instead as simply fatally circumscribed in its own private orbit.

To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites are necessarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting particularity meant that they cannot, by definition, thereby rise above their purely private sensational level to wider and higher validity. By contrast, since intellectual concepts and moral rules are collective both in their origin and nature, they tend to become universalized. Note that Durkheim specifically acknowledged that biological needs--thirst, hunger, etc.--can be satisfied; yet by virtue of their purely physical base, such need satisfactions remain egocentric and thus irrefrangibly privatized.

Thus, the outlines of Durkheim's later tragic vision of the human condition emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to the earlier emphasis on insatiability, but now directed instead to the inevitable discord between the two warring halves of our own nature. Rather than portraying the ego and the person, the physical and the moral, the private and the

public, the concrete and the universal halves of our beings
as complementary, Durkheim saw these forces as waging an e-
ternal struggle for ascendancy over our inner lives. As Durk-
heim deepened the tension in man's inner life by insisting
that the this antinomy is irreconcilable, he came round again
to the problem of insatiability, though in a different way.
For now man's predicament is that he is caught in almost a
fatal "double bind." Now man's inner torment comes from his
inability to simultaneously satisfy both the biological and
cultural halves of our inheritance. The only path from the
eros of the autistic ego to the universal logos is to tran-
scend our isolated and limited physical existence through
the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, culture, and his-
tory. I must emphasize, once again, that the earlier key prob-
lem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was rooted
in the later installment of Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex
in the eternal contradiction and inner division between the
two halves of our natures, rather than, as formerly, in sim-
ply one side--the organic.

CHAPTER TWO

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL

Preface. Besides critically reviewing Durkheim's early no-
tion of anomic insatiability as stemming from the release
of the appetites of the organic half of homo duplex, we shall
next submit Durkheim's explanatory or causal model to criti-
cal scrutiny. When this double task is completed, I suggest
that we shall conclude that the first schema of suicide,
which implicitly rested on these early parallel notions of
homo duplex and abstracted, general evolutionary mechanistic
causality, should be set aside not only because these premi-
ses were logically flawed, but also because they were later
abandoned or modified by Durkheim himself. In Book One, I con-
structed a new and viable portrait of Durkheim's evolving mo-
del, which was couched primarily in terms of the elementary
forms. Whereas I concentrated there on elucidating his theory
of generic symbolic process, now I wish to focus attention
primarily upon his causal model in its more general aspects.

Now, no less a leading light than William Runciman
(1969) contends that Durkheim's causal model, in contrast to
that utilized by Weber in his sociology of religion for exam-
ple, was "fundamentally misconceived." While I remain uncon-
vinced that Runciman and others have perceived precisely
what Durkheim's causal model actually implied (see Book One),
nonetheless, both the general confusion and perennial criti-
cism lead me to agree with Durkheim himself that such univer-
sality of opinion cannot be wholly mistaken.

In terms of the causal model underlying Durkheim's first
schema of anomie and egoisme, what I find most flawed are the
mechanistic and anti-phenomenological premises, and the lack
of historical specificity. Indeed, as we shall discover, these

perspectives are related. While not rent by the serious er-
rors so often attributed to him, nevertheless, Durkheim's
early dominant notion of a rather one-way causality running
from material substructure to symbolic superstructure, his
positivistic slighting of phenomenological processes, his
general evolutionary abstractness and neglect of specific
types of historical breakthroughs and transformations, irre-
trievably flawed his first implicit causal explanation of
anomic and egoismic suicides as he described them in the mo-
dern world.

Let us first briefly outline Durkheim's causal model
in its more general and evolutionary aspects which are rele-
vant to our reconstruction of his specific schemas of sui-
cide. Let us also compare and contrast Durkheim's model with
others in his own day--I mean those of Levy-Bruhl, Marx, and
Simmel. Then we shall critically review an interrelated set
of three theses which held Durkheim back in 1897 from break-
ing through to full and clear recognition of the revolution-
ary theoretical and historical significance of his second
schema for the human sciences.

A. A Brief Review of Durkheim's Causal Model

1. Substructural Social Morphological Processes Linked With Superstructual Cultural Processes

Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as Platoni-
zing or hypostatizing "social realist," one of the basic me-
thodological rules of Durkheim's school was always to anchor
analysis of social facts in a geographically determinable
substratum.

> One of the rules we follow is that, in studying social
> phenomena .... we take care not to leave them up in
> the air, but always to relate them to a definite sub-
> stratum--to a human group occupying a determinate por-
> tion of geographically representable space (1971:809).

In Book One, we explored at considerable length how Durkheim
undertook to link social morphological processes with collect-
ively symbolic processes. We saw that Durkheim posited social

energies and moral implosions as key intervening variables between "material" substructures and "ideal" superstructures. We saw that Durkheim sequentially proposed that social morphological implosions moralize egos, that social life tends to become organized around the two different communal and economic or individualist phases. Then this regular alternation of sociocultural "currents" of energy generates fundamental tensions in the whole symbolic and phenomenological fields between the sacred and the profane which serve to further organize and energize life in terms of a mounting series of classificatory polarities. Then, Durkheim suggested, we discover that these sacred and profane polarities become extended to all spheres of life in a multi-levelled system of resonating symbolic equations. Finally, Durkheim suggested that regular transformations between these two opposed spheres occur in terms of rituals which serve to restore harmony to a divided and suffering microcosm.

Now, Durkheim's dialectical genius in over-coming long-standing dichotomies led him here to embrace both a "materialistic" factor (the social morphological base) and an "idealistic" factor (the focus on moral and symbolic processes). While he anchored his analyses of social facts in an empirically verifiable material social body, much of the ambiguity in Durkheim's causal model comes because his central concern was clearly always with the "second level" moral and symbolic processes. In this regard, Lukes observes:

> Durkheim's view of religion as socially determined led him to seek to establish causal connections between (morphological) features of the social structure and the content of religious beliefs and ritual practices--an attempt seen most clearly in his account of the alleged social determination of the fundamental categories and forms of classification
> (1973:463-4).

Durkheim's later seminal works--such as Primitive Classification and The Elementary Forms-- clearly reveal Durkheim's emerging causal model of the generic relations between social and cultural processes. We would do well to

remember, in addition, that these generic links were also primarily genetic and evolutionary ones. Thus, the specific relations between structural and cultural phenomena changed in the course of societal evolution. Aware that he had been called a "materialist", as well as the "idealist" which others like Parsons later would make of him, Durkheim himself responded in these terms:

> ... in order for collective representations to be intelligible, it is certainly necessary that they should originate from something, and since they cannot form a closed circle upon itself, the source from which they derive must be outside of them. Either the conscience collective floats in a void, a kind of indescribable absolute, or else it is connected to the rest of the world by a substratum upon which, consequently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of society, as they are combined socially (in Giddens, 1972a:159).

2. Generic and Genetic-Evolutionary Relations Between Sub-Structure and Superstructure

In addition to his fundamental causal sequence of generic sociocultural process, it is absolutely critical to recognize that Durkheim's social morphological/collectively representational model was simultaneously anchored in a world-historical perspective which was both genetic and evolutionary. Durkheim himself justified his genetic investigations (likening them to Descartes' "first circle" of certainty) because he thought they were the only empirical way to reveal the fundamental generic and evolutionary relations between society, culture, and personality. Only in terms of the most elementary forms could we discover the generic sociocultural factors fused with the genetic factors.

> Every time that we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given moment in history--be it a religious belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an aesthetic style or an economic system--it is necessary to commence by going back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characteristics by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed, and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question (EF:15).

Cartesian in influence, we should see Durkheim's genetic
method of investigation as the sociological equivalent of
that most potent weapon of modern philosophy--systematic
doubt as the sure road to certainty.

Further, we should not fail to recognize that by fus-
ing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations, Durk-
heim sought to find a paradigmatic case-study in which there
would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were, between sym-
bolic forms and social forms, between the material substratum
and the ideal superstructure. Where collective representations
are deeply fused with the very structures of the group itself,
Durkheim felt that he had found the "mono-cellular" form of
sociocultural life, the template, as it were, which all sub-
sequent forms merely elaborated. As always, biological analo-
gies were very important to Durkheim (see Bellah, 1959; also
Paul Hirst, 1973).

Finally, in the broad, macro-evolutionary passages from
"mechanical" to "organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a
whole series of fundamental sociocultural shifts, more or
less corresponding to the underlying social morphological
differentiations, in the content, form, and direction of
development of collective symbolic forms. As early as 1893
in The Division of Labor, Durkheim postulated a progressive
tranformation of the fused, primitive, collective "sacro-
magical" consciousness into ever-more differentiated, auto-
nomous, abstract, universalistic, and rational collective
symbolic forms.

I must insist that those who persist in reading Durk-
heim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely or
even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional proposi-
tions, must ignore Durkheim's insistence that the intimate
relations between society, culture, and the person are gen-
etically and historically constructed. Giddens rightly points
out in this regard:

> ... Durkheim takes some pains to emphasize that the
> theory set out in The Elementary Forms is not to be

regarded as merely another version of "mechanical ma-
terialism," in which ideas are treated as "reflections"
of social reality and hence are mere epiphenomena.
There is no universal relationship between systems of
ideas and their infrastructures: the nature of this re-
lationship is contingent upon the level of advancement
of society* (1972a:26-7).

Seen another way, Durkheim's causal model was proces-
sual through and through; it rested upon a complex series of
sequential equations. Durkheim was always primarily concern-
ed with the relations between long-term changes, and their
short-term consequences, between social morphological proces-
ses and symbolic and moral processes. This processual ap-
proach was couched on both the micro and macro levels. Now,
Durkheim's concern with the emergence of collectively symbol-
ic representations out of social morphological implosions
on the micro social psychological level led him to postu-
late, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and contin-
uing parallel between social morphological differentiation
and the differentiation of symbolic forms. These parallel
and spreading evolutionary differentiations out of the
primitive sacral complex--which served as the womb of socie-
ty and culture--implied a series of key processual trans-
formations in symbolic culture. These included the progres-
sive movement from concrete to abstract symbolism, from
particularistic, parochial or "tribal brotherhoods" toward
ever-widening structures of fraternization, toward the ex-
tension of the social bond and universalizable symbolic
forms which became the basis of the civilizational bond,etc.
This movement also implies a shift from the fused embedded-
ness of symbols and persons in the primitive sacral complex
to their progressive autonomization and differentiation in
complex societies, and so forth. In short, just as Durkheim
postulated a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less
fluid to crystallized (institutionalized) representations,
so too he postulated a vertical or evolutionary continuum
of sociocultural progress ranging from the most elementary,
micro-level, fused, primitive, "sacral-magical" collective

representations to the most differentiated, universalizable, autonomous, and rational symbolic forms on the world-historical level.

3. Durkheim Versus Levy-Bruhl

It is instructive to compare Durkheim's fusion of his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations in his causal model with another classic paradigm emerging from the same school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's characterization of the gap between primitive and modern mentality. Rather than contrasting and dichotomizing primitive (or tribal) and modern (or civilizational) thought and morality, as we might have expected him to do, and as his learned colleague Levy-Bruhl did, instead Durkheim emphasized their evolutionary continuity! As always, Durkheim sought to reconcile logical unity and historical diversity through the evolutionary notions of differentiation and universalization.

For example, in a little known passage in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim argued of the relations between primitive and modern symbolic forms:

> It is far from true that this mentality has no connection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic ... between the logic of religious thought and the logic of scientific thought there is no abyss. The two are made up of the same elements, though inequally and differently developed* (EF:270-1).

Almost alone among contemporary sociocultural thinkers, Robin Horton has begun to properly emphasize this crucial aspect of Durkheim's thought. Speaking of a most important review by Durkheim, in the 1912 L'annee sociologique, of Levy-Bruhl's book Les Fonctions mentales dans les societies inferiures, and comparing it to the formers'own Elementary Forms, issued in the same year, Horton suggests:

> Durkheim notes that both Levy-Bruhl and himself are concerned to explore the sense of the distinction commonly made between "primitive" and "modern" thought. Both are in agreement about the social determinants of all thought; and about the essentially religious nature of "primitive" thought. Beyond this point, however, they part company. Thus Levy-Bruhl sees "primi-

tive" and "modern" thought as antithetical, and the
movement from one to the other as the replacement
of one pattern by its opposite. Durkheim, on the oth-
er hand, sees "primitive" and "modern" thought as
two stages in a single, evolutionary process, the
latter developing out of the former. At many points,
where Levy-Bruhl finds contrast and discontinuity,
Durkheim claims that a closer look would reveal a
fundamental continuity (1973:267-8).

Horton further suggests the following generalizable
terms for comparing Durkheim's model with Levy-Bruhl's --
the latter entertained a contrast/inversion schema, while
the former postulated a continuity/evolution schema.

To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation
between "primitive" and "modern" in terms of contrast,
and the transition between them as a process of inver-
sion, whilst Durkheim sees the relation in terms of
continuity, and the transition as a process of evolu-
tion (1973:270).

Significantly, Horton echoes my criticism (and that of others)
that Durkheim's causal model lacks historical specification:
"It is surprising to find that Les Formes Elementaires in-
cludes no clear suggestion as to the broad determinants of
the transition from the religious to the scientific conscious-
ness" (1973:266).

Happily, we have just recently been provided with a
translation of Durkheim's review of Levy-Bruhl's book by
Anthony Giddens. Since this represents a most illuminating
confrontation between two giants of French sociology, I shall
now cite key sections in extenso.

There is no need to state that there are fundamental
principles which we share in common with Levy-Bruhl.
Like him, we believe that different types of mental-
ity have succeeded each other in history. We also ac-
cept--and we have tried to establish this through
factual analysis--that primitive mentality is essen-
tially religious; that is to say, that the notions
which dominate the movement of ideas are created in
the very midst of religion. Moreover, since the main
objective of the book is to show that the origins of
religion are social, it follows that these notions
and the corresponding logic have the same origin. This
is what we strove to demonstrate in detail ....

However, our point of view is somewhat different from
that taken by Levy-Bruhl. Since the latter is above
all occupied with differentiating this mentality from

ours,he has gone so far as to sometimes present these differences in the form of a real antithesis. Religious thought on the one hand, and scientific and modern thought, on the other, are contrasted as opposites. In one, the principle of identity and the sovereignity of experience are seen as unquestioned; in the other, there appears to hold sway an almost complete indifference to the lessons of experience and to contradictions.

We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of human mentality, however different they may be, far from deriving from different sources,are created one by the other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type, and form, force and causality, and personality--those in short, to which philosophers have given the name of "categories," and which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated within the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages in the intellectual life of mankind.

At the same time as we established the religious origins of the categories, we showed that they were impregnated with social elements, that they were, indeed, created in the image of social phenomena. Physical space was originally constructed on the model of social space, that is to say, the territory occupied by the society, such as it is represented by society; time expresses the rhythm of collective life; the idea of type was at first only another aspect of the idea of the human group; the collective force and its power over minds served as the prototype of the notion of force and causality, etc. It might appear, it is true, that, because of these origins, these fundamental representations necessarily lack all objective validity, and can only consist in artificial constructions which have no foundation in reality. For society is generally seen as an a-logical or illogical entity, which is in no way capable of satisfying conceptual needs. Thus, it is not at first apparent how ideas which are the product of society, and which express it, could be qualified to play such a preponderant role in the history of thought and science.

But we endeavored to show that, contrary to how it may appear, logical life has had its initial source in society. The distinguishing feature of the concept, as compared to a sensation or an image, is its impersonality: it is a representation which, to the degree to which it preserves its identity, is common and communicable. It can pass from one mind to another; it is by means of concepts that intellects communicate. Now a representa-

tion can only be common to all the members of a single group if it was elaborated by them in common, if it is the work of the community. And if conceptual thought has a very special value for us, it is precisely because, being collective, it is replete with all the experience and science that has been accumulated by the community over the course of the centuries. The intellectual capacity of society is infinitely greater than that of the individual, for the sole reason that it is the result of the convergence and collaboration of a vast number of intellects, and even of generations.... It is society which has taught man there was another point of view than that of the individual, and which made him see things from the perspective of the whole.

Although, therefore, human mentality has changed and evolved over the centuries in relation to society, the different types which it has successively manifested have each given rise to the other. The higher and more recent forms are not opposed to the lower and more primitive forms but are created out of the latter. Indeed, certain of the contrasts which have been pointed out need to be toned down. We have shown, by the use of examples, that if the primitive mind tends towards confusion, it nonetheless recognizes defined antitheses, and often applies the principle of contradiction in an extremely definite way. Conversely, the law of participation is not specific to primitive mentality: today as in other ages, our ideas share common characteristics. This is the very condition of all logical activity. The difference is above all the way in which the participation takes place *(from L'Annee sociologique, 1912:33-7; translated by Giddens, 1972a: 247-9).

In sum, Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema emphasized an important evolutionary point, but fundamentally misconceived the generic relations between society and symbol. Further, Durkheim's continuity/evolution schema is basically correct, but its importance is limited because of lack of historical specification. Therefore, it is logical to turn to Weber's work in order to retain both Levy-Bruhl's contrast insights, and to further complement Durkheim's correct theoretical insights with descriptions of key evolutionary breakthroughs, such as Weber provided at every turn in his Sociology of Religion (1963). We shall return to discuss convergences between Durkheim and Weber later in this section.

B.   Autonomization of Collective Symbolism

>   When individual minds are not isolated, but enter into
>   close relation with, and act upon each other, from their
>   synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life (SP:91).

Even in his early phase, one of Durkheim's most insist-
ent methodological rules was that social relationships and
cultural symbols are sui generis and autonomous products
emerging from the fusion of egos into moralized persons. As
we discovered in Book One in terms of Durkheim's penetration
of the Australian materials, in generic sociocultural process
symbols always tend to grow autonomous. Although it was not
until The Elementary Forms that Durkheim took care to empiri-
cally specify these processes, let us now briefly explore
the parallel logic pervading Durkheim's early methodological
proclamations.

Now, although the fundamental rule of the Durkheimian
school was to always ground analyses of collective represen-
tations in a material social body, instead of in some suppo-
sed notions of the human mind and nature, Durkheim's socio-
logism meant that the links were to be drawn primarily, not
from individual mind to symbol, but between symbols and so-
ciety (see Evans-Pritchard, 1965). However, the relationships
postulated between symbolic superstructures and material sub-
structures were neither simple nor direct. It would be mis-
leading, for instance, to claim that in Durkheim's sociology
of knowledge cultural symbols are merely one-to-one project-
ions of their generating substratum. For Durkheim's causal
model is rather more complex. And before I proceed to exten-
sively criticize fundamental limitations in Durkheim's ex-
planatory model as it underlay his first schema of suicide,
I believe we have a responsibility to articulate more clear-
ly what Durkheim did and did not propose.

Durkheim's explanatory model, while always linking
"social physiological processes" to "social morphological
processes," nonetheless, tended increasingly to grant collect-

ive symbols at least partial autonomy, with feedback power.
He further recognized their changing character in terms of
social and cultural evolution. In any but the most element-
ary case, one cannot simply draw a connecting line from so-
cial morphological states to social physiological represen-
tations, for as Durkheim himself proposed:

> ... it is easy to foresee that the latter must be more
> numerous than the former, for the vital manifestations
> are by far more varied and complex than are the morpho-
> logical conditions which are their fundamental condi-
> tions (1960:362-3).

Once the sociocultural process is underway, Durkheim's causal
model suggests, a certain incommensurability between these
two sets of facts ensues. For although collective represen-
tations are originally generated and sustained by specific
types of social morphological conditions, nevertheless, col-
lective symbolizings are not limited to their generating con-
ditions. Rather, they autonomize--that is, they increasingly
develop according to their own related but different laws.
Perhaps Durkheim would have agreed with Weber that "We are
inserted into separate spheres of existence, each with their
own laws" (1946:123). Inevitably, cultural symbolic forms
proliferate far beyond the constraints of their original
foundations. As always, Steven Lukes provides a concise sum-
mary of this aspect of Durkheim's doctrine:

> ... "once a primary basis of representations has been
> formed," they become "partially autonomous realities
> which live their own life," with the "power to attract
> and repel one another and form syntheses of all kinds"
> and engender new representations. Hence, for instance,
> the "luxuriant growth of myths and legends, theogonic,
> and cosmological systems, etc." and hence the "ways in
> which religious ideas ... combine and separate and are
> transformed into one another, giving rise to contra-
> dictory complexes." There should be, Durkheim argued,
> a special branch of sociology (he called it "social
> psychology") devoted to studying the "laws of collective
> ideation," investigating "by the comparison of mythi-
> cal themes, popular legends and traditions, and lang-
> uages the ways in which social representations attract
> and exclude one another, how they fuse together or be-
> come distinct, etc" (1973:8).

Let us now briefly compare Durkheim's causal model with that
of Marx, and then explore in more detail the actual elements
of Durkheim's doctrine of synthesis and the autonomization
of collective representations.

1.   Durkheim versus Marx

It can hardly have escaped attention that Durkheim's
early explanatory model shares certain similarities with that
of Marx--or at least what passes for Marx's model among his
contemporary epigoni. One essential similarity is that both
shared the general explanatory causal logic of a material
substructure and an ideal or projected symbolic superstruct-
ure. But, as Durkheim himself pointed out, this same explan-
atory logic was widely prevalent in the nineteenth century,
and cannot be exclusively claimed by either Marxian or Durk-
heimian doctrine. Can Durkheim's model then legitimately be
termed "Marxist"? I believe not. Contrary to actual differ-
ences between these theorists, and to Durkheim's correct ob-
servation that this same logic was "in the air," however,
some with radical inclinations still put forward claims for
and against Durkheim's identification with Marxist causal
logic.

For instance, largely under the influence of Parsons'
mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as an abstracted theorist con-
cerned with ahistorical problems of generic social order and
control, John Horton (1964) attempted to polarize Durkheim's
supposed conservatism to Marx's supposed radicalism. And
over the years, the question of the relations between Marx
and Durkheim have been raised repeatedly by Georges Kagan
(1938) and Armand Cuvillier (1948), who compared and con-
trasted their doctrines. More recently, Anthony Giddens
(1971a: 96-98, 196-205, 216-223) in an excellent work has
compared and contrasted their views, as does Lukes more brief-
ly (1973:231-2,246, 314, 319, 343). Giddens rightly notes:

> Durkheim dissociated himself from a theory of know-
> ledge which specifies a unilateral relationship be-
> tween ideas and their social base. This has to be

placed in the forefront when considering how far Durkheim's thesis does in fact differ from that established in Marx's writings (1971a:218).

Lukes adds:

> The socialist historian of German thought, Charles Andler, objected to Durkheim's social realism (calling it "mysticism"), observing that it was just a sociological version of the mistaken economic choisme of Marx. [Footnote: Durkheim replied in 1896--where he rejected "absolutely the ideas which M. Andler attributes to me"] (1973:314).

Now, although we cannot ignore certain similarities between the causal logics of Durkheim and Marx, there are also so many points of difference between them that it would take powerful alchemies indeed to transmute Durkheim into a Marxist. For Durkheim's prime concern was not with forms of domination, but with morality, with structures of conscience and consciousness. I believe that Giddens was right when he said that for both Durkheim and Weber the fundamental sociological problem was the changing grounds of legitimate moral authority. Durkheim differed, of course, from Weber in that he wished to construct a new positive science of morality out of his systematic study of moral facts, an endeavor which Weber emphatically rejected in his famous "vocational addresses" (1946).

As primarily a moral philosopher who worked sociologically and "positively," Durkheim criticized repeatedly the "materialist" socialists for reenforcing the very moral evil that caused our modern travail in the first place. For Durkheim rightly perceived that the "critical radicals" shared certain fundamental ideological premises (eg. materialism, the labor theory of value, technological progress, Ricardian economic theory, etc.) with their prime opponents, the "philosophical radicals" (see Halevy, 1955) from whom they emerged as a heretical offshoot. Durkheim's "laic" positivism led him both to seek to anchor moral life in an empirically verifiable material substratum and to train his powerful analytical focus on the symbolic and moral processes emerging from this material substratum. I prefer to consider

Durkheim, in terms of his allegiance to his own cultural tradition, as an "unrepetant rationalist," a French positivist who devoted his life-work to building a new "laic" or secular morality. As with all positivist moral reformers, he sought moral reconstruction based upon rationally organized evidence and "laic" rational (that is, non-metaphysical and thus non-hierocratic) principles and premises. Indeed, isn't it clear that if one of his prime historical cultural opponents was the Catholic Hierocratic-Metaphysical Cultural Tradition, that Durkheim could not base his critical analyses and programs for moral and social reconstruction on super-empirical revelation or purely personal inspiration? His model had to be simultaneously material _and_ moral if it was to serve his special multiple purposes.

While Durkheim's differences with Marx involved the problem of "latency" or unintended functions of cultural phenomena, I cannot here devote sufficient space to deal with the complex ways in which Durkheim and Marx proposed to encode and decode various levels of symbolic equations. I merely wish to emphasize now that one key difference between them lay in the degree of autonomy granted to collective representations, and the lack of unilateral and direct relations between sub- and superstructure. As noted earlier, it may come as a surprise to some sociologists who, following Parsons, have consistently idealized Durkheim's Elementary Forms, that Durkheim felt constrained there to defend himself against the possible charge of "historical materialism"!

> ... it is necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of religion a simple restatement of historical materialism: that would be misunderstanding our thought to an extreme degree. In showing that religion is something essentially social, we do not mean to say that it confines itself to translating into another language the material forms of society and its immediate vital necessities. It is true that we take it was evident that social life depends upon its material foundation and bears its mark, just as the mental life of an individual depends upon his nervous system. In order that the former may appear, a synthesis _sui_ _generis_ of

particular consciousnesses is required. <u>Now this syn-
thesis has the effect of disengaging a whole world of
sentiments, ideas and images, which once born, obey
laws all their own. They attract each other, repel
each other, unite, divide themselves, and multiply,
though these combinations are not commanded and ne-
cessitated by the condition of the underlying real-
ity.</u> The life thus brought into being even enjoys so
great an independence that it sometimes indulges in
manifestations with no purpose or utility of any sort,
for the mere pleasure of affirming itself*(EF:471).

But perhaps the most direct and definitive statement
of the differences which Durkheim himself drew between his
own causal model and that of Marx is to be found in his re-
view of Antonio Labriola's exposition of historical mater-
ialism--Essais <u>sur</u> <u>la</u> <u>conception</u> <u>materialiste</u> <u>de</u> <u>l'histoire</u>--
which appeared in the <u>Revue</u> <u>Philosophique</u> in 1897. Fortuna-
tely, Anthony Giddens has again recently provided us with
an excellent translation of key parts of this review, which
I again cite <u>in</u> <u>extenso</u>, because of its theoretical signi-
ficance and lack of previous recognition.

> We believe it to be a fruitful idea that social life
> should be explained, not in terms of the conception
> which its participants hold of it, but by reference
> to underlying causes which escape consciousness; and
> we also think that these causes have to be sought
> principally in the way in which associated indivi-
> duals are grouped.

> It seems to us that it is indeed on this condition,
> and on this condition alone, that history can become
> a science and, in consequence, that sociology can exist.
> For in order for collective representations to be in-
> telligible, it is certainly necessary that they should
> originate from something, and since they cannot form a
> closed circle upon itself, the source from which they
> derive must be outside them.

> Either the <u>conscience collective</u> floats in a void, a
> kind of indescribable absolute, or else it is connected
> to the rest of the world by a substratum upon which,
> consequently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this
> substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of
> society, as they are combined socially? The proposi-
> tion seems to us to be obvious. But we see no reason
> to link this, as the author does, to the socialist move-
> ment; it is totally independent of it.

> We ourselves arrived at it before knowing Marx, who has
> not influenced us in any way. The fact is that this con-

ception is the logical end-result of all the develop-
ments in history and psychology over these last fifty
years. Historians have long perceived that social evo-
lution has causes which the authors of the historical
events in question were not aware of. It is under the
influence of these ideas that the role of great men
either tends to be denied or to be limited, and that,
in developments in literature, law, etc. there is a
search to express collective thought which no definite
individual embodies completely.

At the same time, and above all, individual psychology
has recently taught us that the consciousness of the
individual is often no more than a reflection of the
underlying state of the organism; that the cause of
our ideas is determined by causes which are not known
to the subject.

It was natural that, from there, this conception became
extended to collective psychology. But it is impossible
for us to see what part the unhappy conflict of classes
which we witness today can have had in the elaboration
or the development of this idea. No doubt this idea ap-
peared at its given time and when the necessary condi-
tions for its emergence were established. It was not al-
ways possible.... When Labriola asserts that it was cal-
led forth "by the full, conscious, and continuous devel-
opment of modern technology" ... he states as evident a
thesis for which there is no proof. Socialism has been
able to make use of this idea for its own profit; but
it has not created it and, most importantly, acceptance
of it does not imply acceptance of socialism.

It is true that if this objective conception of history
were necessarily bound to the doctrine of economic ma-
terialism, as our author asserts, one could accept that
the former was established under the same influence and
inspired by the same spirit, as the latter certainly
has socialist origins.

But this assmilation is completely without foundation;
and it is important to put an end to it. These two
theories are completely independent, and their scienti-
fic value is singularly different. Just as much as it
seems to us to be that the cause of social phenomena
must be sought outside of individual ideas, so it seems
to us to be false that they derive ultimately from the
state of industrial technology; and that the economic
factor is the source of progress.... Not only is the
Marxist hypothesis unproven, but it is contrary to facts
which seem to be established. Sociologists and histor-
ians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement
that religion is the most primitive of all social pheno-
mena. All other manifestations of collective activity--
law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc.--

have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. In the beginning everything is religious. Now we know of no way of reducing religion to the economy, nor of any real attempt which has been made to effect this reduction. No one has yet shown under what economic influences naturalism developed out of totemism, by what series of changes in technology it became in one place the abstract monotheism of Jahwe, and in another Graeco-Latin polytheism, and we strongly doubt that anyone could ever succeed in such an enterprise. More generally, it is indisputable that at the outset, the economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life is by contrast, luxuriant, and all-pervading. Why could it not follow from this, and is it not probable that the economy depends much more upon religion than the former does on the latter?

There would be no need, moreover, to push the preceding ideas to such an extreme that they lose all validity. Psycho-physiology, after having drawn attention to the foundation of psychic life in the organic substratum, often made the mistake of denying any reality to the latter. This was the source of the theory which reduces consciousness to nothing more than an epiphenomenon. The fact was lost sight of, that if ideas depend originally upon organic states, once they are formed they are, by that token, realities sui generis: they are autonomous, capable of being causes in their turn, and of producing new phenomena.

Sociology must take care to avoid the same error. If the different forms of collective activity also have a substratum from which, in the last instance, they derive, they become in turn original sources of action, with their own specific effects, and they react upon the very causes which they stem from. We are thus far from holding that the economic factor is simply an epiphenomenon; once it exists, it has its own particular influence, and can partially modify the very substratum from which it results.

But this is not reason to confuse it in any way with this substratum, in order to make of it something especially fundamental. Everything leads us to believe, on the contrary, that it is secondary and derived. From which it follows that the economic changes which have taken place during the course of the century, the substitution of large-scale for small-scale industry in no way necessitates a disruption and radical reorganization of the social order; and indeed that the malaise from which European societies may be suffering does not originate in these changes (in Giddens, 1972a:159-162).

Let us now explore Durkheim's definitive statement of this position in 1898.

2.   The Autonomization of Cultural Forms as Synthesis and
        Synergetic Emergence

It is not widely enough understood that Durkheim's
drive for the autonomy of sociology as a separate science
depended, in large part, on his parallel insistence upon
the autonomy of collective representations as prime social
facts. Only if socially generated symbols, concepts, moral
rules, etc. are irreducible to individual psyches could so-
ciology gain a separate and significant subject matter for
itself. Indeed, Durkheim's campaign against biological and
psychological reductionism depended on the proposition that
social and cultural process is a synthesis, that this socio-
cultural synthesis is synergetic, and that the emergents
are sui generis, irreducible, autonomous products. Durkheim's
biographers regularly attribute this notion of levels and
emergents to the influence of Durkheim's teacher, Emile Bou-
troux, although some add Renouvier's name to the list also.
It is not our task here to trace the genealogy of this idea;
it is sufficient here to note that a similar movement was
going on in biology at about the same time. Philosophically
inclined biologists such as C. Lloyd Morgan, Hans Driesch,
Jan Smuts, Samuel Alexander, and so on, all elaborated the
logic of biological levels, "holism," and "emergent evolu-
tion." In addition, the breakdown of the atomistic-mechan-
istic Newtonian world-view at about the same time, and its
reconstruction in terms of the Romantically and Idealistical-
ly inspired organic and processual view of reality, reenfor-
ced the same general trend.

It is interesting to note that one of Durkheim's ardent
defenders, Celestin Bougle, took pains to absolve Durkheim
of the attacks of both materialist and idealist social phil-
osophers in his introduction to Sociology and Philosophy.

> There is no doubt that in his earlier works Durkheim
> took pleasure in insisting upon the close relation-
> ship that appeared between the beliefs and the act-
> ual form of their social milieu. According as the
> size of the group,   the density and mobility
> of the component individual minds varies and the

beliefs which the former sanctify become less effect-
ive and finish by giving place to the cult of indivi-
dualism. Thus, "social morphology" helps us to under-
stand this process of evolution. Once formed, collect-
ive representations combine, attract, and repel each
other according to their own particular ... laws. Durk-
heim is very concerned to point out that men's reli-
gious ideas ... and scientific notions, are very far
from being simple reflections of the social forms them-
selves. He was thus very far from wishing to impose
upon sociology explanations of a materialistic tenden-
cy (1953:xxxvii-xxxviii).

In addition, Giddens claims to have discovered a certain
relationship between Durkheim's notion of autonomization, syn-
ergetic synthesis, and emergent social products with Weber's
more multivalent ideas concerning "cause and effect" (1970:
182, #50). Giddens also provides a useful summary of Durkheim's
doctrine here as we approach his first definitive statement
in 1898.

We must not fall into the trap of treating ideas as
mere epiphenomena, however much it is true that they
are causally influenced by basic characteristics of
social organization. Once ideas and beliefs are es-
tablished, "they are, in virtue of this, realities
sui generis, autonomous, capable of being causes in
their turn and of producing new phenomena" (1970:182).

Now, as is well-known, the first definitive statement
of Durkheim's doctrine of emergent, synergetic, autonomizing
symbolic cultural forms was contained in his highly contro-
versial article "Individual and Collective Representations,"
published in 1898. Durkheim took pains there to criticize
in detail the illogic of associationist psychology, which
derived from the atomistic and mechanistic premises of the
Anglo Cultural Tradition. Especially absurd was the rather
extreme notion that ideas were attached to cells, as if
"Mom" was here, "the flag" over there, and "apple pie" there.
Today, after much search, neurophysiologists recognize that,
as with all other phenomena, mental life is a field of rela-
tionships through time; perhaps it is even governed by the
so-called "law of mass action." Just as mind is not brain,
Durkheim argued, so too culture and society, and the imper-
sonal concepts and universalizable moral rules which emerge

are not products of isolated minds. Rather, these crucial human products are emergents, they are new sui generis sociocultural products resulting from the synergetic, intergenerational symbolic interaction of individuals. Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's analogy between the irreducibility of mental and cultural representations.

Durkheim observed:

> Society has for its substratum the mass of associated individuals. The system which they form by uniting together, and which varies according to their geographical disposition, and the nature and the number of their channels of communication, is the base from which social life is raised. The representations which form the network of social life arise from the relations between the individuals thus combined or the secondary groups that are between the individuals and the total society. If there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that individual representations, produced by the action and reaction between neural elements, are not inherent in these elements, there is nothing surprising in the fact that collective representations, produced by the action and reaction between individual minds that form the society, do not derive directly from the latter and consequently surpass them. The conception of the relationship which unites the social substratum and social life is at every point analogous to that which undeniably exists between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of individuals (SP:24).

Now, when Durkheim argued that among the defining criteria by which distinctively social "facts" can be discovered is "externality," he referred to this special notion of social synthesis. At no time did "externality" mean that symbols were spatially and physically separate entities from individuals. Clearly, such a position would have necessitated the very Platonic, hypostatized deus ex machina so often laid (mistakenly) at his door. Rather, sociocultural process must be simultaneously "internal" as well as "external," for the social bond is based on collective, public symbols which are internalized in conscience and consciousness. "Externality" simply meant that the explanatory line was not to be drawn primarily from individual mind to public symbol, but rather in terms of the intervening social process; symbolization is inherently a collectively representational process, in both

sensesof this term. This is what Alpert meant when he right-
ly argued that Durkheim was actually only a "moderate Durk-
heimian," a "relational social realist"; for social reality
is not to be grasped in either the individual parts alone
or in some hypostatized entity floating in sociological space.
Rather, social life is only to be found in a complex, com-
pounding series of interpersonal and intergenerational rela-
tionships.

> ... If one can say that, to a certain extent, collect-
> ive representations are exterior to individual minds,
> it means that they do not derive from them as such but
> from the association of minds, which is a very differ-
> ent thing. No doubt in the making of the whole each con-
> tributes his part, but private sentiments do not become
> social except by combination under the action of the
> sui generis forces developed in association. In such a
> combination, with the mutual alterations involved, they
> become something else. A chemical synthesis results
> which concentrates and unifies the synthesized elements
> and by that transforms them. Since this synthesis is the
> work of the whole, its sphere is the whole. The result-
> ant surpasses the individual as the whole the part. It
> is in the whole as it is by the whole. In this sense,
> it is exterior to the individuals (SP:25).

Durkheim's instinct led him rightly, for cultural symbols are
phenomenological relationships through time. Symbols are not
things, but those who would deny their reality or significance,
Durkheim argued, would do better to grant them an equivalent
existential status as they grant so easily to physical objects.
This was Durkheim's point when he insisted that "social facts"
be treated as if they were choises (see Peter Berger & T. Luck-
mann, 1966). It should be noted that Kenneth Burke's "symbol-
ic realism" also argues that man is best interpreted as a sym-
bolic animal. In sum, Durkheim was quite right, in my judge-
ment, when he argued that the social whole, especially in
terms of symbols, is greater than the sum of its parts, that,
social and cultural reality is to be found in relationships
through time. Indeed, social science is simply not possible
if these facts are not accredited!

The prime focus, then, of the nascent science of socio-
logy was to be these "total social facts," as Mauss later call-

ed them. Although some might think that Durkheim argued too closely from lower level analogies, I believe that he correctly seized upon the essential principle of "relational realism" and "emergent evolutionism" which informs all these different levels. Today in physical theory, for instance, an atom--the very image of irreducible reality to nineteenth century materialists--is viewed not as a thing, a hard, irreducible rock, but rather is seen as an event in a time-space continuum (see Capek, 1961). Durkheim himself felt constrained to reject the specious objections of those who accused him of hypostatizing la Societe.

> Those, then, who accuse us of leaving social life in the air because we refuse to reduce it to the individual mind have not, perhaps, recognized all the consequences of their objection. If it were justified it would apply just as well to the relations between brain and mind, for in order to be logical they must reduce the mind to the cell and deny mental life all specificity (SP:28).

Durkheim then argued that such "relational social realism" necessarily implied that the synergetic cultural emergents are sui generis autonomous processes, generated not by isolated "social atoms" bouncing off one another as in the atomistic and mechanistic world-view, but by the long-term interactions of the whole sociocultural field. Collective representations, once created, tend to take on a life of their own. Indeed, Durkheim even suggested, at the end of the following passage, a kind of Mertonian multi-functionality.

> ... as the association is formed, it gives birth to phenomena which do not derive directly from the nature of the associated elements, and the more elements involved and the more powerful their synthesis, then the more marked is this partial independence. No doubt it is this that accounts for the flexibility, freedom, and contingence the superior forms of reality show in comparison with the lower forms in which they are rooted.... When a way of doing or being depends upon a whole without depending immediately upon the parts which compose that whole, it enjoys, as a result of this diffusion, a ubiquity which to a certain extent frees it. As it is not fixed to a particular point in space, it is not bound by too narrowly limited conditions of existence. If some cause induces

a variation, that variation will encounter less resistance and will come into existence more easily because it has, in a way, a greater scope for movement. If certain of the parts reject it, certain others will form the basis necessary for the new arrangement without, for all that, being obliged to rearrange themselves. That at least is how one can conceive how it is that one organ is able to perform different functions, different parts of the brain can substitute for each other, and one social institution can successively further the most varied ends (SP:30).

In The Division of Labor (page 333), Durkheim also remarked upon the flexibility of organic process, and the autonomization of function from structure.

In one of the most succinct summaries of his thesis that that relations between social substructure and symbolic superstructure become progressively more autonomous, Durkheim insistently argued:

> ... while it is through the collective substratum that collective life is connected to the rest of the world, it is not absorbed in it. It is at the same time dependent on and distinct from it.... As it is born of the collective substratum the forms which it manifests at the time of its origin, and which are consequently fundamental, naturally bear the marks of their origin. For this reason the basic matter of social consciousness is in close relation with the number of social elements and the way in which they are grouped and distributed--that is to say, with the nature of the substratum. But once a basic number of representations has been created, they become ... partially autonomous realities with their own way of life. They have the power to attract and repel each other and to form amongst themselves various syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities, and not by the conditions of their matrix * (SP:30-31).

As with his criticism of the Marxist model, it is most significant for our present purposes that Durkheim took his stand on the autonomous nature of religious symbols.

> As a consequence, the new representations born of these syntheses have the same nature; they are immediately caused by other collective representations and not by this or that characteristic of the social structure. The evolution of religion provides us with the most striking examples of this phenomenon. It is perhaps impossible to understand how the Greek or Roman pantheon came into existence unless we go into the constitution of the city, the way in which the primitive

clans slowly emerged, the organization of the patriarch-
al family, etc. Nevertheless, the luxuriant growth of
myths and legends, theogonic and cosmological systems,
etc. which grew out of religious thought, is not direct-
ly related to the particular features of the social
morphology--thus, it is that the social nature of reli-
gion has so often been misunderstood. It has often been
believed that it is formed to a great extent by extra-
social forces because the immediate link between the
greater part of religious beliefs and the organization
of society has not been perceived*(SP:31).

Now, as we discovered in Book Two, in Suicide in 1897
Durkheim was still unclear on these problems; thus his waver-
ing between a structural and a cultural explanation of sui-
cide. In contrast to his earlier assertion that suicide var-
ies inversely with the degree of structural integration of
individuals into groups, later in the book Durkheim often
seemed to be saying that the source lay not simply in lack
of integration but in the belief system of society. In short,
cultural values predisposed some to suicide. For Durkheim
then observed:

> The social environment is fundamentally one of common
> ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them to
> impart themselves thus to individuals, they must some-
> how exist independently of individuals; and this ap-
> proaches the solution we suggested. For thus its im-
> plicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective
> inclination to suicide from which individual inclina-
> tions are derived, and our whole problem is to know
> of what it consists and how it acts (S:302).

In 1902, in his preface to the second edition of The
Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim again sounded the
keynote to his program for sociology. It is interesting to
note that even though he was most concerned there with estab-
lishing the logical canons governing the new science of socio-
logy, and thus justifying its existence as an autonomous
field, he did not couch his argument in the first edition of
1895 in terms of synergetic emergence. Clearly, however, this
perspective, which emerged only after 1897, provided a power-
ful reenforcement for his anti-reductionistic polemic. In-
deed, I shall soon criticize Durkheim's first schema of sui-
cide, in 1897, as not fully incorporating his growing recog-

nition of the autonomizing nature of sociocultural processes.
Even in 1902, Durkheim was still taken by the analogy with
life emerging from certain chemical syntheses; the profound
"just-so story" (as Evans-Pritchard, 1965, calls it) in The
Elementary Forms was still a long way away.

> ... the common sense view still holds that sociology
> is a superstructure built upon the substratum of the
> individual consciousnesses and that otherwise it would
> be suspended in a social vacuum.... What is so readily
> judged inadmissible in the matter of social facts is
> freely admitted in the other realms of nature. Whenever
> certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the
> fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain
> that these phenomena reside not in the original ele-
> ments but in the totality formed by their union.
> The living cell contains nothing but mineral particles,
> as society contains nothing but individuals. Yet it is
> patently impossible for the phenomena characteristic
> of life to reside in the atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, car-
> bon, and nitrogen. How could the properties of life ex-
> ist in inanimate elements? How would the biological pro-
> perties be divided among these elements? These proper-
> ties could not exist equally in all the elements because
> the latter are dissimilar by nature.... It is equally
> inadmissible that each of the principal characteristics
> of life be resident in a certain group of atoms. Life
> could not be thus separated into discrete parts; it is
> a unit, and consequently its substratum can be only the
> living substance in its totality and not the element
> parts of which it is composed. The inanimate particles
> of the cell do not assimilate food, reproduce, and in a
> word, live; only the cell itself as a unit can achieve
> these functions (R:xlvii--xlviii).

Surely Durkheim was right to insist that life is irreducible
to the component elements which go to make it up, for life
can only really be understood as a series of relationships
through time, not a self-contained atom floating in absolute
Newtonian space. I wish that contemporary biologists, for
instance, would more consistently apply these established
relational and processual principles, and stop   repeating
the old formula that the cell is the basic unit of life.
This can be true only in the case of unicellular organisms.
Clearly, the cell is not the basic unit of life in terms of
more complex organisms having a multi-cellular division of
labor; it is most certainly not true of man. On the contrary,

the organism is itself the only irreducible unit of life,
and the organism is perhaps best understood, as the struct-
uralists suggest, as a pattern that endures, "a systematic
whole of self-regulating transformations" (Piaget, 1971:44).
Further, if we wished to more fully apply relational and
processual principles, we would say that a set of organisms
in relation to a set of environments is the minimum unit
of life. For how else could these exist, reproduce, perdure,
and evolve without being situated in a complex series of re-
lationships through time and space? Indeed, defining life,
like defining society, would require ecological and evolu-
tionary perspectives. In short, life, whether organic or
sociocultural, is always relational and processual--a com-
plex series of emergent relationships through time and space.

Durkheim applied these basic rules of synergetic emer-
gence to society. He rightly insisted that even though the
levels of complexity are different in the great breakthrough
from bio-chemical to sociocultural phenomena, nonetheless,
the same principle of emergence applies.

> Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as we
> may say, this synthesis constituting every society
> yields new phenomena, differing from those which take
> place in individual consciousness, we must indeed, ad-
> mit that these facts reside exclusively in the very
> society itself which produces them, and not in its
> parts, i.e. its members.... These new phenomena can-
> not be reduced to their elements without contradict-
> ion in terms, since, by definition, they presuppose
> something different from the properties of these ele-
> ments. Thus we have a new justification for the sepa-
> ration which we have established between psychology,
> which is properly the science of the mind of the in-
> dividual and sociology. Social facts do not differ
> from psychological facts in quality only: they have
> a different substratum; they evolve in a different
> milieu; and they depend on different conditions. This
> does not mean that they are not also mental after a
> fashion, since they all consist of ways of thinking
> or behaving. But the states of the collective con-
> sciousness are different in nature from the states
> of the individual consciousness; they are "represen-
> tations" of another type. The mentality of groups is
> not the same as that of individuals; it has its own
> laws. The two sciences are thus as clearly distinct
> as two sciences can be (R:xlvii-xlix).

Durkheim then defined collective representations as "... the ways in which the group conceives of itself in relation to objects which affect it."

> That the substance of social life cannot be explain-
> ed by purely psychological factors, i.e. by the states
> of the individual consciousness, seems to us to be most
> evident. Indeed, what the collective representations
> convey is the way in which the group conceives itself
> in relation to objects which affect it. The group dif-
> fers from the individual in its constitution, and the
> things which affect it are therefore of a different
> nature. Representations or concepts that reflect neither
> the same objects nor the same subjects cannot be traced
> to the same causes. To understand the way in which a
> society thinks of itself and of its environment one must
> consider the nature of the society and not that of in-
> dividuals. Even the symbols which express these concep-
> tions change according to the type of society.
> If, for example, it claims descent from a totemic ani-
> mal, it is conceived as one of those special groups call-
> ed "clans." If the animal is replaced by a human, but
> equally mythical, ancestor, this concept of the clan must
> also be modified. If, over and above local or family
> divinities, it postulates others on which it believes
> itself to be dependent, it follows that the local and
> family groups of which it is composed have tended to
> concentrate and unite, and the degree of unity which
> the divinities present correponds to the degree of unity
> attained at the same moment by the society. If the clan
> condemns certain modes of conduct, it is because they
> violate certain of its fundamental sentiments which are
> derived from its constitution, as those of the indivi-
> dual derive from his physical temperament and his men-
> tal organization. Thus, even if individual psychology
> has no more secrets for us, it could not give us the
> solution for any of these problems, since they relate
> to orders of facts concerning which it can have nothing
> to offer (R:xlix-l).

Now, clearly for our present purposes Durkheim's focal emphasis was shifting from external indices and social morphology to the problematics of social physiology in terms of the autonomizing of collective representations. For Durkheim's 1902 preface to the second edition of The Rules was immediately followed in 1903 with Durkheim's first systematic exploration of a specific category of collective representations-- namely, his seminal Annee monograph , written with Mauss, "De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribution a l'etude des representations collectives." Primitive

<u>Classification</u>, translated under Evans-Pritchard's inspira-
tion by Rodney Needham, presages the classic <u>Elementary Forms</u>,
which, as Alpert reminds us, was:

> ... originally entitled the "The Elementary Forms of
> Thought and Religious Life".... The introduction to
> <u>Les Formes Elementaires</u> which ... first appeared in
> 1909, was the Declaration of Principles of the socio-
> logical theory of knowledge, and, along with other
> sections of the volume, outlined specific analyses
> of such concepts as space, time, genus, force, total-
> ity, personality, and causality. And shortly before
> the publication of the volume itself, Durkheim offer-
> ed a sociological explanation of the origin of values
> and ideals in a paper read before the Fourth Interna-
> tional Congress of Philosophy at Bologna (1939:55,56-7).

In <u>Primitive Classification</u>, Durkheim and Mauss began
to speak of the feedback power of collective representations
in these terms:

> ... in many cases where these classifications are not
> immediately apparent they are nevertheless found, but
> in a different form from that which we have described.
> Changes have taken place in the social structure which
> have altered the economy of these systems, but not to the
> point of making it completely unrecognizable. Moreover,
> these changes are due in part to the classifications
> themselves, and might thus even reveal them.
> What characterizes the latter is that the ideas are
> organized on a model which is furnished by the society.
> But once this organization of the collective mind exists,
> it is capable of reacting against its cause and of con-
> tributing to its change. We have seen how species of
> things, classed in a clan, serve it as secondary or sub-
> totems; i.e. within a clan or particular group of in-
> dividuals, under the influence of causes which are un-
> known to us, comes to feel more specially related to
> certain things which are attributed, in a general way,
> to the whole clan. The latter, when it becomes too
> large, then tends to segment, and this segmentation
> takes place along the lines laid down by the classifi-
> cation. We must beware of thinking, in fact, that these
> secessions are necessarily the products of revolution-
> ary or tumultuous movements. More often ...   it seems
> that, in a large number of cases, the moieties were form-
> ed and then split into clans (PC:31-2).

Now, in a sense, the whole of <u>The Elementary Forms</u>
was devoted to analyzing the processes by which collective
representations not only emerge from society, but most im-
portantly, come to constitute society in the first place.

In his last great book, Durkheim enunciated the famous pro-
position concerning the autonomization of symbols which led
Parsons to portray him as an idealist in his later phase.

> There is one division of nature where the formula of
> idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is
> the social kingdom. Here, more than anywhere else,
> the idea is the reality. Even in this case, of course,
> idealism is not without modification. We can never es-
> cape the duality of our nature and free ourselves com-
> pletely from physical necessities: in order to express
> our own ideas to ourselves, it is necessary that we fix
> them upon material things which symbolize them. But here
> the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object
> serving as support for the idea is not much in compar-
> ison with the ideal superstructure, beneath which it
> disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the sup-
> erstructure (EF:260).

On the same page, in a footnote Durkheim took care to distance
his causal model, once again, from the reductionist material-
ist models of political geography and political economy.

> ... Thus we see how erroneous those theories are which,
> like the geographical materialism of Ratzel seek to de-
> rive all social life from its material foundation (ei-
> ther economic or territorial). They commit an error
> precisely similar to the one committed by Maudsley in
> individual psychology. Just as this latter reduced all
> the psychical life of the individual to a mere epiphe-
> nomenon of his physiological basis, they seek to reduce
> the whole psychical life of the group to its physical
> basis. But they forget that ideas are realities and
> forces, and that collective representations are forces
> even more powerful and active than individual represen-
> tations (EF:260).

In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim summed up his notion
of the autonomization of collective symbolic forms in terms
of the great ascent "from the kingdom of necessity to the
kingdom of freedom" (see also Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Symbol-
ic culture, which moralizes and directs egos, is the genetic
medium and energizing source for this great ascent of man
out of the biological cage.

> There really is a part of ourselves which is not pla-
> ced in immediate dependence upon the organic factor:
> this is all that which represents society in us. The
> general ideas which religion or science fix in our
> minds, the mental operations which these ideas sup-
> pose, the beliefs and sentiments which are at the ba-
> sis of our moral life, and all these superior forms

of psychical activity which society awakens in us,
these do not follow in the trail of our bodily states,
as our sensations and our general bodily consciousness
do.... This is because the world of representations in
which social life passes is superimposed upon its ma-
terial substratum,   far from arising from it; the
determinism which reigns there is much more supple than
the one whose roots are in the constitution of our tis-
sues and it leaves with the actor a justified impres-
sion of the greatest liberty. The medium in which we
thus move is less opaque and less resistant: we feel
ourselves to be, and we are, more at our ease there.
In a word, the only way we have of freeing ourselves
from physical forces is to oppose them with collective
forces (EF:307).

Changing structures of conscience and consciousness are, of
course, the self-made instruments of man's sociocultural li-
beration from the organic cage. The ascent of man is self-
propelled. Therefore, one key to understanding cultural trans-
formations are crucial shifts in the anchors of legitimate
moral and intellectual authority. Would, then, Weber or Durk-
heim have blinked at the suggestion that our modern self-im-
prisonment in an "iron cage" and the resulting forms of sui-
cide are intimately related to modern culturally sanctioned
forms of conscience and consciousness? We shall explore this
possibility in the second half of this book.

CHAPTER THREE

TRANSITIONS: DURKHEIM'S GROWING CULTURAL REALISM

<u>Preface</u>. The key transitions in Durkheim's work supporting
the second rather than the first schema of suicide can all
be summed up in terms of a progressive shift toward the au-
tonomization of cultural symbolic forms. This transition
was first anatomized by Parsons (1937) as a shift away from
positivism toward idealism; and even though he was largely
mistaken about the content and dating of Durkheim's stages,
there is now emerging general agreement that Durkheim's
thought increasingly focussed on superstructural symbolic
processes, and the autonomization of collective representa-
tions (eg. Giddens, 1971a, 1972a; Lukes, 1973:10, 233-6;
Wallwork, 1972:48,113; Parsons, 1975a:106; Whitney Pope, 1973:
410, 1975a:112,114). This same shift has been described as
Durkheim's deepening "social realism" by Jack Douglas (eg.
1967:45). Indeed, almost any serious observer who reads
Durkheim deeply and systematically can hardly fail to be
struck by the widening and deepening exploration of collect-
ive representations in the latter phases of Durkheim's career.
Acknowledgement of the growing autonomy and significance of
the "ideal" factors--that is, symbolically real--represents
the mainline of Durkheim's later development. I term this
fundamental shift in focus Durkheim's growing "cultural real-
ism."

Some key elements in Durkheim's work constituting this
massive and sustained shift which are relevant to our present
reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide include:

(1) His notion in <u>Suicide</u> that anomie and egoisme are
    generated, or at least carried by "social currents"
    or "pools of meaning," as J. Douglas (1967) suggests.
    These modern forms of "moral anarchy" are seen as
    culturally sanctioned just as much as altruisme and

fatalisme are sanctioned in primitive "mechanical solidarity."

(2) His notion that a "marginal leaven of anomie," as La-Capra (1972) terms it, is a necessary creative factor in sociocultural progress.

Combining points one and two, then, we may surmise that modern anomie and egoisme might be culturally sanctioned by modern progressive ideals and concepts.

(3) His growing emphasis on the importance of religion as the prime cultural form and evolutionary matrix, which we have traced from his early interests to the self-acknowledged "breakthrough" of 1895, to the seminal section in Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, to the Annee preface and monograph of 1899, and so on.

(4) Durkheim's repeated acknowledgement of the cultural and institutional creativity of Christianity, especially in terms of its Protestant and rationalist varieties, as a prime source of modern values, especially individualism.

Indeed, with our critical analysis of Durkheim's first schema and causal model, and our recognition of his seminal thesis of the emergence of the person through history, coupled with the compounding shifts outlined above, the question of the historical relations between Christianity, and especially Protestant forms of individualism, and modern egoisme and anomie as culturally sanctioned becomes critical.

(5) Durkheim's fine, but little known, history of education in France, which, as Lukes (1973) notes, emphasized cultural influences, especially "collective aspirations, values, beliefs, and ideals."

(6) Durkheim's seminal Annee "Note," written with Mauss, on the significance of civilizations as the macro-level of sociocultural processes.

One might be tempted to cite occasional comments, and other details, or even the mainline of the subsequent, post-Durkheimian development of the Annee school. But for our present purposes, these shifts in emphasis and content should suffice to demonstrate that Durkheim was indeed progressively moving toward a broad and sustained new program in granting collective symbolic forms and meanings independent causal significance. And I believe, as Parsons did in another way, that the implicit schemas in Suicide played an important role in

in this inner transformation of his thought. Let us now ex-
plore some of these progressive shifts.

A.   "Social Currents" as Energetic Carriers of Modern Anomie
          and Egoisme

    In Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, Durkheim began
to speak of "suicidal currents" as causing suicides. These
"social currents," akin to thermodynamic processes on the
physical level (as Halbwachs suggested, see Douglas, 1967:21),
raise or lower the "moral temperature" of society. It is stri-
king that this new metaphor, which later came to prominence in
The Elementary Forms where Durkheim spoke of the sacred as a
sort of "charismatic electricity" which flows in and out of
things, emerged here when Durkheim insisted: "Collective ten-
dencies have an existence of their own; they are forces as
real as cosmic forces" (S:309). One recent observer, missing
the significance of these metaphorical shifts away from the
more mechanistic images of The Division of Labor toward therm-
odynamic images, went so far as to lamely satirize Durkheim's
notion of "suicidogenetic currents" in these unfortunate terms:
"Individuals were felled by "suicidogenic" social forces act-
ing like some fantastic death ray" (LaCapra, 1972:149).

    Now, it is significant for our present purposes that
Jack Douglas (1967), in searching Durkheim's classic for a
sense of "shared meanings" as phenomenological causes of sui-
cide, cited these "suicidogenetic currents" as examples of
"pools of meaning" crucial to Durkheim's growing "social real-
ism." However one wishes to express this important fact, it
is generally established that the shift occurred. Since I
shall anchor the second schema, in part, on this notion of
"social currents" as energetic carriers of modern anomie and
egoisme, and because space is limited and others have provi-
ded useful reviews, hereafter I shall simply hold it as estab-
lished that this metaphorical shift occurred and is most sig-
nificant for our reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of sui-
cide.

B. A "Marginal Leaven of Anomie," Charismatic and Creative
   Deviants, and SocioCultural Progress

> To dare to shake off the yoke of traditional discipline,
> one should not feel authority too strongly (ME:53).

LaCapra (1972:158, 240, 295, etc.) repeatedly employs
the useful phrase "a marginal leaven of anomie" to describe
Durkheim's important qualification of his seemingly authori-
tarian sociologistic doctrine. Some might be as surprised by
Durkheim's statement that "one should not feel authority too
strongly" as by his qualification of his abstracted doctrine
of homo duplex: "The entire morality of progress and perfect-
ion is inseparable from a certain amount of anomie" (S:364).
Although one might suppose that Durkheim's root dichotomy--
normality/pathology--would lead us to treat the first as
good and general, and the latter as bad and exceptional, this
relation was neither exclusive nor wholly abstract. Rather,
Durkheim's opposition had an evolutionary dimension as well,
and this evolutionism sometimes necessarily implied the in-
version of the normal notion of homo duplex. LaCapra had some
insight into this seemingly paradoxical situation when he
suggested that this dichotomy and the evolutionary tree of
social life served as Durkheim's key guiding metaphors. Pro-
gress, says LaCapra, "... required a certain measure of change
which corresponded to the destructive and creative margin of
anomie" (1972:295). Indeed, a certain balance of anomie and
egoisme is indispensable not only for normal stability (eg.
see J. Douglas, 1967), but also for progressive moral evolu-
tion.

Given the contrast between Durkheim's general evolution-
ism and his seemingly abstract opposition between the normal
and the pathological, this aspect of Durkheim's thesis might
seem paradoxical to some. But his notion of the necessity of
a creative "marginal leaven of anomie" served Durkheim as a
crucial deus ex machina helping him escape the horns of this
dilemma. For while anomie and egoisme clearly remain patholo-
gical, nevertheless, they are still seen as necessary, in

small doses, for general evolutionary progress. Perhaps the appearance of such a _deus_ _ex_ _machina_ was inevitable, given the weakness of Durkheim's canons (see _The_ _Rules_) for distinguishing between the normal and the pathological. Indeed, little has come of this curious dichotomy, even though it was central to much of Durkheim's work. However, LaCapra, Douglas, and others rightly observe that Durkheim's notion of a normal society implies a certain amount of anomie. Indeed, we might have expected this proposition, for in this dichotomy, as with sacred/profane and all the others, the terms are relational--I mean one term has meaning only in relation to the other pole.

> The normal society would also contain a dynamic leaven of anomie.... But anomie would be limited to a marginal aspect of personality and to marginal groups in society. Either extreme of the bell-shaped curve of moral practice would reveal marginal categories of culture-bearing idealists (or perfectionist deviants) at one end, and of criminal deviants at the other. In the normal society, deviants presenting ideological challenges to the existing order might attain ritual status, and, invested with ambivalent sacred values, become the object of dangerous fascination (LaCapra, 1972:242).

Let us next explore some of Durkheim's theses in this regard.

In _The_ _Division_ _of_ _Labor_, for example, Durkheim noted that the intensity of collective life must be in balance with the "state of the social organism, if health is not to be compromised" (DL:340). But this state of wholeness or health is not static, for as Durkheim himself once said, "structure itself is always encountered in becoming." Durkheim, therefore, acknowledged:

> ... if the ideal is always definite, it is never definitive. Since progress is a consequence of changes in the social milieu, there is no reason for supposing that it must never end. For it to have a limit, it would be necessary for the milieu to become stationary at some given moment (DL:341).

Since collective ideals and men change because of varying milieu (DL:344), there are some whose present deviance might become basic to the future shape of society, indeed, to progressive moral evolution and the education of mankind.

> ... among peoples where progress is and should be rapid, rules restraining individuals must be sufficiently pliable and malleable; if they preserved all the rigidity they possess in primitive societies, evolution thus impeded could not take place promptly enough (S:364).

Indeed, Durkheim saw an enlargening role for a "creative leaven of anomie" to play in sociocultural evolution as we move more rapidly away from the repressive stereotyping of thought and behavior in primitive "mechanical solidarity" where the prescriptive etiquettes demanded rigid adherence to the taboos and sanctions of what Nelson (1973a) calls the "sacromagical collective conscience." Here, LaCapra suggests:

> A measure of anomie corresponds to an element of "free play" in society and personality: anomic indeterminacy and daring risk were conditions of progress and prerequisites of an ability to respond creatively to changes in relevant conditions of existence (1972:158).

While Durkheim himself observed:

> We are not obliged to bow to the force of moral opinion. We are even in certain cases justified in rebelling against it. It may, in fact, happen that ... we shall feel it our duty to combat moral ideas that we know to be out of date and nothing more than survivals the best way of doing this will be to oppose these ideas not only theoretically, but also in action (in Giddens, 1972a:122).

It is helpful, as LaCapra suggests (1972:242), to distinguish between different forms of crime and deviance. What Durkheim had in mind, LaCapra suggests, was something akin to a bell-shaped curve of moral practice, with "marginal categories of culture-bearing idealists at one end, and criminal deviants at the other." The former possibility will constitute another important anchor of the second schema of suicide. Nisbet (1974) has also fruitfully explored the "vital relations" which Durkheim posited between certain forms of deviance and progress. Morally creative deviance, Durkheim contended, play an important "latent" role not only in static functioning, but also in energizing and directing moral evolution. Instead of an all-powerful conscience collective, there must be an on-going renegotiation of the self-society equilibrium as society differentiates and the complex relations of

the division of labor continue to ramify. Nisbet (1974:219) draws attention to some key passages in this regard in The Rules. Durkheim's "philosophy of human finitude" led him to insist that even the moral authority of society must itself be restricted and held in a kind of dynamic balance.

> Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent. The authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive, otherwise none would dare criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form (R:71).

Indeed, as LaCapra notes, Durkheim here assigned a fundamental, but little noticed, role to exceptional individuals in advancing the cause of moral progress; for the challenges of charismatic leaders to the inherited structures of conscience and consciousness cannot be explained merely in terms of abstract "moral mechanics."

> Durkheim seemed to attribute a greater causal importance to the exceptional individual in the normal state of society, for in this context his hybris would correspond to the element of possibly creative anomie in experience (1972:240).

Durkheim himself remarked:

> To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall also be possible. One does not occur without the other (R:71).

This general perspective led to Durkheim's famous thesis that "crime" is necessary.

> ... it happens that crime itself plays a useful role in this evolution. Crime implies not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently to take on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine the form they will take. How many times, indeed, is it only an anticipation of future morality--a step toward what will be (R:71)!

Like so many others, Durkheim took Socrates as the ideal typical illustration of the morally creative deviant--namely, as one who is ideologically, rather than egotistically, motivated,

and thus, one who seeks a wider and deeper way of life and of social being.

> According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal, and his condemnation was no more than just. However, his crime,namely, the independence of this thought, rendered a service not only to humanity, but also to his country. It served to prepare a new morality and faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditions by which they lived until then were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life. Nor is the case of Socrates unique; it is reproduced periodically in history. It would never have been possible to establish the freedom of thought we now enjoy if the regulations prohibiting it had not been violated before being solemnly abrogated. At that time, however, the violation was a crime, since it was an offense against sentiments still very keen in the average conscience. And yet this crime was useful as a prelude to reforms which daily became more necessary. Liberal philosophy had as its precursors the heretics of all kinds who were justly punished by secular authorities during the course of the Middle Ages and until the eve of modern times (R:71-2).

In Moral Education, Durkheim elaborated the same argument, emphasizing the creative deviance of individual persons who take us farther along the road to a universalizable and rational perception of reality--in other words, the mainline of sociocultural evolution. In Weberian terms, "charismatic" leaders (eg. prophets) proclaim a "new and mighty objective certainty and subjective certitude" which leads to a new and more compelling "rationalization" of daily existence. As noted before, Durkheim's essential thesis, here illuminated by categories from Weberian sociology of religion, that the parallel autonomization of collective representations and of the morally autonomous person is accompanied, on the world-historical level, by a progressive rationalization and universalization in the constitutive grounds of moral and intellectual discouse (eg. see E. Leites, 1974; B. Nelson, 1973a), is a most significant interpretive perspective in the human sciences. In short, Durkheim proposed that progressive moral evolution depended upon morally creative deviance leading to greater rationality and respect for moral personage.

In primitive societies, Durkheim noted, moral solidari-

ty is mechanical--that is, taboos and prescriptive etiquettes are automatically enforced by society much as an automatic mechanism carries out its foreordained task. But as sociocultural existence becomes more complex, ever-wider spheres of action are opened up to the reflective rationality, growing intellectual autonomy, and moral responsibility of the person. Indeed, the very complexity of fast-paced modern life would prove impossible without this rational flexibility of moral rules.

> The more societies become complex, the more difficult for morality to operate as a purely automatic mechanism. Circumstances are never quite the same, and as a result the rules of morality require intelligence in their application. Society is continually evolving; morality itself must be sufficiently flexible to change gradually as proves necessary. But this requires that morality need not be internalized in such a way as to be beyond criticism or reflection, the agents par excellence of all change. Individuals, while conforming, must take account of what they are doing--thus, it does not follow from a belief in the need for discipline must involve blind and slavish submission. Moral rules must be invested with that authority without which they would be ineffective. However, since a certain point in history it has not been necessary to remove authority from the realm of discussion, converting it to icons to which man dare not, so to speak, lift his eyes (ME:52-3).

Thus, did the positivist moral reformer Durkheim reconcile the generic need for moral discipline with the genetic-evolutionary need for progressive enfranchisement of independent and critical reflection. Here Durkheim invoked his deus ex machina--the morally creative and exceptional deviant who foreshadows the future forms and rules necessary for the emerging society.

> We have contended that the erratic, the undisciplined, are morally incomplete. Do they not, nevertheless, play a useful part in society? Was not Christ such a deviant, as well as Socrates? And is it not thus with all the historical figures through which humanity has passed? Had their feeling of respect for the moral rules characteristic of their day been too lively, they would not have undertaken to alter them. To dare to shake off the yoke of traditional discipline, one should not feel authority too strongly (ME:53).

Granting Durkheim his qualifying thesis, it is legitimate, however, to ask as Nisbet did: "How do we distinguish between the creative deviant--the Socrates and the Christ--and those for whom deviance is no more than a form of assault on social order (1974:220)"? In answering in terms of the opposition between the striving for higher morality (more universal and rational) of the morally creative deviant, and the criminal whose action is egoistic or regressive, Durkheim was forced to subdivide his first category. He further distinguished between those moral reformers whose action leads to new and more creative kinds of universalizable moral rules, and those who may start out as moral reformers but whose only real consequence is to release egoistic desires and to enshrine moral anarchy. This opposition between two kinds of moral reformers is the closest Durkheim came to Weber's distinction between the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of ultimate disposition."

> However, if in critical and abnormal circumstances the feeling for the rule and for discipline must be weakened, it does not follow that such impairment is normal. Furthermore, we must take care not to confuse two very different feelings: the need to substitute a new regulation for an old one; and the impatience with all rules, with the abhorrence of all discipline. Under orderly conditions, the former is natural, healthy, and fruitful; the latter is always abnormal since it prompts us to alienate ourselves from the basic conditions of life. Doubtless, with some of the great moral innovators, a legitimate need for change has degenerated into something like anarchy. Because the rules prevailing in their time offended them deeply, their sense of the evil led them to blame, not this or that particular and transient form of moral discipline, but the principle itself of all discipline (ME:53).

As noted in Book One, Durkheim's points here are well taken, for from at least the Enlightenment on, we moderns have so often conceived of freedom in wholly negative terms--as the release of the individual from all previous irrational constraints and servitudes--that there comes a time in many movements when this opposition to specific forms and rules imperceptibly slides over into a generic and permanent protest against all forms in general, against definition itself. Ro-

mantic egoism, cultural and political nihilism, and so on,
are but a few of the forms taken by such generic protest
(ultimately gnostic), which is based upon a largely negative
view of freedom as release from control rather than harmony
with the generative and directive sources of being and becom-
ing.

The morally creative deviant, Durkheim continued, nei-
ther seeks things for himself, as the criminal does, nor does
he embrace infinite horizons under the specious mask of a
metaphysical pathos of cosmic oppression (gnostic or Roman-
tic dualism). Rather, the morally creative deviant personally
embraces a more rational, more universalizable, impersonal
ideal. He acts in the name of a higher goal, which points to-
ward the future mainline of moral evolution.

> ... because society is beyond us it constitutes the
> only possible goal of individual conduct. For precise-
> ly because this goal is beyond our individual goals,
> we cannot seek to achieve it without elevating our-
> selves in the same measure beyond ourselves--without
> surpassing our individual nature, which is the highest
> ambition that man can pursue or ever has pursued. That
> is why the major historical figures, those who seem to
> us infinitely greater than all the others, are not the
> great artists, or the men of profound wisdom, or states-
> men, but those who have achieved--or are thought to have
> achieved--the greatest moral triumphs: Moses, Socrates,
> Buddha, Confucius, Christ, Mohammed, and Luther, to men-
> tion only a few of the greatest names.... In our minds they
> identify themselves with the impersonal ideal that they
> embodied and the great human groupings that they per-
> sonified, we see them as raised beyond the condition
> of human beings and transfigured (ME:93).

Indeed, selfless devotion to a supra-personal ideal--was this
not the ethic of both Durkheim and Weber? Both demanded that
eros and ego give way to logos and the universalistic moral-
ity of the self-disciplining person. The very necessity of
their prophetic calls (eg. the "The Dualism of Human Nature"
and Weber's "vocational addresses"), however, demonstrates
that rationalization and autonomization ultimately depended
upon human reflection and intentions. Therefore, as we obser-
ved earlier, this enlargement of the basic structures of con-
science and consciousness--the sine qua non of progressive

moral evolution--is a basic phenomenological process on the world-historical level.

If we pull together Durkheim's insight that modern suicides may be caused by "social currents," and that a "marginal leaven of anomie" and egoisme among morally creative charismatic leaders who proclaim a new and universalistic ideal is necessary for progressive moral evolution, are we not then justified in further speculating that anomie and egoisme may be culturally sanctioned by progressive modern forms of conscience and consciousness? Indeed, Durkheim himself suggested this possibility when he acknowledged: "The entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomie" (S:364).

C.   Durkheim's Growing Emphasis on Religion

Having already explored Durkheim's sociology of religion at great length (see Book One especially), I now merely note: close to the core of Durkheim's growing "cultural realism" was his ramifying analysis of religion as society's prime constitutive symbolic mode. Indeed, as we have seen, Durkheim's thesis of the progressive autonomization of collectively symbolic representations often cited as its prime exhibit the growing multivalency of religious images and doctrines (see his review of Labriola cited earlier). Durkheim himself acknowledged, as is generally known, that one of the key turning points in his intellectual career came after reading the British anthropologists of religion, especially Robertson Smith, around 1895. This rare biographical reflection came in response to a charge that his doctrine was simply imported from Germany. Of his lecture course on religion in 1895, Lukes tells us that Durkheim himself reflected:

> It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view
> of the essential role played by religion in social
> life. It was in that year that, for the first time,
> I found the means of tackling the study of religion
> sociologically. This was a revelation to me. That
> course of 1895 marked a dividing line in the devel-
> opment of my thought, to such an extent that all my
> previous researches had to be taken up afresh in or-

der to be made to harmonize with these new insights
.... (This reorientation) was entirely due to the stu-
dies of religious history which I had just undertaken,
and notably to the reading of the works of Robertson
Smith and his school (Lukes, 1973:237).

Lukes (1973:240) suggests that there are two main stages
in Durkheim's developing sociology of religion--marked by the
essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena" (1899) and
by The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912). As I
did in Book One, I wish to note the existence of a third sta-
ge, in which the course of 1895 and the seminal section in
Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide (1897) are among the most
notable statements. Further, is is highly significant for our
present purposes that, when in 1897 in Suicide, Durkheim be-
gan to speak of "social" or "suicidogenetic currents" as cau-
sing suicides, this is placed in the context of his emerging
"cultural realism," and this occurs also when his seminal the-
ses on religion appear for the first time in print. Thereaft-
er, beginning with his Annee preface and article of 1899,
Durkheim further proposed not only that religion is the funda-
mental form in which society conceives of itself, but also
that religion served as the prime matrix--the cultural-gene-
tic medium--from which all other basic symbolic forms progres-
sively emerged. Religious representations thus came eventual-
ly to constitute the central substantive core of Durkheim's
causal model.

Now, since the awakening and guidance of conscience
and consciousness--as prime phenomenological processes--came
to be seen by Durkheim as dependent upon religious symbolic
forms, should we not, then, seek out the changing foundations
of structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority
in changing religious sanctions? Further, should we not look
to specific religious variables as potentially causal factors
in the cultural sanctioning of modern anomie and egoisme as
extreme individualistic drives for "progress and perfection"
as these were led by the descendants of charismatic founders
of the modern world?

D. <u>Durkheim's Emphasis on the Civilizational Significance</u>
   <u>of Christian Culture</u>

One of Durkheim's more important historical observations was his repeated emphasis on the civilizational significance of the moral creativity of Christian culture (see also Chapter Eight, Book One). It is also striking that Durkheim made little effort to explain the origin and impact of Christian culture in the West from within the framework of his general evolutionary mechanical-morphological model. Perhaps he did not do so because it is obvious that there was no real mechanical-evolutionary necessity forcing the emergence of this particular religious doctrine and ethos out of specific social morphological contexts in the ancient world, which Christianity might then symbolize. In both content and origin, then, Christian individualism should be viewed as a volitional doctrine, a moral and spiritual orientation only remotely connected with evolutionary necessity.

Although it cannot be explained in terms of his only explicit causal model, Durkheim's emphasis on the moral creativity of Christian culture, and especially Protestant individualism, reenforces his general thesis of the evolutionary emergence of the person through history (see Book One). In cultural and phenomenological terms, Christian individualism was a powerful, even decisive, force in sanctioning an autonomous sphere for the individual person, over against the traditional collective claims of "blood and soil." For, as Nelson (1973a) observed, the world-historical significance of Christianity was that it broke decisively through the tribal sacral-magical collective conscience of the archaic "sacral complex," and extended the socio-religious bond to all "brothers" in the faith. It is striking that both Durkheim and Weber converged in their estimate of the significance of this awakening of new depths of conscience. The deepening of personal obligation, in regard to both abstract impersonal ideals and to inter-personal obligations, was seen to be of prime importance in the construction of new in-depth person-

ality structures. Indeed, Weber emphasized that "... the increased importance of an ethical attachment of individuals to a cosmos of obligations, making it possible to calculate what the conduct of a given person may be ... has the greatest importance" (1963:35-6). The progressive awakening of conscience, the deepening internalization of moral and ethical obligations, and the growing centrality of a more or less systematic phenomenology of intentions (especially from Abelard on, see Luscombe, 1971, Nelson, 1973a, Leites, 1974), were all of critical significance in the evolutionary construction of the moral individualism so revered by Durkheim.

Now, if we rotate our analytical matrix slightly, what we see here is another facet of the master process of rationalization so central to Weber's historical sociology. Through the progressive internalization of ethical-legal norms in socialization, the personality structure becomes more integral, more consistent, and, hence, more predictible and reliable. Further, in identifying the emergence of the individual conscience with the construction of a new level of in-depth integrated personality structures, Weber also included, as a corollary process, the growing autonomization of facts and individuals, and the greater degree of calculability and thus universalizability which emerges from these simultaneous processes. This represents a significant convergence between Durkheim and Weber, for Durkheim also believed that the autonomization of the person and rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse proceeded together on the world-historical level. Recently, Edmund Leites has described this crucial double dialectical process with particular cogence:

> ... two of the most decisive advances in the philosophic and theoretical development of the norm of moral and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an extraordinary extension (in moral and religious matters) of "universalities in terms of reference and communities of discourse".... Major advances in the articulation of the norm of autonomy have gone along with rejections of moralities and modes or argumentation are believed to be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cultures

and traditions. What is sought are ways of deciding moral and religious matters which all reasonable men, whatever their history and culture, would accept and would have to accept, given the correctness of the procedures. ... There are important cultural and civilizational linkages between: (1) the struggle for universalities in terms of reference, and argumentation in moral and religious matters, and (2) the development of norms of individual autonomy (1974:97-8).

Indeed, didn't the positivist Durkheim himself link rationalism and individualism in evolutionary terms?

Rationalism is only one of the aspects of individualism: it is the intellectual aspect of it. We are not dealing here with two states of mind; each is the converse of the other. When one feels the need of liberating individual thought, it is because in a general way, one feels the need of liberating the individual. Intellectual servitude is only one of the servitudes that individualism combats. All development of individualism has the effect of opening moral consciousness to new ideas and rendering it more demanding. Since every advance that it makes results in a higher conception, a more delicate sense of the dignity of man, individualism cannot be developed without making apparent to us, as contrary to human dignity, as unjust, social relations that at one time did not seem unjust at all. Conversely, rationalistic faith reacts on individualistic sentiments and stimulates it. For injustice is unreasonable and absurd, and, consequently, we are the more sensitive to it as we are more sensitive to the rights of reason. Consequently, a given advance in moral education in the direction of greater rationality cannot occur without also bringing to light new moral tendencies, without inducing a greater thirst for justice, without stirring the public conscience by latent aspirations (ME:12).

Let us explore a few representative passages which illustrate Durkheim's growing emphasis on the civilizational significance of Christian culture, especially its rationalism and individualism. For instance, early in his career, even though he was critically disposed to treat religion as repressive and thus regressive, nonetheless, the positivist Durkheim had a few kind words to say for the evolutionary progressiveness of Christianity vis-a-vis other archaic religions.

Christianity has often been reproached for its intolerance. From this point of view, however, it realized considerable progress over preceding religions.... Everybody knows that the Christian religion is the most i-

dealistic that has ever existed. Thus, it is made up
of articles of faith which are very broad and very gen-
eral, rather than of particular beliefs and practices.
That is how it came about that the dawn of free thought
under Christianity [especially Abelard, see Durkheim's
L'Evolution pedagogique en France] was relatively pre-
cocious. Since its origin, schools have been founded,
and even opposing sects. Hardly had Christian societies
began to organize themselves in the Middle Ages than
scholasticism appeared, the first systematic effort of
free thought, the first source of differences. The
rights of discussion were from the first recognized
(DL:163-4).

Indeed, this idealistic and individualistic character of
Christianity was the source, as Durkheim observed, of the se-
cond great transformation in the structures of conscience and
consciousness which Nelson (1973a) has described as the tran-
sition from "faith structures" to "rational structures of
consciousness." And, as Durkheim noted, it was the scholastic
philosophers, especially with Abelard, that successfully ra-
tionalized the contents of faith, and made personal inten-
tionality the new logical and evidential basis for sin and
responsibility, a momentous shift in cultural evolution.

Further, in his lectures on the evolution of Western
education, the creative correlation of the culture of Chris-
tian inwardness, classical rationalism, and increasingly u-
niversalistic frames of reference are clearly implied as
Durkheim summarized much of his earlier writings on reli-
gious evolution.

The religions of Antiquity are, above all, systems of
rites, the essential objective of which is to assure
the regular working of the universe. For the wheat to
spring up and yield an abundant harvest, the gods of
the river, and the gods of the stars must subsist, and
it is the rites which allow them to do so. If they ceas-
ed to take place on the established days, and in the
prescribed manner, the life of the universe would come
to an end. It is understandable that the attention of
the Greek should be entirely directed towards the out-
side, where, according to him, the principle of exis-
tence is to be found. By contrast, Christian religion
is centered in man himself, in the soul of man. An es-
sentially idealistic religion, its god aspires to reign
over the world of ideas, over the spiritual world. and
not that of the body. To worship the gods of Antiquity
was to maintain their material life with the help of

offerings and sacrifices, since their life depended on
that of the world; the god of the Christians, on the
other hand, wishes to be worshipped, as the phrase ex-
presses it, in spirit and in truth. For him, to be is
to be believed, to be thought, to be loved
(in Giddens, 1972a:239-40).

Harmony with the Christian God, then, is an interior rela-
tionship.

Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his
thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that
which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit.
... The most common rite is prayer; and prayer is an in-
ternal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue and
piety do not consist in material acts, but in internal
states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a perpetual
surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged to per-
petually examine his conscience, he must learn to ques-
tion himself, to analyze himself and scrutinize his in-
tentions: in short, to reflect upon himself. Thus, of
the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one
hand, and man on the other, it is necessarily around the
second that the thought of the Christian societies,and
also consequently their system of education, has come to
gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a:239-40).

In addition, Wallwork speaks of Durkheim's reliance on
the differential content of religious doctrines to explain
the differences in pedagogical ideals in Western culture, and
then cites the following passage from Durkheim's L'Evolution
pedagogique en France.

If Greek reflection was first and exclusively directed
toward the world, this was because the world was then,
in the esteem of public opinion, an excellent and holy
thing. The world, in fact, was considered divine, or
rather the domain of the gods. The gods were not out-
side the world, they were in things, and there was noth-
ing in which they did not reside.... It is man, the hu-
man spirit, which was then considered as profane and of
little value; this is what Socrates himself teaches and
it is upon this profane character that he lays claim to
the right to speculate with complete independence; here,
he says, thought ought not to be expressed with complete
liberty, for it does not risk encroaching upon the domain
of the gods. For Christianity, on the contrary, it is the
mind, the conscience of man, that is the sacred and peer-
less thing: for the soul, the principle of our interior
life, is a direct emanation of the divine. Between the
mind and things, there is all the difference which sep-
arates the spiritual from the temporal. Thus God has dis-
dainfully abandoned the world to the free utilization of
men, traditit mundum hominum disputationi (1972:140).

Lukes gives the latter passage a slightly different sense:

> For Christianity ... it is the mind, the <u>conscience</u>
> of man which is sacred and incomparable; <u>for the soul</u>
> is ... a direct emanation of divinity.... With Christ-
> ianity the world loses the confused unity it had prim-
> itively; there is, on the one hand, the world of thought,
> of the conscience, of morality, of religion; and, on the
> other hand, the world of matter, unthinking, amoral, and
> areligious (1973:387,#39).

Thus did Durkheim pursue these matters of the differential in-
fluence of Christian culture, vis-a-vis other preceding reli-
gious traditions, which lay at the creative core of the emer-
ging European civilization from about the eleventh century on-
ward.

Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the
very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process
of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nascent
conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than adherence
to the religious cultures of Antiquity.

> In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective
> of communicating to the child a certain number of de-
> fined talents. These were either considered as a sort
> of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic val-
> ue of the individual, or else they were seen, as was
> the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools
> which an individual needed in order to play his role
> in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating
> into the pupil certain habits and items of knowledge
> .... It was not a question of influencing the person-
> ality in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity,
> but in clothing it in a sort of external framework, the
> different parts of which could be created independently
> .... Christianity, by contrast, very early on acquired
> the conception that there is in each of us an underly-
> ing mode of being from which   forms   of intel-
> ligence and sensibility derive, and in which they find
> their unity; and that it is this underlying mode of be-
> ing which has to be reached if one really wants to car-
> ry out the work of the educationalist and to produce a
> lasting effect. According to Christian belief, to shape
> a man is not to embellish his mind with certain ideas
> or to allow him to acquire certain specific habits,
> but to create in him a general attitude of the mind and
> the will which makes him see reality in general in a
> definite perspective. And it is easy to understand how
> Christianity came to hold this view. It is because ...
> in order to be a Christian, it is not enough to have
> learnt this or that particular item, to know how to

> discriminate between certain rites or pronounce certain
> formulas, or to know certain traditional beliefs. Chris-
> tianity consists essentially in a certain attitude of
> soul, in a certain <u>habitus</u> of our moral being. To foster
> this attitude in the child is thus the essential goal of
> education (in Giddens, 1972a:206-07).

This "certain habitus of the entire moral being," this com-

mitment to influencing the total personality, was based upon

the Christian notion of "the unity and intrinsic moral value

of the self" (Wallwork, 1972:132).

> ... the goal of Christian education always involved di-
> recting the basic orientation of the self as a unified
> whole.... The important thing was the general disposi-
> tion of the mind and the will of the whole personality.
> In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian concept
> of training the total personality distinguishes the
> whole of Western pedagogical instruction (Wallwork,
>   1972:132).

Modern Western education, though now largely secularized,

Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on the

total personality, and on penetrating with value and moral

habits the "inner, deep recesses of the soul."

> For us the principal object of education is not to pro-
> vide the child with a greater or lesser degree of items
> of knowledge, but to create within him a deep-lying dis-
> position, a kind of perspective of the soul which ori-
> ents him in a definite direction, not only during child-
> hood, but for life.... Our conception of the goal has
> become secularized; consequently, the means employed
> must themselves change. But the abstract schema of the
> educational process has not altered. It is still a mat-
> ter of descending into depths of the soul which Anti-
> quity was unconscious of (in Giddens, 1972:207-8).

Similarly, in terms of the second schema of suicide, we

might wonder whether, and to what extent, a certain form of

Christian individualism became secularized into extreme

sanctions which became unbearable to many.

Indeed, the religio-cultural sanction of individualism

and the interior life which came with Christianity served as

an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral indivi-

dualism" which Durkheim and other Enlightenment liberals and

positivists held dear.

> Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, is
> the immediate source from which modern moral indivi-

> dualism is derived.... Christian ethics provided the moral principles upon which the "cult of the individual" is founded, but now Christianity is becoming supplanted by sacred symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, in the events of the French Revolution, where freedom and reason were glorified.... The French Revolution gave the most decisive impetus to the growth of moral individualism in modern times (Giddens, 1971a:115-16).

At the height of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to defend the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, he rhetorically invoked the origins of western individualism from Christian doctrine to invert the attacks of Catholic conservatives against the "laic" Third Republic intellectuals and moral reformers.

> Are we to ignore the fact that the originality of Christianity consisted precisely in a remarkable development of the individualistic spirit? Whereas the religion of the ancient city-state was quite entirely made up of external practices, from which the spiritual was absent, Christianity demonstrated its inner faith, in the personal conviction of the individual, the essential condition of piety. First, it taught that the moral value of acts had to be measured according to the intention, a preeminently inward thing which by its very nature escapes all external judgments and which only the agent could competently appraise. The very center of moral life was thus transported from the external to the internal, and the individual thus elevated to be sovereign of his own conduct, accountable only to himself and to his God.... If this restrained individualism which is Christianity was necessary eighteen centuries ago, there is a good chance that a more fully developed individualism is indispensable today.... It is therefore a singular error to present the individualist ethic as the antagonist of Christian morality. Quite the contrary ... the former derived from the latter. By attaching ourselves to the first, we do not deny our past; we only continue it (in Bellah, 1973:52-3).

Similarly, in Moral Education, Durkheim suggested that in the world-historical evolution of morality, Christian inwardness, the shedding of externality, the enshrinement of individual subjectivity, and thus, Christianity's resulting nature as "an essentially human religion," played an important role in the autonomization and secularization of the world (see also Bellah, 1973:52-3).

Gradually things change. Gradually human duties are
multiplied, become more precise, and pass to the first
rank of importance; while others, on the contrary, tend
to become diminished. One might say that Christianity
itself has contributed most to the accleration of this
result. It is an essentially human religion, since its
God dies for the salvation of humanity. Christianity
teaches that the principle duty of man toward God is
to love his neighbor. Although there are religious du-
ties--rites addressed only to divinity--the place they
occupy and the importance attributed to them continually
diminish.... Thenceforth, our duties become independent,
in large measure, of the religious notions that guaran-
tee them but do not form their foundation. With Protes-
tantism, the autonomy of morality is still more accentua-
ted by the fact that ritual itself diminishes. The moral
functions of divinity becomes its sole raison d'etre.
It is the only argument brought forward to demonstrate
its existence. Spiritualistic philosophy continues the
work of Protestantism. But among the philosophers who
believe in the necessity of supernatural sanctions,
there are none who do not admit that morality could be
constructed quite independent of any theological concep-
tion. Thus, the bond that originally united and even
merged the two systems has become looser and looser. It
is therefore certain that when we broke that bond defin-
itively we were following in the mainstream of history.
If ever a revolution has been a long time the making,
this is it (ME:6, 7).

Finally, we see Durkheim, like Weber, attributing to
Protestant thought an important role in scientific education,
and, in general, revaluing the "this-worldly" aspect of reli-
gion and moral action.

It was in Protestant circles, and particularly in Ger-
many, that this new pedagogical conception emerged for
the first time; it is in the German countries, moreover,
that it has remained widespread.... The fact is that
there was in Protestantism a sense of the lay society
and its temporal interests which Catholicism did not,
and would not, possess (in Giddens, 1972a:214).

In sum, if, as Durkheim emphasized, our modern ethos
of individualism is ultimately derived from the belief sys-
tem and continuing phenomenological sanctions of Christian-
ity in general and Protestantism in particular, then how can
we accept his earlier contention that social morphological
evolution is the prime cause of the modern individualism
which underlays anomie and egoisme? Can we still accept the

implicit causal model underlying Durkheim's thesis that the growth of moral individualism is an "unceasing development in history"? How can these be more or less automatic reflections of the underlying social morphological differentiation? Contrary to the implications of Durkheim's early theses, and in line with his latter theses which we are exploring in this section, hereafter I shall hold it as established for our present purposes that Christian-Protestant culture represents an independent and perhaps crucial contribution to the modern ethos of individualism and the drives for "progress and perfection" which characterize modern culture.

E.   Durkheim's Cultural Account of the History of Education
        in France

Having repeatedly criticized Durkheim's methodology for
its abstracted general evolutionism, and having pointed out
the need for it to be supplemented by Weberian notions of
specific evolution and breakthroughs, it is significant for
our present purposes that Durkheim came closest to analyzing
Western society in these terms in a series of lectures; I
refer especially to Durkheim's lectures on Socialism and
Saint-Simon, and to his analysis of the development of West-
ern civilization in his lecture course, repeated annually
at the Ecole Normale Superieure from 1904 to 1913, which was
published in French under the title L'Evolution pedagogique
en France (for secondary accounts, see J. Floud, 1965; Wall-
work, 1972; Lukes, 1973). This specific historical account
of pedagogical institutions and "Western Pedagogical Ideals"
in terms of the changing "moral milieu" of Western culture
is important for our present purposes. For here Durkheim's
general evolutionary morphological model faded in terms of
causal significance in the face of the actual cultural com-
plexes directing the shape of Western education. Halbwachs
called this cultural history "a vast and bold fresco cover-
ing ten centuries of history ... a sort of continuous dis-
course on the progress of the human mind in France" (in Lukes,
1973:379, #2). Wallwork also observes:

> Durkheim writes on an extremely broad canvas. Starting
> with an analysis of Christian pedagogical ideals in
> the early Middle Ages, he traces these ideals through
> the High Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlight-
> enment to the modern period. In the process, Durkheim
> sketches not only the historical development of peda-
> gogical ideals, but also the historical evolution of
> the differing concepts of man and his environment with
> which these ideals have been inexorably linked since
> the emergence of Western culture from the chrysalis
> of the Christian Weltanschauung (1972:130).

Indeed, in L'Evolution pedagogique en France Durkheim
entertained multiple themes and variable ways of interpreting

the causes and courses of complex social and cultural change.
Wallwork again provides a useful summary:

> The Christian Weltanschauung that emerged during the
> early Middle Ages was an intellectual synthesis sui
> generis; the concepts of man and his environment en-
> shrined in this unique religious world-view have de-
> cisively molded all Western moral values, including
> the secular moral concepts of contemporary culture;
> the history of Western pedagogical ideals cannot be
> understood apart from this cultural framework and
> historical variations within it, for pedagogical ideals
> invariably derive from fundamental beliefs regarding
> the nature of man and his environment; and, as peda-
> gogical ideals emerge from altered beliefs about man
> and nature, educational institutions, and practices
> are created or altered in conformity with these ideo-
> logical innovations. In short, the history of pedago-
> gical ideals is inseparable from the history of com-
> prehensive religious or philosophical beliefs and val-
> ues (Wallwork, 1972:130-31).

Thus, beyond the often brilliant cascade of insights,
Durkheim's cultural historical account here is valuable be-
cause his encounter with the actual empirical details of the
development of his own civilization led Durkheim to a many-
sided mode of explanation. Clearly, in terms of the varied
details of Western evolution, at least from 1904 on Durk-
heim recognized, at least tacitly, that his earlier, more
dogmatic, quasi-mechanical and rather one-way model of ex-
planation would no longer suffice. Lukes summarizes the
shift in Durkheim's explanatory logics for us in these terms:

> Durkheim's method was "historical and sociological"
> in that it went beyond the analysis of successive ed-
> ucational institutions and practices, and the exposi-
> tion of educational doctrines: he continually sought
> to explain why particular ideas and ideals, practices,
> and institutions arose, survived during certain per-
> iods, disappeared and, in some cases, reappeared. His
> explanatory scheme was neither mono-causal nor one-
> sided; the explanations advanced were always complex
> and stresses different factors at different points.
> Sometimes the main factors were cultural, or "repre-
> sentational", at others geographical, or political,
> or economic (1973:381).

Here Durkheim came the closest to letting the actual histori-
cal constellations of events, conditions, and intentions de-
termine the ruling explanatory principles. Indeed, it is

highly significant for our present purposes that Lukes goes
so far as to suggest:

> If there is an explanatory bias, it is perhaps in the
> direction of the cultural, the factors he tended to
> find especially fruitful in the explanation of edu-
> cational developments were collective aspirations,
> values, beliefs, and ideals (1973:386).

F.   Durkheim's Move Toward Civilizational Analysis

It is significant for our present purposes that Durk-
heim moved increasingly toward the notion of civilizations
and inter-civilizational process as a necessary interpretive
strategy in the human sciences. Although from his first to
his last great book Durkheim was concerned with the broad
evolutionary passages from the simplest levels of sociocul-
tural process to modern complex levels, it was only toward
the end of his life that he felt compelled to spell out the
need for the analytical perspective of civilizations, which
appeared in L'annee sociologique in 1913; the article was co-
authored by Marcel Mauss.

We should first note that, in the preceding year in his
magnum opus, Durkheim had considerably widened out his basic
explanatory model to include only morphological but institu-
tional and even cultural variables as intimate parts of a
deeper causal structure.

> If ... the categories are ... essentially collective
> representations ... they should show the mental states
> of the group; they should depend on the way in which
> this is founded and organized, upon its morphology,
> upon its religious, moral and economic institutions,
> etc. (EF:28).

Further, we might note that Durkheim's macro-processual or
evolutionary sensitivity to society as not only an interact-
ional but also an intergenerational, and thus historical,
phenomena, led him to emphasize the progressive "sedimenta-
tion" or layering down and incorporation of collectively
symbolic representations into the complex evolving "tree of
social life." At various points in various works, Durkheim

referred to key constitutive collective representations
such as, for example, Christian individualism, the spirit
of the medieval scholastic university, Cartesian rational-
ism, the spirit of the French Revolution, and so forth,
which had become historically sedimented into Western civi-
lization. This notion of progressive sedimentation was al-
ready implied in the multilineal overtones of his root meta-
phor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life (see
Book One). In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim referred to
inter-generational or historical-cultural sedimentation of
cultural elements into a new, working civilizational complex
in these terms:

> Collective representations are the result of an im-
> mense cooperation, which stretches out not only into
> space but into time as well; to make them, a multi-
> tude of minds have associated, united, and combined
> their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations
> have accumulated their experience and their knowledge
> (EF:29).

And in L'Evolution pedagogique en France Durkheim spoke in
the following terms of the way in which the educational crea-
tivity of the Middle Ages, especially in the scholastic cul-
ture of the Universities, came to be incorporated and sedi-
mented into Western educational and cultural life:

> And although all of these specific institutions ori-
> ginally stemmed directly from conditions specific to
> medieval life, they became so firmly hardened at that
> time that they have continued up to our day. Certain-
> ly, we do not regard them in the same way as our for-
> bears: we have infused them with a different spirit
> .... (Although) our educational life has been trans-
> formed ... it continues to flow in the channels which
> were created by the Middle Ages (in Giddens, 1972a:210).

In short, just as Durkheim posited a horizontal continuum
ranging from more or less fluid to crystallized or institu-
tionalized collective representations, so too he came to pos-
it a vertical continuum of sociocultural process ranging from
the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive collective re-
presentations to the most differentiated, autonomous, and
universalizable constitutive cultural symbolic forms on the

civilizational and world-historical levels.

Having just completed detailed analyses of the key intra-societal origins and functions of collective representations in The Elementary Forms, and having there only briefly sketched the emergence of increasingly abstract, autonomous, rational, and universalizable symbolic forms, Durkheim turned his attention in the following year to a fuller elaboration of the inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal horizons involved in the passage toward modernity. With this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level of generic sociocultural process, the growing recognition of the importance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural forms marks a new and most important phase in Durkheim's continuing intellectual development.

For instance, Durkheim and Mauss began their important, yet little known, "Note on the Notion of Civilization" by observing that if their general causal theorem of linking symbols to specific social bodies was applied too narrowly, then the crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic symbols may be lost to view.

> There are ... phenomena which do not have such well-defined limits; they pass beyond the political frontiers and extend over less easily determinable spaces. Although their complexity renders their study difficult, it nonetheless behooves us to acknowledge their existence and to indicate their place within the bounds of sociology.... Social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a determinate social organization do exist: they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or they develop over periods of time that exceed the history of a single society. They have a life of their own which is in some ways supranational (1971:809-10).

In other words, the Durkheimian's previous insistence on linking every social process with a specific social body located in geographical space began to break down under the growing pressure of their evolutionary concerns. But this important recognition of potential limitations in the basic explanatory rule of their school represented not so much an abandonment of this rule as a crucial turning point, an inspir-

ed extension of their basic interpretive logics to new and highly significant levels of complexity. In essence, the problem was to find some more specific links between micro-societal, macro-societal, and evolutionary processes. Now, Durkheim had previously prepared the way for this important extension by his earlier insistence that increasingly abstract, universalizable, and rationalizable collective symbols take on greater significance in sociocultural evolution precisely because they come to symbolize the new international life which progressively emerges. In short, universalizable symbols constitute the foundation of the extended or civilizational social bond.

Using the world-wide spread of Indo-European languages as a prime illustration of these processes, Durkheim and Mauss assigned the designation "civilizational" to these crucial higher order trans-local and trans-temporal "social facts." They defined it in this way: "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole" (1971:811). However, I believe the inclusion of national cultures as the component elements making up the "moral milieu" of a civilization to have been a mistake. First, it is by no means certain that modern political and national boundaries reproduce societal and cultural differences and unities. Thus, identifying civilizational "moral milieu" with those of modern nation states does little to address these problems since the latter is merely a convenient unit drawn for interests often unrelated to our present concerns. Moreover, the gap between so-called "national culture" and civilizations neglects the crucial fact, which first compelled Durkheim and Mauss to seek a higher level interpretive perspective in which to anchor long-term, complex sociocultural processes, and which they had just themselves emphasized as absolutely crucial to their own emerging civilizational perspective--namely, the inter-societal, inter-national, inter-temporal, inter-cultural exchange, sedimentation, and pro-

gressive universalization of cultural symbolic forms. If, indeed, civilizations result from these supra-national, supra-societal symbolic interactions, then how can modern nation states remain our basic analytical unit? Once again, these are merely political units, while we are primarily interested in sustained cross-cultural interactions. Even Mauss and Durkheim themselves recognized this fact when they remarked upon the differential susceptibility of various structural and cultural elements to incorporation and sedimentation into sociocultural process on the civilizational level (1971: 812). They rightly noted that political institutions are " ... part of the specific character of each people," and, as such, do not lend themselves as easily to diffusion as do cultural symbolic forms. Indeed, it is precisely the power of of certain cultural forms such as, for example, the Arabic-Hindu decimal system, or modern Western science and technology, to rise above political confines and tribal boundaries which is significant for us. These prime symbolic forms come to collectively represent this transcendence and dialetical emergence of new universal "symbolic frontiers." The extended social bond of complex civilizations--of "organic solidarity" in Durkheim's earlier terms--is possible only if this universalizability and symbolic transcendence is also possible.

Therefore, I suggest that we set aside national-political boundaries as our key analytical unit, and seek instead to fashion a hermeneutical strategy more appropriate to describing these massive and sustained supra-personal, supra-tribal, supra-national, inter-generational symbolic interactions. It is these interactions themselves which must be considered the basic units of civilizations. A key mediating variable intervening between living societies and those complex symbolic matrices called civilizations are cultural-historical traditions. If Durkheim's theory of civilizational process is not to merely "float in the air," as is so often mistakenly charged against his notion of "social facts," it

must be complemented by the notion of cultural traditions.

In sum, we should strive to anchor our ana-
lyses not in terms of <u>things</u> or material <u>social</u> <u>bodies</u> but
rather in terms of sociocultural <u>processes</u>. Or is our current
philosophy of science still too dominated by latent material-
ist and mechanist premises?

With the notion of cultural traditions as the key con-
stitutive elements of civilizations, we can then more fully
utilize Durkheim's notion (after Ratzel) of widening "symbol-
ic frontiers," and the degree of sedimentation and universal-
izability of symbolic forms across these ever-widening fron-
tiers. Those cultural forms that rise to the civilizational
level, then, are carried by dynamic cultural traditions, by
active "dialogues across the centuries" as Nelson (1965a)
poetically suggests. Those cultural traditions competing for
civilizational ascendancy, as Nelson (1973a) reminds us, do
so by successfully extending their spatial and temporal gen-
erality (eg. see EF:482), while simultaneously attempting to
universalize the scope and significance of their prime sym-
bolic forms. The extension of the social bond in ever-widen-
ing degrees of universalism requires cultural traditions act-
ively elaborating and rationalizing universalizable symbolic
forms. This differential ability of cultural traditions to
extend and universalize their prime collective representa-
tions, and to incorporate and sediment these symbolic forms
into civilizational processes, represents an analytical key
to understanding the differential rates of acceleration in
sociocultural evolution. In the succeeding chapter, I shall
utilize this notion of cultural traditions to illuminate
some of the differences between Durkheim and Weber's work.
In Chapter Ten we shall further explore this crucial interpre-
tive perspective of cultural traditions to illuminate some
possible ways in which anomie and egoisme are influenced by
dominant cultural traditions in the modern world.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN DURKHEIM AND WEBER

<u>Preface</u>. Throughout this dissertation I have repeatedly
compared and contrasted Durkheim and Weber's explanatory
logics, especially concerning extreme cultural sanctions
in the modern world as they might influence suicides. As
a prelude to the second schema which integrates Durkheim's
insights into modern suicide and Weber's insights into the
secularization of religious sanctions, I wish first to more
systematically explore some basic complementarities and con-
vergences between Durkheim and Weber's causal models and
historical cultural analyses.

Two recurrent interpretive problems stand in our way.
First, it is important to distinguish between a summary of a
pioneer's thought in some area and an in-depth interpretive
exegesis of a thinker's fundamental premises as these inform-
ed all his work. The difference here is between "topographic"
inquiry and "stratigraphic" exegesis of the paradigmatic or
"nuclear structure" of a great thinker's life-work. Far too
often we perform a summary exegesis (eg. Marks, 1974), but
neglect to systematically understand the deep or "nuclear
structure" of Durkheim or Weber's work. Second, a related
problem is the common failure to adequately distinguish be-
tween a thinker's methodological prescriptions and his act-
ual evolving "logics in use." It is a common observation
that one is better advised to follow what a great thinker
did rather than what he may have said or set out in terms
of "prescriptive logics." Unfortunately, this is as true of
Durkheim as of Weber, for neither the former (despite <u>The
Rules</u>) nor the latter (despite the preface to <u>Economy</u> <u>and
Society</u> and Parsons' best efforts in <u>The</u> <u>Theory</u> <u>of</u> <u>Economic</u>

and <u>Social Organization</u>) developed systematically and explicitly methodological statements which adequately described their own complex theoretical and historical investigations. Neither fully described their own rapidly evolving interpretive "logics-in-use." Simply opposing prescriptions from <u>The Rules</u> or <u>Economy and Society</u> as Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg (1975c) do, will not suffice. The real question is: how, in actual fact, did Durkheim and Weber carry out their respective programs? Many surprises abound here.

Now, surely one of Parsons' greatest contributions to sociological theory has been his steadfast attempt to unify our heritage by demonstrating significant methodological and theoretical convergences in the paradigms of our founding fathers. I believe this represents a legitimate attempt to "consolidate" sociological theory, an effort which Robert K. Merton has advocated for years. The unwary reader of Pope and friends' (1973,1975a,b,c) often successful three-pronged attack on Parsons' charter for American sociology may be led to conclude that, since the foremost attempt at synthesizing Durkheim's and Weber's work seems to have broken down, these two pioneers cannot be said to have converged on any significant substantive matters. Whether or not, however, their general complementarity and specific convergence are to be illuminated under Parsons' aegis can now be separated from the still more important question: can we unify our heritage, and generate more powerful paradigms, or must we stand forever "two souls in one body twain?"

Although much of the evidence forces me to agree with Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg that: (a) Parsons' account of Durkheim (see also the appendix to this dissertation) is often rent by serious errors, and (b) that Parsons' account of Weber is often highly selective, nevertheless, I must part company with these critics' unfortunate conclusion that " ... the vast difference in basic perspective separating Durkheim from Weber belies the thesis that they converged upon any single explanation of social behavior" (1975c:426). Why is it

that we suspect that this was Pope et al's premise as well
as their conclusion? Is the attack here not so much on the
Durkheim-Weber convergence thesis as upon Parsons' preemi-
nence itself? Indeed, why we must we continue to forego whole-
ness, a more unified socio-logic, as Bendix (1971) counsels
us? Setting aside the possibility of "absorption" of Weber
into the supposed Durkheim-Parsons axis, does the position
assumed by Bendix, Roth, and Pope and his collaborators ne-
cessarily mean that a forever divisive kind of "cognitive
dissonance" is built into the growth of scientific knowled-
ge? That we are as much chained to a neurotic cycle of col-
lective monologue and mutual impenetrability as to the
"wheel of progress" of which Bendix (1971) speaks? Given com-
munally shared paradigms and discipline, which alone bestow
conceptual unity on empirical diversity, how is it possible
to carry out our chosen life-tasks in any coherent way if
our inherited models, our prime symbolic guidance systems
irretrievably conflict? I propose that it is unacceptable
 for the rightful demands of autonomy and the necessary dis-
trust of received authority to bar access to the unification
of our heritage, and thus, to subsidize dualistic philoso-
phies.

   Now, one way of viewing the present dissertation is as
an attempt to rewrite The Structure of Social Action--that is,
by returning to a systematic, in-depth exegesis of the same
paradigmatic sources, to reorient some of our crucial sub-
stantive questions and methodological presumptions. By re-
turning to a detailed exegesis of Durkheim's work, I hope
to simultaneously build upon and recast Parsons' charter for
contemporary sociological theory. Once again, the questions
of the relations, past and potential, between these two giants
of classical sociology--Durkheim and Weber--becomes central
to our quest. Specifically, I suggest that their mature cau-
sal models be treated as complementary. Further, Durkheim's
linkage of suicides with modern sanctions for individualism
and drives for infinite "progress and perfection" and with

Protestantism, is as significant for our present purposes as was Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the most dynamic characteristics of the modern world. Finally, in their later work, both sadly interrupted, Durkheim and Weber tended to substantively converge in their concern with universalizing, rationalizing, and autonomizing processes on the world-historical level. Let us now briefly explore some convergences between Durkheim and Weber.

A. Tiryakian's Mystery Problem: The Mutual Unawareness of Durkheim and Weber

Why did Emile Durkheim and Max Weber ignore each other? This is the intriguing question posed by Edward Tiryakian in his "A Problem for the Sociology of Knowledge: The Mutual Unawareness of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber" (1966). It is strange that Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope should have ignored this important "mystery problem" (which Bendix, 1971:283 did not fail to cite) which would have appeared to greatly strengthen their case against Parsons' thesis of convergence. Himself one of Parsons' students, perhaps Tiryakian was led by what had become Parsonian orthodoxy on the question of convergence to wonder out loud: if it is so clearly established that Weber's and Durkheim's work converged in such an epochal synthesis, then how was it possible that these twin pioneers of sociological theory remained so unconcerned with each others work? Not only is this a puzzle in light of Parsons' famous claims, but it also raises a generic problem in the paradigmatic history of any intellectual discipline, or, indeed, any major cultural form based upon multiple and shifting installments of "charisma on deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974).

First, we should note some uncertainty in the literature concerning Tiryakian's claim that Durkheim and Weber totally ignored each other in print. In response to Tiryakian's "mystery problem," Lukes (1973:397) contended that Durkheim did refer to Weber in a three page report on "Le premier congres allemand de sociologie" in the 1913 edition of L'annee

sociologique. But, in an exchange with Tiryakian (1974),
Lukes acknowledged that the note in question was unsigned.
And Lukes (1973:397) tells us that Georges Davy told him
that Durkheim "... connaissait tres mal les oeuvres de Weber."
Conversely, while Weber never acknowledged Durkheim's work
in print, Raymond Aron, noting the similarities between parts
of Weber's and Durkheim's sociology of religion, recalled the
following anecdote from Marcel Mauss: "When I went to see Max
Weber (in Heidelberg), I found a complete set of L'Annee so-
ciologique in his study" (1967:271). And Tiryakian himself
reports that Mauss had claimed (to Aron) that "Weber had bor-
rowed many ideas from Durkheim and his students" (1966:332, #7).
Even granting Mauss's partisanship, surely this is an astound-
ing claim for the intellectual heir of Durkheim to make! If,
as Bendix, Pope and friends seem to assert, there is no real
basis for either methodological convergence between Durkheim
and Weber, then what would have prompted the leader of the
Durkheim school to claim that Weber had "borrowed" his socio-
logy of religion from the Durkheimians? If no meaningful com-
parisons are possible, then why should Mauss, who knew the
literature on primitive religions as well as Durkheim and
better than Weber, forward such a surprising claim? The plot
thickens. Tiryakian cites a few other tantalizing indirect
connections, such as Durkheim's review of a book by Weber's
wife, but these serve only to intensify the mystery: why
did Durkheim and Weber, who certainly knew of each others
existence, so persistently slight each others work? Tirya-
kian's question is still significant, and the challenge re-
mains.

B. Conflicts Over Comparisons and Contrasts Between Durkheim
        and Weber

Comparing and contrasting the work of Max Weber and
Emile Durkheim has become one of the favorite pastimes in
the history of sociological theory. The list, by no means
exclusive, includes Parsons (1949) of course, who has been

joined by Raymond Aron (1967), S. Fenton (1968), Giddens (1971a), Bendix (1971), LaCapra (1972), Wallwork (1972), Nelson (1972a, 1973a), Whitney Pope (1973, 1975a), and so on. From the critical side, Bendix and Pope especially have attempted to refute Parsons' account and his claim for convergence. Let us first begin, however, with Tiryakian's summary of some of the common denominators between Durkheim and Weber.

There are some striking biographical parallels to be noted. For Durkheim and Weber were contemporaries in adjacent countries, both edited major social science journals in their respective nations, both were professors at major universities, and "both achieved a national reputation in intellectual circles." And "... each in his own way (was) a victim of World War I" (Tiryakian, 1966:330). There are, of course, also some important biographical differences. Obviously, one was French, the other German--two groups at war twice within their own lifetimes. Durkheim was a laicized Alsatian Jew of rabbinical parentage, while Weber was an anguished "religiously unmusical" virtuouso caught between his Lutheran and Calvinistic heritages (Mitzman, 1971; Marianne Weber, 1975). "Durkheim worked his way through an outwardly uneventful academic career in France, finishing with the attainment of the ambition of all French academic people, a professorship at the University of Paris" (Parsons, 1949:301), while Weber's life was often politically engaged and fraught with emotional torment and psychic crisis so disabling that for years he was forced to live the life of a private scholar. Durkheim built a school around himself in the Annee sociologique (see especially Terry Clark, 1973), while Weber worked alone, founded no school, fell out of intellectual favor in his own country after his death, and had to be imported later from America, largely through Parsons re-interpretation. In short, using terms borrowed from the sociology of religion, which seems appropriate in characterizing these pioneers, Durkheim may be seen as a secular "priest," while Weber acted as a lone

virtuoso, a "prophetic" figure committed to a "metaphysic of human heroism" (Mitzman, 1971).

Now, in regard to comparing and contrasting the work of Durkheim and Weber, it is striking to note that two giants of contemporary sociology have chosen to oppose each other on precisely the question of the degree of significant convergence between our classical founding fathers--I refer to Parsons on one side and Bendix on the other. Bendix (1971a) and Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg (1975c) have been the most insistently critical of Parsons' claim for convergence. Whereas Parsons claimed methodological convergence, Bendix and Pope draw the contrast between Durkheim and Weber very sharply indeed. So sharply, in fact, that Parsons was moved to rebuke Bendix's (1971a) characterization as "a caricature of Durkheim" (Parsons, 1972b:200; see also 1973:177). I am inclined to agree with Parsons on this score. For Bendix presumes that the key difference between these pioneers is their attiutde toward functional analysis; yet Bendix failed to cite Albert Pierce's (1960) attempt to dissolve the retroactive claims of the functionalists on Durkheim. Bendix generally fails to illumine the differences between these pioneers because he tacitly uses Durkheim as a rhetorical foil to attack Parsons' hegemony. Indeed, Bendix's thinly-veiled polemic simply makes Durkheim the tool of his invidious comparison of the supposed Weber-Bendix versus Durkheim-Parsons alignment. Ironically, one of the reasons Bendix's brief review fails to illumine is that his attack on Parsonian functionalism (using Durkheim as a symbolic third term) unwittingly presumes Parsons' own very special interpretation of Durkheim in the first place! Had Bendix's real purpose been to illumine the past and potential relations between the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, he might have begun by questioning Parsons' orthodox account, instead of tacitly embracing it, and merely inverting the valuation as so many of Parsons' rhetorical opponents are wont to do (eg. see John Horton, 1964). Had Bendix undertaken an independent, full-scale, in-depth com-

parison and contrast, <u>he</u> <u>could</u> <u>not</u> <u>have</u> <u>failed</u> <u>to</u> <u>note</u> <u>the</u>
<u>very</u> <u>real</u> <u>convergence</u> <u>between</u> <u>Durkheim</u> <u>and</u> <u>Weber</u> <u>on</u> <u>Bendix's</u>
<u>own</u> <u>ground</u>--<u>namely</u>, <u>historical</u> <u>sociology</u>! Had they posed the
question in these open terms, rather than accepting Parsons'
account, Bendix and Pope and friends might have spared us
their unfortunate conclusion that sociological theory must
remain forever sundered between these two giants and their
contemporary epigoni (eg. see Bendix, 1971ᵃ:298; Pope et al,
1975c:426).

Undoubtedly, the fundamental source of the very real
and numerous differences between Durkheim and Weber, which
cannot be attributed primarily to "temperament and circum-
stance" as Bendix suggests, must be sought in some notion of
two different traditions. Although I differ from both of their
conceptions of precisely how to characterize these differing
traditions, both Bendix and Parsons agree that Durkheim and
Weber came from two different traditions. But exactly to
what types of traditions should we attribute "une opposition
sourde" of Durkheim and Weber, their mutual unawareness? To
national-political traditions? But we have already critici-
zed this common and questionable practice in the preceding
chapter. To intellectual traditions? This is what Bendix
and Parsons seem to propose, albeit in different ways. A se-
cond important question is: even granting these crucial dif-
ferences of experience, orientation, and purpose, do such
loyalties to variant traditions necessarily preclude signi-
ficant methodological and substantive complementarity and
convergence crucial to the re-unification of sociocultural
theory?

Perhaps we would do well, first, to recall Tiryakian's
delicate rephrasing of our present problem. "One way we could
interpret their mutual unawareness as judged from their wri-
tings is that this may have been not so much a case of mutual
<u>ignorance</u> as a case of <u>ignoring</u> each other" (1966:334-5).
It does not really suffice here to suggest that   Weber
was not really considered a sociologist at the time that

Durkheim was so regarded, for Durkheim was extremely wide
read, and his L'Annee sociologique contained reviews of
many different types of literature in the human sciences.
No, the problem is best posed sociologically--it is not a
question of the lack of knowledge, but rather a tacit silen-
ce in which both parties apparently conspired. Now, while
plausible, neither Tiryakian's nor Bendix's conjectures a-
bout background factors of "temperament and circumstances"
mitigating against direct acknowledgement are sufficient.
Our solution to Tiryakian's mystery problem, and our resolu-
tion of the Parsons-Bendix debate, should be based upon deep-
er reasons, upon sociological reasons. Even though neither
Durkheim nor Weber shied away from controversy, neither even
attempted to engage the other in open critical review or de-
bate. For instance, as Lukes observes, Durkheim "... offer-
ed abundant argumentative refutations of general sociological
approaches and methods that differed from his own--such as
those of Marx, J. S. Mill, Espinas, Tarde, Simmel, Giddings,
Albion Small, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Alfred Vierkandt, Gaston
Richard, and very many others--in fact, those of all his con-
temporaries" (1973:404-5) --with the single exception of the
greatest of them all, Max Weber. For his own part, Weber's
combativeness is well-known. However illuminating such a
clash might have been, we are left only with the fact that
such a confrontation never took place. Whether it never oc-
curred because nothing was felt to be at stake, or whether
too much, remains pure speculation. Thus, as Tiryakian him-
self acknowledges, Durkheim and Weber's non-relationship
should be assigned a different meaning from the revealing
antagonisms between, say, Leibnitz and Newton.

Still, the question remains: to what types of tradi-
tions should we attribute Durkheim and Weber's "une opposi-
tion sourde?" Tiryakian first speculates that "nationalism"
and a kind of "Olympian aloofness" may have been at the heart
of their apparent duet of silence. Raising again the question
of the sociological salience of silence, Tiryakian asks, if

we encounter unexpected massive and sustained silence, is this not due:

> ... to the fact that mental products are so related to their sociocultural setting that even the towering figures of the same social science may operate from sufficiently different presuppositions concerning social reality, and concerning what is socially relevant, that they will know of each other without knowing each other (1966:336)?

Yes, of course, generally that is the question here. But precisely what mental products are related to what elements in the sociocultural setting, and to what types of presuppositions, so that silence shades over into ignorance? Let us briefly explore Parsons and Bendix's opposing answers.

Parsons, of course, portrayed Durkheim and Weber as moving inexorably toward Parsons' own general systems synthesis, as each pioneer overcame the limitations in their respective traditions--positivism and idealism (see also H.S. Hughes, 1958). While much truth remains in this claim, unfortunately Parsons, like Robert Merton (see B. Nelson, 1972b), seldom returned to develop some of the profound themes of his youth. Had he returned to a full-scale revision, Parsons would have had to acknowledge that the dialectical tensions in Durkheim's thought came from his being rhetorically involved on multiple polemical fronts simultaneously against three major opposing cultural traditions (see also Giddens, 1972a; Lukes, 1973). And almost no one has yet adequately clarified the opposition between Durkheim's own tradition--the Franco-Latin Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition--and the preceding Catholic Hierocratic-Metaphysical Cultural Tradition. One does not adequately describe this tradition simply by calling it "Cartesian" as Parsons does (see also 1968a).Consequently, Parsons would have had to reconstruct the very crux of his story--namely, the misportrayal of positivism as synonymous with modern science. (This identification seriously misled Pope, 1973, who only compounded Parsons' error when the former denied that Durkheim was a positivist).

Bendix, in opposition to Parsons, and what they have both taken to be Durkheim's doctrine, argued that Durkheim and Weber belonged to two different intellectual traditions --the Baconian or Saint-Simonian, on the one hand, and the Burckhardtian or Tocquevillian, respectively. But it is unclear from Bendix's association whether these earlier thinkers directly and fundamentally influenced our twin sociological pioneers, or merely whether they can be usefully classified, for certain purposes, as independently following in the same general stream of thought. Since the latter appears to be the case, I do not find the classification very revealing.

C.   Dialogues Across the Centuries: Durkheim and Weber's Cultural Traditions

In contrast to both Parsons and Bendix, I propose that we both explain sociologically the differences between Durkheim and Weber, and then use sociologically this analytical tool to illumine their prime points of convergence and their lasting significance. I suggest that structures of consciousness as deeply rooted and felt as those of Durkheim and Weber's are generally intimately related to structures of conscience. Therefore, I propose that we first seek out the fundamental roots of these twin structures of conscience and consciousness in religio-cultural, rather than purely intellectual, traditions. Specifically, I propose that we connect Weber and Durkheim to partially opposing cultural traditions.

I shall view cultural historical traditions as a basic explanatory unit, comparable to classes or socio-economic status. As such, macro cultural traditions cross-cut national boundaries, time periods, and cultural spheres, on the one hand, and act as key links between societies and civilizations on the other. As one observer suggested about the relations between Marx and Weber: "... they need to be understood in the light of the universes of meaning from which they drew their sustenance and to the progress of which they

hoped to make lasting contributions" (B. Nelson, 1965:150).
These deep loyalties to culturally assigned life-tasks are
perhaps best understood as "dialogues across the centuries,"
as Nelson suggests.

Now, Durkheim embraced his life-task within the con-
text of the Franco-Latin Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradi-
tion. Perhaps Durkheim is best characterized, therefore, as
a positivist moral philosopher who worked sociologically, as
a "laic" intellectual reformer who sought to construct socio-
logically a new base for secular morality, an "unrepentant
rationalist" who dreamed of dialectically resolving the evo-
lutionary dilemmas (see Giddens, 1971a, 1972a) of modern man
in a transitional era, and so on and so forth. The origins,
sanctions, and continued moral and intellectual sustenance
of the former's structure of conscience and consciousness
can be found in the continuing and mounting "laic" reaction
to the lingering medieval hierocratic control of European
life by the Catholic Cultural Tradition. Its preparatory
phase dates from Abelard on (eg. see B. Nelson, 1973a,b),
and the successful scholastic sedimentation of rationality
and a kind of autonomy of the individual intellect and con-
science into European and especially French life. This was
followed much later by a late medieval and Renaissance inter-
lude (eg. with the varied efforts of Rabelais, Montaigne,
Bodin, etc.) The second and early modern stage begins, of
course, with Descartes, as the founder of the modern ration-
alist stream, and with Pascal (a Jansenist--a kind of Calvin-
istic Catholicism), as the model of the ascetic and mystic
strains of "laic morality" and existentialism in French cul-
ture. The enigmatic Pierre Bayle stands as a paradoxical, but
in many ways paradigmatic, transitional figure from the ear-
lier religious stress on conscience to the emerging emphasis
on the independent critical, rational intellect. This inter-
lude was succeeded by the first fully modern phase--that bril-
liant, massive, and sustained series of Enlightenment genera-
tions of French "laic" intellectualistic moral reformers--I

refer to men such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau (a sem-
inal figure because he was a direct link between the progres-
sive Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction), Diderot, Tur-
got, Condorcet, and so on, a list far too long for this page.
Then came another crucial phase, with the turn away from the
critical or negative thrust of the Enlightenment and the ex-
cesses of the French Revolution, with the emergence of "posi-
tivism" with Saint-Simon as the prescient prophet of social
and moral reconstruction. The pioneer of positivism was fol-
lowed, of course, by his more systematic disciple Comte, who
combined in characteristic fashion (to the puzzlement of many
purely intellectual historians) both the scientific and moral
reformist strains so pervasive in French culture. This great
second phase was accompanied by the brilliant incisiveness of
the nostalgic realist Tocqueville, the right-wing, fully nos-
talgic, but even themselves curiously empirical Catholic react-
ionaries such as de Bonald and de Maistre, and the left-wing
realists and positivists, among whom were Balzac, Renan, Taine,
Tarde, and so on.

In sum, Durkheim, coming with the following generation,
can be considered as a brilliant and almost ideal-typical re-
presentation of these uniquely contending "collective repre-
sentations" in French culture--the rationalist, individual-
ist, and intellectualist streams on the one hand, and the
"laic" moral reformist stream on the other. This deeply em-
bedded strategem of the non-religious laity arguing critical-
ly and anti-metaphysically for the moral reform of both the
hierocracy and the nation's morals is a phenomenon peculiar
to what I have come to call the Franco Positivist (anti-meta-
physical, yet rational) "Laic" (secular moral reformist) Cul-
tural Tradition. It is curious that few have noticed that
positivism is a "dis-ease" most often emerging in Catholic
culture areas. It is even more curious that positivism, de-
fined basically as a world-view rooted in a split between
faith and reason or between reason and experience, was first
first constructed by the hierocracy itself (nominalism,

"fictionalism," "probabilism,"   --see Kolakowski, 1968) in
an attempt to secure the "deposit of faith" by walling it
off from doubt and wayward attack. As so often happens, how-
ever, ideas get away from their pioneers. For centuries, the
French moral and intellectual reformers were engaged in an
epic struggle with the hierocracy over the legitimate founda-
tions of moral authority and intellectual decision. Positive
science served as a tool in their struggle to disengage from
traditional claims on man, and as the tool by which they
sought to construct a "laic" morality. Transcendental truth
claims had to be rejected out of hand, for such "essential-
ist" appeals blocked the reformers' "laic" drive to construct
"existentially" rooted structures of conscience and conscious-
ness. Against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," to
use Weber's term, the French and Latin "prophets" and "laic"
moral reformers, whether from left or right, raised the coun-
ter-claims of "Individual Conscience" and "Reason," both
based upon the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" em-
bedded deep within each individual, and upon the "Book of
Nature." The dual insistence on science and moral reform was
not an anomaly in Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim, for it
was precisely this insistent linkage which lay at the heart
of this particular cultural tradition. Indeed, how else are
we to understand Durkheim's drive to construct a "science of
the moral life," his key role in "laic" educational training
in the Third Republic, and his assiduous pursuit of sociolo-
gy as the modern form of societal self-consciousness destined
to replace religion itself?

Weber, on the other hand, emerged out of a "dialogue
across the centuries" within the last major modern tradition
to crystallize--namely, the Romantic-Idealist ("mystic") Cul-
tural Tradition. Perhaps Weber is best characterized as a
tragic existential world-historical anatomist of the dilem-
mas of the opposing forces of charisma and rationalization,
as an intellectualistic, "religiously unmusical," virtuoso,
caught between Romantic-Lutheran and Calvinist religio-cul-

tural streams, a "Sisyphean hero of an age of ultimate
trials" (Nelson, 1965a:163), a moral realist committed to
"meeting the demands of the day" with a "metaphysic of hu-
man heroism" (Mitzman, 1971) and so on and so forth. Weber's
subjectivity, his sense of "utmost inwardness," combined
with his rigorous ascetic rational intellectualism, his op-
position to the fragmentation of man and the lack of inte-
gral wholeness in the modern world stemming from the latent
hoped for Faustian universality, his Pauline-Lutheran-Roman-
tic opposition between Geist and Welt, between Spirit and
Mechanism, Life and Death, his virtuoso encyclopedic per-
sonal knowledge, and his ransacking of the universe of hu-
man history for illumination on dilemmas posed by these gen-
eric polarities these and other traits mark Max Weber, with
a character indelibilis, as an ambivalent member of what I
have come to call the Romantic-Idealist Cultural Tradition.
As Benjamin Nelson has suggested: "However they may oppose
one another, both Weber and Marx are the heirs, executors,
and gravediggers of the German Idealist Tradition" (1965a:
153). Further, Nelson notes: "Weber's Pauline accents pre-
sent the sharpest contrast to Marx's Johannine vision" (1965a:
163). And again, "... Weber reminds one of Luther's reluct-
ant heirs .... He is a faithful helmsman remaining at his
post though the landmarks are gone. His ultimate antagonists
are the confident paragons of the everyday world" (Nelson,
1965a:163). In short, the very structure of Weber's work is
ironic and cautionary in a prophetic mode, while that of
Durkheim's work is dialectical in a priestly and positivist
mode.

Just as the prime rhetorical opponent of Durkheim's
tradition was the preceding Catholic tradition, so too the
clearest opponent of Weber's cultural tradition was (is) what
I have come to call the Anglo Utilitarian-Empiricist ("ascet-
ic") Cultural Tradition. Thus, Durkheim's notion of the in-
timate intertwining of structures of conscience and conscious-
ness and their sociocultural bases, and Weber's opposition

between "priests" and "prophets" together with the "laity"
on the one hand, and between "mystics" and "ascetics" on the
other, serve as my prime analytical anchors by which to clas-
sify modern cultural traditions.

Now, clearly the prehistory of this tradition goes back
at least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before that to
the late medieval mystics, to thinkers such as Cardinal Nicho-
las of Cusa, to the tertiary urban sects, especially the bro-
therhoods and sisterhoods scattered along the Rhine and the
Low Countries. This religio-cultural stream accompanied the
proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian structures of con-
science in the Lutheran Reformation, especially in terms of
its central experience of the angst and deep inner anguish
of the "faith-crisis." This aspect of the Reformation was ac-
companied by a half-invisible, but critically important
stream--the intellectualistic and pietistic mysticism of
"utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of Sebastian
Franck, Schwekenfeld, Valentin Weigel, and especially that
ideal-typical representative of the "personal charisma" of
an "inner-worldly mystic"--I mean Jacob Boehme. This religio-
cultural stream was continued and redirected later by the
full-blown Pietism of Spener, Frank, Count Zinzendorf, etc.
and a host of similar "world-retreating" Protestant sects.
Now, this cultural tradition enjoyed its early prime philo-
sophical expression in the classically influenced Leibnitz,
the outstanding polymath of his day. Leibnitz delivered the
first fundamental critique of the Anglo atomistic and mech-
anistic tradition as embodied in Newton's world-vision; but,
Newton's philosophy won the day, Leibnitz died almost unno-
ticed, only to gain final victory three centuries later when
German thinkers revolutionized modern physical theory and
restricted Newtonian physics. This religio-cultural tradi-
tion reached its first classical phase with the Enlighten-
ment generation of Pietists such as Kant, Hamann, and the
great Herder. It then exploded in its definitive form of
conscience and consciousness with the succeeding generations

of Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schliermacher, Schelling, the von
Humboldts, and so forth. Indeed, it is striking that this
massive intellectual and artistic outpouring, in many ways
even greater than that of the key generations of the French
Enlightenment, was so delayed. Yet, when it finally came,
the German reaction to the progressive and disruptive tend-
encies of the French and Scotch-English cultures was so mas-
sive and so rapid, that the Romantic reaction followed the
German Enlightenment (i.e. Lessing, Kant, Herder, etc.) so
closely as to be almost simultaneous with it rather than se-
quential. The generation of Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and
so on, was followed by that of Dilthey, F. Brentano, Wundt,
Hartmann, Nietzsche, Windelband, and so forth. Next came the
generation of Toennies, Husserl, Weber, Simmel, Troeltsch,
etc., which was followed by Cassirer, Spengler, Scheler, and
later Mannheim. In sum, emerging first in Germany in the lat-
ter half of the eighteenth century, and then spreading across
Europe and America, the Romantic cultural tradition crystal-
lized out of the progressive secularization of the continuing
mysticism of the "spiritual radicals" and their descendants,
the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith crisis," assorted
oriental and gnostic theosophies, Leibnitzian rationalism,
and the later pietistic cult of inwardness and anguished sub-
jectivity as these ethical and experiential orientations
were secularized or translated into art, poetry, music, phil-
osophy, and social thought. The Romantic reaction against
the "progressive" trends of the modern world continues to
inform countercultural movements to this very day.

Seen in this way, Durkheim embraced a very different
cultural and historical task than did Weber. This is why,
as Carl Becker observed in his classic The Heavenly City of
the Eighteenth Century Philosophers:

> ... it is true of ideas, as of men, that they cannot
> fight unless they occupy the same ground: ideas that
> rush toward each other on different levels of appre-
> hension will pass without conflict or mutual injury
> because they never establish contact, never collide
> (1932:122-23).

With this brief review (see Part II of this Book also),
I believe that we can more adequately address and resolve a
legitimate and most intriguing question in the history of
sociology: namely, why did the two most significant pioneers
of modern sociological theory not make contact, much less
collide? Now, is this lack of paradigmatic contact among our
pioneers one reason why today we still lack a unified doc-
trine? That our discipline is still split between seemingly
closed contending factions? Peace treaties, such as Bendix
counsels, which hermetically seal off one aspect of reality
will not suffice. For if the goal of science is integrated
truth and in-depth, universal significance, then how has it
been possible for both contemporary and classical sociologists
to sustain such massive "ignorance"? Ultimately, the mystery
lies, of course, in man himself. Such questions are fundamen-
tal and the problem is eternal. It is the sociocultural coun-
terpart to the perennial problem of "theodicy" in religion.
If God is good, then why does He allow evil to pervade our
lives--why do the good die young, why is life a veil of
tears, how are we to distinguish good from evil when they
are so often bound up together? Here we ask: if the explana-
tory principles of our human science are universal, and gen-
eric human and historical experience comparable, they why
cannot we agree on its meaning? In both cases, we must ex-
plain why unity and harmony has not been attained; what are
the obstacles blocking our path? How was it possible for
highly sophisticated sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber,
who roamed the world of history and philosophy, to entertain
evidential canons so incommensurablethat they permitted them-
selves to ignore each others work? How could their "relevan-
cy of knowledge" structures, their "root metaphors" and "dic-
tionaries," their procedural and applicability canons be so
different? In short, how could their paradigms differ so rad-
ically?

No such easy answers, which conceal more than they re-
veal, such as "temperament and circumstance," will suffice.

For such differences are not superficial or idiosyncratic;
rather, they are fundamental. Only loyalties and orienta-
tions concerning the most basic meanings of existence can
have this wide, deep, and sustained effect. Only "collect-
ive representations" which constitute the very foundations
of conscience and consciousness can be this important. Only
their deep and abiding loyalties to their own religio-cul-
tural traditions begins to explain why our founding fathers
spoke so directly and meaningfully to us, but managed to
ignore each other.

　　　　Therefore, my first answer to Tiryakian's "mystery
problem"--what explains the "mutual unawareness" of Durkheim
and Weber--is that they worked out of fundamentally different
(though related) cultural historical traditions. They embra-
ced very different life-tasks; thus, their basic perceptions,
analytical oppositions, problems, case-studies, intentions,
and so on stood apart. Indeed, perhaps their clear and strong
commitments to their culturally inherited prime tasks helps
explain why both Durkheim and Weber continue to appeal so
strongly to us today. For these thinkers provided us with a
series of classical statements conveying many of the crucial
insights generated by their respective religio-cultural tra-
ditions into the dilemmas of social existence and the signi-
ficance of the curious turnings taken by sociocultural evo-
lution. In other words, both Durkheim and Weber can be taken
as almost ideal-typical representatives of the best their
respective cultural traditions have to offer the sciences of
man. Perhaps this is why Durkheim and Weber have become con-
stitutive symbols, veritable "collective representations,"
for modern sociology.

　　　　Now, the second, and even more compelling reason why
both Durkheim and Weber continue to exercise such a hold
over the sociological imagination is precisely because they
offer us a way beyond the partialities of rhetoric to the
unifying universalities of dialectic. For while serving as
ideal typical representations of the best insights of their

cultural traditions into the dilemmas of modern existence, their personal acknowledgement (see Michael Polanyi, 1958) of the truths they discovered inevitably transcended the limitations of their very different heritages. Although Durkheim and Weber worked out of different cultural traditions, both made it their central life's work to address apparent antinomies and historical ironies. And both of them pursued these dilemmas so assiduously that inevitably they broke through the restrictive definitions placed upon these received problems by their own cultural traditions. In this way, the work of both Durkheim and Weber rose to a new level of universal significance and truth. In short, the same faithfulness to resolving fundamental dilemmas that revealed them as exemplars of the best of their respective cultural traditions, also led them, by the very logic of their quest, to transcend the limitations of their cultural inheritance by rising to a new level of universal significance. It is this profound achievement which ultimately makes both Durkheim and Weber so significant for the future of the human sciences.

D.   A Partial Inventory of Important Complementarities and
     Convergences in the Work of Durkheim and Weber

One of the first problems we face in this regard is the lack of systematic and deeply informed comparisons and contrasts of the special sociologies of Durkheim and Weber; for example, their sociologies of religion or law [1]. In addition, the complexity of both pioneer's thought, their devotion to empirical truth, the multitude of topics each successively addressed, and their commitment to irony or resolving traditional antinomies, meant that both the work of Durkheim and Weber is literally bursting with apparent contradictions, inconsistencies, "loose ends," apparent dilemmas. Indeed, as Lukes (1973) notes, today there abound "many different Durkheims," as there are "many Webers." Sometimes it seems as if any set of claims on either Durkheim or Weber can be more or less effectively countered by textual evidence

to the contrary. As with Scripture, each pioneer's "charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974) can be cited for everyman's own special purpose. But, after all, is this not the ironic fate of all exemplars, all guiding paradigms? While we may wish that universality should be the prime characteristic of all constitutive models, the very same ability to encompass ever-more diverse aspects means that, often as not, paradigms almost necessarily become protean, capable of eliciting myriad meanings. Might we not call this phase of the eternal dialectic of "merger and division" (K. Burke, 1969) the "proteanization of paradigms?"

Now, instead of tacitly accepting Parsonian orthodoxy on Durkheim, and then resolutely polemicizing against the former's convergence thesis, as has been Bendix's and Pope and friends' rhetorical ploy, I would argue, on the contrary, that Parsons' special generic focus held him back from making his claim for convergence as strong as it might have been. In the final analysis, Parsons must be given his due, for the work of Weber and Durkheim did converge in many significant ways. Ironically, as suggested earlier, the strongest basis of convergence is in terms of historical and cultural sociology, Bendix's own grounds. Doubtless, there are many differences between Durkheim and Weber, as Bendix, Pope, and others have informed us. But let us next explore some of the unrecognized ways in which they came to fit together.

1. Some Important Methodological Complementarities Between Durkheim and Weber

Let us first inventory some of the points of methodological complementarity between Durkheim and Weber. Complementarity is here regarded as a relationship in which one part completes or fills out the other. Each perspective thus mutually supplies what is lacking in the other, so that an integral whole emerges. Out of this mutuality a complete and adequate interpretive model may emerge.

a. Durkheim's general evolutionism is complemented by Weber's concern with specific evolution. The former's focus on continuity is complemented by Weber's focus on transformations and difference. More specifically:

i.   Durkheim's general evolutionary perspective allows us to set aside Weber's professed nominalism (which Weber didn't allow to severely restrict him, see Gerth and Mills, 1946). For when Weber came to give his work an explicit theoretical framework, he unfortunately took over the Simmelian interaction paradigm (Nelson, 1969a). This micro-interactional perspective blocked Weber off from recognizing the significance of his own developing "logics in use," as he came to pioneer an "in-depth comparative and historical differential sociology of sociocultural process." Specially important for our present purposes is their growing use of the civilizational perspective as a necessary tool in their wide-ranging investigations.

ii. Durkheim's generic and genetic-evolutionary emphasis on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and the person serves as a much-needed complement to Weber's slighting of ethnographic evidence, and his almost exclusive concern with civilizational scale morphologies (eg. the world-religions).

iii. Durkheim's emphasis on the continuity of sociocultural process between primitive and modern societies (eg. versus Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema), provides a much-needed complement to Weber's almost exclusive emphasis on the major evolutionary differentiations and breakthroughs from one morphological type to the next.

iv. Conversely, Weber's proper and profound concern with specific evolution, with actual historical breakthroughs, involving the specific complex of transformations that led from one type to the next on the main, secondary, and even stable peripheral lines of sociocultural evolution, complements Durkheim's far more limited general evolutionism. Even though Durkheim's metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life was multilineal in that it implied lower branches and survivals, nonetheless, Durkheim maintained an abstracted "birds eye view" of general evolutionary processes and the resulting mainline. Many have criticized Durkheim's lack of historical specification.

While Durkheim provides us with a processual or general evolutionary perspective, Weber provides us with untold analytical insights into breakthroughs and de-

velopmental polarities--in short, a differential sociology of sociocultural process.

It was precisely this lack of comparison cases, this lack of comparative and differential sociology, which led William Runciman to flatly declare that Durkheim's sociology of religion was "fundamentally misconceived." It was not, however, for Runciman simply did not perceive Durkheim's logic of returning to the primitive sacral womb. But Durkheim's model is incomplete, and it is only when we combine both Durkheim and Weber's interpretive frameworks in this regard that we may approach a necessary and sufficient model.

b. Weber's phenomenological approach provides a much needed complement to Durkheim's rather positivistic, early mechanistic model of one-way causality. Conversely, Durkheim's concern with the elaboration of generic symbolic processes as deeply embedded "structures" (as in the structuralists, eg. see Piaget, 1971) complements Weber's typological morphologies. Further, the multi-valency of Weber's "logics-in-use" complement Durkheim's less complex analytical approaches. Weber's constant rotating of his analytical matrix supplements Durkheim's more straightforward analyses. Durkheim's careful preliminary philosophical posing of his problems supplements Weber's reluctance (eg. see opening pages of his Sociology of Religion) to enter into definitional problems. Finally, Weber's ironic view of unintended consequences of sociocultural processes complements Durkheim's dialectical view of history.

2. In terms of historical process, Durkheim and Weber substantively converged in a number of ways, including:

   a. Their central concern with the changing grounds of legitimate moral authority. Both Durkheim and Weber believed that the origin and transformation of moral rules and intellectual concepts were linked with the structure and process of collectivities. Both believed that changes in the structures of conscience generally preceded changes in the structures of consciousness.

   b. Both were basically concerned with the long-term decollectivization of the ruling legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness, especially in terms of the passage from traditional to modern forms.

c. Both were fundamentally concerned with ever-widening structures of social fraternization, and the extension of the tribal bond to more universalistic brotherhoods. The progressive extension of the social bond as it increasingly cross-cut previously closed or restrictive in and out-groups constitutes a basic focus in both Durkheim's and Weber's work.

d. As a corollary, both perceived that the progressive extension of the social bond depended upon the universalization of collective symbolic forms. Both Durkheim and Weber thus saw a progressive passage in cultural evolution from concrete, tribal, fused collective symbolism toward increasingly abstract, universalizable, internally consistent, and rational symbolic forms. In short, universalizable and rationalizable symbols constitute the basis of complex civilizational bonds. As societies evolve, so too must their prime symbolic guidance systems.

e. Durkheim's insights into the importance of the "collective conscience" and "mechanical solidarity" in terms of what I have called the "primitive sacral complex" is complemented by Weber's insights into sacral-magical stereotyping in the "enchanted garden" of primitive and archaic societies. Recently, Benjamin Nelson (1973a) has combined the mutually reinforcing insights of Durkheim and Weber in this regard in terms of what he calls the first basic world-historical structure of consciousness--the "sacral-magical collective conscience."

f. In evolutionary terms, one of the prime points of converging interest between Durkheim and Weber was their powerful emphasis on the formative influence of religious ethical-legal systems on the construction of an in-dept h integration of personality structures through a progressively deepening attachment of the individual to an ever-growing "cosmos of obligations."

g. Both Durkheim and Weber had equally significant insights into the intimate relationships between the evolving autonomy of the person, and progressive universalization and rationalization in the grounds of "moral discourse" (see Leites, 1974; Nelson, 1973a). The development of the intellectually and morally autonomous personage on the world-historical level depends upon a corresponding autonomization, rationalization, and universalization in the legitimate grounds of moral and intellectual authority on the civilizational and inter-civilizational level.

h. Therefore, Durkheim and Weber both focussed much of their analytical energy on the significance of chang-

ing rates and lines of development of major cultural forms--especially law and religion (see Nelson, 1972a, 1973a; Parsons, 1975b). Both of these pioneers were concerned throughout much of their work with unraveling the complex and changing interconnections between these collective moral and intellectual normative structures and personality, institutional, and cultural processes.

i. Further, we should not fail to recognize their joint emphasis on the world-historical significance of Christianity in these terms as it transformed Western European civilization. Especially important here was their estimate of the uniquely powerful impact of Calvinism, and its later secularized forms.

j. Finally, in the face of the impending doom of World War I in Europe, both Durkheim and Weber, from opposite sides of the conflict, issued urgent calls in their own ways for the sacrifice of ego and eros and the imperative need for universal logos if our civilization was to survive.

E. Durkheim and Weber, Anomie and Protestantism

Although almost forty years ago Parsons based his reputation on the convergence between Durkheim and Weber--focussing especially on   what he called the epochal significance of his discovery of the inner links between the internalization of moral sanctions and anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos--it is curious that few others have pursued this line of thought. Perhaps we haven't pursued the question of the degree of significant historical and cultural relations between anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos because of the pervasive nominalism of our own culture.

Although many secondary observers have compared and contrasted various aspects of the work of Durkheim and Weber, few have noted the general convergences just enumerated. Fewer still have realized the potential significance of these links between anomie and Protestantism. For our own purposes Durkheim's linkage of modern suicides with Protestant individualism and modern drives for progress and perfection is as important as Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the most dynamic and stressful features of the modern world. In

contrast especially to Durkheim's uncritical incorporation
of the abstracted pre-socialized ego of the Anglo Utilitar-
ians and the Romantics alike, however, Weber's achievement
here lies precisely in first having shown the historical
and cultural uniqueness of the ethos of market capitalism,
and in revealing its fundamental normative presuppositions.
Clearly, Weber penetrated far deeper into the inner heart
of Protestantism and its cultural impact on the modern world,
into Western development generally, and into the comparative-
historical differential sociology of the world-religions,
problems hardly addressed by Durkheim.

Because of my high expectations engendered by his
generally excellent work, one of the more disappointing fail-
ures to me was Anthony Giddens' 1971(a) book Capitalism and
Modern Social Theory. Giddens' excellent reviews of Durkheim's
thought, and his illuminating comparative exegesis of Durk-
heim, Marx, and Weber prepared the way, but this particular
pay-off never came. Satori never dawned; the "starry winged
messenger" present at creation never visited. To my mind,
a young intellectual historian, with whom I might often dis-
agree, has come closer than most to recognizing the significance
of the potential convergence between Durkheim and Weber in
terms of   anomie and the Protestant Ethos. Dominick LaCa-
pra was a student of H. Stuart Hughes, the Harvard intellect-
ual historian who followed Parsons in his well-known study
of the reorientation of turn-of-the-century European thought,
Consciousness and Society (1958). Led by these direct, sem-
inal background relations, LaCapra seized upon these poten-
tial relations between our pioneers. In speaking of Durkheim
and Weber, LaCapra rightly observes:

> If asked to name the sociological classic par excel-
> lence, most sociologists would hesitate between Sui-
> cide and The Protestant Ethic. But the extent to which
> these two books are complementary as contributions to
> the analysis of modern social and cultural history has
> been little recognized (1972:177).

Now, in reviewing Tiryakian's mystery problem, itself
probably suggested by the curious lack of development of what

was claimed to be the Parsonian consensus, and noting the contrasts in their style of their work, LaCapra reflects: "The apparent paradox ... is that on the basis of such antithetical assumptions, Durkheim and Weber arrived at largely complementary research interests and specific analyses in their investigation of culture and society" (1972:179). This is especially true of Weber's observations on "the unprecedented inner lonliness of the individual" in the "Protestant Era," for as LaCapra, after many others, notes: "Protestantism reduced to a minimum the nexus between the symbolic cult and the existential community which Durkheim was later to present as the essence of the religious phenomena" (1972: 179).

> Where Durkheim stressed the role of anomie in modern
> history, Weber emphasized the birth of a new nomos
> or ethic. But Weber himself tended to situate the
> new "nomie" on the formally rational level of the ad-
> justment of means to ends; and he perceived a certain
> type of institutionalized anomie on the level of ends
> in modern society (LaCapra, 1972:181).

I believe that LaCapra is right, and the ambiguous combination of two different types of anomie begins to indicate the nature of the inner relations between anomie and the Protestant Ethos. It was the final and irretrievable snapping of the once-intimate links between microcosm and macrocosm that relegated post-Protestant man to substantive irrationality or purely faith-structures of consciousness when faced with ultimate questions. The inner connection here is between the "... element of institutionalized anomie or limitlessness on the level of ends which, according to Durkheim, was the negation of substantive rationality" and the "... combination of institutionalized limitlessness on the level of ends and the fundamentally rational discipline on the level of means which seemed to be the truly distinctive criterion of the Capitalist ethos in Weber's mind" (LaCapra, 1972: 182).

Further, we should notice that, in terms of Durkheim's suicide schemas, Weber's insights into the substantive irrationality of Utilitarian ethical dogma, the very paradigm of

functional irrationality, whose calculus can be more or
less mechanically applied to any goal whatsoever, closely
complements Durkheim's view that such a cultural logic sanc-
tioning an "infinity of dreams and desires"is anomic. Some-
how, just as we have lost a sense of balance or proportion
in the scale and speed of our everyday lives, so too have
we "disenchanted" modern men, having repudiated teleology
and metaphysics as necessarily a part of the "enchanted
garden" we have heroically forsworn, lost a clear and com-
pelling sense of substantive rationality. To what purpose,
to what end do we direct our lives? That is the agonized
question which both Durkheim and Weber raised. Who else
but Weber explained how our religiously and culturally
sanctioned "infinity of dreams and desires," sedimented
into the structure and phenomenology of everyday life,
could come to this--I mean the "unprecedented inner lonli-
ness of the individual," and finally, the "iron cage" which
lies at the heart of the closed, infinite world of suicide?
In short, the lack of proportion in our desires and daily
lives, and the loss of substantive rationality are two key
underlying links between anomie and the secularization of
the Protestant Ethos.

Finally, I wish to emphasize again that it has not
yet been sufficiently recognized that Durkheim's prime point
of departure in Suicide was always a deep concern with the
"infinity sickness" of the modern world. Thus, Durkheim's
"philosophy of human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972), and his
classically inspired notion of the "golden mean" as the
source of health, wholeness, and well-being served as coun-
terweights to what he perceived to be modern "moral anar-
chy." Indeed, after criticizing Durkheim's doctrine of homo
duplex, I find his concern with anomie and egoisme as the
"infinity of dreams and desires" culturally and historical-
ly inexplicable without reference to Weber's notion of the
crucial importance of Protestant ascetics and mystics em-
brace of infinite tasks within the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARD DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA

Preface. Granting certain ambiguities and flaws in Durk-
heim's first schema, and granting crucial shifts in the gen-
eral grounds of his argument, how shall we now set about re-
constructing his schema of suicide? Now, almost everyone who
has explored his classic work, Suicide, has recognized that
Durkheim's theses require extensive interpretation. Indeed,
interpreting and reconstructing Durkheim's schemas of sui-
cide has become a minor sociological industry (see the appen-
dix to the present dissertation).

Yet, there is little agreement concerning the meaning
of anomie and egoisme (see appendix). Present research utili-
zing so-called anomia scales is not only severely flawed, but
hardly related to Durkheim's original ideas (see McCloskey,
1974). Let us, then, first explore Durkheim's schema of sui-
cide as a paradigm in crisis from the perspective of the
philosophy of science. We shall look at the process underly-
ing this breakdown in terms of the "routinization of charis-
ma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974). Then, out of both these
philosophical reflections and a detailed examination of al-
ternative competing reconstructions of the meaning of anomie
and egoisme found in the appendix, I shall briefly outline
certain general and specific criteria for a more adequate
reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Next, I
shall very briefly lodge some further historical objections
against Durkheim's first schema which we examined in Book Two.
Fourth, I shall briefly explore other observers' insights in-
to Durkheim's second schema. Fifth, I shall explore rather ex-
tensively Durkheim's argument regarding the social element in
suicide, especially in terms of cultural "suicidogenetic cur-

rents." Finally, I shall conclude by outlining the essential
logics underlying the second schema of suicide.

A. A Paradigm in Crisis: Which Way Out?

What does anomie mean, precisely? Is anomie synonymous
with normlessness? And what does normlessness mean, anyway?
Is anomie equivalent to anarchy, to the so-called "Hobbesian
dilemma?" Does anomie refer to a psychological, a structural,
or cultural condition? Or to all three? What are the relations
between anomie and egoisme? Between these and altruisme and
fatalisme? If anomie especially has become a protean word
(see appendix), conjuring up what we will, can we restore
its significance by giving it truer form and definition, by
assigning it a "name and local habitation?" If anomie and ego-
isme truly constitute one of the fundamental paradigms in mo-
dern sociology, then how is it possible that we still strug-
gle so to bring them into clear and consistent focus?

Further, is there a way out of the crisis of conflict-
ing interpretations of the logic and meaning of Suicide? How
are we to successfully reconcile the ever-mounting plethora
of diverse and even opposing secondary interpretations? Is
there a way we could bring together, for example, both those
who wish to reduce Durkheim's typology down to one lowest com-
mon denominator, and those, on the other hand, who wish to
rescue the distinctness of all four types of suicide (see
appendix)?

Now, clearly the uncertain fate of anomie (and egoisme)
serves as prime examples of a paradigm in crisis. But which
way out? As always, the question of an appropriate "therapeu-
tic" rests upon some prior "theodicy,"--an explanation of
how we "got into the mess in the first place." In this case,
I suggest we explain the source of our paradigmatic crisis
in terms of the "routinization of charisma on deposit" (see
McCloskey, 1974; also appendix). This means that as Durkheim's
fundamental notion of anomie was accepted, incorporated into
mainline sociology, and then extended, it underwent various

metamorphoses in meaning, until it became routinized into
the practice of everyday social science in terms of success-
ive anomia scales. In this process of progressive routiniza-
tion or running down, however, Durkheim's original meanings
became trivialized or lost.

Now, those who would engage in "normal science" should
stand ready, at all times, to respond to a fundamental ques-
tion. Can you effectively demonstrate that your conceptuali-
zation and testing of the "founding father's" paradigm, on
which you base your research and claim our attention, is le-
gitimate? There appear here to be two acceptable responses:
either set the question aside by constructing one's own new
independent paradigm, or justify one's own new version of the
the famous paradigm in terms of a systematic, and historical-
ly informed exegesis?

There is, of course, a third alternative unfortunately
favored by a seeming majority of "scientific sociologists"
these days. Perhaps the tacit canons of this expression of
"normal science" favor this option because it is less ard-
uous, affords a guaranteed legitimacy, and insures an immed-
iate claim on our attention. Here, the unwritten strategy
for gaining instant legitimacy, without doing the real work,
is disarmingly simple, and so universally practiced these
days as to now constitute an unquestioned canon of "normal
science" in sociology. First, simply begin by usurping some
"founding father's" mantle of charisma for one's own efforts,
thereby gaining immediate access to our attention. Then,
pay one's respects in brief ritual obeisance, and cursorily
review the more or less questionable secondary literature.
Next, fasten upon some measuring instrument (itself derived
from the secondary or even tertiary literature).And then
proceed to the "real" task of "scientific sociology" as
"normal science"--extending and criticizing others' empiri-
cal results through the favored tools of surveys and other
statistical methodologies. Seldom do these so-called "scien-
tific sociologists" explicitly and systematically justify

the conceptual foundations of their version of the borrowed
paradigm. Nor do they often place the claimed significance
of their results in terms of the intentions or intellectual
and historical context generating the original paradigm.
Nor do they often pause to recognize the critical histori-
cal processes on which the original paradigm rested. Far
too often we bandy about the terms Protestant and Catholic,
for instance, as if they were eternally fixed entities, im-
mune to change. In short, the micro, social psychological,
ahistorical, abstracted, largely atheoretical, positivistic
biases of contemporary survey research make it almost im-
possible to recognize the crucial large-scale sociocultural,
historical, and phenomenological differences intervening be-
tween a founding theorist's original formulations and the
complex realities of the present day.

Now, it is important to recognize that the traditional
philosophy of science does little to help us understand these
processes and find an acceptable way out of the crisis in
anomie theory. For our present crisis concerning the origin-
al meaning and potential significance of anomie was not the
outcome of a systematic "testing of hypotheses," as tradi-
tional positivist philosophies of science seem to suggest.
Nor was it caused by the accumulation of "anomalies" by
"puzzle solving normal scientists" as even the now classic
account by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) suggests. On the contrary,
fundamental scientific models are neither born nor die be-
cause of minor empirical error; many scientists would sim-
ply reaffirm their faith in their doctrine, and say with
Durkheim, as one story goes, "well, then the facts are
wrong." Rather, the Weberian forces of charisma and ration-
alization are at work in scientific processes as well as
others. Thus, if scientific revolutions are based upon the
charisma of some cultural model, then the dissatisfaction
with the aimless drift and trivialization of these once
compelling paradigms in normal science is an initial pre-
requisite for the re-charismatization of a new scientific

revolution. Equally important is a fundamental critique of the postulates of the depreciated paradigm.

Indeed, conventional wisdom in the philosophy of science—dominated by positivist prejudices has persistently misportrayed the process of the growth of science in terms of the slow, aggregative notion of "consolidation" and "codification" (ala Merton) of "practical reason," as suggested by their underlying formalistic "hypothetic-deductive" model (eg. see Norman Campbell, 1920). It was against this gradual building block image of the growth of science that Kuhn originally directed his notion of scientific revolutions, and the distinction between "normal" and "revolutionary science." Yet, Kuhn has recently been forced to minimize the sharp earlier contrasts between the two phases (see especially Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). As far as the history of sociology is concerned, the picture is far from clear, especially because we lack detailed case-studies of how revolutions in theory and practice come about.

Fortunately, however, today we possess at least two complementary studies related to the origin and fate of Durkheim's work on anomie--Toby Huff's (1974, 1975) review of the logic of Durkheim's discoveries in Suicide, and my detailed review of the shifts in the paradigm of anomie, especially Merton's version, in the section appended to the present dissertation. Huff demonstrates that Durkheim's achievement in Suicide rested neither on the inductive and multivariate use of statistics, nor upon deduction from abstract principles. Rather, there is a third kind of logic operating at the root of scientific discoveries--namely, abduction or retroduction (see also N.R. Hanson, and the works of C.S. Pierce). As Huff rightly argues, the problem faced by Durkheim was not theory testing, but theory finding; in short, the process of discovery which involves a "gestalt switch" as Hanson suggests. Durkheim's great innovation in Suicide was thus first theoretical, not statistical, for it was a series of theoretical innovations of the

first magnitude.

Huff's account is extremely valuable for our present purposes in that he provides us with the first systematic theoretical review of the underlying logic of Durkheim's discovery, which was, of course, very different than that often implied. The common portrayal of the significance of Durkheim's <u>Suicide</u> is as the first real breakthrough to scientific (i.e. positivist) sociology (see, for example, John Madge, 1962, Hanan Selvin, 1965). Indeed, Merton himself suggests that Durkheim was led to his theory through examination of suicide statistics. Selvin and others would have us suppose that Durkheim constructed his paradigms through the inherent virtues of multivariate statistical inductive analysis. But Huff rightly notes: "In none of these accounts ... is Durkheim's innovation treated as an abductive inference" (1974:2). All such accounts "... run the risk," Huff argues, "of substituting the logic of proof (or justification) for the logic of discovery." On the contrary, Huff suggests that:

> ... if all the crucial variations in the rates of suicide were known to Durkheim (and others) long before 1897 ... then it seems doubtful that the innovative quality of Durkheim's work stems from multivariate analysis or induction by enumeration (1974:3).

Instead, Huff argues correctly, it seems to me, that:

> Durkheim began with puzzling and problematic data and he proceeded abductively, not inductively, to find in them a new pattern and order which would suggest the conditions responsible for the variations in rates of suicide.... What Durkheim sought to discover was a set of social factors of a higher degree of generality and simplicity, which would give a greater order to the data at hand, and thereby provide a more compelling explanation (1974:3).

Now, as I have demonstrated in my detailed review of Durkheim's first schema (see Book Two), Huff is probably correct in arguing against Douglas' (1967:25) thesis that Durkheim began with, and worked within, a preconceived framework. Rather, it should be clear that Durkheim's own theoretic reorganization of puzzling data was often shifting and ambig-

uous. An additional reason for characterizing Durkheim's achievement as one of abduction or theoretical discovery in terms of a kind of gestalt switch is precisely because his theory was in the process of being discovered, constructed, and reconstructed again. That is why we find it shifting grounds at so many points, for Durkheim had not really settled upon one pat answer to explaining the underlying reasons for patterns in suicide rates. It is only our secondary summaries of Durkheim's theories which are clear and neatly consistent.

Indeed, this process of cleaning up or repackaging, or even bowderlizing difficult, inconsistent, or potentially embarassing paradigms is a constant and seemingly inevitable sociocultural process characteristic of the "routinization of charisma on deposit." Today Durkheim's suicide paradigms have become institutionalized in sociological normal science, and as they are drained of meaning, they are made acceptable for public consumption and to neophytes entering the brotherhood. Yet, ideology, situated power positions, and the pressure of cultural traditions play a greater role in these processes than most textbooks on the history and philosophy of science might care to admit. Indeed, as Kuhn (1962), Huff (1975), Nelson (1967), M. Polanyi (1958), among others, have rightly argued, the history of scientific development is so often falsified (knowingly or not) that one must make it a basic rule to always return to a systematic exegesis of the pioneer's work. We must return to his generating life-context, in order to begin to understand precisely what the problems perceived were, the logics in use, the gestalt switches leading to discoveries and breakthroughs, and thus wherein lies the founding father's lasting significance. This is why I have eschewed yet another neat summary of Durkheim's doctrine in Suicide in terms of some fallacious formula, and have opted instead for an exhaustive review of the texts in question.

I maintain a way out of the morass of collective mono-
logue and amnesia concerning interpretation of the meaning
of anomie and Durkheim's suicide paradigms shall not come
through   more rigorous statisical testing of Durkheim's
theory. The way out of the crisis confronting anomie theory
does not depend upon the development of a more adequate sca-
ling technique. Nor shall it come about through a superfi-
cial criticism of the reliability of Durkheim's official
sources of suicide statistics (eg. see Douglas, 1967). In
sum, none of the commonly approved methods of "puzzle sol-
ving" in "normal science" will help rescue us from our pre-
sent predicament. Why? Largely because it was these very
same routinizations which got anomie theory in such a bind
in the first place! I repeat: the theoretical crisis con-
fronting the profession in terms of one of our root paradigms
has not been precipitated by anomalous empirical findings,
but by the ever-widening gap between Durkheim's own origin-
al paradigm and the conflicting interpretations and sloppy
research operationalizations of his explanatory model. Rath-
er, it is a crisis of drift, of theoretical entropy, of the
"routinization of charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974).

Now, conflicts in interpretation of a doctrine so com-
plex and multivalent as Durkheim's can only be resolved in
terms of a basic conceptual breakthrough in understanding
the fundamental "nuclear structure" of his thought. Accord-
ingly, my strategy has been to systematically compare and
contrast an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's
fundamental paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" of his
thought with a systematic review of his special sociology
of suicide. Thus, my stratigraphic inquiry in Book One was
extended with my topographic inquiry in Book Two. Further,
in the first part of Book Three, we reviewed changes in
Durkheim's basic premises, and now are about to bring these
two overlapping explorations together by reconstructing
Durkheim's schema of suicide. By these painstaking means,
I have sought to re-enact the process of abduction or ges-

talt switching which Durkheim may have himself experienced
as he discovered, constructed, and reshaped his arguments
in the first place. Hopefully, our outcomes shall be more
consistent, clearer, and at least as profound as his.

C.   Some <u>Criteria</u> <u>for</u> <u>a</u> <u>More</u> <u>Adequate</u> <u>Reconstruction</u>
      <u>of</u> <u>Durkheim's</u> <u>Schema</u> <u>of</u> <u>Suicide</u>

While many have noted that Durkheim's typology in
<u>Suicide</u> is far from unambiguous (eg. see Giddens, 1965,
1971b:215; Dohrenwend, 1959:467; Lukes, 1973:218), never-
theless, it continues to command attention to this day.
Sociologists of varying persuasions persist in attempts
to clarify, reformulate, extend, and operationalize Durk-
heim's schema of suicide. Others attempt to distill the
essential meaning and significance of his pioneering ef-
forts for the philosophy of science (eg. see Huff, 1975).
However, the famous paradigm of anomie has become a pro-
tean concept, capable of meaning almost anything, allow-
ing us to conjure up what we will. Today anomie is utili-
zed almost as a world metaphor, and, consequently, has be-
come incredibly elastic, devoid of scientific precision.
Anomie--the first sociological concept irrefutably demon-
strating the autonomy and significance of "social facts"--
is beset by crisis.

One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to
set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those
who might wish to review the evidence and enter the debate
in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of science, the
secret key by which we rise above the divisiveness of part-
isan rhetoric and endemic conflict and then move to the uni-
ties of dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigorous
standards of logic and evidence can we hope to successfully
resolve the cacophany of competing claims and counter-claims
or refutations. Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963), the growth
of science is fundamentally structured in terms of claims
and refutations, ascending through ever-more rigorous agreed-
upon rules or canons for resolving conflict. Without these
governing norms, the ascent of science proves impossible.
The very cumulative nature of science, as opposed to other
cultural forms, lies precisely in such unifying norms that

all parties to the debate consent on constantly "raising
the ante" to ever-higher levels of universality of evidence
and principle. Indeed, as we discovered in Book One, Durk-
heim himself pioneered analysis of the essentials of this
process of universalization and rationalization on the
world-historical level.

At the outset, I feel bound to sound the following
cautions. I must insist that the following conventional er-
rors in reconstructing Durkheim's typology of suicide sim-
ply will not suffice; they should be set aside, once and
for all. Anomie cannot be simply equated with "normlessness"
(whatever that means, precisely). Nor can anomie be transla-
ted baldly as structural-cultural "malintegration," nor as
"strain in the relational system of society," nor as so-
called "alienation," a feeling of lostness, generalized des-
pair, or a whole host of other "states of mind." Anomie can-
not be simply collapsed to "social disorganization," the
"lack of structural integration," or "lack of social part-
icipation."

Egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered virtuous, ala
Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot be justifiably collapsed
down into one category, nor can anomie and egoisme be accura-
tely located as two extremes on two continuums of integra-
tion--structural and normative. Nor can altruisme and fatal-
isme be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical refer-
ents. Such partial accounts slight both Durkheim's doctrine
of human nature as homo duplex, and his image of historical
development, two crucial factors which we have critically
reviewed in the preceding section in so far as they under-
lay Durkheim's first schema of suicide. In all these ver-
sions (see especially the appendix), Durkheim's discussion
of the source of insatiable and egoistic passions, and his
critical assessment of the broad world-historical processes
transforming the basic relations between society, culture,
and the person simply drop from view. In short, no egoism
and insatiability, and no transforming historical processes,

no egoisme or anomie!

Let us now move to outline some canons or prerequisites for a more adequate re-interpretation of Durkheim's typology in Suicide. First, anyone wishing to enter the lists should meet, or at least revise or challenge, the general hermeneutical canons outlined in the appendix. For our immediate purposes, we may distinguish between general and specific requirements. Besides some truly general canons of science such as consistency, symmetry, truth, significance, and so forth, we may now enumerate the following general requirements forced upon us by our systematic exegesis of the underlying logic of Durkheim's paradigmatic or "nuclear structure."

1. General Paradigmatic Requirements

Any more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's underlying schema of suicide must focus on several key problems, including:

a. The source of egoism and insatiability--the prime sources of these key destructive forces must be explored. Especially important is a critical review of Durkheim's early doctrine of homo duplex--his notion of the inherent egoism and insatiability of the pre-socialized individual or the organic ego.

b. Durkheim's causal model--flaws and shifts in Durkheim's early model as it underlay his first schema of suicide. Transitions in Durkheim's work should then be brought to bear on reconstructing the schema of suicide.

c. The evolutionary-historical matrix--since Durkheim's thought was evolutionary to the core, reconstructed typologies must be inherently evolutionary, not abstracted and formal. Thus, comparisons and contrasts of the dominant "ideal types" of morality, and the specific types of suicide associated with them in societies at the two ends of history must serve as anchors of a reconstructed schema.

d. <u>All four types</u>--none of Durkheim's four types can be ignored. Successful reconstructions should attempt to resolve the contradictions between various "reductions" and "rescues" (see appendix) by simultaneously interrelating the four types, yet maintaining their distinctness. In other words, a new adequate schema must reveal both a fundamental unity and an empirical-historical diversity. The four types should remain distinct, yet linked together in a meaningful gestalt or evolutionary pattern.

e. <u>Durkheim's polemical thrust</u>--Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust, which was ubiquitous in his work, and which lay behind his choice of suicide as a battleground,must be included. Especially important as an anchor for his two modern types was his life-long polemic against opposing dominant cultural traditions in the modern world.

Now, we have already met the first three requirements, and will add the last two to our reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide.

2. <u>Specific Requirements for A New Schema of Suicide</u>

a. <u>Parsons' insights</u>--Talcott Parsons' very real insights (see appendix) that egoisme and altruisme are generated by the presence of strong cultural sanctions for individualism and collectivism respectively should be included. Almost alone among contemporary sociologists, Parsons has rightly recognized that Durkheim emphasized the positive relation between egoisme and Protestant norms as sanctioning the new model man--that is, the inner-worldly ascetic and mystic who is totally self-reliant and devoted to unending service in the name of an infinite, super-personal ideal.

b. <u>Protestantism and anomie and egoisme</u>--as Parsons and others (eg. LaCapra) have recognized, but left undeveloped, both Durkheim and Weber linked Protestantism with some of the most dynamic and significant features of the modern world, including suicide. Indeed, Parsons (1975a:106) recounts how

he was struck by Durkheim's statistics on the puzzling relation between Protestantism and suicide while also "deep in study of Weber's work." Indeed, this striking convergence, unaccountably unexplored by Parsons, serves as a key to the reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide. Therefore, any adequate reinterpretation of Durkheim's schema of suicide should attempt to systematically and explicitly link these two famous paradigms of classical sociocultural theory.

c. <u>Giddens' exegesis</u>--reconstructions should pay close attention, as we did in the second section of Book Two, to Anthony Giddens' important review of Durkheim's notion of anomie and its causes in historical perspective, especially in terms of structural problems (see also appendix).

d. <u>Merton's insights into American culture</u>--any adequate reconstruction should take into account Robert Merton's very important insights (see appendix) into the inordinate emphasis placed upon individual success ideologies in modern society, especially in the economic arena of American culture.

e. <u>Egoisme and the Romantic artists</u>--new schemas should contain reference to the other sources of Durkheim's second notion of egoisme, especially the Romantic artists and poets. This important cultural and historical kinship has been seen, for example, by Giddens, 1965, Jack Douglas, 1967, and by Grana, 1967. In other words, any adequate reconstruction should also seek to explain the sociocultural historical sources of modern suicide among the "litteraturicides" where suicide is treated as a vocation (see Alvarez, 1972).

Let us next turn to consider other observers' insights which approximate mine into the foundations and outlines of the second schema.

D. Other Observers' Insights into Durkheim's Second
    Schema of Suicide

     In the recent renaissance of Durkheim studies, several observers have recorded insights similar to mine in regard to ambiguities or multivalencies in meaning of Durkheim's explanation of the relations between suicidal tensions and sociocultural sanctions. I consider it a striking convergence that different observers, possessed of very different casts of mind and perspectives on Durkheim, should nonetheless, within a span of about five years or so, have independently discovered that Durkheim also suggested that the four suicidal types could be generated by the presence of extreme cultural sanctions. This insight is especially applicable to the relations between anomie and egoisme and modern values concerning individualism and autonomy.

     Let us, by way of preface, briefly review what we learned in the concluding sections of the first part of this book. "Social currents" were considered to be carriers of suicidal tensions. Further, since we acknowledge that a "marginal leaven of anomie" is necessary for drives for "progress and perfection," we may initially conclude that there is some real possibility that anomie and egoisme may be culturally sanctioned by some of the most progressive ideals and callings in the modern world. Further, since, in general, religious sanctions are often important in informing historical development, and since, more specifically, in Western civilization Christianity and especially Protestantism have played key roles in sanctioning morally autonomous individualism, we may speculate, therefore, that there is a strong probability that anomie and egoisme are religiously and culturally sanctioned. With these preliminary speculations in mind, let us explore some others' insights into the emerging logic of the second schema.

First, Anthony Giddens notes that the ambiguities in the relations posited by Durkheim between moral individualism and anomie parallel, in effect, the two very different logics of the two distinct schemas I am outlining.

> The positive connections between the conceptions of moral individualism and anomie, apart from the early formulation in The Division of Labor, were nowhere explicitly stated in any detail by Durkheim and thus tended to be among the most frequently misunderstood parts of his writings (1971b:215).

> He (Durkheim) clearly recognizes that what the (concrete) individual is depends upon "internalized norms" which are, in part, the condition of freedom of action. But his treatment of this matter involves definite inconsistencies. This can be seen quite clearly in his various discussions of egoisme. In his earlier writings, egoisme has reference to the utilitarian model of self-interest. In Durkheim's view, this presupposed a "pre-social" man, and his critique of this conception in Les Regles takes this as its foil. But he evidently soon came to perceive that, according to the position which he had taken in criticizing utilitarian individualism, egoisme itself must be a product of society ... there can be socially created self-interest.... Moral individualism, he emphasizes, does not derive from egoism; but the growth of moral individualism nonetheless produces, as an offshoot, an expansion in the range of egoistic inclinations: "even our egoism is in large part a product of society" *(1971b:220).

But Giddens goes on to observe that elsewhere, when Durkheim spoke of individualism, he reverted to the first notion that egoisme is due to the pre-social half of homo duplex.

> Yet, in other writings, Durkheim reverts to a conception of egoisme which counterposes it in a direct way to social learning, as if the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. Man, he argues, everywhere conceives of himself as homo duplex, as being composed of two beings, which are usually represented in religious thought as the body and the soul. This corresponds to a psychological division between sensations, on the one side, and concepts and moral activity on the other. Sensations and sensory needs, according to Durkheim, are necessarily egoistic because they originate from, and refer to, conditions of the biological organism. Conceptual thought and moral activity are impersonal, they are social products, and do not belong to any particular person who uses them. These, therefore, are two opposed aspects of person-

ality. They are not merely separate from one another, but are in constant conflict. Egoisme is thus identified solely with the "pre-social" and is portrayed as wholly foreign to the "penetration of the individual by society" (1971b:220-1).

Thus, did Durkheim confute these two very different notions of the "individual"--one as "pre-social," as the organic ego, and the other as socially and culturally constructed. Giddens further notes how these two underlying schemas diverge in Durkheim's work.

> The individual in society is not simply a passive imprint of social forms, but an active agent. But, even while he recognizes this, he relies upon the holistic standpoint in working out his critique of utilitarian individualism. From each of these two aspects, historical and methodological, this rests upon the proposition that society is not a creation of the (pre-social) individual, but exists prior to him and molds him. How, then, is it possible that the (concrete) individual is an active agent? It is at this point that the two dimensions, the historical and the methodological, diverge in Durkheim's thought, The answer which he reaches via his study of the evolution of solidarity, and his analysis of moral conduct more generally, is that it is possible because the cognitive and motivational structure of the personality is shaped by social learning. He is not just molded by society; the active orientation of his conduct is framed by internalized moral norms.

> But there is a second answer, to which his thought constantly tends to revert, and which is undoubtedly a derivative of his preoccupation with utilitarianism. This is what is actively willed by the individual is a "pre-social" impulsion. In other words, in seeking to reject utilitarianism, Durkheim tends to deal with it in its own terms. Society cannot be conceived as the outcome of pre-formed individual wills because society makes, and must make, demands upon the individual which are foreign to his own wishes! Hence we reach the position that there is an irremediable conflict between the egoistic inclinations of the individual, and the moral demands which society enjoins upon us. Durkheim never managed adequately to reconcile these two stands of his thought * (1971b:223).

I agree with Giddens in this regard, and accordingly divided these seemingly irreconcilable strands of thought into two different schemas of suicide.

Steven Lukes follows up the same line of thought. In

exploring Durkheim's root dichotomy of homo duplex, Lukes
observes that Durkheim's concern for the development of mor-
al individualism led him in quite another direction.

> Durkheim saw that autonomy was itself socially gener-
> ated and correlative with the development of the in-
> dividual personality, social differentiation, and the
> morality of individualism or the "cult of the indivi-
> dual." But this, given his extreme social determinism,
> led him towards the position that the individual's
> personal, spontaneous private or egoistic desires and
> activities are, themselves, socially generated, rather
> than "rooted in the organism." This issue arises esp-
> ecially clearly in the discussion of anomie in Suicide,
> where Durkheim maintains that the individual's anarchic
> and unrestrained passions are rooted in his organism,
> but also half-sees that they are social or cultural
> premises of a particular type of society. And, in the
> same work, does egoisme result from the absence, or the
> presence of social causes * (1973:23)?

This raises my question precisely: can we view anomie and
egoisme as resulting from the presence as well as the absence
of social causes? Since Durkheim seems to answer both ways,
I have divided these two different answers into two different
schemas of suicide. The clear implication of the second pos-
sibility is that both anomie and egoisme, as well as primi-
tive and traditional altruisme and fatalisme, emerge as un-
anticipated consequences of different, though related, types
of extreme moral obligation in societies at the two ends of
history. Reviewing these very same pages in Lukes' book,
Giddens aptly observes: "But his (Durkheim's) very sociolo-
gical analysis of moral individualism forced him to recog-
nize that egoistic desires are themselves socially condi-
tioned or socially generated" (1974:158).

In addition, Robert Nisbet has remarked about the dif-
ferences between the two notions of individualism in Durk-
heim's doctrine.

> It is interesting to note an apparent contradiction in
> Durkheim's concept of individualism. At times indivi-
> dualism is made to appear as non-society, as the mode
> of behavior or thought that ensues when man is divor-
> ced from society. It is, in this view, the very oppo-
> site of social.

> But there is another view of the matter, one that
> arises from his sweeping insistence that everything
> above the level of physiology derives from society.
> And in this second view, individualism becomes along
> with the collective conscience itself, something so-
> cial in origin. Individualism, Durkheim maintains, is
> ... the result of society: of society's substitution
> of what he calls the cult of the individual for the
> traditional religious cult leading to an attribution
> to man of qualities that were formerly vested in reli-
> gion. It is the second view that is more consistently
> Durkheimian ... that is, consistent not only with his
> premise but also with the full body of his work *
> (1974:123-4).

Again, my comparison and contrast of Durkheim's "nuclear
structure" with a topographic exegesis of his sociology of
suicide has demonstrated that Nisbet is correct when he says
that it is the second view which more adequately represents
Durkheim's more profound line of development. Nisbet goes on
to add an important historical and cultural dimension to
this more consistently Durkheimian and more significant view.

> ... Ages of history, or societies, overwhelmingly
> characterized by cultural emphasis upon the self,
> the ego, and these states of mind in philosophy,
> literature, and art which are recurrently associated
> with such emphasis, are invariably ages, Durkheim
> concludes, of sharp rises in suicide rates (1974:231).

> The suicide who, at first glance, seems to have brok-
> en by his act from society ... Durkheim tells us, has
> simply become obedient to those social currents which
> have put high, even extreme value, upon individualism,
> upon the "cult of the individual" (1974:212).

All of these important observations shall be incorporated
into our second schema of suicide.

Further, as noted in the conclusion to the preceding
section of this book, Dominick LaCapra offers us several
insightful observations on the nature of anomie and its rela-
tion to the Protestant Ethos. LaCapra rightly sees anomie as lim-
itlessness, and clearly sees that these extreme types of in-
dividualism and insatiability are culturally sanctioned in
the modern world.

> Anomie signified the absence of an institutionally
> grounded and ideologically legitimated sense of sub-
> stantive limits in society and the personality....

> Egoisme referred ... to a state in which the princi-
> ple of individuation was carried to the extreme of
> particularistic and self-centered atomistic indivi-
> dualism.... Egoisme in modern societies was an exces-
> sive development of the cardinal emphasis on indivi-
> dual rights and personal responsibility (1972:156-7,8).

LaCapra further observes:

> ... a little noticed aspect of Durkheim's argument
> was crucial. He went beyond the ideas of structural
> contradictions and gaps to a notion of institution-
> alized or ideological anomie. Where institutional and
> ideological anomie existed, limitless assertion was
> actually prescribed or lauded ... he saw this form
> of "le mal de l'infini" in numerous aspects of modern
> culture (1972:162).

Besides Romantic literature, LaCapra goes on to cite the
"dogma of economic materialism" legitimating "ruthless and
rapid progress" as paradigm cases of "institutionalized
and ideological anomie."

Further, Alvin Gouldner has noted that certain norms
may act as both stabilizing and disruptive forces, depend-
ing upon the context. This is an important insight which we shall
also incorporate at the heart of the second schema.

> In his ... Suicide, Durkheim stresses that Protestant
> norms actually induce a higher rate of suicide. He
> stresses that normlessness (or anomie) is not the only
> source of social disorganization or the only stimulant
> to a high suicide rate. A commitment to Protestant be-
> liefs may also induce a disorganizing egoisme, Durk-
> heim argues. And he regards anomie and egoisme as hav-
> ing a close connection, a "peculiar affinity" for each
> other (1958:16).

It is a clear lesson from the historical sociology of reli-
gion, for instance, that religious conflict can and often
has led to social disorganization. Perhaps the classic case,
upon which so much modern social and political theory rests
was, of course, the Puritan Civil War in England during the
1640's. Just as clearly, the descendants of the Puritan sects,
the ascetic branches of Protestantism, were among the prime
carriers of the modern ethos of individualism (eg. Quakers).

Finally, this implicit, ambivalent critique of Protest-
antism in Durkheim's doctrine led some members of the Annee
circle to rebel against Durkheim.

This is especially true of Gaston Richard, one of the leading sociological thinkers of the time in France.

> The evolution of Richard's ideas indicated that the Annee school had its internal critics. Richard in time became one of the most hostile critics of Durkheim, and a source of the idea that his thought was riddled with contradictions. The key issue that antagonized Richard (himself a Protestant) was the increasingly critical edge in Durkheim's sociology of religion which came down most negatively upon Protestantism (LaCapra, 1972:146,#1).

While other testimony could be cited, I trust that this brief inventory of some other observers' insights into the emerging logic of Durkheim's second schema has shown: (a) that others have also recognized the ambiguities in Durkheim's doctrine of anomie and egoisme and their relation to moral individualism, (b) that anomie and egoisme may also be generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions, and (c) that there is a high probability that Protestantism, as the basis of the modern value system, bears some important relation to anomie and egoisme, as yet largely unspecified. With these observers' insights in mind, let us next turn to explore Durkheim's growing sociocultural realism in terms of his insistence that suicide is generated by the presence of "social currents."

E. The Social Element of Suicide: Durkheim's Growing Socio-
    Cultural Realism and the Causal Significance of
    "Suicidogenetic Currents"

> The conclusion from all these facts is that the so-
> cial suicide-rate can be explained only sociologi-
> cally. At any given moment the moral constitution
> of society establishes the contingent of voluntary
> deaths. There is, therefore, for each people a col-
> lective force of a definite amount of energy, im-
> pelling men to self-destruction. The victim's acts
> which at first seem to express only his personal
> temperament are really the supplement and prolonga-
> tion of a social condition which they express ex-
> ternally (S:299).

Preface. In Book Three, chapter one of Suicide, Durkheim
left his formidable array of statistics behind, and turned
to elaborate the guiding rationales underlying his earlier
explanations of modern suicide rates. The very heart of Durk-
heim's argument that suicide, seemingly the most isolated of
human actions and the very negation of society, is socially
caused, was the cultural and symbolic significance of socie-
ty, of "moral mechanics." Since it is the "moral life"
which matters first, last, and always, then the most signi-
ficant aspects of this higher inter-generational social life
were cultural symbolic patterns providing meaning and di-
rective systems to persons and groups. Now, the "social cur-
rents" which acted as the energetic carriers of modern sui-
cidal tensions were not merely structural--that is, the
lack of organizational or normative integration into a warm
and cohesive group. For these causes were cultural and sym-
bolic—phenomenological--as well. This important insight
meant that, whatever the original sanction for suicidal ten-
sions, these "social currents" also served as core consti-
tutive "pools of meaning", as Douglas (1967) suggests, which
orient and guide behavior which may lead up to suicidal act-
ions. This does not necessarily imply, however, that these
symbolically validated and culturally carried "pools of mean-
ing" directly recommended suicide as an answer to human prob-

lems, but rather simply that certain extreme cultural sanctions which, generating overwhelming tensions, may lead to suicidal consequences.

Therefore, I suggest that we should search for certain "social currents" and symbolically carried cultural "pools of meaning" which had suicide, not as their prime focus, but as their ironic or unanticipated outcome. And as we search for cultural sanctions underlying these powerful and ironically destructive "pools of meaning," we would do well to recall Durkheim's seminal thesis that even "the features of our immorality are also the features of our morality." This basic proposition should be combined with the ancient wisdom which guided Durkheim himself--namely, the notion that health, harmony, happiness, and virtue rest on a "golden mean," and thus, that vices are virtues pushed to extreme.

Once again setting aside any necessary correlation between suicide rates and cosmic or biological phenomena, Durkheim insisted that "the social rate of suicide corresponds to a collective tendency." Precisely what is the nature of this collective tendency, however? Now, on the basis of his extensive comparative statistical arrays, Durkheim first explored the differential susceptibility of different groups to suicidal actions. He even remarked that it was "... no mere metaphor to say of each society that it has a greater or lesser aptitude for suicide." Then Durkheim continued:

> Each social group really has a collective inclination for the act, quite its own, and the source of all individual inclination, rather than their result. It is made up of the currents of egoisme, altruisme, or anomie running through the society under consideration with the tendencies to languorous melancholy, active renunciation or exasperated weariness, derivative from these currents. These tendencies of the whole social body, by affecting individuals, cause them to commit suicide. The private experiences usually thought to be the proximate causes of suicide have only the influence borrowed from the victim's moral predisposition, itself an echo of the moral state of society.... His sadness comes to him from without in one sense, however not from one or another incident of his career, but from the group to which he belongs * (S:299-300).

Through cultural symbolic processes, society informs con-
science and consciousness. Thus, suicide cannot be caused
merely by the absence of some important social element,
for as soon as Durkheim stated his underlying rationale
this early and over-simple answer must be set aside. It
now becomes clear that the problem is precisely reversed.
For it now becomes not so much the question of the <u>absence</u>
but rather the <u>presence</u> of sociocultural sanctions which
generates group differentials in suicide rates. To some ex-
tent, egoisme and anomie, like altruisme and fatalisme,
must be caused somehow by some extreme tension inducing mo-
dern cultural sanctions which submit conscience and con-
sciousness to great stress. The lack of collective moral
discipline underlying the first schema now shifts to the
problem of too much collective discipline of a very differ-
ent sort. Absence/presence, too little/too much--these are
the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's theory of
suicide revolved. And, as we discovered in part one of
this book in our critical review of Durkheim's doctrine of
man as <u>homo duplex</u>, when it is no longer a question of the
presence of egoistic and insatiable desires in the organic
ego in the face of the absence of collective moral disci-
pline, then we are left only with the more significant
notion that these destructive desires are anchored in so-
ciety and culture itself.

Durkheim hammered away at this crucial thesis that
the statistical differentials in suicide rates of groups
through time can only be explained socially. Thus, each
group was distinguished by a more or less marked aptitude
toward suicide, and this aptitude must be correlated some-
how to the "moral constitution of the group." Collective,
rather than individual, causation implies that:

> There must be some force in their common environment
> inclining them all in the same direction, whose great-
> er or lesser strength causes the greater or lesser
> number of individual suicides. Now the effects re-
> vealing this force vary not according to organic and
> cosmic environments but solely according to the state

of the social environment. This force must then be
collective.... <u>Each</u> <u>people</u> <u>has</u> <u>collectively</u> <u>an</u> <u>in-
clination</u> <u>of</u> <u>its</u> <u>own</u> <u>to</u> <u>suicide</u> upon which the size
of its contribution to voluntary deaths depends *
                              (S:305).

Against individualistic explanations which fly in the face
of the compelling implications of group differentials in
the suicide rates, Durkheim addressed the following question:

> How does it happen that a given, supposedly stable,
> society always has the same number of disunited fam-
> ilies, of economic catastrophes, etc.? This regular
> recurrence of identical events in proportions con-
> stant within the same population but very inconstant
> from one population to another would be inexplicable
> had not each society definite currents impelling its
> inhabitants with a definite force to commercial and
> industrial ventures, to behavior of every sort like-
> ly to involve families in trouble, etc. (S:306).

Durkheim went so far as to reject the nominalistic
notion that when collectivities are spoken of, this refer-
ence remains metaphorical, and does not rest upon any system
of real relationships. Indeed, if only parts are real and
not relationships, how can society and culture be anything
more than mere metaphor? But Durkheim's emergent relational
realism led him to insist that these collective tendencies
are "forces as real as cosmic forces," (but working, of
course, in a different way).

> Usually when collective tendencies or passions are
> spoken of, we tend to regard these expressions as
> mere metaphors and manners of speech with no real
> signification but a sort of average among a certain
> number of individual states. They are not consider-
> ed as things, forces <u>sui</u> <u>generis</u> which dominate the
> consciousness of single individuals. Nonetheless,
> this is their nature, as is brilliantly shown by
> statistics of suicide. The individuals making up a
> society change from year to year, yet the number of
> suicides is the same so long as the society itself
> does not change (S:307).

Brilliantly developing the implications of his system-
atic statistical evidence, Durkheim next suggested that since
these suicidal rates are historical phenomena, it is reason-
able to suppose that these "collective tendencies" must also
be traditional in some way. Although we shall save consid-

eration of Durkheim's reflections on cultural traditions
for the next book, clearly such long-term collective ten-
dencies must be closely connected with the historical
"pools of meaning" of the group.

> The causes which thus fix the contingent of volun-
> tary deaths for a given society or one part of it
> must then be independent of individuals, since they
> retain the same intensity no matter what particular
> persons they operate on. One would think that an un-
> changing manner of life would produce unchanging ef-
> fects. This is true, but a way of life is something
> and its unchanging character requires explanation.
> If a way of life is unchanged while changes occur
> constantly among those who practice it, it cannot
> derive its entire reality from them (S:307).

Therefore, we may begin to speak of a national or cultural
physiognomy--that is, a traditional and distinctive way of
life which predisposes its members to greater or lesser sui-
cidal tensions.

> From this point of view there is no longer anything
> mysterious about the stability of the suicide rate,
> any more than its individual manifestations. For
> since each society has its own temperament, unchange-
> able within brief periods, and since this inclination
> to suicide has its source in the moral constitution
> of groups, it must differ from group to group, and
> in each of them remain for long periods practically
> the same. It is one of the essential elements of so-
> cial coenesthesia. Now this coenaesthetic state, among
> collective existences as well as among individuals,
> is their most personal and unchangeable quality, be-
> cause nothing is more fundamental. But then the ef-
> fects which spring from it must have both the same
> personality and the same stability (S:305).

Since the distinctive way of life of each society is ob-
viously intergenerational as well as interactional, then
this historical aspect means that something like cultural
traditions may be among the crucial carriers of this long-
term "moral milieu."

Although Durkheim spoke constantly of the "moral life"
in The Division of Labor, he approached it indirectly through
analysis of changing juridical obligations as external indi-
ces. Now, perhaps for the first time, Durkheim directly ar-
gued:

> The social environment is fundamentally one of com-
> mon ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them
> to impart themselves thus to individuals, they must
> somehow exist independently of individuals; and this
> approaches the solution we suggested. For thus is im-
> plicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective
> inclination to suicide from which individual inclina-
> tions are derived, and our whole problem is to know
> what it consists of and how it acts (S:302).

Thus, Durkheim's main problem, and ours after him, is to
understand the nature of these collective tendencies, these
"social currents," how they are carried, how they affect con-
science and consciousness, and so forth. And in Book One, of
course, we discovered the precise directions in which his
developing interest in the "social physiology of the moral
life", in "collective representations," led him by The Ele-
mentary Forms of the Religious Life. Criticizing Tarde's
notion of simple "social imitation," Durkheim began here to
define the nature of these internalized normative sanctions
and energies. Such sociocultural and intergenerational fact-
ors, Durkheim insisted, are as real in their origins and con-
sequences as physical forces.

> Collective tendencies have an existence of their own;
> they are forces as real as cosmic forces, though of
> a different sort; they likewise affect the indivi-
> dual from without, though through different channels.
> The proof that the reality of collective tendencies
> is no less than that of cosmic forces is that this
> reality is demonstrated in the same way by the uniform-
> ity of effects (S:309).

Remember that these collective tendencies, though resting on
"social morphological" bases, are first and foremost "moral
realities." Although resting on material factors, however
(see Book One and Two), the "mechanics of the moral life"
move in the realm of the ideal, of the symbolic, of the phe-
nomenological. This is the province not of population statis-
tics alone, but most importantly of shifts in the legitimate
collective anchors of conscience and consciouseness.

> Since ... moral acts such as suicide are reproduced
> not merely with an equal but a greater uniformity,
> we must likewise admit that they depend on moral for-
> ces external to individuals. Only, since these forces

must be of a moral order and since, except for indivi-
dual men, there is no other moral order of existence
in the world but society, they must be social. But
whatever they are called, the important thing is to
recognize their reality and conceive of them as a to-
tality of forces which cause us to act from without,
like the physico-chemical forces to which we react.
So truly are they things <u>sui generis</u> and not mere verb-
al entities they may be measured.... Thus, the basic
proposition that social facts are objective, a propo-
sition we have had the opportunity to prove in another
work (<u>Rules</u>) and which we consider the fundamental prin-
ciple of the sociological method, finds a new and espe-
cially conclusive proof in moral statistics and above
all in the statistics of suicide (S:309-10).

Indeed, after Kenneth Burke and Robert Bellah (1970), might
we not term Durkheim's growing sociocultural realism a move
toward "symbolic realism" (see also Book One & Three)? Durk-
heim himself here contended that this "... world is nothing
if not a system of realities" (S:310). And he further defined
this "moral world" as made up of "collective representations."

... it is clear that essentially social life is made
up of representations. Only these collective represen-
tations are of quite another character from those of
the individual. We see no objection to calling socio-
logy a variety of psychology, if we carefully add that
social psychology has its own laws which are not those
of individual psychology (S:312).

And, of course, the prime type of "collective representation"
upon which Durkheim so often based his argument for the auto-
nomous causal significance of symbolic reality was none other
than <u>religion</u> (see part one of this book). On page 312 of
<u>Suicide</u>, Durkheim outlined his new sociological theory of
religion (see also Book One) which was later to form the ba-
sis of <u>The Elementary Forms</u>. It is important for our present
purposes to explicitly recognize that all these arguments ap-
peared together for the first time here: I mean the emergent
nature of social and cultural reality, the causal nature of
"social currents" and long-term "suicidogenetic forces," and
the nature of religion as the prime cultural symbolic form
informing structures of conscience and consciousness.

Durkheim proceeded to spell out further his emerging
theory of culture which was, as we saw in Book One, to move

to the center stage of his later thought. Here, he observed,
for instance, that technologies are culturally influenced,
that the "social fact" is "materialized and made an element
of the external world" (S:313). For example, a "definite
type of architecture is a social phenomenon; but it is par-
tially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which,
once constructed, become autonomous realities, independent
of individuals" (S:313-14).

> It is the same with the avenues of communication and
> transportation, with instruments and machines used in
> industry or private life, which express the state of
> technology at any given moment in history, of written
> language, etc. Social life, which is thus crystallized
> and fixed upon material supports, is by so much extern-
> alized and acts upon us from without (S:314).

The process of "crystallization" of cultural forms is, of
course, historical or intergenerational by its very nature.
And the fate of "routinized" "crystallizations" is also in-
timately involved with historical processes--witness the
prime illustrations of cultural charisma losing significance
and legitimacy, and then being retrieved and revitalized
by later generations far removed from the original genera-
ting contexts.

> A child's taste is formed as he comes in contact with
> the monuments of national taste bequeathed by previous
> generations. At times such monuments even disappear
> and are forgotten for centuries, then, one day when
> the nations which reared them are long since extinct,
> (they) reappear and begin a new existence in the midst
> of new societies. This is the character of those very
> social phenomena called Renaissances. A Renaissance is
> a portion of social life which, after being, so to
> speak, deposited in material things and remained long
> latent there, suddenly reawakens and alters the intel-
> lectual and moral orientation of peoples who had had
> no share in its construction (S:314).

In these ways, key elements constituting cultural traditions
are constructed, diffused, and sedimented into civilizational
processes.

Indeed, a special significance should be attached to
the historical and sedimented nature of these highly crystal-
lized symbolic cultural forms, especially those naturally

distinguished by high degrees of potential universalizability (see also Book One).

> The same remark applies to the definite formula into which the dogmas of faith are precipitated, or legal precepts when they become fixed externally in a consecrated form. However well digested, they would of course remain dead letters if there were no one to conceive their significance and put them into practice. But though they are not self-sufficient, they are nonetheless in their own ways factors of social activity. They have a manner of action of their own. Juridical relations are widely different depending on whether or not the law is written. Where there is a constituted code, jurisprudence is more regular but less flexible, legislation more uniform but also more rigid. Legislation adapts itself less readily to a variety of individual cases, and resists innovations more strongly. The material forms it assumes are thus not merely ineffective verbal combinations but active · realities, since they produce effects which could not occur without their existence. They are not only external to individual consciousness, but this very externality establishes their specific qualities. Because these forms are less at the disposal of individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to circumstances and this very situation makes them more resistant to change (S:314-15).

Thus did Durkheim begin to spell out his theory of institutionalization and sociocultural process.

Now, in addition to these more "crystallized" or institutionalized forms, Durkheim remarks that there are also highly fluid sociocultural forms, or rather processes.

> ... not all social consciousness achieves such externalization and materialization. Not all the esthetic spirit of a nation is embodied in the works it inspires; not all morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater part is diffused. There is a large collective life which is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate everywhere, cross, and mingle, in a thousand ways, and just because they are constantly mobile are never crystallized in an objective form.... And all these eddies, all these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single modification of the main legal and moral precepts, immobilized in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these very precepts merely express a whole subjacent life of which they partake; they spring from it but do not supplant it. Beneath all these maxims are actual, living sentiments, summed up by these formula but only as in a superficial envelope. The formula would

> awaken no echo if they did not correspond to definite
> emotions and impressions scattered through society.
> If, then, we ascribe a kind of morality to them, we
> do not dream of supposing them to the whole of moral
> reality. That would be to take the sign for the thing
> signified (S:315).

Thus, as we saw in Book One, collective representations can be sub-divided into fluid and crystallized forms. And these fluid social or suicidogenetic currents are the prime carriers of anomic and egoismic tensions which may generate the ultimate act of suicide. Such collective representations precede and exceed their individual manifestations.

> Because this part of collective life has not enough
> consistency to become fixed, it nonetheless has the
> same character as the formulated precepts.... It is
> external to each average individual taken singly....
> There is not one of all the single centers of con-
> sciousness who make up the great body of the nation,
> to whom the collective current is not almost wholly
> exterior, since each consciousness contains only a
> spark of it*(S:315-16).

Having shifted his guiding metaphors from mechanics to thermodynamics (see also Book One) in speaking of "social currents," energetic "social forces," "sparks," and so on, Durkheim next utilized another significant analogy to drive home his point with greater emphasis. Switching from physical to biological phenomena, Durkheim suggested a bold and stimulating cross-level analogy between the genetic and directive systems of biological organisms and the "social currents" which culture persons in human society. Thus, Durkheim has to be credited with being one of the first, as far as I know, to suggest that culture acts as a kind of social DNA (see also Book One). Parsons also saw this important cross-level analogy (1973), but supposed that Durkheim did not hit upon the connection until 1912 in The Elementary Forms.

> Such a way of considering the individual's relation
> to society also recalls the idea assigned the indiv-
> idual's relation with the species or the race by con-
> temporary zoologists. The very simple theory has
> been increasingly abandoned that the species is only
> the individual perpetuated chronologically and gener-

> alized spatially.... The distinctive characteristics
> of the race change in the individual only as they
> change in the race in general. The race has some real-
> ity whence comes the various shapes it assumes among
> individual beings, far from it consisting simply of
> a generalization of these beings.... It is enough for
> us to show that our sociological conceptions, without
> being borrowed from another order of research, are in-
> deed not without analogy to the most positive sciences
> (S:320).

Just as the gene pool of the species is the real locus of
genetic-evolutionary change, thus, so too is society and
culture the real locus of societal and phenomenological
evolution. Viewing culture as social DNA is helpful because
it directs our attention to the ways in which crucial pro-
grams of information are encoded and decoded on various
levels of phenomena.

Durkheim next extended this insight even further. Durk-
heim suggested that, if one follows out consistently the lo-
gic of this position, then perhaps society and culture feed
back down to the organismic level, as when, for example,
culturally generated desires take on the imperative status
of organic needs. Obviously, such feedback power may vitally
affect   health, not only in terms of wholeness and har-
mony, but even of the nervous system and physiology themselves.

> ... the causes determining the social currents af-
> fect individuals simultaneously and predispose them
> to receive the collective influence. Between these
> two sorts of factors there is a natural affinity,
> from the very fact that they are dependent on, and
> expressive of, the same cause: this makes them com-
> bine and become mutually adapted. The hypeciviliza-
> tion which breeds the anomic tendency and the egois-
> tic tendency also refines   nervous systems, mak-
> ing them excessively delicate; through this very fact
> they are less capable of firm attachment to a defin-
> ite object, more impatient of any sort of discipline,
> more accessible both to violent irritation and to ex-
> aggerated depression. Inversely, the crude, rough cul-
> ture implicit in the excessive altruism of primitive
> man develops a lack of sensitivity which favors re-
> nunciation. In short, just as society largely forms
> the individual, it forms him to the same extent in
> its image. Society cannot lack the material for its
> needs, for it has kneaded it with its own hands*(S:323).

To all students of suicide, Durkheim began here to outline
a potentially profound medical culturology, for the fatal
dis-ease known as suicide can now be seen as due to the in-
ternalization of extreme cultural sanctions and social norms
that become destructive. Stress, anxiety, and self-destruct-
ion may be socially and culturally, as well as organically,
induced.

Moving from the group level to that of the individual,
how shall we explain why some individuals within groups with
differential susceptibilities to suicidal tensions are more
susceptible to such tendencies than others in the same group?
Obviously, even within groups with high rates not everyone
commits suicide. Setting aside the clinician's notion of
individual pathology (eg. nervousness, insanity, etc.), Durk-
heim spoke of a "collective inclination," a cultural tradi-
tion, in effect, which predisposed members of a group to a
greater or lesser extent toward engaging in the kind of act-
ivities and embracing those aspirations which may generate
suicidal anxieties. Put one way, differentially located in-
dividuals vary in their ability to resist the destructive
energies carried by these "suicidogenetic currents." Or put
another way, differentially located individuals vary in their
depth of internalization of potentially self-destructive ex-
treme cultural sanctions.

> The role of individual factors in the origin of sui-
> cide can now be more precisely put. If, in a given
> moral environment, for example, in the same religious
> faith or in the same body of troops, or in the same
> occupation, certain individuals are affected and cer-
> tain others not, this is undoubtedly, in great part,
> because the affected individuals' mental constitution,
> as elaborated by nature and events, offers less resis-
> tance to the suicidogenetic current. But though these
> conditions may share in determining the particular per-
> sons in whom this current becomes embodied, neither
> the special qualities nor the intensity of the current
> depends upon these conditions. A given number of sui-
> cides is not found annually in a social group just be-
> cause it contains a number of neuropathic persons. Neu-
> ropathic conditions only cause the suicides to succumb
> with greater readiness to the current. Whence comes
> the great difference between the clinician's point of

view and the sociologist's. The former confronts ex-
clusively particular cases, isolated from one another.
He established, very often, that the victim was either
nervous or an alcoholic, and explains the act by one
or the other of these psychopathic states. In a sense
he is right.... But in a general sense this motive
does not cause people to kill themselves, nor, espe-
cially cause a definite number to kill themselves in
each society in a definite period of time. The product-
ive cause of the phenomenon naturally escapes the ob-
servation of individuals only; for it lies outside in-
dividuals. To discover it, one must raise his point of
view above individual suicides and perceive what gives
them unity. Only certain ones are called.... These are
the ones who through circumstances have been nearer the
pessimistic currents and who consequently have felt
their influence more completely (S:323-4).

Finally, as Jack Douglas (1967), among others, has
rightly noted, Durkheim proposed that egoisme, altruisme,
and anomie are involved in a complex balance in each society.
Indeed, in each society they are intimately related to the
predominant morality of the group.

No moral idea exists which does not combine in propor-
tions varying with the society involved, egoisme, al-
truisme, and a certain anomie. For social life assumes
both the individual has a certain personality, that he
is ready to surrender it if the community requires,
and finally, that he is to a certain degree sensitive
to the ideas of progress. This is why there is no peo-
ple among whom these three currents of opinion do not
co-exist, bending men's inclinations in three differ-
ent and even opposing directions. Where they offset
one another, the moral agent is in a state of equili-
brium which shelters him against any thought of sui-
cide. But let one of them exceed a certain strength
to the detriment of others, and as it becomes indivi-
dualized, it also becomes suicidogenetic (S:321).

Therefore, assuming that these "currents of opinion" are in
some way connected with social norms and cultural sanctions,
our next task becomes to seek out the ways in which a heal-
thy balance is disrupted by a pervasive and powerful cul-
turally sanctioned counter-thrust. In primitive societies,
therefore, we should look for the ways in which egoisme and
anomie are overcome by the overwhelming strength of sacro-
magical collective rationales. In modern societies, conver-
sely, we should look for the ways in which altruisme (and

by implication, fatalisme) are overcome by the powerfully
pervasive sanctions for absolute individualism and unending
drives for "progress and perfection." Let us now turn to con-
sider these new and potentially powerful considerations.

PART II

DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA: SUICIDE AS GENERATED BY THE PRESENCE OF CULTURAL SANCTIONS

"Every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue."

(Emile Durkheim, <u>Suicide</u>: 240)

Preface

Durkheim's Second Schema: All Four Suicidal Types as Generated by the Presence of Extreme Cultural Sanctions

If the essence of Durkheim's first implicit schema was that anomie and egoisme are caused by the absence of moral control over the organic ego in the modern transitional crisis, the essence of his second implicit schema is that all four suicidal types are generated by the presence of extreme cultural sanctions. Thus, the essential problem is reversed in the two schemas: for the lack of collective moral discipline leading to modern anomie and egoisme (in schema one), now becomes precisely the opposite problem--I mean the presence of too much collective self-discipline of quite another sort. I repeat: absence/presence, too little/too much, these are the analytical axes around which schemas number one and two revolve.

Let me briefly summarize some of the specific shifts in the logic of argument which prepare the way for Durk-heim's second schema. First, he recognized a long-term shift away from extreme emphasis on the traditionally assigned satisfactions of one's special status group and the sacro-magical collective conscience to a modern legitimation of the potentially infinite desires of individuals. Second, we see that Durkheim rather ambiguously recognized (see Book Two) that the modern economy did not simply emerge as a new socioeconomic order through the breakdown of the past, but also rested on new, and powerfully unique, models of legitimate authority. Hence, we detect another subterranean shift corresponding to the first--namely, from the moral legitimacy

of desires and scheduled rewards based on traditional col-
lective regulation to an international market economy based
on "laissez faire," which not only leaves the individual
alone in determining his desires but also positively rejects
collective intervention in regulation, and positively en-
joins insatiable consumer demand to match the unlimited in-
ternational extension of the market. Third, Durkheim began
to shift the location of insatiability and egoism (as we
have seen in Book One and the first part of this Book) from
the organic half of homo duplex. For his key insight here
was that the modern "infinity of dreams and desires" is sup-
ported by a new and different morality, and thus a new type
of culturally shaped conscience and consciousness. There-
fore, the source of insatiability and egoism is now to be
located primarily in a historically specific society and
culture, instead of in the generic qualities of some ab-
stract image of human nature. Thus, these shifts from the
historical emphasis on the collectivity to the individual,
from the legitimacy of traditional constraint to the legit-
imacy of laissez-faire, and the conceptual shift from human
nature to culture as the source of insatiability, consti-
tute some of the crucial foundations of Durkheim's emerging
explanation of sociocultural causation of suicide in evolu-
tionary perspective.

For a number of reasons, schema two is demonstrably more
consistent, and more profound than schema one. For we can
set aside Durkheim's misleading early image of man as homo
duplex which underlies his first schema. As a corollary,
we have widened out Durkheim's causal model, as his growing
sociocultural realism demands. Third, we shall pull together
the same historical types in the same historical set (i.e.
instead of the opposition being egoisme versus altruisme,
anomie versus fatalisme, we shall shift to altruisme and
fatalisme versus anomie and egoisme). Fourth, now all four
types--primitive and modern--are seen to be causally rela-
ted to culturally induced tensions. In other words, all four

suicidal types are ultimately generated by overwhelmingly
strong cultural sanctions. "Every sort of suicide is mere-
ly the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue" (S:240).

Now, although the content and direction of expression
of these cultural norms differ in the primitive and modern
case and, in turn, within each of these sets, nevertheless,
all four types are generated by the presence of exceeding-
ly strong sanctions which disrupt the necessary human bal-
ance--I refer to the Aristotelian "golden mean" as norm of
health and virtue which Durkheim embraced. Durkheim's "phil-
osophy of human finitude," instead of being directed at the
organic element of human nature as before, now becomes a
truly important sociocultural insight into the exceedingly
powerful sanctions which different cultures place on their
members so that a healthy and creative balance is lost. A
special virtue or goal is elevated above else and becomes,
in truth, absolutized. Human proportion is then lost in
daily life, and substantive rationality, which attempts to
integrate contrary virtues and conflicting claims toward a
united and meaningful goal, is similarly lost to view. Spe-
cifically, this means that Durkheim's important, but pre-
viously ignored, notion of the social schedule of rewards
and satisfactions comes to underlie all four suicidal
types. The importance of this sociocultural underpinning
is clearly recognized if, instead of classifying these types
primarily in terms of abstract oppositions, we classify
them in terms of their prime evolutionary anchor. Thus, the
related but opposite types in "mechanical solidarity" are
altruisme and fatalisme, while the related but opposing
types in modern society are anomie and egoisme. Each set
is supported by the same general type of modern cultural
sanctions. The newly orchestrated relations between these
four types are set out in the following chart.

Thus, in the second schema all four suicidal types
are the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both
historical sets proceed from common sources; they differ

Figure 6 . Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions

Axis I: The Generic Power of Cultural Sanctions (a) in Sociocultural Evolution (b)

Axis IIa: Mechanical Solidarity (Traditional Societies)

Axis IIIa:

  a. Common Cultural   Absolutizing Collectivism and
     Content   The Traditional Social Schedule of Satisfaction

  b. Different Modes   Active   Passive
     of Expression

  .

Axis IVa: Dominant   Altruisme   Fatalisme
     Suicidal Types

Axis IIb: The Modern Transitional Crisis

Axis IIIb:

  a. Common Cultural   Absolutizing Individualism and
     Content   Legitimized Insatiability

  b. Different Cultural   Anglo Cultural Tradition   Romantic Cultural Tradition
     Traditions

  c. Different Modes   Active, External   Passive, Internal
     of Expression   "The Infinity of Desires"   "The Infinity of Dreams"

Axis IVb: Dominant
     Suicidal Types   Anomie   Egoisme

Axis IIc: The Future: Organic Solidarity via Cultural Shifts
                                       The "Golden Mean"

in their prime mode of expression. In traditional societies, the common content of altruisme and fatalisme is absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule of satisfaction. Altruisme represents the active acceptance of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice for the group. Fatalisme represents the opposite pole of passive resignation to one's collectively assigned oppressive, traditional fate. Now, in modern societies, caught up in the transitional crisis, both anomie and egoisme proceed from common sources--absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiability, precisely the inverse of the values of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and unending drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires"-- and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition. When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams"--and collapse of the will and imagination in isolation and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals, and so forth. This ethos of _angst_ and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I call the Romantic Cultural Tradition. Together these twin expressions of some of our highest callings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anarchy" and "dis-eases of the infinite" which represent two halves of the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "golden mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our prime vices.

CHAPTER SIX

ALTRUISME, FATALISME, AND ABSOLUTIZING COLLECTIVISM
AND THE TRADITIONAL SCHEDULE OF SATISFACTION

> The individual kills himself at the command of his
> conscience; he submits to an imperative. The domi-
> nant note of his act is the serene conviction de-
> rived from the feeling of duty accomplished (S:283).

Preface. One of the keys to reconstructing Durkheim's
schema is that extremes of human experience leading to sui-
cide in primitive societies were already recognized as pro-
ceeding ultimately from cultural sanctions. Even in the
first schema, altruisme and fatalisme were portrayed as the
result of overwhelmingly strong emphasis on group loyalties;
these types of suicide occurred wherever the group took pre-
cedence over the individual. In the second schema, I shall
deliberately heighten the contrast between primitive and
modern societies, as did Durkheim, by saying that the first
key determinant of both altruisme and fatalisme was the pre-
sence of a strong "sacro-magical collective conscience" (Nel-
son, 1973a). Here, traditional tribal rationales, embedded
in magic and religion, are absolutized. Thus, noting Durk-
heim's notion of a sense of balance in the healthy indivi-
dual and society, we may speak, conversely, of an absolu-
tizing individualism underlying modern suicides.

In both historical sets, we may view destructive ten-
sions as paradoxically proceeding from prime cultural values
which become so sacred that they take on the character of
all-consuming absolutes. Like the snake in Oriental mythology,
they come to devour themselves. Further, since primitive and
archaic societies were supposed to be mired in the "thick
cake of custom," as early observers remarked, for heuristic

purposes we may heighten again the contrast between primitive and modern by noting that in the former type the attainment of such desires--these cultural virtues which become absolutized--is governed by what we shall call a "traditional social schedule of satisfaction." This implies that a person's access to these prime or constitutive sacred values is often largely determined by his ascribed status. How much may one hope for? As much as your father before you, comes back the answer, and no more. On the contrary, in modern societies, not only are such traditional ascribed schedules of legitimate aspirations set aside, but all men, regardless of their origin or station in life, are positively enjoined to seek the heights of perfection. Modern culture is universalistic in its norms (if not its actions). And it is this notion that we are all "inoculated with the precepts of progress and perfection," that all are called, but few are chosen, which lay behind Merton's rewriting of Durkheim's notion of anomie.

Let us now turn to briefly explore the two types of suicide characteristic of overwhelmingly strong cultural mandates in "mechanical solidarity." Since we have already reviewed these types at length in Book Two, and since they have not greatly changed their content from schema one to schema two, and as our main concern now is explaining the problematic origins of the sanctions for anomie and egoisme in the modern world, I shall only briefly indicate the normative structure of these early types here.

A. Altruisme as the Active Acceptance of the Overwhelming
   Mandates of the Primitive Sacro-Magical Collective
                      Conscience

    I have designated altruisme as the prime example of
the active acceptance of ovewhelmingly strong cultural man-
dates toward self-abnegation in primitive "mechanical soli-
darity." It must be emphasized that Durkheim attached speci-
fic historical importance to these typological designations.
For altruisme was not only the abstract valuational pole
of egoisme, but its historical opposite as well. Altruisme
implied that many individuals in primitive and archaic so-
cieties with a low degree of segmentation, and governed by
traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to sacri-
fice themselves for the group as both a duty and a desira-
ble end. Self-sacrifice for the good of one's tribe or kin-
ship group was considered an honor; it granted the martyr
a special "pipeline to charisma" as Weber (1963) suggested.
Indeed, even after the tragedy of the Vietnam War, was it
still not said that self-sacrifice for one's country should
be honored?

    Now, in primitive society, or so Durkheim thought, the
individual is more or less submerged in the group, especial-
ly in the kinship group. Thus, the traditional collective
conscience takes precedence over the rudimentarily indivi-
duated conscience and consciousness. The individual who is
constantly counseled to sacrifice self for the primary good
of his own special groups' survival will meet with a simi-
lar end (suicide), but differently expressed, as the modern
person who is constantly counseled self-sacrifice for supra-
personal, universalistic ideals which lie at the heart of
the modern world (eg. the capitalist ethos or revolutionary
socialism). In the former case, the individual, by virtue
of the structural location of his cultural "charismatic"
endowment, may become so penetrated by the collective con-
science that if tradition demands self-sacrifice (triggered

of course, by specific events), the altruistic suicide may
enthusiastically embrace self-homicide as a justifiable act,
even an honor granting virtue. While the altruist believes
self-sacrifice for his group to be both an obligation and
a good in itself, the modern egoistic suicide does not di-
rectly embrace self-homicide as a duty in the way his ear-
lier counterpart does. Rather, the egoist comes to his last
end by so deeply internalizing the self-reliant mandates
that these special sanctions create, as Weber saw, such
weighty burdens and unbearable tensions that despair becomes
our lot. Both altruisme and egoisme are considered moral du-
ties and goods which fulfill in the deepest way possible
our real human natures.

> Whereas egoisme is due to excessive individuation
> the former is caused by too rudimentary individua-
> tion. One occurs because society allows the indivi-
> dual to escape it ... The other because society
> holds him in too strict tutelage. Having given the
> name of egoisme to the state of the ego living its
> own life and obeying itself alone, that of altruis-
> me adequately expresses the opposite state, where
> the ego is not its own property, where it is blend-
> ed with something not itself, where the goal of con-
> duct is exterior to itself (S:221).

The moral obligation in such societies leading to
altruistic suicides is intensified by the general repres-
siveness of the rootedness of the sacro-magical collective
conscience in what I have called the "primitive sacral com-
plex" (see Book One). Conversely, the modern obligation to
build, direct, maintain, and alter oneself in accordance
with extreme supra-personal ends, must then also be sanc-
tioned by an equally strong, though reversed, force. Speak-
ing of a type of altruistic suicide in which this psycholo-
gical extreme can be seen, Durkheim observed:

> When altruisme is at a high pitch ... the impulse is
> more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and
> enthusiasm carries the man to his death. The enthus-
> iasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on
> the conception of death as a means of union with a
> beloved deity, or as an expiatory sacrifice, to ap-
> pease some terrible hostile power. There is no resem-
> blance between the religious fervor of the fanatic

> who hurls himself joyously beneath the chariot of
> his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia, or
> the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to his
> days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these super-
> ficially different appearances, the essential fea-
> tures of these phenomena are the same. This is an
> active suicide, contrasting it with the depressed
> suicide (i.e. egoisme) (S:283).

Of course, the type of religion having simultaneously the
greatest impact on the development and direction of the
modern west, and unalterably opposed to the sacral-magical
ruling rationales of the "primitive sacral complex" is the
type of ascetic Protestantism investigated by Max Weber.

Thus, I have proposed that both primitive altruisme
and modern egoisme are culturally sanctioned by their res-
pective cultures at the two ends of history. Both altruisme
and egoisme (and fatalisme and anomie,too,as I shall soon
show), proceed from the presence of extreme cultural sanc-
tions leading directly or indirectly to self-homicide. In
both, focus on the self, whether denying it or developing
the true self, is seen as duty and virtue.

> Suicide in lower societies ... is not an act of des-
> pair, but of abnegation.... If the widow of the In-
> dian did not survive her husband, nor the Gaul the
> chief of his clan, if the Buddhist has himself torn
> on the wheels of the carriage carrying his idol, it
> is because moral or religious prescriptions demand
> it. In all these circumstances, man kills himself,
> not because he judges life bad, but because the ideal
> to which he is attached demands the sacrifice. These
> voluntary deaths are therefore no more suicides, in
> the common sense of the word, than the death of a
> soldier or a doctor exposing himself knowingly because
> of duty (DL:246).

Durkheim used as additional illustrations of altruistic sui-
cide various customs from archaic societies in which old men,
women on the funerals of their husbands, warriors, mystical
virtuosos, and so forth, are required by ancient and vener-
able custom to sacrifice their own lives, to "give the full
measure of devotion," for their group.

> Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases,
> it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but,
> on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails

> in this obligation, he is dishonored, also punished,
> usually by religious sanction.... If such a person
> insists on living, he loses public respect (S:219).

Because altruistic suicides are positively enjoined by primitive cultures in custom, and sometimes even by rudimentary legal and spiritual codes, altruistic suicide was utilized by Durkheim as a visible or objective index revealing the inner structure of the type of social body specific to primitive or archaic societies--that is, to all societies still rooted in the ruling rationales of "blood and soil."

> Precisely because the strict subordination of the individual to the group is the principle on which they rest, altruistic suicide is there ... an indispensable procedure of their collective discipline.... There is a close connection between this sort of suicide and the moral organization of this sort of suicide (S:363).

Thus, true to his positivist methodology, altruistic suicide served Durkheim as a visible symbol of the interdependence needed in "mechanical solidarity." If, for example, the social bond is snapped by some irretrievable event like unforseen death, then at certain times the remaining relatives obligation may be to maintain the former social bond as far as possible by themselves joining immediately with the deceased. In death as in life, the same bond continues.

Durkheim continued developing the socially obligatory character of primitive altruistic suicide by showing that such an extreme duty is possible only where the individual is submerged in the traditional "collective conscience."

> For society to be able thus to compel some of its members to kill themselves, the individual personality can have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it.... But there can only be one cause of this feeble individuation itself. For the individual to occupy so little place in collective life he must be almost completely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a compact, continuous mass.... As they consist of few elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, because of the small size of the group it is close to every-

> one and loses no one from sight; consequently, col-
> lective supervision is constant, extending to every-
> thing, and thus more readily prevents divergences
> (S:220-1).

Altruistic suicide is thus the ultimate expression, albeit
an "exaggerated" one, of the cultural mandates found in
"mechanical solidarity." The individual who really enjoys
little of an independent existence of his own sacrifices
himself for the well-being and wholeness of his group. This
overriding sense of moral obligation is due not only to the
very real survival constraints put upon the group by diffi-
cult economic and ecological conditions, but also to the
deep penetration of the collective conscience by sacral and
magical rationales. In Durkheim's doctrine, for the indivi-
dual to emerge as a full-fledged entity in his own right--
that is, as an intellectually responsible and morally auto-
nomous person--the sacral-magical traditional prescriptive
etiquettes must recede.

> The individual has no way to set up an environment
> of his own in the shelter of which he may develop
> his own nature and form a physiognomy that is his
> exclusively. To all intents and purposes indistinct
> from his companions, he is only an inseparable part
> of the whole without personal value. His person has
> so little value that attacks upon it by individuals
> receive only relatively weak restraint. It is thus
> natural for him to be yet less protected against
> collective necessities and that society should not
> hesitate ... to bid him end a life it values so lit-
> tle (S:221).

Even though Durkheim acknowledged that altruistic
suicide is "... a species with several varieties," in each
it is the "pantheistic" organization of society and reli-
gious culture which determines the lack of individual resis-
tance to obligatory self-sacrifice, whether actually consi-
dered as suicide or not. Since religion is, to Durkheim,
essentially the symbolic way in which society collectively
represents its collective existence to itself (see Book One),
then religion was interpreted as the way in which societies
first attained self-consciousness. It follows, then, that
"mechanically integrated" societies, in which the indivi-

dual counts for little and the group for all, should ex-
press these social and cultural realities in terms of pan-
theistic religious projections. When the individual counted
for little in society, so too did the ego count for little
in religious culture. Here, salvation was not deliverance
or redemption, but the transcendence of individual suffer-
ing through the eradication of the ego, the prime source
of disharmony and evil. Durkheim's insights suggest that
societies that have not extended their social bond suffi-
ciently to overcome the sacral and magical ruling ration-
ales of their segmental structural base and the tribal
structures of fraternization might never breakthrough to
modern notions of the autonomous person. Conversely, we
might expect that societies and cultures which have moved
farthest beyond the segmental base and universalized their
logics of social fraternization, will also be those having
the least pantheistically and most atomistically and mech-
anically organized cultures. Once again, all analytical
roads lead to the same fateful historical destination--
namely, the very special type of ascetic Protestantism so
powerfully anatomized by Max Weber in his Sociology of
Religion (1963, 1968), and his special studies on The Reli-
gion of China (1964), The Religion of India (1958b), and
Ancient Judaism (1952).

Durkheim himself noted the uniqueness of Christianity
(see also the first section of this Book) in its aversion
to suicide, which was ultimately interpreted as a lack of
charity to oneself and society, and also as a usurpation
of divine authority.

> ... The aversion to suicide professed and inspired
> by Christianity is well known. The reason is that
> Christian societies accord the individual a more
> important role than earlier ones. They assign to
> him personal duties which he is forbidden to evade;
> only insofar as he has acquitted himself of the role
> incumbent upon him here on earth is he admitted or
> not to the joys of the hereafter, and these joys
> are as personal as the works which make them his
> heritage. Thus, the moderate individualism in the

spirit of Christianity prevents it from favoring
suicide, despite its theories concerning man and
his destiny (S:226).

Further, archaic religions acted to hold down indivi-
dual aspirations, to direct them into formal and public ri-
tual expression. When this restraining collective "lid" was
lifted, especially by the displacement of Catholicism by
Protestantism in the most progressive and dynamic sectors
of the modern world, it meant not only that the traditional
ceiling was taken off individual aspirations, but, more im-
portantly, that new and potentially infinite supra-personal
aspirations were positively enjoined. Of the type of collect-
ive moral discipline which repressses individual desires in
primitive societies dominated by "Consciousness I", Durkheim
remarks:

> This is precisely the role played in ancient society
> by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint-
> Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be
> content with their situation, at the same time that
> it taught them that the social order is providential,
> that it is God himself who has determined each one's
> share, and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of
> another world where everything will be balanced, whose
> prospect made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped
> them from feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, pre-
> cisely because it held economic functions under its
> dominance, contained and limited them (Soc:243).

Now, the power of cultures to inculcate, repress, di-
rect, and alter individual aspirations is a fascinating and
complex subject. In this regard, we should recall that Durk-
heim proposed (see especially S:249-251) that each society
regulates individual want satisfactions through the mechan-
ism of a social schedule. Such a social schedule of satis-
faction of wants, and the allocation of material rewards
and cultural honors, is stratified in terms of individual
contributions, class level, and status group. When each in-
dividual is relatively adjusted to his scheduled ratio of
reward, then there is relative calm, social harmony, and
individual health. When the scheduled ratios of reward are
thrown out of kilter, or when individuals are placed either

under the oppressive weight of their meager rewards, or when they are so stimulated by the cultural ideals to seek reward or honor beyond all hope of reasonable satisfaction, then tensions so extreme may be set up that self-sacrifice becomes imperative or, perhaps, the only way out. Further, Durkheim observed that there are two fundamentally different types of social schedules at the two ends of history. In primitive society, the portion allocated each is traditional, meager, and stratified in terms of ascribed status or inherited or claimed charisma; the social schedule is, in short, rather repressive. "Primitive peoples live in a stationary state from which they do not even think of emerging. They aspire to nothing new" (DL:252). In modern societies, on the contrary, the social schedule counsels individual rather than collective priorities, and legitimizes insatiability rather than resignation to one's traditionally assigned portion. Indeed, throughout Suicide, Socialism and Saint-Simon, Moral Education, The Division of Social Labor, and The Elementary Forms, Durkheim continued to note how wants seem to expand in history. For the Australian aboriginal Arunta, the level of needs and aspirations is rather rudimentary.

> ... the Australian, while leading a miserable existence as compared with other civilized peoples, demands so little of life that he is easily contented. All that he asks is that nature follows its natural course, that the seasons succeed one another, that the rain fall at the ordinary times, in abundance and without excess (EF:452).

Given this rudimentary ecological base-line, Durkheim recognized that human wants have continued to increase with the division of social labor. He posited a kind of feedback cycle in the generation and satisfaction of wants.

> If we have an ever-more compelling need for various activities, if we are less and less satisfied with the rather slow and dull life that man leads in less developed societies, it is because our society requires more and more intensive labors, and more and industry so that it has become habitual, and, through time, habit has become a need. But there is nothing

elemental in us that incites us to this continual
and painful effort (ME:70-1).

Thus, habit becomes need. Modern expanding economies re-
quire constantly expanding levels of wants, and to simul-
taneously fuel and satisfy these expanding wants, we must
constantly work harder and specialize more. As we "progress"
more and become increasingly affluent, and less worried a-
bout traditional subsistence, the greater the burdens we
daily assume and the greater the tensions we must live with.
Life becomes harder, not easier, as one might expect. One
might term this the paradox of affluence and progress. "If
the savage knows nothing of the pleasures of bustling life,
he is (also) immune to boredom, that monster of cultivated
minds" (DL:242). As always, the Garden of Eden was innocent.
As Durkheim established, there is so simple and direct cor-
relation between increase in per capita income and education
and happiness; for did not poverty protect against suicide?
Here is another paradox of progress, for Durkheim himself
sadly reflected: "Suicide has been called the ransom money
of civilization" (S:367).

The historical anchors of these polar suicidal types
always lay in the background of Durkheim's schema. Different
levels of societal complexity, and the corresponding systems
of conscience and consciousness, influence the common content
and different mode of expression of the dominant cultural
mandates in societies at the two ends of history. Of altruis-
me and egoisme, Durkheim remarked:

> One is related to the crude morality which disre-
> gards everything relating solely to the individual;
> the other is closely associated with the refined
> ethics which sets the human personality on so high
> a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinatedto
> anything. Between the two is, therefore, all the
> difference between primitive peoples and the most
> civilized nations (S:227).

We see, therefore, the truth of Durkheim's incisive reflect-
ion that "Every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated
or deflected form of a virtue" (S:240). Thus, viewed as po-
lar members of the same evolutionary set, altruisme and fa-

talisme proceed from a common source--the absolutizing of
collective rationales and the traditionalism of the social
schedule of the satisfaction of wants. These two types dif-
fer in their prime mode of expression and perhaps the struct-
ural and cultural locations of individuals fatally exposed
to these powerful mandates and resulting tensions. For the
altruist _actively_ _embraces_ his destiny, while the fatalist,
as the name clearly implies, becomes _passively_ _resigned_ to
his pitiable fate. One is great, the other sad; the first
serves to inspire people to excel in the approved virtues
and to stand steadfast by their collectively assigned moral
obligations; the second serves to remind us of the frailties
of man and the darkness of our arbitrarily assigned fates.
Thus, just as we discovered that the key axes of anomie
and egoisme in the first and second schema were absence/
presence, too little/too much, so now we discover that the
key analytical axes of altruisme and fatalisme in both the
first and second schema are active/passive, and perhaps
even inspirational/cautionary. Let us next briefly consider
fatalisme as the other category of suicides in primitive
societies.

B. _Fatalisme_ _as_ _Passive_ _Resignation_ _to_ _Oppressive_ _Regle-_
    mentation _by_ _the_ _Collective_ _Conscience_ _and_ _the_ _Tradi-_
        tional _Social_ _Schedule_

    Fatalisme is the valuational opposite of anomie, as
altruisme is of egoisme. In historical terms, fatalisme can
also be considered a polar category to altruisme in proceed-
ing from the same cultural source but, for various reasons,
manifesting itself in an opposed mode. If anomie implies an
externalized "infinity sickness," then fatalisme clearly im-
plies a pervasive sense of passive resignation to one's col-
lectively assigned fate. Historically considered, anomie
versus fatalisme represents the evolutionary contrast between
the insatiable passions either released or sanctioned in our

contemporary era, contrasted with the individual's passive resignation to his fate in the traditional repressive regime of "mechanical solidarity."

In his famous footnote, that "neglected stepchild" fatalisme is described in these terms:

> It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. .... It might be said to have historical interest. Do not the suicides of slaves ... belong to this type, or all suicides attributed to excessive physical or moral despotism? To bring out the ineluctable and inflexible nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression anomie, we might call it <u>fatalistic suicide</u> (S:276).

In explaining his relative lack of concern with fatalisme, Durkheim remarked that it is of "little contemporary importance," presumably because there are few sociocultural sites in the modern world where the ego is over-regulated. Since Durkheim did not directly compare fatalisme with altruisme or even anomie, we shall have to look for indirect comparisons. For example, in the chapter on "The Individual Forms of the Different Types of Suicide," Durkheim compared the characteristic psychological consequences of these types:

> They (the characteristics of altruisme) are the opposite of those characterizing egoistic suicide, as different as altruisme itself from its opposite. The egoistic suicide is characterized by a general depression, in the form either of melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic suicide, on the contrary, involves a certain expenditure of energy, since its source is a violent emotion. In the case of obligatory suicide, this energy is controlled by the reason and the will. The individual kills himself at the command of his conscience; he submits to an imperative. Thus, the dominant note of his act is the serene conviction derived from the feeling of duty accomplished; the deaths of Cato and of Commander Beaurepaire are historical types of this.
> When altruisme is at a high pitch, on the other hand, the impulse is more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and enthusiasm carries the man to his death. This enthusiasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on the conception of death as a means of union with some terrible, probably hostile power. There is

no resemblance between the religious fervor of the
fanatic who hurls himself joyously beneath the char-
iot of his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia,
or the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to
his days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these su-
perficially different appearances, the essential fea-
tures of the phenomenon are the same. This is an act-
ive suicide, contrasting, accordingly, with the de-
pressed suicide discussed above (S:283).

Therefore, as the altruistic type is an active form
of suicide, involving "... energy of passion or will: with
calm feeling of duty, mystic enthusiasm, peaceful courage"
(S:293), so the fatalistic suicide must represent the pas-
sive and apathetic pole like the egoistic type, and yet ir-
ritated and disgusted like the anomic type. Both altruisme
and anomie are active types, while both fatalisme and ego-
isme are passive types. And, of course, altruisme and fat-
alisme are twins, though expressed in opposite modes, for
they are merely different expressions of the same cultural
dominance of the repressive traditional sacro-magical col-
lective conscience. The fatalistic suicide does not sacri-
fice himself directly for the good of the group; it is
true, nonetheless, his despair indicates the strength and
elevation in which the sacro-magical collective traditional
conscience is held. Here, such cultural power is so strong
that for those oppressively regulated by it, especially those
in structurally disadvantaged positions, there may simply
be no other alternative, no other way out. Thus, as with
modern suicides, fatalisme is the indirect result of the
overwhelming strength of certain ruling rationales. And,
of course, in all four types in the second schema, the
lack of balance and proportion between the multiple values
results in one mode becoming absolutized, leading to po-
tential self-destruction.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND MODERN CULTURAL SANCTIONS FOR
ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY

> Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar
> affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie.
> We know that they are usually two different aspects
> of one social state   (S:288).

> Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition, and
> insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbid-
> ity.... Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed
> torture   (S:247).

> Suicides of both types suffer from ... diseases of
> the infinite. But the disease does not assume the
> same form in both cases. In one, reflective intelli-
> gence is affected and immoderately overnourished; in
> the other, emotion is over-excited and freed from all
> restraint. In one, thought, by dint of falling back up-
> on itself, has no object left; in the other, passion,
> no longer recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The
> former [egoisme] is lost in the infinity of dreams,
> the second [anomie], in the infinity of desires (S:287).

Now, anomie and egoisme are polar opposites, histori-
cally as well as generically, of altruisme and fatalisme.
And if the latter both proceed from a common source--namely,
absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social sche-
dule of satisfaction--then is it not reasonable to conclude
that the former set also proceeds from a common, though in-
verted, cultural source? I propose, therefore, that the com-
mon cultural elements underlying anomie and egoisme, as but
"two different aspects of the same social state," are abso-
lute individualism and legitimized insatiability. Just as
altruisme and fatalisme proceed from a common source, so too
do anomie and egoisme both proceed from extreme cultural
sanctions which absolutize individualism and legitimize a
socioeconomic schedule of potentially infinite expectations.

Pulling together the suicidal types into the same his-
torical set (i.e. altruisme and fatalisme versus anomie and
egoisme), rather than leaving them mere abstract oppositions,
helps to emphasize their deeper evolutionary meanings. Fur-
ther, we now see the location of insatiability shifting from
the organic half of homo duplex to modern culture itself.
As was true of the powerfully repressive culture of primitive
societies, so too must this energizing power characteristic
of the path-breaking cultures of the modern world have been
capable of driving masses of people to feats and tensions
wholly undreamed by any lone, isolated ego. The wholly uni-
que achievement of man in primitive society, and in modern
complex society, could only have come from within society
and culture itself. The very logic of comparison and contrast,
as Durkheim's statistics and Weber's universal historical
searches reveal, suggests that the second schema is more con-
sistent and potentially more profound. If these cross-cutting
sets are thus placed in their proper evolutionary contexts,
then we may preliminarily conclude that: (1) all four types
are culturally sanctioned, and (2) that the two modern types
invert the two primitive types.

Following out the notion that anomie and egoisme pro-
ceed from similar cultural sanctions in the modern world--
namely, absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability--
then the major differences between them may be discovered
in the typical social locations most vulnerable to these
tensions. Differences in mode of expression most probably
result from these different locational susceptibilities.
With anomie, or the "infinity of desires," absolute indivi-
dualism and insatiability are externalized and actively turn-
ed against the world. Men are "inoculated with precepts of
progress and perfection." With egoisme, or the "infinity of
dreams," culturally sanctioned streams of individualism and
insatiability are turned inward against the self. Here,
"consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man ... it poses
as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself" (S:280).

Sharing "kindred ties" based upon the same extreme cultural sanctions, these tension inducing streams affect different structural locations. When absolute individualism is actively embraced, we witness the "infinity of desires" of those involved in commerce, industry, technology, and so forth. When absolutizing individualism and culturally sanctioned "longing for the infinite" are internalized and turned against the self, and the self becomes passive, almost paralyzed, we witness the "infinity of dreams" and suicidal tensions most often seen in artists, poets, intellectuals, and so on.

Now, the above combination of common sources and different modes of expression has the additional virtue of reconciling the two opposing camps concerning the "right" interpretation (see the appendix) of Durkheim's typology of suicide. Of course, generally I have sided with the "rescuers" rather than the "reductionists." Schema two reconciles the problem of conceptual unity and historical diversity in one integrated and significant schema. In sum, the commonality of all four types is that they are culturally sanctioned; the mid-point of balance is that both the primitive and modern sets are based upon different opposing cultural historical sanctions. And finally, all four types are wholly different from the others in their specific mode of expression. In short, the four types are doubly cross-matrixed--generically and historically.

For example, Durkheim took pains throughout the latter part of Suicide to reconcile the differences and establish similarities between the modern types of anomie and egoisme. Setting aside his insistence in Book Two of Suicide upon the absence of moral constraint, we find Durkheim suggesting:

> Certainly, this (anomic) and egoistic suicides have
> kindred ties. Both spring from society's insufficient
> presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence
> is not the same in both cases. In egoistic suicide, it
> is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depri-

> ving the latter of object and meaning. In anomic sui-
> cide, society's influence is lacking in the basically
> individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-
> rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the
> two types are independent of each other. We may offer
> society everything social in us, and still be able to
> control our desires; one may live in an anomic state
> without being egoistic, and vice versa. These sorts
> of suicide, therefore, do not draw their chief recruits
> from the same social environments; one has its princi-
> pal field among intellectual careers, the world of
> thought; the other, the industrial or commercial world
> (S:258).

Thus, both anomie and egoisme proceed from the same source,
whether it be due to absence or presence of social norms.
But they are independent of each other because they affect
different strata and occupational sites. As a corollary,
they differ from each other in their prime mode of expres-
sion and phenomenological outlook. Durkheim also suggested
in addition that with egoisme the person lacks an "object
and meaning" beyond himself, while the anomic individual
lacks a "check-rein" to his appetites (see also Giddens,
1966,1971b). Durkheim later clarified further these diverging
psychological manifestations.

> Anomie partially results from the same state of dis-
> aggregation from which the egoistic currents also
> springs. But this identical cause produces differ-
> ent effects, depending on its point of incidence and
> whether it influences active and practical functions,
> or functions which are representational.... The form-
> er it agitates and exasperates; the latter it dis-
> orients and disconcerts. In both cases, the remedy is
> the same (S:382).

Noting that there are "mixed types of suicides," where
"widely different fevers may coexist in one person and con-
tribute each in its own way to raising the temperature of
the body," Durkheim further suggested:

> Two factors of suicide have a peculiar affinity for
> one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. We know that
> they are merely two different aspects of one social
> state; thus it is not surprising that they should be
> found in the same individual. It is almost inevitable
> that the egoist should have some tendency to non-reg-
> ulation; for since he is detached from society, it
> has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him. If,

nevertheless, his desires are not usually excited [it is]
because he is wholly introverted, and not attracted
by the world outside. But he may be neither a com-
plete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation ... he
may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the
gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations;
he applies ... less ardor than the passionate temp-
erament ... but he also wearies sooner and this wear-
iness casts him back upon himself, thus reinforcing
his original melancholy. Inversely, an unregulated
temperament does not lack a spark of egoism; for if
one were highly socialized one would not rebel at
every social restraint. Only this spark cannot devel-
op in cases where the action of anomie is preponder-
ant; for by casting its possessor outside himself it
prevents him from retiring into himself (S:288).

Further, on page 293 of Suicide, Durkheim provided
one of his few schematic summaries, a "morphological class-
ification of the individual forms assumed by the basic so-
cial types," to supplement his earlier causal or "aetiolo-
gical" explanations of his statistics. Here he observed
that the fundamental psychological character of egoistic
suicide is "apathy, with an indolent melancholy and self-
complacence" or the "sceptics' disillusioned sangfroid"
as secondary varieties. The basic psychological character
of altruistic suicide is thus "energy of passion or will,"
with "calm feelings of duty," and "mystic enthusiasm" or
"peaceful courage" as secondary varieties. The basic char-
acter of anomic suicide is "irritation and disgust," and
"violent recriminations against life in general,' or "vio-
lent recriminations against one person" (homicide-suicide).
The "mixed types" include: (1) the egoistic-anomic suicide
characterized by a "mixture of agitation and apathy;" (2)
the anomic-altruistic suicide is characterized by an "exas-
perated effervescence;" while (3) the egoistic-altruistic
suicide is marked by a "melancholy tempered with moral fort-
itude" (S:293).

In addition, Durkheim concluded that the actual forms
of death chosen by the suicide are not essential or reveal-
ing. My schema and his summary table suggest instead that
the general characteristics and common cultural sources be

established before the idiosyncracies of each event are re-
viewed.

> Such are the general characteristics of suicide,
> that is, those which result directly from social
> causes. Individualized in particular cases, they
> are complicated by various nuances depending on
> the personal temperament of the victim and the spe-
> cial circumstances in which he finds himself. But
> beneath the variety of combinations thus produced,
> these fundamental forms are always discoverable
> (S:294).

Finally, I prefer, as a summary passage, Durkheim's
following description of the fundamental sources of unity
and difference between modern egoisme and anomie.

> Suicides of both types suffer from ... the disease
> of the infinite. But the disease does not assume
> the same form in both cases. In one, reflective in-
> telligence is affected and immoderately overnour-
> ished; in the other, emotion is over-excited and
> freed from all restraint. In one, thought, by dint
> of falling back upon itself, has no object left;
> in the other, passion, no longer recognizing bounds,
> has no goal left. The former is lost in the infinity
> of dreams, the second in the infinity of desires *
> (S:287).

In sum, when those who live by virtue of their own inner
creative powers--artists, intellectuals, poets, and so on--
develop their own subjectivity to an extreme by introject-
ing an "infinity of dreams," there results an egoisme so
strong and destructive that it may result in suicide. When
those who live through their managerial or manipulative
powers, such as businessmen, technologists, industrialists,
and so forth, develop their objective rationalizing powers
to an extreme by releasing an "infinity of desires" upon
the external world, there results an anomie so strong and
destructive that it may result in suicide as well as eco-
cide.

Moreover, Durkheim's resolution of unity and differ-
ence in terms of the second schema is significant for our
present purposes because we do not usually connect such
seemingly opposed states of mind as anomie and egoisme.
Indeed, in everyday thought, what do states of extreme

energy and extreme paralysis of the will and imagination
have in common? Durkheim's method and powerful insight al-
low us to answer confidently: everything. Extreme energy
and lack of energy, extreme willfulness and the paralysis
of the will, almost neurotic fixation or lack of imagina-
tion and the revelling in inner fantasies, hope in hope and
the lack of hope or despair--these and other apparent oppo-
sites may actually be intimately related. Perhaps, in terms
of different expressions of the same underlying tensions re-
sulting from peculiar warps of conscience and consciousness,
endless willing and endless waiting, wishing for everything
and wishing for nothing, the instantaneous and the endless
are but two faces of the same gnostic coin, the base of
modern symbolic "currency." Both anomie and egoisme are,
thus, two faces of the modern "dis-eases of the infinite"
which plague our lives. As Josef Pieper (1963) wisely ob-
serves, idleness and the incapacity for leisure are twins
in causing human despair. In such cultures where, for what-
ever reasons, "dis-eases of the infinite" rage, where hope
becomes counterfeit, unfulfilled infinite expectations lie
at the root of despair, angst, revolt and even suicide.

It shall be our task to here explore more fully Durk-
heim's descriptions of these two faces of the modern soul.
We shall then turn, finally,   to explore the cultural
and historical anchors of this modern "infinity sickness."
We shall then attempt to discover whether these two forms,
being analogous, are homologous as well.

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions,
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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VOLUME IV

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June 1978

CHAPTER EIGHT

ANOMIE AS THE ACTIVE EXTERNALIZATION OF ABSOLUTE

INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY

> As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that
> their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them
> accept resignation; so the number of malcontented and
> disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality
> of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from
> a certain amount of anomie (S:364).

> ... Human conduct ... loses itself in the void, the
> emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the
> specious label of the infinite (ME:48).

> Insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering
> (Soc:240).

Preface. Marked by "exasperation and irritated weariness"
(S:357), anomie is generated by the active externalized em-
brace of absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatia-
bility. When culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and
perfection," daily represented as virtue, are externalized
and turned against the world, we see the "infinity of de-
sires" characteristic of the commercial and industrial world.
Noting that "poverty protects against suicide," but that a-
nomie is chronic in the most progressive sectors of modern
economy and society, Durkheim criticized this "moral anar-
chy" as endemic to the modern world. From the perspective
of his "philosophy of human finitude," and health and vir-
tue as the "golden mean," Durkheim insisted that "unlimited
need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), that "insatiable thirst
can only be a source of suffering" (Soc:240), and therefore,
such "insatiability is a sign of morbidity" (Soc:240).

Now, if anomie is culturally sanctioned, then what
are some of the inner historical connections between this
particular form of modern insatiability and the economic

arena? Unfortunately, up to this point we have slighted an important initial clue which Durkheim himself offered--namely, his notion of the social schedule of wants. In traditional societies, marked by a "segmental" social structure, and the dominance of the "sacro-magical collective conscience," satisfaction of needs and desires is determined by ascribed status. How, then, was this traditional schedule inverted? How did economic rationality, utility and efficiency, high productivity and consumption displace their traditional opposites? If insatiability cannot be adequately explained in terms of the organic ego, and if altruisme and fatalisme imply the historical uniqueness of our modern "infinity of desires," how did men then become "inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress" and drive toward perfection? How did the "longing for the infinite" become a "veritable mark of moral distinction?" How was this new "demand" factor generated? And once started, how was it so massively sustained?

Clearly, such a dynamic ethos had to be morally sanctioned. The prime modes of expression of this ethos were, of course, democratic individualism and free market capitalism. Durkheim himself recognized the importance of this egalitarian ethos.

> Above all, in democratic societies like ours, it is essential to teach the child this wholesome self-control. For, since in some measure the conventional restraints are no longer effective--barriers which in societies differently organized rigorously restrict people's desires and ambitions--there remains only moral discipline to provide the necessary regulatory influence. Because, in principle, all vocations are available to everybody, the drive to get ahead is more readily stimulated and inflamed beyond all measure to the point of knowing almost no limits*(ME:49).

Durkheim's notions here echo Tocqueville's insights into the levelling effect of democratic release of individualism, which accompanied the modern "revolution of rising expectations," the "restlessness amidst prosperity."

More specifically, the prime intellectual carriers of

this new economic and social ethos were the Utilitarian moralists. Indeed, Durkheim took special care to refute the Utilitarian doctrines sanctioning this new anomic ethos of extreme individualist drives for "progress and perfection." The multiple links between anomie, the stimulation of new and insatiable desires, the ethos of market capitalism, the doctrines of the Utilitarian moralists, and the tensions and restlessness of modern man, especially in regard to the economic arena of contemporary life, constitute a clear and significant connection between Durkheim's theory of anomie and Weber's work on the Protestant Ethos. Let us now explore some of these themes and potential linkages.

A.   The Psychological Characteristics of Anomie

Anomie results, Durkheim said, from "... man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings" (S:258). Lack of regulation and suffering is, in turn, a consequence of the active externalization of extreme individualism and an "infinity of desires." It is this sense of the lack of normative limits which makes economic anomie "one of the springs from which the annual contingent of suicides feeds."

> Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor
> in our modern societies; one of the springs from which
> the annual contingent feeds. So we have a new type to
> distinguish from the others. It differs from them in
> its dependence, not on the way in which individuals
> are attached to society, but on how it regulates them.
> Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding
> a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, be-
> cause this basis appears to man situated beyond life
> itself. The third sort of suicide (anomie) ... results
> from man's activities lacking regulation and his conse-
> quent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we shall as-
> sign this last variety the name of anomic suicide (S:258).

In psychological terms, this active externalization of absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiable desires begets a "state of exasperation and irritated weariness" (S: 357). The externalizing thrust of anomic desire is blocked by some obstacle; frustration, anger, and ultimately, the collapse of the perpetually taut will ensues.

> There is, finally, a third sort of persons who com-
> mit suicide, contrasting with the first variety in
> that their action is essentially passionate, and
> with the second (altruisme) because this inspiring
> passion   which dominates their last moment is of
> a wholly different nature. It is neither enthusiasm,
> religious, moral or political faith, nor any of the
> military virtues; it is anger, and all the emotions
> customarily associated with disappointment.... Very
> many expressed primarily irritation and exasperated
> weariness.... Sometimes they contain blasphemes, vio-
> lent recriminations against life in general, sometimes
> threats and accusations against a particular person
> to whom the responsibility for the suicide's unhap-
> piness is imputed (S:284).

Thus, the suicide due to frustration of anomic strivings
turned against the external world is marked by a collapse
of the will in isolation and exhaustion. In his war time
tract "Germany Above All," Durkheim spoke of the spiritual
state underlying Germany's drive for European hegemony as
as "... a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-
mania" (1915:44). He further observed:

> But it is not possible to subdue the world. When the
> will refuses to recognize the limitations and restrict-
> ions from which nothing human is exempt, it is inevi-
> table that it should be carried away by excesses which
> exhaust it, and that sooner or later it should dash it-
> self against superior forces which will shatter it
> (1915:46-7).

Since it is derived from active virtues, such a moral
deformation expresses itself actively and externally, in
sharp contrast, for instance, to the suicide due to the ex-
treme introspection known as egoisme.

> The suicidal egoist never yields to such displays of
> violence. He too at times regrets life, but mournfully.
> It oppresses him, but does not irritate him by sharp
> conflicts. It seems empty rather than painful to him.
> It does not interest him, but it also does not impose
> positive suffering upon him. His state of depression
> does not even permit excitement. As for altruistic
> suicides, they are quite different. Almost by defini-
> tion, the altruistic suicide sacrifices himself and
> not his fellows (S:285).

We find, Durkheim proposed, a third psychological form of
suicide, distinct from the others, in that it proceeds from
the love of power or progress gone mad.

Lacking proportion between achievement and infinite expectation, an individual beset by anomic desires, when faced with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, may find the necessary vista of an infinite horizon interrupted by a door of reality rudely slammed in his face.

> Unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one another, nor to the conditions they are supposed to meet; they must therefore conflict with one another most painfully. Anomie, whether progressive or regressive, by allowing requirement to exceed appropriate limits, throws open the door to disillusionment and consequently to disappointment. A man abruptly cast down below his accustomed status cannot avoid exasperation, at feeling a situation escape him of which he thought himself master, and his exasperation naturally revolts against the cause, whether real or imaginary, to which he attributes his ruin. If he recognizes himself as to blame for the catastrophe, he takes it out on himself; otherwise, on someone else....

> It is precisely the same whenever ... a person is impelled in the reverse direction, constantly to surpass himself, but without rule or moderation. Sometimes he misses the goal he thought he could reach, but which was really beyond his powers; his is the suicide of the man misunderstood, very common in days when no recognized social classification is left. Sometimes, after having temporarily succeeded in satisfying all his desires and craving for change, he suddenly dashes against an invincible obstacle, and impatiently renounces an existence henceforth too restrictive for him. This is the case of Werther, the turbulent heart he calls himself, enamored of infinity, killing himself from disappointed love (S:285-6).

The same anomic ambitions to be freed from all mundane restraints, to instantaneously consummate one's infinite dreams or desires, may lead to varying phenomenological manifestations. The "... vain excitement of the hopeless pursuit" of an infinitely receding goal leads to a sort of "melancholy exhaustion."

> There are yet others who, having no complaint to make of men or circumstances, automatically weary of a palpably hopeless pursuit, which only irritates rather than appeases their desires. They then turn against life in general and accuse it of having deceived them. But the vain excitement to which they are prey leaves in its wake a sort of exhaustion which prevents their disappointed passions from displaying themselves with a

violence equal to that of the preceding cases. They
are wearied, at the end of a long course, and thus
become incapable of energetic reaction. The person
lapses into a sort of melancholy resembling somewhat
that of the intellectual egoist but without its lang-
uorous charm. The dominating note is more or less dis-
gust with life. This state of soul was already obser-
ved by Seneca: "The evil which assails us ... is not
in the localities we inhabit but in ourselves. How
many invoke death when, after having tired of every
sort of change, they find themselves reverting to the
same sensations, unable to discover any new experience."
In our own day one of the types which perhaps best in-
carnates this sort of spirit is Chateaubriand's Rene.
While Raphael is a creature of meditation who finds
his ruin within himself, Rene is the insatiate type
"Is it my fault if I find everywhere limits, if every-
thing once experienced has no value for me" (S:286-7)?

Seneca's ancient wisdom could not more perfectly express the

ironic point of Durkheim's second schema, for truly "the evil

which assails us is not in the localities which we inhabit,

but in ourselves." For anomic and egoismic aspirations are

culturally sanctioned. Tensions deriving from such values

are not simply imposed mechanically by the external world,

as if it were some natural necessity that alienates man

from creation. Rather, <u>our</u> <u>anomie</u> <u>and</u> <u>alienation</u> <u>result</u>

<u>from</u> <u>extreme</u> <u>duties</u> <u>which</u> <u>we</u> <u>impose</u> <u>on</u> <u>ourselves</u>.

As we discovered earlier, anomic and egoismic striv-

ings share many similarities, and in the preceding passage,

Durkheim shaded over into common points of phenomenological

convergence with egoisme. Chateaubriand's writings, some of

the earliest French Romantic literature, contain both types,

that is, Raphael "...$_\wedge^a$ creature (egoist) of meditation who

finds his ruin within himself" is complemented by the anomic

Rene who externalizes his insatiabiltiy. In both cases,

<u>alienation</u> <u>is</u> <u>self-generated</u>. It is the same with one of the

leading heroes of contemporary fiction--namely, Herman

Hesse's Harry Hillier in <u>Steppenwolf</u>. And Durkheim himself

cited the following "mixed" possibility.

If anomie is less intense, however, it may permit
egoisme to produce certain characteristic effects.
The obstacle, against which the victim of insatia-
ble desires dashes may cause himself to fall back

upon himself and seek an outlet for his disappoint-
ed passions in an inner life. Finding there nothing
to which he can attach himself, however, the melan-
choly inspired by this thought can only drive him
to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness
and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides,
where depression alternates with agitation, dream
with action, transports of desires with reflective
sadness (S:288).

Since we have already cited other illuminating passa-
ges, and shall soon cite more in this regard, I trust we
have begun to established the psychological character of
the suicidal tensions resulting from anomic strivings. I
propose that in Suicide Durkheim, over and above his path-
breaking use of statistical inference, provided us with
one of the most profound phenomenological portraits of the
two halves of the modern soul. Indeed, anomie and egoisme
should be seen as Weberian "ideal types" of the two seeming-
ly heroic faces of modern man: extreme agitation and ex-
treme depression, inner dream and exterior action, desire
and sadness, an "infinity of dreams and desires." As Par-
sons would say, the problem here lies with the internaliza-
tion of norms so extreme that they may end up driving us to
despair and self-destruction because we cannot live up to
the perfectionistic standards of "visible saints." The prob-
lem here is with the inner nature of these tension inducing
motivations, or as the phenomenologists would say, with the
nature and unanticipated consequences of our intentions.
Anomie and egoisme are, therefore, in phenomenological terms,
the ironic outcomes of extreme tensions induced by the pe-
culiar structures of modern conscience and consciousness.
For just as Weber spoke of the "unprecedented inner lonli-
ness of the individual" in the modern world, so too did Durk-
heim describe the phenomenological consequences of the "iron
cage" in which we unwittingly imprison ourselves.

B. ## The Prime Modern SocioCultural Sites of Anomic Desires

> In one sphere of social life--trade and industry--
> anomie is actually in a chronic state (S:254).

Contrary to common presumptions, suicidal tensions
and outward objective suffering are not directly related,
according to Durkheim. Rather, in contrast to the promise
of the Utilitarians and other harbingers of modern ration-
alistic progress, Durkheim argued that "Poverty protects
against suicide." Indeed, the higher, more successful clas-
ses, are also those most susceptible to anomic strivings,
to a culturally enjoined "infinity of desires." "Indust-
rial and commercial functions are really among the occupa-
tions which furnish the greater number of suicides" (S:257).
Against those who argued that we choose rationally to pro-
gress in order to increase our standard of living (see also
The Division of Labor), and thus, become happier, Durkheim
introduced what may appear, at first, to be a cruel para-
dox.

> ... we have shown that those who suffer most are not
> those who kill themselves most. Rather, it is too
> great comfort which turns a man against himself. Life
> is most easily renounced at the time and among the
> classes where it is least harsh (S:298).

Thus, anomie affects those relatively well-placed persons
who "... having no (objective) complaint to make of men or
circumstances," weary of chasing an infinitely elusive goal.
"Anomie occurs in large numbers only at special points, where
industrial and commercial activity are very great" (S:358).
In short, the "moral anarchy" of anomie is chronic in the
more progressive sectors of the modern world.

Now, contrary to the Utilitarians' and other "Enlight-
ened" doctrines of rationalistic progress, those who are
less progressive are also those apparently least affected
by these self-destructive currents of collective sadness,
according to Durkheim's turn-of-the-century statistics. Para-

doxically, poverty protects against anomie and suicide be-
cause it provides an objective restraint against potentially
limitless ambitions.

> Poverty protects against suicide because it is a re-
> straint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires
> have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual
> possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired
> to. So the less one has the less he is tempted to ex-
> tend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power,
> compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while noth-
> ing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on
> the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us in-
> to believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing
> the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests
> the possibility of unlimited success against them. The
> less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limita-
> tion appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so
> many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value
> of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching
> self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline,
> it prepares us to accept collective discipline with e-
> quanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may
> always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very
> source of immorality. This is, of course, no reason why
> humanity should not improve its material condition. But
> though the moral danger involved in every growth of pros-
> perity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten *
> (S:254).

If anomie and egoisme are but two faces of the same underly-
ing modern pathology, then Suicide can be viewed as Durk-
heim's "cautionary tale" or even "epistle" to the modern
world. Our highest aspirations, our culturally mandated
drives for "progress and perfection," our daily "longing for
the infinite"--in short, our virtues are also the paradoxi-
cal source of our vices, of our collective unhappiness. Durk-
heim as a positivist moralist invoked the ancient wisdom of
many religious and cultural tradition when he suggested that
poverty and self-denial have virtue in themselves, for they
caution the individual to remember his small status as only
a limited point in creation, only a part of the whole. Would
Durkheim have blinked at the suggestion, however, that it
was a very rigoristic kind of sustained self-denial which
landed us in this crisis in the first place?

The solution to the modern chronic "moral anarchy" of
the "infinity of desires" is, certainly, not to make life

easier, to blindly accelerate economic and industrial "progress," not to promise, for the millionth time, affluence for all forever. Rather, we ought to turn toward a new type of balanced goal which may be humanly satisfying. Instead of appeasing some modern _deus absconditus_, instead of throwing ourselves upon some invisible "pyramids of sacrifice" (Peter Berger, 1974), we should strive to regain a certain necessary proportion and harmony in our daily lives.

> ... Just as suicide does not proceed from man's difficulties in maintaining his existence, so the means of arresting its progress is not to make the struggle less difficult and life easier. If more suicides occur today, this is not because, to maintain ourselves, we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our legitimate needs are less satisfied, but _because we no longer know the limits of legitimate needs nor perceive the direction of our efforts_. Competition is becoming keener every day, because the greater ease of communication sets a constantly increasing number of competitors at loggerheads.... The maladjustment from which we suffer does not exist because the objective causes of suffering have increased in number or intensity; it bears witness not to greater economic poverty, but to an alarming poverty of morality (S:386).

Is it not ironic, then, that the once-ascetic Protestant Ethos should metamorphose, especially after the Depression in America and the Keynesian revolution, into its opposite --a positive ethos of high consumption,   reenforcing an "infinity of desires?" Indeed, was it not most unusual, in terms of traditional religious attitudes toward wealth and the moral virtue of poverty, that those who were among the first to systematically preach the gospel of the modern expanding economy, the economic doctrine of material progress, were themselves Scottish Presbyterian Calvinists? I refer, of course, to the Scottish Moralists such as Hutcheson, Ferguson, Smith, and so on, who, to further compound the irony, preached this new seemingly anti-ascetic gospel of economic progress for what, I believe after Weber, were primarily moral, ascetic, disciplinary reasons. What could be more outwardly mystifying than the ascetic Bentham legislating a morality based on pleasure and pain

for all mankind? Indeed, with the revolutionary emergence
of international market capitalism in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the universalistic, homogenizing, self-regulating mar-
ket mechanism became the prime means of moral discipline
of the self, and mass discipline for society, replacing
the older forms of social control such as the community
and church.

Alas, economic progress has not led to the millenium,
but to ecocide and suicide! The Utilitarians argued that
free markets make free men; is it not ironic, then, that
the instrument of liberation of the rising middle classes
should become the impersonal instrument of mass discipline
of the modern age, so that we are all now imprisoned in this
"iron cage?" Clearly, after the "twin revolutions"--the In-
dustrial and the French--Durkheim's statistics showed that
the suicide rate increased two, three, even four times with-
in the nineteenth century. Observing that "Suicide is most
widespread everywhere in the most cultivated regions" (S:
367), Durkheim noted that "It (suicide) has been called
the ransom money of civilization. Certainly, it is general
in Europe and more pronounced the higher the culture of the
European nations" (S:367). But Durkheim also noted that
"... suicide had developed only slightly until the eight-
eenth century" (S:368). What is the meaning of this preci-
pitous rise in collective sadness? As a "laic" moral re-
former himself, Durkheim insisted that "progress (itself)
was not the cause of so much bloodshed"(S:368). Instead of
blaming the "tremendous aggravation during the nineteenth
century" (S:367), and the "moral pathology" this represents
in terms of the rationalistic idea of progress, Durkheim
rhetoricized: "Is it not probable, then, that the course of
our civilization and that of suicide do not logically in-
volve one another, and that suicide may accordingly be check-
ed without stopping progress simultaneously" (S:368)?

> Thus, we may believe that this aggravation springs
> not from the intrinsic nature of progress but from
> the special conditions under which it occurs in our day

and nothing assures us that these conditions are norm-
al. For we must not be dazzled by the brilliant devel-
opments of sciences, the arts and industry of which we
are the witnesses; this development is altogether cer-
tainly taking place in the midst of a morbid efferves-
cence, the grievous repurcussions of which each one of
us feels. It is, then, very possible and even probable
that the rising tide of suicide originates in a patho-
logical state just now accompanying the march of civi-
lization without being its necessary condition. The
rapidity of the growth of suicides really permits no
other hypothesis; in less than fifty years, they have
tripled, quadrupled, even quintupled depending on the
country (S:368).

Perhaps a viable balance could be reached; indeed, is this
not what all reasonable men hope for today? But if we are
truly to reach a viable balance, must we not also begin to
recognize, as Durkheim himself realized, that "... the en-
tire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable
from a certain amount of anomie"?

For our present purposes, it is intriguing to note
that as early as The Division of Labor, when Durkheim began
to counter the doctrine of the economic progressives with
his own philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the
"golden mean," he observed, in a memorable passage, that
the "... the true suicide, the sad suicide, is in an endem-
ic state with civilized peoples."

He is even distributed geographically like civiliza-
tion. On the charts of suicide, there is seen a dark
spot over all the central region of Europe between
forty-seven and fifty-seven degrees latitude, and
twenty and forty degrees longitude. That space is
the favorite place for suicide; according to Morsel-
li's expression, it is the suicidogenous zone of Eu-
rope. There are also found the countries where scien-
tific, artistic, economic activities are carried to
their maximum: Germany and France. On the contrary,
Spain, Portugal, Russia, the Slav peoples of the
south are relatively immune. Italy, born only yester-
day, is still somewhat safe, but its immunity is lost
as it advances. England alone is an exception....
Everywhere suicide rages more fiercely in the cities
than in the country. Civilization is concentrated in
the great cities, suicide likewise. It has even been
viewed sometimes as a contagious disease which has as
its sources of irradiation the capitals and important
cities, and which, from there, spreads over the rest

of the country. The proofs could be multiplied. The
classes of the population furnish a quota proportion-
ate to their degree of civilization. Everywhere the
liberal professions are the hardest hit, and agri-
culture the least. It is the same with the sexes
(DL:247).

As a "moral statistician," Durkheim seized upon this mass-
ive and striking evidence of a paradoxical inversion of our
highest aspirations, for instead of leading to utopia, the
modern "moral milieu" turns out to be pathological.

One observes it everywhere.... Agriculture is less
affected than industry, but the quota it furnishes
to suicide is always increasing. Thus, we are before
a phenomenon which is linked not to some local and
particular circumstances, but to a general state of
the social milieu. This state is diversely refracted
by special milieu (eg. provinces, occupations, reli-
gious confessions, etc.). That is why its action can-
not be felt everywhere with the same intensity, but
its nature does not change on that account.... What
the mounting tide of voluntary death proves ... (is)
that the general happiness of society is decreas-
ing.... What statistician would hesitate to see in
the progress of general mortality in the midst of a
determined society a sure symptom of the weakening
of public health (DL:249)?

Thus, the general unhappiness accompanying rational-
istic economic progress, Durkheim concluded, is due to the
weakening of the several moral milieu which have tradition-
ally nourished European society (see especially part II,
Book Two of this dissertation). And these main currents of
anomie and egoisme are "diversely refracted by special mil-
ieu." The special milieu most susceptible to the pleasure
and pain of an "infinity of dreams and desires" are the
more progressive sectors of modern society. Indeed, in gen-
eral, the higher the educational level, per capita income,
Protestant, intellectual or artistic, urbanized, profess-
ional, and so on, the greater the tendency toward inclusion
in the "suicidogenous zone" of Europe where the "suicido-
genetic currents" of anomie and egoisme flow deepest and
strongest.

C. <u>Insatiability</u>: <u>Modern</u> <u>Man's</u> <u>Dis-ease</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Infinite</u>

> The more one has, the more one wants, since satis-
> factions received only stimulate, instead of filling
> needs (S:248).
>
> One does not advance when one walks toward no goal--
> or what is the same--when his goal is infinity (S:248).
>
> To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable
> is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappi-
> ness (S:248).

Objectively measured in terms of "moral statistics,"
the "moral anarchy" chronic in the more progressive sectors
of the modern world signifies that anomic passions or insa-
tiable expectations reign as legitimate in modern economies
and societies. Indeed, from the Industrial Revolution on,
our modern, constantly expanding economies depend upon the
presumption that wants in the form of consumer demand will
continue to expand to absorb the constantly expanding tech-
nological productivity. Constantly expanding productive ca-
pacity requires greater markets; greater markets, in turn,
demand greater mass consumption, and so on and so forth,
in a self-accelerating feedback cycle. Thus, a kind of <u>in-
satiability</u> <u>is</u> <u>built</u> <u>into</u> <u>the</u> <u>institutional</u> <u>apparatus</u> <u>of</u>
<u>the</u> <u>modern</u> <u>world</u>. And, as we are discovering to our chagrin,
ecocide is one result, as was suicide when Durkheim wrote.

Perhaps the true lesson of the world's interdependence
and finiteness, coupled with man's own finiteness, does not
really come home to us unless we first begin to recognize
that infiniteness is itself a moral virtue in the modern
world! In contrast to the utopian promises held out to us,
especially by the Utilitarian moralists and political econo-
mists--namely, a golden land of high productivity and con-
sumption, a democracy of small entrepeneurs equitably ex-
changing goods through a self-regulating market mechanism
where reward was to be directly proportional to effort and
thus, to virtue, the notion that free markets make free men,
and so forth--it seems a cruel lesson that suicide and eco-
cide should be the unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome.

But, as Durkheim counseled us, it is a lesson we must learn.

Again and again, Durkheim sounded the same moral refrain: "One does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or what is the same, when his goal is infinity" (S:248). One might not expect a seemingly hard-line positivist like Durkheim to be concerned with the ravages of these "marches to infinity." Nonetheless, Durkheim should be given full credit for deep insight into the phenomenology of these extreme socioculturally generated "dis-eases of the infinite."

> Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feelings of pride at the distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfaction, since the remaining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness (S:248).

Pinning our age in one fundamentally revealing epigram, Durkheim continued exploring the modern "dis-ease of the infinite," as expressed in the progressive economic arena of Europe.

> The more one has the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall such action be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly, for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half-veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which it entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever encountered. Our thread of life on these conditions is pretty thin, breakable at any instant * (S:248).

Is it not curious that although such an "infinity of desires" must surely be actively embraced, it serves no reasonable, even useful purpose? Where a substantively irrational "dis-ease of the infinite" enjoys moral subsidy, and a unique kind of "moral anarchy" ensues, then hope becomes counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue us precisely when all reason for hope is gone (see Lynch, 1966). Indeed, when both the world and our own imaginations

seem to conspire to deprive us of some reasonable advance
toward our goals, then we are forced to fall back upon the
plaintive homilies of "hope in hope," of the strange cer-
tainty that comes "beyond belief."

> Of course, man may hope, contrary to all reason,
> and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable.
> It may sustain him for a time, but it cannot sur-
> vive the repeated disappointments of experience
> indefinitely. What more can the future offer him
> than the past, since he can never reach a tenable
> condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal (S:248)?

Here hope is cruelly, almost obscenely satirized, for at
the very time we need it most, this virtue is transformed,
as if by some powerful inner alchemy, into its opposite.
The extremity of our values turns hope into hopelessness,
and delivers us, not into utopia, but into the "slough of
despond and despair." Did not Durkheim himself suggest that
the features of our immorality are also the prime features
of our morality?

> ... There is nothing surprising in the alikeness we
> observe in the features of morals and of immorality.
> Indeed, we know that they are facts of the same na-
> ture and that they throw light one on the other. Im-
> morality is not the opposite of morality any other
> than sickness is the opposite of health, both being
> forms of one and the same state--two forms of the
> moral life, two forms of physical life (PECM:119).

Thus, if our values become so absolutized that we destroy
ourselves and our world, whom have we to blame? If hope is
not for the humanly possible, for the humanly desirable,
if our spirits continue to expire on "pyramids of sacrifice,"
then whom have we to blame? If our perpetual restlessness
without purpose leads to acedia, then whom have we to
blame? If we continue to strive for an elusive moral per-
fectionism meant to appease some deus absconditus, as Weber
should have spoken of Benjamin Franklin's scheme for moral
perfection in his Autobiography, must we not be willing to
pay the price? How can we any longer fail to recognize the
ironic relation between our prime constitutive values, and
our own peculiar dis-eases? In short, if we cannot imagine

the real, if we persist in distorting analogical relations
between all levels of reality by pursuing destructive val-
ues under the specious aegis of "longing for the infinite,"
if we continue to absolutize fragments of human experience,
and if we forget the essential purposefulness of existence,
then hope cannot play its central role in human affairs.
Unfulfilled expectations lie at the heart of modern despair.

There is no more potent recipe for the despair of
modern suicide than the feeling of extreme isolation, of
being abandoned and absolutely alone, coupled with the bur-
den of being faced with an impossible, unending, Sisyphean
task. Although Durkheim the "laicized" Jew, the ascetic mo-
ral philosopher, seemed himself largely immune to the mo-
dern dis-eases of the infinite (eg. see his treatment of
the Jews in Suicide, also see part I of Book Two of this
dissertation), another pioneer sociologist learned through
personal tragedy what it meant to live in the modern "iron
cage" of our own making--I mean Max Weber. Weber explored,
both personally and historically, the phenomenological pri-
son of conscience in which one's own consciousness colla-
borates with one's cultural inheritance to seal all exits,
and tighten inexorably certain excruciating "double binds."
Weber, who sat for hours on end as if paralyzed, learned,
in his worst moments of "scientific and moral acedia" (see
Zetterberg, 1967), what it meant to grapple with the "inner
demons which hold the very fibers of our lives." Weber knew
what it meant, because of the conflicting mandates of his
Pauline-Lutheran and Calvinist heritages, to attempt to
both "meet the demands of the day" and the demands of "ut-
most inwardness" (Marianne Weber, 1975; Mitzman, 1971).
Indeed, Mitzman rightly speculates that Weber's own Prome-
thean labors can be interpreted as a self-imposed ascetic
therapeutic by which he began to rescue himself from the
"iron cage" unwittingly bequeathed by his forebearers.

Now, the moral restlessness which Durkheim's statis-
tics documented, and which Weber tragically experienced

and historically anatomized in The Protestant Ethic as a
way to exorcise his own inner demons, is very similar to
that "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville
often spoke in his reflections on America (see especially
Nisbet, 1966, 1974). This acedia was a general condition
of the modern age, which many early sociological thinkers
tried to come to terms with in one way or another. Durkheim
and Weber, from different sides, both came to see this "dis-
ease of the infinite" as culturally sanctioned, and further,
as substantively irrational. "Durkheim saw the unlimited de-
sires for worldly goods as a prominent instance of modern
social pathology" (LaCapra, 1972:83). This pervasive sense
of restlessness, this lack of fit between our ever-rising
levels of expectations and actual rewards, leads us to per-
ceive such anomic strivings, since they are not substantive-
ly rational, as supported by some tacit yet powerfully sanc-
tioned cultural commitments. Perhaps what has happened here,
as Weber saw in a slightly different connection, is that
the original moral sanction remains strong, even though it
has fundamentally shifted from its original sphere of in-
tended application. Such a "displacement of goals" is a com-
mon sociocultural process, one that affects institutions
and personality structures as well as styles of life. In-
deed, this is precisely the thesis which I have embraced
here, with Weber's inspiration, to help explain Durkheim's
notion of anomie and egoisme as a curious type of "moral
anarchy" which is, paradoxically, the outcome of an extreme
type of moral discipline. I find Durkheim's notion of an
"infinity of dreams and desires" historically and cultural-
ly inexplicable without reference to Weber's insights into
the powerful and unprecedented consequences of Protestant
ascetics' and mystics' embrace of infinite tasks within
the world. Thus, our chronic modern "diseases of the infin-
ite," our endemic struggle with our selves, our lack of
harmony with society, with the past, and with the natural
world, is deeply embedded, not so much in our generic organic

ego, as in our peculiar modern cultural traditions. For
the individual cannot be, as Durkheim first supposed, ac-
curately described as an insatiable ego driven by propor-
tionless passions. Rather, at most, the individual, by vir-
tue of his inter-generational passage, is simply an histor-
cial amnesiac.

Many more passages have been, and will be, cited to
establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Durkheim's cen-
tral concern with anomie was always with insatiable desires
externalized in terms of economic processes. How can there
be any question that anomie refers primarily not to Parson-
ian and Mertonian "normlessness," whatever that means pre-
cisely, but to infinite normative expectations? Again and
again, Durkheim insisted that these modern desires fueling
economic progress were only half-constituted needs, for a
"complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will
and a certain object" (DL:255). To Durkheim, "unlimited
need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), "insatiability is a sign
sign of morbidity" (Soc:240), and finally, "inextinguish-
able thirst is constantly renewed torture" (S:247).

D. Durkheim's Philosophy of Human Finitude: Health and
    Virtue as Coming From a "Golden Mean"

    All excess is bad as well as all insufficiency (DL:340).
    Health consists in a mean activity (DL:237).
    It is not without reason that human experience sees
    the condition of happiness in the "golden mean" (DL:237).

Dominick LaCapra rightly observes that "... the ele-
mentary postulate of Durkheim's philosophy was the finite
nature of all life" (1972:243). Indeed, the notion of virtue
(arete) as the "golden mean" stems largely from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle defined the essence of
his moral theory in these terms: "Evil belongs to the inde-
terminate, good to the determinate.... Excess and deficiency
characterize vice, while the mean characterizes virtue (eg.

1962:43). LaCapra saw this crucial rootedness of Durkheim's notion of anomie and his philosophy of "human finitude" in classical Greek moral philosophy.

> For Durkheim, as for Aristotle, a vice was ... an excessive development of a virtue. In fact, the concept of anomie in its primary meaning of an absence of a sense of legitimate limits recalls the notion of hybris. And implicit in Suicide and its typology was an optimal point of intersection of Durkheim's variables which corresponded to the Greek idea of a golden mean. Nowhere else was Durkheim's indebtedness to the classical tradition of Western philosophy more telling. And nowhere else was the vision of his own France--with its insistence on mesure--as the guardian of what was valid in this tradition more apposite. In the normal society, the golden mean--incarnated in the conscience collective--would restrict hybris to the exceptional individual or the extraordinary feat (1972:158).

For the normal person in the normally evolving society, the "golden mean" implies that there is a satisfying degree of "goodness of fit" between effort and reward, between level of aspiration and level of achievement. The mutual proportion between goals and means is thus substantively rational. Now, as we discovered earlier (see Part I of this Book), Durkheim believed that a creative "marginal leaven of anomie," as LaCapra nicely puts it, was necessary for progressive moral evolution. Indeed, this is the meaning of his somewhat puzzling acknowledgement that the "entire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable from anomie." In the section on the "forced division of labor" in his first great book, for instance, Durkheim reflected:

> It will be said that it is not always sufficient to make men content, that there are some men whose desires go beyond their faculties. This is true, but these are exceptional and ... morbid cases. Normally, man finds happiness in realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to his means (DL:376).

And earlier in the same book, Durkheim observed:

> There are, to be sure, individuals whose need for the new attains exceptional intensity. Nothing existent satisfies them, they thirst for the impossible. They would like to put in the place of imposed reality another. But these incorrigible grumblers are unhealthy,

and their pathological character only confirms what we have just said.... We must not forget that this need is intrinsically indeterminate. It attaches us to nothing precise, since it is a need of something which does not exist. It is then only half-constituted, for a complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will, and a certain object. As the object is not given without, it can have no other reality than that which imagination lends it (DL:254-5).

And, in terms that apply equally well to egoisme as to anomie, Durkheim continued:

This process is half-representational. It consists more in combinations of images, in a sort of intimate poetry, than in an effective movement of the will. It does not take us out of ourselves; it is scarcely more than an internal agitation seeking a way out not yet found. We dream of new sensations, but it is a bodyless desire floating about. Consequently, even where it is most energetic, it cannot have the force of firm and defined needs ... directing the will always in the same direction and by well-beaten paths (DL:255).

By definition, a "marginal leaven of anomie" is localized and contained, for it is abnormal, pathological, in a word, "profane." On the other hand, by definition, health is based upon balance among the many competing claims to human virtue. Health, the baseline of all comparisons of "insatiable morbidity" and pathological excess, is anchored in the "golden mean."

Health consists in a mean activity. It implies ... a harmonious development of all functions, and functions can develop harmoniously only by virtue of moderating one another, by being mutually contained within limits beyond which sickness begins and pleasure ceases (DL:237).

Conversely:

... An inability to restrict one's self within determinate limits is a sign of disease--with respect to all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for all kinds of biological behavior. With a certain amount of nourishment a normal man is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be satisfied (ME:38).

Now, Durkheim's vision of all aspects of the modern world as dominated by the omnipresence of extremes is reflected negatively in cases as widely divergent as war-time

Germany's "will mania" (see <u>Germany Above All</u>, 1915), and
even in the intricacies of philosophical and sociological
method. In his <u>Rules</u>, for example, Durkheim went so far as
to equate the anomie of the modern will and imagination with
Bacon's notion of "idols of the mind."

> ... (these) ideas are those <u>notiones</u> <u>vulgares</u> or
> <u>prenotiones</u> which he points out to be the basic
> ideas of all sciences, where they take the place
> of facts. These <u>idola</u>, which are illusions that
> distort the real aspect of things, are neverthe-
> less mistaken for the things themselves. There-
> fore, the mind, encountering no resistance in this
> imaginary world and conscious of no restraint,
> <u>gives itself up to boundless ambitions and comes</u>
> <u>to believe in the possibility of reconstructing</u>
> <u>the world by virtue of its own resources exclusive-</u>
> <u>ly and at the whim of its desires</u>*(R:17).

While Descartes was not an idealist, surely this founder of
Durkheim's own cultural tradition cannot be absolved from a
degree of complicity in this fundamental enshrinment of mo-
dern subjectivity. For almost all the pioneers of the modern
world--Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Leibnitz,
Locke, among others--each in his own way, ·<u>institutionalized</u>
<u>subjectivity</u> <u>as</u> <u>the</u> <u>foundation</u> <u>of</u> <u>legitimate</u> <u>moral</u> <u>and</u> <u>in-</u>
<u>tellectual</u> <u>authority</u>. Had any great Western philosopher be-
fore Descartes, for example (and herein we glimpse the e-
pochal nature of his achievement), dared to doubt all re-
ceived truth and, in beginning <u>de</u> <u>novo</u>, attempted to ground
the existence of reality and even of God Himself in his
own indubitable "inner certitude"?

By contrast, the objectivism of Durkheim's own socio-
logical methodology was grounded precisely in his insistence
on the objective nature of "social facts,"and on the limit-
ations of unrestrained subjectivity. Whatever its flaws, in
The <u>Rules</u> Durkheim sought to give both a legitimate object
and defined limit to sociological investigation, a charter
that has remained valid, in its general outlines, to this
very day. Against the extreme nominalism of the Utilitarian's
moral and mental calculus of efficiency, Durkheim argued

for a rather different notion of conscience and conscious-
ness.

> Our method, however, has the advantage of regulating
> action at the same time as thought. If the social val-
> ues are not subjects of observation but can and must
> be determined by a sort of mental calculus, no limit,
> so to speak, can be set for the free inventions of
> the imagination in search of the best. For how can
> one assign perfection a limit? It escapes all limita-
> tion, by definition. The goal of humanity recedes
> into infinity, discouraging some by its very remote-
> ness, and arousing others who, in order to draw a lit-
> tle nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into re-
> volutions. This practical dilemma may be escaped if
> the desirable is defined in the same way as is health
> and normality, and if health is something that is de-
> fined as inherent in things. For then the object of
> our efforts is both given and defined at the same time.
> It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an ob-
> jective that retreats as one advances, but of working
> with steady perserverance to maintain the normal state,
> of reestablishing it if it is threatened, and of redis-
> covering its conditions if they have changed. The duty
> of the statesman is no longer to push society toward
> an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is
> that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of ill-
> nesses by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when
> they have appeared (R:75).

Now, as we discovered in Book One, in Moral Education
Durkheim most fully spelled out his philosophy of "human
finitude" in terms of the nature of society as moral disci-
pline. Since we have explored many of these passages at
great length earlier, now we merely recall their signifi-
cance. There, Durkheim observed that energy, whether it be
physical, social or cultural, naturally tends to indefini-
tely expand its radius of movement. In the first schema of
suicide, social norms became the containers, as it were, of
the vital but always potentially explosive energies and pas-
sions of the pre-socialized organic ego. In the second
schema, however, cultural norms themselves become the prime
sources of this energy. If legitimized, and if previous
traditional constraints fade, then new socioculturally sanc-
tioned desires may explode massively and rapidly. And if
expectations soar far beyond what is possible, then des-

truction may result. With the coming of market capitalism, in particular, this is precisely what happened. For the internationalization of the trading market, and the corresponding expansion of the range of desires and culturally sanctioned expectations, meant that the radius of energies potentially destructive of self, society, and world was chronically released from legitimate control. In _Moral Education_, for example, Durkheim argued:

> A need, a desire, freed from all restraint, and all rules, no longer geared to some determinate objective, and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it. What gratification, indeed, can such desires yield, since by definition, it is incapable of being satisfied? An insatiable thirst cannot be slaked. If certain actions are to give us pleasure, we must feel that they serve some purpose, that is to say, bring us progressively closer to the goal we seek (ME:39-40).

Man can only hope to be happy when there is a mutual and meaningful proportion between means and ends; when substantive, instead of formal and functional, rationality prevails. Freedom and hope, as with so much else in the modern world, suffer from being conceived of primarily in negative terms.

> In order to have a full sense of self-realization, man, far from needing to see limitless horizons unravelling before him, in reality finds nothing as unhappy as the indeterminate reach of such a prospect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career without any definite terminus, he can only be happy when involved in definite and specific tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however, that man must arrive at some fixed position where ultimately he finds tranquility. In intermittent stages one can pass from one special task to others equally specific, without drowning in the dissolving sense of limitlessness. The important thing is that behavior have a clear-cut objective, which may be grasped and which limits and determines it (ME:40).

Indeed, LaCapra tells us that Durkheim's philosophy of health and virtue as the "golden mean" appeared in one of his earliest (1887) publications:

> How I prefer the words of the old sages who recommend
> before all else the full and tranquil possession of
> oneself. No doubt, the spirit as it develops needs to
> have before it vaster horizons; but for all that it
> does not change its nature and remains finite (LaCapra:
> 1972:170).

Further, LaCapra rightly remarks:

> Durkheim's concept of achievement cannot be identi-
> fied with a generalized performance principle in so-
> ciety. Limitless competitive striving was for him a
> conspicuous case of anomie. Achievement in Durkheim's
> normal society had the very classical meaning of ful-
> filling one's nature in ways complementary to the
> self-fulfillment of others. Limitless striving would
> be restricted to a marginal aspect of the average per-
> sonality, and to marginal groups of exceptional indi-
> viduals (1972:140).

Now, the key to Durkheim's philosophy of "human fini-
tude," that "all excess is bad as well as all insufficiency,"
rested on the premise that "life itself is a complex equil-
ibrium."

> In order to live, we have to confront the multiple
> requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital
> energy. The amount of energy that we can and should
> devote to achieving each particular goal is neces-
> sarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of
> the strength at our disposal, and the relative sig-
> nificance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a
> complex equilibrium whose various elements limit one
> another; this balance cannot be disrupted without
> producing unhappiness or illness. Moreover, these
> activities in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupt-
> ed become a cause of pain to the person--and for the
> same reason: the disproportionate development accord-
> ed them (ME:39-40).

Indeed, Durkheim proposed that: "Man ... is made for life
in a determinate, limited environment, however extended it
may be." All of this derived from his "relational realism."

> To live is to put ourselves in harmony with the phys-
> ical world surrounding us and with the social world
> of which we are members; however extended their realms,
> they are nevertheless limited. The goals we normally
> seek are equally delimited, and we are not free to
> transcend the limits without placing ourselves at odds
> with nature. At each moment of time, our hopes, our
> feelings of all sorts must be within bounds. The func-
> tion of discipline is to guarantee such restraint. If
> such necessary limits are lacking, if the moral forces

surrounding us no longer contain or moderate our pas-
sions, human conduct--being no longer constrained--
loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is
disguised and adorned with the specious label of the
infinite (ME:48).

Durkheim never wavered from this philosophy of fini-
tude. Indeed, when he came to criticize Germany's "will
mania," he grounded his opposition in his country's ene-
mies violation of the very structure and logic of the world.

> The normal healthy will, however vigorous, accepts
> the necessary relationship of dependence inherent
> in the nature of things. Man is part of the physi-
> cal system which supports, but at the same time
> limits him, and keeps him in a state of dependence.
> He therefore submits to the laws of this system,
> for he cannot change them; he obeys them, even when
> he makes them serve his ends. For to free himself
> entirely of these limitations and resistances, he
> would have to make a vacuum around him, to place
> himself ... outside the conditions of life (1915:44).

The finitude of nature is matched internally, for "... there
are limits based on the nature of things, that is to say, in
the nature of each of us" (ME:49). Thus:

> ... the way to be happy is to set proximate and
> realizable goals, corresponding to the nature of
> each person, and not to attempt to reach object-
> ives by straining neurotically and unhappily to-
> ward infinitely distant and consequently inaccess-
> ible goals (ME:49).

If we are not to invest ourselves in self-destruction,
how can one disagree with Durkheim's philosophy of health
and virtue as the "golden mean?" LaCapra sums up this phil-
osophy in these terms:

> Society and personality as complementary integrated
> wholes whose finite fullness was activated and agi-
> tated by a marginal leaven of anomie: this was Durk-
> heim's essential vision throughout his life (1972:171).

E. Marginalism and Regression to the "Golden Mean"

Our capacity for happiness is very limited (DL:235).

Pleasure loses its intensity through repetition.
If it becomes too continuous, it disappears com-
pletely (DL:252).

Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited
extent   (R:71).

It is interesting to note that Durkheim's philosophy
of the "golden mean" found reinforcement in the theory of
"marginalism" developed in economics and psychology in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. The revolution in
psychological theory led by men such as Fechner and Weber,
and in economic psychology by Gossen and others,was basi-
cally simple, but very significant. These men finally recog-
nized that one can describe a curve of increasing and then
decreasing want or pleasure, that each additional increment
of stimulus or pleasure beyond a certain point of satiabil-
ity or sensitivity becomes, in the same proportion, less ef-
fective as motivation. Hence the term "marginalism," for
beyond the margin of satiation, each additional increment
or "pleasure unit" becomes decreasingly, or marginally, ef-
fective.

Now, it is striking that Durkheim's resurrection of
the ancient wisdom of the "golden mean" as the basis of
health and virtue also emphasized this crucial psychologi-
cal fact. Durkheim's philosophy of "human finitude" and his
notion of life as "a complex equilibrium," led him to pro-
pose that "our capacity for happiness is very limited." In
other words, there are definite parameters, minimums and
maximums, beyond which both pleasure and pain cannot pass.

Indeed, it is a truth generally recognized today
that pleasure accompanies neither the very intense
states of consciousness, nor those of the very feeb-
le. There is pain when the functional activity is
insufficient, but excessive activity produces the
same effects.... Pleasure is, then, situated between
these two extremes. This proposition is, besides, a

corollary of the law of Weber and Fechner.... They
have removed doubt from at least one point. It is
that the variations of intensity through which a
sensation can pass are comprised within two limits.
If the stimulus is too feeble, it is not felt; but
if it surpasses a certain degree, the increase pro-
duces less and less effect, until they cease to be
felt. Now, this law is equally true of the quality
of sensation called pleasure. It was even formulated
for pleasure and pain long before it was for other
elements of sensation. Bernoulli applied it directly
to the most complex sentiments, and Laplace, inter-
preting it in the same sense, gave it the form of a
relation between physical fortune and moral fortune.
The gamut of variations through which the intensity
the same pleasure can run is thus limited (DL:235-6).

Instead of the absoluteness of constantly expanding
wants tacitly presumed by the Utilitarian economists, Durk-
heim, along with the marginal theorists, observed that the
standard of value is relative to the level of aspiration,
and historically to the degree of sociocultural and moral
evolution.

... If the states of conscience whose intensity is
moderated are generally agreeable, they do not all
present conditions equally favorable to the product-
ion of pleasure. In the region of the lower limit,
the changes through which agreeable activity passes
are too small in absolute value to determine senti-
ments of pleasure of great energy. On the other hand,
when it approaches the point of indifference, that is,
its maximum, the magnitude developed has too feeble
a relative value. A man who has very little capital
cannot easily increase it in proportions significant
to change his condition perceptibly. That is why eco-
nomies carry too little joy with them; they are too
petty to improve the situation. The insignificant ad-
vantages procure do not compensate for the privations
they have cost. In the same way, a man whose fortune
is excessive finds pleasure only in exceptional bene-
ficence, for he measures its importance by what he al-
ready has. It is quite otherwise with average fortunes.
Here, both the absolute size and the relative size of
the variations are in best condition for production
of pleasure, for they are sufficiently important, and
yet it is not necessary for them to be extraordinary
to be estimated at their worth. The standard measur-
ing their value is not yet so high as to result in
strong depreciation. The intensity of an agreeable
stimulus can then increase usefully only between lim-
its still more closely related than we first said,

for it can only produce its full effect in the inter-
val which corresponds to the average part of the a-
greeable activity. Above and below that, pleasure
still exists, but it is not proportional to the cause
producing it, whereas, in the limited zone, the least
oscillations are felt and appreciated. Nothing of the
energy of the stimulus converted to pleasure is lost
(DL:236).

The two main variables of stimuli--intensity and repetition--
are both contained within parameters, within the "golden
mean."

What we have just said of the intensity of each stim-
ulus could be repeated of their number. They cease
to be agreeable when they are too many or too few,
as when they surpass or do not attain a certain de-
gree of vivacity. It is not without reason that hu-
man experience sees the condition of happiness in
the golden mean (DL:236-7).

Durkheim's philosophy of finitude and the "golden
mean" thus flew in the face of the Utilitarian ethos which
assumed that "more is better," that functional efficiency,
high productivity, high consumption, in short, "progress,"
would not only have few ill side-effects, but that it was
both possible and desirable. But was Durkheim not closer
to the truth when he suggested:

... pleasure ... loses its intensity through repeti-
tion. If it becomes too continuous, it disappears com-
pletely.... To the extent that we accustom ourselves
to a certain type of happiness, it flees from us, and
we are obliged to throw ourselves into new underta-
kings to recapture it. We must bring the extinguish-
ed pleasure to life again by means of more energetic
stimuli, that is, multiply or render those which we
have more intense. But that is possible only if work
becomes more productive and, consequently, more divi-
ded. Thus, each realized advance in art, science, in-
dustry, would necessitate new advances, so as not to
lose the fruits of the new preceding advance (DL:252).

Hence, we embark upon the treadmill of modern existence,
where one must advance simply to keep from falling back.
If this really represented generic human experience, one
might be tempted to agree with Norman O. Brown's dictum
that "Man is a disease of history"!

The equilibrium time destroys cannot be reestablished,
nor can happiness be maintained at a constant level

without attempts which are the more disagreeable as
they approach the higher limit of pleasure, for in
the region adjoining the maximum point the increases
are steadily lower than the corresponding stimuli.
More trouble must be taken for the same reward. What
is gained on one side is lost on the other, and loss
is avoided only through new expenditure. Consequent-
ly, for the operation to be profitable, this loss
would at least have to be important, and the need
for reparation strongly felt. But, in fact, it has
only a very mediocre energy, because simple repeti-
tion brings nothing essential to pleasure (DL:253).

Nor, as some suggest, does constant novelty substi-
tute for the marginality of repetition of pleasure. Indeed,
Durkheim took pains to point out that it is "... necessary
not to confuse the claim of variety with that of novelty."

The first is the necessary condition of pleasure,
since an uninterrupted enjoyment disappears or is
changed into pain. But time alone does not suppress
variety; continuity must be added to it. A state oft-
en repeated, but in discontinuous manner, can remain
agreeable, for, if continuity destroys pleasure, it
is either because it makes it unwitting, or because
the play of each function demands an outlay which,
prolonged without interruption, is exhausting and
becomes painful. If, then, the act, in becoming ha-
bitual, returns only at separated intervals, it will
continue to be felt, and the expenditures will be re-
placed in the intervals. That is why a healthy adult
always sleeps, eats, drinks, every day. It is the
same with the needs of the spirit, which are, also,
periodic as the psychical functions to which they
correspond. The pleasures that music brings, or the
arts, or sciences, are integrally maintained provi-
ded they alternate (DL:253).

By no means can the periodicity of regular needs be consi-
dered a source of potential insatiability. Time simply de-
mands that regular needs shall be more or less regularly
satisfied; but these needs are largely determinate, as are
the satisfactions.

If continuity can do what repetition cannot, it does
not inspire us with a need for new and unforeseen
stimuli. For, if it totally abolishes the conscious-
ness of the agreeable state, we cannot discover that
the pleasure attached to it has vanished at the same
time. It is replaced by the general feeling of well-
being accompanying the regular exercise of functions
normally continued which is not their least worth....

There is, then, nothing in the way in which time af-
fects the fundamental element of pleasure that can
provoke us to some sort of progress. It is true that
it is otherwise with novelty, whose attraction is not
durable. But if it gives greater freshness to pleas-
ure, it does not constitute it. It is only one of
its secondary and accessory qualities (DL:253).

Now, what is really striking about these notions
that the standard of value is relative, and that there is
no absolute beckoning us on to progress through constant
increase of wants, and that the schedule of wants is social-
ly constructed, is not the painfully obvious fact of the
satiability or "marginality" of wants, but rather: how could
the Utilitarians have tacitly presumed that the opposite
was true? The question is analogous to my incredulity at
the naivete of the famous Hawthorne experiments, for instead
of enshrining this case as a classic, my question is: how
could the original experimenters have been so blind? In
both cases, we should invert the meaning of the so-called
"revolution" in theory which supposedly resulted, for what
truly requires explanation is the original hidden biases
which held these "pioneers" back! As always, it was their
materialist and atomist predispositions which led the Util-
itarians astray. In terms of the materialist account of
the origins and expression of human economic wants, for in-
stance, we are left helpless to explain the insatiability
of the drives dominating so much of economic action. For
on the physical level, as Durkheim himself established,
wants are relatively fixed and constant; indeed, organic
needs serve as the very paradigm of satiability (see part
I of this Book). The really curious fact, then, is how the
Utilitarian theorists could blithely ignore such an obvious
fact when their own root rationale of "common sense" might
have immediately revealed that organic wants are inherent-
ly limited. For if economic wants are primarily material,
then they are also limited. On the other hand, if one re-
cognizes that not nature alone but society too is the sour-
ce of economic motivations, then the symbolic nature and

imperative character of so many such economically expressed
desires becomes more understandable. Since the economy is
the nexus between the natural and cultural spheres, the
"ideal" or potentially insatiable character of economic
desires, as opposed to fixed and limited organic needs, be-
comes clear.

In this manner, the Utilitarians unwittingly placed
a difficult obstacle in the path of progress of their own
economic theory. For if one presumes materialism and atom-
ism, after each has satisfied his own individual material
survival needs, isn't our continued and seemingly unending
quest for material satisfaction substantively irrational?
But this is, in effect, precisely what classical economic
theory presumed, since labor was the fount of all economic
value, and unending methodical work was the visible char-
acter of an upright character structure (eg. see Parsons,
1949 on Marshall), men would continue to constantly strive
to increase the technical efficiency of production and,
thus, indirectly but almost automatically increase the scale
of consumption. For wouldn't more material goods make us
happier? The Utilitarians' implicit assumption of the abso-
luteness of material wants and their potentially infinite
satiability, was a fatal flaw that had to be resolved before
economic theory could progress (eg. the Austrian school,
Walras, Pareto, and many others developed the implications
of the basic insights of "marginalism"). Further, I believe,
after Weber and Parsons, that these insistent claims can
only be fully understood, in the last analysis, as a sym-
bolic assertion of over-riding ethical demands. Indeed,
was this not Parsons' purpose in examining Marshall's no-
tion of the insatiability of wants in relation to charact-
er structure (eg. see Parsons, 1949: 514)?

Now, "marginalism" in economic theory was important
not only because it helped to resolve formal theoretical
problems in relating so-called "exchange values" to "use
values," as Parsons (1949:130) suggests, but also because

for the first time the stubborn and incontrovertible fact
was finally explicitly and and systematically recognized
that each additional increment beyond a certain point di-
minished, rather than increased, further desire. The sig-
nificance of this finally obvious conclusion could not be
evaded forever. Indeed, I believe that it was only ethi-
cally driven desires for "progress and perfection," ori-
ginally moral and spiritual but now displaced, that could
have sanctioned this massive and sustained irrationality
at the very heart of economic rationality. It is no sur-
prise that Gossen's discovery was first known as "the law
of satiability of wants." The simple and obvious law of
diminishing returns on effort and stimulation counteracts
the tacit ethically driven presumption that wants and stim-
ulation are potentially infinite, that the more we have,
the more we want, and that this infinite stairway upward
can continue forever. Thus, "marginalism" has come to be
considered a major revolution in economic and psychologi-
cal theory in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
But, clearly, Durkheim, still largely unaffected by the
Utilitarian biases, had little trouble in independently re-
cognizing the importance of the "marginal" perspective and
regression to the "golden mean."

Indeed, when placed in proper historical perspective,
what is so striking is that we could have resolutely for-
gotten the ancient moral wisdom which counsels that health,
virtue, and happiness are rooted in the "golden mean." For
it was this classical insight, so conspicuous by its ab-
sence from the ethics of the modern era, which led Durkheim
and other moral philosophers, such as Camus, to see that
human life and health, while swept up in a constantly pro-
gressing equilibrium, is, nonetheless, always anchored in
a dialectical relationship or "golden mean" between all
opposites.

F.   Legitimacy of Wants and the Social Schedule
              of Satisfaction

>   What is needed if social order is to reign is that
>   the mass of men be content with their lot. But what
>   is needed for them to be content, is not that they
>   have more or less, but that they are convinced they
>   have no right to more (Soc:242).

In contrast to the Utilitarian notion that economi-
cally expressed wants are materially based and atomistic
(random), Durkheim's sociological perspective led him to
propose that desires are culturally generated and social-
ly scheduled. Assuming that "life is a complex equilibrium,"
and that "no living being can be happy or even exist un-
less his needs are proportioned to his means"(S:246), Durk-
heim made the crucial suggestion that such desires must be
legitimate if they are to be entertained as candidates for
satisfaction in the social schedule of the ascending scale
of wants. Thus, in moving from his first to his second
schema, we shall retain his philosophy of human finitude,
and the notion of the social schedule, and intensify the
sociocultural significance of these premises by shifting
the location of insatiability from homo duplex to modern
society and culture. Further, we shall see that these in-
satiable desires are legitimized in the modern ethos of
market capitalism. Because they are legitimized virtues
through the mechanism of the market, the "moral anarchy"
of anomie reigns.

For purposes of comparison, it is clear that the dom-
inant Utilitarian stream of economic theorizing, which con-
stitutes both the historical and logical baseline against
which almost all other alternative schools of economic
thought have reacted, entertained a very specific type of
psychology. Indeed, behind the program of the "philosophic
radicals" and their predecessors (reaching back at least
to Hobbes, Wm. Petty, Locke, Adam Smith, etc.) for moral

reconstruction of society and man lay an "associationist" psychology (see especially Halevy, 1955). In the hands of Bentham and his followers, of course, the associationist psychology became cast in terms of the famous "hedonistic calculus" of pain and pleasure. In later economic theory, still largely rooted in analogous presuppositions concerning man's "innate propensities," the once vibrant ethical postulates receded farther into the background. However, the nominalistic emphasis on the inner psychological nature of economic motivation as the supposed paradigm of rationality itself--essentially an "economizing" type of calculation of "efficiency" (see K. Polanyi, 1968)--remained solid throughout.

Consider, for example, contemporary post-Marshallian micro-economic theory. I simply do not find it very enlightening to think that wants, in generic terms, as the basis of consumer demand, are ultimately rooted in idiosyncratic individual "tastes." This seemingly empirical, but misleading, premise implies that individual "tastes," and the underlying "drives," are prime motivational categories, and thus, the key to consumer demand. But I suggest that "tastes" are not prime analytical categories, analogous to tracing a specific need to a specific location in the organism. Even the most rudimentary sociological perspective suggests that societies, not isolated individual atoms floating in the void of the international market, generate personality structures, motivations, desires, self-images, and so on. For these are primarily sociocultural phenomenological processes. In addition, the term "tastes" implies a certain arbitrariness or pervading "randomness of ends" (see Parsons, 1949) concerning the origin and structure of human desires, which suggests that these are largely incommensurable from one person to another. By contrast, a sociocultural view suggests that instead of random, autonomous, and idiosyncratic "tastes," socially and culturally generated and directed desires are often fairly standarized. Further,

by assuming that these supposedly random individual "tast-
es" are physically generated, and thus expressed in terms
of physical goods, the Utilitarian economic theorists tend-
ed to encircle themselves in a kind of self-fulfilling tau-
tology--physical wants for physical goods for physical
wants, and so on and so forth.

On the contrary, we must inevitably recognize that
there are a multiplicity of reasons for participating in
economic action. We must recognize that economic wants may
be divided into "needs" which are organically generated,
and thus comparatively fixed in their nature and standard
of satiability, on the one hand, and on the other we see
"desires" which are socioculturally generated, and thus com-
paratively variable in their object and standard of satia-
bility. In this dialectical combination of "needs" and "de-
sires," the first emerging from the organism and the second
from society, there lies the truth of Durkheim's doctrine
of man as homo duplex. Therefore, the fully sociocultural
perspective on economic action suggests that the economy
is the nexus between the material and symbolic spheres of
society. All economic systems have dual functions--the al-
location of both material and symbolic resources. Every
economy is simultaneously engaged in the production and
distribution of goods, services, privileges, and desired
symbols.

Therefore, in Durkheimian and sociological terms,
every society is faced with similar sociocultural and eco-
nomic problems of negotiating a variable ratio , in terms
of available resources and the legitimacy of the schedule
of satisfaction of wants, between organically generated
"needs" (eg. food) and socioculturally generated "desires"
(eg. honor or the demands of charisma). The dual nature
of economic wants, the simultaneity of economic motivations,
shifts in the legitimacy of wants and in the historical
schedules of satisfaction, these and other crucial factors

make not only for the great complexity of human economic action, but for its potential insatiability as well.

Since we have already pursued some of these notions pertaining to the social schedule of satisfaction (see especially part I of Book Two), let us now briefly look at Durkheim's perception that both wants themselves and their schedule must be accepted as legitimate if society and economy are to work. Since human hearts and minds cannot be restrained or directed by external, physical forces, only Durkheimian moral forces, sociocultural forces, are capable of touching the "awakened human conscience." In shifting from schema one to schema two, we see that society not only moralizes egos, but also that culture is the energizing and directing force of the socially constructed person. Socially constructed and directed "desires" are legitimate, those beyond and below are proscribed. This is what Durkheim tried to say, albeit unsuccessfully, with his early notion of man as homo duplex. Therefore, as with Max Weber, the basic category in Durkheim's doctrine was egitimate moral authority.

For the socioeconomic order to work properly, for the person to be properly motivated and directed, for culture to regulate and energize "desires," certain ratios of satisfaction, between a person and his station, and between his desires and resources, must be considered more or less legitimate by all.

> ... in every society and in all ages there exists a vague but lively sense of the value of the various services used in society, and of the values, too, of the things that are the subject of exchange. Although neither of these factors is regulated by tariff, there is, however, in every social group a state of opinion that fixes its normal value at least roughly. There is an average figure that is considered as the true price, as the one that expresses the true value of a thing at a given moment (PECM:209).

Many things contribute, besides scarcity, to the determination of the "fair price":

All sorts of causes enter into the way it has evol-
ved: that is, a sense of the true usefulness of things
and services, of the labor they have cost, of the re-
lative ease or difficulty in producing them, tradi-
tions and prejudices of every kind, and so on.... This
scale is certainly a real one, and it is the touchstone
by which the equity of exchanges is to be judged (PECM:
209-210).

Further, we saw that in schema one Durkheim spoke as if the social
schedule served to constrain individual desires.

... It is absolutely essential that there be an auth-
ority whose superiority they acknowledge and which
tells them what is right. For an individual committed
only to the pressure of his needs will never admit
that he has reached the extreme limits of his right-
ful portion. If he is not conscious of a force above
him which he respects, which stops him and tells him
with authority that the compensation due him is ful-
filled, then inevitably he will expect as due all that
his needs demand. And since in our hypothesis these
needs are limitless, their exigency is necessarily
without limit (Soc:242-3).

But having already set aside Durkheim's hypothesis, based
upon the image of man as homo duplex, that these needs are
inherently insatiable, we see that in schema two the modern
social schedule itself acts to generate and legitimize these
potentially infinite social and cultural desires.

At the base of Durkheim's theory of the social sche-
dule was the notion that economic value is socially, not
individualistically, determined.

... it is not the amount of labor put into a thing
which makes its value; it is the way in which the
value of this thing is assessed by the society, and
this valuation depends, not so much on the amount of
energy expended, as on the useful results it produces,
such as they are felt to be by the collectivity, for
there is a subjective factor there which cannot be
ruled out (PECM:216).

In addition, a crucial observation is that the social sche-
dule of price and income changes through history (on all of
this see S:249-51).

This normal price is, of course, an ideal price only:
it very rarely coincides with the real price which
naturally varies according to circumstances; there
is no official price list to apply to every indivi-
dual case. It is only a fixed point, around which

> there must inevitably be many fluctuations; but these
> cannot go beyond a certain range in any direction with-
> out seeming abnormal. We might even say that the more
> societies evolve the more does this structure of val-
> ues become stable and regulated and unaffected by any
> local conditions or special circumstances, so that
> they come to assume an objective form. When every farm
> and almost every village had its own market, the price
> scale varied according to the locality: each had the
> scale and tariff that suited it. These variations left
> far more lee-way to a shrewd personal ingenuity and
> calculation. This is why bargaining and individual
> prices are one of the characteristic features of pet-
> ty trading and small scale industry.
> The more we advance, on the other hand, the more do
> prices come to have an international basis: and this
> through the system of stock exchanges and controlled
> markets whose action covers a whole continent. Former-
> ly, under the system of local markets, there had to
> be negotiating and a battle of wits, to know on what
> terms an object could be had; today, we only have to
> open a well-informed journal. We are becoming increas-
> ingly used to the idea that the true price of things
> exchanged should be fixed previous to the contract and
> be in no way governed by it (PECM:210).

Durkheim here provided us with a series of seminal suggest-
ions concerning the evolution of the social schedule and
the delegitimation of traditional ones rooted in the small
scale life of the village. Let us pursue these clues.

Now, in general, for the traditional social schedule to
have broken down so irretrievably, and for absolutizing in-
dividualism and legitimate insatiability to have been en-
shrined in its place, there must have been a delegitimiza-
tion of the old norms of tribe and neighborhood which ac-
companied the extension of the international market. Indeed,
delegitimization of old norms and legitimation of new and
unlimited individual aspirations probably went hand in hand.
Again and again, Durkheim emphasized the critical element
of moral legitimacy which underpins shifts in all socioeco-
nomic schedules. Whereas before in history the potential
insatiability of culturally generated desires absolutized
society and tradition, today very different types of de-
sires, precisely because of their moral sanctions, absolu-
tize the individual and the "tradition of the new." Where-

as before it was legitimate to desire only as much as one's
father received, and his father before him, today it is le-
gitimate, nay expected, to peg one's hopes for a beginning
salary higher than one's father ever received!

> ... it would be of little use for everyone to re-
> cognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions
> established by public opinion, if he did not also
> consider the distribution of these functions just.
> The workman is not in harmony with his social posi-
> tion if he is not convinced that he has his desserts.
> If he feels justified in occupying another, what he
> has could not satisfy him. So it is not enough for
> the average level of needs for each social condition
> to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more
> precise rule must fix the way in which these condi-
> ditions are open to individuals. There is no society
> in which such regulation does not exist. It varies
> with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the
> almost exclusive principle of social classification;
> today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than
> hereditary fortune and merit (S:250-1).

We may preliminarily conclude, therefore, that the shift to
a stratification system based upon individual achievement
accompanied the breakdown of the traditional, small scale
social schedule and the release of insatiable demands. In
the reversal of the traditional social schedule in terms of
the enthronement of legitimized insatiability and the "cult
of the individual," we see that both sets of suicidal types,
altruisme/fatalisme and anomie/egoisme, demonstrate the ex-
tremes to which societies and cultures can go in absoluti-
zing one or another element of the complex human equation
(see also ME:49). In both cases, Durkheim suggested there
must be a rebalancing of the books, a new and more human
equilibrium, with less tyranny of these warring and destroy-
ing absolutes.

Now, it is not sufficient to explain this revolution
in the social schedule as Durkheim was tempted to do in his
first schema merely in terms of the erosion of the tradi-
tional "collective conscience" by the progressive division
of labor. Indeed, in The Division of Labor itself, Durkheim
came very close to the Weberian notions of economic tradi-

tionalism of archaic societies, and the obstacles that had
to be overcome by certain crucial world-historical break-
throughs.

> Indeed, a change of existence, whether it be sudden
> or prepared, always brings forth a painful crisis,
> for it does violence to acquired instincts which op-
> pose it. All the past holds us back, even though the
> most beautiful vistas appear before us. It is always
> a laborious operation to pull up the roots of habits
> that time has fixed and organized in us.... A genera-
> tion is not enough to cast aside the work of genera-
> tions, to put a new man in the place of the old....
> Those who find pleasure in regular and persistent
> work are still few and far between. For most men, it
> is still an insupportable servitude. The idleness of
> primitive times has lost its old attractions for them.
> These metamorphoses then cost a great deal for a long
> time without accomplishing anything. The generations
> inaugurating them do not receive the fruits, if there
> are any because they come late. They have only the
> pain. Consequently, it is not the expecation of great-
> er happiness that draws them into such enterprises.
> But, in fact, is it true that the happiness of the in-
> dividual increases as man advances? Nothing is more
> doubtful (DL:241).

As I suggested in part I of this Book, it is most helpful
here to think in terms of the normative preconditions for
such painful breaks with the past, and for breakthroughs
to more powerful future social organizations, especially
when we attempt to explain the emergence of modern societ-
ies, modern personality structures, and modern desires. The
modern economic cosmos is possible, for example, only if
the highly restrictive bonds of social fraternization of
primitive and traditional societies are set aside. The so-
cial bond must be progressively extended to include more
universalistic exchanges. However, as the social bond is
more widely extended, as Tocqueville, Maine, Toennies, and
Weber among classical writers, and Benjamin Nelson (1973a)
among contemporary observers, have noted, the "brotherhood"
or "neighborhood ethic" also becomes increasingly attenua-
ted, and a sort of impersonal "universal otherhood" reigns
in its place. In short, as the social bond is extended,
its intensity lessens.

Therefore, in order to adequately explain the break-down of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, we must simultaneously explain the power of the forces that broke through this heavy and massively legitimized system of authority. We must try to account not merely for the release of the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," as Durkheim's early doctrine of homo duplex tried to do, but also, and more importantly, for the stimulation and legitimation of these new desires. In other words, we should try to explain the origin and continuing sanction of this modern "revolution of rising expectations." If we complete the shift from the analytical axis of absence to the presence of cultural sanctions, may we not then conclude that the generation and sustenance of such desires, far from being due to the release of the organic ego from moral control, might itself be the unanticipated result of a peculiar form of extreme moral discipline pervasive in the modern world?

G.   The <u>Origin</u> <u>and</u> <u>Continuing</u> <u>Sanction</u> <u>for</u> <u>Our</u> <u>Modern</u>
        <u>Revolution</u> <u>of</u> <u>Rising</u> <u>Expectations</u>

In contrast to traditional moral philosophies, the
dominant note of the modern economic ethos has been unlim-
ited aspirations, a veritable "infinity of dreams and de-
sires." This utopian image of a cornucopia of plenty is,
of course, the core of the American Dream as it is lived
out today. Clearly, some basic shift must have occurred in
the axis of the modern moral universe for drives for unend-
ing "progress and perfection," daily represented as virtues,
to have been translated into economic action. But where did
these drives and desires come from? And how have they come
to be so massively legitimated?

Delegitimation and relegitimation, conflicting moral
challenges and moral claims, the competition of one charisma
against another--surely these are most complex sociocultural
processes. In the second schema, the refusal to acquiesce in
the face of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, and
the moral sanctioning of a new and absolute sphere for the
autonomous individual, and the legitimizing of a "longing
for the infinite," can only have emerged from a long series
of challenges and conflicts between competing systems of
moral authority, of competing rationales for informing and
directing structures of conscience and consciousness. There-
fore, it behooves us now, instead of explaining away these
processes as "mechanically generated", as Durkheim allowed
himself to do in the first schema and in <u>The</u> <u>Division</u> <u>of</u>
<u>Labor</u>, to enter more closely into the nature of these chal-
lenges, and their sometimes ironic outcomes. This story
shall be explored in greater detail in Chapter Ten.

In general, in <u>Suicide</u> Durkheim followed the line of
thought earlier established in <u>The</u> <u>Division</u> <u>of</u> <u>Labor</u> concern-
ing the generation of new needs through history. It is the
progress of civilization itself, Durkheim seemed to say,
which generates new needs.

> Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of
> the changes which are produced in the volume and den-
> sity of societies. If science, art, and economic act-
> ivity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity
> which is imposed upon men. It is because there is,
> for them, no other way of living in the new condi-
> tions in which they have been placed. From the time
> that the number of individuals among whom social re-
> lations are established begins to increase, they can
> maintain themselves only by greater specialization,
> harder work, and intensification of their faculties.
> From this general stimulation, there inevitably re-
> sults a much higher degree of culture.... (Civiliza-
> tion) develops because it cannot fail to develop.
> Once effectuated, this development is found to be
> generally useful.... It responds to needs formed at
> the same time because they depend on the same causes.
> But this is an adjustment after the fact. Yet, we
> must notice that the good it renders in this direct-
> ion is not a positive enrichment, a growth in our
> stock of happiness, but only repairs the losses that
> it has itself caused. It is because this superacti-
> vity of general life fatigues and weakens our nervous
> system that it needs reparations proportionate to its
> expenditures, that is to say, more varied and complex
> satisfactions (DL:336-7).

Thus, we see that Durkheim, involved on one rhetorical
front in an argument against the Utilitarians, was not
wholy sanguine about the progressive division of labor.
Yet, as we discovered in Book Two and especially part I
of this Book, Durkheim's thesis was posed on the general
evolutionary level, and largely ignored specific historical
breakthroughs.

Therefore, Durkheim's early answer in The Division
of Labor that "everything happens mechanically" cannot
really hope to explain this modern explosion of desires.
Now, it is striking for our present purposes that at one
point in this book, Durkheim himself stopped to reflect
upon the complex relations between greater production and
consumption.

> A function can become specialized only if this new
> specialization corresponds to some need of society.
> But all new specialization results in increasing
> and improving production.... Therefore, advance can
> be established in permanent form only if individuals
> really feel the need of more abundant products, or

> products of better quality.... For it to become a
> specialty, however, men had to cease being satis-
> fied with what had, until then, satisfied them and
> become more exacting. But whence could these new
> demands come (DL:272)?

At this point, Durkheim still seemed to think that the feed-
back cycle of the division of social labor itself sufficed
as an answer--namely, that the greater competition that ser-
ved as the initial spur for specialization also led to great-
er stress and fatigue, which thus required greater "repara-
tion" and psychic compensation. Although the wish for mater-
ial progress was not itself an adequate explanation, Durk-
heim seemed to assume that greater demand was itself an out-
growth of the progressive division of labor. Thus, rising
desires were an unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome of
this basically mechanical social evolutionary process.

> They are an effect of the same causes which deter-
> mines the progress of the division of labor. We have
> just seen that such progress is due to the greater
> acuteness of the struggle. But a more violent strug-
> gle does not proceed without greater depletion of
> forces, and reparation must be proportionate to the
> expenditure. That is why the dispensations, until
> then sufficient to restore organic equilibrium, are
> insufficient from then on. There must be a more abun-
> dant and choicer sustenance.... It is especially the
> nervous system that supports all these burdens, for
> it must devise ingenious methods to keep them up with
> the struggle, to create new specialities, to acclima-
> tize them, etc. In general, the more subject to change
> the environment is, the greater the part intelligence
> plays in life, for it alone can have new conditions
> of equilibrium continually broken, and yet restore it.
> Cerebral life develops then, at the same time as com-
> petition becomes keener, and to the same degree. These
> advances are observed not only among the elite, but in
> all classes of society....
>
> Besides, it is not without cause that mental diseases
> keep pace with civilization, nor that they rage in ci-
> ties rather than in the country, and in large cities
> more than in small ones. Now, a more voluminous and
> more delicate brain makes greater demands than a less
> refined one. Difficulties and privations the latter
> does not even feel painfully disturb the former. For
> the same reason, more complex stimulants are needed
> to affect this organ agreeably once it is refined, and
> there is greater necessity for them, because it has

been developing at the same time. Finally, more than all the others, needs properly intellectual increase; rough explanations no longer satisfy more perspicacious minds. Fresh insights are needed and science holds these aspirations together at the same time that it satisfies them. All these changes are, then, mechanically produced by necessary causes. If our intelligence and sensibility develop and become keener, it is because we exercise them more, and if we exercise them more, it is because we are forced to by the greater violence of the struggle we have to live through. That is how, without having desired it, humanity is found apt to receive a more intense and varied culture (DL:272-3).

But Durkheim himself then acknowledged that these simple predispositions are not only necessary, not sufficient to explain the advancing desires in modern expanding economies. Rather, he said that the new desires, especially for constant novelty, are awakened and satisfied through the progressive division of labor itself, Durkheim's early deus ex machina.

If another factor did not intervene, however, this simple predisposition would not of itself rear the means for satisfaction, for it constitutes only an aptitude for enjoyment.... Simple aptitudes for enjoyment do not necessarily provoke desire.... Besides, these indeterminate aspirations can rather easily deviate from their natural ends and their normal direction. But, at the very moment when a man is in position to taste these new enjoyments and calls for them, even unconsciously, he finds them within reach, because the division of labor has developed at the same time, and furnishes them to him. Without there having been the least pre-established harmony, these two orders of fact meet, simply because they are effects of the same cause (DL:273-4).

But surely this is a weak explanation; for how could these two very different orders of fact simply converge? In the early stages Weber also relied on weaker explanatory links such as the most troublesome, poetic, notion of "elective affinities."

Here is how the meeting can be conceived. The attraction of novelty would be sufficient to impel man to taste these pleasures. It naturally follows that the greater richness and complexity of these stimulants

would cause him to find those with which he had been content more mediocre. He can, besides, adapt himself to them mentally before having tried them, and as, in reality, they correspond to changes in his constitution he hastens to benefit from them. Experience thus comes to confirm these presentiments; needs which were sleeping awaken, are determined, become aware of themselves, and are organized. This is not to say that this adjustment may be in all cases perfect, that each new product due to new advances in the division of labor always correspond to a real need of our nature. It is, on the contrary, likely that rather often needs are contracted only because one has become accustomed to the object to which they are related. This object was neither necessary nor useful, but it has been experienced several times, and it has been so well enjoyed that it cannot be denied. Harmonies resulting from quite mechanical causes can never be anthing but imperfect and proximate, but they are sufficient to maintain order in general. That is what happens to the division of labor. The advances it makes are, not in all cases, but generally, in harmony with changes in man, and this is what permits them to last (DL:274-5).

This was, in essence, Durkheim's mechanical explanation of the generation of new desires and consumer demand through the progressive division of labor.

From the production side, Durkheim argued that the greater efficiency and productivity of labor also gets caught up in a kind of self-stimulating feedback loop. Indeed, Durkheim suggested that this is yet another reason why the progressive division of labor "... is a source of social cohesion, not only because it limits the activity of each, but also because it increases it" (DL:395).

... The same causes that oblige us to specialize more also oblige us to work more. When the number of competitors becomes greater in society, it also becomes greater in each particular profession. The struggle becomes more lively, and, consequently, more efforts are necessary to sustain it.... Labor becomes more continuous as it is more divided.... In societies which are exclusively agricultural and pastoral, labor is almost entirely suspended during the season of bad weather. In Rome, it was interrupted by a multitude of holidays and days of rest.As we go forward, however, work becomes a permanent occupation, a habit, and indeed, if this habit is sufficiently strengthened, a need   (DL:393-4).

Is it legitimate to wonder whether, beyond the structural
and "mechanical" causes, there might have been something
special about the moral values of the Middle Ages which
made work into a permanent occupation, perhaps even a need.
We might do well to remember Weber's insight that the monks
and ascetic orders were among the first groups to systema-
tically live out a consciously chosen and rationally regu-
lated vocation. Indeed, when one examines that era, one is
struck by the extraordinarily high estimation in which the
monastics, and later, the scholastic philosophers, were held.

Finally, Durkheim hastened to admonish us, however,
that this constant increase in productive capacity and con-
sumer demand did not, as a net outcome, make us happier.
We did not rationally choose to become vocational ascetics,
to work harder and harder, for that is what we must do in
order to satisfy our insatiable demands.

> But, to repeat, we are not happier for that. To be
> sure, once these needs are excited, they cannot be
> suspended without pain. But our happiness is no great-
> er because they are excited. The point at which we
> measure the relative intensity of our pleasures is
> displaced. A subversion of all gradation results. But
> this confusion of classes of pleasures does not im-
> ply an increase. Because the environment is no long-
> er the same, we have to change, and these changes
> have determined others in our manner of being happy,
> but changes do not necessarily imply progress (DL:275).

Later, in Suicide, Durkheim made the notion of intra-
societal competition the driving force behind the genera-
tion of new needs more specific. There he suggested that
since the ratio of scheduled rewards is relational--that
is, one want pitted against another, one group or class
against another--relative deprivation may be a key to the
constant escalation of desires. The ever-escalating demands
of favorably situated groups leads others not similarly fa-
vored to resent the formers' advances. Competition intensi-
fies the struggle. "... The stuggle grows more violent and
painful, both from being less controlled and because compe-
tition is greater. All classes contend among themselves be-

cause no established classification exists" (S:253).

> If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the
> principles controlling the distribution of means a-
> mong various occupations. Since the relations between
> various parts of society are necessarily modified,
> the ideas expressing these relations must change.
> Some particular class especially favored by the cri-
> sis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on
> the other hand, the example of its greater good for-
> tune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it.
> Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion,
> become disoriented, and no longer recognize the lim-
> its proper to them. Besides, they are at the same
> time seized by a sort of natural eretheism simply by
> the greater intensity of public life. With increased
> prosperity, desires increase. At the very moment when
> traditional rules have lost their authority, the rich-
> er prize offered these appetites stimulates them and
> makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The
> state of deregulation or anomie is thus further height-
> ened by passions being less disciplined, precisely when
> they need more disciplining (S:253).

Now, Durkheim's discovery of relative deprivation as a potent force fueling the fires of inflation in modern expanding economies is an important insight into the sociocultural forces underlying the upward wage-price spiral. This unending competition of collective egoisms is an independent variable contributing to the inflation which we now grudgingly accept as the cost of a constantly rising standard of living. The natural status competition in any society was intensified and even apotheosized as legitimate norm by the Utilitarian ethos of the "war of each against all," of "nature red in tooth and claw," of the potent fiction of the "natural identity of interests," and so forth (see especially E. Halevy, 1955). What resulted, of course, was a kind of culturally sanctioned "moral anarchy," a form of legitimate socio-economic civil war in which each group practiced a kind of covert extortion against others through the neutralizing mechanism of the international market.

And in Socialism, Durkheim spoke in the following terms of this rather peculiar war of "collective egoisms," this unending sanctioned spiral of status competition and inflation.

Picture the most productive organization possible,
and a distribution of wealth which assures abundance
to even the humblest--perhaps such a transformation,
at the very moment it was constituted, would produce
an instant of gratification. But this gratification
could only be temporary. For desires, though calmed
for an instant, will quickly acquire new exigencies.
Unless it is admitted that each individual is equal-
ly compensated ... there will always be some workers
who will receive more and others less. So it is in-
evitable that at the end of a short time the latter
find their share meager with what goes to the others,
and as a result new desires arise, for all levels of
the social scale. And besides, even apart from any
feeling of envy, excited desires will tend naturally
to keep outrunning their goals, for the very reason
that there will be nothing before them which stops
them. And they will call all the more imperiously for
a new satisfaction, since those already secured will
have given them more strength and vitality (Soc:242).

Thus, the treadmill of modern, progressive existence speeds
up. As we have often discovered to our consternation, it is
often when things are getting better that greater demands
are lodged, that revolutions break forth. When things are
bad, aspirations are scaled down to meet the restricted re-
sources. When things are opened up, instead of banking the
fires, demands are accelerated. Indeed, those who are endem-
ically faced with a marginal subsistence life style come to
be possessed by what one observer (Richard Ball, 1968) has
accurately called "an analgesic subculture."

Therefore, as we observed earlier, the standard rela-
tions in economic theory between scarcity and society need
perhaps to be reversed. Normally, it is assumed that scar-
city is primarily a natural phenomenon; indeed, some defin-
itions of economic action couched in terms of rationalizing
decisions concerning the efficient utilization of scarce re-
sources incorporate this notion at their very core. But as
Stanley (1968) rightly points out, it is far more likely
that scarcity is socially created. Indeed, I went even fur-
ther than Stanley by suggesting that monopolization and
specialization are two basic ways which every group uses to
increase their share of the social schedule of reward. With

the former, one attempts to make natural environmental or infrastructural resources artificially scarce, while with the latter one attempts to make human capital (skills, knowledge) increasingly scarce or diversified. Thus, scarcity is far more a social necessity than a natural given. Nowhere is this ironic development more clear than in the ever-ascending desires seen in various forms of status competition. While it is true that all societies entertain agonistic displays (eg. the "Potlatch" of the Northwest Coast Indians), nonetheless, it was only with the breakdown of the corporative structure of society that the modern economy could emerge. Dominick LaCapra has noted this important relationship betwen socially generated scarcity and "institutionalized anomie" in modern economies. The gap between expectation and resources, between one's previously assigned level of satisfaction and that of one's neighbor constantly accelerates.

> ... the problem of the relation of scarcity to aggression and conflict was basic to Durkheim's notion of anomie.... A second type of scarcity was a form that depended on the cultural definition of scarcity, as well as on the institutional creation or social conditioning of scarcity effected by the apportionment of things or social and cultural value and, of course, of any economic surplus. The problem of social order and solidarity was concerned with the dialectical relation of these two types of scarcity, for instance, the ability of the second to shape or distort the first--an ability which in certain ways might increase with the development of science and technology (1972:167).

LaCapra rightly sees that there are two types of scarcity--natural and social. And he saw that Durkheim's notion of anomie concerned the latter; he further recognized the substantive irrationality of culturally enforced scarcity even when technological advances render general affluence possible, and subsistence marginality unnecessary.

Moreover, LaCapra also sees that this problem of the generation of new desires, this ever-escalating status competition, mounting feelings of relative deprivation, and

the specter of culturally generated and socially enforced
scarcity, changes from one historical period to the next.

> Definitions of what constitutes legitimate expecta-
> tions and need, beyond the requirements of biological
> survival, vary according to social type. One of Durk-
> heim's contentions was that the relative poverty of
> traditional societies was itself often a basis for
> the limitation of desires and expectations to a level
> at which they could be institutionally satisfied with
> available resources. This was the basis for the cor-
> relation of poverty, in certain societies, with low
> suicide rates. And especially in archaic societies,
> the institutional definition of legitimate needs was
> often assumed to be consensually accepted by all in-
> terested groups (1972:168).

The building up of permanent surpluses, the erosion of the
segmental type of society, the transcendence of the repres-
sive collective conscience, increasing occupational and re-
leased status competition, all led to the modern revolution
of rising expectations. What resulted was the lifting of
the traditional ceiling on legitimate aspirations, and the
modern worship of an "infinity of dreams and desires."

> The elementary and reiterated point of Durkheim's
> argument was that anomie, including its institution-
> alized variety, made the problem of solidarity and
> social order insoluble, because it both maximized
> scarcity and eliminated the possibility of recipro-
> city in social relations. In a state of society in
> which desires were perpetually stimulated, and sta-
> tus always in doubt, mutually invasive and aggress-
> ive relations were always inevitable. A society which
> combined achievement values and anomie faced devasta-
> ting problems, for it gave rise to the type of man
> who was constrained to be pre-emptively rapacious in
> his dealings with others and anxiously uncertain in
> his every action.... In the absence of consensually
> accepted norms which defined within flexible limits
> an optimal set of compatible alternatives in the
> just allocation of resources, any surplus--however
> greater it might be in absolute terms--would be psy-
> chologically experienced in terms of uncooperative
> competition for scarce values (LaCapra, 1972:169-70).

Now, the first time that I heard anyone emphasize
that Durkheim's notion of anomie implied insatiability of de-
sires was Benjamin Nelson's lectures at the Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social

Research in the school year 1969-70. Like Durkheim, Nelson proposed that every society is engaged in the production and distribution of desired values. Every culture is a value enterprise whose primary resources and net outcomes are symbols of varied worths. Society constitutes a network of institutions which produce and allocate an inevitably scarce supply of coveted symbols. Further, Nelson also distinguishes between organic needs and socioculturally generated desires. Relative to desires (not basic subsistence needs), almost any resource may be considered scarce. Because such desires are socially created and culturally apportioned, they may expand indefinitely. In other words, since society sanctifies an ideal as "sacred," desires for consummation of these cultural values may become, in effect, insatiable. At the same time, society may move to protect the sacredness of these values from becoming mere "common currency," by making them more scarce. Almost inevitably, we witness the problem of the allocation of scarce symbolic resources.

Nelson clearly sees that Durkheim's central concern was with the insatiability of desires, especially in the modern world. Durkheim saw the seemingly unlimited expansion of desires through the mechanism of the expansive international market. People's expectations rose accordingly, and if, perchance, their hopes were dashed, or if, by some good fortune, their desires were immediately consummated, then people tended to see themselves as relatively deprived. The egalitarianism which Tocqueville anatomized only intensified this problem. Thus, Nelson concludes, when private ownership came about on a massive scale, then people became, in effect, insatible, wanting more than they could possibly have or even use. And the constant moral disequilibrium led to suicide. Thus, Nelson's insights stand as a bridge between the first and second schemas.

Finally, Nelson observes that Weber's focus on "rationalization" complemented Durkheim's concerns here. For one of Weber's key analytical concerns was the degree to which so-

cieties are capable of maximizing the satisfaction of wants by the scheduled allocation of scarce resources to highly valued ends by putting premiums on idealized or charismatic values. This represents yet another convergence between Durkheim and Weber significant for our present purposes.

Finally, let us turn to consider what may be regarded as one of Durkheim's fullest explorations of the origins of the modern revolution of rising expectations. Strangely, this statement is not to be found in Suicide. Rather, it comes indirectly in a review in Socialism of the early nineteenth century French-Swiss historian and political economist Sismondi de Sismondi's explanation of the origins of the modern socioeconomic order. Although a secondary account, Durkheim clearly offered a sympathetic treatment of Sismondi's insights. Indeed, Sismondi is granted a whole chapter to himself in Socialism, second only to Saint-Simon. Originally a disciple of Adam Smith, Sismondi later moved away as he became more critical and independent. In Socialism we discover that Sismondi offered us original and striking insights into the ironic process of the development of market capitalism which are still relevant to our contemporay travail. In addition, he was also one of the first to understand the theory which later became known as "marginalism."

Focussing on the question of the supposed self-equilibrating and beneficent "invisible hand" of Utilitarian dogma, Sismondi raised many vexing questions. "The modern economic system surely presents us with a magnificent spectacle, says Sismondi. Never has the productive capacity of man been carried to such heights" (Soc:109). But Sismondi was one of the first political economists to ask: "But do all these apparent signs of prosperity correspond to real prosperity" (Soc: 109)? While witnessing the "triumph of things" in the early nineteenth century, Sismondi concluded that "Man seemed to be more badly off than before" (Soc:110). Who, in the last analysis, really benefits from this new found abundance? Certainly not the workers, says Sismondi, and not even the

entrepeneurs as a group can be considered wholly blessed by
new competition.

> Necessarily limited in number, this group shrinks
> every day as a result of the increasing concentra-
> tion of commerce and industry. Further, the possi-
> bility--always approved--of new inventions, or of
> unforeseen rivalries which ruin them, the fear of
> bankruptcy always on the horizon, especially in in-
> dustries which develop rapidly--keep these in a
> state of perpetual anxiety and prevent them from
> truly enjoying this nstable prosperity (Soc:110).

Consumers gain a greater volume and variety of material
goods from this "industrial hyperactivity," but while the
gains should good to those who need them most, the masses
generally benefit less. "Thus there would be an increase in
want and misery at the very time a plethora of wealth was
produced, at the very time when there ought to be ... a wide-
spread abundance" (Soc:110). "This paradox," Durkheim noted,
"rests on the new conditions of economic organization" (Soc:
110), which he then proceeded to explore. It is important to
note not only that Durkheim agreed with Sismondi's analysis,
but that this secondary account was far more extensive than
any provided by Durkheim himself.

Now, at the very heart of Sismondi's critical insight
was the notion of a necessary balance between society and
economy, a viable equilibrium or "golden mean." Sismondi's
entire argument, Durkheim proposed, rested on two proposi-
tions: (a) Collective well-being implies that production and
consumption balance exactly, and (b) The new industrial re-
gime prevents this balance from being established in a regu-
lar manner (Soc:110). The lack of a viable balance between
production and consumption Sismondi saw as the root of the
unanticipated problems of modern economic expansion. And for
Durkheim, Sismondi's insights provided important historical
checks for his own notion of anomie. Viewing economic action
in a substantively rational manner, Sismondi noted that in
the ideal case a person would produce just as much as needed
for personal consumption (i.e. use value) plus a reasonable
surplus, as a hedge against the future.

> After having provided a supply for use and a fund
> for reserve, he will stop, even though he could in-
> crease his consummable wealth further. He will pre-
> fer to rest than produce things he cannot use. So-
> ciety as a whole is precisely like this individual....
> After these two sets of wants are provided, anything
> more is useless and ceases to have value. To the de-
> gree that accumulated wealth exceeds the needs of
> consumption, it ceases being wealth. The products of
> his labor enrich the worker unless he finds a consum-
> mer to buy them. It is the purchaser who makes their
> value; therefore, if he is lacking it is nil (Soc:111).

Then Sismondi criticized the Utilitarian notion of an auto-
matic self-balancing mechanism intervening between production
and consumption, between supply and demand.

> ... according to Say, Ricardo, and their followers,
> this necessary balance between consumption and pro-
> duction is self-establishing, and inevitably, with-
> out anyone's trying to concern himself with it, pro-
> duction cannot increase without consumption increas-
> ing at the same time. Were commodities able to multi-
> ply themselves indefinitely, they would always find
> markets.... An increase in commodities will always
> increase the pleasure of those who produce more (Soc:
> 111-112).

But Sismondi, and Durkheim, of course, questioned the impli-
cit premise that the desire for material goods was poten-
tially infinite. Indeed, Sismondi argued in marginal terms
that there can be no infinite elasticity of consumer demand.
If there is greater surplus available, he argued, people will
first shift from questions of quantity to quality, and then,
when they have had enough, their desires will cease to moti-
vate further.

> But, replies Sismondi, this is to attribute to human
> needs an elasticity they do not possess. In reality
> the clothier does not have a better appetite because
> he weaves more fabric.... There is a limit that comes
> from being satisfied, and no one will indefinitely en-
> large his reserve of clothing merely because his in-
> come increases. What will happen? Instead of demanding
> more clothes, he will get better ones. He will give up
> those he is accustomed to and demand finer ones....
> Thus it is necessary that all surpluses balance and
> be exchangeable, and in relationship, if they are to
> raise consumption accordingly. They no longer serve
> one another mutually as markets from the moment they
> are increased beyond a certain point. They tend, on

> the contrary, to repel and suppress one another in
> order to give way to commodities of new and better
> quality--which they call into being. These latter do
> not add further to the old but substitute for them.
> The farmer who produces more than in the past does
> not utilize, in exchange for this surplus, the ex-
> cess fabrics which at the same time, the manufact-
> urer, by exertion, is able to make. On the contrary,
> he leaves the latter without work. He will dispose
> manufacturers, by the very pressure he exerts on them
> and the prospect of remuneration he offers them, to
> change their machinery and replace their surplus by
> products of higher price, and in this way equilibrium
> will at length reestablish itself (Soc:112-13).

But this complex reestablishing of equilibrium, Sismondi and
Durkheim noted, between supply and demand, productive effi-
ciency and rising consumer demand, will not emerge automati-
cally and without internal "friction," as it were.

> But this transformation is not made _ipso facto_. It
> constitutes a more or less grave crisis since it im-
> plies losses, new expenses, and a whole series of
> working rearrangements. In fact, it supposes that ex-
> cess commodities have remained unused and lost all
> value, that the capital engaged in the tools employ-
> ed to produce them has been destroyed, that workers
> have remained without employment or had to go into
> new jobs, that all the losses entailed by the change
> of work have been undergone by industry, etc. So we
> are already far from the perfect harmony which would
> establish itself automatically--according to the Eng-
> lish school--between consumption and production (Soc:
> 113).

The business cycle, manufacturer retooling and changeover,
cyclical unemployment, retraining, geographical dislocation,
etc., these and more are merely some of the first inventory
of the hidden costs of economic and technological progress.
And certainly these dislocations are not automatically heal-
ed by some beneficent "invisible hand," automatically reest-
ablishing harmony, a veritable _deus ex machina_.

Now, while the classical Utilitarian economic moral-
ists were primarily concerned with touting the beneficial
social effects of greater individual production, Sismondi
and Durkheim were more concerned with the unanticipated nega-
tive social consequences of infinitely expanding consumption.
Indeed, Sismondi wondered, in effect, where is this constant-

ly accelerating demand going to come from? Even the substi-
tution of quality for quantity, Sismondi argued, will have
increasingly less effect on regenerating demand.

> Balance can establish itself in this manner only by
> the substitution of luxury enterprises for former
> undertakings. But this substitution is not possible
> indefinitely, for the need of luxury items is not
> itself unlimited. The life of luxury is the life of
> leisure.... So the necessities of life constitute in
> this way also a limit which cannot be determined pre-
> cisely but which always is present. It is not there-
> fore true that production can increase indefinitely
> while remaining in balance with consumption, for the
> latter, at a given state of civilization, cannot rise
> above a certain level. The quantity of objects neces-
> sary to life has very narrow limits for certain items
> and the producer cannot go beyond them with impunity.
> When that comes he must himself improve quality--but
> even the perfecting of quality itself has limits. The
> need for superfluities--like the need for necessites--
> has a limit (Soc:113-114).

Again and again, Durkheim, after Sismondi, emphasized
that there is a certain incommensurability between greater
production and greater consumption--for an increase in the
former does not necessitate a corresponding increase in the
latter. Indeed, while productive capacity may increase in-
definitely, given resources, both Sismondi and Durkheim de-
clared that consumption is relatively fixed, certainly on
the level of needs, and even demand for luxury goods reach-
es a point of marginality. While this marginal boundary is
not fixed, and may expand with higher standards of living,
nevertheless, at each point in history societies seek to
establish some kind of workable and reasonable equilibrium
between expanding production, available resources, and con-
sumption.

> At each point in history there is a point which pro-
> duction cannot pass without disrupting the balance
> with consumption, and this disruption cannot occur
> without serious disturbances resulting. For either
> this useless surplus stays without a buyer--and con-
> sequently without value--constituting a kind of caput
> mortuum which will decrease as much as the returns
> of the producers--or else to sell this excess, the
> producers will offer it a low price. But to do so
> with the least possible injury, they will be forced

> to lower wages, income to the capital employed, rents paid, etc. (Soc:114).

Durkheim and Sismondi then asked us to imagine what would happen if the utopia promised by the Utilitarian reformers actually materialized.

> Imagine general overproduction, and it will be a struggle of all against all, a violent, grievous struggle from which the victors themselves will not really profit. For in order that production may safely free itself from its surplus by letting it go cheap, it must diminish the income of all its associates. But it is by his income that each regulates his expenditures ... his consumption. If he lowers one, the other diminishes. He is therefore at an impasse. One cannot succeed in artifically elevating the level of consumption in one way except by lowering it in another.... One flounders endlessly in a situation without solution (Soc:114).

What a powerful epigrammatic description of both the dilemmas of the modern economy and anomic desires, and the closed world of suicide: "One flounders endlessly, helplessly, in a situation without solution." And, of course, we drown.

These are just a few of the unanticipated consequences we have discovered on the road to the Utilitarians' utopia. Viable relations between society and economy, between self and culture, are only possible if there is a generative and meaningful balance between technological expansion of productive capacity and the more problematic growth of consumer desires. Health, remember, has been defined here as balance, as resting on the "golden mean." In other words, health means wholeness, mutual proportion, just as meaning is the relation of part to whole. Since the intimate and necessary inner link between expansion of production and growth of consumer demand has been almost irretrievably snapped in the modern economic world, we are all caught up in a constantly expanding technological-economic machine that no one can shut off, that no one has control of, that no one can submit to a substantively rational rule. In short, we have entrapped ourselves in an ever-tightening "iron cage," fit subjects for a Gothic horror novel. The "moral

anarchy" of anomie chronic in precisely those liberal sec-
tors of the modern world which have insisted on the great
moral and social benefits of "market capitalism," and its
correlate of constantly accelerating appetites. Ecocide
and suicide are the public and private unanticipated traum-
atic outcomes of this utopian disaster.

Today, it is especially the infinite expansion of the
market, the rationalization of economic and social process,
and the resulting insatiable appetites of this planetary
behemoth, this Frankenstein, which we have built, which
throws everything so fundamentally out of human scale.

> The equilibrium between production and consumption--
> far from being inevitable--is on the contrary very
> unstable and easy to disturb. According to Sismondi,
> our new conditions of economic life make this imbal-
> ance chronic. Formerly, when the market was very lim-
> ited, when it did not extend beyond the village, the
> small market town, or the immediate neighborhood,
> each producer could make a careful computation of the
> needs he had to supply and limit his work accordingly.
> But today, when the market has become almost limitless,
> this useful check has disappeared. No longer can one
> judge precisely the extent of the demand he must sup-
> ply. The industrialist, the farmer, believe that they
> have _infinite markets spread before them and tend to_
> _spread themselves to meet them. These limitless pros-_
> _pects arouse limitless ambitions, and to satisfy the_
> _appetites thus stirred each produces as much as he can_
> * (Soc:114-15).

Thus, rather than the creation of a utopia, Durkheim
and Sismondi argued, the impersonal world-wide "universal
otherhood (Nelson, 1969a) of the Utilitarian moral reformers
bequeathed us a fear-ridden war of collective egoisms, which
leads to ecocide and suicide. Rather than a promised heaven
on earth, both the Utilitarians and their heretical heirs
(that is, the philosophic and critical radicals), have in-
stead willed us a hell on earth, where one is condemned, by
the very structure of society and everyday life, to "floun-
der helplessly, alone, in a situation without solution."
Or, to shift the image, we are forced, like Sisyphus, up
yet another ascent of the mountain, to assume another spirit

crushing burden (see also Weber, 1958a). The treadmill grinds
on, and on and on.

> Even to be sure of holding onto an acquired position,
> one is often obliged to try to extend it. For, as one
> feels himself surrounded by rivals--whom he does not
> even know--he always fears that a surplus from a more
> or less distant enterprise will be thrown on the mar-
> ket he now supplies, and he will be dispossesed from
> it. To prevent an invasion one gets ahead of it by him-
> self invading and one attacks in order to avoid having
> to defend himself. He increases his own production in
> order to prevent over-production elsewhere from becom-
> ing a threat. It is because individual interests are
> discordant and unleashed, without restraint today,
> that the community's interest in a regulated product-
> ion, in harmony with the needs of consumption, is lost
> sight of. It is a fight unto death which has imposed
> itself on those who have engendered this fever, this
> hyperactivity, which exhausts individuals and societ-
> ies. And this is why the production of wealth, when
> it has--as today--no regulation, and no planning, cau-
> ses pain and misery instead of abundance *(Soc:115).

Durkheim and Sismondi conclude thus their ironic lesson:

> It is not true that the struggle of individual inter-
> ests promotes the greatest good of all. Just as pros-
> perity within a family requires the head to adjust ex-
> penditures in proportion to income, so in advancing
> the public welfare the sovereign authority must super-
> vise and restrain individual interests so as to have
> them work for the general good (Soc:115).

Now, assuming that some crucial historical shift oc-
cured to sanction insatiable desires in the form of unend-
ing drives for progress and perfection, we should note that
the constant stimulation of such demand is a cornerstone of
modern expanding economies. We might recall that Keynes's
diagnosis of the underlying ills of the Great Depression
was that the problem lay mainly on the demand side of the
equation. That is, insufficient demand was being generated
to soak up the productive capacity of the constantly accel-
erating economic machine. Hence, the "Great Transformation"
of which Polanyi (1944) spoke so profoundly. Apparently,
the traditionally high levels of demand of the small but
conspicuously consuming elite circles could not sustain the
new economic imperative if their insatiability did not

also spread to the masses. (Perhaps the mass production of images of royalty in egalitarian American played an important, if subterranean, symbolic role in this transformation). Clearly, the old middle classes still largely directed by the Puritan ethos of thrift (low consumption) and hard work (high production) contributed to the problem, for the economic machinery was gearing up to new heights of productive scale and efficiency, with little expanding markets to absorb the coming cascade of goods. And just as clearly, the classes (eg. farmers, other immigrants, etc.) still dominated by a traditional social schedule of satisfaction could not supply the necessary demand. Thus, as Bensman and Vidich (1971) have seen, the New American Society created out of the Depression, the New Deal, and the "Keynesian revolution" rested on an inversion of the old supply-demand equation. What we see, then, is a metamorphosis of the Protestant Ethos from the duty to save to the compulsion to consume.

Given such obstacles to stimulating higher consumer desires (see especially the cogent article by Parsons, 1934), the Keynesian revolution in sociocultural terms capitalized on the latent ethic of "impersonal service directed toward super-personal ends" while bending it to an entirely different expression than originally intended. I repeat: one of the hidden meanings of post-Keynesian economic intervention by the central political authority is that the traditional relations between supply and demand have been inverted. And, I submit, just as market capitalism itself could not have been born without a specific normative underpinning, so too this inversion of the traditional social schedule of supply and demand, of the socioeconomic equations between production and consumption, could not have occurred without another major metamorphosis in the cultural underpinnings. If the first breakthrough described by Weber and Polanyi rested on the old Protestant Ethos, then the second breakthrough to central intervention and amelioration of the plight of the masses (in order to raise consumption on a mass level) was

legitimated by a second installment of the Protestant Eth-
os, the liberal ethos of "social service" (see Benton John-
son, 1971, 1975). Indeed, in a curious twist of fate, it
was just this liberal "New Deal" ethos which Mertonian "ano-
mie theory" served (see appendix).

H. The Moral Legitimation of Absolute Individualism and
    Insatiability in Modern Economies: The Utilitarian Ethos

> The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress
> has become an article of faith (S:257).

> Today the market has become almost limitless.... The
> industrialist, the farmer, believe that they have in-
> finite markets before them.... These limitless pros-
> pects arouse limitless ambitions (Soc:115).

> It is because individual interests are discordant and
> unleashed, without restraint today, that the communi-
> ty's interest in a regulated production, in harmony
> with the needs of consumption, is lost sight of. It
> is a fight unto death which has imposed itself on those
> who engendered this fever, this hyperactivity, which
> exhausts individuals and society (Soc:115).

> We will not succeed in pacifying roused appetites,be-
> cause they will acquire new force in the measure they
> are appeased. There are no limits possible to their
> requirements. To undertake to appease them by satis-
> fying them is to hope to fill the vessel of the Danai-
> des (Soc:93).

To review: in his first schema, Durkheim portrayed the
the insatiable desires constituting modern anomie as the re-
sult of the release and moral deregulation accompanying the
modern transitional crisis. But we have also discovered
that with the great transformation that accompanied the
birth of market capitalism, a fundamental metamorphosis
from traditional to modern society, the "moral anarchy" of
anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors of
the modern world. Indeed, Durkheim himself acknowledged that
this "longing for the infinite" is "daily represented as a
mark of moral distinction," and that "when men are inoculat-
ed with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is
harder to make them accept resignation, so the number of
malcontented and disquieted is bound to increase." Thus,
the traditional social schedule of satisfaction that coun-
seled only the maintenance of one's long-standing standard
of living in an assigned occupation and cultural status
has been chronically upset. Whereas earlier deviations
from the traditional schedule were considered illegitimate,

today absolute individualism and insatiability are consi-
dered legitimate; regulation cf the unencumbered individual
is bad. Or as James Russell Lowell put it in a quintessen-
tial expression: "Not failure but low aim is the only crime."

As we conclude this section on Durkheim's notion of
anomie as culturally sanctioned, let us recall his contrast
between the traditionalism of the social schedule in socie-
ties dominated by a sacrosanct magical collective conscien-
ce, and modern societies which sanction absolute individual-
ism and infinite strivings on a Utilitarian basis. Durkheim
observed that in traditional societies several social insti-
tutions regulated satisfaction of individual desires through
the economic sphere. For example, in medieval and early mo-
dern Europe, various levels of government, religious insti-
tutions, and occupational groups such as guilds restrained
deadly competition, and thus regulated desires in a more cor-
porative direction. However, in modern societies religious
and guild-like groups have lost much of their regulatory po-
wer over economic life. Indeed, in the first phase of mar-
ket capitalism even the government's role assigned by Util-
itarian doctrine was merely to support and stimulate the
market, but not to regulate it or constrain it. As Halevy
(1955) pointed out, the political and economic demands of
the Utilitarians were based upon opposing principles.

> For a whole century, economic progress has mainly
> consisted in freeing industrial relations from all
> regulation. Until very recently, it was the function
> of a whole system of moral forces to exert this dis-
> cipline. First, the influence of religion was felt
> alike by workers and masters, the poor and the rich.
> It consoled the former and taught them contentment
> with their lot by informing them of the providential
> nature of the social order, that the share of each
> class was assigned by God himself, and by holding
> out the hope for just compensation in a world to
> come for the inequalities of this world. It govern-
> ed the latter, recalling that worldly interests are
> not man's entire lot, that they must be subordinate
> to other and higher interests, and that they should
> therefore not be pursued without rule or measure.
> Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of eco-
> nomic functions by its supremacy over them and by the

relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products, and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income on which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances (S:255).

But in the modern era no traditional social institution or cultural norm serves to regulate economically expressed desires. Indeed, not only has therebeen a release from traditional controls, but more importantly, the anomic insatiability implied in permanent drives for "progress and perfection" have been culturally mandated. Both liberal Utilitarians and Marxian socialists alike worship at the altar of material progress. "The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith" (S:257). Whether the England of Dickens and Owens, or Russia under Lenin and Stalin, or China under Mao, industrialization is a traumatic experience which alters almost every aspect of society.

> Actually, religion has lost much of its power. And government, instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue, and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On both sides nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the implication of the dogma of economic materialism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems. And as these theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike (S:255).

Now, the contrast between the ruling rationales of social organization under the traditional schedule of maintenance and the modern apotheosis of well-being is instructive. As Karl Polanyi (1968) has observed, in tribal or "reciprocal" economies, the economic system was embedded in the

ruling rationales of another social institution--namely, the kinship system. In archaic or "redistributive" economies, socioeconomic action was largely directed by a coalition of political, military, and religious elites. Now, in world-historical terms, one of the unique features of market capitalism was that, for the first time, the economy was freed from traditional corporative constraints and from being bent to non-economic ruling rationales. The "tribal brotherhood" of traditional society was forever dissolved. Individualistic and non-traditional Utilitarian rationales, through the mechanism of the global markets' "invisible hand," began to dominate all previous cultural rules and all other social institutions. All aspects of life were now to be subordinated to the so-called "natural" or "iron laws" of the self-equilibrating market. The Puritans' deus absonditus became reincarnated as the deus ex machina of the new international market mechanism. The self-regulating market itself, in replacing God as a primal rhetorical principle (see the work of Kenneth Burke) became the prime instrument of mass moral discipline in the modern "disenchanted" age. Thus, since release and control are often ironically bound to one another, we may catch a glimpse of how it came to be that the instrument of liberation of the rising middle classes, and such political parties as the Whigs and the Federalist-Republicans in the United States, came to enslave us all.

I cannot emphasize too much the importance of this great reversal in economic rationales. The individual displaced the collectivity, and insatiability or a legitimized "infinity of dreams and desires" replaced the resignation to the traditional social schedule; these elements go together. And, I must further emphasize that this double displacement cannot adequately be ascribed to the simple release of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline, as in Durkheim's first schema. For this "Brave New World" could only emerge from the imposition of a new and rather differ-

ent type of mass moral discipline. Today we are disciplin-
ed to insatiability, to infinite "progress and perfection."
Durkheim himself saw that the Utilitarian moralists enshrin-
ed the self-regulating market as the chief means of imper-
sonal mass social control.

> ... the appetites thus excited have become freed of
> any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to
> speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them
> above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort
> of sacrilege.... Ultimately, this liberation of de-
> sires has been made worse by the very development of
> industry and the almost infinite extension of the mar-
> ket. So long as the producer could gain his profits
> only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted a-
> mount of possible gain could not overexcite ambition.
> Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world
> as his customer, how could passions accept their form-
> er confinement in the face of such limitless prospects
> (S:255-6)?

Today, of course, since to consummate our ever-expand-
ing desires we must worker harder, the ever-expanding imper-
sonal international market mechanism imposes an ever more
resolute discipline on us all. Just as it constantly escal-
ates demands for productive efficiency, and the correspond-
ing specialization and "vocational asceticism" this demands
of each of us, so too the market also demands that we con-
stantly increase our level of consumption, even though we
may not have time to enjoy the fruits of our labor. Indeed,
it has become almost as much a duty to entertain constant-
ly rising aspirations and expectations as it has always been
a duty, at least in American culture, to stand alone as a
hard-working self-reliant Yankee. Certainly, the inflation-
ary spiral we have come to accept as the price of constant
progress presumes constantly accelerating sales and wage
and salary levels. Since the self-regulating market has re-
placed all former ethical principles in working to regulate
and generate desires through individualistic competition,
the infinite expansion of the market implies that infinite
desires must also be sanctioned and constantly regenerated.
Otherwise, we could be charged, as Merton noted, with a weak-
ness of character--lack of "moral stamina."

Such is the source of the excitement predominating in
this part of society, and which has thence extended
to other parts. There, the state of crisis and anomie
is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to
bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without know-
ing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm
it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain.
Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams
of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandon-
ed but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn
becomes reality. A thirst for novelties, unfamiliar
pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their
savor once known. Henceforth, one has no strength to
endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and
the sterility of the tumult is apparent, and it is seen
that all these new sensations in their infinite quanti-
ty cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to sup-
port one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing
how to enjoy achieved results without having constant-
ly to replace them with others, finds in them an attach-
ment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who
has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived
with his eyes fixed on it, has nothing in the past as
a comfort against the present's afflictions, for the
past was nothing to him but a series of hastily exper-
ienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his ex-
pectation always to find further on the happiness he
had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks;
from now on nothing remains behind or ahead to fix his
gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough to bring disillu-
sionment, _for he cannot in the end escape the futili-
ty of an endless pursuit_*(S:256).

Is this not the essence of our contemporary moral malaise?

When we couple Durkheim's keen phenomenological in-
sight into the ravages of the modern "infinity of dreams
and desires" with the actual historical ethical supports
for market capitalism, especially in the secularization of
Calvinistic ethics in the Anglo Enlightenment led by the
Scottish moral philosophers, the evidence becomes compell-
ing--modern anomie and egoisme are generated by the presen-
ce of still strong ethical and cultural sanctions for abso-
lute individualism and drives for infinite "progress and per-
perfection." The Utilitarian moral philosophers, only par-
tially disguised as neutral "political economists," presum-
ed endless striving, as Parsons went to great pains to de-
monstrate in the work of Marshall (1949). The Utilitarians

apotheosized the chronic imbalance so brilliantly anatomized
by Sismondi and Durkheim. Indeed, Durkheim remarked that
"... the themes that celebrate the beneficence of unrestric-
ted liberties are apologies for a diseased state" (ME:54).

> We are living precisely in one of those critical revolu-
> tionary periods when authority is usually weakened
> through the loss of traditional discipline--a time that
> may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy. This is
> the source of the anarchic passions that, whether con-
> sciously or not, are emerging today, not only in the
> particular sects bearing the name, but in the very dif-
> ferent doctrines that, although opposed on other points,
> join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regu-
> lation (ME:54).

> ... human conduct ... loses itself in the void, the emp-
> tiness of which is disguised and adorned with the spe-
> cious label of the infinite (ME:48).

Further, in Moral Education, while speaking of how his
notion of the necessity of moral discipline and the dangers
of anomic passions seems to "affront a widespread sentiment,"
Durkheim mentioned the leading Utilitarian theorist--Jeremy
Bentham, by name.

> ... to limit, to restrain--this is to deny, to impede
> the process of living and thus partially destroy; and
> all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it be
> good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits,
> that it cannot overcome?... Does not all constraint, by
> definition, do violence to the nature of things? It was
> just reasoning that led Bentham to see in law an evil
> scarcely tolerable, which could only be reasonably jus-
> tified when it was clearly indispensable. However, be-
> cause a person's continuing activities involve those of
> others, and because in the encounter there is the danger
> of conflict, it becomes necessary to specify fair limits
> of conduct that must not be transgressed. But such lim-
> itation is in itself an abnormal thing. For Bentham,
> morality, like law, involved a kind of pathology. Most
> of the classical economists were of the same view
> (ME:35-6).

Indeed, when constraint "is hateful in itself," then
we see the apotheosis of the infinite expansion of the inter-
national market, the infinite expansion of dreams and desires
in a finite world. Clearly, the Utilitarian ethos shifted the
grounds of legitimate moral authority from the group to the
individual, from tradition to culturally sanctioned drives

for "progress and perfection."

> These dispositions are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is accustomed to think of them as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction (S:257).

Clearly, if this "eternal dissatisfaction" is represented as "a mark of moral distinction," it cannot be considered as due simply to the release of the pre-social ego from traditional moral controls, but rather was and is preached as a new gospel. If the "longing for infinity is daily represented" as virtuous, then how can we escape the conclusion that anomie and egoisme are themselves the unanticipated negative results of extreme moral obligations? Of a peculiar type of modern moral discipline that leads to self-destruction?

> Thus, one is led to enjoin man to develop not a preference for balance and moderation, some feeling for moral limits--and which is only another aspect of the source of moral authority--but to an altogether contradictory view, that is, impatience with all restraint and limitation, the desire to encourage unrestrained and infinite appetites. Man, it seems, is cribbed and confined when he has not a limitless horizon before him. Doubtless we know very well that we shall never be in a position to achieve such a goal: but apparently such a perspective is essential, since it alone can provide us with a sense of the fullness of life. From such reasoning derives the veneration that so many nineteenth-century writers accorded the notion of the infinite. Here we see the lofty sentiment par excellence, since by means of it man elevates himself beyond all the limits imposed by nature and liberates himself, at least ideally, from all restrictions that might diminish him (ME:35-6).

Thus, we see that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion of absence to presence of cultural sanctions when he recognize that the "notion of the infinite" was the ideal for Utilitarian and Romantic alike. One might ambiguously consider that the daily "longing for the infinite" comes only from "unregulated consciences," but, if so, it must be emphasized that these are new types of self-regulated consciences who, in imposing "vocational asceticism or mysticism" on themselves, "elevate to a rule the very lack

of rule from which they suffer." This dual rejection of traditional moral control and the elevation of the autonomous individual and his infinite drives for "progress and perfection" to the center of the moral stage heralds a new type of conscience, a "New Model Man" for a "Brave New World."

Alas, the "New Man" commits suicide and ecocide. We have to learn, once again, the wisdom of the ancient moral philosophy of the "golden mean," for when we push our virtues to extreme, they invert, ironically, into our characteristic vices.

In Chapter Ten of this Book, we shall explore the religious and ethical roots of anomie and egoisme and their respective cultural traditions.

CHAPTER NINE

EGOISME, THE INFINITY OF DREAMS, AND THE MODERN

ANGUISHED JOURNEY INTO THE INTERIOR

Our very egoisme is in large part a product of society
(S:360).

One cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism (DL:239).

Excessive individualism not only results in favoring
the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such
a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away
with himself ... but creates this inclination out of
whole cloth, and thus gives birth to a special suicide
which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood
(S:210).

Preface. If anomie implies an externalized "infinity of desires," egoisme implies an inward turning "infinity of dreams." Both anomie and egoisme proceed from similar sources--the absolutizing of the individual, and the assignment to him of an infinite task. Both anomie and egoisme are socially carried and culturally sanctioned. However, in the first case, the absolutizing of the lone individual and his infinite task is turned outward against the external world, while in the second case, the angst of the isolated social atom is introjected, and ultimately, this "journey into the interior" and "infinity of dreams" is turned against the self. Durkheim himself noted:

Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar
affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie.
We know that they are usually two different aspects
of one social state; thus, it is not surprising that
they should be found in the same individual. It is,
indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have
some tendency to non-regulation; for since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon
him to regulate him. If, nevertheless, his desires

are not usually excited, it is because in his case
the life of the passions languishes, because he is
wholly introverted and not attracted to the world
outside (S:288).

Further, the pathology of "infinity sickness" is mani-
fested in different ways in these two two modern forms of
"moral anarchy."

Anomie partially results from the same state of disag-
gregation from which the egoistic current also springs.
But this individual cause produces different effects,
depending on its point of incidence and whether it in-
fluences active and practical functions, or functions
that are representational. The former it agitates and
exasperates; the latter it disorients and disconcerts.
In both cases, the remedy is the same (S:382).

In psychological terms, anomie affects the "practical and
active functions," and in sociological terms, the business-
man and the industrialist, while egoisme, in psychological
terms, affects the imaginative or "representative" func-
tions, and is found most clearly among artists, intellect-
uals, and so on. Among other observers, LaCapra has seen
these similarities and differences between anomie and ego-
isme in Durkheim's Suicide.

Egoisme, in the sense of atomistic individualism, ob-
viously had a large area of analytical and empirical
overlapping with individualistic forms of anomie, and
both might be institutionally or ideologically justi-
fied.... Anomie referred to a pathology of practical
reason and egoisme to a pathology of theoretical rea-
son.... Anomie was related to the "practical," appe-
titive, and active faculties: desire, passion and will,
especially the will to power. Egoisme was related to
the imaginative, intellectual, cognitive, and "theo-
retical" faculties (1972:165-6).

But Durkheim himself provided us with the consummate
description of the points of convergence and divergence be-
tween these two dominant forms of the "moral anarchy" emer-
ging from our contemporary "dis-eases of the infinite."

Suicides of both types suffer from ... diseases of
the infinite. But the disease does not assume the
same form in both cases. In one reflective intelli-
gence is affected and immoderately overnourished
[egoisme]; in the other, emotion is over-excited
and freed from all restraint [anomie]. In one,

> thought, by dint of falling back upon itself, has
> no object left; in the other, passion, no longer
> recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The former
> is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second in
> the infinity of desires * (S:287).

In both anomie and egoisme, we drown, "floundering helpless-
ly in a situation without solution." Why? Perhaps because
it is religious sanctions which mandate our infinite stri-
vings in a finite world.   Later, we shall explore how
our highest aspirations came to encircle us in an "iron
cage."

Here, let us first look into some of the psychological
characteristics of egoisme as the fourth and final major his-
torical type of suicide. We shall note that egoistic sui-
cides, in contrast to anomie, are passive and apathetic.
Comparing egoisme to altruisme, in the second schema we see
not only the passive/active contrast, but the double opposi-
tion between fundamentallyopposed cultural sanctions rela-
ting the individual to society at the two ends of history.
We shall then consider Durkheim's second thesis that even
"Our egoisme is in large part a product of society." Al-
though the "cult of the moralized person" is coterminous,
in Durkheim's view, with the universalistic or extended
civilizational bond of the modern era, we also discover
that all prime cultural values tend to become absolutized
and thus, almost inevitably deflected from their original
proportions and meanings. Therefore, we see that in modern
society, while the "cult of the individual" and egoistic ten-
sions resulting in suicide are not exactly logically and his-
torically congruent, because of the fundamental principle
just enunicated "the one cannot be stimulated without the
other being enlarged" (S:364). Indeed, "one cannot develop
personality to excess without developing egotism."

Finally, we shall discover that the tensions induced
by the modern "dis-eases of the infinite," and the Romantic
"journey into the interior" and the ethos of angst and an-
guished subjectivity accompanying these, are really only

the "... deflected or exaggerated forms of a virtue." Indeed, the cultural sanctioning of "utmost inwardness" and, thus, of egoisme, results in " ... creating nothingness within by creating it without, and thus has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own misery" (S:279).

A.   The Psychology of Egoisme: Passive Introversion and
         The Litany of Modern Angst

> Sadness does not inhere in things.... It is a product of our own thought (S:280).

> Extremely refined nervous systems live in pain, and end by attaching themselves to it (DL:242-3).

> If consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man, it is only by achieving a morbid development in which, revolting against its own nature, it poses as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself (S:280).

In contrast to anomie, which has become enshrined as " ... one of the few truly central concepts in sociological theory" (Parsons), egoisme has fallen into sociological darkness. Would it, then, surprise us to learn that Durkheim thought egoisme actually to be the more chronic problem in the modern world?

> The type of suicide actually the most widespread and which contributes most to raise the annual total of voluntary deaths is egoistic suicide. It is characterized by a state of depression and apathy produced by exaggerated individuation. The individual no longer cares to live because he no longer cares enough for for the only medium which attaches him to reality, that is to say, for society. Having too keen a feeling for himself and his own value, he wishes to be his own only goal, and as such an objective cannot satisfy him, drags out languidly and indiffently an existence which henceforth seems meaningless to him
> (S:356).

Now, egoisme, like fatalisme, is a passive form of suicide, in contrast to both anomie and altruisme; an inward turning pathology in contrast to anomie; and a self-centering and self-destroying "dis-ease of the infinite" in con - trast to the sacrifice of self for the group seen in primitive altruisme. Thus, the prime psychological characteris-

tics of egoisme in the second schema include: apathy, pass-
ive introversion, "indolent melancholy," or "disillusioned
sangfroid" (S:293), extreme subjectivity, and a deep depres-
sion or despondency coming from an "infinity of dreams" and
the consequent exhaustion of the imagination and correspond-
ing paralysis of the will. As with all human tensions which
reach a suicidal crescendo, egoisme is simultaneously the
result of both too much and too little. Too little proportion
in one's daily life, too little help and human support--thus,
the individual is either left alone or perhaps even compelled
to isolate himself. On the contrary, with altruisme, the in-
dividual is completely depersonalized and submerged in a so-
cio-cosmic ocean, as it were. Too much, because the overwhel-
ming cultural emphases on the "cult of the individual" and
the corresponding cult of "utmost inwardness" become absolu-
tized. This deflection from mutual proportion in everyday
life and exaggeration of the significance of only one virtue
over against all the others bidding legitimately for our at-
tention inevitably ends in torturing the person and, ultima-
tely, consuming his soul.[1]

Therefore, Durkheim gave the name "egoisme" to "... the
state of the ego living its own life and obeying itself alone"
(S:221).

> If we agree to call this state of egoism, in which the
> individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of
> the social ego, and at its expense, we may call egoist-
> ic the special type of suicide springing from excessive
> individualism (S:209).

In contrasting egoisme and altruisme, Durkheim observed that
they are opposed psychological forms. "The egoistic suicide
is characterized by a general depression in the form of a
melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic
suicide, on the contrary, involves an expenditure of energy.
... Altruisme is an active suicide, contrasting with the de-
pressed suicide" (S:283).

> While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing
> real in the world but the individual, the intemper-
> ate altruist's sadness, on the contrary, springs from

the individual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One is deflected from life, because seeing no goal to which he may attach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless; the other because he has a goal but one outside this life, which henceforth seems merely an obstacle to him. Thus, the difference of the causes reappears in their effects, and the melancholy of the one is quite different from that of the other. That of the former [egoisme] consists of a feeling of incurable weariness and sad depression; it expresses a complete relaxation of activity, which, unable to find useful employment, collapses. That of the former [altruisme], on the contrary, springs from hope; for it depends on the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life. It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith eagerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of extreme energy (S:225-26).

Now, we should remember that altruisme and egoisme are doubly opposite; their opposing valuational content served Durkheim as both a significant index of the ruling cultural rationales and dominant modes of social organization of societies at the two ends of history.

One [altruisme] is related to the crude morality which disregards everything relating solely to the individual; the other is closely related to the refined ethics which set human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything. Between the two is all the difference between primitive peoples and the most civilized nations (S:227).

Both altruisme and egoisme are ethically sanctioned by their respective cultures at the two poles of sociocultural evolution. As noted earlier, Durkheim acknowledged however, that at times we may find some "mixed" forms of egoisme and altruisme.

... egoisme and altruisme, themselves, contraries as they are, may combine their influence. At certain epochs, when disaggregated society can no longer serve as an objective for individual activities, individuals or groups will nevertheless be found who, while experiencing the influence of this general condition of egoisme, aspire to other things. Feeling, however, that a passage from one egoistic pleasure to another is a poor method of escaping themselves, and that fugitive joys, even though constantly renewed could never quiet their unrest, they seek some durable object to which they attach themselves permanently and which shall give

> meaning to their lives. <u>Since they are contented
> with nothing real, however, they find satisfaction
> only in creating out of whole cloth some ideal real-
> ity to play this role.</u> So in thought they create an
> imaginary being whose slaves they become and to which
> they devote themselves the more exclusively the more
> they are detached from everything else, themselves
> included. To it they assign all the attachment to ex-
> istence which they ascribe to themselves, since all
> else is valueless in their eyes. So they live a two-
> fold existence: individualists so far as the real
> world is concerned, they are immoderate altruists in
> in everything that concerns this ideal objective.
> Both dispositions lead to suicide*(S:289).

Surely this description of the "mixed" possibility of ego-
isme and altruisme aptly characterizes many political and
social reformers today. But Durkheim turns back in history
to offer Stoic philosophy as a prime illustration.

> Though the Stoic professes absolute indifference to
> everything beyond the range of the individual person-
> ality, though he exhorts the individual to be self-
> sufficient, he simultaneously assigns the individual
> a close dependence on universal reason, and even re-
> duces him to nothing more than the instrument through
> which this reason is realized. He thus combines two
> antagonistic conceptions: the most radical moral in-
> dividualism and an immoderate pantheism. The suicide
> he commits is thus both apathetic like that of the
> egoist, and performed as a duty like the altruist.
> The former's melancholy and the active energy of the
> latter appear in this form of suicide; egoisme here
> mingles with mysticism. This same combination also
> distinguishes the mysticism characteristic of periods
> of decadence, which contrary to appearances, is so
> different from that observed among young, formative
> peoples. The latter springs from the collective en-
> thusiasm which carries individual wills along with
> it on its way, from the self-abnegation with which
> citizens forget themselves to share in the common
> work; the former [egoistic-altruistic mysticism] is
> a mere self-conscious egoisme, conscious also of its
> own nothingness, striving to surpass itself but suc-
> ceeding only in artificiality and in appearance (S:289).

Durkheim's disdain for the modern egoist cloaking himself
in quasi-religious images calls to mind Weber's equally po -
werful refusal to endorse any of the myriad competing thera-
peutics of his day which counseled "jumping out of one's
skin." Both Durkheim and Weber were moral realists.

Finally, Durkheim noted that egoisme and anomie may mix their separate but intimately related types of despair.

> But he be neither a complete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation. In such cases he may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations, he applies, to be sure, less ardour than the passionate temperament so called, but he also wearies sooner and this weariness casts him back upon himself, thus reenforcing his original melancholy. Inversely, a regulated temperament does not lack a spark of egoisme; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social restraint. Only, this spark cannot develop in cases where the action of anomie is preponderant; for, by casting its possessor outside himself, it prevents him from retiring into himself. If anomie is less intense, however, it may permit egoisme to produce certain characteristic effects. The obstacle, for example, against which the victim of insatiate desires dashes may cause him to fall back upon himself in an inner life. Finding there nothing to which he can attach himself, however, the melancholy inspired by this thought can only drive him to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides where depression alternates with agitation, dream with action, transports of desire with reflective sadness (S:288).

In exploring some individual forms of egoistic suicide, Durkheim took "Raphael," one of the heroes of the early French Romantic writer Lamartine, as an "ideal type." In our own day, Proust's reveries and other instances of the "Romantic agony," especially among the Symbolist poets and other artists of the dark underside would serve just as well.

> One form of suicide ... has widely developed in our day: Lamartine's Raphael offers us its ideal type. Its characteristic is a condition of melancholic languor which relaxes all the springs of action. Business, public affairs, useful work, even domestic duties inspire the person only with indifference and aversion. He is unwilling to emerge from himself. On the other hand, what is lost in activity is made up for in thought and inner life. In revulsion from its surroundings consciousness becomes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-observation and self-analysis. But by this extreme concentration it merely deepens the chasm separating it from the rest of

> of the universe. The moment the individual becomes
> so enamored of himself, inevitably he increasingly
> detaches himself from everything external and empha-
> sizes the isolation in which he lives, to the point
> of worship * (S:278-79).

It is interesting to recall here that Rimbaud, that super-
annuated voyager into hell, spoke of himself and his kind
as "litteraturicides."

> Self-absorption is not a good method of attaching
> one's self to others. All movement is, in a sense,
> altruistic in that it is centrifugal and disperses
> existence beyond its own limitations. Reflection,
> on the other hand, has about it something personal
> and egoistic, for it is only possible as a person
> becomes detached from the outside world, and re-
> treats from it into himself. And reflection is the
> the more intense the more complete this retreat.
> Action without mixing with people is impossible;
> to think, on the contrary, we must cease to have
> connection with them in order to consider them ob-
> jectively--the more so, in order to think about one-
> self. So the man whose sole activity is diverted
> to inner meditation becomes insensible to all his
> surroundings. If he loves, it is not to give him-
> self, to blend in fecund union with another being,
> but to meditate on his love. His passions are mere
> appearances, being sterile. They are dissipated in
> futile imaginings, producing nothing external to
> themselves *(S:279).

Does this passage not perfectly describe, for in-
stance, the fevered false love felt by Kierkegaard, the
arch Romantic lyricist and theologian, for Regina in Fear
and Trembling? Indeed, the distinguished literary and mo-
ral philosopher Kenneth Burke seized upon the brooding
Dane's "dialectical lyric" as "... Kierkegaardian dialect-
ic for changing finite species into the currency of the
infinite" (1969:244). Posing first as a scoundrel, then
the "knight of infinite resignation," Kierkegaard, says
Burke, offers us:

> ... the currency of the infinite, but brought down
> to earth like a god incarnate, a spirit that hence-
> forth infuses all things with its essence, bathes
> all things in its unitary light, subordinating the
> disparate facts of the world of contingencies to
> one transcendent unitary principle, ironically call-
> ed the Absurd. This transformation is also called

a "leap" across the "incommensurable" (1950:245).

As a quintessential representative of moral egoisme, Kieke-
gaard, this "knight of faith," courted "infinite resignation."
He sanctified his own introversion, embraced despair and the
curious hope of the "Absurd," the faith beyond hope, "beyond
belief."

> ... if this "knight of faith" would court in terms of
> the infinite, it follows that he would court eternally,
> in perpetual repetition.... But if one would court for-
> ever, whereas the object of one's courtship is not only
> willing to yield, but even becomes importunate in yield-
> ing, then the goodly dialectician must supply resistance
> of his own, from within himself, out of his own "inner
> check," and by setting up a situation, both emotional
> and practical, that would restore the necessary distance.
> First, in somewhat of a panic, he would even act like a
> "scoundrel" if necessary. For he would do anything to
> retain the purity of his motives, being an individualist
> of integrity. However, once he had got away from her,
> and she had become married to another, since they were
> both highly proper he had again the objective situation
> necessary to his nature: he could now court here in terms
> of eternity, that is, in eternal repetition. The dilemma
> was solved. On firm moral and legalistic grounds, their
> union was impossible. Hence, he could safely become her
> knight again. To gallantly make amends for his affront,
> he could psychologistically amend the Bible. Everything
> was now in order--and with her marriage as the "objec-
> tive correlative" that matched his own subjective "inner
> check," he could now court her in terms of the infinite,
> the incommensurable, the absurd, the faith that will
> somehow bring about the impossible (1950:249-50).

But, not to be fooled by Kierkegaard's brilliant moral dia-
lectics, Burke rightly insists that the former has amended
the justificatory Bible story of Abraham and Issac, for he
"... starts by putting in a strategic addition to a Biblical
text.... Needing the story to motivate the leap, he himself
puts the leap into the story" (1950:250-1). That is, Kierke-
gaard fabricated his own story to suit his own special psy-
chological needs. Kierkegaard embraced the infinite as his
life-focus, he embraced egoisme as his vocation. On observer
said of him that he has been characterized as "an unregener-
ate romantic who could not abandon the pleasures of the 'un-
happy conscience'" (B. Nelson, 1962c:xiv). This "Master of
Irony," however, "burdened by the compulsion to practice mor-

dant reflection and double agency" (Nelson, 1962c:xii),
really wished to be whole.

> So turbulent a spirit as Kierkegaard's was not to win
> the peace he prized without an exhausting civil war a-
> gainst his inner demons. To think of himself as an "Ex-
> traordinary One" in the religious sense was at once his
> temptation and his dread.... In the end, however, he
> forged for himself the fate he craved. Instead of suc-
> cumbing to destructive afflictions and excesses as did
> a number of others, notably Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche,
> he let no day go by without struggling to hold himself
> in readiness to be a "witness." He rededicated himself
> and his gifts continually to the Life which was for him
> the Light, the Truth, and the Way (Nelson, 1962c:xii).

Indeed, if we view Durkheim's ironic insights into the self-
destructive "longing for the infinite" of Romantic moralists
and artists from a Weberian perspective, then Kierkegaard's
own testimony serves to confirm that egoisme flows through
the Romantic Cultural Tradition from the secularized angst
of Lutheranism.

> When the infinite requirement is heard and upheld, heard
> and upheld in all its infinitude, then grace is offered.
> ... But surely it is not an exaggeration when (in the
> interest of grace itself) the requirement of infinity,
> the "infinite requirement," is presented infinitely.
> Exaggeration occurs only when, in an entirely different
> way, the requirement is presented and grace is not even
> alluded to (1962:154).

Yes, what then? What happens when "an infinite requirement,"
once religious, now becomes merely cultural, but is yet pre-
sented as an infinite task, yet "grace is not even alluded
to"? Durkheim gave the fatal answer in Suicide.

To return, Durkheim continued with his counter-argu-
ment, stressing the relational or "intentional" structure of
consciousness.

> ... all internal life draws its primary material from
> without. All we can think of is objects or our concep-
> tions of them. We cannot reflect our own consciousness
> in a purely undetermined state; in this shape it is in-
> conceivable. Now, consciousness becomes determined only
> when affected by something not itself. Therefore, if it
> individualizes beyond a certain point,   it separates
> itself too radically from other beings. Men or things,
> it finds itself unable to communicate with the very
> source of its normal nourishment and no longer has any-
> thing to which it can apply itself. It creates nothing-

ness within by creating it without, and has nothing left upon which to reflect but its own wretched misery (S:279). The Romantics' inflation of the ego's infinite task leads, then, to "wretched misery," to morbid melancholy, to self-destruction.

> Its only remaining object of thought is its own inner nothingness and the resulting melancholy. It becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of morbid joy which Lamartine, himself familiar with it, describes well in the words of his hero: 'the languor of all my surroundings was in marvellous harmony with my own languor. It increased this languor in its charm. I plunged into the depths of melancholy. But it was a lively melancoly, full of thoughts, impressions, communings with the infinite, half-obscurities of my own soul, so that I had no wish to abandon it. A human disease, but one the experience of which attracts rather than pains, where death resembles a voluptuous lapse into the infinite. I resolved to abandon myself to it wholly henceforth; to avoid all distracting society and to wrap myself in silence, solitude, and frigidity in the midst of whatever company I should encounter; my spiritual isolation was a shroud through which I desired no longer see men, but only nature and God' (S:280).

However pure the ardent wayfarer's motives, the result of his actions is ironic. For instead of empowering us, the pursuit of "infinite horizons," portrayed insistently as the truly heroic alternative to the mundane or profane existence in which most mankind is daily mired, leads inevitably, not to the consummation of the hero's life-giving vision but rather to despair and self-destruction.

> One cannot long remain so absorbed in contemplation of emptiness without becoming increasingly attracted to it. In vain one bestows on it the name of infinity; this does not change its nature. When one feels such pleasure in non-existence, one's inclinations can be completely satisfied only by completely ceasing to exist. This is the element of truth in the parallelism Hartmann claims to observe between the development of consciousness and the weakening of the will to live. Ideation and movement are really two hostile forces, advancing in inverse direction, and movement is life. To think, it is said, is to abstain from action; in the same degree, therefore, it is to abstain from living. This is why the absolute reign of idea cannot be achieved and especially continue, for this is death.

> But this does not mean, as Hartmann believes, that re-
> ality itself is intolerable unless veiled by illusion.
> Sadness does not inhere in things, it does not reach us
> from the world and through mere contemplation of the
> world. It is a product of our own thought. We create it
> out of whole cloth; but to create it our thought must be
> abnormal. If consciousness sometimes constitutes unhap-
> piness for man, it is only by achieving a morbid develop-
> ment in which, revolting against its own nature, it poses
> as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself (S:280).

b. The Main Sociocultural Sites of the Egoistic "Infinity
     of Dreams"

> The suicidal tendency is great in educated circles (S:168).

> A mind that questions everything, unless strong enough to
> bear the weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning
> itself and being engulfed in doubt (S:282).

> If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, every-
> thing becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it (S:213).

Through his statistical arrays, Durkheim first found
that the following factors were linked in egoismic suicides:
Protestantism, individualism, free inquiry, higher education-
al levels, the liberal professions, and so on. We should al-
ways remember that such concrete social factors served as the
original point of departure for Durkheim's moral concern with
the "infinity sickness" of the modern world.

Durkheim first assumed that these factors were all out-
wardly associated (see Part I, Book Two) because they were
all results of the same root transformation--negatively, the
weakening of traditional beliefs, and positively, through the
sanctioning of the Individual, Reason, and subjectivity in
modern culture. This was especially true in terms of liberal
Protestant cultures, where these virtues bloomed most vigor-
ously. Now, it is striking that one of the leading American
spokesman for liberal Protestantism, Talcott Parsons, has
from the beginning emphasized that egoisme was sanctioned by
Protestant norms (see Appendix). Egoisme, or as Parsons trans-
lates it "institutionalized individualism," which implies the
injunction to guide oneself by one's own "inner light," re-

sulted from the historically rooted "social pressure in Protestant norms toward a higher order of individualized religious responsibility." Indeed, Parsons proposed that Durkheim's breakthrough to the discovery of the internalization of norms in terms of egoistic suicide constituted a solution to what Parsons had supposed to be Durkheim's original problem in The Division of Labor--namely, the content and obligatory force of the collective conscience governing contractual obligations in the modern organic division of labor. Against the common, but mistaken, notion that the roots of the modern crisis can be adequately explained simply as the result of the release of the individual ego from traditional controls (as in Durkheim's first schema), Parsons, following Weber, correctly insisted that egoisme, as a culturally sanctioned form of individualism, could only be fully understood as the outcome of the secularizing thrusts of Protestantism. This insight represents an important convergence with Weber's work. Hence, we shall look for the breakthrough to a new system of moral and spiritual direction, and the internalization of new and more rigorous forms of self-discipline and life-tasks. And, as Parsons adds, echoing Rousseau, sometimes this new, socially enforced freedom may become too great a burden to bear.

This identification is not, however, without its hidden ironies for Parsons' own doctrine. For, by ignoring Durkheim's historical and highly critical thrust, Parsons felt little compunction in rendering egoisme as a highly virtuous product of Protestantism. What Durkheim described as "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness," Parsons transmutes into moral or "institutionalized individualism." Hence, Parsons' biased reconstruction gets him into the following bind: if egoisme as "institutionalized individualism" and its correlate of "organic solidarity" is tacitly and historically supported by Protestant religious and cultural norms, then how can Parsons account for the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," the destructive egocentricity which so disturbed Durkheim? Is

this "moral anarchy" to be considered simply the lapse from the heroic demands of Protestant norms, or, on the contrary, as Durkheim's second implicit schema suggests, as the unanticipated consequences of living out these norms? In terms of his own reconstruction and splitting of schemas one and two (see Appendix), must not Parsons accordingly admit that the fundamental sources of egoistic insatiability also find their origins and continuing sanctions in an exaggeration or deflection of Protestant norms? That Protestant norms are the ultimate source of both the positive aspects of modern "institutionalized individualism" and drives for "progress and perfection" and the egoismic and anomic insatiability seen by Durkheim as underlying the "moral anarchy" and "le mal de l'infini" of the modern world, would most probably prove a surprising and perhaps even repugnant suggestion to some. What would Parsons himself say to the inevitable conclusion that our very Central Value System is itself egoistic and anomic? The very logic of Parsons', Durkheim's, and Weber's arguments, taken together, leads inevitably to the ironic conclusion: our virtues become our vices!

Now, Durkheim held it as almost axiomatic that the higher the intellectual life, the more professionalized and progressive the standard of living, the greater the probability of being afflicted by "infinity sickness."

> The liberal professions, and in a wider sense, the well-to-do classes, are certainly those with the livliest taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual life. ... [suicide] is undeniably frequent in the higher classes (S:165).

But, having made the profound link between education and the extremes of introspection and self-scrutiny that accompany it, the Enlightenment liberal in Durkheim made him shrink from equating the apotheosis of the Individual and Reason with the modern intellect and modern despair (eg. see S:162-4; see also Part I, Book Two). But even so, Durkheim acknowledged that the exercise of individual reason acts as a further solvent of traditional mores and thereby increases the

need for further education and heightened reflection, in a
sort of self-reinforcing psycho-socio-cultural feedback pro-
cess. Indeed, Durkheim insisted that rather than individual-
ism and learning being the pathological agents, they are, on
the contrary, the only means of remedying European "moral
anarchy."

> ... we see why as a rule suicide increases with know-
> ledge. Knowledge does not determine this progress. It
> is innocent, nothing is more unjust than to accuse it,
> and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively.
> But these two facts result simultaneously from a single
> state which they translate into different forms. Man
> seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss
> of cohesion in his religious society; he does not kill
> himself because of his learning.... Far from knowledge
> being the source of the evil, it is its remedy, the only
> remedy we have (S:168-9).

It is striking that Durkheim drew his main illustra-
tions for egoisme as a suicidal type from intellectuals or
Romantic literature and art. For instance:

> ... the intellectual and meditative nature of suicides
> of this sort is readily explained if we recall that ego-
> istic suicide is necessarily accompanied by a high de-
> velopment of knowledge and reflective intelligence. In-
> deed, it is clear that in a society where consciousness
> is morally compelled to extend its field of action, it
> is also in more danger of transgressing the normal lim-
> its which shelter it from self-destruction. A mind that
> questions everything, unless strong enough to bear the
> weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning itself,
> and being engulfed in doubt. If it cannot discover the
> claim to existence of the objects of its questioning--
> and it would be miraculous if it so soon succeeded in
> solving so many mysteries--it will deny them all reality;
> the mere formulation of the problem already implying an
> inclination to negative solutions. But, in so doing, it
> will become void of all positive content, and finding
> nothing which offers it resistance, will launch itself
> perforce into the emptiness of inner revery (S:281).

Durkheim emphasized that launching the ego into infinite or-
bit, into the "emptiness of inner revery," serves to dissolve
solid ties to society.

> The more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels
> himself a real participant in the religious faith to
> which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself,
> the more the family and the community become foreign to
> the individual, so much the more does he become a mys-

tery to himself, unable to excape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose (S:212)?

c. Egoisme as the Ironic Result of the Modern "Cult of Moral Individualism"

One cannot develop personality to excess without developing egotism (DL:239).

Individualism is, of course, not necessarily egoism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stimulated without the other being enlarged. Thus, egoistic suicide arises (S:364).

[Egoisme] is closely associated with the refined ethics which set human personality on so high a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to anything (S:227).

The moment the individual becomes so enamored of himself, inevitably he detaches himself from everything external and emphasizes the isolation in which he lives, to the point of worship (S:278).

Every sort of suicide is the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue (S:240).

In Durkheim's second schema of suicide, egoisme is culturally sanctioned in the modern world; it is the ironic outcome of the modern "cult of the individual." Conversely, egoisme's first polar opposite--altruisme--is the result of traditional cultures' "cult of collectivity." Indeed, Durkheim observed that if altruisme is culturally sanctioned as a moral duty, so, too, egoisme is the deflected outcome of a certain type of moral obligation:

The fact is stressed that the motives of certain altruistic suicides reappear in slightly different forms as the basis of actions regarded by everyone as moral. But is egoistic suicide any different? Has not the sentiment of individual autonomy its own morality as well as the opposite sentiment?... Every sort of suicide is then merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue * (S:240).

Thus, every society has an ideal of man, which tends to become absolutized over time. This inevitable extension or exaggeration destroys the necessary mutual proportion between multiple human virtues. Primitive societies thus absolutize

devotion to tradition and the group; hence, their suicides
take the form of altruisme and fatalisme. Modern societies,
on the other hand, tend to absolutize the self, and devotion
to the "tradition of the new;" hence, our virtues are
the self-destructive vices of anomie and egoisme. Or, as
Durkheim once said, even the features of our immorality are
features of our morality. LaCapra has seen this inner irony
to the central values of modern culture:

> Egoisme referred ... to a state in which the principle
> of individuation was carried to the extreme of particu-
> laristic and self-centered atomistic individualism.
> Egoisme in modern societies was an excessive development
> of the cardinal emphasis on individual rights and per-
> sonal responsibility (1972:157-8).

As Merton observed in his famous essay "Social Struc-
ture and Anomie" (see Appendix), it is the overwhelming em-
phasis on cultural mandates that leads to the exaggeration
or deflection of what had been our highest virtues into our
most vexatious failings. Clearly, it is a generic sociocul-
tural process afflicting all peoples at all times, though in
different degrees. Perhaps what is unique about the modern
syndrome, apart from its specific content, is its relentless
pressure.

> Excessive individualism not only results in favoring
> the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such
> a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away
> with himself, but creates this inclination out of whole
> cloth.... This must be clearly understood * (S:210).

But "what is there in individualism which explains this re-
sult," Durkheim asks? In other places in Suicide, Durkheim
himself replied that the cult of the individual is morally
sanctioned in the modern world. It is a product of progres-
sive moral evolution, of which Protestantism and Positivism
are the modern culminations.

> ... in societies and environments where the dignity of
> the person is the supreme end of conduct, where man is
> a God to mankind, the individual is readily inclined to
> consider the man in himself as a God and to regard him-
> self as the object of his own cult. When morality con-
> sists primarily in giving one a very high idea of one's
> self, certain combinations of circumstances readily suf-
> fice to make man unable to perceive anything above him-

himself. Individualism is, of course, not necessarily e-
goism, <u>but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stim-
ulated without the other being enlarged. Thus, egoistic
suicide arises</u> * (S:364).

A year later, in one of his political writings--"Individual-
ism and the Intellectuals" (1898)--delivered at the height
of the Dreyfus Affair against the Catholic conservative for-
ces, Durkheim reiterated the same theme. This time the ear-
lier connection between Protestantism and extreme, egoistic
individualism becomes clearer, for the following passage was
surrounded by others acknowledging the Christian sanction for
modern individualism (see also Chapter Eight, Book One, and
Chapter Three, Part I of this Book).

> The communion of spirits can no longer be based on de-
> finite rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices
> are overcome by the course of events. Consequently, noth-
> ing remains which men can love and honor in common if
> not man himself. That is how man has become a god for
> man, and why he can no longer create other gods without
> lying to himself. And since each of us incarnates some-
> thing of humanity, each individual consciousness con-
> tains something divine and thus finds itself marked with
> a character which renders it sacred and inviolable to
> others. Therein lies all individualism; and that is what
> makes it a necessary doctrine (in Bellah, 1973:52).

And in his address "The Determination of Moral Facts" (1906),
Durkheim again acknowledged that the sacredness with which
the human person in the modern world is endowed is socially
and culturally created.

> ... the human being is becoming the pivot of social con-
> science among European peoples and has acquired an in-
> comparable value. It is society that has consecrated
> him. Man has no innate right to this aura that surrounds
> and protects him against sacrilegious trespass. It is
> merely the way in which society thinks of him, the high
> esteem that it has of him at the moment, projected and
> objectified. Thus very far from there being the antago-
> nism between the individual and society which is often
> claimed, moral individualism, the cult of the individual,
> is in fact the product of society itself. It is society
> that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant
> it is (SP:52-3).

In the same address, in reply to a criticism of this doctrine
by Brunschwig, Durkheim argued:

> Society has consecrated the individual and made him

> preeminently worthy of respect. His progressive emanci-
> pation does not imply a weakening but a transformation
> of social bonds. The individual does not tear himself a-
> way from society but is joined to it in a new manner,
> and this is because society sees him in a new manner and
> wishes this change to take place. The individual submits
> to society and this submission is the condition of his
> liberation (SP:72).

Further, it is significant for our present purposes
that Durkheim's philosophy of the "golden mean" and his no-
tion of the "normality" of deviance led him into the second
schema of suicide. For instance, in The Division of Labor,
Durkheim set up the "virtues to vices" syndrome with this in-
sistence that even the highest ideals of a culture must be
kept in mutual proportion.

> Each people has its morality which is determined by the
> conditions in which it lives.... But the morality of
> each society, taken in   of itself, does it not allow
> an indefinite development of its charged virtues? Not
> at all. To act morally is to do one's duty, and all
> duty is limited. It is limited by other duties. One can-
> not give oneself too completely to others without aban-
> doning oneself. One cannot develop personality to excess
> without developing egotism * (DL:239).

And in his vibrant defense of the modern equation of the In-
dividual and Reason, Durkheim explicitly acknowledged that
one virtue may shade over into a vice by going to extreme.

> Without doubt, it can happen that individualism is prac-
> ticed in a completely different spirit. Some use it for
> their personal ends, as a means of disguising their ego-
> ism and of more easily escaping their duties to society
>   (in Bellah, 1973:49).1

Egoistic tensions of suicidal strength, then, are not due to
the frustration of the naturally insatiable passions of the
organic ego; rather, they are the unanticipated consequences
of the extreme modern religio-cultural emphasis on the "cult
of individualism" and the Romantic cult of "utmost inward-
ness." Almost imperceptibly, one sanction metamorphoses into
another; ironically, what started out as a leading virtue
becomes, through constant elimination and refinement, a lead-
ing vice. When extreme rhetoric or prophetic calls destroy
the human scale, the necessary proportion between virtues,
then the life-giving balance can only be restored through

letting go, through a healing dialectic that restores the
distorted and self-tortured part to a harmonious relation-
ship with the whole. For healing means "making whole."

d. Egoisme, Modern Angst, and the Romantic Ethos of the
   Infinite "Journey into the Interior"

> Today neurasthenia is considered a mark of distinction
> rather than a mark of weakness. In our refined socie-
> ties, enamored of things intellectual, nervous members
> constitute almost a nobility (S:181).
>
> In revulsion from its surroundings, consciousness be-
> comes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and
> unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-ob-
> servation and self-analysis (S:278).
>
> ... the man whose sole activity is diverted to inner
> meditation becomes insensible to all his surroundings.
> If he loves, it is not to give himself, to blend in fe-
> cund union with another being, but to meditate on his
> love. His passions are mere appearances, being sterile
> (S:279).
>
> [Egoisme] creates nothingness within by creating it
> without, and thus has nothing left upon which to re-
> flect but its own wretched misery (S:279).
>
> [The egotist's] only remaining object of thought is his
> own inner nothingness, and the resulting melancholy. He
> becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of
> morbid joy (S:279).

Now, Durkheim's polemical target with egoisme was the
Romantic ethos of anguished subjectivity. Here we see a high
moral calling transmuted into immoderate intellectual and ar-
tistic aspirations; the resulting angst drowns the individual
in an "infinity of dreams." Indeed, the inflation of the ego,
the apotheosis of the artists' "journey into the interior"
(E. Heller, 1968) has been a hallmark of the Romantic Cultur-
al Tradition. In our own day, at least three major poets--
who accepted this heroic plunge, who danced on the edge, who
lived out a kind of cosmic brinksmanship--have taken their
own lives within a few years of each other; I refer to Sylvia
Plath, John Berryman, and Anne Sexton. In an illuminating
study of literature and suicide, The Savage God (1972), A.

Alvarez noted that spreading out from this dramatic ethos "... the closed world of suicide has penetrated Western culture like a dye that cannot be washed" (1972:206). Perhaps this is what Rimbaud, that superannuated explorer of the self-tormenting hell of the Romantics, meant when he called himself and his fellow voyagers of the infinite ocean within litteraturicides. Indeed, because egoisme is willingly embraced as an ideal fulfilling one's deepest inner nature, because it is presented as one of our highest possible callings, it has become a veritable "vocation," as Alvarez suggests, among modern Romantic artists and thinkers.

Others have also noted that Durkheim's critical illustrations of egoisme were often drawn from the works and lives of Romantics. LaCapra, for instance, suggests: "Although Durkheim referred to Chateaubriand, a magnificent anatomy of anomie--indeed, a myth of the time--was provided by Balzac in Le Peau de Chagrin" (1972:166-7). Perhaps the contemporary observer who has most clearly recognized Durkheim's intellectual debt to the Romantics has been Jack Douglas. He notes, for example, how "... Rimbaud spent his adult life destroying himself" (1967:357).

> Death, especially suicide, was a favorite theme in the literature of the romantic movement. Indeed, the most important contribution of this literary tradition to the developing sociology of nineteenth century Europe was that it helped focus attention on suicide. Largely because of its treatment in literature, suicide was seen by the educated public as a fundamental social problem. Nineteenth century Europeans, especially the French, were frightened of "la manie du suicide."

> But the literary concern with suicide also provided the core of certain very important, specific "theoretical" explanations. Of fundamental importance was the prime romantic symbol of an isolated, lonely hero of a poetic (or intellectual bent), who wanders far from human society in search of the impossible, and, failing of the impossible, becomes increasingly melancholy and enamored of eternity. The idea that self-imposed isolation produces melancholy and hence, suicide, was hardly novel; indeed, Robert Burton's seventeenth century treatise, The Anatomy of Melancholy, had carefully documented its classical sources. But this prime symbol of romanticism contained the most unclassical ideas of both

egoisme and anomie. Indeed, the romantic image of sui-
cide seems to have been so much the mythical model
which the sociologists of suicide had in mind that both
Morselli (1879) and Durkheim (1897) had a strong ten-
dency to treat egoisme and anomie as almost identical.
It is even possible to specify the work of Chateau-
briand, especially as treated by de Boissmont, as the
major source of Durkheim's idea of anomic suicide
(1968:366-67).

Another observer, Cesar Grana, notes how Durkheim
of egoisme reflected the Romantic Ethos of deliberately em-
bracing angst, mordant subjectivity, and suicide.

The Paris "Suicide Club" and other necrophiliac dis-
plays of Bohemia were, of course, linked to the fatu-
ously masochistic side of romanticism. But they remind
us all the same of Lammenais's observation that self-
killing was essentially an act of self-worship, and as
such, was one of the chief signs of modern decay
(1967:80-81).

Referring to one of Durkheim's statements (see S:169), Grana
echoes my own discovery of the cultural sanctioning of ego-
isme:

Durkheim's statement, however, is only part of Durk-
heim's theory of suicide as a product of the moral wa-
tering-down of institutions of modern society. He comes
close to the relationship between suicidal ideas and
the ailments of the modern literati when he points out
that it was precisely the utopian intensity of their
aesthetic and intellectual dreams that led to bitter-
ness and demoralization.... it is only with Durkheim's
description of suicide egoiste that we step into the
atmosphere of modern literary motivations*(1967:80-81).

Grana continues, citing George Sand's sardonic estimate of
the Romantic Ethos, which spread from its origins in Germany
in the last half of the eighteenth century to England about
the turn of the century, to France about a generation later,
and finally to America around the 1840's.

For George Sand, looking at the same state of mind,
saw it as the spectacle of the anguish and fatigue
created by a self-centered intellectual ambition
"grown and stretched beyond measure." Durkheim, in
speaking of "vanishing phantasamagorias" and the "ar-
tificial combination of illusory images" suggests that
the tour ironie was also a tour de force which liter-
ary self-will could in the end sustain. Rationalism
had seen the emancipation of man from faith as a vic-
tory. The Romantics may also have seen faith as de-

fenseless before the analytic mind. But for them the consequence was self-defeat (1967:213).

Indeed, so complete was the Romantic influence, in this regard, on Durkheim that in The Division of Labor he made the mistake of according art and the imagination the special status of being free from all constraints, the very message so often proclaimed by the Romantics themselves. "Art is absolutely refractory to all that resembles obligations, for it is the domain of liberty" (DL:51). Thus, on both sides, Durkheim allowed himself to be too strongly influenced by the premises of his polemical opponents. On the one side, he mistakenly accepted the Utilitarian apotheosis of individualistic economic competition through the mechanism of the market (see Chapter One of this Book); while on the other hand he unfortunately incorporated the opposite pole--namely, the Romantics' insistence that art and imagination be freed from all constraint; or as Levi-Strauss once said, be granted the special status of a "national park, wild and free." Thus, at certain points, Durkheim was unfortunately tempted to exclude both economic and artistic activity from the all-important realm of the moral and the social.

But, as we have discovered, Durkheim also proposed that art and aesthetic activity must follow the same rule of the "golden mean" or human proportion between mutual human obligations.

> The aesthetic-moral activity seems freed from all control and limitation because it is not regulated. But, as a matter of fact, it is narrowly circumscribed by activity properly moral, for it can surpass a certain standard only to the detriment of morality.... When the place of the imagination in morality is made too great, obligatory tasks are unnecessarily neglected. All discipline appears intolerable when one is used to acting only under rules of one's own making. Too much idealism and moral elevation often deprives a man of the taste to fulfill his daily duties.
>
> In general, the same may be said of all aesthetic activity; it is healthy only if moderated.... To great an artistic sensibility is a sickly phenomenon which cannot become general without danger to society. The limit beyond which excess begins is, of course, varia-

ble, according to the people or the social environment (DL:239-40).

In conclusion, Durkheim himself alluded to one of the leading symbols or "collective representations" of the Romantic ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior"-- namely, Goethe's Faust.

> One cannot bring some objective nearer that, by definition, is infinitely far away. The remaining distance is always the same, whatever route we take. What could be more disillusioning than to proceed toward a terminal point that is nonexistent, since it recedes in the measure that one advances? Such futile effort is simply marching in place; it cannot fail to leave behind frustration and discouragement. This is why historical periods like ours, which have known the malady of infinite aspirations, are necessarily touched with pessimism. Pessimism always accompanies unlimited aspirations. Goethe's Faust may be regarded as representing par excellence this view of the infinite. And it is not without reason that the poet portrayed him as laboring in continual anguish (ME:40).

In sum, having established from Durkheim's own work that both anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the modern world--the first by the Utilitarian Ethos and the latter by the Romantic Ethos--let us now turn, briefly, to investigate the religious foundations of these modern cultural traditions.

CHAPTER TEN

ANOMIE AND EGOISME, MODERN CULTURAL TRADITIONS,
AND THE FIRST AND SECOND PROTESTANT ETHOS

<u>Preface</u>. How shall we explain the origins of, and contin-
uing sanctions for, anomie and egoisme in the modern world?
The same insight that led to the second schema of suicide
also leads us to search for better ways to conceptualize the
mediating contexts in which to anchor anomie and egoisme. As
noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, the notion
of cultural traditions suggests itself as a potent analytical
perspective.

Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is
the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, develop-
ment, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing individualism
and legitimized insatiability in the modern world, we look to
the interface between religion and culture. Accordingly, we
shall now ask: what are the prime terms of translation be-
tween modern religions and contemporary culture and psyche,
especially anomie and egoisme? Thus, our Durkheimian problem
becomes a Weberian one--whether, and to what extent, various
ethical sanctions coming from Protestantism have become sedi-
mented at the heart of modern structures of conscience and
consciousness?

Let us review our essential findings so far in this re-
gard. Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One
we linked the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism
with two dominant contemporary cultural traditions. In Book
Two, we explored the problematic relations between Protes-
tantism and suicide. In the second part of Book Three which
we have just concluded, we connected anomie and egoisme as
absolutized forms of individualism and legitimized insatia-

bilities to two dominant modern cultural traditions.

How, then, did anomie and egoisme come to be cultural-
ly sanctioned? That is, having linked the second schema of
suicide to modern cultural traditions, it is now time to
link these latter, in turn, to their originating religious
sanctions. Therefore, we ask: what are the specific moral
and spiritual foundations of the Utilitarian Ethos and the
Romantic Ethos? In both cases, we shall search for ethical
premiums placed by secularizing religious drives on nominal-
ism, atomism, or the absolute immediacy and autonomy of the
individual's experience, and his infinite life-task. Specifi-
cally, we shall now move to link anomie to the secularization
of Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheran-
ism. In sum, we propose the following essential psycho-socio-
cultural-historical linkages. As the active externalization
of absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability, ano-
mie is connected with the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural
Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Calvinistic
ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original and contin-
uing source. In addition, as the "infinity of dreams" seen,
for instance, in the modern artist's "journey into the inter-
ior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural
Tradition, and then, ultimately, with the Lutherans' and
spiritual radicals' ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its
original and continuing source. Thus, anomie and egoisme
serve as critical anatomies of two halves of the modern soul,
of the ironic outcomes of the first and second Protestant
Ethos.

A. <u>Cultural</u> <u>Traditions</u> <u>as</u> <u>an</u> <u>Interpretive</u> <u>Perspective</u>

Cultural traditions of more or less complexity may be found in all societies. This is so because society is an inter-generational as well as an inter-actional process. On the universal level, a cultural tradition may be most simply defined as an institutionalized series of interpretations. A cultural tradition is built up out of a "dialogue across the centuries" (B. Nelson, 1965a). A cultural tradition is a community of memories and shared aspirations. A cultural tradition is formed by handing down from generation structures of conscience and consciousness--of right and wrong, of truth and error. Thus, a cultural tradition is a moral and cognitive community bound together through time and space by shared symbols, common values, and fields of meaning.

Cultural traditions are here regarded as the prime historical contexts in which questions of meaning and value, truth and error, are worked out. Cultural traditions mediate between us, as moral agents and intellectual subjects situated in specific "heres and nows" in which we constantly have to choose and act, and earlier models of compelling moral agency and satisfying intellectual achievement to which we turn, time and again, for guidance. Cultural traditions may be regarded as prime symbolic guidance and classificatory systems which we, the present, share with past generations and, perhaps, future ones as well.

A fuller, more formal definition might be: a cultural tradition is a series of temporally linked cultures engaged in applying analogous and progressive variations on the same basic inherited and appropriated themes and models to specific problems within the sphere of their own immediate and prospective experience. Each group within a common cultural tradition contributes to relatively persistent and evolving efforts to developing and making explicit the implications of inherited norms, and extending analogous applications of inherited and appropriated models, reinterpreting their original, current, and potential meanings, and reemphasizing

or devaluing certain elements or logics to fit their own specific situations, present interests, past histories, and probable futures.

Since cultural traditions as they are lived through by their participants serve as crucial symbolic frames of reference, so, too, thinkers in the human sciences might better collaborate if we used these lived frames of reference, these actual evolving "logics in use," as our prime analytical units, rather than abiding by the standard disciplinary restraints of domains and genres, periods, and national societies. As an integrative interpretive perspective, cultural traditions cuts across a series of analytically separable dimensions, including:

(a) geo-political boundaries--cities, regions, kingdoms, nation-states, empires, etc.;

(b) temporal demarcations such as decades and centuries;

(c) cultural boundaries such as the domains of religion, law, philosophy, science, literature, language, art, and so on.

Our real challenge here, then, is to more deeply grasp the embeddedness, the interrelations, the multiple and resonating links between different groups, cultural spheres, levels of experience, and historical phases.

Further, cultural traditions act as an intermediary level of sociocultural complexity between specific societies and larger civilizational complexes; that is, civilizations are composed of several related but often competing cultural traditions. In sum, as basic interpretive units, cultural traditions cross-cut national boundaries, time-periods, and cultural spheres, on the one hand, and act as key links between societies and civilizations on the other.

In analyzing the evolution of cultural traditions, one cannot hope to trace a simple, straight line of development from the earliest through the latest phases. Rather, the construction of any cultural tradition is due to an extraordinary interplay of many factors over time to form a cultural complex. Hence, we should look for various strands, sometimes

competing, sometimes reinforcing, which converge to have similar net effects.

In analyzing the internal structure of cultural traditions, we focus primarily on the anchors of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. Proceeding from what we learned in Book One (see the summary in the first part of Chapter Eight), we shall assume that structures of conscience--rules for determining right from wrong, for allocating moral responsibility--are always and everywhere intimately linked with structures of consciousness--rules for determining truth from error, for determining intellectual integrity, and, in turn, these are linked with the structure and process of collectivities. The logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellectual judgment are often deeply intertwined. Hence, we are especially interested in understanding the complex interrelations between religious and ethical systems and other major cultural forms, societal institutions, and personality types. Therefore when seeking to understand crucial cultural transformations, we ask: what are the fundamental shifts in the collective grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority?

Further, we shall assume that: (a) there are a series of dynamic tensions energizing and eroding cultural traditions, and (b) cultural traditions are constituted through the layering or sedimentation of crucial transformations based on various resolutions of conflicting polarities. We shall focus, then, on the cumulative series of struggles and resolutions which constitute and change cultural traditions. In terms of polarities, we shall look for opposing claims on the structures of conscience and consciousness. We shall attempt to trace central rhetorical conflicts over the legitimate grounds of moral and intellectual authority. Then, in terms of transformations, we look to the major resolutions of these opposing polarities which fundamentally shift the grounds of conscience and consciousness from one anchor to another. Such rhetorical struggles are resolved in one direc-

tion or another at one point in time, thus transforming the cultural structure. When a cumulative series of tensions converge or build to an exploding point, there is often a breakthrough (or breakdown) from one cultural system to another. We then see the grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority permanently shifted. There is, then, a fundamental reorientation of the structures of conscience and consciousness; and a new tradition emerges.

At the center of our hermeneutic or interpretive strategy are the notions of symbolic equations or transformations. Interpretation means, first, looking for "what goes with what" (Burke, 1973:38); that is, a set of symbolic equations linking diverse levels and spheres together. Second, interpretation means looking for "from what to what" (Burke, 1973:38); that is, a series of transformations linking different processes and phases together. Hence, we shall search for the basic series of unifying equational and transformational processes which constitute and change cultural traditions.

In analyzing cultural traditions, then, the first task is to unravel the central series of symbolic equations which link different spheres and levels of human action together through the progressive extension of analogies from one set of experiences to another. Correspondingly, in terms of the historical axis of traditions, we seek to unravel the complex series of sequential equations or transformation terms linking diverse historical phenomena with their common origins. We have, then, two complementary interpretive strategies for moving from empirical diversity to conceptual unity.

In sum, this interpretive perspective assumes that:

(1) cultural traditions are long-term symbolic systems of meaning and value. shared by many generations;

(2) all people are informed--individually and collectively--by cultural traditions (they are universals);

(3) the internal structure of cultural traditions differ from one society to another (they are variable also);

(4) cultural traditions are the most important contexts
in which questions concerning meaning and value are
addressed;

(5) the core of cultural traditions centers around moral-
ities and logics, on questions of integrity, belief,
and judgment;

(6) cultural symbolic patterns--especially the prime mor-
alities of thought and logics of action--are closely
connected to social processes;

(7) there are often internal conflicts in a tradition
over what is right and wrong, true and false, good
and bad, and since such polarities are universal to
human action, conflicting claims based on these po-
larities tend to resurface again and again, today
as in the past;

(8) hence, it is crucial to understand these specific
rhetorical contexts and, thus, the series of dynamic
tensions energizing and changing cultural traditions;

(9) these sociocultural tensions are resolved in one di-
rection or another at various times, and these series
of cultural transformations build up a cultural tra-
dition;

(10) when a cumulative series of conflicts builds to a
breaking point, there is either an acute cultural
breakdown, or a cultural revolution, a time of break-
through from one symbolic system to another; then we
witness a fundamental reorientation in the structures
of conscience and consciousness--that is, shifts in
the basic legitimate models anchoring morality,
thought, belief, and feeling.

B. Outline of Four Major Western Cultural Traditions

Each tradition has been defined primarily in terms of its most distinctive cultural logics. Hence, we shall pre- liminarily distinguish between polar pairs of dominant West- ern cultural traditions in terms of basic ethical and epis- temological oppositions (drawn mainly from Weber's sociology of religion)--namely, "priests" versus "prophets" (and laity), on the one hand, and "ascetics" and "mystics" on the other. Space limitations permit only a schematic outline of these traditions and their historical development.[1]

First, the cultural tradition which emerged as dominant in the formative period of European civilization was the Catholic tradition. The Catholic Hierocratic-Rational Cultur- al Tradition was (is) a unique and powerful fusion of Greco- Roman, Germanic, and Arabic cultural elements with a special form of Judaeo-Christianity. The third great phase of this tradition was coterminous with the emergence of a distinctive Western civilization from about the eleventh century onward. Not only did tradition serve as the matrix of European civi- lization, but it was against this tradition that the three major modern traditions reacted. Space limitations preclude "excavation" of the Catholic tradition; moreover, our central concern lies with the modern traditions. In short, anomie and egoisme pertain to the modern traditions.[2]

If we are to comprehend the origins of the modern world, we should strive to understand how the medieval organ- izational, theological, and ethical syntheses came to seem problematic to many. Among the critical shifts in the late medieval-Reformation period are a series of decisive shifts from "office charisma" and institutional authority to "per- sonal charisma" (see Weber, 1968) and the "inner light"; the rejection of the medieval triangulated system of conscience, casuistry, and the cure of souls (eg. see Nelson, 1969a); the overcoming of invidious dualisms of "Religion" and "World" in the outlawing of the possibility of "two lives"

and thus the double standard of moral perfection; the rejection of scholastic rationalism for skepticism, nominalism, fideism, and mysticism, and so on.

Here, the tensions between priest and institutionalized "office charisma," and the prophetic, ascetic, and mystic rooted in "personal charisma" became especially acute during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe. When, finally, in the Reformation, prophets set aside priests, and ascetics and mystics felt compelled to live within the world, a series of momentous cultural changes resulted. For their powerful religious energies transformed the medieval world.

For example, with his notion of a Christian "calling" or vocation with the world, Luther broke through the medieval contrast between clergy and laity by proclaiming the "priesthood of all believers." And, whereas the Catholic tradition had joined faith and reason (through the medium of Greek philosophy), many reformers demanded that we live by the truth of revelation alone, and insisted that we are not saved by the Church, but only through faith in God. The Bible and St. Paul, not Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, were to be the sole guides for human action.

During that time which Huizanga called "the waning of the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed the "Counter-Renaissance," many people were haunted by questions such as: "How shall I know if I am saved? How do we know anything to be true? How shall we gain certainty?" Against this background of crisis, seen in skepticism, fideism, probabilism, fictionalism, etc., certain prophetic figures rose up to proclaim new bases for belief and action, new and mighty objective certainties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certainty in the human subject, such pioneers of early modern culture as Luther, Calvin, the spiritual radicals and mystics, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, and so on (whatever their other differences), all came to anchor moral and intellectual authority in a deeply interior faith, or feeling, in the inherent rationality of the human mind--in

short, in the Self or Subject. <u>Authority</u> <u>became</u> <u>internalized;</u> the Protestant principle of self-reliance became extended to all aspects of life. The religion of the "inner light" was raised to center stage. Hence, ethics and knowledge in all three modern traditions rest on a new and compelling sense of individual moral agency and intellectual autonomy.

Since Catholicism was allied with the "center" (eg. see Shils, 1975), a parallel movement was the rising demand for the autonomy of the peripheries and the secular world. This movement was seen in the rise of the national monarchies and their drives for autonomous national churches, the growing desires of many lay people to live sanctified lives within the world, and the emergence of modern natural science governed by its own special laws. "This world" began to free itself from traditional constraints imposed in the name of the "other world."

We shall look, then, to the main sociocultural transformations stemming from three types of Reformations--a Catholic "prophetic" reaction against the dominance of the Catholic Church, and two forms of Protestant asceticism and mysticism working within the world. These drives toward reform and autonomy took different forms in the different political and institutional contexts of France, England, and Germany. Having a common opponent, and sharing a common anchor in "personal charisma," these three drives--the prophetic, ascetic, and mystic--became differentiated by national context. Thus, while in Anglo-American society Calvinistic Protestantism contributed an "inner-worldly ascetical" cast to secular culture and personality, and Lutheran, mystical, and pietistic Protestantism contributed an "inner-worldly mystical" cast to German and Romantic culture, in France the anti-clerical drives for moral, intellectual, and socio-legal reform contributed a "laic" and "positivist" cast to the mainlines of modern French culture.

C. The Franco-Latin "Laic"-Positivist Cultural Tradition

What does an educated, lay Catholic, rising middle class, committed to living a moral life within the world, do when it is confronted with a powerful and wayward Church which is, in turn, allied with a corrupt aristocracy and monarchy? Now, the first modern cultural tradition--the "laic"-positivist cultural tradition--stemmed from a kind of Catholic "prophetism" or protestantism, especially in France. This tradition was "laic" because it derived primarily from the laity, who strove to live a life of high moral standards within the world. And it became positivist because spokesman for the educated laity gradually felt compelled to declare that Individual Reason and Natural Science were the only certain ways of gaining positive, valid knowledge.

Over against the dominance of the Catholic metaphysical or "essentialist" tradition, the positivist stream sought to construct an "existential" conscience and consciousness. Against the pervasive claims stemming from the "Book of Revelation," whose authoritative interpretation was monopolized by the Latin hierocracy, they appealed to the "Book of Nature." This latter was also the "work of God's hand," and it was an open book which could be read by any man who learned to read its special language, for it was a work written in numbers (hence, the importance of mathematics in early modern science).

Whereas the ruling philosophy in the Catholic tradition had been metaphysical, this new tradition became positivist--for it denied that ultimate reality is knowable through human reason. At root, positivism rests on a radical split between faith and reason. Ironically, the first to institutionalize this gulf (besides nominalists), were fideist members of the Church establishment. They separated things that are knowable only through revelation and faith off from things of this world that are positively knowable through the senses and reason in order to safeguard the sacred deposit of faith from skeptical attack.

However, as tensions deepened, there was a significant
shift as later "laic" reformers came to set aside the impor-
tance and then even the possibility of a metaphysical, other-
worldly half of the dichotomy. Thus, the two worlds were fur-
ther split into two separate truths--reason had little or
nothing to do with faith, while established religion was in-
creasingly put on the defensive by Individual Reason and Nat-
ural Science. Like those who rejected reason for faith and
Scripture alone, then, the positivists--who came to live by
Reason alone--radically split off faith from reason, revela-
tion from nature, this world from the other world.

From the beginning, the central thrust of the Franco
Cultural Tradition was to separate morality from its tradi-
tional hierocratic and metaphysical foundations. Metaphysics
was attacked as the anchor pin of the legitimacy of hiero-
cratic control of society and individuals, and as a bulwark
shielding the waywardness of the incumbents of "office char-
isma." Thus, the French moral and intellectual reformers
were engaged in an epic struggle with the hierocracy over
many centuries concerning the legitimate foundations of moral
and intellectual decision. Positive science came in later
stages as a prime tool in their struggle to disengage from
traditional claims on man, and as the prime tool by which to
construct a "laic" morality. Remember that an educated laity
had little role to play in the Church, just as the middle
class was blocked by the restrictions of the old feudal-aris-
tocratic regime. Anti-clericalism, as in many hierocratically
dominated cultures, whether from left (eg. the philosophes)
or right (eg. Pascal and the Jansensists), fueled the mount-
ing drive for a new "laic" morality. The opposition to the
dominant Catholic Cultural Tradition led them to embrace the
following rhetorical series: priests are to metaphysics as
laity is to positivism and science, and as aristocracy and
monarchy is to middle class, and as the old feudal regime
is to progress, Enlightenment, and the modern world. In sum,
against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," the

French and Latin moral and intellectual reformers raised the
counter-claims of "Individual Conscience" and "Reason" based
on the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" and the
"Book of Nature." The dual insistence on science coupled
with social critique and moral reform was not an anomaly
(eg. with Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim), for it was pre-
cisely this emphatic linkage which lay at the very heart of
the powerful dynamic of the "laic"-positivist cultural tradi-
tion.

From the late medieval period on, some of the most dy-
namic streams in French culture may seen as part of a growing
tradition of opposition to the dominant tradition. And, al-
though opposed in certain ways, their critique had the con-
verging effect of delegitimizing the ancien regime. For it
was a continuing stream of evangelical monks and lesser cler-
gy (eg. the satires of Rabelais, d. 1553), disgruntled or
displaced nobleman (eg. the world-weary fideistic skepticism
of Montaigne, d. 1592, the critical relativism of Montes-
quieu, d. 1755, the atheistic materialism of Holbach, the u-
topian positivism of Saint-Simon, d. 1825), Calvinists (eg.
the Huguenots, the radical skeptical fideism of Pierre Bayle,
d. 1706), French Catholic Calvinists (eg. the Jansenists, or
the fideistic skepticism of Pascal, d. 1662), rising bour-
geoisie (eg. the dualistic critical rationalism of Descartes,
d. 1650, or many of the Jesuit-educated philosophes of the
Enlightenment, eg. Voltaire, d. 1778), who, among others,
fueled this rising tide of cultural opposition, the radical
critique of tradition and all forms of servitude, and accel-
erated the "laic" drive for moral and intellectual autonomy
and social reconstruction. The successive waves of fideism,
nominalism, skepticism, critical rationalism, positivism,
existentialism, Marxism, and so forth, which have washed over
French culture, should be understood in terms of their common
opposition to the Catholic Cultural Tradition.

Perhaps one of the critical factors here was that, un-
like England which enjoyed a peaceful Reformation in the

the 1520's and a violent political-social Revolution in the
1640's, and in contrast to Germany which enjoyed a Reforma-
tion in the 1530's but never experienced a comparable socio-
political revolution, France had no successful Reformation,
yet experienced the most violent political-social Revolution
in 1789, which, nonetheless, proved to be abortive in sever-
al ways. The deepening split in France between reformist and
monarchic-hierocratic elements was to plague French society,
politics, and culture for centuries after. Indeed, nowhere
else did the oppositions become so deep, so mounting and ir-
revocable as between the monarchic/middle-class, cleric/lay,
metaphysical/positivist factions during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. And it was because of these historical
alignments that the two series of dichotomies became such
compelling symbolic equations in the minds of reformer and
traditionalist alike.

Main phases in the development of this tradition in-
clude:

(1) the late medieval background: the rise of the new
national monarchies, and their struggle with the Roman papacy
over control of the Church in their realms; the resulting
"Babylonian Captivity" of the Church at Avignon, the Western
Schism, and the rise of the conciliar movment; the establish-
ment of the persistent claims for the "liberties of the Galli-
can Church," all represent crucial background for the Reform-
ation phase in France;

(2) Reformation: the Reformation phase runs basically
from the opening of the Wars of Religion in the mid-sixteenth
century to the Edict of Nantes in 1598 which granted the Hu-
guenots toleration. However, the prolongation of this strug-
gle, and the fact that neither side decisively triumphed un-
til the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, with the
mass expulsion of the Huguenots, proved decisive for the sub-
sequent history of French society, polity, and culture;

(3) the growing absolutism and centralization of French
government in the monarchy, the suppression of independence
of the regional aristocracy, and the increasing identifica-
tion of the Church with the absolutistic regime (eg. the car-
dinals Richilieu and Mazarin as prime ministers) was criti-
cal. When coupled with the extraordinary longevity of the
Kings Louis XIII, XIV, and XV (1610-1774), and the suppres-
sion of dissent by the Baroque monarchies, only served to in-

crease the drive for reform;

(4) the rise of <u>critical rationalism</u>, especially in the early seventeenth century, with Descartes and the Cartesians, which was to constitute the most distinctive secular and early modern thrust of French philosophy;

(5) the rise of <u>Jansenism</u> as a rigoristic morality and philosophy of opposition to the compromises and laxity of the French Catholic Church, and of the critical rationalism of Descartes which anchored certainty in Individual Reason, and opened the way for a mechanistic universe devoid of God. Drawing on the dissatisfaction of upper-middle class lawyers (the <u>noblesse de robe</u>), the Jansensists, as a type of pietist French Catholic Calvinism rooted in Augustine, continued to have an influence in French culture far out of proportion to their small numbers;

(6) the <u>Enlightenment</u>, the great explosion of cultural critiques that came with the generations born in the last decade of the seventeenth century and the first two decades of the eighteenth century was the crucial transition to the modern, "secular" era of French culture. Their drive for moral and social reform, for a "natural religion" and a "natural morality," was directed both against the <u>ancien regime</u> and the Catholic Church of their youth. So great were the consequences of this massive outpouring that these generations came to be regarded as representing a crucial phase in the secularization of European civilization generally;

(7) the <u>French Revolution</u>, with its optimistic prelude, the engagement of successive class resentments against the old regime (the aristocracy, middle class, and lower class in turn took the lead) the unexpected violence, its rapid passage through many phases, the radical moralism of the Reign of Terror and Virtue, etc., and ultimately, its abortive and unfinished program of social reconstruction which would remain throughout the nineteenth century;

(8) the <u>Restoration</u>, the <u>Napoleonic Empire</u>, and the <u>Conservative Reaction</u> against the excesses of the Revolution of 1789, the resurgence of the Catholic right-wing and the rise of ultramontanism, and the subsequent alternation in French political culture between "caesaristic" leaders and laic-bourgeois Republics;

(9) the rise of <u>Utopian positivism</u>, with Saint-Simon, Comte, and their followers (akin to the Benthamite Utilitarians in England at about the same time), formulating the unfinished program of social, intellectual, and moral reconstruction. Also, we see the emergence of French social science outside the academy as the heir to the long tradition of social criticism, drives for positive reform, Science, and social organicism (in contrast to the social nominalism

of the English reformers);

(10) the rise of nineteenth century literary realism (eg. Balzac, d. 1850), literary positivism (eg. Taine, d. 1893), and critical rationalism not only in literature and literary criticism but also in philosophy (eg. Renan, d. 1892), and the philosophy of science (eg. Duhem, Poincare, d. 1912);

(11) the Third Republic, and its attempt to construct a "laic" morality (eg. the expulsion of the Jesuits from public education), bourgeois rationalism, the Dreyfus Case, Zola, and so on;

(12) twentieth century movements, attendant on the two world-wars and France's loss of world-position, eg. existentialism, Marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, and so on.

Indeed, it seems as if these struggles for moral, social, and intellectual reform are never completed; as the French say, "The more things change, the more things stay the same."

Yet, in a number of ways, the French reformers remained sons and daughters of the tradition against which they so relentlessly struggled for centuries, especially in their emphasis on Reason, natural law, high moral standards, the good of the whole society, social organicism, and so forth. As was noted in Chapter Four, this was Durkheim's cultural tradition. And it was for these and similar other reasons that Durkheim himself was immune to self-destructive individualisms and an "infinity of dreams and desires." Especially it was his social organicism, his positivistic rationalism, his typically French concern with mesure, proportion, and good order, and the classical notion of the "golden mean" as the norm for health and happiness, that led Durkheim to become such an incisive critic of the anomie and egoisme which plagued the Anglo-American and German-Romantic traditions. For in the last analysis, Durkheim's Suicide should be seen in terms of its rhetorical opposition to the heart of two other competing cultural traditions in the modern world.

D. <u>The Anglo-American Empiricist-Utilitarian Cultural Tra-
dition</u>

The first fully modern tradition is the Empiricist-U-
tilitarian ("ascetic") cultural tradition which emerged
primarily in England and then America from at least the sev-
enteenth century onward. The central motifs in this tradi-
tion are individualism (atomism, nominalism) and mechanism.
Empiricism is the central morality of thought; utilitarianism
is the central logic of action. Our thesis, following Max
Weber, is that these cultural logics emerged from the secu-
larization and translation of Calvinistic theology and ethics
into highly dynamic cultural and institutional forms during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and A-
merica.

Some of the key background events which allowed this
tradition to emerge in England include: the dynastic strug-
gles, English Erasmianism, and the peaceful Reformation of
Henry VIII, the establishment of a national Chruch in the
early sixteenth century, the alternation of Tudor Reforma-
tion and Tudor repression (eg. "Bloody Mary"), the growth
of English Calvinism and the stormy Puritan Revolution and
English Civil War during the mid-seventeenth century, and,
after the Restoration, the permanent establishement of Pro-
testant, Parliamentary, and middle-class principles in the
Whig Revolution of 1688, the waning of religious enthusiasm
and displacement of energies into non-political channels in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the
rise of Methodism in the mid-eighteenth centuries, and so on.

Structurally, it was England's isolation and indepen-
dence from continental Europe, her greater internal unifica-
tion than many other countries, her successful national Re-
formation, the parliamentary system of shared power, a per-
meable class structure which allowed the rising middle class
upward mobility, a state church which gradually granted tol-
eration for many competing Protestant denominations, the e-
mergence of new types of voluntary associations (eg. the dis-

senting academies, Royal Society, Lunar Society, etc.), the inclusionary thrust (begun in the Army during the Civil War and concluded only in the twentieth century) to include more citizens in the political process in the continuing democratic revolution, the market capitalism and scientific-industrial revolutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, among other things, which proved crucial for the development of this cultural tradition.

Major organizing polarities (variations of center/ periphery tensions) and major phases include the following. In the first phase, approximately late fifteenth century to 1588, the major organizing polarity was "Court" (including both Puritan and Anglican in the sixteenth century) versus "Country" (Catholic). The end of this phase came with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588; no longer did international Catholicism divide the country. Rather, from this point on, nationalism superseded religious differences. Thus, the "Court" party represented the rights of the "periphery," that is, a national religion, England, and the crown in the person especially of Henry VIII versus the continent, Catholicism, the Roman papacy, and so on. In the second phase, roughly 1588 to 1688, that is, during the Stuart period especially, "Court" versus "Country" meant Puritans versus Anglican-Conformists. During this period after the defeat of the Armada, international Catholicism lost its power as a divisive symbolic force, and the Puritan party shifted toward the "Country" position vis-a-vis the "Court." These two opposing forces cut across social classes. During the Civil War in the 1640's (under Cromwell), the Country party was victorious over the crown. However, the Puritans failed to fully legitimize their rule, and there was a peaceful Restoration in 1660. However, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 represented the ultimate victory of the Country, Parliamentary, and Whig principles; thus, this phase ends in 1688.

In the third phase, roughly 1688 to the mid-eighteenth century, the primary polarity is "Establishment" versus

"Dissent." During the later Stuart period and under the Han-
overian kings, the Whig oligarchy grew conservative, reached
a common understanding with the Anglican establishment, and
enforced civil disabilities on religious dissenters. It was
during this period, then, that liberal and radical Calvinist
reformist drives were forced into non-political and non-reli-
gious forms, especially science, economics, and technology.
It is during the latter half of the seventeenth century that
we first see Calvinistic ethics being translated in a massive
and sustained way into secular forms.

In the fourth phase, the main polarities were "Estab-
lishment" versus the emerging "Empiricist-Utilitarian Cul-
tural Tradition;" this phase extended roughly from the middle
of the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. During
this phase, the alignments solidify--on the one hand, we see
Anglican, Tory, the old landed aristocracy, while on the
other hand, we see Whig, individualism, the Industrial Revo-
lution, Market Capitalism, Utilitarian science and technolo-
gy, and so on. The establishment was overcome, among other
reasons, because they were static, while the other tradition
transformed the economic, social, and cultural structure.
Here, the rise of Methodism played a crucial role in bring-
ing a form of Calvinism to the masses, and in reenergizing
the secularizing thrust of Calvinism which had been running
down and into other channels for the past century.

In the fifth and final (in this schema) phase, the ma-
jor polarities were "Conservative" versus "Liberal;" it runs
from the first reform acts of the early eighteen hundreds
through the early 1900's. Here, we see the reaction against
both irrational traditionalism and the incipient negative
effects of the industrial revolution and market capitalism.
Perhaps one of the most significant changes was the metamor-
phosis of Utilitarian individualism into Benthamite collec-
tivism and state interventionism. The culmination of this
phase is the transformation of the laissez-faire market so-
ciety into a welfare state in the twentieth century (see al-

so Karl Polanyi, 1944).

Let us next briefly explore the two dominant logics of this cultural tradition--empiricism and utilitarianism. Empricism is a form of philosophic individualism, which emphasizes immediate experience, experiment, and induction from direct experience and experiment. It directs the individual to believe only the demonstrable evidence of one's own senses, including the innate "common sense." Empiricism rests on a sensationist and associationist psychology. Empiricism opposes both scholasticism and various other forms of rationalism, including idealism (eg. Bacon versus late medieval scholasticism and the "Idols of the Mind, and Locke's tabula rasa versus Descartes' "innate ideas"). Empiricism starts inductively from direct experience; from the part it reasons to a wider inference, to the whole. English and American culture has always had a characteristic emphasis on what is plain, simple, immediate; toward what is directly knowable by the senses; toward what is practical and useful.

This commitment to individualism, of which empiricist philosophy is one prime expression, has a series of reinforcing roots deeply embedded in English culture. One may cite the following symbolic equations for Anglo-American individualism:

(1) periphery versus center relations--that fact that England is an island, faced with a huge, populous Continent, is one perennial source of the drive for autonomy, both moral and intellectual. For, in general, the periphery stands for the rights of the part, while the center necessarily stands for the interests of the whole. Thus, England was faced successively by Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, France, Spain, Germany, and so on.

(2) personal charisma versus office charisma--a pervasive influence in building Anglo-Saxon culture was the influence of monastic orders such as the Benedictines and later the Franciscans. Here we see the inner equation working itself out between the personal charisma of mysticism and empirical,

experimental philosophy (eg. as in the Franciscan monk Roger
Bacon, d. 1292, an early advocate of experimental science).

(3) nominalism versus realism, via moderna versus via an-
tiqua--for instance, in the fourteenth century Franciscan
monk William of Ockham's logical nominalism (stemming from
his fideism, which denied the necessary interdependence of
existential facts to place them instead in direct dependence
on God) which helped dissolve medieval Thomistic realism.
With Ockham the connection between the periphery and nominal-
ism ("only parts are real") is clearly evident in the link
between his logical thought and his ethical thought--namely,
his struggle with the nationalists and rigorists against the
hegemony of the international Roman papacy.

(4) Calvinism versus Catholic scholasticism--the radical
individualism stemming from the Protestant principle, Calvin-
istic predestination, and the sects' extension of "inner
light" asceticism and mysticism became secularized and
translated into general culture in the form of Enligtenment
empiricism and other forms of individualism. Ockham's nomi-
nalism lingered at Oxford through Bacon and Hobbes' time;
and when fused with the empiricist residues of "inner light"
Protestantism through John Locke and the "common sense" of
the Scottish philosophers, generated the epistemological
anchors of this cultural tradition.

Nominalism and religious individualism became translat-
ed or secularized during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies into many different institutional and cultural forms.
For instance, there is a well-recognized connection between
the Calvinist drive toward self-governing congregations and
the English concern with voluntary associations and politi-
cal democratic individualism (eg. see Lindsay, 1947); for
the latter gained their ethical sanction from the former.
While the Puritan foundations (especially in the "Army De-
bates") of Anglo-American democracy and the rights of the
middle class individual are commonly recognized, it should
be noted that empiricism also rests on a similar ethical

sanctioning of the individual in terms of his "inner light" --the natural, inherent, "light of reason." Thus, empiricist epistemology is the natural correlate of democratic individualism ; they go together, there is a deep inner symbolic equation and historical transformation linking them.

Other expressions (or "equations") of this same individualism include: social contract theories and the notion of "civil society" (eg. as found in Locke, Ferguson, etc.), liberalism and the economic individualism which is at the root of free market capitalism (under the notion that "free markets make free men"), associationist psychology, atomistic and mechanistic Newtonian physics (ie. the "corpuscular theory"or the billiard ball image of the universe in which atoms bounce into each other), Dalton's atomic theory in chemistry, individual competition, natural selection, and the "survival of the fittest" in Darwinian evolutionary biology, Social Darwinism, judge-made case law, reductionism in medicine and science, and so on, which continue ramifying to this day.

Because of the strong continuing ethical sanction for absolute individualism and self-reliance, one of the most deeply embedded symbolic equations in this tradition is the insistence on a necessary and natural, inner link between reductionism (ie. always reduce higher levels to lower ones, the complex to the simple, the "nothing but" formula), or methodological nominalism, on the one hand, and the drive for moral autonomy, individualism, and political liberty on the other. Hence, organic or holistic or systemic images are condemned as totalitarian.

In addition, Utilitarianism is the characteristic moral philosophy, or logic of action, of this cultural tradition (its cousin is Pragmatism in America). Utilitarianism is an impersonal and objective calculus of efficiency; its prime value is functional rationality. Here, the grounds of ethical judgment become shifted to practical outcomes; whether it works or not becomes the chief criterion of value. Utilitar-

ianism shifts questions of value from essential goals and ultimate ends (substantive rationality) to operating means, to means-ends efficiency (functional rationality). Notions of value rooted in tradition, the community, nature, cosmology, God, etc., are sacrificed to notions of productivity and efficiency.

All actions, then, come to be judged by a statistical collective calculus of pain and pleasure, by "cost/benefit" analysis. The ruling ethical norm then becomes the "greatest good of the greatest number;" today, we have become an "actuarial society" in which public decisions have to be grounded in an impersonal trade-off of cost/benefit ratios. In this way, Utilitarianism builds on atomism or individualism, since the individual is taken as the basic unit and his preferences are statistically aggregated, and the result projected as the "common good." This "logic of action" is seen in contemporary life, for instance, in the method of taxing land in the United States in terms of its so-called "highest and best use," which is presumed to be whatever possible function which produce the most money if sold on the market.

This ethos constitutes the single most crucial step in what Weber (after the poet Schiller) called the "disenchantment of the world," for the world is no longer something mysterious, an "enchanted garden" or the "playground of the Gods." For God has abandoned the world (deus absconditus), and thus, the world has fallen merely to the status of something to be mastered and used to help build the "Kingdom of God" here on earth.

Now, the linkage between the growth of English liberalism, free market capitalism, the development of Utilitarian moral and political economic theory, the scientific and technocultural revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the Industrial Revolution and international extension of the market and the Pax Britannica in the nineteenth century, proved to be one of the most powerful and fateful convergences in world-history. These multiple and

reinforcing revolutions, all stemming from England, represented the high pressure area of the European world, and swept all before it as they colonized much of the rest of the world. Only the Catholic Cultural Tradition, and perhaps the Franco Cultural Tradition in its revolutionary movements, have had such a powerful and sustained outward thrust. No other cultural tradition in history can claim credit, or accept blame, for the Industrial Revolution, the international spread of market capitalism, and colonialism, and, thus, the change not only of their own way of life, but of every other society.

It is my thesis here (following Weber) that a number of key elements in Calvinism (eg. the devaulation of the world as wholly separate, of nature as completely fallen, radical religious individualism, predestinarianism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, the drive to build the Kingdom of God here on earth, etc.), combined in a decisive and highly dynamic way. In opposition to the priestly and hierarchical system of both Catholicism and Anglicanism, Calvinism represents the first and foremost expression of an "inner-worldly," "inner-light," vocational asceticism, of the personal charisma of the monk condemned to live in this world, but to be neither of or for the world. The drive of the ascetic toward systematic and methodical self-discipline, toward mastery of the flesh and the world to the greater glory of God is continued and even intensified in the Protestant ascetic, especially in the Puritan. The "visible saints" were a "salvation aristocracy," a rigoristic "saving remnant," committed, as in the theocracies of Geneva, Massachusetts Bay, and Cromwell's England, to building a "Godly Commonwealth," a "New Jerusalem," a "City on the Hill."

When secularized, "inner-worldly asceticism" and the drive toward impersonal service toward a supra-personal goal led to the Utilitarian culture. Now, whole it must be acknowledged that these outlooks developed from a number of sources over a series of generations marked by crucial dis-

placements and transformations in ethical sanctions, nonethe-
less, one may detect the emergence of a secular impersonal
ethic of service directed toward supra-personal goals couch-
ed in terms of a calculus of efficiency and productivity and
the norm of the "greatest good of the greatest number" as
early as the late seventeenth century (after religious "en-
thusiasm" waned). Again, one should not try to read back in-
to early reformers what their descendants did with their doc-
trines. Yet, we see such groups as the "moral statisticians"
and the rise of the notion of "political arithmetick" among
individuals in public life such as William Petty (who survey-
ed the confiscated Irish estates for the invading Cromwell,
and against whom Swift directed his satire in "A Modest Pro-
posal"). Utilitarian theory emerged with the strongest pro-
gram in the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment (eg. in the work of
Hume, Hutcheson, Priestly, Ferguson, Smith, etc., see Hale-
vy, 1955), as central to the attempt to build a "Newtonian
moral science," with its own special laws, whether these be
the "association of ideas," the "law of supply and demand,"
or similar notions. The development of the notion of "civil
society" in which the basis of the social bond was declared
neither to be kinship nor personal allegiance to a patriarch
or king but rather impersonal and individualistic participa-
tion in the economy, on the one hand, and the notion of a
society organized in terms of the market on the other hand,
went hand in hand. Markets were common before then, of course,
but, as both Weber and Polanyi saw, England was the first na-
tion in history to organize itself internally primarily in
terms of a market society, and these "moral scientists" work-
ed out the legitimating and directive theory. The idea of a
society governed by a self-regulating market, free from gov-
ernmental influence, in which prices would be set impersonal-
ly through the "law of supply and demand," was revolutionary,
as was the idea that the market was self-balancing because it
was governed by nature, automatically, as if by an "invisible
hand."

It was with doctrines such as these (which, along with Locke's political theory of 1688, formed the theoretical basis of American society and our Constitution), that we moved irrevocably from traditional to modern society, from the "tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a). For ethics became individualized and rationalized, that is, impersonal and calculating. This tradition was the first in history to state the moral doctrine that egoisme, regulated only by the impersonal competition of the marketplace, is really altruistic because it would inevitably lead to greater productivity and efficiency, and these, in turn are closely linked to the common good (eg. see Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees" in which "private vices become public virtues"). Now, given our interpretive perspective, it is significant that many of the leading pioneers of the Utilitarian perspective were Scottish moral philosophers, and that many of these and the English were either sons of ministers or themselves "dissenting divines," especially of Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Quaker, or Unitarian denominations.

Here, the development of a "New Model Man" and the "New Model Society" (to borrow a phrase from the Puritan "New Model Army") went hand in hand. And, although he was largely unaware of it, these transmuted ethical drives can still be seen in the legal, social, economic, and political reforms of the "Hermit of Queen's Square Place"--Jeremy Benthan, son of dissenters, and the very prototype of an "inner worldly ascetic" and "philosophical radical" (see Halevy, 1955). John Stuart Mill's touching account of his breakdown in his Autobiography, and his turn toward romantic poetry is a most revealing chapter in the later history of this tradition, for it is the most dramatic instance of a leading spokesman finding he cannot live within this tradition alone; the tradition here begins to breakdown from within.

With the turn toward social reform from a Benthamite liberal perspective, toward socialism and Idealism, Fabianism, and Labor governments in England, and the Social Gospel

movement in America, we see a metamorphosis in the old Protestant Ethic from prime concern with individual success to the central concern of contemporary liberal Protestantism--namely, social service and amelioration of poverty and oppression (eg. see Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975).

For our present purposes, it is the absolute individualism and "inner-worldly asceticism" of Calvinism as it became secularized in England and America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that constitutes the crucial cultural-historical sanctions for anomie. Here, we see the displacement of powerful religious energies into secular pursuits. Here, see "the unprecedented inner lonliness of the individual," as Weber remarked. Here, we find that embrace of an "infinite task"--building the "Kingdom of God" here on earth;" and thus, we find the vocation of the "monk within the world." Here, we find that functional rationality which positively enjoins limitlessness, because there is no goal in sight (see also LaCapra, 1972). We have discovered, in short, in secularized Calvinism the necessary cultural sanctions for absolute individualism and a legitimate "infinity of desires," which are turned against the external world in economics, science, technology, and so on. Hence, finally, we have discovered ourselves, and how our central values unintentionally metamorphose into our vices.

E. The Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition

The last major modern tradition to crystallize was the Romantic-Idealistic ("mystic") Cultural Tradition. Just as the prime rhetorical opponent of the Catholic Cultural Tradition was the Franco-Positivist Tradition, so, too, the sharpest critics of the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural Tradition were found among the Romantics. Emerging first in Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and then spreading across Europe and America, the Romantic Tradition emerged out of the progressive secularization of the "inner light" fideistic mysticism of the late medieval German mystics, and that of the "spiritual radicals" of the late Reformation period, the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith-crisis," assorted oriental and gnostic theosophies, neo-Platonism, and Leibnitzian rationalism, and the later pietistic cults of inwardness and anguished subjectivity, as these o-rientations were fused and progressively translated into modern art, poetry, music, philosophy, the social sciences, and so on. Although Weber himself never pursued these connec-tions, clearly "inner-worldly mysticism" is as significant a force in the modern world as "inner-worldly asceticism." Thus, we shall focus here on a second, and rather different, "Pro-testant Ethos."

Now, the political and religious background was deci-sively different in Germany. First, Germany was not a homo-geneous, internally unified nation-state like England or France; rather, Germany was a region of small competing states in central Europe. There was a continuous oscillation between the international, universalistic Holy Roman Empire and the Latin Church, on the one hand, and the small, locali-zed, particularistic states and principalities on the other, with little ground as in the nation-states of Western Europe. Thus, the essential political background conditions were Ger-man princes competing simultaneously against both the Habs-burg Empire and the universalistic claims of the Roman Catho-lic Church.

As might be expected during this era, the initial key
to these struggles was the conflict between center and peri-
phery. Thus, the key to the outcome of the Reformation in
Germany was the alliance between the Lutheran Reformation
and political regionalism. Lutheranism took on the character
of a national revolt against both Rome and Empire. Luther,
of course, depended for protection on the German princes a-
gainst both Rome and the German peasant uprising. On this
basis, Lutheranism built up a clergy and a territorial
Church system. After Germany fell into prolonged struggle be-
tween Catholic and Protestant states, the Peace of Augsburg
signified a victory for the rights of the princely states by
temporarily resolving the civil strife according to the form-
ula "cuius regio eius religio." Later, the Peace of Westphal-
ia (1648), ending the devastation of the Thirty Years War,
meant a checkmate to the Counter-Reformation in Germany, the
turning aside of the domination of Europe by the empire of
the Catholic Habsburgs, the dissolution of the Holy Roman
Empire in fact if not in name, and the de facto religious
pluralism of Europe as a permanent fact of life. While
France, England, and other Western European powers were cen-
tralizing and consolidating into modern nation-states, Ger-
many remained politically a region of many small competing
states, relatively backward economically, and penetrated by
feudal socio-economic organization.

Now, one cannot hope to trace the institutional his-
tory underlying this cultural tradition in the same manner
as with the other traditions. For one of the peculiar char-
acteristics of this tradition is the split between culture
and polity, between the "inner" and "outer" world. Indeed,
this stems from the basic Lutheran opposition between "Reli-
gion" and "World," his notion of two truths, and especially
his Pauline handing over of the direction of the external
world to the state. In contrast to Anglo-American Calvinism,
Lutheranism never legitimized a strong, external, collectiv-
ist organizational thrust. Moreover, this Lutheran split o-

pened the way for a unique symbiosis in German political culture--namely, in the most powerful of the emerging German states, Prussia, the Hohenzollern rulers were predominantly Calvinist, while the subjects were predominantly Lutheran (see Parsons, 1977:162). One can hardly conceive of a better fit between religion and politics--namely, disciplined, activist, authoritarian, collectivist Calvinist rulers paired with submissive Lutheran subjects.

It was against the background of a decisive religious Reformation coupled with political and economic backwardness in Germany that we should seek to understand the rise of the Romantic cultural tradition. For Romanticism first emerged as a reaction against the progressive trends of the modern world in society, economics, science, technology, art, and so on. Indeed, Germany's weak Enlightenment phase was followed almost simultaneously by the massive and brilliant Romantic reaction; here, Herder was a key link. Germany's cultural isolation and the central role of the universities in the rise of German culture (in contrast to the extra-university roles of reformers in Britain and France), are also important factors. Being in revolt against the homogenizing and geometrizing rationalism of the Enlightenment, the Romantics naturally reacted against the excesses of the French Revolution and Napoleon's hegemony over Europe. In the early nineteenth century, this symbolic equation between culture and politics led to an association of German nationalism with cultural ideals opposed to the rationality of the Enlightenment, and especially the obsession with utility at the heart of Anglo market capitalism. Thus, when Germany acted for almost the first time as a political unity against Western Europe, German thinkers and cultural spokesman also set themselves against Western European Enlightenment thought, a pattern which was to have fateful consequences for the future of the West.

Clearly, the prehistory of this tradition goes back at least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before to the late medieval mystics such as Eckhart, Suso, Tauler, and

others (of the _Theologica Germanica_), to the fideistic mysticism, nominalism, and conciliarism of thinkers such as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, to the _devotio moderna_ of the urban tertiary sects, especially the brotherhoods and sisterhoods scattered along the Rhine, Flanders, and the Low Countries such as The Brethren of the Common Life, the Friends of God, the canons regular, and so on. These religio-cultural streams accompanied the proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian structures of conscience in the Lutheran Reformation, especially in terms of the _angst_ and deep inner anguish of the paradigmatic Lutheran "faith crisis." Indeed, Luther served as a key conduit for both the Pauline-Augustinian structures of feeling and thought and Ockham's and Biel's nominalism (the _via moderna_), _and_ for the mysticism of the late medieval German mystics and the pietistic fideism of the _devotio moderna_. Indeed, as Panofsky (1957) notes, nominalism and mysticism shared an "elective affinity" (or symbolic equation) during this period in that both reinforced the primacy of the experience of the individual. These aspects of the Reformation prehistory were reinforced by the intellectualistic (often neo-Platonic) and pietistic mysticism seen in the ethic of "utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of the spiritual radicals and men such as Sebastian Franck, Caspar Schwekenfeld, Sebastian Castellio, Valentin Weigel, and others. Weigel has been honored on occasion as the original father of German Idealism.

Perhaps one of the most revealing figures, standing as he did between converging strands of earlier Christian and Protestant mysticism, and various oriental and neo-Platonic and gnostic theosophies, was the humble cobbler of Gorlitz--Jacob Boehme. Living in the last quarter of the sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Boehme had ecstatic visions, and was persecuted by the now-staid and orthodox Lutheran Church authorities. As a transitional figure in the interlude between the Reformation phase and the emergence of the dominant secularized cultural tradition

(like Pascal in France), the shoemaker from Silesia is an "ideal typical" example of an "inner-worldly mystic."

Approximately a century and a half after the Reformation, and after Lutheranism had hardened into a state supported Church and orthodoxy, the original spirit of the reformers was revitalized by the Pietist renewal led by men such as Spener, A.H. Francke, Count Zinzendorf, the Moravians, and a host of other "world-retreating" Protestant sects which followed. Methodism in England and America several generations later stemmed directly from the model of the Moravian pietists and brotherhoods, and both forms paved the way for the "cult of feeling" in Romanticism. Lutheran pietism, especially, was an important and pervasive background influence in the orientation of early Romantics such as Hamann and Herder.

During this same period, this cultural tradition enjoyed its earliest prime philosophical expression in the work of Leibnitz, the "German Plato" of his time, the outstanding polymath of his day, and a thinker given to mystical inclinations and sympathies. Leibnitz delivered the first fundamental critique of the classical formulation of the Newtonian atomistic and mechanistic world-view. Further, it is significant that he developed the calculus as the same time as Newton; however, in assuming that fields and processes were primary (rather than atoms), he approached the invention of the calculus from the point of view of the differential, while Newton worked primarily on the integral calculus (see C. Boyer, 1939). But Newton's physics and world-view won the day; Leibnitz died almost unnoticed, his critique of Newtonian physics and Locke's _Essays_ almost forgotten. Yet, his outlook gained final vindication almost three centuries later when the generation of German thinkers led by Einstein revolutionized classical physics, and substituted a processual, field theory. It was no surprise that only these thinkers (rather than the pioneering J.C. Maxwell) were able to draw upon their cultural tradition for the organic and processual

premises needed to fundamentally reorient physical theory.

Now, this developing religio-cultural tradition emerged in its first secularized modern phase with the Enlightenment generations of Lessing, Hamann, Herder, and Kant. It then exploded in its classical and definitive form of conscience and consciousness with the succeeding generations led by Goethe, Fichte, Schiller, Novalis, Savigny, Schopenauer, Hegel, Schelling, the Schlegels, the von Humboldts, and so on. It is here that history is portrayed as the "unfolding of the Absolute Spirit," emphasis is placed on the primacy of the "Transcendental Ego," that we see the first of many modern "journeys into the interior" (Heller, 1968). Indeed, it is striking that this massive intellectual and artistic outpouring, in many ways even greater than that produced by the core generations of the French Enlightenment, was so delayed. Yet, when it finally came, the German reaction to the progressive and disruptive tendencies of the Franco and Anglo-Scottish cultures was so massive and so rapid, that the Romantic reaction followed the weak German Enlightenment so closely as to be almost simultaneous with it rather than sequential. Although senior to Herder and his compatriots, much of Kant's Idealistic Rationalism may be viewed as a kind of anticipatory reaction against the incipient Romanticism of Herder and especially Hegel and his later generation.

Now, space has not permitted us here to chart representative figures of these leading traditions in other societies than those in which they were first born. However, since the Romantic tradition is the most international, let us look at the way in which this cultural tradition came to be detached from its homeland and came to cut across modern society. Remember that this ability to cross national frontiers is essential to a cultural tradition (rather than a national intellectual tradition). Dating roughly from the last quarter of the eighteenth century in Germany, the Romantic movement (excepting Rousseau) appeared approximately a generation later in England, another generation still in France, and, then,

another generation still in America (c. 1840's).

In England, the Romantics' reaction against the cold, abstract, Utilitarianism expressed in the leading economic, scientific, and technological streams of the day was prepared by the rise of Methodism. The intense inwardness and evangelical emotionalism of this--one of the first modern Protestant--mass revivalistic movements helped transform the predominantly "ascetic" Anglo personal and cultural styles. The first and most prescient English Romantic was William Blake (d. 1827), clearly a radical descendant of Protestant "inner light, inner-worldy mysticism." Blake prophesied against the incipient Industrial Revolution ("dark satanic mills") and apotheosized the individual Imagination. Along with others such as Swedenborg, Blake, with his mixture of mysticism, pietistic inwardness, ecstatic vision, and radical democratic individualism, remains one of the most powerful figures in the background of early English Romanticism.

A step removed from the religious fervor of these early mystic-Romantics was Wordsworth's spiritual, moral, and esthetic intoxication with nature; his lyrical poetry is a kind of affirmative "inner-worldly nature mysticism." In his early writings (eg. the "Lyrical Ballads"), Wordsworth attempted to counter in direct, personal experience of nature the dominant thrust of Anglo culture--the drive of "instrumental activism" for mastery of the external world. Moreover, it is no coincidence, that Wordsworth friend, S.T. Coleridge, the first theoretician in English Romanticism and one of its finest critics, drew inspiration from both the German Idealists and from a common "spiritual technology" of mystics the world over-- namely, psychoactive drugs (eg. in his case, opium). English Romanticism then exploded in the subsequent generations of Byron, Keats, Shelley, Ruskin, Morris, and so on; indeed, as Williams notes, it is striking that the very development of the term "culture" in the English language stems from the Romantics reaction against the disintegrating effect of the industrial and market capitalist revolutions on English society

(see Raymond Williams, 1958).

Similarly, many of the early French Catholic and/or A-
ristocratic Romantics (except Rousseau) such as Chateau-
briand, Lammenais, du Musset, Lamartine, and so forth, also
turned away from the cold, abstract, geometrizing and homo-
genizing rationalism of the Enlightenment to warmly embrace
either a romanticized nature or mankind (the cult of the
"people"). Both alternatives placed great stress on the nat-
ural emotions and subjective feelings in opposition to the
strictures of French classicism; this, in turn, helped bring
certain strands of French Catholicism closer to a Schlier-
machean (or perhaps Pascalian) pietism. Since society, as de-
veloped in French utopian positivism, was a keynote of the
French Romantics, advances made against the rationalistic
metaphysics, on the one hand, and the indulgence in senti-
mentality and emotion served to turn religion into morality,
and thence to identify morality and social norms. This new
ethical religion of society and mankind also retained the so-
cial organicism of earlier Catholic philosophy, which now
rested on a new basis. This fusion of new and old alterna-
tives pointed out a mainstream of French cultural develop-
ment centered around the identification of morale and morals
that was to occupy many of the great public moralists and
early sociologists such as Saint-Simon, Comte, and, above
all, Emile Durkheim. Gradually, as Romanticism metamorphosed
into Realism, and then successively into Symbolism (eg. Bau-
delaire, Rimbaud), Dadaism, and Existentialism, the egoistic
and "demonic" or gnostic, alienated underside of French Ro-
manticism increasingly came to the surface.

Finally, in the "American Renaissance" of literature
and thought, there is the clear influence of Unitarians, U-
niversalists, and Quakers on the American transcendalists
and Romantics of the early and mid-nineteenth century. What
is significant for the cultural historian here is the meta-
morphosis of liberal Calvinism into Romanticism, a path that
had already been blazed by Rousseau. Thus, we see in Emerson

and Thoreau the metamorphosis of "inner-light, inner-worldly asceticism" into Romantic "inner-worldly mysticism" focussed on Nature and Self. Other major figures in this emerging A-merican branch of the Romantic tradition include Walt Whitman, and especially that "Empress of Calvary," the hermit of Amherst, Miss Emily Dickinson. Although a minor figure in terms of literature, the life of John Muir (d. 1912) is paradigmatic here for the historian of cultural traditions. For Muir, born in Scotland and oppressed by a dour, Puritan father, moved directly away from the old-line Calvinism of his youth to inner-worldly Romantic nature mysticism. Indeed, as founder and first president of the powerful conservation organization, the Sierra Club, Muir institutionalized a public expression of the Romantics' concern for Nature; thus, he was one who translated the Calvinist drive for service into a new form of stewardship of the earth, one which is paradigmatic for the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Now, in terms of our special purposes here, it is the absolute individualism and "inner-worldly mysticism" of Lutheranism, fideistic pietism, and the subjective idealism of the spiritual radicals as these became secularized first in Germany and then in other countries from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries which provides the required cultural-historical sanction for Durkheimian egoisme. In the Romantic cultural tradition, we see the extreme subjectivity, the inflation of the ego, the fascination with heroic angst, that is central to egoisme. Here, we find that "infinity of dreams," the "journey into the interior" which issues in egoisme. Here, we discover suicide as a "vocation" among Romantic artists. In short, we discover in secularized Lutheranism the necessary cultural sanctioning for the Romantic ethos of absolute individualism, anguished subjectivity, and an "infinity of dreams" which are turned inward against the self, and which find their foremost expression in modern Romantic literature, art, music, and philosophy. In sum, in this cultural sanctioning of egoisme, we discover the other half of

the modern soul.

FOOTNOTES

BOOK THREE

#1, p. 877--In order to perform this task, we need systematic exegeses of their special sociologies; for instance, I have prepared an exegesis of the first three chapters of Weber's <u>Sociology</u> <u>of</u> <u>Religion</u>, unexplored territory to this day.

#1, 1024--In <u>The Division of Labor</u>, Durkheim had this to say about the understanding and the "golden mean" in history:

"But understanding is only one of our faculties. It can increase beyond a certain point only to the detriment of the practical faculties, disrupting sentiments, beliefs, customs, with which we live, and such a rupture of equilibrium cannot take place without troublesome consequences.... At each moment of history and in consequence of each individual, there is a determined place for clear ideas, reflected opinions, in short, for science, beyond which it cannot normally extend" (DL:238).

#1, 1039--But Durkheim's additional statement that ".. this abusive exploitation of individualism proves nothing against it," fails to catch the true thrust of his own insight into the "exception proving the rule" (as with, for example, the Jews and higher learning). For it is not those who shirk their duties to the modern "infinity of dreams" and the cult of "utmost inwardness" who are beset by egoistic tensions and suicide. Rather, it is those who live out these values to the fullest! The problem is not with some sinking to the sub-human level of animal drives or organic egoism, but, rather, of rising to super-human heights, and then failing. What Durkheim often observed but could not admit systematically was this crucial process of the routinization and deflection of modern charisma.

#1, 1052--As originally planned, a separate fourth book on cultural traditions was projected. Yet, this dissertation had grown so large that it became impossible to include much of this material. A detailed and systematic introduction to the methodology of interpreting cultural traditions has been worked out.

#2, 1052--A long paper on the evolution of the Catholic Cultural Tradition is being prepared.

APPENDIX

WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO ANOMIE?

Synopsis. As is true of all paradigmatic notions, anomie
has become a protean concept, and, therefore, devoid of
specific and profound meaning. And Durkheim's typology has
both distorted and neglected.

In Part I of the following appendix, we shall explore
the vast literature which has grown up around Durkheim's no-
tion of anomie; we shall divide these into various streams
of development. We shall explore, first, the Parsonian
stream which may be considered basically normative, then
the Halbwachian stream which is structural, while the Merton-
ian stream of development mediates between these two in fo-
cussing on the conflict between cultural mandates and struc-
tural opportunities. The Srolian stream reflects these other
streams, especially the Mertonian and Parsonian, in psycho-
logizing anomie. Finally, we shall explore a miscellaneous
category of development.

What Parsons, Halbwachs, Merton, and others did to
Durkheim's anomie, and what others did, in turn, to their
theories, can be understood as a typical illustration of the
breakthrough and subsequent breakdown of central paradigms
used in the "normal science" of any discipline. Perhaps a
hidden law of intellectual and cultural entropy is at work
here--the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit."

In Part II, we shall explore various confusions over
Durkheim's typology of suicide. Despite the paradigmatic
status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide remains un-
derdeveloped and confused in the sociological literature.
While anomie has been applied to theories of deviance and
despair, the other three types have been largely ignored.

Thus, Durkheim's classic Suicide has experienced a doubly sad fate--for not only has anomie undergone routine and progressive distortion, but, at the same time, the rest of his complementary typology has been routinely ignored and distorted.

Fortunately, over the years several observers have attempted to rescue Durkheim's typology from obscurity. We shall explore their widely diverging reinterpretations. These attempts to restore or reinterpret Durkheim's schema of suicide will be divided into "reductions" and "rescues." Reductions refer to those reinterpretations which argue that Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues" refer to those interpretations which seek to distinguish the four interrelated types.

We shall first consider several representative reductions of Durkheim's typology, and then move to consider several rescues which serve as a bridge to my second schema of suicide as developed in Book Three. Our guiding assumptions here are that any adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide should: (a) take seriously the reductionists' attempts to elucidate an underlying unity to the four types, and (b) follow the rescuers in their attempt to elucidate the distinctness of the four types. Hence, we seek to reconcile this conflict by simultaneously interrelating the four types, and, at the same time, maintaining their distinctness. In sum, we seek a coherent unity-in-diversity.

PART I

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE MAIN STREAMS OF DEVELOPMENT
OF ANOMIE IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

<u>Introduction</u>. <u>Anomie</u>: <u>A</u> <u>Protean</u> <u>Concept</u>

All paradigmatic concepts suggest varying degrees of
generality and specificity. For while being comprehensive
and covering the greatest number of cases, they must also
yield specific, testable propositions about concrete situa-
tions, and do so in the most explicit, elegant, and economi-
cal manner possible. It is precisely this dialectical ten-
sion between polarities that constitutes the potency of fun-
damental concepts. However, at the same time, generality and
specificity have their negative "flip-sides." For extreme
generality tends to degenerate into diffuseness and amor-
phous ideas, while striving for specificity tends to lead us
into rigid and narrow preconceptions. Therefore, if "anomie
constitutes one of the truly central concepts of sociology"
(Parsons, 1968a), then how has it fared in escaping the twin
conceptual evils of diffuseness and narrowness?

When embarking upon a systematic review of the litera-
ture on anomie, one cannot help but observe that anomie has
become a protean concept. Asked to associate synonyms for a-
nomie, most American sociologists might reply with a long
list, including: normlessness, malintegration, normative
breakdown, social disorganization, social anarchy, sociocul-
tural chaos, social isolation, confusion--personal and norm-
ative, meaninglessness, alienation, social estangement, lack
of opportunity, apathy, despair, extreme passivity, resigna-
tion, and so on and so forth. All of these factors imply the
<u>absence</u> of some crucial social factor.

Yet, taking only the most common connotation of anomie as normlessness (an identification most sociologists have probably embraced through the osmotic medium of textbooks and introductory courses), one may ask: what does normlessness mean, precisely? Does it refer to situations where no viable norms yet exist, a sort of cultural void, or, rather, does it refer to the breakdown of existing norms? In a perceptive comment, the psycho-historian Erik Erikson suggested, in contrast to Merton, that "... the breakdown of normless itself is becoming a problem" (in Merton, 1956:43). What types of norms are breaking down? What is the scope of the normative breakdown? Whose norms are breaking down? Everyones? Simultaneously? Or is there some standard sequence involved? What are the key elements in the process of normative breakdown? What are the causes of this breakdown? Is it primarily or even exclusively the stress between cultural mandates and the lack of structural opportunities (Mertonian malintegration)? What do we mean by normative breakdown, anyway? Does it mean weakening, confusion, conflict, diffusion, routinization, or destruction? Is cultural or value or class conflict roughly synonymous with normlessness? Is pluralism synonymous with normlessness? How long do these factors have to last to qualify as normlessness? How does one distinguish between normlessness, deviancy, and moral innovation? The fact that we could almost indefinitely extend this list of questions reveals that anomie-as-normlessness is devoid of almost any specific meaning.

Unfortunately, anomie has become "a word to conjure with," as Yinger (1964) remarks; it has become a protean concept. As with other paradigmatic notions such as Marx's "alienation" (see J. Horton, 1964) or Weber's "Protestant Ethic," anomie has lost all specific meaning as it has become stretched to mean almost anything we desire. Anomie has come to signify almost anything, and therefore, too much, and therefore, nothing in particular. We shall call this progressive routinization, extension, distortion, and emptying out

of meaning the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (Mc-Closkey, 1974).

It is significant, however, that the founders of these fundamental sociological concepts conveyed both specific and general meanings. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber proposed their paradigmatic concepts of alienation, anomie and egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos to explain specific historical realities relating to the causes of the crisis of modern society. Yet, at the same time, these specific insights into the causes of crucial transformations carried generic meanings about man-in-society. In a curious way, the natural history of the career of these concepts reveals that both the original historical specificity and the generic thrust have been altered or lost. Each is a paradigm in crisis (Kuhn, 1962).

Reflection on these sad inevitabilities should lead us to revalue the present tenuous connection between history and theory in our disciplines. For what the routinization and distortion of these paradigms reveals is that our own theorizing might more closely approximate the potency of these seminal concepts of the founding fathers when we proceed, not abstractly, formally, or deductively, but, rather, from a deep and systematic reflection concerning the fundamental processes transforming our own lives, considered in comparative and historical perspective. Indeed, it is only when we both situate ourselves in our time and within a guiding cultural tradition that we gain sufficient perspective to build theoretical paradigms worth pursuing. It is only an apparent paradox that universally valid ideas gain their applicability by emerging from a comparative analysis of historical phenomena, not from being posited in vacuo.

Truly, anomie has become a protean concept, "a word to conjure with," for each of the different streams of development of anomie lays claim to legitimate kinship with Durkheim's original concepts. Each lay claim to the still-resonant halo of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit." Yet, as with religion, it is all too easy to selectively quote "scripture"

to one's own special purpose. As George Simpson observed:
"What a thinker said and what his too ardent followers say
he meant not uncommonly turn out to be different things"
(1963:lx). Thus, one our additional tasks here will be to
determine the actual degree and depth of continuity between
these various streams of development of anomie and Durkheim's
original ideas.

CHAPTER ONE

PARSONIAN ANOMIE

Talcott Parsons' analytical discussion of anomie in his magisterial The Structure of Social Action remains the single most influential source concerning Durkheim interpretation in American sociology. Parsons' pioneering analysis is significant for our present purposes in at least three other respects. First, it represented one of the first big theoretical breakthroughs in American sociology, but one which was founded on European theory. Parsons' rescue of Durkheim, along with the pioneering efforts of Alpert (1939) and Foskett (1939), helped raise Durkheim's social realism and scientific sociology to a new and more acceptable light in the eyes of many American sociologists (see R. Hinkle, 1960; Radcliffe-Brown's visit to Chicago was also important, see Nisbet, 1965). Second, almost all of the subsequent development of the notion of anomie, and many other basic Durkheimian ideas, was filtered through Parsons and his colleague Robert K. Merton (although in time, Merton's variant on anomie became more influential). Finally, Parsons' analysis even today remains the most influential account which has only recently been effectively challenged (eg. see Pope, 1973, 1975a; almost all of Giddens' work).

Here we shall only briefly review the structure of Parsons' argument concerning anomie, saving exploration in greater detail of Parsons' interpretation of the entire typology of suicide until Part II of this appendix. Now, by focussing on the "meaningfulness of goals" or "strains in the relational system," Parsons is the prime architect of the normative stream of development of the idea of anomie. In an absolutely crucial, yet subtle, shift in meaning, Parsons switched Durkheim's constant and over-riding concern with the infinite-

ness of expectations created by cultural goals in modern society to an abstracted, formalistic concern with the "indefiniteness" or "lack of clarity" in the normative system.

As is his custom, Parsons starts his reconstruction of Durkheim's ideas, not in terms of Durkheim's own work or intentions, but wholly within Parsons' own, very different, interpretive framework. Now, in The Structure of Social Action Parsons was haunted by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"-- namely, how to modulate the anarchy of egoistic passions and generate a stable society. By displacing this concern onto Durkheim (who was not centrally concerned with it but rather with his own positivistic dilemma concerning the scientific foundations of morality and the corresponding synthesis of traditional polarities to deal with), and by repeatedly insisting that Durkheim's central theoretical problem was the generic bases of social order and control, Parsons appeared to find the very answer embedded at the heart of Durkheim's sociology for which he so desperatedly searched. The solution to the Hobbesian dilemma which Parsons would have us believe that he found in Durkheim was this: stable social equilibrium can only ultimately be based on internalized moral obligation founded on an over-arching value consensus which is, in turn, rooted in a religiously grounded "ultimate value system" anchored in "non-empirical reality."

In light of his insistent search for the grounds of internalized moral obligation and a religiously sanctioned value consensus on which such obligation and moral rules rest, Parsons first placed great stress upon Durkheim's conception of egoisme, and then subsequently even greater stress upon anomie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's notion of egoisme, Parsons identifies egoisme with the "higher order of individualized moral obligation in Protestantism." In contrast to his negative valuation of altruisme which subordinates the individual to the collective conscience, Parsons renders egoisme virtuous, and not as implying the sacrifice of the collective conscience to the individual ego, but as implying the elevation of the individual's conscience

in Protestantism to a life-principle of the first order. But Parsons' virtuous translation of egoisme ignores Durkheim's critical views and confuses his first and second schemas (see Books Two and Three). In his 1968 summary, Parsons distinguishes between egoisme and altruisme in terms of self versus collective orientation, which is partly correct, and between anomie and fatalisme in terms of the absence and presence of normative regulation. However, such abstract distinctions confuse Durkheim's intentions, for Parsons takes egoisme from the second schema as being an expression of cultural values, yet puts a positive coloration on it, and then reinserted this positive image of egoisme back into Durkheim's first schema. Further, by deemphasizing Durkheim's crucial doctrine of human nature, Parsons turned Durkheim's image of the <u>presence</u> of generic drives in the pre-social individual ego into a generalized image of the generic <u>absence</u> of social control.

After discovering egoisme as his first virtuous anchor, Parsons turned to analyze anomie as the key to his search, for he now possessed explanations of both the sources of social stability (internalized moral obligation) and the source of the breakdown of effective moral obligations and motivations. Anomie is the key to societal disorder; anomie <u>is</u> the Hobbesian dilemma. Hence, we may term Parsonian anomie a normative theory, in contrast to Mertonian anomie, which is largely a structural theory. As the opposite pole of internalized moral obligation, Parsons considers anomie to express the lack of normative clarity leading to a generalized normative breakdown. "[With anomie]... the problem is the definiteness of expectations" (1968a:316).

Having posited internalized moral obligation (ie. Protestant egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability, Parsons explained social instability in terms of normative confusion. In a subtle shift in meaning, Parsons shifted Durkheimian anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." While indefiniteness might sometimes imply infiniteness, one need hardly be a linguist to decide that lack of clarity is

not synonymous with insatiability. Yet of such tiny mountains, great molehills are made. Whereas Durkheim was fundamentally concerned with the sources of insatiability and the personal and societal ravages of the "infinity of dreams and desires," Parsons, for his own special purposes, basically shifted Durkheim's meanings by fitting both egoisme and anomie into his own very different interpretive framework.

In his later summary, Parsons observed:

> ... anomie is that state of a social system which makes a particular class of members consider exertion for success meaningless, not because they lack capacity or opportunity to achieve what is wanted, but because they lack a clear definition of what is desirable. It is a pathology not of the instrumental but of the collective normative system (1968a:316).

But Parsons himself has here shifted the connotations he has bestowed on anomie. For instead of anomie serving as a synonym for the chaos of the "Hobbesian dilemma," now Parsons seems to place greater emphasis on the internalization of clear moral obligation, and thus anomie has come to carry the additional meaning, for Parsons, of withdrawal of motivation or "affect" or moral support from confusing cultural mandates. In addition, we ought to note a paradox involved here in Parsons' abstracted quest for generic social theory: although the first line of the preceding passages couches anomie in terms of the generic Social System, the next line concerning the refusal to conform to dominant achievement values in modern society is surely largely culture bound. Further, Parsons hinted here at the distinguishing characteristic between his anomie and Merton's --for he sees the problem not as lack of opportunity and thus anomie is not primarily a structural problem as with Merton, but rather it is basically a problem of confusion in the relational system, or the lack of adequate perception of the real significance of cultural values and goals.

Can we accept the generalized terms of Parsons' contrast between anomie and consensus as a valid translation of Durkheim's concerns? One of the most perceptive of contemporary interpreters of Durkheim, Anthony Giddens, has criticized Par-

sons on these and other related points.

> By abstractly contrasting moral consensus (the exist-
> ence of "common values") with anomie (the dearth of
> such values), Parsons' account blankets out Durkheim's
> overriding concern with the distinctions between the
> moral and institutional structure of the modern social
> order and that found in traditional forms. The problem
> of anomie cannot be separated from the effects of the
> transformation of the division of labor.... The polari-
> ty is not primarily between the existence of moral con-
> sensus and its absence, but between the rigid moral con-
> formity of the traditional conscience collective and the
> looser, more institutionally complex structure of organ-
> ic societies are still in a transitional phase (1972a:42).

Thus, if Parsons wished to construct his own terms for norma-
tive breakdown, okay, but when he claims that his own transla-
tion of anomie fairly and sufficiently represent Durkheim's
meaning, then he must be called to task, for the evidence
proves that such a claim is ill-founded.

Although Parsons' notion of anomie as malintegration in
the "relational system" has filtered into the mainsteam of
American sociology, partly through Merton's translation, most
attention has been focussed on the Mertonian development of
anomie or Srolian anomia, and surprisingly few have subsequent-
ly taken up Parsons' definitions and pursued them. Robin Wil-
liams (1951) a student of Parsons, applied anomie to the Amer-
ican context. In addition, two well known articles interpre-
ting Durkheim's types fall within this same stream of devel-
opment of anomie. Although they take diametrically opposed
positions on the question of whether Durkheim's types can be
distinguished or are reducible, both Barclay Johnson (1965)
and Bruce Dohrenwend (1959) seem to agree that normative inte-
gration or regulation is the key underlying dimension, and
Whitney Pope (1976) largely follows Johnson in this matter.

Whatever the independent validity of his own theory,
by insisting that Durkheim's anomie refers not to insatiable
and (negatively) egoistic drives located either in human na-
ture or culture, but to a pathological lack of clarity in
the normative-relational sector of society (whatever that
means, precisely), Parsons has not only ignored and subverted
Durkheim's central intentions but also got himself into some

difficult binds of his own (see Chapter Ten, Part II of this appendix).

In sum, by forcing Durkheim into his framework, Parsons arrived at a unique combination of egoisme and anomie. From his own abstracted, ahistorical, normatively oriented frame of reference, anomie meant confusion or lack of clarity resulting from malintegration in the cultural system. In clear contrast to Durkheim, Parsons' central concern with anomie is not with the infiniteness but rather with the indefiniteness of expectations. In contrast to Mertonian anomie, to which we shall turn presently, Parsonian anomie is concerned more with the cultural-relational system than with the structural-instrumental system. Only in a highly ambiguous sense can either Parsons' or its descendant Mertonian anomie, be identified with Durkheimian anomie. Further, Parsons' claim to have accurately interpreted the essence of Durkheim's major ideas, and his claims to be a legitimate heir of Durkheim's sociological charisma must be set aside.

Finally, the development of anomie in American sociology seemingly all filters through Parsons. The change in the connotational "load" of anomie from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton is a two-step process involving the predelictions of the Master and the second-in-command. Parsons acted as a crucial "gate" through which anomie passed on its way to the oblivion and trivialization of success. If a key founder's ideas often convey fruitful ambiguity to prove successful, then perhaps one of the crucial phases in the loss or critical reappropriation of the founders' "charisma-on-deposit" is accomplished by disciples from other groups, times, and places who fundamentally alter the original meanings to fit their own purposes and problems. Doubtless, at its best such cross-fertilization between different groups generates new vitality for both--the first receives a new continuity and fresh lease on life, while the second receives both a new point of departure and a surrounding aura of legitimacy. Yet, at the same time, something precious is lost in such exchanges.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HALBWACHIAN STREAM

The Halbwachian stream of development of Durkheim's
ideas of anomie and egoisme centers around the notion of
breakdown of social integration or social isolation. Deri-
ving from Maurice Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide (1930),
this stream focusses on Durkheim's early explicit formula
that the suicide rate is inversely related to the degree of
social integration. Thus thinkers in this stream tend to re-
duce Durkheim's various types down to what they consider the
fundamental type--namely, egoisme. This stream has recently
received it most precise formulation in Gibbs and Martin's
(1964) well-known study Status Integration and Suicide. In
contrast to Parsons who emphasized egoisme as a postive con-
dition of individual normative self-direction, the Halbwach-
ian stream emphasizes egoisme as a breakdown of social rela-
tionships, statuses, and so on. In contrast to both the Par-
sonian and Mertonian streams, the Halbwachian sub-tradition
focusses almost exclusively on structural integration and
the consequences of its weakening, inconsistency, or break-
down. Hence, we witness the emergence of the first three ma-
jor possible permutations of Durkheim's anomie: from one side
comes Parsons' normative thesis concerning the lack of cultur-
al integration, from the other side emerges Halbwach's thesis
concerning the breakdown of social structural integration,
while Merton's thesis mediates between these two possibilities
by focussing on the breakdown of consistent relations between
structure and culture.

Now, Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide represents both an
extension and revision of Durkheim's earlier analyses. Hal-
bwachs' statistical analysis generally supports Durkheim's

earlier work. But there are a number of differences. Split
between statistical and social phenomenological approaches,
Halbwachs analyzed altruistic motives further, and disting-
uished between self-sacrifice and suicide. In addition, he
placed greater emphasis on psychological intentions and the
suicidal context. But beyond these and other differences per-
haps the greatest divergence between the master and one of
his closest disciples was that Halbwachs, perhaps because of
his drive toward statistical measurability, seized upon Durk-
heim's early formula and reduced all the suicidal types down
to the lack of integration of the individual into a stable
group (see also Jack Gibbs, 1957:94-95; Giddens, 1965:6-7;
Jack Douglas, 1967).

In American sociology, one of the most sophisticated stu-
dies extending the Halbwachian thesis is the well-known explor-
ation of the relations between Status Integration and Suicide
(1964) by Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin. Proceeding from demo-
graphic interests like Halbwachs, and from Gibbs' doctoral
dissertation written under the direction of Martin, they took
as their key proposition (ala Halbwachs) Durkheim's first and
only explicit summary that "Suicide varies inversely with the
degree of integration of social groups" (S:208-9). Their pos-
itivistic proclivities lead them to reject much of Durkheim's
own analysis as untestable, yet, taking what they perceive to
be the essence of Durkheim's theory, they postulate a deduct-
ive series of more precise propositions which yielded their
major theorem: "The suicide rate varies inversely with the
degree of status integration in the population."

Since the major virtue of the status integration thesis
is that it can be measured and subjected to systematic test-
ing, it is, perhaps, not unwarranted to surmise that their
chain of deductions is prompted as much by the need to work
through Durkheim's theories down to a more localized level
which permits the use of demographic statistics as by any ab-
stract desire for greater clarity. Such a development is not
unusual in social science where the exigencies of research
demand alterations in theory, and the empirical cart ends up

directing the theoretical horse. However, the need to dis-
till, fragment, or reduce significant theories down to their
component parts to better fit or utilize existing data is
generally felt, even though the significance of the theory
changes from a perspective which touches the very depths of
crucial transformations to a theory which is important be-
cause it can be tested. In this vein, the response to Gibbs
and Martin's work appears to have been enthusiastic. In the
relatively short time since it was proposed, a rather large
literature has grown up around it, some of it critical for
various reasons (eg. J. Douglas, 1967; B. Segal, 1969; C.
Bagley, 1972).

In contrast to Durkheim's multiple sociocultural, his-
torical, and philosophical concerns, Gibbs and Martin's ef-
fort appears as a radical truncation, an interest in a sim-
ple proposition amenable to statistical testing rather than
an interest in Durkheim's deeper propositions. Their theory
is an ahistorical, formalistic, demographically inspired ap-
proach. Their theory is different from Durkheim's notions in
that it doesn't even address the problem of the "infinity of
dreams and desires" as the key intervening variable between
social structural breakdown and individual suicide. Their
theory is different from Durkheim's in that it is primarily
microsociological in focussing on status malintegration, and
not societal structures or cultural-historical traditions.

But, in contrast to most contemporary survey research
(eg. utilizing Srolian anomia), Gibbs and Martin's approach
is refreshingly different in that it is at least truly socio-
logical, utilizing objective indices of inconsistent status-
es; it is not mass psychological interviewing masquerading as
sociological research. Another virtue of their exploration
is that in this stream theoretical formulations and empirical
testing are closely intertwined. Finally, their effort is sig-
nificant because, by returning directly to the original text
and elucidating its key propositions, their independent ini-
tiative bypassed Parsons and Merton, thus breaking the almost

unquestioned hegemony of the leading structural-functional
theorists' orthodox interpretation of anomie.

Halbwachs' reformulation of Durkheim's work carries ad-
ditional significance here since it is one of the few major
studies in this area which undeniably lie in a direct line
of continuity with Durkheim himself. In contrast to Parsons'
reconstruction of Durkheim's ideas (which remaining Durkheim-
ians seem to have ignored), Halbwachs' work was intimately
associated for years with Durkheim. Halbwachs was a key mem-
ber of the circle gathered around L'Annee sociologique. But
while providing greater balance and extension, what disciples
do with their master's ideas cannot always be accredited.
Halbwachs' reduction and simplification represents another
chapter in the on-going story of the "routinization of char-
isma-on-deposit" of Durkheim's anomie. In order to "live" be-
yond himself, a founder's ideas must become institutionalized;
yet in that very process they are often disassembled, and the
integralness of vision, and the multiplicity of resonating
levels of meaning which made the original breakthrough so com-
pelling, and which constitutes its revolutionary and lasting
significance, ebb away.

In sum, the Halbwachians (including Gibbs and Martin,
among others), rightly criticized the rampant ambiguity of
many of Durkheim's basic concepts. But rather than attempt
to sort through these complexities, they chose instead to
settle upon simpler, ahistorical, formalizable propositions
promising to yield testable indices. In the sense that they
have returned directly to parts of Durkheim's theory itself,
those working in this stream can lay claim to represent a
legitimate reformulation of an important set of elements in
Durkheim's complex thought. However, because they slight so
much of the complexity, subtlety, and historical, sociocul-
tural, and phenomenological depths of Durkheim's ideas, this
sub-tradition cannot really claim, any more than the other
streams, to represent the legitimate development of Durkheim's
notions concerning suicide, especially anomie.

ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD

Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions,
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos

by

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VOLUME V

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Department of Sociology
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June 1978

CHAPTER THREE

MERTONIAN ANOMIE: STRUCTURAL-CULTURAL MALINTEGRATION

Preface. Since Robert K. Merton's notion of anomie remains
the most widely known contemporary version, I shall assume
intimate knowledge of this essay in the following examina-
tion. First, I shall state my basic objections to Merton's
version of anomie, especially as they relate to Durkheim's.
Next, I shall indicate some of the historical reasons for the
success of Merton's schema. Then, I shall outline some of the
textual difficulties encountered in a full-scale, systematic
exploration of the inner logic and development of Merton's
model. Finally, we shall examine in detail the major theses
of the paradigm.

Now, Merton's version of anomie mediates between Parsons'
purely normative notion and the Halbwachs-Gibbs and Martin
structural focus. Proceeding from the Parsonian notion of
"strain in The Social System," Merton came to emphasize the
"malintegration of goals and means;" or in other words, con-
flict between cultural mandates and structural opportunities.
Hence, the maladjustment of structural means to cultural goals
lies at the heart of Mertonian anomie. It should be noted,
however, that although Merton seems closer to Durkheim in em-
phasizing the "infiniteness" of the goals counseled by the A-
merican value system, nowhere does Merton fundamentally ques-
tion the legitimacy of these goals themselves. Certainly, he
never portrayed the American success ethic as a sign of the
endemic "moral anarchy" of the modern world as did Durkheim.
Nor would Merton have admitted, it can be surmised, that our
Central Value System is itself anomic! How both Parsons and
Merton were able to sidestep these and other critical implica-
tions of the very paradigm they borrowed forms a fascinating
story, albeit one which we cannot pursue here.[1] Our main con-

cern here is with the inner and shifting logic of Merton's
schema, and its relation to Durkheim's original notions.

Now, Dubin (1959), Cloward (1959), and Harary (1966),
among others, have offered extensions and elaborations of
Merton's anomie schema. Mizruchi (1967), Cohen (1965), Thio
(1975), among others, have offered criticisms of Merton's
theorizing and empirical support (see chapters four and five
of this appendix). In addition to these extensions and criti-
cisms, I shall offer the following essential criticisms:

(a) In terms of the legitimacy of the Mertonians' claim
on Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit," I note that Mer-
ton's anomie diverges from Durkheim's at many points.
Merton is faithful to Durkheim mainly in terms of the
anti-reductionistic polemic, the notion in <u>Division</u>
<u>of Labor</u> that anomie has to do with structural ine-
qualities, and that the dominant modern value system
counsels eternal striving which is destructive. At
other critical points, Merton's version runs directly
counter to Durkheim's;

(b) More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Merton
should have recognized the convergence between his own
theorizing on anomie, Durkheim's second schema in
which anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned,
and Weber's historical insights into the Protestant
Ethos. Why Merton did not make these connections re-
mains a great mystery in the history of American so-
ciological theory;

(c) In terms of the internal logic of his schema, Merton's
notion of malintegration of goals and means really con-
ceals three different dimensions: integration, legiti-
macy, and historical position;

(d) In terms of the internal logic of his major category--
innovation--Merton's typology actually contains two
very different propositions applying to different clas-
ses, aspirations, and restraining conditions;

(e) The other categories in Merton's typology rest on ec-
lectic, <u>ad hoc</u> hypotheses, invoked as needed, and un-
supported by the theory supposedly anchoring the first
two types of responses;

(f) Therefore, not only must Mertonian anomie be sharply
distinguished from Durkheim's and the others, but Mer-
ton's theory should be set aside as a paradigm of Amer-
ican sociological theorizing. Further, the uncertain
fate of Merton's program of anomie serves as a case
study refuting his own program and philosophy of science.

A.   Merton's Anomie: The Theory and Its Significance

1.   The Historical Importance of Merton's Model in American Sociology

Robert King Merton's now classic essay "Social Structure and Anomie," first published in 1938, constitutes the original source from which most contemporary research and theory on anomie flows. If we accept the testimony of Talcott Parsons that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly central concepts of contemporary social science" (1968a:316), then Merton's special theory is surely one of the discipline's most prestigious and imitated works. As one of the principal architects of contemporary American sociology, Merton's extension of of his original essay on anomie, incoporated in his prestigious and often reprinted Social Theory and Social Structure, stands almost alone alongside Parsons' "pattern variables" and The Structure of Social Action as classics of contemporary sociological theory, comparable to such continental classics as Durkheim's Suicide and Weber's The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism.

The significance of Merton's pioneering effort may be interpreted on a number of different levels. In a discipline rent by contending factions, Merton's theory of anomie and opportunity structures took on the higher function of serving as an example, perhaps the prototypical illustration in American sociology, of a unifying paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). When sociologists wish to display their wares favorably to wider publics or uninitiated students, there is often a tendency to choose "Social Structure and Anomie" as the example of the best of American sociological theorizing. Thus, Merton's oft-revised essay has gradually attained an honored status beyond that bestowed on common sociology; his model has become a symbol, a true "collective representation" of the sociological enterprise.

The preeminent symbolic status granted Merton's famous essay provides a clue to understand its larger significance. For on this level Merton's schema is significant because it
                                                     provided

mid-century sociologists with a dual model: both an explanation, a master hypothesis, a paradigm in the sense of content, and a manner of theorizing, a stylistic mode, a paradigm of a paradigm in the sense of a form to be emulated. Those familiar with Merton's theory of anomie commonly retain two "after-images." The first memory is that of content--a specific theory based on the image of strain in the social system resulting when opportunity structures restrict access to mandated cultural achievement. The second image retained is that of a certain style of sociological theorizing which appeared to convey clarity, consistency, and a degree of logical elegance and power previously rare in the discipline. American sociological theory around mid-century stood desperately in need of cogently articulated, yet simple, master hypotheses, and Merton's essay seemed to answer this need. One observer suggests that the response of American social scientists was "quick and enthusiastic, sociology was now new born" (B. Nelson, 1964:138).

In addition, Merton's theory offered remedies to sociologists on a number of other levels. First, as a theory concerned with normative and structural breakdowns and resulting deviancy, it claimed to offer a basic explanation of the critical social problems confronting an America beset by the Depression crisis. Since American sociology grew out of pragmatically oriented social reform movements, Merton's paradigm not only resonated with these feelings but also seemed to offer a theoretical crystallization and justification of efforts toward social amelioration. Second, as a preeminent example of "middle-range" theory, Merton's schema served to link the relatively isolated micro-sociological and pragmatic point of view of American sociology with the deeper, more abstract and more historical theories of continental sociological theorists, especially Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The nascent American sociological tradition with its heavy emphasis on pragmatic social action and relatively primitive development of theory, now seemed doubly reborn by its new and seemingly intimate links with the best of continental sociological theory. All in all, Merton's schema seemed, both at the time and in re-

trospect, to constitute a major breakthrough in sociological
theory and practice, and thus a minor revolution in social
scientific thought (Kuhn, 1962).

While affirming its historical significance, can we to-
day grant Merton's theory the same high honor as before? Can
Merton's theory stand up under close critical scrutiny? How
and why did "Social Structure and Anomie" come to be accept-
ed so widely and implicitly as a prototype of sociological
theorizing? Does the structure and logic of Merton's proposi-
tions deserve such fame? Can it be legitimately maintained
that Merton's theory of anomie stands directly in the mainline
of the tradition stemming from Durkheim? And, finally, what
does the development of Mertonian anomie in terms of his own
elaborations, revisions, various extensions by others, criti-
ques, and Merton's responses, empirical applications and test-
ing, reveal about the viability of Merton's own program for
sociological theory and his philosophy of science? We shall
explore these and other related questions in the following
sections on Merton's anomie.

2.   Textual Problems in Interpreting Merton's Anomie

Anyone attempting to systematically analyze the internal
structure of Merton's famous paradigm will encounter various
textual problems. The first major problem barring a single
simple interpretation is that one is confronted with numerous
additions and variations on the central theme coming from the
hand of Merton himself. Once one begins to immerse oneself in
these documents one discovers a bewildering plethora of instal-
lments of "Social Structure and Anomie." As Stephen Cole (1975)
remarks, Merton's efforts are better considered as a "research
program" than a single article. Therefore, these documents may
be divided into primary and secondary materials.

First among the primary documents is Merton's original
essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which appeared in 1938 in
the fledgling American Sociological Review. Then comes his
1949 extension and revision of the same article which first ap-
appeared in Merton's equally famous collection of essays So-

cial <u>Theory</u> <u>and</u> <u>Social</u> <u>Structure</u>. The third well-know primary
document is Merton's supplementary essay "Continuities in the
Theory of Social Structure and Anomie" which first appeared
in a revised edition of Merton's book in 1957. But even among
primary materials there are additional but lesser known pro-
ductions which should be consulted. In chronological order
they are: transcripts of a talk and discussion on juvenile
delinquency in which Merton participated in 1955 and which
was published in 1956; Merton's review in 1959 of criticisms
and extensions by Cloward and Dubin entitled "Social Conform-
ity, Deviation, and Opportunity Structures;" and finally his
1964 review essay "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction:
Contexts of Deviant Behavior."

In addition, the following must be listed among secon-
dary materials in Merton's writings which are directly rele-
vant to issues raised here: a short section in Merton's es-
say on "Sociological Theory" in his collected essays <u>Social</u>
<u>Theory</u> <u>and</u> <u>Social</u> <u>Structure</u> summarizing what Merton took to
be the essence of Durkheim's paradigm in <u>Suicide</u>; Merton's
introduction to Part One of the same book; and his lengthy
and often revised essay on "Social Problems and Sociological
Theory," written as an epilogue to the volume on <u>Contemporary</u>
<u>Social</u> <u>Problems</u> (1960, 1966, 1971, 1976) which Merton co-edi-
ted with Robert Nisbet.

Thus any serious investigator is faced not with just one
short article, but rather with at least six primary install-
ments of the same basic theme, and in addition, a number of
secondary materials directly relevant which could be supple-
mented by a host of peripheral references scattered through-
out the rest of Merton's works. Undertaking analysis of Mer-
ton's evolving theory of anomie and social structure is no
simple task. One must be especially sensitive to different
emphases, corrections, gaps, and shifts in the grounds of
argument.

But the difficulties due to the bewildering assortment
of Merton's writings relating to anomie (which reveal Merton,
appearances to the contrary, as perhaps not the best example

of a systematic theorist but rather as a talented essayist)
carry a redeeming virtue. The evident advantage afforded the
sociological public by Merton's variations on his theme is
that we are here presented with an opportunity of studying
in-depth a central sociological schema as it evolved over
four decades. We can watch, for example, as Merton contin-
ually reworked his essay, attempting to fill in gaps, and
iron out the inconsistencies in response to critics. This
unique opportunity to plumb the inner workings and changes
of Merton's theory of anomie should lead to an important
case-study in the development of theory and the history of
social science, and serve as a test case for various hypo-
theses about the growth of science.

A second problem faced by explorers in these regions
concerns certain evident gaps in Merton's various install-
ments of his theory. Merton himself in his reply (1959:188)
to Cloward and Dubin acknowledged that "blind spots" occa-
sionally plague his attempts at systematic theorizing. Fur-
ther, Cohen observes that a number of the more serious gaps
in the theory of "Social Structure and Anomie" could be reme-
died by borrowing insights and concepts from other parts of
Merton's own writings. In addition to any scholarly obliga-
tions to perform a complete survey, another reason for fam-
iliarity with the rest of Merton's work is to help correct
the misleading impressions inevitably given by close readings
of Merton's schema, since he could have himself corrected
several gaps by simply drawing upon insights from other parts
of his own work. Instead of asserting that Merton did not per-
ceive these crucial factors which might have been omitted from
his famous theory, it is perhaps better to say that Merton did
not perceive them in this present context at least, for what-
ever reason. In any case, such "blind spots" do exist.

A third major problem concerns related inconsistencies
in Merton's schema. Perhaps no intellectual, even those who
propose their work as paradigms of systematic theory, can
flawlessly fashion his work without gaps and internal incon-

sistencies. Yet this endemic problem is exacerbated by the relatively non-systematic character of Merton's theorizing, appearances aside. For as we shall soon discover, Merton's famous theory contains not one simple proposition but rather two! Essentially, the first proposition suggests that inordinate emphasis on culturally mandated success goals swamps out legitimate institutional means of achievement. The second is the more famous proposition--namely, that differential access of different groups to legitimate institutional channels of upward mobility generates anomie, in the sense of normative confusion, and leads to deviancy. And the remaining categories in Merton's typology are based upon still different, and often eclectic, series of propositions. The fact that Merton never systematically distinguished between his two basic propositions, or recognized that he had introduced ad hoc hypotheses to cover the rest of the typology complicates matters further.

Among additional problems facing us here is the curious fact that Merton so rarely explicitly defined anomie, nor did he explicitly review Durkheim's usage. To apologize for Merton's "under-citation" of Durkheim, as Stephen Cole (1975:187) does, because Suicide is so well known that it was not necessary is unacceptable. For it is simply not true that Durkheim's suicide typology was well known to American sociologists when Merton published in 1938 and 1949 his original and revised versions of "Social Structure and Anomie." How could it be since Suicide was not even translated until 1951, and we are still debating its meaning and significance? The truth of the matter is that most American sociologists came to view Durkheim and anomie through Parsons' and Merton's eyes; and Parsons' distortion and Merton's undercitation were essential strategies in this transfer of charisma. At best, Merton appears to have indirectly derived his first proposition on innovative deviancy from Durkheim's emphasis on modern drives for progress and perfection and the discussion of the anomic division of labor and structured inequalities in The Division of Labor. The general theoretical framework, however, came

not from Durkheim, but from Parsons' functional theory, with
the constant addition of large doses of Merton's own charact-
eristic insight and style. There are, of course, great dif-
ferences between Durkheim's anomie and Merton's, for the form-
er was not so much interested in cross-pressures or malinte-
gration of the social system as he was concerned with the ra-
vages of absolutizing individualism and insatiability. Parsons
was far more concerned than Durkheim with anomie as confusion
in the relational sector of The Social System. And even Par-
sons rejected (1968a:317) sole identification of anomie with
Merton's notion of problems with the "instrumental system" of
society and culture.

Hence, if anomie generally has become a protean concept,
then Merton's shifting development of his own theory of ano-
mie is just as difficult to keep in clear and constant focus.
It appears that Merton's schema conveys at once too much or
too little. If his theory rests on the fairly simple thesis
that certain groups' lack of access to structures of opportun-
ity contributes to frustration and perhaps deviance, then it
might prove less troublesome, with certain qualifications. But
surely in that case one need not elaborate an entire typology
and complex theory, nor claim that this schema explains all
sorts of rule-breaking and other behaviors. This is far too
much. On the other hand, if, as Merton has often claimed, his
key proposition is not the specific one about blocked oppor-
tunity but rather the more general, abstract thesis about
malintegration of cultural goals and structural means, then
his schema is far too sketchy to explain all it claims. Even
Merton has acknowledged that his theory is incomplete as a
systematic explanation of all rule-breaking behaviors. Either
way Merton appears in a bind, presenting us with too much or
too little. Perhaps without undue irony we might call this
the bind of the middle-range theorist.

3. The Mertonians' Claim to Durkheim's Charisma-on-Deposit

Let us briefly consider here the genealogy of anomie and try to evaluate the claim of the Mertonians to legitimate derivation of their anomie from Durkheim. The first basic fact to recall is that Merton's theory of malintegration of means and ends was fundamentally influenced by Parsons' generalized theory of malintegration in The Social System. In the 1930's, Merton was a student and then a colleague of Parsons at Harvard. Parsons had just finished his own classic The Structure of Social Action, and he acknowledged Merton's assistance in reviewing the manuscript. And now through his interpretation of Durkheim and anomie, Parsons influenced another classic--Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie."

In addition, Merton appears to have derived some influence directly from Durkheim's work itself. For Merton published two independent studies on Durkheim in 1934: a critical analysis of "Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society" (1934a), and an essay on "Recent French Sociology" (1934b). In retrospect, Merton appears to have derived more influence from Durkheim's views on the anomic and forced divisions of labor in The Division of Labor than from Durkheim's usage of anomie in Suicide. Perhaps Merton took his lead here from Durkheim's suggestion in The Division of Labor that the anomic and forced divisions of labor depends on the elimination of social inequalities in the distribution and inheritance of occupational opportunities, and from Durkheim's description in The Rules of the "... cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation" (Merton, 1938:673,#3). Blending these diverse intellectual sources, then, Merton presented a highly original schema of his own which was destined to become one of the foundation paradigms of contemporary sociology.

Now, let us briefly consider the claims of Mertonians to legitimate development of Durkheim's notion of anomie. While Merton does not explicitly claim this as either his intention or achievement, there are numerous passages in the various installments of his essay which implicitly suggest that

"this" was indeed what Durkheim had in mind. In his 1964 review of the present state of anomie research, Merton briefly traced the history of the concept from Durkheim through himself to others. In addition, the appendix to that same volume, prepared by Merton's then students Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman, explicitly linked Durkheim's anomie with Merton as his successor (see also S. Cole, 1975). The general image presented by Merton and his followers in works on social theory, on anomie and deviance, in textbooks and readers, and so forth, is an unquestioned confidence that Merton has legitimately developed the essence of Durkheim's ideas. In a typical essay, Richard Cloward claims that his well-known essay:

> ... represents an attempt to consolidate two major sociological traditions of thought about the problem of deviant behavior. The first, exemplified by the work of Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton, may be called the anomie tradition.... The theory of anomie has undergone two major phases of development. Durkheim first used the concept to explain deviant behavior. He focussed on the way in which various social conditions lead to "overweening" ambition," and how, in turn, unlimited aspirations ultimately produce a breakdown in regulatory norms.... While Durkheim confined his application of anomie chiefly to suicide, Merton sought to explain not only suicide but crime, delinquency, mental disorder, alcoholism, drug addiction, and many other phenomena (1959:164-5).

On the other hand, more than one observer has noted divergence between Durkheim's notion of anomie and Merton's usage of the concept. Cloward's remarks also indicate a growing sensitivity to some of the important differences between Durkheim's and Merton's ideas.

> Unlike Durkheim, Merton did not consider man's biological nature to be important in explaining deviation; what Durkheim considered the innate drives of man, such as ambition to achieve unattainable objectives, Merton felt were induced by the social structure (1959: 165).

Here Cloward notes some crucial transitions from Durkheim to Merton: Durkheim had an image of human nature which was central to his theory of anomie but which disappears in Merton's revision; and whereas Durkheim located insatiability in the organic ego, Merton located insatiable ambitions in social pressures.

Merton himself later acknowledged in an off-hand way that here was a crucial difference between his ideas about anomie and Durkheim's. In 1968, in a discussion of the pressure on prize winners in science to outstrip their previous achievements, Merton downgrades the notion that it is "... their own Faustian aspirations [which] are ever-escalating that keeps eminent scientists at work." Merton admits: "This process of a socially reinforced rise in aspirations, as distinct from Durkheim's concept of the "insatiability of wants" is examined" (in Merton, 1973:442, #12) in Merton's 1964 essay. And in that 1964 essay Merton remarked:

> Social pressures do not easily permit those who have climbed the rugged mountains of success to remain content; there is no rest for the weary. In short, it is not only that their own Faustian aspirations are ever-escalating, becoming unlimited and insatiable, and so, even when achieved, landing them no nearer to heaven (the point Durkheim seized upon). It is also that ... more and more is expected of these men by others and this creates its own measure of stress. Less often than one might believe, is there room for repose at the top (1964:221).

Thus, we now have Merton's own word that his notion of anomie as generated by social pressures is different from Durkheim's where insatiability was generated by the release of the passions of the organic ego from social constraint in the modern era. Now, in a sense, in this dissertation we are making a move similar to Merton's by shifting the location of Durkheimian insatiability from the organic ego (schema one) to the very social and cultural structure (schema two) which Merton so brilliantly anatomized.

Besides this growing acknowledgment from the Mertonian camp that Merton's anomie is different from Durkheim's, other observers have also registered their recognition of this important divergence. Here we cite only a few representative objections. For instance, in an insightful but highly polemical article, John Horton argued that the critical thrust of Durkheim's notion of anomie has been lost.

> Contemporary definitions of anomie and alienation have confused, obscured and changed the classical meanings of these concepts. Alienation for Marx and anomie for

Durkheim were metaphors for a radical attack on the dom-
inant institutions and values of industrial society....
The politically and essentially conservative content of
his [Merton's] definition is apparent when it is compar-
ed with that of Durkheim. Anomie, defined as a a disjunc-
tion between the success goal and legitimate opportuni-
ties to achieve success, may very well be a socially
structured discontent in American society, yet Merton's
anomie differs from that of Durkheim's in one crucial
respect--in its identification with the very groups and
values which Durkheim saw as the prime source of anomie
in industrial societies. For Durkheim, anomie was endem-
ic in such societies not only because of inequality in
the conditions of competition, but, more importantly, be-
cause self-interested striving ... had been raised to so-
cial ends. The institutionalization of self-interest meant
the legitimization of anarchy and amorality.... To maxi-
mize opportunities for achieving success would in no way
end anomie. Durkheim questioned the very values which Mer-
ton holds constant (1964:283, 294-5).

In an equally tendentious article, Turner and Scott (1965)
offer the ingenious yet unconvincing argument that Mertonian
anomie bears more resemblance to Weber's basic types of social
action than to Durkheim's anomie. "As used by Merton, 'anomie,'
we believe, has little resemblance to Durkheim's concept; rath-
er, Merton's formulation is best understood as a continuation
of Weber's work" (1965:233). "Merton's essay ... bears scant
relevance to Durkheim" (1965:236). In contrast to Durkheim's
notion of the sudden disharmony of expectations and fulfill-
ment, they argue that Merton's anomie rests on an enduring
condition--the unending pursuit of success. "A fundamental
difference between Merton's and Durkheim's conception of ano-
mie emerges: Merton conceives of anomie as a chronic condition;
Durkheim, as an acute fracturing in the social world" (1965:
234).

The similarity between Durkheim's long-run conception
of anomie and Merton's conception is superficial: Durk-
heim pictured long-term changes in social life leaving
individuals unsure of where they stood or how to pro-
ceed, whereas Merton is postulating social actors who
internalize on the one hand values, and on the other,
norms relating to their achievement only to find that
they do not have a matching set (1965:235, #6).

Also in 1965, McClosky and Schaar observed:

Discarding Durkheim's concept of man as a bundle of pas-
sions which can be tamed only by social restraints, he
examines the actual social pressures upon persons to vio-

late the accepted codes. He retains Durkheim's defini-
tion of relative normlessness in a society, but offers
a revised statement of its causes. Whereas Durkheim held
specifically that anomy was produced by an economic eth-
ic which removed all limits from greed, Merton sees ano-
my as the result of "a breakdown in the cultural struct-
ure, occuring particularly when there is an acute dis-
junction between the cultural norms and goals and the so-
cially structured capacities of the members to act in ac-
cord with them" (1965:15).

In a reflective and useful article, Ephraim Mizruchi
(1967) argues that there are basic differences between Durk-
heim's anomie and Merton's anomie.

A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie sug-
gests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's and
that this difference leads to varying hypotheses. Merton's
conception of anomie is one of a condition in society in
which there is a disjunction between socially mandated
goals and the means by which these goals are pursued....
Durkheim's emphasis, however, in his theory of anomie was
on the unrealizable goals which characterized periods of
prosperity and upward mobility (1967:439-40).

G. Duncan Mitchell, in his Dictionary of Sociology (1968)
distinguishes the following connotations of anomie:

[Anomie refers to] any state where there are unclear,
conflicting, or unintegrated norms in which the indivi-
dual had no morally significant relations with others or
in which there were no limits set to the attainment of
pleasure.... R. Merton uses the term to refer to a state
in which socially prescribed goals and the norms govern-
ing their attainment are incompatible.... In most attempts
to make anomie measurable (eg. Srole), emphasis is pla-
ced on lack of clarity in goals and norms or upon the ab-
sence of social ties. All such attempts involve a more
restricted use of the concept than Durkheim's which was
related to a philosophical conception of human nature.

Further, it is most significant that in his definitive
intellectual biography of Durkheim, Steven Lukes mentions Mer-
ton's name only once in passing. Lukes' comprehensive biblio-
graphy of writings on Durkheim contains Merton's two 1934 art-
icles, but does not refer to Merton's famous "Social Structure
and Anomie" (Lukes, 1973:608).

Alex Thio (1975) remarks of the difference between Durk-
heim and Merton:

Contrary to many sociologists' belief, Merton's theory
is not a pure reformulation of Durkheim's concept of ano-

mie. In examining Merton's analysis, one is hard put
to find any genuine resemblance between Merton's and
Durkheim's concepts of anomie. In fact, Merton's con-
cept of anomie is a perversion of Durkheim's; Merton
sees the poor as more likely to suffer from anomie
while Durkheim views the rich as more likely to be
victims of anomie (1975:156).

Concerned with the class bias in theories of deviance (Thio,
1972), he seriously questions Merton's assertion that lower-
class persons are more likely than upper-class persons to suf-
fer from an aspiration-opportunity disjunction and therefore
are more subject to greater pressure toward deviation.

Teevan (1975) suggests that we develop different questions
on scales to test for Durkheimian as contrasted with Mertonian
anomie (eg. 1975:169). Simon and Gagnon (1976) observe both
that Merton's anomie differs from Durkheim's, and that the lat-
ters' rested on an image of human nature as inherently insatia-
ble.

It is important to point out that there is, in fact,
only a limited intellectual continuity between the ma-
jority of the modern users of the concept of anomie and
Durkheim. Both Parsons and Merton, who share responsibil-
ity for introducing the idea into American sociology, do
severe violence to the integrity of the original ideas
expressed by Durkheim by selectively abstracting elements
from the original text (1976:358).

That a number have questioned, from various theoretical
and empirical perspectives, the relation of Mertonian anomie
to Durkheimian anomie, and further, that the definitive intel-
lectual biography of Durkheim contains no bibliographical ref-
erence to Merton's essays, should suffice to raise the criti-
cal question of the degree of legitimacy of the claim of Mer-
ton and the structural-functional school to the proper title
of Durkheim's heirs. The problem of ascertaining the legiti-
macy of Merton's claims is exacerbated by a number of other
factors due to Merton himself. First, Merton never explicitly
defined anomie, offering only indirect synonyms such as "mal-
integration," "disjunction," or "cultural chaos," and so on.
Indeed, Merton never explicitly discussed Durkheim's concept
or usage of anomie. Incredibly, Merton never even mentioned
The Division of Labor or Suicide in his essays on anomie!

In the original 1938 installment of "Social Structure and Anomie," Merton simply introduced the term "anomie," without explanation or reference to Durkheim's ideas or writings, or even Parsons' interpretations which were published the previous year. At this time Merton didn't even use quotation marks to denote a special or unfamiliar term, but took it for granted that all understood the intended connotation. Since Durkheim's Suicide had not yet been translated, this left most American sociologists dependent on Parsons' or Merton's secondary accounts and usages. In the later 1949 revision, Merton added "normlessness" in parentheses as an apparent, but vague, synonym for what Durkheim called "anomie." Besides these omissions, Merton later added the following curious footnote:

> Durkheim's resurrection of the term "anomie" which, so far as I know, first appears in approximately the same sense in the late sixteenth century, might well become the object of an investigation by a student interested in the historical filiation of ideas.... The word "anomie" (or anomy or anomia) has lately come into frequent use, once it was reintroduced by Durkheim. Why the resonance in contemporary society (1957:135, #6)?

Coupled with the curious fact that Durkheim's specific usages of anomie in Suicide were never formally acknowledged, we next see Merton recommending that someone else undertake a study of the historical philology of the term "anomie"! Should not Merton himself have at least aided such an important exploration by systematically and explicitly relating his version of anomie to the thinker from whom he borrowed it?

In his follow-up essay of 1957, Merton mentioned, for the first time, what he thinks Durkheim meant by anomie.

> As initially developed by Durkheim, the concept of anomie referred to a condition of relative normlessness in a society or group. Durkheim made it clear that this concept referred to a property of the social and cultural structure, not to a property of individuals confronting that structure. Nevertheless, as the utility of the concept for understanding diverse forms of deviant behavior became evident, it was extended to refer to a condition of individuals rather than of their environment (1957: 161).

Here we see Merton invoking Durkheim's charisma only to put down the psychological interpretations of anomie. Merton nei-

ther analyzes Durkheim's ideas, nor spends much time on them. Doesn't it seem strange that Merton, so careful a historical scholar, who just recommended a study on the historical semantics of this famous concept of anomie which he borrowed, should give so little attention himself to Durkheim's real ideas?

Now, there is one other passage by Merton, buried in an essay on sociological theory written in 1945, and reprinted in his Social Theory and Social Structure as "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research" in which he attempts to lay out in paradigmatic form the essential model underlying Durkheim's notion of anomie. As far as I have been able to determine, this passage represents Merton's most explicit and systematic statement of his interpretation of the meaning of Durkheim's schemas.

> To exhibit the relations of empirical generalizations to theory, and to set forth the functions of theory, it may be useful to examine a familiar case in which such generalizations were incorporated into a body of substantive theory. Thus, it has long been established as a statistical uniformity that in a variety of populations, Catholics had a lower suicide rate than Protestants. In this form, the uniformities posed a theoretical problem. It merely constituted an empirical regularity which would become significant for theory only if it could be derived from a set of other propositions, a task which Durkheim set for himself. If we restate his theoretic analysis in formal fashion, the paradigm of his theoretic analysis bebecomes clear:
>
> (1) Social cohesion provides psychic support to group members subjected to acute stress and anxieties;
>
> (2) Suicide rates are functions of unrelieved anxieties and stresses to which persons are subjected;
>
> (3) Catholics have greater social cohesion than Protestants;
>
> (4) Therefore, lower suicide rates should be anticipated among Catholics than among Protestants (1957:92-3).

Even though the theory outlined here is offered only as an illustration, it is interesting to compare its "thinness" with the rich and multi-layered exegesis which we have set out in Books One, Two, and Three in this dissertation. Here, Merton's logic is simply that a structural condition favors and represses a psychological condition. One could question the usefulness of

such a simple model; in any case, it should be clear that
Merton's brief reconstruction of the logic underlying Durk-
heim's schemas in Suicide bears little resemblance to the
actual logics-in-use. Even the image of greater or less
structural integration, seized upon mainly by the Halbwach-
ian stream, represents a radical truncation of Durkheim's
theses. One could question, in addition, the   tacit
notion that Catholics and Protestants are universally sub-
jected to the same stresses and unrelieved anxieties; that
Durkheim started out puzzling over certain statistical regu-
larities in suicide rates, and then constructed a theory to
fit them, and so on.

Even the image projected by Merton that his theory re-
presents the epitome of a social structural theory, like
Durkheim's, is partially misleading. For Merton's anomie is
a crucial stage in the social psychologization of anomie. Al-
though his basic paradigm includes all three basic elements--
culture, social structure, and personality--Merton's central
concern has often been with the boundaries between social
structure and personality (see B. Nelson, 1972b). Although
Merton claims to be following in Durkheim's footsteps in of-
fering a social structural explanation of deviance, he seem-
ed to irretrievably gravitate toward his own natural level of
interest--the abstracted micro-level latent functional theory
of status and role. It is not surprising, therefore, that
post-Mertonian anomie (see the following chapters) has shift-
ed even farther down the theoretical scale, and has gradual-
ly become synonymous with a subjective psychological condi-
tion of individuals. The additional irony in this untoward
development is that Merton is generally less concerned with
subjective psychological and phenomenological notions than
he is with latent structural functions for individuals. Mer-
ton himself noted this shift in levels in anomie theory and
research:

> ... as the utility of the concept for understanding di-
> verse forms of deviant behavior became evident, it was
> extended to refer to a condition of individuals rather
> than of their environment. This psychological concep-

> tion of anomie has been simultaneously formulated by
> R.M. MacIver and David Riesman.... "Anomy is a state
> of mind in which the individual's sense of social co-
> hesion--the mainspring of his morale--is broken or fa-
> tally weakened" [MacIver].... But the psychological
> concept is nevertheless a counterpart of the sociologi-
> cal concept of anomie, and not a substitute for it
>   (1957:161-2).

(See also the following section on Merton's responses to
criticism and extensions of anomie). Merton then continues:

> An effort has been made to catch up the psychological
> and sociological concepts in a distinction between "sim-
> ple" and "acute" anomie [eg. S. deGrazia]. Simple ano-
> mie refers to a state of confusion in a group of socie-
> ty which is subject to conflict between value-systems,
> resulting in some degree of uneasiness and a sense of
> separation from the group; acute anomie, to the
> deterioration and, at the extreme, the disintegration
> of value systems, which result in marked anxieties. This
> has the merit of terminologically ear-marking the often
> stated but sometimes neglected fact that, like other
> conditions of society, anomie differs in degree and per-
> haps in kind (1957:163).

Teevan (1975), noting this distinction , proposed that we de-
velop scales to test for an individual's perception of his
own anomie, as contrasted with his perception of the anomie
of the larger society. The curious fact about this is that
Merton has done, perhaps, more than any other thinker to ad-
vance the social psychologization of anomie.

 Although certain diffuse relations can be discerned be-
ween Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie, Merton fundamen-
tally shifts the ground of argument. Mertonian anomie leads
not only to different hypotheses than found in Durkheim's
work, but in a number of significant ways fundamentally re-
verses Durkheim's meanings, and stands in direct contradict-
ion to Durkheim's theory. This is seen most clearly in terms
of Merton and Durkheim's differing views on the relations be-
tween anomie and poverty. Whereas Durkheim considered pover-
ty as protection against anomie and suicide because it res-
trained insatiable ambitions, Merton proposes that anomie as
blocked aspirations on the part of the lower classes leads
to deviance. One considers poverty   protection against ano-
mic strivings, the other considers poverty and blocked aspir-

ations to be the cause of anomie! Specifically, Durkheim always conceived of anomie as implying egoism and insatiability, whatever its causes. The opposite of anomie in Durkheim's typology was fatalisme--a type of traditional passive resignation to one's assigned fate. In other words, many contemporary sociologists have come to use the term anomie to refer to the precisely opposite condition which Durkheim labelled fatalisme. Characteristically, Durkheim considered poverty to be protection against anomie--that is, against the insatiable ambitions of the drives for "progress and perfection." Mizruchi especially (see also Thio, 1975, among others) has observed this glaring difference between Durkheim and Merton as they conceptualized the relations between anomie, aspiration, poverty, and suicide.

> According to Durkheim, poverty is a restraining force in relation to anomie. It is the lifting of limitations on aspirations which reflects Durkheim's major concern with anomie rather than the utilization of illegitimate means for the achievement of given ends (1967:440).

Comparing the "infinity of dreams and desires" of progressive classes with the lesser aspirations of lower classes, Durkheim himself proposed:

> Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent... So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, it prepares us to accept collective discipline with e-quanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten (S:254).

In sum, even though Merton starts out at roughly the same place as Durkheim--namely, emphasizing the insatiability of the dominant cultural values--his development of the notion of anomie quickly diverges from Durkheim's. Merton rarely questions the moral legitimacy of these values, as did Durkheim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber. Both Durkheim and Weber took up highly critical stances toward the very values which Merton appears to have taken for granted. Merton accepts these goals as givens, and then shifts attention from ends to means, from cultural values to structtural opportunities. In a phrase, what is anomie to Durkheim, and an "iron cage" to Max Weber, signifies the normal moral consensus to Merton!

Thus, we must not fail to notice that the force of Merton's essay derives as much from the historical background as from the abstracted typology. For Merton emphasizes that cultural goals may grow so overwhelming that their force swamps out the restraining action of legitimate means of achievement, resulting in his type of anomic innovation. The historically specific application of this drama of malintegration is, of course, American society and culture, where the content of our cultural goals (ie. the American Dream) convey such an exaggerated and inordinate emphasis on the individual "cult of success." Remember that Durkheim was concerned with this cult of the individual and the corresponding cult of "progress and perfection," and Merton begins where Durkheim ends. Yet it seems that Merton implicitly accepts the egoism and insatiability inherent in the standard American value system. He gives us a "Social Structure and Anomie," and a Social Theory and Social Structure, but what we also desperately need is a Cultural Theory and Cultural Structure building on Durkheim and Weber. Nowhere does Merton indicate the possibility that these dominant cultural values and goals may be illegitimate in themselves. The only possibility presented by Merton is legitimate goals vis-a-vis legitimate and non-legitimate means. Yet the deeper question of the moral legitimacy of the dominant goals of the modern world was precisely the problem over

which Durkheim and Weber agonized. In Merton's world, as in Parsons', however, it seems that since whatever cultural goals are given are legitimate almost by functional definition, little can go wrong with that society as long as the means to those ends are also legitimate and approved, and the goals retain their clarity and compellingness. The pathology of anomie for Merton represents problems of social mechanics and not, as with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central cultural goals and basic institutions of the modern world.

Hence, we witness the narrowness of Merton's social psychological framework in contrast to the scope of the progenitors of the ideas with which he worked. For Durkheim and Weber argued both from inside a deeply historical and comparative sociocultural framework, and from the perspective of a view of human nature. The ultimate force of Durkheim's <u>Suicide</u> and Weber's <u>Protestant Ethic</u> ... theses rest on their perceptions of the destructive modern psycho-socio-cultural demands made upon human nature. Using these tacit, embedded images of human nature as their anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot stand up alone under an "infinity of dreams and desires" (suicide and ecocide being the inevitable result), while Weber argued that attempts by self-proclaimed "visible saints" to master world, self, and society for God's glory and to build His Kingdom here on earth, now, binds all of us in an inexorably tightening "iron cage." Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the very hearts and souls of modern men.

What Merton did to Durkheim's anomie, and then what other sociologists have done in turn to Merton's anomie can perhaps be best described as a rather typical illustration of the general process characterizing the breakthrough and subsequent breakdown of central paradigms used in the "normal science" of any discipline. In sum, the critical historical shifts in the routinization and trivialization of the "charisma on deposit" represented by Durkheim's anomie in the context of American sociological theory came in two main phases. First, we see a shift from a macro level sociocultural histor-

ical and comparative analysis and critique to a micro ahistorical social psychological level of analysis. Second, we witness a shift away from a fundamental critique of the very social and cultural foundations of the modern world to a remedial, ameliorist perspective in sociology and in the politics of the welfare state.

For these and other reasons found herein, it is my judgment that there are compelling reasons for rejecting claims associating the names of Merton or Parsons or the structural-functional school as the legitimate heirs of Durkheimian anomie and Durkheimian sociology.

4. <u>Merton's</u> <u>Theory</u> <u>of</u> <u>Malintegration</u> <u>of</u> <u>Goals</u> <u>and</u> <u>Means</u> <u>in</u>
   <u>The</u> <u>Context</u> <u>of</u> <u>American</u> <u>Society</u> <u>and</u> <u>Utilitarian</u> <u>Culture</u>

In the first part of "Social Structure and Anomie," after announcing his program of discovering social pressures toward deviance, Merton sets out his central theme of the malintegration of culturally mandated goals and operating institutional means. Although Merton offered us an elaborate typology, it is interesting to note that his first real concern was not with abstracted possibilities but with the specific pressures put upon individuals in the context of American society. These pressures to achieve individual success become so absolutized that eventually some may be tempted to use any technically efficient means to achieve the culturally mandated end. Here Merton thought he had detected a key flaw, a "fault" in the social system--a structurally induced pressure toward the erosion of legitimate operating norms, and a relapse into purely individualistic and Utilitarian-pragmatic moralities of thought and logics of action. In other words, when the "strain" between cultural and structural systems becomes too great, some individuals lapse back into the egoisms and insatiabilities of the Hobbesian state of nature.

One of the problems facing such an interpretive perspective may be that such a situation represents not so much a generic possibility (for one must entertain a Utilitarian image of man in that case), as a situation historically most preva-

lent in Anglo-American society. Despite its appealing reason-
ableness, surely such a proposition is misleading as an ex-
planation of social action, anomie and deviance in a society
where Utilitarian or Pragmatic "moralities of thought and lo-
gics of action" are dominant in the first place.

> To say that cultural goals and institutionalized norms
> operate jointly to shape prevailing practices is not to
> say that they bear a constant relation to one another.
> The cultural emphasis placed upon certain goals varies
> independently of the degree of emphasis upon institu-
> tionalized means. There may develop a very heavy, at
> times a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of
> particular goals, involving comparatively little con-
> cern with the institutionally prescribed means of stri-
> ving toward these goals. The limiting case of this type
> is reached when the range of alternative procedures is
> governed only by technical rather than by institutional
> norms. Any and all procedures which promise attainment
> of the all-important goal would be permitted in this hy-
> pothetical polar case. This constitutes one type of mal-
> integrated culture (1957:133).

Of course, Merton's first pole of cultural-structural malin-
tegration representing the purely personal and pragmatic pur-
suit of success can be seen as a translation of the "Hobbesian
problem" into the context of American society. But there's a
twist involved here apparently unperceived by Merton and oth-
ers; for Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or absence of
restraining norms in the context of the Puritan rebellion and
the English Civil War, while Merton's anomic context is the
consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms.

Now, Merton assumes that, in his abstractly defined so-
ciety, the generic "normal" case is that goals and means are
well integrated. He further assumes that if the operating means
come to be seen solely in terms of self-interested calculations
of technical efficiency that this constitutes one type of so-
ciocultural malintegration. Then what shall we say of our own
society, where the dominant values are themselves Utilitarian,
Pragmatic, and individualist? By Merton's definition, it would
seem that this state of "malintegration" would be both "normal"
and "abnormal." How could this be? This inconsistency means,
in turn, either that Merton's abstracted theoretical assump-
tions are incorrect, or his empirical reflections misleading.

But this apparent inconsistency raises a paradoxical ques-
tion: are certain types of malintegration in certain socie-
ties to be considered "normal"? Remember, Durkheim used the
idea of anomie as he agonized over the "moral anarchy" of
the modern world, a type of anarchy which he saw as "chronic."
Can certain types of anarchy be normal?

It is important to recognize that Merton's focus on the
extraordinary emphasis placed upon success goals in American
society directly corresponds to Durkheim's concern with the
modern drives for "progress and perfection" which are "daily
represented as virtues," and which lead to the "infinity of
dreams and desires" lying at the heart of the chronic "moral
anarchy" plaguing the modern world. However, it is signifi-
cant that Merton nowhere explicitly draws the connection. For
instance, after the preceding passage, Merton refers not to
Durkheim but to Andre Siegfried.

> Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in
> this direction (see Andre Siegfried, America Comes of
> Age). The alleged (?) extreme emphasis on goals of mone-
> tary success and material prosperity leads to dominant
> concern with technological and social instruments design-
> ed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institu-
> tional controls become of secondary importance. In such
> a situation, innovation flourishes as the range of means
> employed is broadened.... There occurs the paradoxical
> emergence of "materialists" from an "idealistic" orient-
> ation. Cf. Durkheim's analysis of the cultural conditions
> which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of
> which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms....
> See Les Regles...(1938:673, #3).

Besides noting that this passage was deleted in the revision,
we are led to wonder why Merton would use double emphasis to
question Siegfried's (and others) description of the American
drive for success by using the word "alleged" (as if it signi-
fied the accusation of a crime, not yet proven, about which
Merton wishes to retain innocence until overwhelming evidence
established guilt), and then add a question mark after it.
Is not the very crux of Merton's own thesis also that Ameri-
cans put such overwhelming emphasis on individual success that
the legitimate avenues of achievement are ever-widened and
sanctions attenuated?

In addition, we should not fail to notice that Merton admits into the discussion an important historical insight into American society, properly coming from Weber, when he speaks of the "paradoxical emergence of 'individualists' from an 'idealistic' orientation." Recognition of this historical paradox underlying the foundations of American morality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of the historical origins and constitutive processes of Durkheim's anomie and egoisme, as they relate to Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis. Even Merton himself tacitly suggests that this dominant pragmatic attitude of functional rationality, seemingly devoid of visible ethical foundation, could have had its origin in a deeply idealistic orientation demanding absolute individualism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, insatiable or unending drives for progress and perfection in this world, and the active, consensual mastery of the natural givenness of world, self, and society for God's glory; in short, the basic elements of the Protestant ethos. The resonances in these passages with Weber's themes are certainly striking. For Merton has just defined a state of sociocultural malintegration which is synonymous with a culture dominated by Utilitarian logics and cultural operating rationales! Merton himself had just finished his Weberian analysis of the Utilitarian culture of early modern English science (1936, 1972). Yet, as with Durkheim, Merton nowhere explicitly linked his insights in this regard to Weber's. It is most surprising, due either to conceptual "blind spots" or ideological defensiveness, that both Merton and Parsons, though close at many points, somehow neglected or refused to connect Durkheim's explanation of anomie and egoisme as proceeding from modern sanctions for "progress and perfection" with the never-ending functional rationalization of the world described and explained by Weber.

5. The Underlying Schematic Structure of Merton's Typology

    After indicating the pragmatic, individualist pole of
sociocultural malintegration, Merton outlines the opposite
pole which he terms "ritualism."

> A second polar type is found in groups where activities
> originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted in-
> to ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgot-
> ten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescri-
> bed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. Stability is
> largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of
> alternative behaviors is severely limited. There devel-
> ops a tradition bound, sacred society characterized by
> neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat
> is a case in point (1938:673).

Now, what Merton has done here is to begin to outline the un-
derlying schemas of cultural and institutional integration.
At the polar extremes of these continuums we find: (a) Mer-
ton's first type of anomie where the ends are strong and the
means weak, (b) ritualism, where the ends are weak and the
means strong. Merton's first implicit continuum also suggests
a mid-point where the integration of means and ends are at an
optimum level of integration. Since Merton's typology proba-
bly evolved through a series of elaboration of these dichoto-
mies, it is possible that he was so intrigued by the logical
appearance of the final product that he neglected to mention
the original points of departure or the process of develop-
ment. Merton's first continuum of integration may be schema-
tically represented in the following manner:

Figure 7:   Integration of Ends and Means

Merton's   optimum
Initial   high/low   balance   low/high
Schema   (eg. anomie)   (eg. ritualism)

In short, there are at least three positions in Merton's ini-
tial theoretical formulation: (a) the optimum point of integra-
tion (ie. "conformity"), (b) the pole where ends predominate
over means (ie. the first type of anomie in innovative devian-
cy), (c) the opposite pole (ritualism" where means overcome ends).

Actually, even this far into Merton's emerging typology things are more complex. For Merton's paradigm rests on two other implicit continuums--one abstracted and one historical. The second hidden dimension is not primarily concerned with technical questions and integration but with moral perceptions and legitimacy. At the center of this continuum of sociocultural legitimacy is again the mid-point or optimum locus of high legitimacy of both cultural goals and institutional means. At one extreme we discover a situation of low legitimacy of means (eg. "retreatism"); at the other pole we find low legitimacy of existing institutional means (what Merton later called the "nonconforming idealist" (1971:829-31), or if both means and ends are rejected we see "rebellion." Recasting the graphic presentation, Merton's underlying schemas may be represented in the following manner (see Figure 8-- Merton's full schema; see also Harary, 1966).

Finally, the third major implicit continuum in Merton's schema concerns the fundamentally opposed attitudes of modal societies at the two ends of history toward change and the "corrigibility" of social reality and social problems. In various installments of his later essay on "Social Problems and Sociological Theory" (eg. 1971), Merton explicitly distinguished between "fatalist" and "activist" societies. In cross-cut-

Figure 8:   Merton's Full Schema

1.   Integration of
      Means and Ends

high

Conformity

low   low

(ends over means--   (means over ends--
    eg. innovation)   eg. ritualism)

2.   Legitimacy of
      Means and Ends

high

Conformity

low   low

(legitimacy of ends   (legitimacy of means
    eg. retreatism)   (eg. rebellion)

ting the two dimensions just outlined, ritualism refers not
only to the state of malintegration where operating means
and institutional norms predominate over cultural goals, but
also to the type of traditional society deeply entrenched in
that thick "cake of custom" of which anthropologists used to
speak. And innovation refers not just to an abstracted con-
tinuum of integration but also to societies which actively
intervene in their lives and try to possess their own histor-
ies and direct their own fates. And this, in turn, implies
that the continuum of legitimacy refers also to the attitudes
of "rightness" and "wrongness" toward stability, rational in-
novation, and change among different societies at different
ends of societal evolution. Of course, behind these implicit
distinctions lay not only Durkheim's distinctions between
"mechanical" and "organic societies," but also Weber's evolu-
tionary dichotomy between traditional social orders dominated
by custom and magical-ritual stereotyping, on the one hand,
and modern rational, innovative social orders on the other.
In sum, it is important to recognize that Merton's typology
of adaptations rests on these three underlying continuums:
integration, legitimacy, and historical type.

B. Merton's First Type of Anomie

1. Extreme Emphasis on Success Attenuates the Legitimacy of Institutional Channels (Upper and Middle Class Deviancy)

The source of the original pathology underlying Merton's first type of anomie is, of course, the insatiable drives demanded for individual success by the cultural goals themselves. However, after establishing this foundation, Merton takes the origin of this cultural pathology for granted, and shifts main focus to its secondary consequences--namely, the inaccessibility of institutional means to given ends.

> Of the type of societies which result from independent variation of cultural goals and institutionalized means, we shall be primarily concerned with the first--a society in which there is an exceptionally strong emphasis upon specific goals without a corresponding emphasis upon institutional procedures (1957:134).

Then Merton qualified this important initial insight.

> No society lacks norms governing conduct. But societies do differ in the degree to which the folkways, mores and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the goals which stand high in the hierarchy of cultural values (1957:134).

> Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support from the culturally defined implementation of these ends .... Certain aspects of the social structure may generate countermores and anti-social behavior precisely because of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the extreme case, the latter may be so vitiated by the goals emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by considerations of technical expediency. The sole significant question then becomes: which available means is most efficient in netting the socially approved value? The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues, the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues (1938:674).

Now, Merton's important suggestion that extreme emphasis on cultural goals of success may lead over time to the emergence of purely Utilitarian mores concerning the achievement of individual success is apparently in his mind one of the key connecting links between his first and second propositions concerning anomie and innovative deviancy. But, as we shall see, this common link cannot be left to obscure a series of

hidden presumptions--for example, that lower class deviants actually perceive and act out their dilemmas in pragmatic terms, or that there are not critical class differences in these two types of anomic deviancy. We are primarily interested in this section in upper and middle class deviancy, where the extreme emphasis on individual success attenuates the legitimacy of institutional channels of achievement.

It is interesting that Merton follows up the preceding passage with this footnote:

> In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton Mayo's paraphrase of the title of Tawney's well-known book. "Actually the problem is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society; it is the acquisitiveness of a sick society" (Human Problems of an Industrial Society, 1933). Mayo deals with the process through which wealth comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering the unintegrated monetary success goal as an element in producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both phases of this system of interdependent variables (1938: 674, #5).

Here Durkheim's anomie is introduced through Mayo. Correspondingly, Merton appears to recognize that the original pathology lay with the overweening desires generated by the cultural goals themselves. Yet, beyond a few such references and hints in the various versions of SS&A, Merton never returned to complete his suggested analysis of both variables. This omission leaves a large gap in the development of American sociological theory, especially as it relates to the application of Durkheim's anomie and Weber's Protestant Ethos to the American scene.

Now, ambiguity is as rampant in Merton's discussion of anomie as in Durkheim's. For Merton slides back and forth between two different propositions about different classes and deviancy without sufficiently differentiating between them. On the one hand, we see Merton in his 1957 "Continuities..." essay repeating his essential and general idea of anomie:

> Anomie is conceived as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occuring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them. In this concep-

> tion, cultural values may help to produce behavior
> which is at odds with the mandates of the values them-
> selves. On this view, the social structure strains the
> cultural values.... The social structure acts as a bar-
> rier or as an open door to the acting out of the cul-
> tural mandates. When the cultural and the social struct-
> ure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior
> and attitudes which the second precludes, there is a
> strain toward the breakdown of the norms or normlessness
> *(1957:162-3).

But is it not equally true to say that the extreme cultural
values strain the institutional structure? That extreme cul-
tural emphasis on individual success goals attenuates the le-
gitimacy of institutional channels? This is what happens to
upper and upper-middle classes who are under great pressure
to succeed at any cost; certainly, these groups are not dis-
advantaged or "locked out." On the other hand, in the same
"Continuities..." essay, we see that Merton still was not
clearly discriminating between the various shades and meanings
of anomie.

> It will be remembered that we have considered the em-
> phasis on monetary success as one dominant theme in
> American culture, and have traced the strains which it
> differentially imposes upon those variously located in
> the social structure. This was not to say, of course,
> as was repeatedly indicated, that the disjunction be-
> tween cultural goals and institutionally legitimate
> means derives only from this extreme goal emphasis.
> The theory holds that any extreme emphasis upon achieve-
> ment--whether this be scientific productivity, accumu-
> lation of personal wealth, or, by a small stretch of
> the imagination, the conquests of a Don Juan--attenuate
> conformity to the institutional norms governing beha-
> vior designed to achieve the particular form of "suc-
> cess," especially among those who are socially disad-
> vantaged in the competitive race. It is the conflict
> between the cultural goals and the availability of us-
> ing institutional means, whatever the character of the
> goals, which produces a strain toward anomie (1957:166).

It seems redundant to speak, as Merton does in his last sen-
tence, of a "strain toward anomie," for anomie has been de-
fined by Merton himself as the condition of sociocultural
strain. More importantly, Merton hits upon both of his propo-
sitions concerning anomie and innovative deviancy in the im-
mediately preceding sentence where he speaks of extreme em-
phasis on cultural success goals attenuating conformity to

legitimate means as the general case, which is then applied
specifically to the lack of structural access on the part of
disadvantaged groups. In the first case, which constitutes
the original core of Merton's thesis, the cultural goals them-
selves are the cause of conflict and are pathological in their
extremity. In the second situation, the independent cause is
the lack of structural access. Thus, although in Merton's own
mind the two cases may proceed from the same general over-arch-
ing thesis of malintegration and strain, in actual fact the
two are so different, both structurally and phenomenologically,
that it is inconsistent to lump them together. For the key se-
quences in the two cases are reversed: In the first type of a-
nomie, cultural values strain the social and personality struc-
tures, while in the second type of anomie the social structure
strains the cultural structure. Surely no beginning student in
a methodology class would confuse independent and dependent
variables in this manner, unless the schema was inherently am-
biguous, even to its creator.

Let us next briefly explore the first type of anomie in
which extreme emphasis on individual success swamps out the
legitimacy of institutional channels, a type of adaptation
found primarily in upper and middle classes.

2. Moral Alchemies and the American Cult of Success

Merton discusses the power of images of the "cult of suc-
cess" in the American Dream without central reference to Web-
er's ideas. It is significant to note that, although Merton's
description of the   American ethos corresponds closely
with the standard connotation of the Protestant Ethic (eg.
hard work, personal achievement, money, success, etc.), no-
where does Merton refer to Weber's theses, their popular de-
formations, or their potential meaning for his discussion.
Rather, Merton here explores American culture as one polar
type of social-cultural malintegration where there is high
emphasis on goals coupled with low emphasis on legitimate in-
stitutional means.

Although the 1938 paper proceeds directly from introduct-

ory reflections into Merton's typology, the revised version
spends much more time exploring these culturally sanctioned
drives for progress and success. We start here from the short
passage in the original edition (which doesn't appear to be
paraphrased in the revision, one of the notable exceptions).

> The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth
> as a symbol of success in our society militates against
> the completely effective control of institutionally re-
> gulated modes of acquiring a fortune. Fraud, corruption,
> vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscrib-
> ed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the empha-
> sis   on the culturally induced success goal becomes
> divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis
> (1938:675-76).

Then Merton briefly reintroduces his original polemical intent
and also his Parsonian background.

> This observation is of crucial theoretical importance
> in examining the doctrine that anti-social behavior
> most frequently derives from biological drives break-
> ing through restraints imposed by society. The differ-
> ence is one between a strictly utilitarian interpreta-
> tion which conceives man's ends as random and an analy-
> sis which finds these ends deriving from the basic val-
> ues of the culture (1938:676).

In contrast to the biological and psychological reductions a-
gainst which he polemicized, Merton's seemingly paradoxical
thesis of the social generation of anti-social behavior was
much more sophisticated and complex. We should note, however,
the inherent difficulties in conceiving the former type as
purely Utilitarian, and the latter as cultural, as if these
were necessarily opposed; for American culture is Utilitar-
ian, individualist, Pragmatic.

Merton's revision, interestingly enough, recaptures some
of Durkheim's original emphases on egoistic insatiability.

> Contemporary American culture appears to approximate
> the polar type in which great emphasis upon certain
> success goals occurs without equivalent emphasis upon
> institutional means.... Money has been consecrated as
> a value in itself, over and above its expenditure for
> articles of consumption, or its use for the enhance-
> ment of power.... Moreover, in the American Dream there
> is no final stopping point. The measure of "monetary
> success" is conveniently indefinite and relative. At
> each income level ... Americans want just about twenty-
> five percent more (but of course this "just a little bit

more" continues to operate once it is obtained). In this flux of shifting standards, there is no stable resting point, or rather, it is the point which manages always to be "just ahead." An observer of a community [Hollywood] in which annual salaries in six figures are not uncommon, reports the anguished words of one victim of the American Dream. "In this town, I'm socially snubbed because I only get a thousand a week. That hurts" (1957: 136).

This insightful passage literally calls out for quotes from Durkheim (see Books Two and Three). However, Merton's comments are directed mainly to "relative deprivation" which was a subsidiary phenomenon to Durkheim. But Merton does offer incisive comments on these matters--where the lack of a reasonable or fixed standard for satiability and expectation lead one to forget whatever one really <u>needs</u> for a comfortable margin of survival, and instead helps generates that "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville spoke so insightfully. Merton focusses on status competition where, especially without the aid of accepted traditional signs and symbols, even the achievement of success sours in one's mouth as one continues to measure one's happiness not by what goals one has won nor by what one possesses, but rather only by what others have and you lack. Using Durkheim's conception of the social schedule, and coupled with a minimum inventory of the dimensions of relative deprivation, these insights possess great potential for a sociologically rooted explanation of inflation. The tragedy implicit, of course, in this never-ending cycle of other-directedness, self-doubt, envy, monopoly, etc., is the simple fact that nothing can be imagined which, when achieved, gives true satisfaction. For no matter how much one gains, one can always feel deprived relative to the fortunes of others.

Merton's lengthy excursus into the cultural socialization of Americans into an "infinity of dreams and desires" is most welcome, and leads me to wonder again why: (a) these observations were not linked to Durkheim's anomie as insatiability, and (b) these elements seem to fade in and out of Merton's analysis. For instance, the following passage comes from the revised version:

> To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched in American culture is only to say that Americans are bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the right, or often, <u>the duty of retaining the goal even in the face of repeated frustration.</u> Prestigeful representatives of the society reinforce the cultural emphasis. The family, the school, and the workplace--the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans--join to provide the <u>intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be motivated by the promise of a gratification which is not redeemed</u>*(1957:136-7).

These insightful observations reveal that Merton, especially in his later revisions, recaptured some of the tone of Durkheim's profound anatomies of modern culture. However, even here, Merton's focus seems to be different, for his main thrust concerns <u>the discipline needed to retain intact impossibly</u> accelerating goals. One of the functions of the central socializing agencies of American society, Merton adds, is purely inspirational--to continue to call out to us to "hold fast" to the cultural goals of unlimited success forevermore for Everyman, "even in the face of repeated frustration." And as we shall see, if any acknowledge the limitations of reality, we are then faced with what Merton, with a touch of genius, once called "moral alchemies."

Surely Merton's emphasis on the inspirational function of American culture in calling out to us to hold fast to the American Dream, even when evidence demands that such a reality demeaning image be set aside, echoes Durkheim's main themes. Yet, if we accept the importance of Merton's insights here, doesn't the real significance of his theme differ from its common presentation in American sociology? For Merton's first proposition concerning innovative deviance and anomie <u>is</u> implicitly related to Durkheim's anguished analyses. Mertonian anomie rests, then, not so much on the abstracted disjunction between institutional means and cultural goals as on <u>the unique vagaries of the American social and cultural structure in which the cultural goals of unlimited success for all are so overwhelmingly exaggerated and endlessly reiterated that this inordinate emphasis swamps out the legitimacy of the normal in</u>-

stitutional <u>channels</u> <u>of</u> <u>achieving</u> <u>success</u>. This internal contradiction is exacerbated by the peculiar fact that these culturally sanctioned goals are continually reemphasized; perhaps most strongly at the very moments when frustration impedes the achievements of large segments of the society. Hence, a peculiar form of culturally sanctioned "moral amnesia" is constantly invoked. Observers from Tocqueville on have commented on the Americans lack of a past; in his important study <u>The</u> <u>American</u> <u>Adam</u>, R.W.B. Lewis calls us a "one generation people." Contrary to common opinion, then, the original pathological source of anomie <u>even</u> <u>in</u> <u>Merton's</u> <u>version</u> lies not with the vagaries of inadequate social structuring (and, therefore, <u>not</u> at root a question of social mechanics and societal engineering), but rather with <u>the</u> <u>inordinate</u> <u>and</u> <u>passionate</u> <u>and</u> <u>insatiable</u> <u>and</u> <u>idealistic</u> totalism <u>of</u> <u>American</u> <u>cultural</u> <u>goals</u> <u>in</u> <u>themselves</u>.

Merton goes on to consider some prototypical carriers of the "American Dream," thereby uncovering the ideology behind the inspirational functions of "business class culture."

> Central to this process of disciplining people to maintain their unfulfilled aspirations are the central prototypes of success, the living documents testifying that the American Dream can be realized if one but has the requisite abilities (1957:137).

Then quoting from a prominent business magazine, Merton offers the following examples and his own sociological translation of their latent, inspirational functions.

> "You have to be born to those jobs, buddy, or else have a good pull."

> Here is a heretical opinion, possibly born of continued frustration, which rejects the worth of retaining an apparently unrealizable goal, and, moreover, questions the legitimacy of a social structure which provides differential access to this goal (1957:137).

> "That's an old sedative to ambition."

> The counterattack, explicitly asserting the cultural value of retaining one's aspirations intact, of not losing "ambition" (1957:137).

So far, Merton has analyzed two sides of the same coin--doubts about the "worth of retaining an unrealizable goal," and the

reassurance that one must "keep the faith" even in the face
of chronic doubt and perpetual frustration. One wonders if
American society has not embedded here within itself a myth
or archetype similar to the myth of Sisyphus, yet without re-
cognizing the implicit tragedy of a life condemned to etern-
al willing, effort, energy expended, and so forth, which yet,
by its own inner nature, can only end in eternal frustration.
It's as if we took over the joke, but forgot the punch line.

Merton continues:

"Before listening to its seduction, ask these men:"

A clear statement of the function to be served by the
ensuing list of "successes." These men are living tes-
timony that the social structure is such as to permit
these aspirations to be achieved, if one is worthy.
Failure to reach these goals testifies only to one's
own personal shortcomings. Aggression provoked by fail-
ure should therefore be directed inward and not outward,
against oneself and not against a social structure which
provides free and equal access to opportunity (1957:137).

Here Merton explores a series of crucial insights into the
therapeutic logics of our peculiar "moral alchemies" which,
in the case of individual and seemingly isolated failure,
serve to deflect criticism away from society and culture and
back onto the individual himself, who is then encouraged to
internalize the guilt at his own failure to reach the contem-
porary American state of perfection.

This leads naturally to the subsidiary theme that suc-
cess or failure are results wholly of personal quali-
ties; that he who fails has only himself to blame, for
the corollary to the concept of the self-made man is
the self-unmade man.... Failure represents a double de-
feat: the manifest defeat of remaining far behind in
the race for success and the implicit defeat of not ha-
ving the capacities and moral stamina needed for success
* (1957:168).

What beautiful phrases--the "self-unmade man" and "moral sta-
mina"! Not only has Merton reminded us of the disciplinary
and inspirational functions of our socializing agencies, but
he also reminds us that the American Dream of unlimited suc-
cess for all is itself predicated on an ethical base--namely,
whether one demonstrates that one is morally worthy of suc-
cess in this land. Weakness in required character traits, or

unusual or long-term delictions from duty, bring down that
disapprobation normally evoked by real and symbolic viola-
tions of what Durkheim called the "collective conscience."

Merton points to the critical modes in which such in-
dividual failure is dealt with--since success is predicated
upon intense, unending desire, effort, personal worthiness
and sincerity, then failure must be due either to lack of
will power or some other inherent ethical flaw in one's char-
acter. Consequently, since failure is internalized, on top of
the tension generated by the constant acceleration of demands
upon one's time, energy, will, and strength of character--
in short, upon one's "moral stamina"--there looms the ever-
present free-floating anxiety that if one lets up one's fail-
ure is then publicly defined as one's own. The alternative
possibility is seldom presented to the imagination that the
goals in themselves are wrong, or inhuman, or impossible, or
destructive; not even that the opportunities for success were
lacking as Merton argues. The only conclusion possible is
that one lost desire or nerve. In Merton's own terminology,
these embedded dysfunctions of the American Dream are displa-
ced from the society back onto the individual himself, who
is then forced to accept his lonely guilt for his failure.
Remember that success comes only if one is "worthy," as Mer-
ton emphasizes. For as many have learned to their double sor-
row, the hazards of unemployment in American society are not
merely economic; rather, the more devastating aspects of the
experience are psychic and social strain. One loses self-re-
spect, and then defines and accepts oneself as a failure: and
then in another turn of this vicious cycle of moral alchemy,
one is defined and treated as a failure by one's peers. One
recurrent question: why is Weber's thesis that modern econo-
mic culture has an ethical foundation not mentioned here?

Merton next outlines three success typologies.

I. All may properly have the same lofty ambitions, for
however lowly the starting point, true talent can reach
the very heights. Aspirations must be retained intact.

II. Whatever the present results of one's strivings, the
future is large with promise; for the common man may yet

become a king. Gratifications may seem forever deferred, but they will finally be realized as one's enterprise becomes the "biggest of its kind."

III. ... No matter what one's present situation, messenger boy or clerk, one's gaze should be fixed at the top (1957:138).

The first success prototype suggests the legitimacy of unlimited aspirations for all. Such an "infinity of dreams and desires" is culturally sanctioned, not merely as possibilities, but as moral duties. By contrast, in the past most societies governed themselves with a traditional social schedule of satisfaction (see Books Two and Three) in which one's own individual level of satiability was largely dependent upon a relatively stable standard assigned to one's group on the basis of their social status and cultural honor. The second success prototype enjoins each person to reject precisely these traditional valuations of one's worth by ascribed social statuses, and beckons him on to unlimited individual achievement, regardless of the past or his native group. Moreover, not only must every individual, without exception, actively reject the traditional standard of satiation ascribed to the status of his inherited group, but each must keep on striving without cease, for this ethos positively excludes any set standard of satiation for the future. This is remarkably close to Durkheimian anomie. Further, since one must be self-reliant to achieve these successes in a competitive society, one must also make it on his own. This emphasis on individual uniqueness and progress and perfection is further testified to by the reassurance given a person by being proclaimed "Number One" in any field of endeavor. Competitive sports clearly express these drives--to be a world-record breaker, to do what no man has done before, to be the champion, always achieving new heights of perfection and glory. Such drives toward uniqueness, progress and perfection through extreme specialization are certainly one expression of what Spengler (1922) called "Faustian man."

Merton's illustrations point up another key element in the American attitude toward time. If one must forever strive,

yet forever wait, forever defer gratification, then one's goal never comes closer, and hope becomes its own counterfeit. When American culture issues inspirational calls and exhortations for us to have faith in faith, to hope in hope, is this not really a mask for some deeply embedded sense of hopelessness, of final estrangement? In this case, hope becomes a desperation virtue, an "emergency virtue" as William Lynch (1966) has called it. Such counterfeiting of hope reveals a deeply rooted ambivalence toward time and process in our culture. Time, especially in terms of generic, natural processes such as our life-sequences, is not generally perceived as inherently generative, as leading to fulfillment by its own inner nature. Perhaps some of the obscenity of death in American society can be understood in this light, for it is my conviction that people do not fear too much reality, as the poet says. Rather, we fear too much unreality, especially at the most real times in our lives; we do not fear death as much as we fear the prospect of dying in the American way--that is, alone, isolated, exhausted, with an unfinished life-project that no one can ever complete. Our attitude toward the future is endless willing and endless waiting. Our attitude toward the past is amnesia. We cannot wait, we cannot remember. We believe that life is constituted through will and imagination, but we cannot will the real, the finite, nor can we imagine a point at which we would find true satisfaction. Consequently, this sense of constant, endless, restless, aimless urgency about our lives and the future, coupled with the amnesiac's sense of floating in an isolated instant, the American Adam as the American atom, unrelated to any other phase in time, paradoxically entraps us into the endless and repetitious patterns of the past, our national neurosis. For Lynch reminds us that a culture's primal attitudes in conflict with human nature may inform neurosis.

The other side of this "gnostic" failure of the imagination to imagine the humanly possible is seen in our apocalyptic drives to leap out of time. Our culture is now saturated with myriad forms of instant gratification--instant food, in-

stant photographs, instant sex, instant salvation, instant
destruction, instant everything and anything at the push of
a button. Since we are primarily a pragmatic, progressive
people, we do not see the dialectic involved between these
two polarities of time and natural process. For if we did
we might come to recognize that domination by the endless
and the instantaneous are actually only two sides of the
gnostic coin.

Merton mentions another facet of similar themes in the
symbolism of royalty in an egalitarian culture.

> The symbolism of the commoner rising to the estate of
> economic royalty is woven deep in the texture of the A-
> merican culture pattern, finding what is perhaps its ul-
> timate expression in the words of one who knew whereof
> he spoke, Andrew Carnegie: "Be a king in your dreams.
> Say to yourself: 'My place is at the top' " (1957:138).

Merton's parade of cultural exhortations reveals again the re-
lentless emphasis on these images of striving and success.
Yet, is it not also paradoxical that in our supposedly egali-
tarian society, our culture is so permeated with almost ri-
tual obeisance for high station that even common goods, pla-
ces, foods, etc., cloak themselves in images of royalty? What
other nation has so intimately bound these contraries togeth-
er, and undertaken to elect an emperor every four years? Per-
haps we should count this among those small revenges of his-
tory that the heirs of those who overthrew hierocratic and
aristocratic feudal social organization in the west should
also be the ones to find themselves furtively substituting
new aristocracies of wealth, new meritocracies of brains,
new celebrities as national heroes, new litanies of visible
saints, and the ones to mass produce images of royalty!

Merton continues:

> Coupled with this positive emphasis upon the obligation
> to maintain lofty goals is a correlative emphasis upon
> the penalizing of those who draw in their ambitions. A-
> mericans are admonished "not to be a a quitter," for in
> the dictionary of American culture, as in the lexicon of
> youth, "there is no such word as fail." The cultural man-
> ifesto is clear: one must not quit, must not cease stri-
> ving; must not lessen his goals, for "not failure, but
> low aim is crime" (1957:138-9).

Personality warps induced by the peculiar twists of these
moral alchemies should be seen in their cultural and histor-
ical specificity, and as representing the inverse of most
traditional economic motivations. James Russell Lowell's fa-
mous aphorism, in perfectly capturing our dilemma, demon-
strates that at bottom, an individual's failure to achieve
in any sphere reveals an ethical failure, a failure of mor-
al stamina, and thus, moral character. A cultural system in
which the real crime is to entertain balanced aspirations,
and the real virtue to be possessed by an "infinity of dreams
and desires," and never to falter from that high, exalted
and difficult path to perfection, and never to yield to anx-
iety or give in to doubt, frustration, or exhaustion--surely
such a unique, powerful, and destructive system of values has
tacit ethical foundations. Are we not justified in asking:
if American and modern economic and status strivings repre-
sent secularized translations of a religiously sanctioned
moral system and "civil religion," then why didn't Merton,
like the Weber he knew so well, explore or even refer to
the historical, sociocultural foundations of these pervasive
and powerful ethical demands? That Merton did not turn in
this direction, but rather in an abstracted micro-social psy-
chological direction by looking at individual adaptations to
anomie, serves as a key to the rest of our story on Merton's
anomie.

Returning to the text, Merton summarizes thus far:

Thus the culture enjoins acceptance of three cultural
axioms: first, all should strive for the same lofty
goals since these are open to everyone; second, present
seeming failure is but a way station to ultimate suc-
cess; and third, genuine failure consists only in the
lessening or withdrawal of ambition (1957:139).

In sociological paraphrase, these axioms represent,
first, the deflection of criticism of the social struct-
ure onto one's self among those so situated in the so-
ciety that they do not have full and equal access to op-
portunity; second, the preservation of a structure of so-
cial power by having individuals in the lower social stra-
ta identify themselves, not with their compeers, but with
those at the top (whom they will ultimately join); third,
providing pressures for conformity with the cultural dic-

tates of unslackened ambition for those who fail to
conform (1957:139).

As in the later sections on anomie and poverty, here we see
Merton tacitly using Marx and the notion of internal contra-
dictions (eg. see Gouldner, 1970) to "pry open" Durkheim's
anomie in the context of American society. Surely Merton's
observations here stand as one of the more insightful ana-
tomies of the dilemmas generated by our cultural logics and
curious "moral alchemies."

3.   Upper and Middle Class Deviancy: Pragmatism, Achievement,
           and Legality

      While exploring his logically derived category of "inno-
vative deviancy," Merton switches from his first to his se-
cond proposition concerning anomie. Much of the revised ver-
sion on "innovation" is concerned with the effect of the A-
merican ethic of success in attenuating legitimate institu-
tional channels of achievement. The crucial shift from the
first to the second theory comes when Merton begins to consi-
der the case of lower-class individuals who are chronically
blocked in their institutional access to achievement of cul-
tural goals. Perhaps this ambiguous combination was due to
an embedded flaw in Merton's mode of formal theorizing, in
which he began with logically derived, abstracted and empty
categories, and then attempted to fit diverse empirical cases
into these formal, conceptual pigeonholes.

      Now, it is certain that upper and middle class business
and legal "shenanigans" are just as much deviations from the
formal legal codes as lower-class "criminality." However, the
sociologist must take additional factors into account--name-
ly, that the perception and "labelling" of these different
types of deviance of different classes are treated very dif-
ferently in our culture, and even by the legal apparatus it-
self. As Merton made clear with the quote from Charles Dick-
ens, our social perception of upper and middle class deviance
is that of respectful indulgence for the successful cheat. On
the other hand, the social perception of the dominant middle

class majority is that the "criminality" of the lower-classes constitutes a potentially dangerous threat to the established order, to the social and economic virtues, especially those regarding the legitimate means of "getting ahead."

Merton restated the basic problem of the first type of upper-class deviancy with characteristic cogence:

> Great cultural emphasis upon the success goal invites this mode of adaptation through the use of institution-ally proscribed but often effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of success-wealth and power. This response occurs when the individual has assimila-ted cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally in-ternalizing the institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment.... From the standpoint of so-ciology, the question arises which features of our so-cial structure predispose toward this type of adapta-tion, thus producing greater frequencies of deviant be-havior in one social stratum than in another (1957:141)?

We should note, however, that the "induced" pressure toward "innovative deviancy" is not, in the first place, structural-ly generated. Rather, the primary cause is the inordinate cul-tural emphasis on individual success; it is more that the cul-tural structure strains the social structure than vice versa. Like many functional theorists, Merton here is a causal theo-rist in search of an effect. His basic question becomes re-phrased in this fashion: Given a cultural system which coun-sels absolute individualism, unending drives for progress and perfection, and unlimited individual success, what differen-tial features of social structuring predispose different so-cial strata toward different modes and possibilities of act-ing out these overwhelming cultural mandates?

Merton starts at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and works his way down. His second thesis--that lack of opportun-ity of disadvantaged strata to legitimate institutional access to channels of upward social mobility generates deviancy--is found only toward the end of this section.

> On the top economic levels, the pressure toward innova-tion not infrequently erases the distinction between bus-iness-like strivings this side of the mores and sharp practices beyond the mores. As Veblen observed, "It is not easy in any given case, indeed it at times impossible until the courts have spoken, to say whether it is an in-

stance of praiseworthy salesmanship or a penitentiary
offense (1957:141).

Illustrating his theme with choice satirical quotes, Merton
explores his first sub-category of upper-class "innovative
deviancy"--namely, the "cheat." The "cheat" is one who pub-
licly accepts the goals, while covertly indulging in purely
pragmatic considerations concerning observance of the "rules
of the game." As Huizanga noted in his famous book on the
play element in culture (1955), precisely because of his pub-
lic acquiesence and the private nature of his deviance, the
"cheat" is always treated more indulgently than the "spoil-
sport" or "rebel."

> The history of the great American fortunes is threaded
> with strains toward institutionally dubious innovation
> as is attested to many tributes to the Robber Barons.
> The reluctant admiration expressed privately, and not
> seldom publicly, of these "shrewd, smart, and success-
> ful" men is a product of a cultural structure in which
> the sacrosanct goal virtually consecrates the means
> (1957:141-2).

Thus, in his first type of anomie, Merton suggests that
the cultural mandates are so extreme in themselves as to bor-
der on pathology. In effect, it is culturally legitimate to
desire success so much that institutional norms may be con-
veniently set aside in actual practice. In America its "OK"
if drives toward overweening cultural goals override legit-
imate institutional restraints. Dicken's caricature of our
conflicting values reveals this situation perfectly: " ...
and he is utterly dishonorable, debased, and profligate? Yes
sir. In the name of wonder, then, what is his merit? Well
sir, he is a smart man" (1957:142). Ambrose Bierce adds:
"The American public will be plundered as long as the Ameri-
can character ... is tolerant of successful knaves" (Merton,
1957:143). In a very real sense, then, such types of upper
and middle class deviancy are hardly deviancy at all; rather
these simply are American values "writ large." Being a prag-
matic people, devoted to individual success and unlimited hor-
izons, we can hardly condemn too much those among us who fol-
low out our most sacred precepts more enthusiastically than

the rest; at most, we might consider this a case of more or less "pathological overconformity" as Parsons and Merton somewhere later suggest.

Extreme individualism, Pragmatic or Utilitarian ethics, success at any cost--some theorists might wish to term this a sign of malintegration of "goals and means." However, we should not forget that Durkheim considered this a sign of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the modern world. But here the paradox begins. For, as noted earlier, if this anomie is a sign of malintegration or "moral anarchy," it is one which is rooted deeply in our traditional values. This type of anomie is not simply due to the release of the ego from all previous constraints, but rather is itself constructed and constantly reinforced by our most precious cultural sanctions. The reluctant admiration we grant to such rogues, cheats, and other assorted "connivers" comes from the fact that we value their over-enthusiasm more than we condemn their more or less momentary lapse from legal consciousness. The conflicting values here are not simply the success ethic and the respect for legal order; rather, the conflict is really between laws as institutional norms and the American emphasis on Pragmatism as our basic operating logic. If it works, why be concerned with legal niceties, with outworn mores? Indeed, since Pragmatic individualism is itself one of our prime norms of "right conduct," when our conscience is thus formed, how else can our consciousness be directed?

After this consideration of strains imposed upon upper and middle class strata by the tremendous pressure of the American success ethic, Merton turned to his second thesis concerning other strata. Here, the concern is mostly with the "locked out status" of the American lower class, especially ethnic minorities. But these two empirical cases of "innovative deviancy" are socio-logically incompatible. Merton's key underlying distinction between manifest and latent functions glosses over some of these differences. For it is precisely the different definitions, "labels," and differential

societal responses between upper and lower class "deviancy"
that mark their incompatibility. Phenomenologically, they
are very different cases. Structurally, they represent dif-
ferent cases also, for the problem with the first is that
the institutional restraints are too weak, but too strong
in the second case. Can we really hope to understand the
usurpation of power and "criminal" conduct that led to "Water-
gate" and the resignation of a President of the United States
in disgrace by including it in the same category as the ghet-
to youth who steals to support his narcotic habit? Upper
class deviations from institutional norms (eg. price fixing,
cartels, monopolies, white-collar crime, etc.) are seldom
branded as "criminal" in the same way that highly visible
crimes against persons (eg. armed robbery), even though the
number of people affected and the total amount extorted may
be many times greater in the first instance than in the se-
cond.

Let us now turn to consider Merton's typology, and his
second case of anomic deviancy.

Now, as Merton prepares for the transition from the
theoretical to the typological parts of his work, we should
notice a number of basic shifts in the level and focus of
his argument. One basic shift is from the pathology of cul-
tural goals to inadequacies of social structure. A second
shift is from the historical-cultural level down to the so-
cial psychological level. Merton poses the key questions as
he came to perceive them in these terms:

> ... contemporary American culture continues to be char-
> acterized by a heavy emphasis on wealth as a basic sym-
> bol of success, without a corresponding emphasis upon
> the legitimate avenues on which to march toward this
> goal. How do individuals living in this cultural con-
> text respond? And do our observations bear upon the doc-
> trine that deviant behavior typically derives from bio-
> logical impulses breaking through the restraintsimposed
> by culture? What, in short, are the consequences for the
> behavior of people variously situated in a social struct-
> ure of a culture in which the emphasis on dominant suc-
> cess goals has become increasingly separated from an e-
> quivalent emphasis on institutionalized procedures for
> seeking these goals (1957:139)?

Now, as we have discovered, there is an inherent ambiguity concerning the case of high-emphasis on goals and low emphasis on operating means. For it contains both of Merton's two separate propositions about anomie: (a) that extreme emphasis on success goals leads to an attenuation of legitimate institutional means, and (b) where the goals are universally accepted but the means of achievement are differentially distributed, individual deviance depends upon the social structural situation. In Merton's first type of anomie and innovative deviancy, the independent variable is culture, while in the second type it is social structure. If deviance, albeit of different types, is the dependent variable, then what is anomie? Is it the cause or the result of the conflict or the deviance? Indeed, when reading through Merton's typology one may easily find oneself wondering whether anomie leads to innovation and rebellion, for instance, or whether innovation and rebellion leads to anomie? Again, is anomie the cause or the result, or neither? In addition, if Merton's anomie rests on the functionalists' notion of a malintegration between the social and cultural systems, then why would Merton maintain at one point that "In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, the outcome is normally a type of ritualism rather than anomie" (1957:136, #8)? I thought both extremes--innovation where the ends are strong and the means weak <u>and</u> ritualism where the ends are weak and the operating means strong--represented anomic malintegration. Further, on what grounds does Merton gratuitously presume that similar success values are shared by all? Should we not be careful not to mistake universalistic "logics" with universal acceptance of them? If in Merton's second case of anomie he considers the differential distribution of access to institutional means, should he not then also consider the differential distribution of values? These and other related questions shall occupy us in the next section.

C. Merton's Second Type of Anomie

1. The Typology of Individual Adaptations to Malintegration

In the second section of his famous essay, Merton turns to analyze typical modes of individual adaptations to various strains in their sociocultural situation. Here we shall explore only the first two main modes; of course, Merton's concern centered on innovative deviancy. This category combines both of Merton's types of anomie. In regard to the other logically derived possibilities, Merton does not generally regard "conformity" as problematic, and it is unclear what systematic theory lies behind the last three types (see also Turner and Scott, 1965:234, #3).

> Turning from these culture patterns, we now examine types of adaptation by individuals within the culture bearing society. Though our focus is still the cultural and social genesis of varying rates and types of deviant behavior, our perspective shifts from the plane of patterns of cultural values to the plane of types of adaptation to these values among those occupying different positions in the social structure (1957:139).

Merton then proceeds to diagram out five logically possible permutations concerning the acceptance or rejection of legitimate cultural goals and institutional means. Conformity represents acceptance of both cultural goals and institutionalized means. Merton considers conformity to be the modal response in all groups. Innovation represents acceptance of goals but rejection of existing legitimate means (and the substitution of illegitimate means). Ritualism, in terms of his later typology, refers to the rejection of legitimate goals but the acceptance of operating means (implying not only the displacement of original goals, but also their replacement by means, "means becomes ends"). Retreatism implies the rejection of both goals and means (although it is not made clear how one then exists in a vacuum; surely again something else must be at least partially substituted). And finally, rebellion represents "rejection of prevailing values and substitution of new ones" for both goals and means. As my parenthetical additions suggest, however, Merton's typology is not

wholly consistent. For each case implies not only the reject-
ion of one or both elements, but also at least partial sub-
stitution of new elements. The same rationale that first ap-
pears clearly in the case of rebellion would also apply to
the other categories. Merton adds this footnote on rebellion:

> This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different
> from that of the others. It represents a transitional
> response seeking to institutionalize new goals and new
> procedures to be shared by other members of the socie-
> ty. It thus refers to efforts to change the existing
> cultural and social structure rather than to accomo-
> date efforts within this structure (1957:140, #13).

It is simply not clear to me how Merton purports to differen-
tiate so neatly between change and internal accomodations:
for don't efforts at accomodation that reject either or both
cultural goals and institutional means and thereby substitute
new elements also constitute indirect efforts to change the
"existing cultural and social structure"? How could it be oth-
erwise? If his theory rests, in turn, on the fine distinction
between imputation of conscious motives or not, then it be-
comes more tenuous. Even with the intentional difference,
isn't the functional result, the very factor Merton thinks
important, similar? In short, isn't Merton's starting point,
his logical abstract typology, internally inconsistent as
outlined?

When Merton reiterates his thesis, does he recognize,
for instance, not only the difference between his first and
second anomie, but the real possibility that differential
distribution may apply to goals as well as to means? That it
may be the upper and upper-middle classes which are the prime
carriers of Pragmatic and individualist cultural logics which
are then differentially followed by members of other classes?

> ... It is a primary assumption of our typology that
> these responses occur with different frequency within
> various sub-groups in our society precisely because
> members of these groups are differentially subject to
> cultural stimulation and restraints (1957:140, #12).

2. Adaptation I: Conformity

Merton begins his typological analysis with conformity. Although at first it appears that he considers conformity to be the general modal response in all groups, and therefore unproblematic by definition, in some later related writings Merton considerably revises his earlier simplified analysis of conformity. Yet, it is interesting to note that as Merton continued to revise his earlier and simple view of conformity in favor of a more inflected approach, much of the certainty of the original formulation began to fade. For not only, by implication, are the other categories equally complex and yet equally simplified in the original formulation, but also the base category of conformity itself has ramified and become capable of multiple interpretations and expressions. Hence, the very category which, by its seeming straightforward simplicity, anchored the rest of the typology, has become less obvious and less certain in the very process of refinement.

As I suggested before, Merton's original assumption that conformity is relatively unproblematic is perhaps understandable from the way in which he goes about theorizing. Most likely derived from Parsons' abstracted idealization of "The Social System," Merton proceeds deductively to elaborate a schema based upon logical permutations, and assuming perfect integration as the basic anchor. Now, this curious procedure of functionalist theorists differs little from economists who have traditionally started from a series of arbitrary and normative premises, such as perfectly competitive markets, rationality and optimization, and so on. Perhaps Merton's later revisions of some of these assumptions (eg. consensus), is attributable to his growing independence of his teacher Parsons over the years. For example, although many continue to charge Merton (eg. 1971:795-7) with that brand of functionalism which had made an abstract value consensus a key postulate, ever since at least his essay on "Manifest and Latent Functions" (1949), Merton had taken care to avoid such a dubious thesis.

Here Merton describes conformity as the prototypical case of sociocultural integration.

> To the extent that a society is stable, adaptation type I--conformity to both cultural goals and institutional-ized means--is the most common and widely diffused. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies consti-tuting every social order is sustained by the modal be-havior of its members representing conformity to the es-tablished, though perhaps secularly changing, culture patterns. It is, in fact, only because behavior is typi-cally oriented toward the basic values of the society that we may speak of a human aggregate as comprising a society. Unless there is a deposit of values shared by interacting individuals, there exist social relations, if the disorderly interactions may be so called, but no society.... Since our primary interest centers on the sources of deviant behavior, and since we have briefly examined the mechanisms making for conformity as the mo-dal response in American society, little more need be said regarding this type of adapation, at this point
> (1957:141).

Although in both his original and revised editions, Mer-ton spends little time on conformity but rather takes it for granted, in his subsequent essays related to anomie and devi-ance, Merton began to admit that conformity might be more pro-blematic than he had previously acknowledged. For example in his 1957 "Continuities" essay, Merton explicitly responded to criticism from Herbert Hyman and others by admitting that one should not presume that universalistic goals are universally accepted. "It is a matter for inquiry, not a matter of suppo-sition, to find out how widely the values under examination have been assimilated" (1957:170). Merton qualifies his form-er presumptions in this way:

> ... It becomes essential to state this assumption more clearly by qualifying it; the analysis assumes that some individuals in the lower economic and social strata act-ually adopt the success goal. For after all, the analy-sis holds not that all or most members of the lower stra-ta are subject to pressure toward non-conformist behav-ior of the various kinds set out in the typology of a-daptation, but only that more of them are subject to this pressure than those in the higher strata.... De-viant behavior is still the subsidiary pattern and con-formity the modal pattern. It is therefore sufficient that a sizable minority of those in the lower strata as-similate this goal for them to be differentially subject

to this pressure as a result of their relatively small-
er opportunities to achieve monetary success (1957:171).
If this sounds like special pleading, perhaps it is. To main-
tain his position, Merton is forced here to perform some fan-
cy footwork. First, Merton does not yet appear to recognize
that his idea of anomie really contains two separate proposi-
tions; else he would not have claimed again that some members
of lower strata are differentially subject to anomie more
than members of higher strata. In that case he would have to
admit that they are differentially subject to different
strains. Second, whereas before he boldly claimed that all
are subject to the same disjunction which differentially af-
fects lower strata because of their weaker structural posi-
tion, Merton is now forced to backtrack and suggest instead
that more members of the lower class are subject to anomie
than members of the upper classes. If we extend our question-
ing here to Merton's tacit assumption still underlying his
revision--namely, that different strata share the same aspi-
rations (see Mizruchi especially, 1967), then Merton would
be forced to do even more backtracking. But as far as I can
tell, Merton has never answered in print Mizruchi's criti-
cisms.

Further, it is not correct to unqualifiedly identify
Merton's "conformity" with the assumption of "value consenus"
so often characteristic of functionalist thought. For as ear-
ly as 1949 in his lead essay on codification of functional
theory "Manifest and Latent Functions" in Social Theory and
Social Structure, Merton explicitly disavows the notion of
a clear consensus. And as late as 1971 (eg. 796-7), Merton
again defends himself with copious quotation from his own
work against this persistent charge. Yet, as Gouldner once
remarked of the difference between Parsons' theoretical and
historical writings, it's as if two separate sets of books
were being kept. It is certainly correct to say that earlier,
while still under Parsons' spell, Merton did indeed, espe-
cially in "Social Structure and Anomie," tacitly presume an
abstracted value consensus as the corollary of conformity.

Yet, in some of his later related essays, especially while responding to criticism, Merton himself questions these very assumptions. Merton is probably right in contending that:

> ... it is difficult to see the basis for imputing the notion of a "consensual society" to functional analysis. It is as though an intellectual stereotype had taken charge, as though it were mandatory for a functional orientation to social problems to adopt the assumption of full consensus, and so need look no further to learn whether this is really so (1971:796).

Yet, even so, once again the irony of this recent disclaimer should not escape us, for despite some of his own best efforts over the years, Merton himself had aided and abetted over the same period this wide-spread confusion.

We ought also to consider some further implications of Merton's original assumption of the unproblematic nature of conformity, especially in the political vein. In his introduction to Part Two of Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton indicated a number of new concerns. Implicitly responding to criticism, Merton rises to defend his theory against possible misunderstandings. For instance, instead of implying a society governed by consensus of values, Merton took care to point out, as he did again in 1971, that consensus is often variable and that one must specify the "degree of support of particular institutions" by particular groups. This qualification includes an additional factor--namely, power as a key element in maintaining social control. By implication, then, members of groups who have not shared the dominant cultural values yet have been held relatively in check by power and social control, to these people whose deviation has always been labelled "criminality," Merton now extends the possibility that this may simply represent a case of a different type of "innovation." "It may therefore be misleading to describe non-conformity with particular institutions merely as deviant behavior; it may represent instead the beginning of a new alternative pattern with its own distinctive claims to moral validity" (1957:122).

Thus, in extensively revising his earlier, over-simple stance regarding conformity as a modal response, Merton has evidently arrived at a much more complex and subtly inflected position. This progressive development parallels Merton's growing sophistication over the years in the elaboration, for instance, of the concepts of social organization and deviancy. Yet, the paradox previously mentioned should not be allowed to escape us, for as Merton has progressively refined his conceptions of conformity (and thus deviance), he has unwittingly made at least two things clear: (a) the most questionable and critical transition in his functional thought is that between the manifest and latent levels of functions, and (b) the seeming clarity and logically elegant appearance of his earlier schemas in "SS&A," which anchored the rest of the typology by its simplistic certainty, has by its own ramification betrayed the self-evident obviousness of the rest of the typology by contrast. In short, without an unproblematic notion of conformity, the rest of the typology becomes also more problematic.

Finally, in comparing Merton's assumptions about conformity to the dominant American value system and success ethic with Durkheim's and Weber's ideas, we should remember these facts. Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not that they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that the "infinity of dreams and desires" flowed directly from the culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfection." They were, therefore, "chronic," and, in a sense, the "normal" forms of the "moral anarchy" reigning in the modern era. Further, who can forget the anguished tones with which Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart: this nullity imagines that it has achieved a level of civilization never before achieved" (1958a: 182). Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted conformity to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as Merton often did. In short, both Durkheim and Weber directed their most critical shafts at the very values which Merton

appears to have taken for granted. Are these pioneers really to be considered the progenitors of that "arid functionalism" which claims them for its own?

Finally, we should recall that Merton himself had just finished exploring some of the pathologies permeating the dominant "American Dream" value system. Surely conformity to social or cultural pathologies is itself pathological! Besides personality pathologies induced by our "moral alchemies" in those who are unsuccessful, conformity to those eternally expanding dreams and ever-accelerating desires and demands represents an even greater moral pathology on the part of those who are successful. Such a sorry state of human affairs is not to be so easily accepted as "normal" as Merton did, but rather cries out in its historical uniqueness, power, and inversion of human values as a fact to be explained. Remember that Durkheim proposed that poverty serves as protection against anomie and suicide. And in one of those grim paradoxes of modern history, it is precisely those of us who are the most successful who are also the ones most beset by the "infinity of dreams and desires," and therefore the most anxiety ridden and driven and most prone to various moral, spiritual, and existential maladies largely unrelated to deprivation or oppression. Strangely, Merton managed to invert the real thrust of Durkheim and Weber's most profound paradigms--for what is comparatively normal to Merton was anomie to Durkheim and an "iron cage" to Weber!

3. Differential Responses to Malintegration: The Case of Structurally Blocked Strata

Now, the typological discussion in Merton's original essay contained little material on upper or middle class "deviant innovation." Rather, it was primarily concerned with the blocked mobility of the lower class, and the supposition that this structural blockage would result in their turn to crime, organized vice, and other assorted forms of highly visible, traditional "deviance." Much more material on upper class deviancy appears in the 1949 revision. Perhaps it was

not surprising that Chicago of the 1930's should have provid-
ed Merton with a number of his illustrations (eg. Capone, or-
ganized vice, etc.). In terms of his main theme, Merton notes:

> But whatever the differential rates of deviant behav-
> ior in the several social strata, and we know from many
> sources that the official crime statistics showing uni-
> formly higher rates in the lower strata are far from com-
> plete or reliable, it appears from our analysis that the
> greatest pressures toward deviation are exerted upon the
> lower strata. Cases in point permit us to determine the
> sociological mechanisms involved in producing these pres-
> sures. Several researches have shown that specialized
> areas of vice and crime constitute a "normal" response to
> to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary
> success has been absorbed, but where there is little ac-
> cess to conventional and legitimate means for becoming
> successful. The occupational opportunities of people in
> these areas are largely confined to manual labor and the
> lesser white collar jobs. Given the American stigmatiza-
> tion of manual labor, which has been found to hold rather
> uniformly in all social classes, and the absence of real-
> istic opportunities for advancement beyond this level, the
> result is a marked tendency toward deviant behavior. The
> status of unskilled labor and the consequent lower income
> cannot readily compete in terms of established standards
> of worth with the promises of power and high income from
> organized vice, rackets, and crime (1957:144-5).

I suggest part of Merton's basic theses are sound--name-
ly, that "anti-social behavior" is socially produced, and that
"internal contradictions" beset American and other social sys-
tems. However, not only did Merton bring these two factors to-
gether in a certain way, he also implied other postulates
which we have taken care to elucidate here. Especially ques-
tionable among the flaws in Merton's theory are the lack of
recognition of the pragmatism of the basic American value sys-
tem itself, and the tacit assumption, as Cohen (1965) pointed
out, that those who find themselves structurally blocked will
react pragmatically and rationally. Merton restates his ideas:

> For our purposes, this situation involves two important
> features. First, such antisocial behavior is in a sense
> "called forth" by certain conventional values of the cul-
> ture and by the class structure involving differential
> access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, pres-
> tige bearing pursuit of the culture goals. The lack of
> high integration between the means and ends elements of
> the cultural pattern and the particular class structure
> combine to favor a heightened frequency of antisocial

> conduct in such groups. The second consideration is of
> equal signficance. Recourse to the first of the alterna-
> tive responses, legitimate effort, is limited by the fact
> that actual advance toward desired success goals through
> conventional channels is, despite our persisting open-
> class ideology, relatively rare and difficult for those
> handicapped by little formal education and few economic
> resources (1938:679).

The attentive reader will observe that Merton's earlier re-
flections on the American dilemma--the gap between our indivi-
dualistic, achievement oriented goal of unlimited success for
all and the grim historical realities of ethnicity, religion,
region, and class--were a good deal more critical. For exam-
ple, the following footnote was deleted save for the first
sentence in the 1949 revision.

> The shifting historical role of this ideology is a pro-
> fitable subject for exploration. The "office-boy-to-pres-
> ident" stereotype was once in approximate accord with the
> facts. Such vertical mobility was probably more common
> then than now, when the class structure is more rigid.
> The ideology largely persists, however, possibly because
> it still performs a useful function for maintaining the
> status quo. For insofar as it is accepted by the "masses,"
> it constitutes a useful sop for those who might rebel a-
> gainst the entire structure, were this consoling hope re-
> moved. This ideology now serves to lessen the probability
> of Adaptation V (rebellion). In short, the role of this
> notion has changed from that of an approximately valid
> empirical theorem to that of ideology, in Mannheim's
> sense (1938:679, #15).

One can only speculate on the tacit political undercurrents
flowing beneath Merton's efforts that led him to soften his
critique of American society in the decade following the Great
Depression. In any case, in this early passage one can detect
Merton's tacit usage of Marxian perspective to "pry open" Durk-
heimian anomie in the context of American society and its in-
ternal contradictions and deflections of revolutionary possi-
bilities.

Merton next indicates how, from his own special perspect-
ive, similar pressures to succeed exert different strains on
different social strata. This passage marks one of the crucial
transition points between Merton's first and second theses on
anomie and innovative deviancy.

> The dominant pressure of group standards of success is,
> therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but
> by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing
> use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, exped-
> ients of vice and crime. The cultural demands made on
> persons in this situation are incompatible (1938:679).

Here both upper and lower class deviancy are beset by Parson-
ian (normative) cross-pressures, for both are tacitly encour-
aged to elevate purely pragmatic considerations over legiti-
mate norms. However, the actual historical situation from which
which Merton generalized is really rather different than the
schematic picture painted here by Merton. First, as we have
noted, our cultural values are themselves Pragmatic. Second,
Mertonian anomie results not merely from incompatible norma-
tive demands, but primarily from the overwhelming emphasis
placed by the culture on individual success. In other words,
this social pathology is due not merely to normative conflicts
--internal contradictions in the Marxian sense--but rather to
the incredible and distortive power of the dominant values in
themselves. At root, then, the problem is Weberian and Durk-
heimian, not Marxian. For as Durkheim observed, our vices are
merely the "exaggerated or deflected forms of our virtues."
Again, note that both the first and second types of innovative
deviancy proceed from the very same cultural pathology, for
whereas upper class individuals find their culturally manda-
ted insatiable desires swamping out legitimate and merely
bothersome institutional channels, the lower class, in a very
different structural situation, finds themselves faced not
with institutional norms too weak to restrain their insatia-
ble desires, but, rather with structures too closed to them.
They do not enjoy full access to the institutional structures
of upward mobility in the first place.

Merton continues, unaware that his description of innova-
tive deviancy has given rise to two very different analyses
of structural responses to the same cultural values. Merton's
typology has often been touted as the very paradigm of socio-
logical analysis; but, once again, why should the cultural
goals themselves remain unexamined?

> On the one hand, they are asked to orient their con-
> duct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth, and
> on the other, they are largely denied effective oppor-
> tunities to do so institutionally. The consequences of
> such structural inconsistency are psycho-pathological
> personality, and/or anti-social conduct, and/or revolu-
> tionary activities. The equilibrium between culturally
> designated means and ends becomes highly unstable with
> the progressive emphasis on attaining the prestige-la-
> den ends by any means whatsoever. Within this context,
> Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence
> over morally prescribed "failure," when the channels
> of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed in a socie-
> ty which places a high premium on economic affluence
> and social ascent for all its members (1938:679-80).

In short, normative cross-pressures resulting from structural
inconsistencies generate personality problems, anti-social
conduct, and perhaps even revolutionary activities! Surely
an ambitious theory! One can readily understand how Merton's
elegant schema and underlying proposition became the very
paradigm of sociolgical theorizing, especially over against
models from other disciplines and fields. But, given these
sociocultural tensions, wouldn't the ascendancy of the domi-
nant standard American value system itself represent the tri-
umph of "amoral intelligence"--in terms of our Pragmatic and
Utilitarian cultural logics--seen especially in terms of eco-
nomic and technological activity? Shouldn't Merton also have
briefly explored how these particular cultural logics came
to dominance? But perhaps this might have led to two uncom-
fortable conclusions. First, it might have revealed that even
"universalistic" values are not universally shared; that they
have "particularistic" origins, and perhaps even special con-
tinuing sociocultural "carriers." Certainly, they are parti-
cularistically applied in practice, though perhaps less so in
1970's in America than in the 1930's and 1940's when Merton
first wrote. This recognition might have led Merton to more
carefully distinguish between "universalism" in values and
"universalism" in belief and practice. Indeed, Merton seemed
to assume that lower classes do internalize upper and middle
class aspirations; but as he later noted, this must be empir-
ically demonstrated, not presumed. Second, had Merton explor-

ed these historical questions of the sociocultural bases of
competing systems of legitimate moral and intellectual auth-
ority, he might have run directly counter to Weber's theses.
For while Merton here assumes a structurally induced pres-
sure toward utilitarian or pragmatic (on the generic level,
and thus spelled with a little "u" and "p") attitudes and
behavior, Weber suggested the emergence of these very same
cultural operating logics (on the specific historical level,
and thus capitalized), not from some abstracted notion of
"strain in The Social System," but rather from the seculari-
zation of "inner-worldly ascetic" Protestantism. Remember,
if the dominant American values are themselves Pragmatic and
counsel individualistic and insatiable ambition, then in Mer-
ton's framework, this state of "malintegration" would be "nor-
mal"! In other words, our Central Value System is itself ano-
mic! I believe this to be an inevitable conclusion, given
both the inner logic and sociocultural history implied in
Durkheim's and Merton's versions of anomie (and given Par-
sons' rendering of egoisme). Indeed, the recognition emer-
ging from our detailed examination of Merton's theses con-
stitutes a compelling foundation for the second schema of
anomie as generated by our dominant cultural system (see
Book Three). In short, these recognitions include: (a) insa-
tiable ambition is counseled and sanctioned by our value sys-
tem, and (b) historically, our value system derives from the
secularization of ascetic Protestantism.

   Merton continues expanding his main theme in a series
of succinct and insightful passages that made his essays clas-
sics.

> ... other phases of the social structure besides the ex-
> treme emphasis on pecuniary success must be considered
> if we are to understand the social sources of anti-so-
> cial behavior. A high frequency of deviate behavior is
> not generated simply by "lack of opportunity" or by this
> exaggerated pecuniary emphasis. A comparatively rigidi-
> fied class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may
> limit such opportunities far beyond the point which ob-
> tains in our society today. It is only when a system of
> cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain
> common symbols of success <u>for the entire population at
> large</u> while its social structure rigorously restricts or

completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquir-
ing these symbols <u>for a considerable part of the same pop-
ulation</u>, that antisocial behavior ensues on a considerable
scale. In other words, our egalitarian ideology denies by
implication the existence of noncompeting groups and in-
dividuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success. The same
body of success symbols is held to be desirable for all.
These goals are held to <u>transcend class lines</u>, not to be
bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is
such that there exist class differentials in the accessi-
bility of these <u>common</u> success symbols. Frustration and
thwarted aspiration lead to the search for avenues of es-
cape from a culturally induced intolerable situation; or
unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit attempts to
acquire the dominant values. The American stress on pecun-
iary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exag-
gerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses, and anti-social
behavior (1938:680).

Again, Merton's theses here rest on the notion of "internal
contradictions" or "strain in The Social System." Surely Mer-
ton has performed valuable service in exploring the cross-
pressures exerted upon individuals of different strata by com-
peting values of Pragmatism, success, law and order, and so
on. Further, Merton incisively observes that our egalitarian
ethos compounds the tensions by implicitly denying that actual
differences in equality of opportunity exist. Such a "moral al-
chemy" deflects criticism away from the societal structure,
and back onto the lone individual who internalizes these val-
ues, but meets with a contradictory reality. Such failure is
then explained away by these "moral alchemies" which transmute
"base" failure into new cultural gold. If, indeed, as American
culture proclaims, every man may become a king, then the fail-
ure of any individual, even a deprived one from the lower clas-
ses, to achieve part of whole of the American dream is forced
back upon the individual himself as wholly his fault, and
hence individualized in terms of his lack of character or
ethical virtue. Surely such "moral alchemies" have tacit,
deeply embedded ethical bases.

In his own way, Merton is debunking the actualization
of the dream, and not the dream itself. Indeed, few men have
typified the dreamt of rapid upward mobility more than Merton him-
self, who skyrocketed from a Philadelphia immigrant slum to

the pinnacle of American academia in a few short decades (see M. Hunt, 1961). In his own way, <u>Merton</u> <u>was</u> <u>calling</u> <u>us</u> <u>to</u> <u>make</u> <u>the</u> <u>dream</u> <u>real</u> <u>for</u> <u>all</u>. Although Merton began, with Durkheim, by emphasizing the content of the success ethic, especially its insatiability and egoism, he turned instead to another perspective. Merton's real point is that our success goals are universalized, but the means for achievement are not. The momentous historical breakthrough to an egalitarian, achievement ethos slights the historical fact that the instrumental means, the institutional channels, of achievement are still so often differentially distributed. In short, Mertonian anomie rests on the disjunction between universalistic goals and particularized structural opportunities.

However, this means that Merton, in turn, accepts these same universalistic goals as givens, and thus shifts attention away from the question of the legitimacy of these goals to the problems of the structured inequality confronting lower strata. Hence, Mertonian anomie raises essentially a distribution problem--how to open up the doors to let more in. It is a problem in social engineering for a liberal society. But Durkheim, on the other hand, meant anomie to refer to the content of these goals, as counseling an "infinity of dreams and desires." To Durkheim, anomie referred to the constitutive foundations of the whole social and cultural structure, not merely to a few peripheral classes. To Durkheim, anomie and egoisme were most rampant precisely among the more progressive, not the backward, sectors of society. As Lynch (1966:45) suggests, "... an ideal that seems to be commanded and that is also hopeless" can be the source of cultural, social, and personal pathology. I repeat: for Durkheim, these "ideals" of unending "progress and perfection," "daily represented as virtues," are impossible and destructive for all, not just a few.

Further, in his original essay, Merton took pains to point out that this state of anomic malintegration does not

simply result from blocked opportunities of oppressed strata
alone. Nor does Mertonian anomie, in the American historical
context, refer~to~a simple inconsistency between cultural goals
and structural means. Rather, Mertonian anomie actually refers
primarily to our own type of society dominated by extreme em-
phasis on values of individual achievement and success for all,
contrasted with the historical realities of structured inequal-
ity. Although pitched abstractly on the formal level, Merton
himself came very close to the core of his thesis which could
also serve as a epigrammatic summary for the present disserta-
tion: "... a cardinal American virtue, "ambition," promotes a
cardinal American vice, "deviant behavior" (1957:146).

4. Anomie, Poverty, and Crime

Merton then turned to explore the relations between ano-
mie, crime, and poverty. He began by rejecting simple, linear
correlations between crime and poverty. Rather, he proposed
that anomie acts as a crucial intervening variable between
these two social phenomena.

> This theoretical analysis may go far toward explaining
> the varying correlations between crime and poverty. Po-
> verty is not an isolated variable. It is one in a com-
> plex of interdependent social and cultural variables.
> When viewed in such a context, it represents quite dif-
> ferent states of affairs. Poverty as such, and conse-
> quent limitation of opportunity, are not sufficient to
> induce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behavior.
> Even the often mentioned "poverty in the midst of plen-
> ty" will not necessarily lead to this result. Only in-
> sofar as poverty and associated disadvantages in compe-
> tetion for cultural values approved for all members of
> the society is linked with the assimilation of a cultur-
> al emphasis on monetary accumulation as a symbol of suc-
> cess is anti-social conduct a "normal" outcome.... It is
> only when the full configuration is considered, poverty,
> limited opportunity and a commonly shared system of suc-
> cess symbols, that we can explain the higher association
> between poverty and crime in our society than in others
> where rigidified class structure is coupled with differ-
> ential class symbols of achievement (1938:680-81).

Now, among others, Ephraim Mizruchi has noted a discrep-
ancy between Durkheim's and Merton's ideas on anomie and pover-
ty. Mizruchi questions whether various classes share the same

aspirations as Merton presumes.

> The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its focus
> is on means rather than on ends, assumes relatively un-
> iform aspirations across the class structure, and a
> greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower class-
> es. This theory, however, largely ignores observations
> made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, among
> others, regarding the relatively low levels of aspira-
> tion which characterizes those at the lowest level of
> the class structure, and it ignores certain qualitative
> differences within and between the classes (1967:441).

The question Mizruchi raises here concerns not consensus, but
differential aspirations. Are the same goals shared by all
classes? As we discovered earlier in the section on "Conform-
ity" as the modal response, in his 1957 "Continuities" essay
Merton showed himself sensitive to criticism by Herbert Hyman
and others that "... clearly Merton's analysis assumes that
the cultural goal is in actuality internalized by lower class
individuals." There we saw that Merton (eg. 1957:171) respond-
ed with the weak claim that, in terms of absolute numbers ra-
ther than the percentages that social scientists prefer, more
of the lower classes are differentially subject to these cross-
pressures than upper classes.

In essence, Mizruchi, Hyman, and others have posed a
critical problem for Merton's schema: are, in fact, the domi-
nant cultural aspirations and achievement goals, especially
insatiable individual aspiration underlain by ethical sanc-
tions, uniformly internalized among all sectors of the popula-
tion? Or, on the contrary, do different sectors and classes,
especially traditional, national, and ethnic minorities or
even regional minorities, have relatively different kinds or
lower levels of goals and aspirations? According to Merton's
premises, one would expect that some of the lower classes
would inculcate the dominant aspirations, and the more they
find themselves structurally blocked, the more they would
pragmatically turn to "innovative deviancy" to get what they
had been promised but had been denied by structured inequali-
ty. On the contrary, however, much empirical evidence shows
that traditionally backward or oppressed strata simply do not
share upper or even middle class expectations; rather, they

are often permeated with what one observer brilliantly call-
ed an "analgesic subculture" (Richard Ball, 1968). As Weber
noted with his concept of "traditionalism" (and Merton with
his notion of "fatalistic" versus "activistic" societies,
1971), here the major emphasis is on maintaining one's tradi-
tional level of subsistence, security, conservatism, low risk-
taking, and various means of escape and/or masochism. It is
an entirely different ethical world-view than the one which
counsels pragmatic and calculated revolt of "getting back"
or "getting on."

Merton's problem here stemmed from his unwarranted pre-
sumption that universalistic achievement values are universal-
ly embraced; in effect, that the Protestant Ethos is the norm
for the whole population. He assumed "relatively uniform as-
pirations across the class structure." But we are perhaps more
justified in presuming that rather different values, aspira-
tions, level of expectations, and so forth are identified with
different ethnic, national, or socioreligious groups. Hence,
Merton's original presumption that universalistic values were
particularistically structured in practice needs to be taken
back one step further--namely, that to a great extent, our
universalistic values are themselves particularistic--that is,
not only differentially distributed but perhaps even emerging
from powerfully situated cultural minorities (eg. the New Eng-
land Puritans and their descendants). In other words, not only
are structures of opportunity differentially distributed, but
the culture of aspiration and values are also differentially
distributed and emerge from special groups.

5. <u>Merton</u> <u>Versus</u> <u>Durkheim</u> <u>and</u> <u>Weber</u>

Why didn't Merton directly examine Durkheim's ideas on anomie? Why did Merton (and Parsons) slight certain critical features in Durkheim's work? Why didn't Merton relate his own analyses of the American success ethic to Weber's theses? And most importantly, why didn't Merton connect Weber's theses to Durkheim's? More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Merton should have recognized some links between his own theorizing on anomie, Durkheim's insights into the modern cultural sanctioning of anomie and egoisme, and Weber's historical insights into the Protestant Ethos. The fact that Merton did not make these connections constitutes a mystery problem in the history of American sociological theory. Let us now briefly consider some of the reasons why we might have expected such an explicit convergence on Merton's part, and some conjectures why this revolutionary synthesis was not forthcoming.

First, let us consider Merton's background and his interests at the time he wrote "Social Structure and Anomie." Now, Merton had certainly been thoroughly exposed to what some thought were striking and significant convergences in Durkheim's and Weber's thought. As a student and then colleague, Merton was sensitized to these possibilities by the leading theorist of this persuasion, Talcott Parsons. Moreover, Merton himself was reworking themes borrowed from Durkheim and Weber at the same time. In the same year in which his famous "Social Structure and Anomie" was published (1938), Merton published his less famous, but equally important, doctoral dissertation <u>Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England</u>, in which he brilliantly applied Weber's theses to the development and legitimation of early modern Utilitarian science and technology in seventeenth century, post-Puritan Revolution England. Thus, <u>the youthful Merton provided us with profound reworkings of both Weber's and Durkheim's theses in the same year</u>, applying Weber's theses on the relationship between the Protestant Ethos and the development of

science and technology in England, and applying Durkheim's
theses on anomie to American culture and internal contradict-
ions in American society. Surely these simultaneous interests
with the support of the Parsonian framework might have led us
to expect a similar striking convergence between Durkheim and
Weber in Merton's subsequent work on anomie in American socie-
ty. Yet none was forthcoming. Why?

Let us further consider the curious fact that although
Merton's discussion of the "cult of success" in American cul-
ture corresponds closely with the standard connotation of the
Protestant Ethos, Merton nowhere refers to Weber's work on
this subject, even though it was central to Merton's own
themes. If Merton himself detected the moral sanctions under-
lying the deformations caused by the extreme individualism
and insatiability of aspirations of the American Dream, why
didn't he refer to Weberian themes? It is interesting to note
that at least two observers, noting that Merton's notion of
anomie, like Weber's analyses of the spirit of the modern era,
rests on the cultural pervasiveness of unending pursuit of
success, went so far as to propose that "Merton's anomie the-
sis is not a development of Durkheim's treatment of anomie,
but a restatement, considerably simplified, of Weber's analy-
sis of the Protestant Ethic" (Turner and Scott, 1965:240).

It is even more strange that when Merton finally did
cite Weber in his articles relating to anomie, it served
mainly to obfuscate the real and potential significance of
the latter's insights for the former's exploration of the
pathologies of American culture. When Merton cited Weber, it
was not to indicate the relevance of the "Protestant Ethic"
to Merton's own discussion of the American ethos of indivi-
dual success, nor to link Weber's theses to Durkheim's. Ra-
ther, he cites Weber, amazingly enough, in a negative way.

> This heavy accent of financial success is, of course,
> not peculiar to Americans. Max Weber's analytical and
> long-standing observation is still much in point: the
> impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of
> the greatest possible amount of money has in itself no-
> thing to do with capitalism (and in the present instance
> nothing to do specifically with the American culture).

> This impulse exists and has existed among waiters,
> physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishon-
> est officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers,
> and beggars. One may say that it has been common to
> all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in
> all countries of the earth (1957:167).

However, contrary to the thrust of this reference, what Weber
was trying to do in the passage Merton cited from Weber's "Au-
thor's Introduction" to his unfinished collected works in the
sociology of religion (see, for example, Benjamin Nelson,1975a)
and in the second chapter on "The Spirit of Capitalism" in The
Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, was to set aside
precisely such misleading identifications of traditional eco-
nomic motivations with the peculiarly modern type of function-
al rationality and this-worldly vocational asceticism practi-
ced especially by the Calvinistic branches of Protestantism.
Merton's use of this quote and his parenthetical insertion to
the effect that the traditional economic impulse of greed is
so universally applicable that the specific ethos of American
culture needs no special explanation is misleading in the ex-
treme. One wonders why Merton did it. For the real thrust of
Weber's theses is precisely the opposite of what Merton inti-
mates here.

Finally, we may note that Merton admitted into his dis-
cussion an important historical insight, properly coming from
Weber, when he spoke of the "paradoxical emergence of 'indivi-
dualists' from an 'idealistic' orientation." Recognition of
this historical paradox underlying the foundations of American
morality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of Durkheim's
anomie and egoisme, especially as they relate to Weber's para-
llel Protestant Ethos theses. Even Merton himself tacitly ack-
nowledged that this dominant Pragmatic attitude of functional
rationality, seemingly devoid of visible ethical consideration,
could have had its origins and continuing sanction in a deeply
idealistic orientation demanding absolute individualism, voca-
tional inner-worldly asceticism, insatiable or unending drives
for progress and perfection in this world, and the active, con-
sensual mastery of the natural givenness of world, self, and

society for God's glory; in short, the basic elements of the Protestant Ethos. Although the resonances in much of Merton's description of the American cult of individual success with Weber's historical insights are striking, as with Durkheim, Merton simply neglected to link his work on anomie with Weber.

I suggest that we view Merton's simultaneous tacit rhetorical incorporation of Weber's ideas and his failure to explicitly explore the potential significance of Weberian themes, especially as they converged with Durkheim's critiques, on two levels: (a) the analytical-methodological level, and (b) the substantive cultural-historical level. As Merton veered away from the cultural historical level down to the social psychological level of analysis, he blunted (whether consciously or unconsciously) the critical edge of Durkheim's and Weber's theses as they applied to American culture and modern society in general. First, although Merton had already demonstrated his virtuosity as a historian of science and culture in applying Weber's ideas to the development of seventeenth century English science and technology, Merton did not follow through with further path-breaking work on that level. Rather, he turned instead to the micro, ahistorical level of abstracted social psychological analysis. In this perspective, Merton's work takes an added dimension in the history of American sociology, since as a scholar capable of numerous levels of analysis, Merton turned toward the one most preferred by the implicit nominalism of American sociologists. Comparing Merton's later work with Weber's "periods," Benjamin Nelson observes:

> There have been some moves of a comparable sort in the work of Merton, but these have only been hints. His thrust has been different; instead of moving out toward the comparative historical sociology of sociocultural process, he has tended to develop an ever more keen concentration in the areas or the boundaries of the sociological psychology of social and cultural process. For Merton this dissertation may be said to represent the high point of his efforts in historical sociology rather than a point of departure.... To the great loss of instruction and research in our country--in my view--the several strains of his dissertation tended to draw apart during the years after his dissertation.... We witness a thrust toward the frames of reference which

came to serve as the formats of highly institutionalized theoretical and empirical work mainly in the sphere of a sophisticated sociological social psychology oriented to non-temporal horizons (1972b:229-30).

Nelson then suggests that Merton's impact on American sociological theory stems largely from the essay we are considering here, which seemed to offer a workable paradigm, a theory in the "middle range" suitable to the particular cultural and social environment of American theory.

> ... It was Merton's seminal paper "Social Structure and Anomie," published in the same year as the dissertation, which was to set the pattern for the "normal science" in departments of sociology at great American universities, and which became the "launching pad" for a great number of American doctoral dissertations and research monographs. This was the study which was to become the model of the so-called structural-functional analysis in the manner now regularly ascribed to Durkheim.... The road Merton was to take was to become the high road of American sociology and the one he was to visit only occasionally was to undergo very great neglect (1972b:231).

Of course, my hope in the present dissertation is to partly remedy that "very great neglect."

Now, we have repeatedly noted that Merton rarely questions the moral legitimacy of the dominant values as did Durkheim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber. Both Durkheim and Weber took up highly critical stances toward the very values which Merton appears to have taken for granted. Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not that they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that these "infinity of dreams and desires" flowed directly from our culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfection." They were, in a real sense, "chronic," the "normal" forms of our "moral anarchy." Further, who can forget the anguished tones with which Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has achieved a level of civilization never before achieved." Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted conformity to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as Merton so often seemed to do. Remember that Durkheim proposed that poverty serves as protection against anomie and suicide. Strangely,

Merton managed to invert the real critical thrust of Durkheim's and Weber's most profound paradigms of the modern world--for what is relatively normal to Merton was anomie to Durkheim, and an "iron cage" to Weber!

Hence, we see that the pathology of anomie for Merton represents at root a problem of social mechanics and not, as with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central value systems of the modern world. Here we discover the relative narrowness of Merton's emerging social psychological framework in contrast to the scope of the progenitors' ideas with which he worked. For Durkheim and Weber argued from both within a deeply informed historical and comparative sociocultural analytical framework, and from a moral perspective on human nature. The ultimate force of Durkheim's Suicide and Weber's Protestant Ethic... theses rest on their perceptions of the destructive impact of modern psycho-socio-cultural demands upon human nature. Proceeding from these tacit, embedded images of human nature as anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot stand up alone under an "infinity of dreams and desires" (suicide and ecocide being the result), while Weber argued that attempts by self -proclaimed "visible saints" to master world, self, and society for God's glory and to build His Kingdom on earth binds all of us irretrievably in an inexorably tightening "iron cage." Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the very hearts and souls of modern men.

Finally, I suggest that if Merton had explicitly linked his theses to those of Weber, he might have had to face some revealing difficulties. If, for instance, our culture is permeated by Utilitarian-Pragmatic, and individualist rationales in the first place, then why do we need the abstracted notion of sociocultural malintegration and "strain in The Social System" to explain this situation after the fact? If anomie is a sign of malintegration or "moral anarchy," it is one which is deeply rooted in our traditional values. For such anomie is due not simply to the release of the ego from all previous constraints, but rather is itself constructed and constantly reinforced by our most central values. Further, Merton's view of

anomic innovation--representing the purely individualistic Pragmatic pursuit of success--can in one sense be seen as a translation of the Hobbesian problem into the context of American society. But Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or absence of restraining norms in the context of the Puritan Rebellion and English Civil War, while Merton's anomic context is the consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms. Hence, if our situation is anomic and Hobbesian, it is because our values themselves are the ones which lead (perhaps ironically) to anomic and Hobbesian outcomes. We thus reach again, from a different point of approach, the troublesome conclusion that our state of malintegration, of "moral anarchy," is normal.

Indeed, had Merton turned to explore the historical and continuing moral sanctions of our sociocultural values he might have run directly counter to Weber's theses. For whereas Merton assumed a structurally induced pressure toward Utilitarian or Pragmatic attitudes and behaviors, Weber's theses suggest the emergence of these very same cultural operating logics from the secularization of inner-worldly ascetic Protestantism. Hence, the inescapable conclusion--if the dominant American values are themselves Pragmatic and counsel individualistic and insatiable ambition, then, again, in Merton's own framework, this state of malintegration would be normal. Our Central Value System is itself anomic! Coming at it from a slightly different angle, since Weber's theses suggest the derivation of our main cultural sanctions for individual achievement and drives for success, progress and perfection from the Protestant Ethos, had Merton explicitly admitted Weber's theses into his schema it would have suggested, especially in terms of his first proposition concerning anomic deviancy, that our dominant cultural values are themselves the source of anomie and social pathology! For, in sum, (a) insatiable ambition is counseled and sanctioned by our values, and (b) our central value system is a translation and secularization of ascetic Protestantism. Surely as with Parsons, to acknowledge that our Central Value System is itself anomic would have been unacceptable.

CHAPTER FOUR

MERTONIAN ANOMIE: EXTENSIONS

Preface. The basic outlines of Merton's famous essay have
entertained the attentions of various theorists in extending
his typology. Marshall Clinard (1964:23) noted major addi-
tions and reformulations of Merton's theory by Parsons, Rob-
ert Dubin, Richard Cloward, and Albert Cohen. We shall ex-
plore the contributions by the first three here, with the ad-
dition of Frank Harary's extension, while leaving Cohen's i-
deas to the next chapter on critiques of Mertonian anomie.
Each of these extensions builds on Merton's basic premises
and typology, and consists largely either of further and more
explicit sub-divisions of categories, or of the addition of
new categories.

A. Parsons' Extension

In the magnum opus of his abstracted social theory, The
Social System (chapter seven, 1951), Talcott Parsons reformu-
lates Merton's schema by incorporating it as "a very import-
ant special case" (1951:258) in a more generalized theory of
deviance and social control. Parsons' usage of Merton's sche-
ma is rather interesting in the history of contempora socio-
logical theory in that Parsons here adopts, so to speak, one
of his own grandchildren. Parsons' anomie rests here, as it
did over a decade before when he originally inspired Merton's
theory, on the notion of the malintegration in the socio-cul-
tural "relational" system. Strain in these "interactive sys-
tems" generates pressures for deviance and change, a theme
Merton himself returned to in his 1957 "Continuities" essay.

Let us first very briefly recall the thrust of Parsons'
original interpretation of the meaning of anomie. Haunted by
the "Hobbesian dilemma," Parsons seized upon Durkheim's ano-

mie as a social structural and cultural explanation of the breakdown of social order. However, Parsons deftly shifted the crucial thrust of Durkheim's anomie from the "infinity of dreams and desires" to the lack of definiteness of social expectations and moral obligations, a subtle but tremendously significant shift in meaning. Parsons thus translated Durkheim's profound concern about the infiniteness of expectations into the lack of definiteness or clarity of expectations, which leads to malintegration and, ultimately, to disintegration of The Social System. As Parsons puts it, in his version "anomie represents a pathology not of the instrumental but of the collective normative system" (1968a:316).

Since Parsons' intention here is to go beyond Merton by generalizing an elaborate functional theory of deviance and social control, Parsons' account contains much more than the reformulation of Merton's anomie schema. Parsons is concerned with major areas such as: psychological needs and dispositions, social expectations, social interaction, strains in interaction, motivations, ambivalency, frustration, anxiety, etc. as responses to strain; expressions or types of deviance, variance in clarity and definiteness of norms and sanctions, pragmatic situational factors in the genesis of deviance, role conflicts and the social patterning of deviant behavior, problems of claims to legitimacy, opportunity structures, mechanisms of social control, structured strains and social change, etc. However, here we shall be concerned mainly with his reformulated typology of modes of deviant orientation.

Parsons, like Merton, begins by assuming the most critical factor--namely, conformity and normative consensus. Parsons then sets out to consider the "other side of the coin, the processes by which resistances to conformity with social expectations develop" (1951:249). In general terms, Parsons takes conformity to be relatively unproblematic, and roughly synonymous with social integration, and deviance as synonymous with disturbances or "strains" in the social interactional equilibrium. Parsons accords the image of "strain" a key role in the genesis of deviance for he views these disruptive

"strains" as resulting from ambiguities, conflicts, or break-
downs in social expectations. Hence, "strains" are disturban-
ces, or forms of localized "social friction" disrupting the
"normal flow" of social interaction. As Smelser remarks:

> The concept of strain is not identical with the concept
> of deviance; it constitutes one of the main responses
> giving rise to deviant responses.... As the phrase "from
> whatever source" indicates, Parsons is not initially con-
> cerned with the origin or disequilibrium or strain....
> The main idea is that strain on the system of interaction
> frustrates expectations (1971:27).

However, as Smelser, a former student and colleague of
Parsons, indicates, even this absolutely crucial concept of
Parsons is not without its own ambiguity.

> Strain is not a single variable but a system of varia-
> bles--conditions that give rise to strain, strain it-
> self, and mechanisms to reduce strain. Furthermore,
> strain gives rise to a number of responses, only one
> of which is deviant behavior.... Further refinement of
> the model would require a systematic classification of
> the types of sources of strain, the means of reducing
> strain, and the alternate responses to strain and an in-
> dication of the conditions under which strain would give
> rise to deviance and not another kind of response (1971:
> 28).

A tall order indeed! Although Smelser suggests the minimum re-
quirements for specifying systematically the meanings and types
of strains, he perhaps misses the key point that Parsons' no-
tion of strain may never be fully specified, since it, like al-
most all key concepts, rests on a metaphor, here a mechanical
metaphor, whose very fruitfulness for extension from the natur-
al to the social sciences depends on its latent ambiguity. If
we were able to restrict this connotation to a precise and de-
limited denotation, Parsons' effort might prove impossible.

Noting that deviance may be defined in two ways by refer-
ring either to the individual or the patterns of social inter-
action, Parsons begins his typology by starting with the poss-
ible directions of deviant motivation itself. As Clinard has
usefully summarized this position: "Parsons attempts to char-
acterize types of motivational responses in terms of active
and passive orientations, alienative or conformative need dis-
positions within the motivational structure, and the relation

of the person to social objects and to normative patterns" (1964:24). Parsons' typology rests on a series of dichotomous polarities: active/passive, positive (conformity)/negative (alienative) action, persons/norms, dominative/submissive. Thus, out of such polar orientations Parsons constructs a complex table containing eight major "directions of deviant behavior" (see figure 9).

Figure 9:

Parsons' Table of Deviant Behavior

	ACTIVITY		PASSIVITY	
	Compulsive Performance Orientation		Compulsive Acquiescence	
	Focus on Social Objects	Focus on Norms	Focus on Social Objects	Focus on Norms
Conformative Dominance	Dominance	Compulsive Enforcement	Submission	Perfectionistic Observance (Merton's ritualism)
	Rebelliousness		Withdrawal	
Alienative Dominance	Aggressiveness toward Social Objects	Incorrigibility	Compulsive Independence	Evasion

    While Parsons' typology and his theory of deviant behavior are extraordinarily complex, a number of preliminary conclusions relative to our present concerns may be sketched. First, whoever wishes to construct a systematic theory of deviance and social control should at least attempt to decipher Parsons' elaborate scheme since it represents one of the most complete analytical statements on deviance from the functional school. Whatever its limitations, these derive largely from the more general analytical framework, and not the specific analysis alone. Second, Parsons' claim that his reformulation is congruent with Merton's more famous typology is contestable. As Smelser observes:

> The cases of "equilibrated condition" and "conformity," "compulsive acquiescence" and "ritualism," and "withdrawal" and "retreatism" appear to be relatively straight-

> forward instances of logical parallelism, and justify
> Parsons' claim. The cases of "compulsive performance"
> and "innovation" as well as "rebelliousness" and "re-
> bellion" are more questionable (1971:32).

Coining new labels for old realities, one wonders why Parsons
would advance this claim. Perhaps the "latent function" of
Parsons' claim is to share in some of the reflected glory of
Merton's famous schema, for as we have discovered, although
Parsons may have originally inspired Merton's anomie, his own
interpretation remained more obscure.

Further, despite its apparent comprehensiveness, Parsons'
theory of deviance and social control is both logically and em-
pirically incomplete. Such incompleteness should be viewed not
as merely a localized flaw but rather as a generic problem in
Parsons' mode of theorizing. In this regard, Smelser remarks
that Parsons' analyses cannot directly be derived from his ba-
sic propositions, and instead rests on a whole series of tacit
judgments; a major failing in one who claims the mantle of sys-
tematic theory.

> Why was only one of several possible nonderived psycho-
> logical reactions to strain on the interaction system
> chosen as a primary dimension for the classification of
> directions of deviance?... Parsons' derivations leave
> unanswered the question as to why these two types of in-
> dividual reactions to institutionalized role expectations,
> rather than others, were chosen as the basic for the theo-
> retical classifications of deviant tendencies (Smelser,
> 1971:33).

In addition, Smelser rightly characterizes Parsons' implied
"logical ordering as very loose" and permeated by "... a kind
of openness or indeterminacy with respect to specific outcomes"
(1971:33). Also, Smelser catches the type of analysis with
which Parsons is centrally concerned, its virtues and failings,
in the following way:

> ... The type of propositions emerging from Parsons' ana-
> lysis is that of a general class of independent variables
> (eg. several types of strain) and causally linked to a
> general class of dependent variables (eg. several types
> deviance). Because of this looseness of theoretical
> structure, it is not possible to relate a specific type
> of strain (eg. role conflict) to a specific deviant ten-
> dency (eg. compulsive conformity) (1971:33).

If, after reading this insightful critique by one of Parsons own circle, we ask ourselves: what then are the virtues of such analysis? Its supposed virtues might include: (a) a clear conception of generic elements, yet these cannot be adequately determined in a wholly deductive fashion; (b) its level of analysis which we have discovered has more to do with the abstracted claim of universality than with complexity of subject; (c) its formal and systematic character which yet seems both logically and empirically incomplete. Is it too much, then, to surmise that the claimed virtues of this mode of analysis also conceal its vices?

Finally, we are led to wonder once again about anomie as a protean concept here yielding yet another different set of typologies. While some might view this situation as illustrating the cumulativeness of social scientific knowledge, I merely ask: are all these variant typologies really derived from Durkheim's? Are they really compatible with one another? Are they empirically grounded? Or significant? Or even necessary? What ever happened to anomie?

B. Robert Dubin's Typology

Apparently, Robert Dubin experienced something like an explosion of interest in abstracted, formal theory in the late 1950's vis-a-vis Parsons and Merton. For in 1959 Dubin published an extensive reformulation of Merton's typology of deviance in his essay "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continuities in Social Theory," and in 1960 he published an extensive analytical critique and reformulation of Parsons' paradigm of social action in his article "Parsons' Actor: Continuities in Social Theory." Dubin's twin forays into "Continuities in Social Theory" seemed a challenge to these two leaders of American sociological theory, and, in a singular privilege accorded few peers, both Parsons and Merton apparently felt constrained to respond to Dubin's challenge. This interchange brought forth Parsons' important "Pattern Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert Dubin," and a response from Merton which we shall briefly examine here.

Dubin's sympathetic, yet ambivalent, analysis is signi-
ficant for our present purposes in a number of ways: while
formally laudatory, it also offers a number of telling criti-
cisms; while accepting much of Merton's basic theme, it is
much more circumspect and precise; and while on one level, Du-
bin's extension of Merton's typology is a compliment, on ano-
ther level it unwittingly serves to reveal the absurdity of
empty, a priori typologizing. The beginning and conclusion
of Dubin's paper are most interesting. Dubins begins by pro-
posing that "A complete theoretical model must specify the
[empirical] outcomes." In his conclusion, Dubin reiterates
this initial thesis, and then explicitly states that both his
and Merton's typologies represent "... only part theories de-
scribing predictable states; they are not a theory of deviant
behavior" (1959:162). Dubin is generally more careful than Mer-
ton to indicate the specific nature and limitations of his
theory; he repeatedly (and correctly) emphasizes that his and
Merton's contributions lie merely with the more or less soph-
isticated elaboration of a descriptive typology of deviant
possibilities.

> ... our effort is to explore the range of outcomes of
> behavior called deviant, not to propound a theory of
> deviance.... This is not a theory of how deviant beha-
> vior occurs, nor why it occurs. It is simply a descrip-
> tive typology of the range of mutually exclusive types
> of non-conforming behavior.... These typologies are only
> part theories. Theoretical models of deviant behavior
> which explain why and how such behavior occurs remain
> to be constructed (1959:162,163,164).

Dubin's programmatic theses here are important because they
corroborate my interpretation of the internal validity and
potency of Merton's famous schema. In my judgment, Dubin is
certainly correct in delimiting the thrust of these typologi-
cal efforts as basically descriptive and not explanatory; it
brings to mind Homan's charge that Parsons' work is more taxo-
nomic than propositional. Such a conclusion runs directly coun-
ter to Merton's claim to have put forward a major theory which
explains deviance.

Dubin also pointed out that Merton's schema did not spe-

cify any laws of interaction, hence ignoring the crucial so-
cial interactional processes between people and statuses.
Finally, Dubin also rightly characterizes Merton's theory
as basically pitched at the social psychological level, not
at the social structural level which it initially proclaims.

Now, the main body of Dubin's article is caught up in
elaborating an extension of Merton's typology. Building on
Merton's major categories, Dubin also distinguishes between
institutional norms and means, and between actual behavior
and orientation to values. By repeatedly subdividing the new
and old categories, Dubin finally arrives at a list of four-
teen main types of deviant adaptations, although he notes that
there actually may exist twenty-seven possible modes of adap-
tation (see figure 10).

Figure 10:

Dubin's Typology of
Deviant Adaptations

Type of Deviant Adaptation	Mode of Attachment to—		
	Cultural Goals	Institutional Norms	Means
Behavioral Innovation			
Institutional Invention	+	±	±
Normative Invention	+	±	+
Operating Invention	+	+	±
Value Innovation			
Intellectual Invention	±	+	+
Organization Invention	±	±	+
Social Movement	±	+	±
Behavioral Ritualism			
Levelling of Aspirations	—	+	+
Institutional Moralist	—	+	—
Organization Automaton	—	—	+
Value Ritualism			
Demagogue	+	—	—
Normative Opportunist	+	—	+
Means Opportunist	+	+	—
Retreatism	—	—	—
Rebellion	±	±	±

+=acceptance
—=rejection
±=rejection and substitution (active rejection)

Dubin's extension and reformulation are valuable in
that they introduce greater consistency, rigor, and clarity
into Merton's schema. Yet, what started out to be a valuable
addition to Merton's theory ends up unwittingly in self-paro-
dy. What can we do with such an overwrought monster of a typo-
logical system such as this? If Merton's general schema was

demonstrably incomplete, at least its simplistic clarity allowed us to grasp it and attempt to apply it. But Dubin's typology overwhelms us with a vacuous series of permutations. Paradoxically, instead of a clear and definite step forward, Dubin's typology signifies the reductio ad absurdum of formalistic, empty, abstracted theorizing. Such hair-splitting can be elaborated ad infinitum et nauseam.

One should always know when to stop, but apparently Dubin's challenge to typological jousting got the better of Merton, and he responded. I now merely direct the reader's attention to the tone of Merton's response (1959), and ask that it be compared with Parsons' response to Dubin's other challenge. While Dubin's analytical critique stimulated Parsons to an important revision of one of his doctrines, by contrast Merton's response gives one a feeling of intellectual pique. No important revision of his theory was forthcoming; we should not miss the irony in this, for it was Merton who always held for the cumulativeness and codification of theory, and here it was Parsons and Dubin who advanced in fraternal argument while Merton and Dubin merely quarrelled. While at one point he favorably comments on Dubin's contribution, Merton seemingly takes affront at Dubin's intrusion into what had previously been Merton's own private domain.

C.   Richard Cloward's Contribution

Richard Cloward, one of Merton's own students, is credited by Merton with initiating a new phase in the theory of anomie and opportunity structures. To Merton's schema, Cloward adds the hitherto unspecified, yet strategic, variable of "differentials in availability of illegitimate means." In his well known article "Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior" (1959), appearing in the same journal issue as Dubin's reformulation and Merton's response, Cloward explicitly proposes his new "variable" as the key link between divergent theoretical interpretations of deviance. Cloward set out to "consolidate the two major sociological traditions of thought

about the problem of deviant behavior"--namely, the anomie
stream and the "differential association" and "cultural trans-
mission" tradition exemplified by Sutherland. In these terms,
Cloward proposes his "strategic new variable" as constituting
Phase III of the "anomie tradition."

Cloward questions Merton's tacit assumption that "... il-
legitimate means are freely available," and observes:

> ... the notion that innovating behavior may result
> from unfulfilled aspirations and imperfect socializa-
> tion with respect to conventional norms implies that
> illegitimate means are freely available, as if the in-
> dividual, having decided that "you can't make it legi-
> timately," then simply turns to illegitimate means which
> are readily at hand whatever his position in the social
> structure (1959:167).

Cloward then correctly notes that since Merton's anomie theory
already explicitly recognizes the differential distribution of
legitimate means of achievement, it should also now recognize,
by simple extension, differentials in access to illegitimate
means. (Merton's original "blind spot" is instructive).

By adding this strategically important, but overlooked
variable, Cloward both modulates some of the simplistic ration-
alism and gaps of Merton's original formulation, and begins to
tie in with the more empirically grounded theories of Suther-
land and his school. In this regard, Cloward observes that
Merton's theses about "strains in the sociocultural system"
are inadequate explanations of the actual genesis of deviant
processes, ie.   "... motivations or pressures toward devian-
ce do not fully account for deviant behavior." Instead, Clow-
ard proposes as intervening variables both "learning struct-
ures" and "opportunity structures" which provide the link with
Sutherland's "differential association" tradition.

Further, Cloward's account is valuable in that it begins
to specify more fully the "circumstances under which various
modes of deviant behavior arise." For example, in terms of
"retreatism," Cloward differs from Merton in that he views
this deviant adaptation as a "double failure." Cloward notes
that in Merton's view a "crucial element encouraging retreat-
ism is internalized constraint concerning the use of illegiti-

mate means. But this element need not be present" (1959:175).
Merton apparently assumed that such prohibitions were essen-
tial, since in their absence, the logic of his schema would
compel him to predict that innovating behavior would result.
But the assumption that the individual uninhibited in the
use of illegitimate means becomes an innovator presupposes
that successful innovation is only a matter of rational moti-
vation, frustrated by the initial lack of proper outlets.

> Once the concept of differentials in access to illegit-
> imate means is introduced, however, it becomes clear
> that retreatism is possible even in the absence of in-
> ternalized prohibitions.... retreatist adaptations may
> arise ... among those who are failures in both worlds,
> conventional and illegitimate alike (1959:175).

Now, Merton responded most favorably to his student
Cloward's extension of the theory of anomie and opportunity
structures, and its linkage with the other major school on
interpreting deviancy at that time. In a short series of cru-
cial admissions, Merton accepts Cloward's reformulation of
the "social distribution of pressures for deviant behavior."

> As Cloward now shows, this assumes by default that ac-
> cess to deviant or illegitimate means for reaching a
> valued goal is uniformly available. He corrects this
> unwitting and, it appears, untrue assumption by dealing
> with socially patterned differences of access in learn-
> ing how to perform particular kinds of deviant roles
> and of access to opportunity for carrying them out....
> Pressures for deviant behavior are construed as a func-
> tion of access to both legitimate and illegitimate op-
> portunity structures (1959:188).

Second, Merton accepts Cloward's point in terms of the "so-
cial distribution of vulnerability to pressures for deviant
behavior." Merton admits that even his later suggestions about
variance in socialization say little about the conditions pre-
disposing individual toward one or another mode of adaptation.

> Pressures for deviant behavior are one thing; actual
> rates of deviant behavior, quite another. I made a
> slight and insufficient effort to distinguish the two
> and to bridge the gap by distinguishing socially gen-
> erated pressures for deviance from vulnerability to
> these processes. Socially patterned differences in the
> content and processes of socialization were said to af-
> fect vulnerability to pressure for one or another type
> of deviant behavior.... But, as Cloward shows, this is

at best no more than a bare beginning. It is necessary
to identify other sociological variables that intervene
between structurally induced pressure for deviant beha-
vior and actual rates of such behavior (1959:188).

Finally, Merton accepts Cloward's refocus on the problem of

the sequence and process of taking up one deviant role or ano-

ther.

Toward the close of his paper, Cloward begins to devel-
op an idea that is practically unnoticed in my own work,
is implicit in Dubin's paper, and is greatly advanced in
forthcoming articles by Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. This is
the concept of patterned sequences of deviant roles, and
of the conditions of social structure making for one or
another sequence.... I did not see the problem that Clow-
ard brings into focus: that it should be possible to
work out the conditions making for patterned sequences
of deviant behavior.... Cloward moves beyond [my] occa-
sional remarks, poses the problem of deviant adaptations,
and suggests processes making for one or another sequence.
His observations on "double failure"--in both legitimate
and illegitimate endeavors--as a prelude to retreatism
afford one example (1959:189).

Even with these gracious admissions by Merton and his public subsi-

dy of Cloward's reformulation, this new phase of anomie theory

has not been without criticism. As Clinard notes, Cloward and

Ohlin's theory (up to 1964) has been criticized for being:

(1) largely culture-bound, and restricted to the ethnic
and minority situation existing in large urban areas
in the U.S. today;

(2) not stating clearly the success goal aspirations of
slum boys, except the economic and educational goals;

(3) assuming that such goals are appreciated in all seg-
ments of society;

(4) barely recognizing the extensive violations of ethi-
cal and legal norms in the general adult society a-
mong all classes (Clinard, 1964:30).

Finally, Short et al (1965) have observed that their data

on gangs in Chicago, to which the Merton-Cloward-Ohlin theory

should apply, does not support some of these theories. They

conclude: "The logic of the theory clearly presumes that per-

ceptions of opportunities precede involvement in delinquency,

while our data reflect perceptions 'after the fact'" (1965:66).

But perhaps just as important is their opening observation.

They note that the way in which this new theory of delinquency

and opportunity structures has been so uncritically and wide-
ly embraced as to almost constitute a reigning ideology in
the field of juvenile delinquency during the 1960's.

> Not since the advent of psychoanalysis has a theory had
> such impact in institutionalized deliquency control as
> the theory, explicit or implied, in Delinquency and Op-
> portunity. Given the impetus of major foundation and
> federal support, the theory has been extensively adop-
> ted as a rationale for action programs in many areas of
> the country.. There is some danger that, like psychoana-
> lysis, "opportunity structure theory" may be rationali-
> zed and elaborated and extensively as to discourage, if
> not render impossible, empirical testing, pragmatic val-
> idation, or demonstration of worth by any other criter-
> ion of "good theory" (1965:56).

In sum, we see the public subsidy and ideological role of Mer-
ton's anomie schema given extended life, a second wind, in the
work of his students.

D. Frank Harary's Contribution

Consider the unique and unsung contribution of Frank
Harary (1966). Proceeding from Merton's original schema, then
touching base next on Dubin's explosion of types, and finally
Parsons' mode of analysis and typology, Harary manages to make
a distinct contribution to these mushrooming typologies which
seems, at the same time, a superb satire. Harary's paper is a
rare phenomenon in scholarly writing: a paper which is at once
short but concise and sufficient, and while making a serious
contribution, it yet inverts itself in quiet satire.

Harary's only slightly-tongue-in-cheek article observes
that Merton's usage of notation in his schema is ambiguous.
Harary then proposes that adequate use of notation here should
indicate valences in the attitudes of the individual--namely,
indifference, rejection, interest, and so forth. By introdu-
cing "0" as a symbol for indifference, Harary expands Merton's
original five element schema into nine separate categories,
which if one accepts the simple logic of positive, negative,
and neutral attitudes, seems to constitute the minimum accep-
table typology in the Mertonian vein. Finally, Harary adds two
more possible attitudes--ambivalence and rejection with replace-

ment; thus generating twenty-five theoretically possible permutations of attitudes toward goals and means. This inventory contains such descriptive terms as: "Vegetation, Ritualism, Retreatism, Confusion, Beatnikism, Indolence, Wishism, Innovation, Fetishism, Mobility, Preacherism, Developmentism, Demagoguery, Democracy, and Rebellion"!

Can it still be maintained that Merton's classic typology and its more logically consistent expressions represent an extremely useful way of correlating many otherwise unrelated concepts? At the beginning of his paper, Harary quotes Morton Hunt, the New Yorker profiler of Merton, on the initial impact on sociologists of Merton's elegant and seemingly all-inclusive schema.

> Chilly and unprepossessing though the chart may look, it was truly a thing of beauty to Merton and many other sociologists, bringing into one readily comprehensible taxonomy such seemingly unrelated deviant personalities as Cubists and alcoholics, lone-wolf ineventors and religious martyrs, executives and beggars, card-carrying communists and members of the Society of Cincinnati
> (1961:58-9).

Of course, if Merton's little schema really possesses such wonderful, semi-magical powers, one need not stop here. For any sociologist with the least spark of imagination could conceive of even more possibilities! Just think, for example, how wonderful it might be to pull together Merton's typology, with all its various extensions and revisions by luminaries such as Parsons, Dubin, Cloward, Harary, among others, and with each thinker adding his own unique contribution,into one grand theoretical typology encompassing every possible permutation of attitude and behavior! If one stirs into the pot the almost wholly neglected element of a time or historical dimension, then the possibilities grow absolutely staggering. But perhaps some lowly soul might rudely pierce our day dream with the coarse aphorism of computer programmers: "Garbage in, garbage out"! Such a mind-boggling exercise is absurd in almost everyone's eyes, except those who engage in them, for such intellectual activities may be rightly regarded as themselves deviations from a simple modicum of common sense. At which point the end-

less and unelightening elaboration of logically conceivable
permutations becomes absurd cannot be decided here, yet we
may echo Ockham's rule here: stick close to experience first,
and never multiply typologies needlessly!

Harary's successful attempt to bring some all-too-rare
comic relief to this typological logorrhea serves as one in-
structive end to a stream of thought. Finely wrought refuta-
tions such as that by Cary-Lundberg (1959) are another. Sa-
tire, critique, and proportionless exhaustion mark the col-
lapse of intellectual traditions.

CHAPTER FIVE

CRITIQUES OF MERTON'S THEORY OF ANOMIE

Preface.   In his response to Dubin and Cloward's papers in
the same issue, Merton (1959) attempted to distinguish be-
tween amendments, revisions, and criticisms that simply ex-
tend "incomplete theories" from evidence and critiques that
demonstrate a theory fundamentally mistaken. Counting his
own theory of anomie in the former rather than latter cate-
gory, Merton also indicates his own attitude toward his own
theory and the development of theory. Finally, Merton gracious-
ly assents to what, as an elder statesman of contemporary Amer-
ican sociological theory, Durkheim once poetically called the
"slow usury of time." Merton's statement here is noteworthy
both for its propositions as well as his characteristic co-
gence.

> They [papers by Dubin and Cloward] exemplify one way in
> which a theory develops through successive approxima-
> tions. A set of ideas serves, for a time, as a more or
> less useful guide for an investigation of an array of
> problems. As inquiry proceeds along these lines, it un-
> covers a gap in the theory: the set of ideas is found
> to be not discriminating enough to deal with aspects of
> phenomena to which it should in principle apply. In some
> cases, it is proposed to fill the gap by further differ-
> entiation of concepts and propositions that are consis-
> tent with the earlier theory, which is regarded as de-
> monstrably incomplete rather than fundamentally mista-
> ken. In other cases, the new conceptions put in question
> some of the assumptions underlying the earlier theory
> which is then replaced rather than revised. The papers
> by Dubin and Cloward are evidently of the first type,
> providing basic extensions, rather than a replacement,
> of the sociological ideas under review. Not the least
> merit of contributions such as theirs is that they keep
> us from behaving like sociological barnacles, clinging
> desperately to the theories we have learned in our youth,
> or that we may have helped develop at any age (1959:177).

Now, we may ask: after reviewing existing extensions,
and detailed criticism, can Merton's theory be justifiably as-

signed to the first category as Merton himself claims, or
will these compounding series of revisions and criticisms
come to reveal his theory of anomie as fundamentally mista-
ken? And, how many times may a theorist amend and revise his
theory before it loses its distinctive and originally signi-
ficant configuration? Finally, at what point are we forced
to relegate one of the paradigmatic theories of contemporary
sociology from category one to category two?

A. Specific Criticisms

By their very nature, a number of the extensions of Mer-
ton's theory and typology conveyed specific criticisms of am-
biguities, gaps, or other more or less serious limitations in
Merton's theory. Dubin's, Cloward's, and Harary's contribu-
tions of this type, and it must be remembered that each basi-
cally accepted the validity of Merton's essential framework
and intentions. Parsons' claim, for instance, that Merton's
theory was really only a "very important special case" of his
own more general theory of deviance and social control carried
no explicit criticism, only a rather severe restriction of the
potential scope of Merton's paradigm. While it is known that
Merton himself intended his schema to explain more than juve-
nile delinquency, Parsons' claim, as befits the relations be-
tween these two theorists, has apparently never been contest-
ed in print by Merton (eg. 1959:177, #1). Hence, we are left
to conclude that, either by default or tacit concurral, Merton
acceded to Parsons' claim.

Some of Dubin's criticisms of Merton's schema are tanta-
mount in a different way to Parsons' more imperial claims. Du-
bin argued that   Merton's theory and typologies (and his
own) were largely descriptive, not explanatory. They were only
part-theories, which did not specify empirical outcomes. In
addition, Dubin observes that Merton's theory does not specify
any laws or principles of social interaction processes, espe-
cially over time. Of course, these preliminary critiques are
damaging to Merton's central thesis which purports to offer
an explanation of the social structural pressures for non-con-

forming behaviors.

But perhaps the most significant criticism, for our present purposes, proffered by Dubin concerns the real level at which Merton pitched his analysis. While purporting to provide a social structural explanation of the causes of deviance, Merton's descriptive typology is actually focussed on the social psychological level of the motivations of separate individuals.

> Merton, in fact, pitches his discussion at two levels. He presents a typology of deviant behavior using an implicit set of social psychological laws. He also considers a variety of instances in which imperatives are created the consequences of which are deviant behavior. The latter sociological analysis, although brilliantly set forth, remains wholly descriptive. When Merton combines the two levels of analysis, the linkage becomes a social psychological one. For the mechanisms by which persons or groups, subject to structural imperatives, make decisions in favor of deviant courses of conduct are social psychological. This is the only legitimate interpretation of the plusses and minuses in Merton's tables and my own (1959:162).

Dubin's criticisms of Merton echo my criticism of Parsons, and we shall encounter a similar criticism of Merton from Albert Cohen.

While Cloward's contribution, which Merton hailed as signalling a new era in anomie research, constitutes merely an addition of a key "strategic variable" ignored or tacitly assumed by Merton, and Harary's witty and refreshing satire initially pointed out ambiguities involved even in Merton's use of notation, Ephraim Mizruchi offered no major or minor revision of Merton's typology, yet his specific criticism drives to the heart of some of Merton's implicit basic assumptions. Mizruchi notes that in the key factor of individual aspiration, Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie sharply diverge (see also A. Thio, 1975). Merton apparently assumes that universalistic achievement values are universally adhered to and aspired to by all classes, while Durkheim considered poverty as protection against suicide because it restrained the insatiable "disease of the infinite" which was the endemic dis-ease of the middle and professional classes.

> ... the emphasis in his [Durkheim's] theory of anomie

was on the unrealizable goals which characterize per-
iods of prosperity and upward mobility. The greatest
effect of anomie was experienced not by those in pover-
ty but by the more affluent in society. According to
Durkheim poverty is a restraining force in relation to
anomie. It is the lifting of limitations on aspiration
which reflects Durkheim's major concern with anomie ra-
ther than the utililization of illegitimate means for
the attainment of given ends.... The Merton theory, at
least in part since its focus is on means rather than
ends, assumes relatively uniform aspirations across the
class structure and a greater impact of anomie on the
relatively lower classes. This theory, however, largely
ignores observations made not only by Durkheim but by
Veblen and Marx, among others, regarding the relatively
low levels of aspiration which characterizes those at
the lowest levels of the class structure, and it ignores
certain qualitative differences within and between the
classes (1967:440).

Alex Thio (1975) also seriously questions Merton's idea that

lower-class persons are more likely than upper-class persons

to suffer from an aspiration-opportunity disjunction, and are

therefore subject to greater pressure toward deviation. In-

stead, following Durkheim, Thio suggests that the higher clas-

ses are more prone to this anomic disjunction. "Merton's theo-

ry is seriously flawed by its over-simplification of the rela-

tionship between social class, on the one hand, and aspiration

opportunity disjunction and deviant behavior on the other"

(1975:153).

Although Mizruchi's conclusion is cautiously understated,

the thrust of his intention is clear. He requests a thorough

revision of our estimates of the various forms of anomie theo-

ry, as this dissertation attempts.

> ... our analysis clearly suggests that:
>
> (a) more clarity regarding the differences between Mer-
>   ton's and Durkheim's concepts of anomie would be de-
>   sirable;
> (b) our conception of lower-class social processes may
>   well require overhauling, and
> (c) although Merton's theory does, at given points in the
>   social structure, provide insight and understanding of
>   these processes, contemporary sociology needs a con-
>   tinued assessment of the theory's strengths and weak-
>   nesses in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:
>   446).

Mizruchi's points are well-taken. It is surprising that few

have perceived the need for such a complete reevaluation. Apparently, the lingering prestige of Merton and his classic theory retarded such a searching inquiry.

Finally, Mizruchi's last paragraph is worth quoting in this regard because it tacitly testifies to these problematics of the almost unquestioned prestige of Merton's theory of anomie.

> Must we assume that only one theory is necessary to explain a given set of phenomena, for example, deviant behavior? Can a field afford several theories which may be utilized in attempting to understand diverse aspects of the same general phenomena? It is our position that sociology can and should direct itself to developing parallel theories in given content areas rather than monolithic ones. Thus, the immediate theoretical problem is not simply a matter of middle range as against highly generalized theories.... The current state of sociology can well tolerate both Merton's and Durkheim's theories of anomie so long as we maintain a proper perspective in relation to each (1967:446).

Mizruchi's observations suggest some of the problems faced by theories, at least until the 1970's (see S. Cole, 1975), competing with anomie theory which, if not "monolithic" in content and empirical validation, seemed through the 1950's and 1960's to be almost monolithic in its unquestioned acceptance and reputation. As with Parsons' self-serving and misleading reconstruction of Durkheim, which has unfortunately constituted almost a reigning orthodoxy for years in Durkheim interpretation, Merton's theories of anomie seem to have sometimes been granted the almost magical quality of possessing numerous lives and resistance to attack or contradiction. Short et al (1965) feared the same uncritical embrace of Cloward and Ohlin. And this unhealthy situation raises another question (which we cannot take time to answer here): how is it possible for certain theories and theorists to attain such enormous prestige that their ideas, detached from their point of origin and freed of the lowly need for empirical validation, come to constitute images or symbols almost exempt from scientific review?

B. Albert Cohen's General Critique

More damaging than the criticism of either Dubin or Miz-
ruchi is the general critique of Merton's theory of anomie by
Albert Cohen. Cohen's observations in 1965 cut to the very
heart of Merton's perspective, and Merton himself felt obliged
to respond. Cohen's critique takes on additional significance
in that he represents a link between the two main traditions
of deviancy theory (up through the 1960's)--namely, the milieu
and differential association school (with roots at Chicago and
Indiana) and the Harvard-Columbia structural-functional school.
Whereas Cloward attempted to argue for a partial theoretical
convergence between the two, much of Cohen's work in this area
represents an actual working link.

Cohen's paper is worth examing in some detail. Although
initially friendly and laudatory, Cohen launches immediately
into some telling criticisms. Clearly, he is ambivalent toward
Mertonian anomie, perhaps because of his strategic position as
a meditator between these two different theoretical schools.
Cohen's first substantive observations begins with a footnote
expressing his intentions in his article and containing import-
ant insights into the relative lack of development of anomie
theory.

> I am not here concerned with empirical applications and
> tests of anomie theory.... In view of the sustained in-
> terest in anomie theory, its enormous influence, and
> its numerous applications, it is worth noting and wonder-
> ing about the relatively slow and fitful growth of the
> substantive theory itself (1965:5).

Cohen then begins blazing away with a charge that rocks the
foundations of Merton's famous theory. Cohen charges that there
is a hiatus, a divergence, between Merton's levels of analysis.
On the formal and explicit level, his theory is seen as the
very prototype of sociological (ie. social structural) theori-
zing, while Merton's actual descriptions and typology are
pitched at the micro, social psychological interactional and
motivational level. Cohen also charges that Merton's formula-
tion really contains atomistic and individualistic biases.

Merton's theory has the reputation of being the preemi-

> ment sociological theory of deviant behavior.... The
> theory is radically sociological. And, yet, as far as
> the level and explicit structure of Merton's first form-
> ulation is concerned, it is, in certain respects, atom-
> istic and individualistic. Within the framework of goals,
> norms, and opportunities, the process of deviance was
> conceptualized as though each individual ... were in a
> box by himself. He has internalized goals and norms,
> regulatory rules; he assesses the opportunity structure;
> he experiences strain; and he selects one or another mode
> of adaptation. The bearing of other's experience--their
> strains, their conformity and deviance, their success and
> their failure--on ego's strain and consequent adaptations
> is comparatively neglected.... In the original version of
> his theory, each person seems to work out his solution by
> himself, as though it did not matter what other people
> were doing (1965:5,6,7).

Actually, in addition to Cohen's charge that Merton's theory
is atomistic and individualistic, there lies concealed in Co-
hen's critique another insight into Merton's hidden presuppo-
sitions. These series of charges are that in Merton's schema
the isolated individual acts rationally and pragmatically, as
if he were a scientist armed with reliable knowledge and cool-
ly surveying his options in an attempt to optimize returns o-
ver constraints, in response to his predicament. The allusions
here are intentional, for indeed, such tacit premises do echo
the "economic man" of classical Utilitarian economic theory.

As an illustration of his contentions, Cohen critically
examines Merton's key concept of strain (see also Smelser,
1971). Although he does not see "strain" as a metaphor, Cohen
cuts to the core of the inadequacy of the Parsonian-Mertonian
image of strain. In contrast to the mechanical metaphors of
equilibrium and strain, Cohen correctly observes that the so-
cial perceptions of individuals engaging in deviant behavior,
especially in terms of relative deprivation, should be key
elements in any theory of social strain.

> One thing that is clear is that the level of goal attain-
> ment that will seem just and reasonable to concrete act-
> ors, and therefore the sufficiency of available means,
> will be relative to the attainments of others who serve
> as reference objects. Level of aspiration is not a fixed
> quantum, taken from the culture and swallowed whole, to
> lodge, unchanged, within our psyches. The sense of pro-
> portionality between effort and reward is not determined
> by the objective returns of effort alone (1965:6).

In addition to his criticism of the absence in Merton's schema of reference to the social phenomenology of perceptions and moral processes, Cohen also observes that Merton's theory is permeated with a certain discontinuity.

> To say that anomie theory suffers from the assumption of discontinuity is to imply that it treats the deviant act as though it were an abrupt change of state, a leap from a state of strain or anomie to a state of deviance .... The dominant bias in American sociology has been toward formulating theory in terms of variables that describe initial states, on the one hand, rather than in terms of processes whereby acts and complex structures of action are built, elaborated, and transformed (1965: 8-9).

And, finally, if we supplement these characteristics with the abstracted, deductive, formalistic quality of Merton's theorizing, we can recognize the essential congruence of this theoretical perspective with other expressions of the Anglo Cultural Tradition (see Book Three), especially classical Utilitarian economic theory (see for example, Merton 1934a, in Nisbet, 1965: 111). Atomism, mechanism, Pragmatism or Utilitarianism, and deductive formalism are all intimately related root logics underlying diverse expressions of this cultural tradition, whether it be sociological or economic theory, psychology, medical or legal theory, biology or physical theory, and so on. If Merton's theory is so evidently empirically and theoretically inadequate, it stems as much from the mistaken perspective taken over from this cultural tradition as from the complexities of deviant processes themselves.

Cohen's insistence on the importance of phenomenological processes in social interaction, in contrast to Merton's tacit atomistic image of "every individual in a box by himself," is significant for our present purposes. If one considers, for instance, what is involved in the social phenomenology of relative deprivation, one must assign central importance to mutual perceptions of legitimacy, virtue, resources, etc. through time; all processes which cannot be approached directly from either a Pragmatic individualistic action schema, or from a mechanical image of society. Cohen offers a series of insightful suggestions into the social phenomenology of in-

vidious comparisons of moral virtue, a topic one might expect
to be important for Merton's theory, but one which was cur-
iously ignored by him. Cohen asks: "... what strains does de-
viance on the part of others create for the virtuous?"(1965:
6). While I cannot here review all of these suggestive obser-
vations, it should be noted that Cohen, along with a few oth-
ers such as Kai Erikson (eg. 1962, 1966) and Joseph Gusfield
(eg. 1963, 1967) during the 1960's, seems to have recognized
a key factor missing from many theories of deviance prior to
the emergence of labelling theory--namely, the social pheno-
menology of perceptions, images, symbols, and moral processes.
To remedy the more blatant inadequacies of anomie theory, Co-
hen suggests marriage not only with reference group theory,
but also with the theory of relative deprivation, symbolic
interactionism, role theory, self-identity theory, and so on;
in short, a wholesale reconstruction relegating the structural-
functional contribution to a relatively minor role. Especially
significant here is Cohen's repeated insistence on the social
and symbolic rather than the individual and pragmatic-mechan-
ical nature of deviance.

> Much of what we call deviant behavior arises as a way
> of dealing with this disjunction [between goals and
> means]. As anomie theory has been formally stated, this
> is where it seems to apply. But much deviant behavior
> cannot readily be formulated in these terms at all.
> Some of it, for example, is directly expressive of the
> roles. A tough and bellicose posture, the use of ob-
> scene language, participation in illicit sexual acti-
> vity, the immoderate consumption of alcohol, the delib-
> erate flouting of legality and authority, a generalized
> disrespect for the sacred symbols of the "square world"
> ... all of these may have the primary function of af-
> firming, in the language of gesture and deed, that one
> is a certain kind of person. The message-symbol rela-
> tionship, or that of claim and evidence, seems to fit
> this behavior better than the means-ends relationship
> (1965:12-13).

I entirely agree with Cohen's suggestion that deviant process-
es may be better comprehended from the point of view of both
the participants and society as symbolic and expressive action,
rather than merely pragmatically motivated self-interested
functional behavior (see also Mary Douglas, 1966). Such a view

has the evident merit of emphasizing precisely the key socio-cultural dimension of perceptions, images, symbols, messages, rhetoric, reactions, legitimacy, power, authority, and so on. Rather than a psychological and individualistic theory masquerading as a structural interpretation, what is needed is an explicit focus on both the structural and symbolic-cultural aspects of deviancy as symbolic violations and symbolic processes. Durkheim, of course, knew this, but Merton forgot apparently (see Book One).

Finally, Cohen notes a curious but instructive fact about Merton's mode of theorizing: a number of the inadequacies which he has pointed out could be remedied from a careful search through Merton's own writings. Like Thio (1975:148), Cohen remarks upon the slighting of reference group theory in Merton's discussions of anomie:

> The student of Merton will recognize that some of these points are suggested or even developed at some length here and there in Merton's own writing. Merton is, of course, one of the chief architects of reference group theory, and in his chapter on "Continuities in the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure," he has a section entitled "Nonconformity as a Type of Reference Group Behavior." There he recognizes the problems that one actor's deviance creates for others, and he explicitly calls attention to Ranulf's treatment of disinterested moral indignation as a way of dealing with this problem. In "Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure and Anomie" he describes how the deviance of some increases the others vulnerability to deviance. In short, my characterization of the earliest version of "Social Structure and Anomie" as "atomistic and individualistic" would be a gross misrepresentation if it were applied to the total corpus of Merton's own writings on deviance. He has not, however, developed the role of comparison processes in the determination of strain or considered it explicitly in the context of anomie theory. And, in general, Merton does not identify the complexities and subtleties of the concept of strain as a problem area in their own right (1965:7).

One may ask however: whose responsibility is it to draw together all of the relevant insights to a particular area--the theorist himself or his audience? And, can it be legitimately maintained that scattered, peripheral, or "cosmetic" statements alter the fundamental propositions and structure of a theory?

Surely, if Merton purports to provide us with a systematic, though partial, theory of deviance and anomie, then the responsibility is his, and not his students' or his audience's to provide us with a coherent and systematic statement. Clearly, Merton is not a systematic theorist in the same vein as Parsons. Rather, Merton's favorite _genre_ appears to be the essay, which accounts for his incisiveness, insightfulness, felicitous phrasing, and the relatively unsystematic nature of his writings.

C. Merton's Response to Cohen

In 1964, Merton felt compelled to respond and perhaps deflect Cohen's criticism which had first been made at a sociological convention in 1963. Merton prefaces his remarks by noting:

> ... I consider that part of this [Cohen's] paper contains sound observations which have in fact been taken into account in the theory of SS&A and that another part contains important contributions which have not been explicitly stated in the theory but which can be incorporated in it. Cohen's paper is directed toward the core of the theory and promises to extend it considerably, should its implications be followed up (1964:231).

Merton's introductory footnote is noteworthy for a number of reasons here: he recognizes that Cohen's criticisms touch the heart of his theory of anomie, and he attempts to deflect the damaging thrust of Cohen's critique by (a) maintaining that much of Cohen's critique is unnecessary since what is criticized as lacking is really already contained in Merton's existing theory, and (b) the other part of Cohen's criticisms can be easily accomodated within the existing outlines of anomie theory without radical shift or internal breakdown. However, Merton should perhaps be more careful than to so easily admit Cohen's critique strikes at the core of his theory, and then to suggest that Cohen's other arguments be incorporated and extended within anomie theory itself, since such a casual attitude toward an ambivalent critic like Cohen might well unhappily surprise Merton. (Perhaps these are some potential dangers and ironies of intellectual public relations in trying

to play down the significance of criticism, by admitting it
and then attempting to co-opt it, but then later being torn a-
part from within). Merton does not seem to publicly perceive
the full and potentially dangerous implications of Cohen's
critique, for if, indeed, one did follow out the thrust of
Cohen's key criticisms, not only would Merton's anomie theory
begin to fall apart, but structural-functional theory itself
might prove impossible! Again, how often and how deeply may
a theorist, in response to criticism and extension, amend and
revise his theory before it ceases to represent a coherent and
distinctive theory? How many ad hoc concessions to criticisms
and empirical reality may a theorist make before the unique
and distinctive outlines fade, and his theory becomes an amor-
phous and shifting grab-bag of insight, principle, anecdote,
ad hoc revision, and so on? Does this represent the so-called
"cumulativeness" of social scientific theory, or its negation?

Now, although Merton outlines two possibilities concern-
ing Cohen's critique, he does not attempt to evaluate Cohen's
contributions which might significantly extend anomie theory.
Rather, Merton merely responds to Cohen's first set in a cri-
tique of the critique in which he attempts to refute Cohen's
charge that his anomie theory is "atomistic, individualistic,
discontinuous," and lacks any reference to social interaction-
al processes, by citing allusions in his previous work which
purportedly show that Cohen is attacking a straw man. Merton
begins by dividing his own work on anomie and deviance into
early and later periods, and then suggests that Cohen's criti-
cisms apply mainly to the first rather than the second phase.

> The early formulation of the theory of SS&A amply jus-
> tifies this criticism. In that formulation, my princi-
> pal concern was to develop a systematic way of thinking
> about the seeming paradox that the structure of society
> and culture, ordinarily thought of as operating to pro-
> duce patterned behavior in rough accord with social norms
> could, under designated conditions, operate to produce
> deviant behavior (both aberrant and nonconforming). In
> retrospect, it seems evident that this theoretical task
> usurped my attention in the early paper. As a result, I
> did not examine processes of social interaction between
> members of collectivities that affect changes in the ex-

tent of anomie and responses to anomie through one
or another form of deviant behavior (1964:231-2).

Next, Merton argues that although Cohen's criticisms
are appropriate to the early phase of his anomie theory, in
his later revisions he claims that he did indeed take into
account these crucial variables. Yet, Merton's claims is dis-
ingenuous.

> It was only in later formulations of the theory that
> individual responses to anomie began to be linked with
> processes of social interaction. There, it was explicit-
> ly stated that the changing liklihoods of individuals
> engaging in deviant behavior, either separately or col-
> laboratively, is conceived to be a function of changing
> rates of anomie in the social system and that these
> changing rates in turn are a result of patterns of in-
> teraction among members of a collectivity (1964:232).

But what is the nature of the later evidence which Merton now
encourages us to accept as clear testimony that Cohen's criti-
cisms are not justified when applied to later formulations?

> In order to see that this part of Cohen's cogent criti-
> cism has already been incorporated in the theory of
> SS&A, it is necessary to quote rather than to paraphrase
> earlier formulations in print. Paraphrase might mistaken-
> ly suggest that it was necessary to improvise an ad hoc
> patchwork to meet this criticism once it had been made
> (1964:232).

But to prove his assertions taken in his own defense, and to
exonerate himself from Cohen's changes, Merton proceeds to
quote extensively from verbal remarks made in response to ques-
tions and criticism contrasting psychiatric and sociological
approaches to deviance made at a conference on juvenile delin-
quency in 1955! (See the edited proceedings by H. Witmer and
R. Kotinsky, 1956:37-38). Surely, however, this is a compara-
tively weak defense on Merton's part--that a few years before,
at a conference on juvenile delinquency, Merton made some oc-
casional remarks alluding to social interaction, which were
subsequently published in an obscure and largely inaccessible
government publication! In the hierarchy of evidential canons
of scholarly hermeneutics, statements published by the author
himself are to be given more credence than reported verbal re-
marks transcribed from open discussions, as must statements
directly related to the subject in dispute rather than peri-

pheral or off-hand allusions, as must statements published in disciplinary (ie. sociological) literature rather than in obscure or non-disciplinary publications. Yet, in each of these instances, Merton is left to defend himself with the weaker sets of evidence.

Having considered the nature of the majority of Merton's main exhibits, we shall now consider the substance of his attempted self-exoneration. Merton observes that after the verbal remarks made at the conference in 1955, he began to explicitly consider the importance of social interactional processes.

> After this first allusion to the interplay between anomie and deviant behavior, it became clear to me that the theory implicitly contained the notion of differences in the degree of vulnerability to anomic strains in the social system. That is why, in the next extension of SS&A, I tried to explicitly link up the conception of social interaction among members of a collectivity marked by a substantial initial degree of anomie with the conception of vulnerability (1964:233-34).

Merton's tactic here is worth noting: although initially he admits that Cohen's criticism is well-taken, he then shifts his ground by claiming that reference to social interactional processes was not really missing after all. Instead, it was actually latent in it from the beginning, and all one need do is bring into stronger relief that which was already implicitly contained. Such a rhetorical tactic has the evident value of claiming that the concept of social interaction can really be easily accomodated through the existing concept of vulnerability, and thus wholly within the existing framework of anomie theory itself. Although Merton then claims that the reason he next quotes extensively from his 1957 "Continuities" revision is to retain the "lines of continuity" with the remarks published the year before, perhaps a latent function was to help buttress his case to extricate himself from Cohen's charges.

What is the actual substance of Merton's claim to have first tacitly, and then explicitly and systematically, considered the range and type of social interactional processes requested by Cohen? Quoting two paragraphs (eg. 1957:179-80)

from his revision, and proceeding also from his concept of
"patterned differentials" in response to exposure to anomic
strains (eg. "vulnerability"), Merton claims that the vul-
nerability of one person, if it leads to successful deviancy,
is then imitated by another and another, in a sort of mechan-
ical or social chain-reaction process.

> These long extracts must make it clear that there is
> nothing "integral to the theory" of SS&A--the quoted
> phrase is Cohen's--which requires it to be atomistic
> and individualistic, without regard to social inter-
> action between members of a collectivity.... On the
> contrary: the theory does not conceive of anomie as
> the result of this or that individual proving to be
> vulnerable to straining for what he happens to regard
> as success. For anomie is a condition of the social
> environment, not of the isolated self....

> To make this component of the theory of SS&A emphati-
> cally plain, something that is evidently needed in of
> the counter-impression left with even so perceptive a
> sociological critic as Albert Cohen, I repeat in thin
> outline that the social process making for anomie is
> conceived as follows: the men most vulnerable to the
> stresses resulting from contradictions between their
> socially induced aspirations and poor access to the op-
> portunity structure are the first to become alienated.
> Some of them turn to established alternatives (Cloward's
> illegitimate opportunity structure) that both violate
> the abandoned norms and prove effective in achieving
> their immediate objectives. A few others actually inno-
> vate for themselves to develop new alternatives. These
> successful rogues--as measured by the criteria in their
> significant reference groups--become prototypes for oth-
> ers in their environment who, initially less vulnerable
> and less alienated, now no longer keep to the rules
> they once regarded as legitimate. This, in turn, cre-
> ates a more acutely anomic context for still others in
> local social system. In this way, anomie, anomia, and
> mounting rates of deviant behavior become mutually re-
> inforcing unless counteracting mechanisms of social
> control are called into play (1964:234, 235).

This sounds like the sociological equivalent of the domino
theory. Merton's reconstituted view still seems as atomistic
and mechanical as the dynamical theory of gases, for it seems
as if successful deviancy exerts some relatively fatal form
of social gravity by pulling others out of their normal social
"orbits" and leading them into "eccentric" deviations. Or,
from another perspective, it seems that we are to assume here

vulnerability to anomie (what an ill-defined concept), if
supplemented by social imitation (taking us back to the nine-
teenth century social psychologists, eg. Tarde and Le Bon),
can lead to contagious social diseases! But even with such
defenses, Merton ignores the central thrust of Cohen's criti-
que, for although he postulates interaction as imitation, he
almost completely ignores how, in actual fact, all the complex
social processes underlying deviancies tend to compound each
other. Why are imitation and gravitational attraction better
suited to explain the complex moral phenomenologies and sym-
bolic cultural processes than properly phenomenological cat-
egories? I see little gained, and much lost by Merton's vocab-
ulary. Further, does Merton really expect us to accept these
few relatively isolated and peripheral statements as signifi-
cantly altering the basic presuppositions of his famous theo-
ry? If so, then should not Merton have also directly altered
the presuppositions themselves? If Merton himself admits that
Cohen's critique cuts to the very heart of his theory, then
are we to judge Merton's defense adequate when he neither al-
ters his theory nor extends it by incorporating Cohen's sug-
gestions, all the while attempting to exonerate himself by
sending us off to read occasional verbal remarks made at some
obscure conference or statements buried deep in later revi-
sions?

In addition, Merton introduces at least three new ele-
ments in his summary: "alienation," "significant reference
groups," and "counteracting mechanisms of social control."
Merton's protestations notwithstanding, just as Parsons' ela-
borate inventories of interactional processes (1951:chapter
7) on deviance ultimately rest on the reductive notions of
psycho-biological needs and drives for tension-reduction, so
Merton's reconstruction of his own theory, even when he at-
tempts to squarely meet the issue, ultimately rests on a
rough analogy of deviance with a type of social gravity pul-
ling people out of their normal "orbits." In the end, Merton's
theory remains atomistic and mechanistic. Although he refers
now to legitimacy, for instance, how can one adequately hope

to approach this problem without reference to people's actual
perceptions, to images held by various groups, to their logics
in use, to their participation in symbolic and moral process-
es, and so on? Therefore, not only do Cohen's explicit criti-
cisms stand, but they now loom larger than before, for this
episode reveals that even when Merton was directly confronted
with a critical challenge, invisible but powerful leading
strings pulled him back to his culturally derived orientations
and premises.

Let us briefly consider the following series of paradox-
ical conclusions concerning the essential nature of Merton's
theory and framework. Although initially social structural in
point of departure, Merton's actual focus in "Social Structure
and Anomie" becomes social psychological. But although his real
focal level is social psychological (eg. individual adaptations
to strain), it's not really micro sociological in the sense of
accounting adequately for social psychological interactional
processes, and thus leaves a vast gulf between the social and
the individual factors. And, although it is social psychologi-
cal in focus it is not so in content, for Merton's theory as-
sumes individual perceptions and Pragmatic motivations and at-
titudes, yet says little about perceptual, social, or moral
phenomenological processes. Therefore, we are forced by these
curious series of internal contradictions to the sad conclu-
sion that Merton's paradoxes reveal deep inconsistencues embed-
ded at the very foundation of his theoretical position.

CHAPTER SIX

SROLIAN ANOMIA

Leo Srole's anomia scale has become as widely known
and used as Merton's notion of anomie, and, indeed, there
is a constant tendency to conflate the two. Srole's thesis
is similar to the tradition carried on by Gibbs and Martin
in that it focusses on the breakdown of social integration,
and attempts to derive measurable indices for it. Yet,
Srole's anomia differs from all the other conceptions in
that it looks at this central variable of the lack of so-
cial integration from the individual's own psychological
viewpoint. Srolian anomia represents a "psychologization" of
a fundamental sociological concept.

Shifting from what he termed the "molar" (sociological)
level down to the "molecular" or micro (psychological) level,
Srole explicitly set out to construct a scale to test what he
considered to be the essence of Durkheim's anomie--namely,
"inter-personal alienation." However, Srole did not explicit-
ly derive his specific propositions from Durkheim's notions
of anomie, nor did he explicitly set out to test the validi-
ty of Durkheim's ideas. Rather, Srolian anomia emerged on
"piggy back," since this scale was first developed as an ad-
junct to some "diversionary items" in research primarily de-
signed to study authoritarianism and prejudice. Srole himself
reports: "These diversionary items afforded a 'hitch-hike'
opportunity to test hypotheses centering on Durkheim's con-
cept of anomie" (1956:710).

Failing to explicitly cite Durkheim's writings, Srole
referred to other writers to justify his conclusion that Durk-
heim's different types of suicide could be reduced to one com-
mon element. "In the writer's view, 'self-to-others aliena-
tion' may be regarded as the common element in Durkheim's

conceptualization of anomie, egoism, altruism, and fatalism
as different but overlapping forms of suicide"(1956: 712).
But, as we have unhappily discovered, this type of approach
in which the total framework and subtlety of Durkheim's ar-
gument is simply ignored is unfortunately the rule rather
than the exception. The ambiguity of Durkheim's concepts has
led many secondary observers to arbitrarily decree that "this
is really what Durkheim had in mind," or else to throw up
their hands, and propose that Durkheim's different types of
suicide "really" are one and the same in any case, so why bo-
ther with tedious exegesis?

Proceeding partly from MacIver's and Lasswell's psycho-
logized notions of anomie, Srole postulated a series of sub-
jective attitudes representing "interpersonal alienation."
Srole's hypothesis for these "diversionary, hitch-hike" items
to his larger study on authoritarianism and prejudice was that:
"... social malintegration, or anomia, in individuals is asso-
ciated with a rejective orientation toward out-groups in gen-
eral and toward minority groups in particular" (1956:712).
Yet, identifying anomia with Parsonian-Mertonian "malintegra-
tion" in general is not sufficient, for this concept is itself
fuzzy. Certainly, it should not be assumed to be clear and
self-evident in its meaning and implications. Thus, at the
crucial point of translating Durkheim's ideas into a testa-
ble index, Srole waffled, and fell back on Parsonian and Mer-
tonian metaphor.

Now, as many observers have noted, Srole's anomia scale
seems to have indiscriminately lumped together a number of di-
verse synonyms of anomie such as alienation, meaninglessness,
apathy, anonymity, isolation, powerlessness, etc.; and in the
last analysis, Srole's scale seems virtually indistinguishable
from a generalized feeling of apathetic resignation or despair
(see also Gwynn Nettler, 1965:763). Teevan suggests:

> Too many sociologists have reified the Srole scale. It
> has several faults in form and several in content. Per-
> haps the biggest shortcoming it exhibits is that it does
> not measure anomia as discussed either by Durkheim or by
> Merton. It measures neither alienation from norms, nor

lack of means to achieve goals, but instead a mixture
of powerlessness and other forms of alienation (1975:
165-6).

One of the scale's major faults is that the items are so am-
biguous. On one reading, the first two elements of Srole's
scale refer roughly to social environmental perception, while
the last three items correspond to self-perceptions (at least
this is what appears to have been intended by Srole's explana-
tory preface to each item, see 1956:712-13). Yet, other read-
ings are possible: Dubin (1959:158) suggests that Srole's
first item deals with an institutional norm, while the last
four pertain to cultural goals. Teevan remarks:

> Ideally, there should be two separate measures of an
> individual's perception of his own anomia and his per-
> ception of the anomia of others. Unfortunately, the two
> have been confused. Srole's scale purports to measure
> the individual's perception of his own social psycholo-
> gical anomia. Instead, it measures the individual's per-
> ception of others' anomia.... It measures the indivi-
> dual's perception of the "average man's," and not his
> own anomia. Examination of the scale reveals that ques-
> tions one and three have the average man as their ref-
> erent, questions two and five, and question four, an
> unknown referent.
> Thus, the Srole scale asks for the individual's percep-
> tions of the anomia of others, and not for his percep-
> tions of his own anomia. This may lead to confusion
> since sociologists have designated the individual who
> scores highly on the scale, who perceives the average
> man to be anomic, as the anomic individual himself.
> There would be no confusion if the respondent sees him-
> self as the average man or if he projects his personal
> feeling to others around him. If, however, these condi-
> tions do not obtain, then one errors in assuming that
> the Srole battery measures ... the individual's percep-
> tion of his own anomia (1975:162).

Teevan's objections are well-taken, and we now see that Srole's
scale really is predicated on the individual's projection of
himself or herself into the mold of that hypothetical type--
the "average man." And as Teevan notes, "the average man is
generally perceived as more anomic than the individual him-
self." Teevan goes on to suggest that we develop different
questions to distinguish between an individual's perception
of his own anomie, and an individual's perception of the ano-
mia of the larger society.

Further criticisms of Srole's scale come from Lenski and Leggett (1960) and L. Carr (1971) who argue that the lower class may appear to be more anomic than they really are due to a deference effect, or the acquiescence to "yes" answers posed by middle class interviewers. McClosky and Schaar question Srole's sampling in his original research:

> Srole's 1951 paper ... and his 1956 paper on anomy rested upon a sample of 401 native-born, white, Christian residents of Springfield, Mass., all of whom lived within walking distance of transit lines and rode the bus four or more times per week. This seems a curious sample with which to test an anomy scale or to assess the relations between anomy and various other factors --unless one has a powerful theoretical conviction that anomics tend to congregate on Springfield buses. To our knowledge, Srole has never questioned the appropriateness of that sample. Nor has he challenged the samples used in numerous other studies that have employed the Srole anomie scale (1965:765-66).

And, in terms of the methodology of scaling, C. Miller and E. Butler question the unidimensionality of underlying items of Srole's scale, and conclude: "Gradations of the Guttman scale type would appear to be contra-indicated, and polarization would appear to be more appropriate" (1966:405). Doubtless, there are other problems; but the irony of these conclusions shall not be lost on a perceptive observer. For it is precisely these various shades of meaning which such scales claim it is their virtue to determine in the first place! Yet, here Srole only succeeded in confusing the various shades and grades of meaning, and thus sacrificed conceptual precision and theoretical significance for the appearance of statistical accuracy.

Srole appears to have been influenced in his efforts from a number of different sources. First, from his teacher and colleague at The University of Chicago, W. Lloyd Warner (see R. Hinkle, 1960:288-89), Srole derived an admiration for Durkheim's ideas from the perspective of British-influenced social anthropology. Now, although it would appear evident that Srole was influenced in some manner or another by Durkheim, it is hard to detect in his famous article these precise relations. It appears that the content of Durkheim's in-

fluence tended to exerted a generalized concern affecting
Srole's psychiatric predelictions. For example, Srole con-
cludes his paper by offering his new research method as a
scientific instrument which he hoped might help to alleviate
the dangers of social disintegration.

> ... there appears to be a trend among social scientists
> toward convergence of interest in the phenomena of so-
> cial integration.Equipped with the advances of the past
> decade in theory and research technology, this trend
> gives promise of accelerating the scientific attack,
> powerfully and single-handedly launched by Emile Durk-
> heim more than a half-century ago, on one of the most
> pervasive and potentially dangerous aspects of Western
> society, namely, the deterioration in the social and
> moral ties that bind, sustain, and free us (1956:716).

Yet, although Srole obviously shares with Durkheim a deep con-
cern over these problems, we find a paucity of references to
Durkheim's work on these subjects. Although Srole drops Durk-
heim's name several times, like Merton, he never specifically
quotes Durkheim. Nor does Srole, amazing as it might seem in
retrospect, even refer to any of Durkheim's works! If Srole,
like Merton's undercitation, simply presumed that Durkheim's
ideas were simple, clear, and understood by all in their ori-
ginal meanings, he made a fatal mistake.

A second source of Srole's anomia appears to have been
derived from the American structural-functional theorists'
concern with "malintegration" and the problematics of social
integration. Srole tells us at the beginning of his 1956 paper
that he "... felt the need of theoretical developments center-
ing on the concept of 'social integration.'" Then Srole cites
various sociologists including Robin Williams, Parsons and
Shils, W. Landecker, R.C. Angell, and Merton. Given the subse-
quent prestige of Srole's efforts deriving from the structural-
functionalists' perspective on social integration, even Merton
himself was pleased to report: "I can only take chauvinistic
pleasure in Srole's report that he developed his scale of ano-
mia in 1950, when he was a member of the Bureau of Applied So-
cial Research as Columbia University" (1964:227,#5).

Third, Srole's own unique contribution was the meshing
of these anthropological and sociological outlooks with his

own psychiatric emphasis on the components and conditions of mental health. Srole's own career predelictions toward a social psychiatric approach to social and individual problems, which generated the subjective anomia scale, appears to have been the right instrument in the right place at the right time in meeting the needs of many American social scientists for some research tool with which to test for anomie. At once congruent with the basic biases of American sociologists toward a micro-social psychological level of focus, and of the milieu and social problems approaches, Srole appeared to be eminently successful in providing survey methodologists with their required scale instrument to measure aggregated anomic perceptions.

Srole's attempt to scale out anomic responses for survey questionaires can be seen as a key methodological breakthrough in the research administration of this concept. Apparently joined in one single and concise instrument were diverse ideas ranging from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton to MacIver to Srole himself. This meant that the continental tradition of social theory was now extended beyond Parsons' and Merton's general theorizing, and implicitly joined with the other dominant strain of American sociology—namely, the pragmatic-reformist-nominalist concern with empirical social research. Anomia now constituted one of the few visible and testable fusions of continental theory, grand theory, middle range theory, social reformist theory and the efficient procedures of mass social research. Quite an accomplishment for only five short items!

Now, although many have noticed (eg. Merton, 1964:227-28) that Srole's anomia scale is basically psychological, few have explicitly recognized the ramifications of the usage of this scale and other survey tools of the same nature as mass psychological interviewing devices. This largely unheralded but powerfully driven development signals an important shift in the central focus of fundamental sociological ideas down to the psychological level. Whether this be explained as a result of the need to develop measurable indices, or as a natu-

ral reversion of ideas in the American context back to our nominalistic roots (eg. see R. Hinkle, 1960), the unhappy fact remains that too much of the content and method of contemporary sociological research has become far more psychological than sociocultural. In this case, perhaps the single most famous sociological concept, which has so often been heralded as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration of the "autonomy of social facts," is not even sociological anymore!

The contradictions underlying Srolian anomia constitute another important chapter in our ironic history of a classic sociological idea. What happened to Durkheim's ideas, especially at the hand of his admirer Leo Srole, and, in turn, how other sociologists have utilized these various ideas, can perhaps best be understood as an another instance of the more general process characterizing the translation, reappropriation, fragmentation, and progressive trivialization of the paradigms central to the "normal science" of any discipline. This entropic process is abundantly illustrated in Miller and Butler's flippant statement: "While the theoreticians debated among themselves as to what anomie might be, several researchers constructed questionaire items in an effort to measure it" (1966:400). In short, their cavalier and casual remark reveals the basic feelings of too many of the "puzzle solving normal scientists" in sociology who seem to be saying: its no good unless we can formalize a theory and test it statistically; and any scale is better than no scale at all, even if it means that we have little idea about the content or validity of the concept we are testing (see McCloskey, 1974,1976a)!

CHAPTER SEVEN

CROSS-OVERS BETWEEN SROLIAN ANOMIA AND MERTONIAN ANOMIE

Preface. We have already noted that Srole developed his scale of anomia while working at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. And Merton (1964:228, #6) reports that it was not until after April 1956 that Srole even began using the term "anomia" instead of the Mertonian and Durkheim "anomie." Now, some might consider the cross-over between the two best-known developments of anomie theory to constitute definite and visible progress in sociology--namely, the cumulativeness of theory interrelated with empirical research. Yet, the perspective which emerges from detailed examination is that each of these streams of development of anomie represents fundamentally different positions, and that each of these streams represents an entropic degeneration and fragmentation of Durkheim's original ideas. It would be a dubious proposition to attempt to maintain that these cross-overs signify important sociological progress. Let us briefly review some of the empirical applications of Mertonian anomie, and consider some of the relations between these two streams.

A.   Stephen Cole's Defense of Mertonian Anomie

Now, it is interesting to note that the problematic relations between Merton's theoretical developments and empirical testing of his notion of anomie have called forth two defenses of Merton from within his circle, and Stephen Cole was involved in both. In 1964, Cole produced along with Harriet Zuckerman, a long bibiliography of work on anomie theory. And in 1975, in the Merton festschrift, The Idea of Social Structure (L. Coser, ed.), Cole returned again to the same problem with more sophisticated analytical and statistical techniques. Let us examine each of these defenses of the fate of

anomie at the hands of empirical researchers.

In Clinard's volume Anomie and Deviant Behavior (1964), there is included a summary table inventorying empirical and theoretical studies on anomie since Durkheim compiled by Merton's students Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman. Merton prefaced the table by linking his own notion of anomie with Durkheim's, and then added these remarks:

> ... just as there was little concerted attention given the matter after Durkheim first introduced it, so there was a considerable interval after the later 1930's before anomie research became a focus of empirical and theoretical attention.... The accompanying tabulation shows ... that there was a gap of some fifteen years before there emerged a substantial (though still limited) concentration on the subject (1964:216).

Merton includes the following figures for the number of empirical studies reported on anomie in these five year intervals: 1940-50:3; 1950-54:7; 1955-59:25; 1960-64:39. It would appear at first glance that empirical research in anomie theory was a burgeoning industry at that time. Now, although Merton does not explicitly state it, we are led to implicitly assume that most or all of these studies have to do with a clearly formulated conception of anomie, especially Durkheim's anomie and Merton's extension. However, a closer look at the items in Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman's inventory on which Merton's totals are based reveals several curious findings. First, although the inventory appears very impressive at first glance (extending over forty pages and from 1897 to 1964), one discovers upon closer examination that only certain items are designated as "explicit testing or extensive application of Merton's theory of social structure and anomie." Of the total of eighty-seven different studies listed, only fifteen are starred by Cole and Zuckerman as explicitly working with Merton's notion of anomie. Approximately twenty others are based upon Srole's scale of anomia. In short, the clear majority of studies cited are not directly concerned with contemporary theoretical formulations of anomie.[1]

Of the fifteen studies specifically designated by Cole and Zuckerman in 1964 as related to, or in some way testing,

Mertonian anomie, many of the earlier studies cited appear to come from authors who were Merton's own students, colleagues, or acquaintances. Two articles remain unpublished. In at least five of the studies (Riley and Flowerman, 1951, Rosenthal, 1954, E. Barber, 1955, R. Coser, 1958, R. Cloward, 1956), Merton's SS&A paradigm appears either as an afterthought, or as an appendage serving as an ex post facto interpretive device for impressionistic evidence. In no way can such studies be legitimately cited as demonstrative evidence. Only Hyman (1953), Lander (1954), Glaser and Rice (1959), Mizruchi (1960), Stinchcombe (1960), and Rhoades (1964) appear to be based on more carefully drawn data. Of these, Mizruchi and Rhoades both utilized Srole's anomia scale to test Mertonian anomie (a troublesome procedure which even Merton rejects, see the following section). Glaser and Rice (1959) merely invoke Merton's theory at the end as a possible complement to Sutherland's differential association theory. Hyman (1953), as we have seen, is critical of some of Merton's crucial assumptions, and Lander's work was criticized by Merton himself (later by Bordua, 1958, R. Child, 1964, R. Gordon, 1967). Thus, while the empirical literature concerning Mertonian anomie appeared in 1964 to be truly voluminous, upon closer examination the inventory performed under Merton's own supervision appears to have been greatly inflated. Indeed, it is hard to point to even a couple of studies at that time which conclusively verified the empirical validity of Merton's notion of anomie. As we shall see in the following section, this paucity of good research greatly bothered Merton himself in 1964.

Eleven years later, for the Merton festschrift volume The Idea of Social Structure, Stephen Cole went much deeper into the empirical fate of Merton's theory of anomie by treating it as a case-study in the growth of scientific knowledge. Rather than simply compiling an index as in 1964, Cole now submitted the use of Merton's anomie theory in the sociological literature to sophisticated statistical and theoretical analyses. Let us explore this latest defense from the Merton camp.

Cole offers us a summary of the frequency with which

Merton was cited for the periods 1950-54, 1955-59, 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-73, as an index to his influence on the sociology of deviance. According to Cole's findings, Merton was ranked first or second in all periods but the last, when his prominence declined precipitously (to number 12). Cole's 1975 sample was drawn from four leading sociological journals, and tabulated only citations to different authors, not number of citations of the same author of different works. Thus, if an author received ten citations, it means he was cited by ten different people. Although Cole claims this was done simply "... to prevent a few authors who might heavily cite a particular person from tipping the results" (1975:189), it should be noted that this unusual way of indexing citations worked to tip the scales in Merton's favor. Again, as in the over-long bibliography in 1964, Merton's collaborators tended to inflate these tables. Even Cole himself felt it necessary to justify this unusual procedure:

> It should be noted that this procedure does differ from that normally employed, in which each distinct reference to an author's work would count as a citation. For example, when we looked at the distribution of citations done in the typical fashion, Short rather than Merton received the most citations for this period (1950-73). This is because Short was frequently cited for four or more articles within a single article, whereas Merton was usually cited for one or two contributions * (1975:217, #36).

Now, the results of Cole's factor analysis of Merton's prominence in each period are also interesting. During the period, 1950-54 for instance, Cole observes that:

> ... Merton was an intellectual isolate in the field of deviance as then constituted.... Although Merton was the second most frequently cited sociologist in the period, his work had not yet made a major impact on the field. He was cited by people who were still primarily doing the type of work done by Sutherland and Sellin [differential association].... Although by this time Merton had established himself as a prestigious theoretician, the theory of SS&A had very little impact on deviance research in the four leading sociological journals (1975:195,196).

It should be noted that this was the curious situation more than a decade after Merton's article "Social Structure and A-

nomie" was first published; Merton himself (1964) was disturbed by this "delayed utilization." Cole suggests (1975:205-6) that it was the 1949 revision of "Social Structure and Anomie" in Merton's collected essays <u>Social Theory and Social Structure</u> which really gained prominence. To explain this lag, and the apparent rise of Mertonian anomie in the 1950's, Cole suggests that it was not until this period that Ph.D.'s trained in structural-functional theory spread out across the country.

Of the citations in 1955-59 period, one-third referred to Merton's work other than SS&A. Three used SS&A to legitimate and support the ideas of the authors, and two others simply refer to it as part of the relevant literature. Of the remaining third, Cloward and Ohlin's work (1960) was a theoretical revision and extension of Mertonian anomie, and not an empirical test, while Powell (1958) and Dohrenwend (1959) attempted to define and develop the concept of anomie independently. The remaining study, Glaser and Rice (1959), used SS&A as an <u>ex post facto</u> interpretive device, invoking Merton's theory only at the end as a possible complement, as noted earlier, to differential association theory. Cole claims:

> In the second period anomie theory had emerged as a distinctive orientation to the study of deviance. The theory of SS&A was further developed and extended, but at least in the four major journals there were still relatively few empirical studies aimed at testing it or in which it was used as an interpretive device (1975: 197).

During the periods 1960-64 and 1965-69,[1] in which anomie theory emerged as a major factor and then the dominant perspective in deviancy studies, the breakdowns are similar. And during the 1970-73 period, the labelling-interactionist approach displaced anomie as the dominant perspective in deviancy theory in terms of citations. Now, it interesting to note that during the whole period 1950-73, Cole (1975:228) notes that forty-two percent of the articles cited Merton in a ceremonial fashion only to legitimate the work of the author. And while there were twenty-one articles which used SS&A as an <u>ex post facto</u> interpretive device to make sense of certain empirical findings, Cole (1975:211) found only nine articles re-

port research designed to empirically test a part of SS&A or a derivative theory. Of these nine, at least two (Mizruchi, 1960, and Rhoades, 1964) used Srole's anomia scale, four (Spergel, 1963, Landis and Scarpitti, 1965, Short, Rivera, and Tennyson, 1965, and Voss, 1966) really test Cloward-Oh-lin's theory and Cohen's derivative theory rather than direct-ly testing Merton's. One study (Wilson, 1971) used Srole's scale, tested some of Lander's (1954) assumptions, and came up with results contradictory to SS&A, and some striking find-ings on the sub-cultural norms of ghettos. Another study (Reiss and Rhodes, 1959) yielded indeterminate results, while only one study (William Rushing 1971) attempted a di-rect test of SS&A with results consistent with Merton's theo-ry. Since Rushing's study is one of a precious few which could be cited as empirically confirming Merton's theory, let us briefly review it.

Rushing's article is cogent both in its criticism of existing usage of Mertonian anomie and its own theoretical formulations. Therefore, Rushing constructed his own scale of anomie, which appears, however, to suffer from several of the flaws which Teevan (1975), among others, pointed out for Srole's scale. Actually, Rushing (1971:859-60) explicitly set out to test psychological alienation from norms, rather than to test anomie as a societal state; whereas Merton's theory, as he has repeatedly declared (eg. 1957, 1964), pertains pri-marily to anomie as a societal state rather than a psychologi-cal condition. Noting that "class differences in goals is not the crucial datum," Rushing suggests that it is rather, as Mer-ton himself says, whether "... disjunction between goals and opportunity among lower class strata [occurs with greater fre-quency] than among the more advantaged upper-class strata," and "if so, whether such disjunction is associated with norm-lessness" (1971:862).

Although his "... results consistently support Merton's hypothesis about the dynamics of normlessness in the lower class" (1971:864), Rushing also contends that "... it is not blocked opportunity per se that is important, but the way

blocked opportunity is <u>interpreted</u>, and such interpretations
will differ depending on one's cultural background" (1971:
866). Indeed, Rushing's conclusion that "cultural interpreta-
tion is a significant intervening variable in the relation-
ship between aspirations and blocked perceived opportunity"
(1971:870) reinforces my earlier criticism of the culture-
boundedness of Merton's theory.

In sum, out of the huge 1964 bibliography and the 1975
citation analysis, Cole is only able to come up with one or
a few valid empirical studies validating Merton's theory of
anomie, and even these are often equivocal confirmations. This
is hardly overwhelming empirical evidence for so famous a theo-
ry. If this troubles the reader, it should also be noted that
this embarassing lag between the popular acclaim for his theo-
ry and empirical support also rankled Merton himself, as we
shall discover in the following section.

Against this troubling background, Cole tries two differ-
ent rhetorical tactics to salvage Merton's theory of anomie.
On the one hand, he claims that interest in Merton's theory
continues unabated and that it has merely shifted in theoret-
ical significance from one research area to another. On the
other hand, from the perspective of the contemporary philoso-
phy of science, Cole suggests that anomie theory has declined
not because of lack of hard empirical evidence to support it,
but rather from an external shift in the sociological communi-
ty's focal interest. Let us consider these rhetorical defenses
in turn.

First, in the face of the apparent precipitous decline
in citation of Merton during the 1970-73 period, Cole tries
to salvage Merton's theory in this way.

> ... SS&A has declined in significance in the last per-
> iod. Yet there is a good deal of evidence that SS&A re-
> mains a very important theory.... When, for example, we
> look up citations to Merton's work on deviance in the
> 1973 volume of <u>The Social Science Citation Index</u>, we
> see that in this one year it has been cited approximate-
> ly sixty times.... Consider some additional evidence on
> the continued interest in SS&A. This article has been
> reprinted many times and the rate at which it has been
> reprinted has increased in recent years rather than de-

> clined. The theory has been discussed in scores of in-
> troductory textbooks and continues to be discussed in
> virtually all the introductory texts published in the
> last few years. The theory is frequently discussed in
> both American and European symposiums on deviance. In
> short, the theory has anything but disappeared (1975:
> 201).

What Cole refers to here, of course, is the "halo effect"
or "lag" in the reputation of a theory which has had its day
and faded. While thinkers and researchers on the cutting edge
of the discipline no longer pursue this theory, other publics,
less well-informed, to whom sociologists wish to present their
intellectual wares, are still regaled with its cogence and
significance. The theory dies in the journals, only to gain a
second lease on life in introductory textbooks.

Cole attempts to salvage the importance of this "second
lease on life" for Merton's theory of social structure and ano-
mie by distinguishing different phases in the life of any
great theory.

> How can we explain the decline in citations to SS&A in
> the four leading journals at the same time that the theo-
> ry continues to received heavy attention in other places?
> Perhaps we must think of the various stages that a theo-
> ry goes through from the time that it is presented until
> the time that it is either abandoned or obliterated
> through incorporation. When SS&A was first published it
> may have experienced delayed utilization; later, it be-
> came the leading theory guiding work at the research
> front in deviance. Now its significance at the research
> front of other areas may be increasing, and as an exem-
> plar or pardigm of sociological theory, it may continue
> to be reprinted in anthologies and cited in introductory
> texts for years to come. In short, we must not asssume
> that the life of a theory is unidimensional. A full un-
> derstanding of the role played by a theory would consider
> the full range of uses a theory is put to and the stages
> through which it progresses (1975:201).

It is interesting to see this admission from the Merton camp
which reinforces my earlier suggestion that the reasons Mer-
ton's theory gained such prominence had more to do with its
symbolic and ideological function than its logic or empirical
validity. Old theories never die, they just just lodge in
textbooks like barnacles.

Further, Cole attempts to deflect the lack of empirical

verification of Merton's anomie theory and its relative de-
cline in terms of external shifts in the sociological commun-
ity's commitments. Now, Cole claims that the empirical evi-
dence critical of Merton's theory could have been deflected
had Merton made a crucial shift in one of his assumptions.

> What can we conclude from the studies that have act-
> ively attempted to test the theory? There was certain-
> ly as much evidence in support of SS&A and derivative
> theories as in opposition. The strongest negative evi-
> dence confronting SS&A are the several studies finding
> no differences in rates of deviant behavior between lo-
> wer class and middle class people. By the time the
> 1949 revision of SS&A was published, Merton was aware
> that actual rates of deviant behavior may be considera-
> bly higher in the middle classes than official crime
> statistics indicated.... At this time, Merton had to
> decide whether he should see anomie as characterizing
> the entire society and thus creating high rates of de-
> viance in the society as a whole, or as being unevenly
> distributed, with the lower class being more exposed
> than the middle class. He opted for the latter choice.
> If he had chosen the other alternative, most of the
> criticism would have been avoided (1975:212).

Cole then suggests that the decline in influence of Mer-
ton's theory is due more to shifts in the external "sociologi-
cal framework" rather than to contradictory empirical evi-
dence.

> It is easier to explain the decline of utilization of
> SS&A from what I should like to call the "sociological
> framework." From this point of view, the acceptance or
> rejection of a theory is not primarily dependent on em-
> pirical evidence. It is dependent on the way the theo-
> ry fits in with the other interests of the community of
> scientists and the ability of the theory to fulfill what
> might be called its "functional requirements." First,
> what evidence is there in this case that the acceptance
> or rejection of a theory is not dependent on empirical
> evidence? I have shown that at least in the four major
> journals, there were few attempts to directly test the
> theory, and that there were even fewer attempts that
> claimed to find evidence contradicting the theory (1975:
> 212).

Finally, proceeding from the contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, Cole concludes with the striking admission that the real
function of theories such as SS&A is to act as a research pro-
gram providing orientations and problems for the discipline.
It is thus a paradigm not in the sense of an achievement to

be imitated, but as a source of potentially fruitful ways of thinking about certain problems.

> Before I began this research, I believed that SS&A had been difficult to test because it had not been put forth in a precise enough manner to operationalize the key components. I believed that it would be possible to state the theory in a more precise way, and that a definitive empirical test would then be possible. I, of course, no longer believe this would be either possible or desirable. SS&A is an approach to studying a wide range of behavior that stimulated much theoretical thought and a good deal of empirical research. The range of empirical phenomena for which SS&A is relevant is too wide for a definitive test to have been performed. Besides, theories that provide puzzles are not rejected in the face of negative empirical evidence unless an alternate theory is present and deemed superior. And, in fact, the utilization of SS&A may be declining, not because it has been empirically proven false, but because we have exhausted most of the puzzles that it provided. Labelling theory is currently the major source of puzzles for deviance researchers (1975:213).

This acknowledgment is, of course, a chastening experience for the partisans of Mertonian theory, not only in terms of his anomie theory but also in terms of his more general philosophy of scientific progress and his program of consolidation and codification of theory.

B. Merton's Program for Empirical Research into SS&A

Merton himself noticed with chagrin both the paucity of empirical studies concerned with his famous paradigm, and their generally distressing qualities. For instance, in his 1957 "Continuities..." essay, Merton carefully termed Bernard Lander's 1954 study using census tract data "a symptomatic advance."

> For just as the mere availability of official statistics constrained Durkheim to employ such rough, indirect and highly provisional measures of anomie as occupational status, marital status, and family disintegration, so the fortuity that census tracts in Baltimore include data on delinquency, racial composition, and house ownership, led Lander to use these as a rough, indirect, and highly provisional measure of anomie. Pragmatic considerations of this sort are no suitable alternative to theoretically derived indicators of the concept. Turnover in residence may be an indirect measure of the rate of breakdown in established social relationships, but it is evident that the measure would be substantially improved if provision were made to obtain data directly on rates of disrupted social relationships.... just as the scales of the subjective aspects of anomie must be further improved, so must scales of its objective aspects. The utililization of social book-keeping data is only a pragmatically enforced and interim substitute (1957:165-66).

In the 1960's, Merton's concern increased about the lack of methodological precision involved in anomie and deviant behavior studies. Merton explained this gap in development "... between theory and systematic empirical research" by relying on the principle that "... sociological theory tends to outrun the inevitably slower pace of systematic empirical research in sociology" (1964:240). Of course, such justification of the gap between theory and research stems from the tacit presumption that these really are separable activities; hence, it is inevitable that the theorists will always move ahead of the plodding researchers. The resulting lacuna means that theorists are allowed, nay encouraged, to continue to spin out their typologies on one side, while on the other the empirical survey researchers are encouraged to continue to gather data regardless of what it means in

practice. Ironically, it was precisely this potentially fatal split which Merton's own call for "theories of the middle range" was itself supposed to mediate. Indeed, Merton himself (eg. 1964:215) tells us that his theory of anomie is a prime example of a "middle range theory." Yet, here in the case of his single most famous theory, Merton is forced to admit that adequate empirical testing still awaits us after almost thirty years (after almost forty years if you count Cole's 1975 tabulation)! And, we should remember that Merton himself never undertook such an empirical confirmation of his theoretical schema. And although Merton wrote well-known treatises on "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research" and on "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological Theory," in terms of his own anomie theory, Merton himself never undertook to provide us with a paradigmatic study intimately intertwining the two sides of the scientific process. Thus, despite his preachments, Merton has continued to aid and abet this this unfortunate lacuna still plaguing contemporary sociology. One of the few thinkers who could have, and should have, exemplified the conciliation of theory and research, not as separate roles but as mutually reciprocal phases of the same process of intellectual inquiry, did not do so. And thus, Robert Merton must be judged responsible, certainly more than his students, for the lack of empirical confirmation of his own theory of anomie and opportunity.

Now, Merton asserts that the general principle of "empirical research lag" is the reason for the gap between his development of anomie theory and its empirical confirmation. And he admits that his own theory has proven surprisingly resistant to rigorous testing and application, which would seem anomalous in the case of one who has made it much of his life's work to tell other members of the profession how they ought to better conduct their intellectual affairs ("do as I say, not as I do"). Merton observes of this general process:

> ... very rough approximations to the requirements of the theory are developed and these, in the nature of the case, prove indecisive. At times, empirical investigators find themselves compelled to make such extreme

> compromises in their collection and analysis of data
> that what starts out as an effort to institute a de-
> manding test of a theoretical idea ends, as the Cole-
> Zuckerman inventory of research on anomie periodically
> suggests, by being so loose an approximation to the
> theory as to be wholly inconclusive. <u>There is not a</u>
> <u>single empirical investigation of anomie and deviant</u>
> <u>behavior that has succeeded in mounting a research de-</u>
> <u>sign that systematically, rather than impressionisti-</u>
> <u>cally and qualitatively, includes simultaneous analy-</u>
> <u>sis of collectivity, subgroup, and individual attri-</u>
> <u>butes in relation to deviant behavior along the lines</u>
> <u>set out in the preceding pages</u> * (1964:240).

The gap Merton so poignantly points out leads me to wonder out
loud: in the case of anomie theory, who is to blame for this
serious lacuna between the development of theory and empirical
testing? The theorist or the researchers or both? While Mer-
ton's statements appear to explain this oft-lamented gap in
terms of some postulated necessary gap between the sophisti-
cated theorists the compromising difficulties encountered by
the empirical researcher, perhaps the latent function of Mer-
ton's self-justification here is to displace the burden of
responsibility for failure onto the data gatherers. Although
Merton attempts to alleviate their imputed guilt by grounding
their inadequacies in the very nature of their role, Merton
seldom assumes that the basic problem might lie instead with
the theorists' own procedures and assumptions. It is not sur-
prising that Merton fails to recognize, even in the face of
discomforting evidence drawn by his own colleagues, that per-
haps the root problem underlying this endemic lacuna between
the proposal of theoretically viable propositions and empiri-
cal confirmations stems originally from the sterile stance
of the structural-functional theorists that theories can and
should be elaborated <u>in vacuo</u>, deductively, abstractly, ahis-
torically, generically, without immersion in the muddy actual."
Perhaps one can even detect here a hint of the age old con-
flicts between the spirit and the world; why else would these
theorists confidently consider their splendid yet sterile
theoretical isolation so high a calling? It may seem ironic
that we should make these claims against Merton who, in turn,
"cut the umbilical cord" by advancing them against Parsons

in 1947 (see Merton 1949, and "On Sociological Theories of
the Middle Range"), but so be it.

Always possessed of a sensitive ear for innuendoes, Mer-
ton explicitly disclaims any feeling of exasperation or pique
against the less endowed empirical researchers who have so
consistently failed to fulfill and support his grand theoret-
ical vision.

> All this may sound as though it were an attack on em-
> pirical research into anomie and deviant behavior, and
> a defense of theory bearing on this subject. But ...
> this would be to miss the point entirely. This is no
> evaluative, let alone invidious observation on the com-
> parative merits of theory and research on anomie. It
> lays a claim, instead, to being a detached, objective
> observation of a discrepancy in the pace at which theo-
> retical formulations are being developed and the neces-
> sarily slower pace at which systematic empirical re-
> search is mounted.... It is this gap between the char-
> acter of current theories and the character of much of
> the current research that explains the difficulty of
> decisively confirming, modifying, or rejecting one or
> another aspect of the contemporary theory of deviant
> behavior (1964:241-2).

We should not here miss the curious yet characteristic ploy
through which the supposed "value-freeness" of functional theo-
ry yet carries with it such invidious or moral overtones at
the very time it explicitly denies this intention. Also, while
Merton pointedly reflects on the "only natural" superiority of
the "character of current theories" vis-a-vis "current re-
search," almost any inquirer in these areas knows matters are
rarely so simple. Again, I propose that the gap which Merton
rightly laments is due not so much to any "natural law" of the
inferiority of research to theory, but rather to the nature
of the specific type of theorizing favored by Merton.

Although his last statement ignores that other major
theories of deviant behavior than his own carry substantial
empirical support, it should be recognized that Merton was
trying sincerely here to act as his own best critic. Earlier
in the 1950's, Merton had called for the reconciliation of
his own objective structural conception of anomie with the
subjective anomia scale developed by Srole.

> Growing out of the conception of both subjective and
> objective components of anomie is the further evident
> requirement that research on the sources and conse-
> quences of anomie deal <u>simultaneously</u> with the inter-
> action of the two types of components.... This means
> that the behavior of "anomic" and "eunomic" <u>indivi-</u>
> <u>duals</u> within groups having a designated degree of ob-
> jective anomie would be systematically compared, just
> as the behavior of individuals of the same type could
> be examined in groups with varying degrees of anomie.
> This kind of research plainly constitutes the next
> step forward in the study of anomie (1957:166).

Now, clearly Merton's attempts to clarify his own schema, to
criticize existing research, and to suggest guidelines and en-
courage further empirical investigation into his own theory
represent laudable activities, <u>and</u> also constitute an extra-
ordinarily interesting case study in the history of the devel-
opment of a very significant concept in sociology. Few other
sociological concepts have enjoyed such continuous elaboration,
refinement, extension, critique, and rebuttal by a major fig-
ure such as Merton for nearly four decades.

Almost thirty years after his original publication of
"Social Structure and Anomie," how did Merton come to specifi-
cally suggest that empirical testing of his paradigm in sys-
tematically designed research be carried out? The structure
and argument of Merton's outline for research is very signi-
ficant for the unraveling of our story of the "routinization
of charisma-on-deposit." In his 1964 essay "Anomie, Anomia,
and Social Interaction," Merton proffers a number of reveal-
ing suggestions. First, urging cognizance of the crucial, yet
complementary, differences between his own social structural
notion of anomie and the more psychologized subjective con-
cept of Srole's anomia, and eschewing critical examination
of the technical adequacy of Srole's scale, Merton begins
with the following significant admission: "Curiously enough,
the advance represented by Srole's preliminary scale design-
ed to measure anomia--a condition of the individual--seems to
have had an adverse effect on systematic studies of anomie--
a condition of the social system" (1964:228). Merton here im-
plies that although he systematically introduced the idea of

anomie ("... simply a matter of drawing out some of the im-
plications of Durkheim's work, 1964:215) into American socio-
logy through his famous SS&A paradigm, his concepts lay unap-
plied on a larger scale for almost thirty years, and when
Srole's scale came to be widely known, Srolian anomie super-
seded Mertonian anomie in research studies. This is, in my
judgment, an accurate historical reflection. While too many
sociologists indiscriminately lump together Durkheim's anomie
(and egoisme) with Mertonian anomie and it, in turn, with
Srolian anomia, Merton attempted to draw definite distinctions.
In 1964 Merton appears to lament the fact that Srole, who pro-
posed only a simple scale to measure anomia, has taken over
the lead in anomie-anomia research, while Merton himself, who
offered a complex and changing theoretical typology, now lags
behind.

Merton's specific suggestions as of 1964 for concrete
research to "bridge the theory-research gap" and to lead to a
resolution of Srolian anomia and Mertonian anomie are as fol-
lows. We ought to note that as Merton attempts to reconcile
the subjective and objective views of anomie, he appears to
make crucial concessions to the other ("complementary") side,
and gets ensnared in a fundamental methodological error. Mer-
ton's program for resolution begins thus:

> It seems not to have been widely recognized--if we are
> to judge from the appended inventory of research on the
> subject--that by adopting well-known procedures of ana-
> lysis, the measures of anomia for the individual can
> be adapted to serve as a measure of anomie for the so-
> cial system. By doing so, composite studies that <u>simul-
> taneously</u> examine the behavior of individuals, with <u>sim-
> ilar degrees</u> of anomia, within differing social con-
> texts of anomie, would enable us to deal with theoreti-
> cal problems that have remained on the periphery of
> systematic research.
> ... both the logic and substance of analysis which have
> been known for sometime have yet to be comprehensively
> applied to the study of anomia,anomie, and deviant be-
> havior (1964:228; 230, #8).

Merton proceeds to outline three successively more sophisti-
cated phases of inquiry into these areas. In Phase I, Merton
makes the crucial proposal that anomie as a social structural
condition can be measured by aggregating the individuals' sub-

jective feelings of anomia, which then could be used to differentiate between the comparative rates of deviance between anomics and non-anomics. While Phase I may be considered his concession to Srolian anomia, Phase II may be considered Merton's conciliatory response to Albert Cohen's (1965) criticism of Merton's theory as "atomistic." Thus, Phase II specifically focusses on "Rates of Social Interaction Between Anomics and Non-Anomics in Collectivities Differing in Degrees of Anomie." Phase III pulls Phases I and II together by studying the "Rates of Deviant Behavior Among Anomics Within Collectivities Differing in Degree of Anomie" (1964:237). Lastly, to cope with the processual dimension, Merton suggests a panel analysis also.

Now, my criticism here is directed not so much to the specific design of these phases as to Merton's underlying methodological assumptions. First, clearly the lead in formulating anomie had passed from his hands. Indeed, this outline represents an inversion of the theoretical sequence so successfully employed earlier; whereas formerly he had begun deductively and proceeded from the macro-systemic generic level of analysis down to the micro-empirical level, now Merton, in attempting rapprochement with the rapidly developing empirical stream of work which threatened to outstrip his own, proceeds inductively from the micro to the macro levels. Such an acquiescence on Merton's part gives credence to the approach of many researchers who hope to construct meaningful inductively generated theories of masses of data. Indeed, Merton himself (1968:151) comes perilously close to suggesting that "empirical generalizations" generate their own higher-order theory. However, as many philosophers of science (eg. the classic by N. Campbell, 1920; and contemporary thinkers such as T.S. Kuhn, 1970, N.R. Hanson, 1958, K. Popper, 1968, Lakatos & Musgrave, eds. 1970) have shown, the problem of scientific discovery is not so much a matter of "inductive generalization" as "abductive inference," of theory-finding. Far too often this inadequate conception of the intimate relations between insight and evidence has been reinforced by the pragmatic bias of American social scientists.

Another fundamental methodological problem implicit in
Merton's formulation has to do with the unwarranted move from
one level of analysis to another, with the expansion and con-
traction of scientific theories. If the "ecological fallacy"
(eg. see Robinson, 1950) suggests that from demographic-ecolo-
gical data one may determine the characteristics of indivi-
duals living in an area, then Merton's suggestion similarly
contains the invalid assumption that one can simply aggregate
individual attitudes as an accurate index of social structural
and cultural conditions. By proferring Srole's anomia scale of
individual feelings as the basis for aggregating subjective
"self and others" perceptions as accurate statistical indices
of objective social structures, Merton succumbs to the unwar-
ranted presumption that aggregated subjective attitudes of in-
dividuals accurately represent objective social structural
conditions. Since the ecological fallacy works both ways, Mer-
ton here, along with many others, is guilty of the flipside:
the unwarranted expansion of scientific constructs from one
diverse level to the next. Such a mistaken, yet widespread,
practice stems, perhaps, from the almost universal psycholo-
gization of key sociological concepts in mass-survey research.
Far too much survey research masquerading as sociology is
really only mass psychological interviewing unjustifiably pro-
jected onto the societal level. Indeed, one of the virtues of
Merton's functionalism had always been that it distinguished
between structural and psychological levels, especially con-
cerning anomie, and between perceived and unperceived condi-
tions. Yet, here Merton has succumbed to the erroneous con-
clusion that Srole's anomia can be plugged in to measure ob-
jective anomie. Merton is not alone in this fallacious en-
deavor, for it is one of the most widespread procedures in
contemporary sociological survey research, and indeed, here
has the cited sanction of Lazarsfeld himself.

C. Research Cross-Overs Between Mertonian Anomie and Srolian
    Anomia

A number of research studies concerning anomie have used
Srole's scale to test Merton's propositions. These cross-overs
between Srolian anomia and Mertonian anomie appear to have re-
sulted from the lack of measurable indices for Mertonian ano-
mie, and thus, when Srole's scale appeared, empirical method-
ologists wedded to mass survey techniques embraced it without
sufficient critical analysis. This literature is far too large
(and repetitive) to discuss at length here; some of the better
known examples of this cross-over include D. Meier and W. Bell's
"Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life
Goals" (1959), L. Rhodes' "Anomia, Aspiration, and Status"
(1964), Ephraim Mizruchi's "Social Structure and Anomia in a
Small City" (1960), R. Wilson "Anomie in the Ghetto" (1971),
and so on. While some of these studies have yielded at least
partial confirmations of Merton's theses, many of them recog-
nize confusion over the meaning of anomie and admit inconsis-
tent research findings.

Let us take Mizruchi's research as an illustrative
study. This research is especially important for our present
interests because Mizruchi consciously sets out to test what
he conceives to be the common elements of Durkheimian and Mer-
tonian anomie by using Srole's scale of anomia. Noting that
the lower classes studied have lower social participation
scores and higher anomia scores, Mizruchi pointedly observes:
"... [the data] does not provide a full test of Merton's theo-
ry since we have assumed that the respondents have similar
life goals. Merton himself makes this assumption" (1960:655).
In a subsequent exchange of letters, Lorna Mui and Mizruchi
disagreed over the validity and meaning of Mizruchi's work.
Mizruchi then explicitly states:

> Merton's theory, as I see it, is essentially derived
> from Durkheim's proposition that "to aspire to what is
> unattainable" reflects extreme pathological conditions
> in a social system. Thus Merton's theory must be viewed
> within a Durkheimian framework.... Both Durkheim and
> Merton view anomie ... as chronic states for industrial

societies, though Durkheim stressed acute anomie in
order to clarify, by contrast, what he had in mind.
In the case of American society, Merton takes the
Durkheimian position that for certain segments of
the population, aspiring to what is, for them, unat-
tainable, anomie is greater than for other segments
of the population. Thus Merton's contribution is to
be found in his application of the Durkheimian scheme
and his typology of patterned reactions to structured
strain. My own study, is consequently, a partial reas-
sessment of Durkheim's theory in American society
(1961:277).

Mizruchi began, then, by closely identifying Mertonian and

Durkheimian anomie. Not only do these streams converge in his

studies, but they also begin to gradually diverge again as

Mizruchi begins to test various key assumptions Merton made,

and as he reflects on his own findings. Hence, Mizruchi's

work represents the high point in empirical terms of the fu-

sion of Durkheimian anomie with Merton's schema and Srolian

anomia, and also, simultaneously, one of the most significant

points at which they began to be distinguished again.

Mizruchi characterizes his early efforts in the follow-

ing manner:"The level of generality remains Durkheimian and

in my study the Srole scale is particularly useful since it

was designed from a Durkheimian point of view" (1961:277).

Then Mizruchi, still identifying Mertonian and Durkheimian

anomie, makes the following relevant observations:

It is precisely the affluent society which breeds ano-
mie--this was Durkheim's point. Affluence creates a
thirst for more and more wants beyond the reasonable
possibility of attainment. I'm afraid that Lorna Mui
has completely misinterpreted Durkheim, and as a con-
sequence, Merton as well.... My current study sug-
gests that there are three sub-types of anomie which
must be taken into account in assessing the Durkheim-
Merton theory: (1) boundlessness, which represents
Durkheim's notions regarding the lack of limits to as-
pirations in a social system; (2) bondlessness, which
suggests Merton's lack of tie between norms and goals;
(3) normlessness, the process of breakdown or norma-
tive systems. Boundlessness seems to occur primarily
in the middle classes in American society and bond-
lessness appears to be characteristic of the lower
classes. Normlessness would appear to characterize
the marked changes occuring in the old upper classes

> whose normative systems are being subjected to strain
> and breakdown (1961:277).

The last distinction is particularly interesting; one wonders
whether, and to what extent, Parsons' concern with anomie as a
withdrawal of affect from dominant norms or as lack of norma-
tive clarity might speak for the "strain" of these upper clas-
ses of which Mizruchi speaks. In any case, Mizruchi's useful
distinctions illustrate that he is both closer to Durkheim in
a number of respects, and closer than Merton to contemporary
changes in the social structure.

By 1967, these careful distinctions which Mizruchi had
begun to draw between the various shades and grades of meaning
between Durkheimian and Mertonian anomie began to culminate in
a much sharper series of distinctions betweeen these notions
which would lead to their severance.

> A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie
> suggests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's
> and that this difference leads to varying hypotheses.
> ... The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its
> focus is on means rather than ends, assumes relatively
> uniform aspirations across the class structure and a
> greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower clas-
> ses. The theory, however, largely ignores observations
> made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, a-
> mong others, regarding the relatively low levels of as-
> piration which characterizes those at the lowest levels
> of the class structure, and it ignores certain qualita-
> tive differences within and between classes (1967:439-
> 441).

In contrast to Merton's implicit but central assumption that
all classes and sectors share the same values and goals, Miz-
ruchi, as noted earlier, proposes that "retreatism" and the
subsequent withdrawal of motivation and affect from cultural
mandates does not adequately explain the long-standing con-
servatism of lower classes.

> ... we hold that aspirational conservatism represents
> both an adaptation to a social condition in which there
> is a discrepancy between the goals of the larger socie-
> ty, ie. "success," and the limited means available as
> well as a more chronic condition characteristic of many
> societies rather than "retreatism" in relation to the
> American Dream (1967:446).

Finally, Mizruchi suggests that, in the future, re-

searchers attempt to draw more careful distinctions between the various types of anomie which they might wish to empirically test (see also Teevan, 1975).

> Our analysis clearly suggests that:
> (1) more clarity regarding the differences between Merton's and Durkheim's concepts would be desirable;
> (2) our conception of lower class social process may well require over-hauling;
> (3) although Merton's theory does, at given points in the social structure, provide insight and understanding of these processes, contemporary sociology needs a continued assessment of the theory's strengths and weaknesses in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:446).

Hence, in terms of our wider story, Mizruchi is one of the few empirical researchers who have consciously set out to relate Merton's anomie to Durkheimian anomie using Srole's anomia scale. Yet upon reflection on inconsistent findings, Mizruchi has gradually pulled back from any facile identification of these diverse approaches to anomie. His conceptual and research itinerary, and his frank and cogent reflections, constitute a fascinating case study on the vicissitudes of attempting to cross-over these three separate streams of development of anomie. Rather than constituting definite progress in sociological theory, these studies reveal the sterility of the philosophy of science championed by Merton for thirty years. Although unwilling as of 1967 to wholly reject Merton's claims, Mizruchi clearly delivered a body-blow to one of Merton's tacit assumptions, distinguished clearly betweeen the Durkheimian and Mertonian notions of anomie, and cautioned greater care in formulating theory and research tests in these these areas. Mizruchi's work here is significant, then, because it represents the end point in empirical terms of the unquestioned fusion of Durkheim's anomie, Merton's anomie, and Srolian anomia.

CHAPTER EIGHT

MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF ANOMIE

Preface. Alongside the more clearly demarcated streams of
development of anomie, there has emerged a more diffuse and
less systematically refined series of efforts. These miscel-
laneous developments often lack a clear and coherent theoret-
ical perspective; also, since so few have been sufficiently
pursued and elaborated, they cannot really be said to now
constitute distinct and important streams of development. As
this literature too is very large, we shall consider here on-
ly some of the more distinctive theoretical and empirical
studies which formulate or test a new or different notion of
anomie; and further, we shall try to focus primarily on stu-
dies which are not examined elsewhere in the dissertation.
First, let us consider the construction of several new scales
of anomie; second, we shall explore some new theoretical form-
ulations of the meaning of anomie.

A. New Scales and Empirical Research

In a short article, Dwight Dean and Jon Reeves (1962)
consciously claim to set out to test "... whether Durkheim's
hypothesis that Protestants exhibit a higher degree of anomie
than Catholics can be sustained" (1962:208-9). Ignoring the
differences between egoisme and anomie, and the crucial fact
that Durkheim identified Protestants with egoisme and not a-
nomie, Dean and Reeves set out to test their hypotheses by
using their own "normlessness" scale. Like Srole's scale,
Dean and Reeves use their "normlessness" scale in "hitch-
hike" fashion as indirect indices of other concerns, notably
alienation. Also like Srole, Dean and Reeves never bothered
to attempt to relate their notions of anomie to Durkheim's
work. And as with Srole's scale, it is hard to tell exactly

which analytical level is being probed, and whom the referents are. Like Srole's scale, the Dean and Reeve's scale questions are inherently ambiguous. These items are:

    (1) The end often justifies the means.

    (2) People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll ever have anything to depend on.

    (3) Everything is relative and there just aren't any definite rules to live by.

    (4) I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.

    (5) The only thing that one can be sure of today is that he can be sure of nothing.

    (6) With so many religions abroad, one doesn't really know which one to believe (1962:210).

Because there is no conceptualization offered here it is hard to know what the authors intended to test by these items; what we appear to find is a hodge-podge including rule-breaking and the absence of set or absolute norms, relativism, meaninglessness, pluralism and value-conflict, etc. Are each of these dimensions synonymous with anomie, or taken all together? As Teevan (1975) noted of Srole's scale of anomia, Dean and Reeves' scale depends upon projections of the individual into the shoes of the "average man," and also of the individual's own feelings. Again, is anomie here conceived of as an individual psychological problem, or a societal condition?

    Eschewing such questions, Dean and Reeves conclude that their evidence shows that "Durkheim's keen observation of long ago gains empirical validation" (1962:212). Since the theoretical formulation is vague, the scale multi-dimensional and ambiguous, and mistakenly connects Durkheim's notions of anomie rather than egoisme with Protestantism--for these and other reasons--we can hardly follow Dean and Reeves in either their empirical conclusion or testing instrument.

    Unfortunately, two other researchers--Lee and Clyde (1974) followed Dean and Reeves's scale and their empirical hypotheses. On the level of contemporary standards of "normal science" in the sociology of religion, Lee and Clyde's paper suggests at least three interesting propositions:

    (1) "Normlessness" varies inversely with "religiosity;"

      (2) Religious identification (eg. Protestant, Catholic), in contrast to Durkheim and others, is not significantly related to "normlessness;"

      (3) In their study, "normlessness" was more strongly correlated with "religiosity" than with socioeconomic status.

However, Carr and Hauser (1976) came up with findings which conflict with the notion that anomie was inversely related to religiosity. But there are so many conceptual problems in Lee and Clyde's work that it is a moot question what the theoretical significance of their empirical findings might be. McCloskey (1974) offers a detailed analysis and rebuttal of their position which applies to many others of the same genre.

McClosky and Schaar (1965) explicitly set out to construct a scale by which to test for the psychological dimensions of anomie. They offer a much fuller conceptualization than either Srole or Dean and Reeves. McClosky and Schaar propose to:

> ... conceptualize anomy as a state of mind, a cluster of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings in the minds of individuals. Specifically, it is the feeling that the world and oneself are adrift, wandering, lacking in clear rules and stable moorings. The anomic feels literally de-moralized; for him, the norms governing behavior are weak, ambiguous, and remote. He lives in a normative "low pressure" area, a turbulent region of weak and fitful currents of moral meaning. The core of the concept is the feeling of moral emptiness (1965:19).

Further, McClosky and Schaar are sensitive to the difficulties of projecting individual feelings onto the "average man" and calling the aggregated results an index to the anomie of the larger society.

> ... the leap from the subjective feelings expressed by individuals to statements about objective social conditions is a perilous one. What people believe about a society may or may not be an accurate reflection of its nature: perceptions and feelings are never a literal copy of what is "out there" but are always powerfully shaped by the needs, motives, attitudes, and abilities of the observer. Hence, we can never confidently assume that because some people feel anomic the society is anomic. Moreover, even if one could establish that some members of a society report strong anomic sentiments, one could label the society anomic only after systematically comparing that society with others (1965:18-19).

Then McClosky and Schaar propose their basic thesis:
that such anomic feelings are learned, especially by those
in the lower classes, the outsiders, ethnic minority groups,
and so on.

> ... whatever interferes with learning the norms of a so-
> ciety tends to increase anomic feelings among its mem-
> bers....In short, whatever interferes with one's abil-
> ity to learn a community's norms, or weakens one's so-
> cialization into its central patterns of belief, must
> be considered among the determinants of anomy (1965:20).

Specifically, McClosky and Schaar focus on three types of fact-
ors which may impair effective learning norms.

> The personal factors that impair learning and socializa-
> tion may be divided into three categories: (1) Cognitive
> factors that influence one's ability to learn and under-
> stand; (2) Emotional factors that tend to lower one's
> ability to perceive reality correctly; (3) Substantive
> beliefs and attitudes that interfere with successful com-
> munication and interaction (1965:21).

To test for these three complexes, these researchers construct
the following nine-item scale:

> (1) With everything so uncertain these days, it almost
> seems as though anything could happen.
>
> (2) What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of
> friendship that lasted for a lifetime.
>
> (3) With everything in such a state of disorder, its hard
> for a person to know where he stands from one day to
> the next.
>
> (4) Everything changes so quickly these days that I often
> have trouble deciding which are the right rules to
> follow.
>
> (5) I often feel that many things our parents stood for
> are just going to ruin before our very eyes.
>
> (6) The trouble with the world today is that most people
> really don't believe in anything.
>
> (7) I often feel awkward and out of place.
>
> (8) People were better off in the old days when everyone
> knew just how he was expected to act.
>
> (9) It seems to me that other people find it easier to
> decide what is right than I do (1965:23).

However, even though McClosky and Schaar attempt to con-
ceptualize more fully their notion of psychological anomie, un-
fortunately their scale is prone to the same flaws as many others.

First, it is unclear why they would wish to identify their notions and scale with anomie, for these bear little relation to Durkheim's ideas. Their formulation is probably closer to the Parsonian stream, with its premises of normative confusion, lack of definiteness of norms, breakdown in the relational system of society and culture, and so on. Second, as noted with Srole's scale and Dean and Reeves's scale (see Teevan 1975), the present scale mixes analytical levels and prime referents--for example, items five, seven, and nine ask for the individual's own feelings, while the other items ask him to project his own attitudes onto the larger society. Also, their legitimation of their scale items is tautologous --for they simply define as anomic who scores high in re - sponse to their items, whereas it is these items which set out to find out what anomie is in the first place. One can hardly object to their scale, given such a premise, that it does not really test anomie at all, for anomie is, by definition, what the scale tests. However, close examination reveals that this scale, too, appears to be a grab-bag of different concepts and psychological and sociocultural conditions. Apparently included here are: general uncertainty, lack of social ties, unpredictability coming from rapid social change, loss of continiuity with the past, a deflation of traditional values, relativism and pluralism, loss of normative clarity from generation to generation, and so on. Rushing suggests that this normlessness scale ".... appears to refer more to unpredictability and meaninglessness and to the <u>effects</u> of normlessness ... than to normlessness itself" (1971:860). McClosky and Schaar themselves sum up their scatter-gun approach to defining the so-called "anomic mentality" in these terms:

> The items express the feelings that people today lack firm convictions and standards, that it is difficult to tell right from wrong in our complex and disorderly world, that the traditional values which gave meaning to the individual and order to society have lost their force, and that the social ties which once bound men together have dissolved (1965:24).

Nettler (1965:763) questions the validity (meaning) of their scale of anomy, and suggests that their scale, like Srole's, may actually measure a sort of generalized despair. Curiously, McClosky and Schaar (1965:767) agree with Nettler. But if their scale actually measures generalized despair, then why not simply call their scale a measure of individual projection of a generalized feeling of despair rather than anomie? I hardly find it acceptable to add yet another confusing synonym for anomie. Why don't researchers simply make up their own terms for their own ideas, be bold and straight about it, rather than trying to cash in on the still resonant "charisma-on-deposit" of the founding fathers (see McCloskey, 1974)?

Critical of the Srole, Dean and Reeves, and McClosky-Schaar scales, William Rushing (1971) set out to construct his own scale of psychological alienation or an individual's feeling of generalized normlessness. Items in Rushing's scale include the following:

(1) Is a person justified in doing almost anything if the reward is high enough?

(2) Some people say you have to do things that are wrong in order to get ahead in the world today. What do you think?

(3) Would you say that the main reason people obey the law is the punishment that comes if they are caught?

(4) Some people say that to be a success it is usually necessary to be dishonest. Do you think this is true?

(5) In your opinion, is the honest life the best regardless of the hardships it may cause?

(6) In your opinion, should people obey the law no matter how much it interferes with their personal ambitions?
(1971:861).

Though there is a certain degree of redundancy, Rushing's scale has at least two advantages over related scales of normlessness. Except for item one which asks for projection into the shoes of an abstract "person," Rushing's scale specifically asks for the individual's (you, your) attitudes. Second, since Rushing's items are theoretically grounded in the Mertonian notion of anomie, they consistently attempt to test an individual's feeling of the pervasiveness of deviations from a

generalized normative order, especially in terms of the per-
ceived propensity to use illegitimate means to pragmatically
further one's own self-interest. Indeed, Rushing expressly
indicates that his scale is close in content to Han's (1968)
scale of "illegitimate expediency." Therefore, in this regard,
Rushing's scale of normlessness is better suited than Srole's
anomia scale as a test for Mertonian anomie.

However, Rushing's scale neglects to address the two
major premises of Merton's theory--namely, whether people
feel our culture places a great emphasis on individual achiev-
ement and success for everyone and whether the means of a-
chievement are differentially distributed. Furthermore, as
noted earlier, one of Rushing's more significant findings
is that the crucial factor is not so much the posited Merton-
ian disjunction between goals and means as the cultural inter-
pretations given to blocked opportunity. Hence, any new scale
should include this factor as a crucial component.

Finally, let us consider some of the empirical studies
of Warren Breed who has shed new light on one of Durkheim's
forgotten types--namely, fatalisme, the opposite of anomie.
Breed's 1963 study relates Durkheim's idea of "de-classifica-
tion" in anomie suicide to the "downward mobility" of the sta-
tus "skidder." Then, in his 1970 study, Breed extends Durk-
heim's ideas on "fatalisme" and oppressive regulation to Ne-
groes and American Indians. Breed's reappropriation of "fatal-
isme" as a type of suicide is valuable for two reasons. First,
since so many contemporary formulations of anomie are almost
indistinguishable from what Durkheim meant by "fatalisme,"
Breed helps us to differentiate, once again, Durkheimian ano-
mie from its opposite. Second, in applying "fatalisme" to a
number of cases, Breed demonstrates its empirical and theoret-
ical relevance in contemporary society. He remarks, for in-
stance, that the "... suicide among young, low class single
Negro males is frequently fatalistic suicide" (1970:162).
Surely, it is a sad commentary on the history of sociology
that Durkheim's central notion of anomie had become so fuzzed

that, until Breed, it had become inverted into its opposite!

B. New Theoretical Formulations of Anomie

Since Durkheim's work is so central to sociology, and since anomie is so central a sociological concept, a review of various secondary observers' and thinkers' accounts and concepts might potentially include almost every introductory textbook and history of sociological thought, we obviously cannot attempt such a review here. Nor shall we even detail usages or passing references to anomie by luminaries such as MacIver (1950), Lasswell (1952), Wolin, (1960), Riesman et al (1950), Nisbet (1966), Coser (1971), and so on and so forth. However, since Sebastian de Grazia makes anomie the central superstructure of his suggestive study (1948) on the modern political community, we shall briefly explore his treatment of anomie here.

De Grazia's notions are of importance to our present interests for a number of reasons. First, his formulation is an independent one, derived directly from Durkheim himself, instead of being filtered through Parsons' and Merton's interpretations. Also, it is an application of Durkheim's notions to the field of political science. Further, when de Grazia does quote Durkheim (eg. 1948:3-5, 99-100), he recognizes to a certain extent that insatiability played a crucial role in Durkheim's perspective (eg. 1948:4). Moreover, completely on his own, de Grazia comes close to recognizing the crucial step necessary for moving from Durkheim's first to his second notions of anomie (see Books Two and Three). Specifically, de Grazia questions Durkheim's tacit assumption that insatiable desires are innate, and insightfully suggests instead that they are learned.

> When Durkheim spoke of the ill effects of "illimitable desires," he failed to realize that the establishment of illimitable desires in man is itself the result of a well-developed system of beliefs. It is not the natural result of man's freedom from all restraining rules or norms of behavior. Far from being natural to man, it took a long time to groom him for the mere idea of illimitable acquisition. To be the very model of the

indefatigable entrepeneur it was necessary that a man
drink in activism with his porridge or count among his
ancestors a person who, with Cotton Mather, read a lit-
tle of Calvin each night "to sweeten his mouth" (1948:
72).

This insight is especially important for our present purposes
because this passage comes directly at the end of a chapter
devoted by de Grazia to the tension exerted on modern men by
the Protestant Ethos! In short, de Grazia sees that Durkheim-
ian anomic insatiability is--yes, a morbid condition--but al-
so one that is learned, and not innate; it is the result of
specific historical types of cultural conditioning (see Book
Three).   Finally, given this background, although de
Grazia cites crucial passages from Durkheim's Suicide illus-
trating primarily anomie as insatiability or the "infinity of
desires" alongside de Tocqueville's pregnant observations on
American society (eg. 1948:99-100), somehow de Grazia fails
to draw the conclusion that Durkheimian anomie is culturally
sanctioned in American culture.

Perhaps what held de Grazia back was his loose, even
metaphorical, "catch-all" definition of anomie as a conflict
in values and belief systems. He suggests that Durkheim's no-
tion essentially implied a breakdown in common, binding, sat-
isfying belief systems: "... as the disintegrated system of
a society that possesses no body of common values or morals
which effectively govern conduct" (1948:xii). "For him [Durk-
heim], anomie was most often the disordered condition of a
society that possessed a weak conscience collective ... the
ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens
of the same community" (1948:4-5). Specifically, de Grazia
suggests that "... anomie as Durkheim conceived it in the
subjective sense had three characteristics: a painful uneasi-
ness or anxiety, a feeling of separation from the group or
isolation from group standards, a feeling of pointlessness
or that no certain goals exist" (1948:5). Now, while de Gra-
zia's conception of anomie is primarily subjective, in con-
trast to Durkheim and Merton's which are primarily societal,
his distinction between simple and acute anomie is valuable

in that it indicates that anomie, whether societal or subjective, may differ in degree; that it is not an all-or-nothing condition (see also Merton, 1957:163). However, in the last analysis, de Grazia's loose usage of anomie as almost synonymous with the ills and tensions of the modern world render it less usable as a concept than our analysis; it is too generalized a concept, lacking the specificity we gave anomie here in Book Three.

Marvin Olsen (1965) claims to have discovered that Durkheim used the notion of anomie in two different ways in The Division of Labor and in Suicide. Basically, Olsen says that in the first book anomie referred to inadequate functional integration, while in the latter anomie referred to inadequate normative integration.

> ... anomie, as Durkheim first conceived it in The Division of Labor in Society, might be defined as a condition of inadequate procedural rules to regulate complementary relationships among the specialized and interdependent parts of a complex social system. In Suicide, Durkheim makes extensive use of the concept of anomie, but gives it a different meaning. He begins with the assumption that man's social and emotional needs are unlimited, as compared with physical needs, which are automatically regulated by the body.... Under stable social conditions, the collective conscience defines and orders social relationships. As societies become more complex and dynamic however, social controls weaken, and men are led to aspire to goals which are extremely difficult or impossible to obtain. These pressures for "infinite" or "receding" goals then generate additional stresses within the normative order.... In sum, anomie, as Durkheim described it in Suicide, might be defined as a condition of inadequate moral norms to guide and control the actions of people and groups in the interests of the social system (1965:40-1).

Now, Olsen is undoubtedly on to something important here; one need only note that many secondary reformulations (see Part II of this appendix) of Durkheim's suicide schema revolve around precisely the problem of reconciling the structural-functional and normative dimensions. And, to a certain extent, Olsen is justified (see Books Two and Three) in characterizing the early and later notions of anomie in two different ways.

> Two significant differences are noticeable between
> Durkheim's early and later uses of anomie. First, in
> The Division of Labor, anomie refers to inadequate pro-
> cedural rules for interaction, whereas in Suicide it
> means inadequate moral norms for social control. In one
> case the emphasis is on functional expediency, while in
> the other case the concern is for social responsibility.
> .... The discussion of organic solidarity in The Divi-
> sion of Labor is concerned with functional integration,
> whereas Suicide is directed toward normative integra-
> tion. Anomic division of labor therefore refers to inad-
> equate functional relationships among specialized parts
> of a social system, while anomic suicide is the result
> of an inadequate normative order in society (1965:41-2).

Finally, to distinguish between the two different connotations
of anomie, Olsen (1965:43) suggests that the term "discordance"
be used to "... refer to a relative state of inadequate proce-
dural rules for maintaining functional relationships."

While on one level Olsen's distinctions are well taken,
on a deeper level Olsen misses the "nuclear structure" of Durk-
heim's thought. I went to great lengths in Book One to lay out
the continuity and in-depth structure of Durkheim's thought
which cut across all his works. And in Book Two I connected
Durkheim's first schema of suicide with his notions of the
anomic division of labor. While Olsen sees, on the simple top-
ographical exegetical level, the apparent differences between
Durkheim's use of anomie in 1893 and his use of anomie in 1897,
because his analysis has no depth, he neglects to see the deep-
er connections between the two notions. Nor can he make wider
sense of the difference he has discovered. In short, Olsen has
stumbled on to something important here, but he doesn't quite
know what it is, or its significance.

Although he does not cite Olsen, a similar thesis can be
found in Stephen Marks's lengthy review (1974) of Durkheim's
changing theory of anomie. Like Olsen, Marks appears to detect
certain differences in Durkheim's theory of anomie as it devel-
oped through his career. Like Olsen, Marks is on to something
here--a sympathetic reading might dispose us to grant that he
has discovered a potentially troublesome hiatus between Durk-
heim's micro and macrosociological approaches to resolving the
problem of anomie and the "moral anarchy" of the modern world.

One might abstract Marks's argument as follows.

> A hiatus between Durkheim's micro and macrosociological
> analyses of anomie has been discovered. Focusing on Durk-
> heim's program to "engineer the crisis of anomie out of
> existence" (1974:330), this paper shows that Durkheim
> attempted successively four different solutions. The key
> to each solution concerns what structural base generates
> what kind and level of normative consensus. On the micro-
> level, Durkheim first tried the occupational solution.
> The problem of anomie was then shifted to the macrolevel,
> where the "bold problem that Durkheim ... now set for
> himself" (1974:338) was how to generate a "macro-nomos,"
> "a societal self-consciousness." On the macrosocietal le-
> vel, Durkheim explored two indirect "gate-keeper" solu-
> tions in terms of normative mediation by political and
> educational elites. Finally, Durkheim suggests the direct
> macro societal solution of charismatic mass movements.
> Ultimately, however, all these theoretical solutions to
> the problem of anomie failed on their own terms. It is
> concluded that Durkheim's attempts were doomed to fail-
> ure, in any case, since anomie inevitably characterizes
> any large group (see McCloskey, 1976a).

While there are many valuable things about Marks's argument
on the topographic exegetical level, his analysis is beset by
many problems. As with so many others who dare to tread in
these treacherous regions, Marks's account simply has little
notion of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. Spe-
cifically, this means that Marks slights: (a) Durkheim's cru-
cial doctrine of the inherent egotism and insatiability of
the presocialized individual; (b) Durkheim's central explana-
tory model linking superstructural (cultural) collectively
representational processes to substructural social morpholog-
ical processes; (c) Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary perspect-
ive, especially his notion of the primitive sacral complex;
(d) Durkheim's developing concern with civilizational proces-
ses; (e) Durkheim's central concern, on the world-historical
level, with universalizing, autonomizing, and rationalizing
inter-cultural processes. If one attempts to address any part
of Durkheim's sociology, especially his notion of anomie, with-
out reference to these and other crucial anchors of his system,
one runs the risk of seriously distorting the true meaning
and significance of anomie. This is precisely the limitation
of all topographic exegeses (on all of this see McCloskey,
1976a).

Yinger (1964), like de Grazia, makes a valuable attempt to distinguish between different degrees of anomie. Yinger especially tries to differentiate between cultural pluralism and anomie. Yinger raises some good questions:

> What is the opposite of an anomic situation? Is it a completely stable society where everyone agrees on both goals and appropriate means? If so, it is quite unimaginable in the modern world, where social change is chronic, diverse ethnic and religious groups live within the same society, and individual choice and freedom are ranked high as values. Anomie is a variable that can range from little to much (1964:159).
>
> Are heterogeneous and pluralistic societies by definition anomic (1964:159?

No, Yinger answers, and then suggests a criterion for this important judgment.

> A person strongly committed to his own values and thoroughly aware of the extent of value disagreement is likely to declare that society is dissolving in chaos, that anomie is upon us. But if anomie is not an individual moral term but a concept referring to the operations of a group, we need some way of distinguishing anomic value disagreements from what I call pluralistic value disagreements. If the disagreement does not disrupt the workings of the society--the interactions of members that require the fufillment of shared expectations--it is pluralistic, not anomic (1964:160).

Utilizing Merton's (eg. 1964) "social imitation hypothesis," Yinger proposes a "cyclic test of anomie": "... value disagreements that tend to spread through the social system are anomic; those that have no tendency to spiral are pluralistic" (1964:161). Then Yinger distinguishes between four related types: cultural unity, cultural pluralism, subcultural anomie, and full anomie, in terms of the criteria of whether value disagreements are present, whether value disagreements disrupt interaction, and whether value disagreements are cumulative (1964:162).

> This quasi-scale is meant to suggest a range from a situation in which normative agreement is high and governs most interactions to one in which normative agreement is low, and because of that very fact, tends to fall ever lower. In situation one interactions are effectively governed by the system of shared expectations. In situation two (pluralism), there are some value disagreements, but these are accepted as legitimate

> or desirable, at least they are tolerated.... Situation
> three (subcultural anomie) represents the beginning of
> anomie--a situation in which value disagreements dis-
> rupt the pattern of mutual expectations; the differen-
> ces make a difference....[we see] a "demoralization"--
> the lack of widely shared norms to control the inter-
> action. In situation four (full anomie), demoralization
> has gone farther. Value confusion now characterizes not
> only interactions among individuals, but the inner lives
> of many individuals as well (1964:161-2).

If one accepts the Parsonian-Mertonian frames in which Yinger
works here, these are, of course, valuable refinements of the
full range of anomic possibilities.

Especially in terms of race relations during the 1960's,
Yinger saw an unmistakable trend of increasingly anomic social
interaction, a spreading spiral of ungoverned relations. "...
there has been a great increase in anomie, both in the sense
of normlessness (disagreement on norms in an interacting group)
and in the sense of the use of illegitimate means in the pur-
suit of culturally learned goals (1964:163). Further, noting
that "Modern societies are made up of various combinations of
the four normative situations discussed, with the two middle
areas--pluralism and subcultural anomie--often of great im-
portance" (1964:168), Yinger goes on to emphasize:

> ... the complexity of modern societies. They are neith-
> er "riddled with anomie," nor likely in the foreseeable
> future to eliminate it. If one starts from a strongly
> ideological position, he is likely to mistake pluralism
> for anomie: since so many people do not behave accord-
> ing to my norms, there is normlessness. In a heterogen-
> eous society it is not easy, as Robin Williams says, to
> distinguish deviation from the norms from (1) subcultur-
> al variation; (2) a permissible alternative interpreta-
> tion of general norms, or (3) patterned evasions of "he-
> roic" norms that are so common that the evasions them-
> selves are normative (1964:163).

Again, these are valuable distinctions; far too many scales
of anomie are really only self-fulfilling prophecies--since
the investigator defines the self and society as normless,
they then discover widespread and pervasive projections of
anomie! Or, if people do not agree with my norms, the socie-
ty is going to hell in a handbasket. Clearly, neither of
these projections are acceptable as indicators of sociocul-

tural anomie. Yinger's distinctions would prove helpful in clearing up the loose theoretical formulations and projections of anomie by liberal-radical thinkers on the larger society, and might also help researchers better test exactly what they set out to explore.

Finally, Yinger, who works largely with a Parsonian-Mertonian "functionalist" framework, tends at a few points to recapture some of Durkheim's original emphases. For instance, when he turns to consider the rising anomie during the 1960's, Yinger speaks of the rising level of aspirations in these terms:

> I think there can be little doubt that the urbanization of American society, the increase in education, the diffusion of media of communication, the enormous visibility of goods and services available, among other influences, have raised the levels of expectations enormously. Opportunity structures have probably not kept pace with opportunities envisaged--the very essence of anomie as Merton sees it (1964:164).

However, Yinger fails to consider whether such an opportunity-aspiration disjunction is not inherent in American society--for Durkheim's notion of anomie is that aspirations always outstrip reality, because they are inherently limitless. If so, American culture is permeated with acute Durkheimian anomie (of the second variety).

In the mid-1970's, two other thinkers raised this problem in a slightly different way. Simon and Gagnon (1976) suggest that, in contrast to Merton's notions of an "anomie of deprivation caused by scarcity," we see today an "anomie of affluence." Whereas Merton emphasized lack of access to structtural means of achieving cultural success goals, Simon and Gagnon emphasize that ease of access to means of success trivializes achievement, it depreciates the "currency." Addressing themselves especially to the loss of support for the standard American Dream of individual success among upper-middle and middle-class youth during the 1960's and '70's, Simon and Gagnon see a "demystification of success":"Where success is hard to get it is worth a lot, where it is easy, it becomes worthless." "In such a situation, the problematic nature of

the means that plays such a crucial part in Merton's formulation tends to lose much of its significance" (1976:369). In contrast to Merton's typology of adaptations and much of deviance research which had traditionally focussed on non-conforming outsiders and lower-classes, Simon and Gagnon observe that "It is the largely neglected and largely unexplained deviance of those in the higher economic and educational strata" (1976:369) which is to be explored under the title of the "anomia of affluence." To be fair to Merton, however, it should be noted that he has explored the related problem of the "anomie of success" in 1964 and elsewhere. In any case, Simon and Gagnon's contribution to understanding the sociocultural situation in which the commitment to goals, to the prime cultural values themselves becomes problematic (instead of the less critical Mertonian notion of lessened commitment to operating institutional means) is a welcome one. Perhaps we might surmise, as is suggested in Book Four, that the withdrawalof affect from the dominant success goals and"American Dream"ideology during the cultural revolution of the 1960's and '70's had something more to do with the rejection of the anomie--the embedded egoism and insatiability of American culture. Although Simon and Gagnon did recognize that Durkheim's notion of anomie referred to insatiability, they neglect to link the rejection of the endless, exhausting, and destructive American drive for individual success with the ravages of Durkheimian anomie.

Finally, let us consider the ambitious attempt of Elwin Powell (1958) to redefine the meaning of anomie in terms of occupation, status, and suicide. Freely mixing sociological, psychological, and psychoanalytic perspectives, Powell proposes that the common denominator of the different elements of Durkheim's typology and the different definitions of anomie is "meaninglessness." Proceeding from what he takes to be Durkheim's and Merton's discussions, Powell contends: "When the ends of action become contradictory, inaccessible, or insignificant, a condition of anomie arises. Characterized by a

general loss of orientation and accompanied by feelings of
"emptiness" and apathy, anomie can be simply conceived of as
meaninglessness" (1958:132).

Powell then constructs a U-shaped scale to describe sui-
cides based upon occupational status. Powell terms the lower
extreme "anomie as dissociation"--the skidders, men in retreat
from the world, and "desocialized personalities"--devoid of a
coherent conceptual structure, impotent to act, and so forth.
At the upper end with the professional-managerial groups, Pow-
ell distinguishes "anomie as envelopment." In contrast to the
other end (type V) where "anomie seems to be associated with
a fragmentation of the conceptual" and (quoting Durkheim) re-
sults from "society's insufficient presence in the individual,"
in this type the "self is almost completely enveloped by the
success ideology and presents the paradox of what might be
called institutionalized anomie, ie. meaninglessness arising
from normative regulation itself." Here Powell comes close to
the transition from Durkheim's first to second schema of sui-
cide with his notion of an "institutionalized anomie" among
professional-managerial types in business and the liberal
professions. Because the "whole of life" for these upper-mid-
dle class occupational groups "revolves around drives for
success, it wholly permeates the individual who thus has no
life of his own." Yet, while insightful in a number of ways,
Powell concludes in contrast to Durkheim that:

> The source of anomie is not the destruction of ends or
> the quest for infinitely receding goals, but the inabil-
> ity of the self to reconstruct its own ends from the
> raw materials (concepts) presented to it by the culture.
> Living by the unexamined directives of the culture, the
> person has the sense of being totally controlled by for-
> ces outside himself. Hence, he feels he is not really
> living at all (1958:139).

Powell then summarizes his ambitious reconstruction of Durk-
heim's theory of anomie, and his own U-shaped continuum of
dissociation and envelopment in these terms:

> As opposite poles of a continuum, two forms of anomie
> can be discerned: the one results from the self's dis-
> sociation from, the other, its envelopment by, the con-
> ceptual system of the culture. Both render the indivi-

dual impotent and thus give rise to self-contempt which in extreme cases eventuates in suicide (1958:139).

Now, while Powell's article contains useful insights, and approaches both Durkheim's notions of anomie at certain points and our second schema, his claim that the essence of Durkheim's theory is "meaninglessness" is itself almost meaningless, for it is without any demonstration beyond bald assertion. Indeed, Powell's interesting but highly arbitary redefinition of anomie seems somewhat like a sponge soaking up any and all available meanings of anome, egoisme, alienation, and the like. Once again, anomie reveals its nature as a protean concept.

In a little known but excellent rejoinder to Powell's proposals, Cary-Lundberg (1959) raised a series of questions with a degree of insight and historical precision rarely seen in these matters. Her perspicacious response to Powell's fuzzing of Durkheimian anomie can be taken as a valuable critique of the dispersive tendencies of the miscellaneous stream of development of anomie. First, Cary-Lundberg asks whether Powell's rather arbitrary declaration that the essence of Durkheim's anomie is "meaninglessness" is true to Durkheim's usage and intentions.

> Durkheim's major concern in Le Suicide is with a society as a collectivity, with the state of its ordre collectif and its conscience collective. To describe Europe's collective consciousness pre-1900, Durkheim used the term malaise. A sickness, not economic, but moral, he said, afflicts France and the West because all previously existing cadres have either broken down or been worn away by time. Thus: social disorganization; discarded and discredited norms; a flat unwillingness to accept in any form a checkrein on pleasures, appetites, production, or prosperity.... In de-controlled societies "suffering" from anomie, he said, large numbers of men are driven to suicide by frustration at the collapse of exaggerated hopes, by exasperation at the failure of excessive ambitions, by rage over being balked in any pursuit....

> Anomie ... can by no scientific canon be "simply conceived as meaninglessness" (1959:250, 251).

She concludes her excellent short response by soliciting "Mr. Powell's reexamination of his primary source ... his findings

do not require him to redefine anomie. On the contrary, they
require Durkheim's type of refined analysis and penetrating
insight" (1959:252). Powell's reply, in turn, rests simply
on his weak assertion that he is working in the spirit of
Durkheim rather than from his explicit works!

It often happens that, as a stream of thought begins
to diffuse and confuse the original paradigm, an incisive
commentator will bring the intellectual exhaustion to public
light. The various criticisms of Merton's anomie, Mizruchi's
questioning of the relations between Mertonian and Durkheimi-
an anomie, and Cary-Lundberg's incisive rebuttal to Powell's
arbitrary claims, illustrate this possibility. At such times,
two basic options seem open: either disregard the original
conception and boldly strike out on one's own, without mak-
ing any self-legitimating claims, or stop the facile and mis-
leading identifications of different streams of thought and
try to recapture the fullness of the pioneer's ideas.

PART II

CONFUSIONS OVER DURKHEIM'S TYPOLOGY OF SUICIDE

Introduction. Despite the almost universally acclaimed para-
digmatic status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide re-
mains largely undeveloped and confused in the sociological
literature. While social scientists have lavished attention on
anomie, with diverse results, the complementary types of ego-
isme, altruisme, and fatalisme continue to languish in socio-
logical darkness. If Durkheim himself, for instance, insisted
that egoisme was responsible for more suicides in the modern
world than anomie, how has it been possible for sociologists
to either consistently ignore egoisme or to collapse it into
anomie? In turn, how has it been possible, even for historical
sociologists and ethnographers, to ignore the historical and
cultural implications of altruisme and fatalisme? Of Durkheim's
four types, only one--anomie--really survives; what accounts
for this radical truncation of his profound and complex theo-
ries? Is this truncation and distortion an outcome unique to
the reception of Durkheim's doctrines? Or, on the other hand,
can we begin to see here the outlines of a generic sociolcul-
tural process (see McCloskey, 1974)?

Several other observers of the curious fate of Durk-
heim's typology have noted this characteristic process. For
instance, although over fifteen years ago Dohrenwend noted
"... a tendency to overlook the conditions labelled by the
companion concepts of egoism and altruism, and the footnoted
stepchild, fatalism, has all but been ignored" (1959:466), the
balance between these equally important types has yet to be
fully redressed. Giddens (1966:277) observed: "Durkheim's
types of egoistic and anomic suicide ... have not been devel-
oped by later sociologists as a typology." Over a decade after

Dohrenwend's initial statement of concern, A.R. Mawson echoed both Dohrenwend and Giddens: "The relations between Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoisme have been virtually ignored in the substantial body of literature on social pathology" (1970: 298).

Now, the mystery surrounding the virtual disappearance of three-quarters of Durkheim's typology of suicide is deepened by the curious fact that anomie--the one type developed by sociologists--has been mostly applied to theories of deviance and despair, while sociologists concerned with understanding suicide have largely ignored both egoisme and anomie by translating them into some standard sociological euphemism such as social disintegration, normlessness, alienation, and so forth. And it is unfortunate that Durkheim's typology of suicide has had little impact on historical or philosophically minded sociologists concerned with historical processes and the origins and dilemmas of the modern and post-modern worlds. Giddens observes in this regard:

> Sociologists studying suicide have tended to reject the concept of anomie as either being indistinguishable from egoisme, or as having little explanatory reference to suicide. Writers concerned with other forms of deviant behavior, on the other hand, have made anomie the mainspring of a general theory.... There seems to be little logic in the uneven use which has been made of these concepts * (1966:277).

Durkheim's fate here has been cleverly summed up by one observer: "Clearly our estimate of Durkheim is more reverential than referential. Presently it is less appreciation than patterned evasion" (C. Parker Wolf, 1966:723). As I indicated earlier (see Book Three), Durkheim's classic Suicide has experienced a doubly sad fate, for not only has anomie--his most famous concept--undergone routine and progressive distortion-- but at the same time the rest of Durkheim's complementary typology has also been routinely ignored, and thus relegated to sociological darkness.

Fortunately, over the years several observers have attempted to rescue Durkheim's typology from obscurity. We shall now briefly explore their widely diverging reinterpretations.

Attempts to restore Durkheim's schema to the center stage of
sociological thought can be roughly classified into two differ-
ent types--what I shall term "reductions" and "rescues." By
the former I refer to those reinterpretations which argue that
Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced
down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues" re-
fer to those interpretations which seek to restore the full
measure of distinction to the four interrelated types of sui-
cide. Of course, we cannot here review all the various descrip-
tive summaries or recapitulations of Durkheim's typology in
the secondary literature; rather, we shall be concerned only
with those who argue a distinctive reduction or rescue of the
four types.

Underlying these conflicting discussions is the recogni-
tion, of course, that the structure and meaning of Durkheim's
typology of suicide is not self-evidently clear, that it may
often be ambiguous, and in process of development. Precisely
because the schemas are obscure, they require careful inter-
pretation. Something lost, something hidden--it is to the re-
covery of such meanings that we sharpen our hermeneutical
tools.   .

Let us turn first to consider several reductions of
Durkheim's typology, and then, finally, consider several res-
cues of the distinctness of all four types which serve as a
bridge to our own second schema of suicide as developed in
Book Three.   Our guiding assumptions here are that any
adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide must:
(a) take seriously the reductionists' attempts to elucidate an
underlying unity to the four types, and (b) follow the rescuers
in their attempt to elucidate the distinctness of the four
types. Hence, we seek to reconcile this conflict by simultan-
eously interrelating the four types, yet maintaining their dis-
tinctness. We seek here a coherent unity-in-diversity (see
also Part I, Book Three).

CHAPTER NINE

REDUCTIONS

A. Poggi and The Four-Fold Table

Following Parsons' emphasis on normative regulation,
Gianfranco Poggi (1972) suggests that social cohesion is
really dependent upon normative regulation. Although citing
neither Barclay Johnson (1965) nor Bruce Dohrenwend (1959),
Poggi attempts to demonstrate his theses by showing that Durk-
heim's typology cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms
of a standard four-fold table.

Although Poggi has a point in revealing the essential
links between social structural integration and normative reg-
ulation, in attempting to argue his thesis, Poggi--as with the
other reductionists--goes to the other extreme by insisting
that there is no significant difference between these variables,
and thus between egoisme and anomie. And, of course, like the
others, Poggi neglects to ask whether the variables of social
cohesion and normative regulation are sufficient to adequately
conceptualize the full complexity of Durkheim's types.

> The distinctions between cohesion and regulation, like
> that between mechanical and organic solidarity, may be
> one on which Durkheim places more weight than its ana-
> lytical tenability warrants. In particular, his inter-
> pretation of the differential suicide rates of various
> religious groups implicitly suggests that in his own
> view a society's cohesion depends on the extent to which
> which individuals are made the subject of norms, and
> is thus a product of regulation. The fact that in one
> passage his distinction between "egoistic" and "anomic"
> suicide is linked to that between cohesion and regula-
> tion ... is not decisive for two reasons. In the first
> place, the distinction between egoistic and anomic sui-
> cide can be alternatively construed in terms of differ-
> ent types of norms. In the second place, Durkheim's own
> attempts to base the distinction on that between cohe-
> sion and regulation is intrinsically faulty. This can

> best be seen from a longish footnote [S:279] in which
> Durkheim insists that cohesion and regulation should
> be treated as mutually independent variables but fails
> to establish his case (1972:200).

While Poggi's argument, as with the other reductionists, is
valuable in that it attempts to establish a deeper, underlying
coherence to Durkheim's typology, Poggi seems so consumed by
the search for normative themes in Durkheim's doctrines that
he is also willing, like the other reductionists, to simply
set aside or contradict Durkheim's own statements when they
run counter to their theses. This, then, is the virtue and
vice of the reductionists: while, on the one hand, they will
lead us to articulate the interrelation of all four types in
terms of some underlying unity, they will, on the other hand,
lead us to ignore or swamp out crucial differences between
the various types. Instead of generating an articulated sche-
ma, the reductionists lead us to one irreducible common de-
nominator, a radical reduction to one category.

To demonstrate his contention that underlying Durkheim's
typology is the single, fundamental continuum of normative reg-
ulation, Poggi attempts to categorize Durkheim's schema in
terms of a simple, standard four-fold table. Failure to do so,
Poggi holds, implies the rejection of all attempts to maintain
the distinctness of Durkheim's types.

> But there is no way of constructing such a table with
> Durkheim's pretended independent variables as its two
> coordinates and his four types of suicide as its cells;
> that is, no "property space" comprising the four types
> will result from actually treating his two variables
> as independent and crossing them (1972:201).

As might be expected, however, Poggi neglects to inquire whe-
ther: (a) there are any other adequate ways of schematically
conceptualizing Durkheim's types in a coherent structure; (b)
there is any inherent necessity in conceptualizing Durkheim's
types exclusively in terms of a simple four-fold table; (c)
and if not, whether this still disqualifies Durkheim's own ex-
plicit statements to the contrary.

Since he fails to pursue such alternative formulations,
Poggi concludes:

> Cohesion and regulation [can be] juxtaposed, but they
> cannot be "crossed," either because they are not inde-
> pendent of one another or because they belong to dif-
> ferent levels of conceptualization. I have already sug-
> gested that Durkheim's own treatment assumes the depen-
> dence of cohesion on regulation in spite of his claims
> to the contrary. At any rate, Durkheim's repeated dis-
> cussions of the nature of society, the concept of so-
> cial fact, and on morals unequivocally indicate that
> in his thought normative regulation has no rival as the
> central and critical component of society (1972:201-2).

Again, Poggi's claim is valuable in that it directs our atten-
tion to the pervasiveness of normative themes in Durkheim's
notion of social control; however, Poggi's argument is no more
acceptable than many of the translations of anomie since, it
too, ignores much of the underlying "nuclear structure" of
Durkheim's thought. How can one speak, for instance, of the
need for "normative regulation" unless one knows what Durkheim
thought needed controlling--namely, the insatiable passions of
the pre-socialized ego? Not including this factor in any dis-
cussion of Durkheim's theory of normative regulation is a
basic failure. Further, even given his two central variables
of social cohesion and normative regulation, Poggi neglects
to explore Barclay Johnson's interesting attempt to schemati-
cally present just these two factors in terms of high and low
positions, or Anthony Giddens' helpful attempt to present ano-
mie and egoisme as representing two low positions on two con-
tinuums of integration, social and normative. For these and
other reasons, Poggi's curious exercise demonstrates little,
except the limitations of four-fold tables as standard inter-
pretive devices, and the binds interpreters get themselves in-
to by slighting whole portions of the very doctrine which
they hope to understand.

B. Barclay Johnson's Reduction

In one of the more interesting and independent analyses of Durkheim's types, Barclay Johnson alleges that all four types can be reduced down to one basic underlying dimension-- integration or regulation. However, in order to reduce the distinctness of Durkheim's types down to one homogeneous, common denominator, Johnson is forced to do great violence not only to Durkheim's crucial doctrines of human nature and his image of the direction of historical development, but also to much evidence in Durkheim's own statements opposing such a reduction. One thing is certainly clear, however, from such an attack as Johnson's--any adequate theory of suicide, even if based upon their essential distinctiveness, must follow interpreters such as Halbwachs, Gibbs and Martin, Johnson and others in so far as they attempt to establish common foundations for egoisme and anomie.

Johnson begins well enough by identifying from the first part of Durkheim's work two key "independent variables" --namely, social integration and social regulation (eg. see also Smelser, 1976: 90). Then Johnson characterizes these as continuums, with high, low and medium possibilities. Next, he matrices these possibilities--anomie, fatalisme, egoisme, and altruisme--as low and high locations on these continuums of regulation and integration, respectively. As long as one ignores Durkheim's inherent dichotomizing tendencies, and his doctrines of human nature and history, Johnson's analysis appears to be a useful schematic summary of   common observations. Indeed, at least one observer of Durkheim who maintains that Durkheim's types can be distinguished, Anthony Giddens, bases his schema of Durkheim's typology on essentially the same schema of continuums of social structural integration and normative regulation (1966).

Then Johnson begins his own series of reductions by first eliminating altruisme and fatalisme from serious consideration. Johnson contends: "Under Durkheim's own premises, he cannot legitimately study altruistic and fatalistic groups"

(1965:879) because reliable statistics are not available for primitive societies! And thus what began as an attempt to restore Durkheim's original schema to fuller significance now turns into the one of the most extreme and questionable reductions attempted. By abstracting Durkheim's thought and ignoring the historical underpinnings of the typology of suicide, Johnson presumes that Durkheim's notions of fatalisme and altruisme are largely suppositionary. "Altruisme should be excluded from Durkheim's theory, then, because, with the single exception of the army, all the cases he cites either lack evidence or are not explained in purely social terms" (1965:881).

After attempting to justify thus his unfounded slighting of the entire pre-modern half of Durkheim's schema, Johnson then attempts to extend his reformulation by citing the discovery of a "serious flaw in the theory," and thus seeming to justify his collapse of anomie and egoisme down to one common denominator. "To overcome this flaw, egoisme and anomie should be equated, for integration and regulation are in truth one dimension, rather than two" (1965:881). Johnson insists that, since the suicide rate depends on two social variables, integration and regulation, "... even to predict a group's relative rate requires that one locate each group on both dimensions at once" (1965:882). Now, we have ourselves (eg. see Part I, Book Three) pointed out some fundamental flaws in Durkheim's theory, especially as they relate to his application of his doctrine of homo duplex to cases of suicide; the question here is whether Johnson has identified a real flaw or simply confused further an already ambiguous situation. How can one equate integration and regulation unless you know what each specifically implies? And, what role does Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex play in relation to these two notions of social integration and normative regulation? These questions must be answered by the reductionists.

Then Johnson offers a series of reasons justifying his claim that egoisme and anomie are not merely related but identical.

> Suicide contains a number of reasons for concluding
> that egoisme and anomie are merely two different names
> for the same thing. First, if anomie and egoisme can
> be equated, so that integration and regulation are
> really only one dimension, then one need only know
> which of the two will have the higher suicide rate.
> Thus, equating egoisme and anomie resolves the flaw
> I have found in Durkheim's theory and makes his pre-
> dictions determinate (1965:882).

Rather than attempt, through systematic exegesis and compari-
son of Durkheim's foundational theory with one of his special
sociologies, to elucidate and sort through the various com-
plexities and ambiguities of Durkheim's doctrine, reduction-
ists such as Johnson wade in with sledge hammers, pound the
typologies into a homogeneous pulp, and emerge triumphantly
with a single common denominator! Small matter, really, that
in the process one simply contradicts the pioneer thinkers'
own testimony. For his second reason, Johnson argues that
since anomie and egoisme usually occur together, they are
more or less identical. Johnson's special dispensation to ig-
nore crucial parts of Durkheim's theory, and to reconstruct
other parts solely in terms of his own special logics, allows
him to go so far as to propose that "... not only do the two
coincide empirically, but there is not even a conceptual dis-
tinction between them" (1965:883).

Johnson then attempts to argue, from a very incomplete
exegesis of Durkheim's work, that "... Durkheim's very defin-
itions of the terms make egoisme and anomie identical" (1965:
883). He continues:

> But it remains to be shown that the two conditions
> are conceptually identical. Such a conclusion can be
> defended on the grounds that when Durkheim creates
> what purports to be a separate concept, anomie, from
> one aspect of egoisme, he contradicts one of his own
> principles. His definitions of mechanical and organic
> solidarity in The Division of Labor, and of egoisme in
> Suicide, seem to derive from the working principle that
> several dimensions coinciding empirically should be re-
> garded as one conceptually. Each end of a such a multi-
> faceted dimension is then assigned a single name, and
> treated as a single concept. According to Durkheim's
> own practice, then a legitimate definition of anomie
> must encompass not only the absence of social regula-
> tion but the other two aspects of egoisme as well. Ano-

mie and egoisme are thus identical conceptually as
well as empirically (1965:884).

While one cannot fault the attempt to point out internal in-
consistencies in an argument, we can hardly follow Johnson
here in his curious slighting of evidence in Durkheim's own
work contrary to Johnson's claims. Johnson repeatedly ignores
counter evidence and invokes tacit and questionable "princi-
ples" purportedly derived from the text itself. The violence
that secondary interpreters sometimes wreak on "sacred texts"
is nowhere seen so clearly as here, for Johnson simply outlaws
Durkheim's own explicit distinctions between egoisme and ano-
mie, especially in the section on "Individual Forms of Suicide."

Again, Johnson's fourth argument relies on the same spe-
cious type of claim.

> My fourth argument for equating the two conditions is
> that he fails in this attempt.... If the morphological
> types depend logically on the aetiological types, there
> can only be as many of the former as there are of the
> latter. In short, if egoisme and anomie are identical
> social conditions, they cannot have distinguishable psy-
> chological manifestations (1965:884).

But Johnson simply ignores that it is he, not Durkheim, who has
"established" the fact that "egoisme and anomie are identical
social conditions," and therefore must be morphologically as
well as aetiologically identical. What an arrogant way to in-
terpret a text--to consistently and repeatedly ignore not only
the author's doctrines but his explicit statements, to revise
the stated theories by engaging in purely imposed "internal
logical checks," instead of first attempting to discover and
make systematic and explicit the "logics-in-use" in the origin-
al theory, and finally, when faced with incontrovertible evi-
dence from the text itself, to appeal to the specious authori-
ty of the "conclusions" which one has already "established"
solely by oneself!

Interestingly, Johnson then considers and rejects Par-
sons' discovery of an important distinction between egoisme
and anomie.

> ... Parsons' claim is an ill-founded one. His position
> is that Durkheim implicitly linked anomie with the
> strength of the common conscience, and egoisme with its

content. Anomie is present where common sentiments and social regulation are weak, whereas egoisme occurs where a common sentiment places a high value on the individual. I have no quarrel with Parsons' view of anomie, but I must challenge his interpretation of egoisme (1965:885).

How Johnson treats this discordant suggestion (see the succeeding chapter) is most interesting, for here one interpreter summarily dismisses the important insights of Parsons into one of Durkheim's most profound break throughs.

> Parsons derives this interpretation largely from Durkheim's discussion of Protestantism. Durkheim says Protestants are ruled by a "spirit of free inquiry." Parsons contends that this spirit is a shared sentiment maintained by the religious authority of the Protestant church. But, on the contrary, Durkheim asserts that it is a breakdown of collective sentiments which has led Protestants to pursue truth independently of any social authority. Protestant society is weak and poorly integrated. This absence of integration, and of the shared sentiments accompanying it, forces individuals to find purpose and meanings for their lives independently (1965:885).

But Johnson does not here sufficiently emphasize, in contrast to Parsons, Durkheim's highly critical attitude toward egoisme; further, in order to refute Parsons' virtuous image of egoisme as sanctioned by Protestant individualism, he falls back on the weak link in Durkheim's evolutionary argument. Although Johnson is prone to invoke many logical checks, he fails here to critically review Durkheim's generalized doctrine of the emergence of individualism through the progressive division of labor (see Book One). Not only is this not a sufficient explanation of the historical process, but, as Parsons observed, there is much evidence in Durkheim's work itself to support the notion of egoisme as culturally sanctioned.

But Johnson next turns to deal summarily with this critical evidence in _Suicide_ itself.

> Occasionally, Durkheim contradicts his usual view of egoisme and his cult of personality, and his confusions help to account for Parsons' misunderstanding. At several points he speaks as if the cult of personality prevailed in his time, as if it is upon it that "all our morality rested." But this notion contradicts other, more powerful lines in his thought. If a strong common respect for the individual existed in Durkheim's time,

then his whole analysis of modern egoisme (and, since it is indistinguishable from egoisme, of anomie as well) must be considered invalid. The common conscience in a given society cannot be simultaneously strong and weak (1965:885).

Johnson was on to something important here--he almost recognizes the foundations of Durkheim's second schema, that anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the modern world. But Johnson rejects these transitional possibilities as a "hopeless muddle," and thus again misses important clues to the breakthrough to Durkheim's second theory.

> Nonetheless, if the cult of personality and egoism co-exist empirically, they must somehow be reconciled theoretically. Durkheim toys with the position that the two are somehow compatible, so that egoism is "associated with" respect for individuality in civilized nations.... Since Parsons equates the cult of personality with egoisme, he may well have relied heavily on this passage. But it is a hopeless muddle, an attempt to reconcile two irreconcilable views of the modern world, and thus hardly a suitable proof text for the Parsonian view (1965: 836).

Hence, we witness once again how difficult basic conceptual breakthroughs can be--for here one of the leading contemporary interpreters of Durkheim's suicide typology, when led by Parsons, one of the seminal modern interpreters of Durkheim, to the very brink of discovery of Durkheim's second theory, instead turns around, throws up his hands in dismay, and castigates the outlines of Durkheim's second schema as a "hopeless muddle"! I merely now note that what Barclay Johnson retreated from as a "hopeless muddle," viewed in terms more faithful to the complexities of Durkheim's own thought, constitutes the foundations of the linkage of such basic paradigms of anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos.

Instead of sorting through the various levels of Durkheim's meanings, Johnson, though rightly noting many ambiguities permeating Durkheim's work, nonetheless wrongly concludes that this fruitful ambiguity must be set aside and the most severe and simplest kind of reductions embraced. Johnson is like a sociological Puritan, reducing the complex deposit of faith, tradition, and symbol down to the barest essentials.

> Durkheim's confusion must be acknowledged. But the
> evidence strongly suggests that his primary view is
> that egoisme implies not a strong common sentiment
> of respect for the individual, but rather the weak-
> ness of the common conscience. Since this weakness,
> and the resulting absence of social regulation, is
> also defined as anomie, I conclude once again that
> egoisme and anomie are identical (1965:886).

Once again, Johnson was on to something important here--for
he realizes, as we do (see the section on Parsons in the suc-
ceeding chapter), that Parsons has taken only one of Durk-
heim's explanations of the origins of egoisme. In our recon-
struction, we suggest that Parsons took over egoisme from
the second schema, and tried, unsuccessfully, to insert it
into the first schema of suicide. But Johnson's drive to
reduce, rather than elucidate, the complexities of Durkheim's
thought, leads him to ignore this important possibility. Fin-
ally, Johnson neglects to even cite the wholly contrary asser-
tions of Bruce Dohrenwend (1959).

Although he begins well, and offers several valuable in-
sights, by pursuing so relentlessly his theses Barclay Johnson
not only reduces the diversity and rich meaning of Durkheim's
typology, but also manages to set aside contrary evidence from
Durkheim himself as "confusing" and a "hopeless muddle," while
also ignoring counter-evidence from other secondary interpre-
ters. While Johnson turned away from the complexities and am-
biguities of Durkheim's thought, and reduced his types down to
one common denominator, other interpreters seized upon the po-
tentialities of Durkheim's profound theses, and moved boldly
ahead to forge new perspectives.

C. Whitney Pope and Social Integration

One of the more sophisticated reductions of Durkheim's typology of suicide can be found in Whitney Pope's recent book, Durkheim's Suicide: A Classic Analyzed" (1976). Pope is a follower of Barclay Johnson: "I accept Johnson's equation of integration with regulation, but reject the rationale underlying the elimination of altruisme (and fatalisme)" (1976: 46). Pope treats social integration as the key to suicide; he emphasizes social structure and social interaction. In taking "mechanical solidarity" as his essential model, Pope drops out the evolutionary dimension, and collapses all down to social integration. Pope asserts that: "... Durkheim shifted away from The Division of Labor's two types of solidarity model, and toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the mechanical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to primitive but also to modern societies" (1976:37). Pope even goes so far as to reverse Durkheim's theses: "... egoistic and anomic suicide do not result from lack of organic solidarity, but precisely from lack of mechanical solidarity" (1976:37).

In one sense, Pope's analysis is a welcome reexamination of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. His exploration is good in that it recognizes the complexity of Durkheim's theses, and insofar as it proposes a more complex, multivalent sequential theory of suicidal processes. Specifically, Pope's attempt is valuable in that he attempts to link Durkheim's notions of social morphological and interactional processes to his theory of sociocultural processes, and these, in turn, to Durkheim's theses on suicide. Pope's theory is preeminently a theory of intervening processes. The question remains, however, whether or not Pope's articulation of these intervening processes is justified and compelling.

The essential flaws in Pope's effort include: (a) he doesn't provide an in-depth exegesis of the underlying "nuclear structure" of all of Durkheim's work; hence, he has no deeper structure in which to locate his literal exegesis of Suicide; (b) Pope ignores Durkheim's crucial doctrine of man

as _homo_ _duplex_; (c) he also fails to place Durkheim's sui-
cide typology in an evolutionary context. I must insist, on
the contrary, that if there is no insatiability and egoism,
and no transforming historical process, there can be no ano-
mie and egoisme! Perhaps the most telling flaw in Pope's ar-
gument is his unfounded equation of "mechanical solidarity"
with an abstracted notion of social interaction. Unfortunate-
ly, Pope's attempt emerges as a yet another abstract, ahis-
torical reduction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Instead
of enriching Durkheim's seminal insights, Pope leaves us with
flatter, less interesting heritage.

Now, in his reconstruction of the typology, Pope in-
sists on: (a) focussing almost exclusively on integration
and regulation (as if they were somehow key code words by
which to unlock the secrets of Durkheim's schemas), and (b)
conceptualizing the four types as if they had to be opposite
poles on these two continua. In both instances, he is
misled by occasional or summary comments of Durkheim. For
example, in the first case, it is more essential to eluci-
date Durkheim's actual "logics-in-use" rather than to seize
upon these two terms as if there were magic keys. Pope's
failure to compare and contrast a systematic exegesis of the
"nuclear structure" of all of Durkheim's work with a system-
atic "literal" exegesis of _Suicide_ bars access to these ac-
tual shifting "logics-in-use." Hence, Pope's exegesis remains
on the outside of the "hermeneutical circle;" his interpreta-
tion remains on the surface.

In the second case, there is no innate necessity to
conceive of Durkheim's types as if they had to be opposite
poles on the ends of an integration and regulation contin-
uum. For these continua really do not emerge from a syste-
matic exegesis of the actual interpretive "logics-in-use"
through which Durkheim built up his typology from _The_ _Divi-_
sion _of_ _Labor_ through his lectures on _Moral_ _Education_ and
Professional _Ethics_ _and_ _Civic_ _Morals_, _Socialism_, and _Suicide_.
Specifically, Pope argues:

The first of Durkheim's two major explanatory variables
was integration. Two types of suicide represent opposite
ends of the integration continuum. One type is egoistic.
Rates of interaction in egoistic groups are low; beliefs,
values, traditions, and sentiments are not common to all
members. Consequently, they reciprocally enfeeble one a-
nother as they come into conflict. Collective life dimi-
shes, and individual interests assert themselves....
Just as weak integration leads to high suicide rates, so
also does strong integration. With the individual com-
pletely absorped into and controlled by the group, his
individuality, so slightly developed, cannot be highly
valued (1976:12).

Thus, on the integration continuum, Pope portrays egoisme as
low integration and altruisme as high integration. In addi-
tion:

Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and
named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence
of social change resulting in a dimunition of social reg-
ulation.... Durkheim recognized that just as egoisme and
altruisme represent opposite ends of a single continuum,
so logically there should be an opposite end of anomie
on the regulation continuum (fatalisme) (1976:12-13).

Pope then connects these two continua   with what he
takes to be "the underlying logical structure" of the theory.

Implicit in the derivation of Durkheim's typology of
suicide is the underlying logical structure of the
theory. Durkheim postulated identical relations be-
tween each of two independent variables--integration
and regulation--and suicide. When either is high or
low, the suicide rate is high; when either is moderate,
the rate is low. Changes in rates are proportional to
changes in the strength of these two variables. The
high and low points of each are named--egoisme and al-
truisme (integration) and anomie and fatalisme (regula-
tion)--and identified as the causes of suicide. The
theory, then, proposes that suicide rates are low at
some point along the integration and regulation con-
tinua, increasing in proportion to the distance from
those points (1976:14).

Yet, at various points Pope acknowledges that his sche-
ma is a secondary construction, and imposed on the material.

Suicide conveys the impression that Durkheim was only
vaguely and intemittently conscious of the underlying
logical structure of his theory. Only twice did he note
that when either integration or regulation is moderate,
suicide rates are low (1976:14).

Pope then admits that his schema is interpretive--that is,

he attempts "... to make explicit what is left implicit in
Suicide itself;" but, how can we hope to accurately eluci-
date the implicit underlying structure of Durkheim's theses
here without performing a comprehensive and systematic exege-
sis of the underlying substantive structure informing all of
Durkheim's works?

> Because he never explicitly worked with the total con-
> figuration (Suicide identifies only one or two steps at
> a time), the figure (4.1) entails some reconstruction
> (1976: 31).

Again, Pope acknowledges that he has imposed his conceptual-
ization on Durkheim's Suicide.

> ... it should be remembered that Durkheim did not typi-
> cally think of his theory as diagrammed in figure 5.1.
> Thus, he did not always take into account that in cros-
> sing the mid-point of the integration continuum, the re-
> lationship between integration and suicide changes from
> negative (egoisms) to positive (altruisme) (1976:210, #5).

In sum, Pope insists on imposing on Durkheim's material an
abstract, ahistorical continuum, and insists on taking inte-
gration and regulation as code words; then, he reduces norma-
tive regulation down to structural integration; and finally,
he reduces this down to social interaction which is mistaken-
ly equated with "mechanical solidarity." When, at the end of
his book, Pope claims to have thereby resolved the "central
ambiguity" of Suicide--the relationship between anomie and
egoisme, integration and regulation--"without cost," we can
hardly agree with him. For his reduction has been achieved,
as with Barclay Johnson's, only through a certain sort of
textual violence which shrinks and flattens this seminal
text. Our task today is to reappropriate our heritage, our
informing cultural traditions, not to flatten and reduce
them.

In terms of his first continuum of integration, while
faced with the ambiguous relation of egoism to religion and
belief systems, Pope chose to take Durkheim's early causal
model at face value, and thus, to collapse the cultural to
the structural level.

The strength of collective beliefs varies inversely

> with free inquiry. Strength of collective beliefs is
> the independent variable, and each dimunition of its
> strength results in a concomitant increase in free in-
> quiry and individuality. But to speak of the strength
> of collective beliefs is really to speak of the vitali-
> ty, cohesion, or integration of society itself. The more
> integrated a society is, the more it controls the behav-
> ior of its members, protecting them from suicide....
> Durkheim's explanation emphasizes the strength of collec-
> tive beliefs and, hence, the level of integration in a
> society determines, and varies inversely with, the
> strength of free inquiry (moral individualism, or simply
> individuality) (1976:16).

But Pope apparently did not realize that to Durkheim, moral
individualism was the opposite of egoistic individuality.
In addition, Pope (eg. 1976:19-20) fails to distinguish Durk-
heim's notion of individuation in The Division of Labor from
later developments, especially the crucial insight that mor-
al individualism is not simply a product of individuation
and differentiation, but, rather, that it must be culturally
constructed (see Chapter Eight, Book One).

In terms of integration in familial society, Pope
sounds some of his essential themes:

> ... the number of people determines the amount of inter-
> action, which determines the number of reacting conscious-
> nesses, which determine the number of consciousnesses re-
> acting in common and sharing collective sentiments, which
> determines the degree of social integration (1976:17).

Although the level of integration is explained in terms of
the strength of collective sentiments, Pope attempts to an-
chor this, in turn, in degrees of social interaction without
recognizing the full extent of Durkheim's notions of social
morphological processes in evolution (see Chapter Four, Book
One), and Durkheim's "law of moral mechanics" (see Part II,
Book Two).

Pope then offers his own synthetic theory of social in-
tegration. Here he acknowledges, again, that "... what is
missing is Durkheim's own synthesis ... A synthesis is not
readily apparent" (1976:22). Pope's model, though complex,
centers around a strong/weak social interaction process.

> Rate of interaction is central because it determines
> the number of consciousnesses acting and reacting in

> common to each other and to collective sentiments, which
> in turn determines the strength of the latter.... The
> strength of the collective factor--here collective senti-
> ments--and that of the individual factor--vary inversely.
> The strength of collective sentiments determines the de-
> gree of social integration (1976:22).

Pope here takes Durkheim's early simplistic opposition of
society to the individual as the key, and sees it as an ei-
ther/or proposition. Yet, Pope also sees that cultural fac-
tors--"collective representations" and "sentiments"--are cru-
cial, as we documented in Chapter Four of Book One, and in
Book Three on the autonomization of "collective representa-
tions."

> The higher the rate of interaction, the greater the fu-
> sion of individual consciences into collective represen-
> tations and, consequently, the stronger the latter. Durk-
> heim here explained why both integration and regulation
> vary inversely with interaction, which is decisive not
> only as the process through which the "essential" social
> component (collective representations, sentiments) is
> created. but also as the determinant of the social fac-
> tors' strength (1976:191).

And, of course, Pope's focus on social interaction is central
in Durkheim, as we saw in Book One. "Interaction is identi-
fied as the process through which emergent realities are cre-
ated" (1976:195). Yet, somehow, even though Pope perceives
certain key elements, his reductionistic drive leads him to
a certain type of positivistic stringing together of hypo-
theses. For instance:

> ... the rate of interaction determines the strength of
> collective sentiments which, in turn, determines the de-
> gree of social integration. Degree of integration deter-
> mines the degree to which the individual finds meanings
> in this life, which determines the social suicide rate
> (1976:25).

This flattening drive yields, then, summary propositions such
as the idea that Durkheim's central empirical generalization
was:

> ... rate of interaction is proportional to numbers, in-
> tegration is proportional to rate of interaction, and
> suicide rates are inversely related to interaction
> (1976:77).

Yet, the drive for common denominators simply obscures cru-

cial principles in Durkheim's work; and the restringing of
causal connections leads to a very different model than that
which we discovered in Suicide.

> To turn this into a theory of suicide requires adding
> the following linkages: the strength of social integra-
> tion determines the extent to which individuals act in
> service of social interests, which determines the de-
> gree to which they find meaning in life, which in turn
> determines the social suicide rate. In sum, the theory
> of egoisme as a theory of suicide holds that the higher
> the rate of social interaction, the stronger collective
> sentiments; the stronger collective sentiments, the
> stronger social integration; the stronger social integra-
> tion, the more individuals act in service of social in-
> terests; the more individuals act in service of social
> interests, the more meaning they find in life and the
> lower the social suicide rate (1976:23).

But Pope then runs into trouble defining altruisme--
why should higher social integration lead to higher suicide
rates? Is it a case, perhaps, of too much meaning in life?
No, Pope claims that altruisme places too little meaning on
continued individual existence. "High levels of social inte-
gration lead to lack of meaning in individual existence,
which in turn leads to high suicide rates" (1976:23). But
this is sheer nonsense. However, it is not this existential
flaw which is most glaring in Pope's claim here; rather, it
is the failure to fully understand what "mechanical solidar-
ity" implies to Durkheim.

Pope then sets out to synthesize the two opposite sets
of suicide on the integration continua --namely, egoisme and
altruisme.

> Given that egoisme refers to low, and altruisme to high,
> levels of integration, it should be possible to inte-
> grate the two theoretical statements. Both treat rate of
> interaction as causally linked to level of social inte-
> gration. However, the two linkages are somewhat differ-
> ent. The theory of egoisme speaks of the number of con-
> sciousnesses reacting in common as a determinant of the
> strength of collective sentiments. In contrast, the the-
> ory of altruisme states that high rates of interaction
> enable strict social control, thereby insuring highly de-
> veloped common group life and minimum individual diver-
> gences. Hence, it becomes possible to integrate the the-
> ory of altruisme and egoisme. The rate of interaction de-
> termines the strength of collective sentiments, or, in

> different terms, the extensiveness of common life. The
> strength of collective sentiments, in turn, determines
> the strength of social integration. The similarities
> underlying certain differences in terminology and causal
> linkages are such that the theories of egoisme and al-
> truisme may be synthesized into a single theory of in-
> tegration. The egoist commits suicide because his exis-
> tence fails to fulfill his need to find meaning in life;
> the altruist because he attaches little meaning to his
> continued physical existence. Lack of meaning is deci-
> sive in both cases (1976:23-4).

But underlying Pope's synthetic effort here is an unaccepta-
ble proposition. Can it really be the case that altruistic
suicide is a result of a lack of meaning in continued physi-
cal existence? Or, rather, is it because the individual is
so penetrated by collective rationales that, if necessary,
he will sacrifice himself for the group? Pope entirely misses
the point (see Books Two and Three) that in using altruism as
an index to mechanical solidarity, Durkheim pointed to a so-
ciocultural and evolutionary situation in which the sacro-
magical collective conscience pervades the individual's nas-
cent conscience and   bends it almost completely to collec-
tive duties and traditional obligations. It is ludicrous to
suggest here, as Pope does, that altruisme is due to anything
but the presence of extremely strong cultural sanctions for
self-abnegation.

Pope's collapse of egoisme and altruisme down to an
abstract continuum of integration obscures these and other
important differences. It is not high social integration
which is the opposite of suicide; for in mechanical solidar-
ity, dominated by a sacral complex (see Book One), altruisme
itself results from strong collective sentiments, high social
control and interaction, from high solidarity. Thus, Pope's
simplistic interactional-integration model suffers from the
outset.

> ... Number of people determines the rate of social inter-
> action, which in turn determines the strength of collec-
> tive sentiments.... The strength of collective sentiments
> determines the degree of social integration, which in
> turn determines the degree to which the individual finds
> meaning in life, which determines the social suicide rate
> (1976:25).

Now, Pope does identify (see his figure 4.1) the psychological correlates of anomie and egoisme which Durkheim associated in <u>Suicide,</u> but it is hard to pull these together as Pope does. For, in reality, these belong to two different schemas.

> Altruistic suicide contrasts with egoistic in being more active and passionate, and with anomie in that the source of the "inspiring passion" is external, coming from society.... When related to the earlier distinctions between egoisme and anomie, these contrasts raise questions. Curiously, Durkheim attributed to altruistic suicide two characteristics--activity and strong emotions--that had previously been reserved for anomic (as opposed to egoistic) suicide. This attribution shows why the distinction between egoisme and anomie cannot be equated with that between integration and regulation generally.

> <u>Suicide</u> successfully identifies several differences between anomie and egoisme. The difficulty is that the sociological difference between them as causes of suicide is never elucidated. In terms of key variables, Durkheim drew his distinctions at the level of intervening, rather than independent, variables.... <u>It is the sociological distinction between integration and regulation that Durkheim never identified. Suicide's failure in this regard is an indication that the distinction</u> between the two basic independent variables in his theory, and hence between egoisme and anomie, is uncertain at best * (1976:33).

However, Pope's real insight here leads him, like Johnson, on a relentless drive to reduce the apparent differences between anomie and egoisme, rather than to provide a clearer and deeper articulation. If Pope had not insisted on conceptualizing the suicide schemas in terms of those code words--integration and regulation--many of his problems would vanish. For instance, he rightly observes that these two types are intimately related (eg. S:288). But, while it is true that egoisme and altruisme share common foundations, Pope slights the real possibility that they may be still be distinguished as different expressions of a common cultural source. Instead he collapses their differences: "If egoisme and anomie have the same cause, if they are aspects of the same social state, then, by definition, they are identical" (1976:45). "Suicide makes a strong case for the identity of egoisme and anomie" (1976:45-6). This is the very hallmark of the reductionistic thrust.

In his program to reduce the regulation continuum to social integration, Pope claims that:

> ... both integration and regulation may be linked to either loss of meaning or to a means-needs equilibrium. The unsuccessful nature of existing attempts to distinguish between egoisme and anomie, Durkheim's own failure in this regard (especially in contrast with the many indications in Suicide that anomie and egoisme are essentially the same), the similarity of Durkheim's empirical examples, his failure to control for either in analyzing the relationship between the other and suicide, and the possibility of coupling the links between suicide and other major independent variables with those of the other strongly argue for the essential similarity of integration and regulation (1976:48).

Pope then adds the following caveat:

> Of course, demonstrating the overlap between integration and regulation does not necessarily rule out the possibility that they are in some measure distinct. However, to be viable, any identification of a distinction between the two must be accompanied by a demonstration that the distinction is comparable in theoretical importance to their overlap, which lies at the core of Durkheim's theory (1976:48).

I contend I have met these requirements in Book Three. By contrast, what is to be gained, and what is lost, from Pope's reduction? While he would probably answer: "a unified theory," it is clear that this is possible on other grounds, as we have shown, one that maintains a unity-in-diversity. Why does Pope insist on a radical reduction as the only way to resolve the real ambiguities in Durkheim's work? Why is it not more desirable, as a matter of course, to discern both a fundamental unity and also a real diversity?

Pope's reductionistic drive leads him to make utterly gratuitous assumptions; for instance, that the real function of Durkheim's anomie theory is to protect the schema from falsification. When faced with ambiguity, the reductionist flattens the powerful, though unclear, portions, and then raises up tiny molehills where no problem exists.

> Durkheim's theory contains one pervasive ambiguity resulting from the fuzziness of the integration-regulation distinction. Since these are Durkheim's central independent variables, ambiguity therefore exists at the core of the theory. Indeed, the overlap between the theory of

egoisme and that of anomie is virtually complete. Inclu-
ding the latter makes Durkheim's theory of suicide far
more difficult to falsify; however, it adds no more ex-
planatory power. Consequently, there is a strong case
for equating egoisme and anomie and, hence, integration
and regulation; thus resolving the most problematic as-
pect of Durkheim's theory without cost (1976:201).

... the real function of the theory of anomie is to pro-
tect the overall theoretical statement from falsifica-
tion (1976:56).

Pope then offers the following summaries of his theo-

retical reconstruction of the schemas of suicide.

... in seeking the starting points of his causal chain,
my obvious choice is to focus primarily on the theory
of integration.... Rate of interaction occupies a central
place in Durkheim's causal chain. This rate, in turn, is
determined by the numbers of mutually accessible people
in a given group or area which, in turn, is a function
of society's morphological structure. The rate determines
the strength of collective sentiments, which determines
the degree of integration-regulation.

To turn this statement into a theory of suicide requires
including links between the level of integration-regula-
tion and social suicide rates. The stronger collective
sentiments are, the higher the degree of restraint exer-
cised by the group over individual needs and the more
nearly means are proportioned to needs (theory of ano-
mie) or, alternately, the greater the meaning in life
(theory of egoisme) and the lower the suicide rate. This,
then, is Durkheim's theory of egoisme-anomie as a theory
of suicide (1976:58).

Perhaps what underlies Pope's collapse of regulation (cultur-

al and normative forces) to integration-interaction is a cer-

tain bias toward social structure as a causal anchor. Pope

then contrasts this first schema with altruisme.

In contrast to this theory, which postulates an inverse
correlation between level of social control and suicide,
that of altruisme postulates a positive relationship.
Otherwise, the variables and their mutual relations are
the same, with one exception--the variable linking degree
of social control to suicide. In the case of egoisme-ano-
mie, means-needs equilibrium and meaning in life can be
seen as alternative links between level of social control
and suicide, while in the case of altruisme the former is
ruled out.

Clearly, the high level of social control in altruisme
insures the restrained individual passions and modest
needs that preclude the development of a means-need dis-

equilibrium. Here it is a matter of the relative lack of meaning in continued physical existence per se, because meaning resides either in adhering to social dictates or in achieving union with some goal beyond this life. When "meaning in life" is defined as including these possibilities, it constitutes the link between degree of social control and the social suicide rate. Through degree of social control, the relationship between variables are the same as for the theory of egoisme-anomie (1976:58).

Again, there is much of value in passages such as these; and insofar as Pope makes distinctions such as those of above, he helps to establish the common foundations of the suicidal types.

Pope summaries the overall theoretical structure of his argument in these terms:

The final relationships are as follows: the higher the degree of social control, the less meaning is attached to continued life per se, and the higher the social suicide rate. Alternatively, the lower the degree of social control, the more meaning is attached to continued life per se, the less willing the individual is to part with it, and the lower the social suicide rate. The complete theory of suicide is produced by joining the theory of egoisme-anomie with that of altruisme:

(1) the morphological structure of society determines

(2) the number of people in a given group or area, which determines

(3) rate of social interaction, which determines

(4) strength of collective sentiments, which determines

(5) level of integration-regulation (social control), which determines

(6) means-needs proportionality (meaning in life)(theory of egoisme-anomie), and meaning attached to continued existence (theory of altruisme), which together determines the

(7) the social suicide rate   (1976:60).

Having outlined and summarized Pope's theoretical reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide, let us now briefly review Pope's retreat from the second schema as we have outlined it in Book Three. At various points Pope, like others, perceived certain ambiguities in Durkheim's complex treatment of suicide; however, Pope retreated from the second schema just as he reduced normative regulation to structural

integration. Let us here document those recognitions which converge with mine, and then how Whitney Pope turned away from the implications toward a very different schema.

For example, in his discussion of the relations between egoisme and religion (1976:15-16), Pope sees that Durkheim emphasized the role of religious beliefs and ideas, even though Durkheim's early mechanical model of one-way causality from structure to culture limited him. Then, in terms of the relation between egoisme and suicide, Pope observes:

> From Durkheim's perspective, however, this explanation is less than satisfactory; even though the suicide rate is a function of level of social integration, the suicidal thrust is conceptualized as in opposition to social forces and as originating with the individual. It may be stretching the point here to maintain that suicide is socially caused. Thus, it is not surprising to find Durkheim [S:210] characterizing the above reasons as "purely secondary" before going on to explain that excessive individualism, itself the creation of the operation of strictly social factors, creates the inclination to suicide "out of whole cloth"*(1976:18).

Yet, Pope cannot grasp why Durkheim conceived of the suicidal thrust in egoisme as opposed to social forces, because he has no idea of Durkheim's doctrine of the insatiable passions of the pre-social ego.

In terms of anomie in our second schema, Pope observes that modern moral anarchy is culturally sanctioned:

> Observing, characteristically, that belief systems reflect an underlying social reality, Durkheim also noted that in modern society, the anarchic state is elevated to a virtue: "The longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction" (1976:27).

Yet, Pope didn't know what to do with this insight.

In terms of his first characterization of anomie, Pope comes closer to Durkheim's central ideas.

> Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence of social change resulting in a dimunition of social regulation.... Freed of social control, passions and appetites are subject to no restraint, since only the collective moral authority of a group can perform this function. People's desires quickly outstrip their means. The result is frustration, exasperation, and weariness lead-

ing to high suicide rates (1976:12).

Thus, Pope did recognize the problem central to Durkheim--
the release of the individual from social control, and the
deregulation of desires. Pope even conceptualizes this in
terms of a means-needs imbalance.

> The crucial consideration is whether man's means are ade-
> quate for the fulfillment of his needs. Where means are
> proportional to needs, Durkheim said that they exist in a
> state of equilibrium; where the former are inadequate to
> fulfill the latter, they exist in a state of disequili-
> brium. These needs are not given by man's biological,
> psychological, or individual nature. Rather, they are so-
> cial products that vary from one social context to the
> next. Particular goals, desires, passions, or appetites
> for comforts may become translated into needs. Durkheim
> used needs in a very broad sense to include all of these
> things, and he spoke of needs, ends, and goals, or the
> persons, appetites, and desires that can turn a want into
> a need *(1976:25).

All of this is, of course, very close to schema number two.
Pope even notes that, to Durkheim, these needs are insatia-
ble.

> Human needs are boundless and insatiable; consequently,
> unless restrained they represent a constant threat to
> individual happiness [S:246-8]. Far from serving to sa-
> tiate the individual, satisfaction of needs serves only
> to stimulate further needs. Thus, the sine qua non for
> equilibrium between means and needs is some force that
> limits man's desires. Since the needs in question are
> are moral, society alone can provide the required re-
> straint, because it is the only superior moral power
> whose authority the individual accepts (1976:25).

This is straight from Durkheim; yet, again, one wonders why
are
human needs are boundless? And why, if Durkheim considered
(in his first schema) these insatiable desires to be the
very hallmark of anomic a-morality, then why does Pope say
that "these needs are moral"? How can they be both anomic
(amoral) and moral at the same time? But Pope sees no signi-
ficance to these problems and contradictions;   these sub-
tleties   simply drop from view in his reduction.

Pope elaborates this point, but simply fails to relate
it to Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex.

> Durkheim's explanation is based on three assumptions.
> First, the happiness of man is to be explained not as

a function of property or wealth, but rather of the de-
gree to which their means are proportional to their
needs. Second, the needs of man are not subject to any
inherent limitation. Finally, society is the only power
that can restrain these otherwise boundless goals and
thereby create the equilibrium between means and needs
upon which man's happiness depends (1976:26).

Pope fails to question Durkheim's underlying image of human
nature here; indeed, his neglect of this problem is so com-
plete that homo duplex doesn't even appear in his index!

Pope's blindness in this regard is matched by his
truncation of Durkheim's theory of authority and social con-
trol. While we went to great lengths in Book One to uncover
Durkheim's developing theory of social, cultural, and pheno-
menological processes, Pope suggests:

Though his basic purpose was to explain how society
develops, shapes, and controls the individual, Durkheim
never clarified how social control occurs. He [S:318-19,
335] conceptualized the relationship between society and
the non-social individual as one of forces in opposition.
In these terms, the more powerful society is as a system
of forces, the better able it is to control the opposing
force represented by the unsocialized individual
(1976:194; 195).

Thus, not only does Pope slight Durkheim's absolutely cru-
cial doctrine of man as homo duplex, thus missing the source
of insatiability, he also ignores the developing notion of
social control and internalized moral authority to be found
in such works as Moral Education and The Elementary Forms.

In terms of altruisme, Pope sees two loci for this type
--namely, primitive society and the modern military; and he
notes (1976:21) that the military represents an evolutionary
survival in the modern world. Yet, his abstractness leads him,
like so many others, to simply drop out the absolutely criti-
cal historical dimension to Durkheim's schemas of suicide.
This is a basic failing.

Further, Pope sees that altruisme is culturally sanc-
tioned, he fails to make this a central principle, and foc-
usses instead on high social interaction. His basic mistake
here is not to recognize that Durkheim used altruisme as an
index to mechanical solidarity. He ignores the cultural com-

ponents of traditional societies; he underplays the role of
values. Instead, Pope emphasizes the high integration and
interaction found in mechanical solidarity.

> More or less every society outside of modern Europe and
> its offshoots--anything from preliterate tribes to the
> great world-civilizations of China, Japan, and India--
> is classified as primitive.... Durkheim stressed that
> primitive societies are small, compact, and undifferen-
> tiated. In these terms the prototypical primitive socie-
> ty is a small, preliterate tribe. But if small size,
> compactness, and undifferentiated social structure are
> hallmarks of primitive society, then China, Japan, and
> India do not qualify (1976:103).

Of course these societies wouldn't qualify if one looked
merely at size and differentiation as the key criteria of
"mechanical solidarity." But, as with so many others, Pope
misses the crucial element here--namely, that in all these
societies there was no decisive break with the collectivis-
tic and traditional structures of conscience and conscious-
ness, no break with "Consciousness Type I."

This persistent slighting of the role of cultural fac-
tors in evolution leads to Pope's disagreement with Parsons
(see also Part I, Book Three). Underlying this opposition,
as we have discovered, is a disagreement concerning the re-
lative weight of structural versus cultural factors in hu-
man society. Now, Pope observes that: "Parsons argued that
integration refers to the content of the collective con-
science; regulation to its strength" (1976:34). Pope then
accepts Parsons' discussion of regulation, but criticizes
Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim's notion of integration
--that is, of egoisme as culturally sanctioned (the second
schema). Pope also criticizes Parsons' treatment of altruis-
tic suicide.

> Parsons and Durkheim agreed that in the case of altru-
> isme, the individual is subordinate to the group. Accord-
> ing to Parsons, though, the important factor is not
> strength of integration, but rather the content of val-
> ues. In fact, this is not the case, as Durkheim himself
> |S:220-1) made clear. Parsons simply ignored a pervasive
> theme in Durkheim: the content of belief and value sys-
> tems is a derived phenomenon in that it reflects the un-
> derlying social reality.... High levels of integration

cause "feeble individuation." Subtracting what is cen-
tral for Durkheim (strong integration), and omitting
reference to low valuation of individuality (as reflec-
ting the existing social reality), leaves Parsons with
value content. Parsons maintained that value content
was crucial, even though Durkheim made it clear that the
value content upon which Parsons focussed--low valua-
tion of the individual--is caused by the very factor,
high levels of integration, whose importance Parsons
denied (1976:34-5)!

But Pope is simply wrong here in baldly equating high inte-
gration with low individuation; even Durkheim himself shifted
away from such a simplistic schema. For the value content of
mechanical solidarity--pantheism, a sacro-magical collective
consciousness--is the key to the strength of traditional so-
cial and cultural structures; in other words, ultimately,
high social integration depends on these cultural factors.
But, here again, the Bendix-Pope axis lines up against Parsons.

Pope gets into further trouble when he suggests:

... Durkheim shifted away from The Division of Labor's
two types of solidarity (mechanical and organic) and
toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the mechan-
ical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to prim-
itive but also to modern society) (1976:37).

This claim is simply mistaken (see Book One). Indeed, his mis-
understanding of mechanical solidarity, his equating it simply
with high integration and interaction, and his slighting of
Durkheim's evolutionary perspectives reveals that Pope simply
does not fully comprehend the "nuclear structure" informing
Durkheim's life-work. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim:
"Egoistic and anomic suicide do not result from lack of organ-
ic solidarity but precisely from lack of mechanical solidari-
ty" (1976:37). But this is only possible if Pope is right in
baldly equating integration with mechanical solidarity. Yet,
Pope's ahistorical reduction collapses the distinction between
traditional and modern forms of solidarity.

Durkheim's famous proposal to heighten levels of soli-
darity in modern society spoke not of developing indivi-
duality, heightening complementary differences, encoura-
ging functional interdependence, or grouping individuals
according to differences, but rather of integration pro-
duced through commonalities. The lack of solidarity in
modern society is to be rectified through massive infu-

> sions of mechanical (not organic) solidarity! In refer-
> ring to the development of individuality and differen-
> tiation, even in the mechanical altruistic setting, Par-
> sons read elements of Durkheim's Division of Labor's or-
> ganic model into mechanical solidarity. Altogether, Par-
> sons reversed the shift in emphasis in comparing Division
> with Suicide (1976:37).

But, once again, Pope is factually mistaken (see Book Two);
for Durkheim did indeed speak of functional interdependence
and a differentiated autonomy as the foundations of organic
solidarity. Pope's reductionistic drive leads him here to do
great violence to the texts.

And although there are problems with Parsons' treat-
ment of egoisme, Pope is wrong in criticizing Parsons' in-
terpretation of altruisme.

> Parsons wanted to show that in the altruistic setting, in
> individuality and differences can coexist with high lev-
> els of integration. However, central to Durkheim's theo-
> retical structure is the notion that the social factor
> (identified in terms of extent of commonalities, strength
> of the collective conscience, or strength of social in-
> tegration) varies inversely with individuality. Thus,
> Parsons' failure to cite any passages supporting his in-
> terpretation is not suprising, for it runs counter to
> Durkheim's basic theoretical perspective (1976:37).

But, again, Pope is mistaken (see Chapter Eight, Book One).
Thus, Pope misconstrues both altruisme from the first sche-
ma, and Parsons' insights into egoisme in the second schema.

> Egoisme is the second point at which Parsons attempted
> to discern value content as the decisive variable....
> Even if Parsons' acccount of Protestant-Catholic differ-
> ences were acceptable, his identification of value con-
> tent as the key factor in egoisme is not (1976:38-9).

But Pope fails to criticize Durkheim's mechanical model of
causality here; and, for these and other reasons, shrinks a-
way from Parsons' real insight that egoisme, as a form of
absolute individualism, is culturally sanctioned in the mod-
ern world.

Indeed, the notion that the person is culturally con-
structed, especially Durkheim's apotheosis of the "cult of
man" in the modern era, gives Pope trouble.

> Durkheim's general position was that the strength of
> the collective conscience and of individuality vary in-

> versely. But what is the relationship when the collec-
> tive conscience stresses the value, dignity, and impor-
> tance of man generally and the individual in particular?
> The stronger such shared sentiments, the stronger the
> collective conscience; but also, presumably, the greater
> the development of individuality. Durkheim first strug-
> gled with this dilemma in <u>Division</u> of <u>Labor</u>. He acknow-
> ledged that the cult of dignity, basically a shared be-
> lief in the value and dignity of man and his individual-
> ity, is growing stronger, not weaker. To accept this as
> an increasingly important source of social solidarity is
> inconsistent with his conclusion that "all social links
> which result from likeness progressively slacken" as me-
> chanical solidarity is increasingly undercut and replac-
> ed by organic solidarity during the course of social e-
> volution. Durkheim [DL:171-2] resolved this dilemma by
> denying that this shared belief represents a bond of so-
> cial solidarity. Since a basic premise of his theory as-
> serts that shared beliefs constitute bonds of social
> solidarity, it is hard to avoid concluding that this re-
> presents an <u>ad hoc</u> assertion designed to resolve an other-
> wise intractable theoretical dilemma (1976:40).

But we cannot follow Pope in concluding that Durkheim's no-

tion of the emergence of the individual person through his-

tory (see Chapter Eight, Book One) is merely an <u>ad hoc</u> and

tangential hypothesis; rather, we see it as central to the

substantive and historical structure of all of Durkheim's

work. By abstractly contrasting shared belief (traditional

society) with absence of shared belief (modern society),

Pope misses the crucial fact that the cult of moral indivi-

dualism is the modern religion of the self; that extreme in-

dividualism is a result of shared beliefs.

> ... insofar as he explained the "completely exceptional
> place in the collective conscience" of this cult, he did
> so by appealing to the content of this shared belief,
> which turns the will toward the individual rather than
> social ends. However, since Durkheim did not elsewhere
> treat the content of beliefs as relevant to their soli-
> darity producing qualities, this appeal must, as before,
> be judged to be <u>ad hoc</u> (1976:40).

Thus, even when Pope does stumble on Durkheim's second sche-

ma, he tosses it away; he is simply mistaken in claiming

that Durkheim never treated beliefs as producing solidarity.

Indeed, we have seen that the autonomization of culture and

the modern cult of the morally autonomous individual person

are two central themes in all of Durkheim's work. And appar-

ently Pope entertains here some hidden bias against norma-
tive or cultural explanations, preferring instead to anchor
everything in social structure.

Pope continues struggling with the cultural sanction-
ing of modern individualism, and yet refusing to allow him-
self to enter into the implications of the second schema.

> In Suicide Durkheim continued to struggle with the prob-
> lems posed by the cult of man. In particular, he eviden-
> ced uncertainty as to whether the cult of man leads to
> egoistic suicide through its stress on individualism.
> At one point [S:336], he denied that the cult is associa-
> ted with egoistic suicide, thus reasserting his premise
> that shared sentiments constitute a fundamental bond of
> solidarity.... As in The Division of Labor (but contrary
> to his own formulation earlier in Suicide), Durkheim held
> that a shared sentiment, presumably because its content
> stresses the value and dignity of the individual, does
> not represent a social bond but, on the contrary, encour-
> ages individualism and egoistic suicide (1976:41).

Again and again, Pope shies away from the cultural anchor-
ing of the suicide schemas.

> The underlying theoretical paradox takes somewhat dif-
> ferent forms in different contexts. In The Division of
> Labor the question is whether an increasingly important
> component of the collective conscience can be seen as
> an increasingly important element in modern organic so-
> ciety. In Suicide the question is whether a shared belief
> which emphasizes the importance of the individual leads
> to individuality and egoistic suicide. The underlying
> dilemma, however, is the same in both cases: Does a shar-
> ed belief that stresses the value of the individual
> strengthen social solidarity (as do other shared beliefs),
> or does it, because of its emphasis on the individual,
> actually weaken social solidarity * (1976:41)?

Yes, that is the question precisely, finally. Can there be
a culture of the self, a cultural sanctioning of the moral
anarchy of anomie and egoisme? I believe there is such a
sanctioning in modern culture, and this is the foundation of
the second schema.

But Pope, once again, turns away from his real insight
into this second possibility.

> Granting the existence of the dilemma and recognizing
> that at one point in Suicide Durkheim denied that a
> shared sentiment represents a social bond (thereby im-
> plicitly acknowledging the importance of value content),

one must also acknowledge that this statement appears
late in his book, long after his primary development of
the contrast between egoisme and anomie. Furthermore,
the point is unrelated to any of the distinctions he
drew between integration and regulation, and is never
directly employed to explain variation in social sui-
cide rates. Clearly this reference cannot be read back
into Durkheim's systematic contrasts between more and
less integrated groups in religious, domestic, and po-
litical societies; it is thus an unconvincing foundation
upon which to reinterpret integration in terms of value
content. Indeed, overall Parsons' attempt to distinguish
between regulation and integration is based on such an
array of pervasive misrepresentations that it may be un-
hesitatingly rejected (1976:41).

It is, of course, for others to finally judge who has misre-
presented Durkheim, and slighted important elements. Let it
now simply be recorded that Whitney Pope, author of a full
book-length study of Durkheim's classic _Suicide_, perceived
many of the same ambiguities and problems as I, glimpsed the
outlines of the second schema, but turned away.

CHAPTER TEN

RESCUES

A. Parsons

Preface. Since Durkheim's Suicide was not translated until
1951, Talcott Parsons' exploration in his classic The Struct-
ure of Social Action provided for many years the most exten-
sive secondary treatment of Durkheim's typology of suicide.
Parsons' pioneering analysis remains to this day one of the
most influential accounts, constituting almost a ruling ortho-
doxy which has only recently been effectively challenged (see
especially Giddens, 1970, 1971a,b,c, 1972a,b, 1976; Pope, 1973,
1975a). Besides the systematic explication in The Structure,
Parsons added a 1960 article "Durkheim's Contribution to the
Theory of the Integration of the Social System," and his review
of Durkheim's life and work in the 1968 Encyclopedia of the So-
cial Sciences.

In essence, Parsons reconstructs Durkheim's typology of
suicide in terms of his own notions concerning the strength and
content of The Central Value System (or conscience collective).
Parsons distinguished between the presence (eg. altruisme and
egoisme) of normative consensus, and its absence (anomie). Then
he proceeds to distinguish between the orientation of the shared
values--if the collectivity takes precedence, then altruisme re-
sults; if the individual, then egoisme results. Parsons recon-
struction of Durkheim's typology is schematically represented
in figure 11 (see also Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951:176-7).

Figure 11: Parsons' Interpretation of Durkheim's Typology
of Suicide

	Presence of Norms	Absence of Norms
Content of Norms	Collectivism--Altruisme Individualism--Egoisme	Anomie

Apart from abstracting and translating Durkheim into his own
terms, Parsons' schema is asymmetrical, and ignores one whole
category--namely, fatalisme. But Parsons must be given his due,
for he has insisted on retaining the distinctness of three out
of four of Durkheim's basic types.

1.   Parsons on Egoisme and Altruisme

At the outset, we should note a startling fact: Parsons stands
almost alone among American sociologists who have paid close at-
tention to Durkheim's concept of egoisme. For over thirty years,
Parsons has steadfastly insisted on interpreting Durkheim's con-
cept of egoisme in a virtuous light, as religiously sanctioned
"institutionalized individualism" (eg. 1968a:317). In his search
for the source of internalized moral obligation and a religious-
ly sanctioned value consensus on which such obligation rests,
Parsons first places great emphasis on Durkheim's conception of
egoisme, and then even greater stress on the significance of ano-
mie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's descrip-
tion of egoisme, Parsons takes it to refer to what he himself
holds most dear--namely, the "higher order of individualized
moral obligation in Protestantism." Opposed to his elevation of
Protestant egoisme to a principle of the first order, is Parsons'
negative valuation of altruisme, which subordinates the indivi-
dual to the archaic, fused, collective conscience which Parsons,
in turn, identifies with Catholicism as a survival in the mo-
dern world.

In both cases, Parsons interprets egoisme and altruisme
as proceeding from the presence of religio-cultural sanctions.
However questionable other aspects of his interpretation of
Durkheim's typology, Parsons stands almost alone among contemp-
orary social theorists in recognizing Durkheim's breakthrough
to his second schema of suicide (see Book Three). Of course,
I differ from Parsons in his positive valuation of egoisme, and
cannot follow his confusion of Durkheim's first and second sche-
mas. Moreover, by deemphasizing Durkheim's image of historical
process and doctrine of human nature, Parsons turns Durkheim's
first image of the presence of generic drives in the pre-social

ego into the misleading image of the <u>generic</u> <u>absence</u> of social
control ("the Hobbesian dilemma"). Parsons' abstracted search
for the generic elements of social order and control hardly mir-
rors Durkheim's highly inflected philosophical, moral, and his-
torical concerns (see Book One).

Parsons' tortuous but brilliant account of Durkheim's types
is predicated upon his own special thesis regarding certain
fundamental shifts in Durkheim's theoretical development. Par-
sons places great weight on Durkheim's breakthrough in <u>Suicide</u>
in his own proposed sequence of Durkheim's developmental phases.
Here, Parsons sees Durkheim as transcending his supposed pre-
vious difficulties in separating the collective conscience from
organic solidarity, and in postulating only external, physical
constraint, instead of internalized motivations and obligations.
Parsons later summarizes his theses in these terms:

> ... in <u>The Division of Labor</u> Durkheim had much to say about
> the role of institutionalized norms, but little about the
> character of the motivation underlying commitment to values
> and conformity with norms.... In <u>Suicide</u>, however, and in
> his work on the sociology of education, he took two import-
> ant steps beyond this position.... The first is his discov-
> ery and partial development of the idea of the internaliza-
> tion of values and norms. The second is the discrimination
> he makes, with special reference to the problem of the na-
> ture of modern "individualism," between the two ranges of
> variation. One of these concerns types of institutionalized
> value-norm complexes, and is exemplified by the distinction
> between egoisme and altruisme. The other concerns the types
> of relation that the individual can have to whatever norms
> and values are institutionalized. Here the distinction be-
> tween egoisme and anomie is crucial; it is parallel to that
> between altruisme and fatalisme (1960a:141-2).

In locating his underlying schema in terms of Durkheim's devel-
opment, Parsons thus appears to gain deeper validation for his
central thesis that the fundamental source of social order and
control can only be ultimately found in certain types of social-
ly enforced self-discipline which penetrates to the heart of
the personality structure; in short, in the "internalization of
moral authority." In religious terms, with latent Weberian over-
tones, Parsons conceives this to be also the prime difference
between Catholicism and traditional cultural structures and the
rigors of the collectivized self-discipline characteristic of
ascetic Protestantism.

a. The Significance of Egoisme and Protestantism

Parsons anchors his favorable notion of egoisme in an e-
qually favorable valuation of Protestant "moral individualism."
Not unsurprisingly, Parsons appears to discover here the very
factor for which he searches so relentlessly--namely, that sta-
ble equilibrium and social order can only be based in the long
run upon internalized moral obligation founded upon a religious-
ly sanctioned over-arching abstracted value consensus. Now,
Parsons interprets Durkheim's linking of egoistic suicide with
Protestantism to mean that Durkheim had thereby broken through
his previous identification of the conscience collective with
primitive mechanical solidarity. Thus, Parsons would have us
suppose that Durkheim only gradually came to see that even mo-
dern "moral (or"institutionalized") individualism" must also
enjoy normative support and deeply embedded religious and cul-
tural sanctions.

Since Durkheim himself ostensibly described his first di-
chotomous set--egoisme versus altruisme--as high and low types
of social integration Parsons sums up these possibilities as
three positions on a continuum of social structural integration:

> There is an optimum intensity of group attachment which
> the Catholic with a large family comes close to. Too
> strong an attachment, an increase far beyond the opti-
> mum, leads to an increase (the army rate), as does too
> weak an attachment (the Protestant rate) (1949:331, #3).

However, Parsons proceeds to his crucial contention by noting
that, as Durkheim himself observed, the actual historical rea-
son why Protestants seemed to be more egoistic is not simply be-
cause they weren't sufficiently structurally integrated into
groups, but rather that their "egoisme" was instead itself the
result of a certain type of group pressure, indeed of a new
type of collectively sanctioned "individual conscience." Unlike
other interpreters, Parsons critically compares Durkheim's des-
cription of altruisme and egoisme with the latter's rather dif-
ferent explanation of their root causes. Parsons explores this
gap between Durkheim's descriptive and explanatory levels by
comparing the way in which Durkheim first described egoisme and
altruisme as opposites on a continuum of social integration,

with the different picture emerging from the central historical
rationales in which both egoisme and altruisme were presented
as resulting from the <u>presence</u> of culturally sanctioned moral
obligations.

> Egoisme seems to exist as a factor in suicide so far as
> people are freed from group control, while altruisme ex-
> ists so far as the group control is excessively strong....
> This leaves the relation of egoisme to anomie unclear....
>   (1949:331).

Now, Parsons identifies one of Durkheim's shift in ration-
ales when he considers the relation between religion and sui-
cide rates.

> ... The striking fact is that the rate for Protestants
> is much higher than for Catholics.... The explanation
> lies, according to Durkheim, in the Protestant attitude
> toward individual freedom in religious matters. The Cath-
> olic precisely in so far as he is faithful has laid down
> for him a system of beliefs and practices which his mem-
> bership in the church prescribes for him. He has no initia-
> tive in the matter; all responsibility belongs to the chur-
> ch as an organization. The very state of his soul and chan-
> ces of salvation depend on his faithful adherence to these
> prescriptions. The case of the Protestant ... is very dif-
> ferent. He is himself the ultimate judge of religious truth
> and the rightness of conduct deduced from it. The church is
> in a very different relation to him (1949:331-2).

In historical and doctrinal terms, then, Parsons correctly ob-
served, as did Durkheim, that the actual reason Protestants
are less structurally integrated is not simply that they were
released from moral control because of the weaker, more decen-
tralized character of Protestant churches, but rather that Protest-
ant <u>norms</u> <u>themselves</u> <u>force</u> <u>the</u> <u>individual</u> <u>to</u> <u>be</u> <u>self-reliant</u>
<u>and</u> <u>autonomous</u>.

> It is in the relation of the individual to the organized
> religious group that Durkheim sees the decisive difference.
> In one sense the difference consists in that the Catholic
> is subjected to a group authority from which the Protest-
> ant is exempt. But ... <u>the</u> <u>essential</u> <u>point</u> <u>is</u> <u>that</u> <u>the</u>
> <u>Protestant's</u> <u>freedom</u> <u>from</u> <u>group</u> <u>control</u> <u>is</u> <u>not</u> <u>optional</u>.
> In so far as he is a Protestant he must assume this res-
> ponsibility and exercise his freedom. He cannot devolve
> it on a church. The obligation to exercise religious free-
> dom in this sense is a fundamental feature of protestant-
> ism as a religious movement * (1949:332).

Hence, Parsons intimates that traditional Catholicism, for
instance, corresponds to the submission of the individual con-

science in mechanical solidarity, while Protestantism corresponds to the new type of "institutionalized individualism" appropriate to modern societies. In contrast to the hierarchical submission of the individual to the church in Catholicism:

> A Protestant is free of these types of control. But he is not free to choose whether or not to accept such controls.... The obligation to accept such responsibility is legitimized by the common values of the Protestant group and is translated into norms governing behavior (1960a:147).

> It is a remarkable interpretation, both in itself and because it converges with the theme developed a few years later by Max Weber concerning the importance of the Protestant ethic in modern society. There is also ... an echo of Rousseau, in that Durkheim seemed to be citing an instance of the famous paradoxical formula about a man being "forced to be free," adding that this enforced freedom may become too hard to bear (1968a:316).

Parsons interprets this as the critical point at which Durkheim was obliged to shift the grounds of his first argument by recognizing the cultural-historical rootedness of Protestant values. Now both altruisme and egoisme are seen to proceed from the presence of cultural sanctions; the difference between the two is merely in the direction of individual duty. Altruisme, proper to mechanical solidarity, requires the individual to submerge himself in the fused, primitive collective conscience, and includes the demand to sacrifice oneself for one's group. On the other hand, egoisme, in Parsons' version, implies the religiously sanctioned injunction to guide oneself by one's own inner-light, even in the face of conflicting social or traditional claims, and proceeds from the historically rooted "social pressure in Protestant norms toward a higher order of individualized religious responsibility."

Parsons also proposes that this new perception of egoisme as generated by the presence of religio-cultural rationales constituted a solution of what he supposed to be Durkheim's original problem in The Division of Labor--namely, the content and obligatory force of the collective conscience in the modern organic division of labor. Against the common, but misleading, notion (embraced by R.H. Tawney, 1926 for example) that the roots of of the modern world can be adequately explained as due simply to

the release of the individual from traditional controls, Parsons correctly emphasizes, following Max Weber, the absolutely crucial fact that Protestant individualism as egoisme cannot be historically considered the result of either structural or normative breakdown. Rather, both egoisme and the most distinctive features of the modern world as the "Protestant Era" (Tillich, 1948), are due to the secularizing thrusts of this religio-cultural system. Durkheim's first causal explanation--social morphological differentiation and individuation--simply will not suffice as a full and sufficient explanation of either the emergence of Protestantism or modern individualism (see Books One, Two, and Three). This point is critical to emphasize, for even as late as 1965 an observer such as Barclay Johnson could attempt to counter Parsons' interpretation of egoisme with Durkheim's weak evolutionary model suggesting that Protestantism is itself a result of the progressive breakdown of traditional collective sentiments due to the ubiquitous effects of the division of labor. Parsons insists, on the contrary, that this comes:

> ... close to a manifestation of the collective conscience. For religious freedom is a basic ethical value common to all Protestants. In so far as a man is Protestant he is subjected to a social, a group pressure. But the result is a very different relation to the religious group as an organized entity from that of the Catholic. He is under pressure to be independent, to take his own religious responsibility, while the Catholic is under pressure to submit himself to the authority of the church * (1949:332).

Thus, contrary to almost all other theories of anomie and egoisme as caused by the absence of social structural or normative integration, Parsons, in embracing half of Durkheim's second theory, correctly argues that the great historical significance of Protestantism, in this respect, is precisely that it shifted the main source of normative control and directive from the collectivity to the individual, from external constraint to internalized self-discipline. With this historical insight into the religio-cultural foundations of individualism and egoisme, Parsons clearly forges a potentially profound link to another famous interpretation of the significance of Protestantism in the modern world. Weber, of course, also recognized the importance of the various ascetic Protestant sects (eg. Weber, 1946, 1958a,

1968; see also Benton Johnson, 1971, and Stephen Berger, 1971)
in exerting the unrelenting social pressures needed to incul-
cate a new level of intensity of self-discipline and drives
for moral perfection within the world. Surely it is one of the
great mysteries of contemporary sociological theory that no
one has yet attempted to systematically and historically explore
the significance of Durkheim's second notion of egoisme as gen-
erated by the presence of ethicoreligious values with Weber's
theses, which also rested on the perception of the ironic and
even tragic outcomes of the Protestant resolve to construct new
self-disciplined, rationally integrated, perfection seeking char-
acter structures (but see Book Three).

In exploring this striking convergence between Durkheim's
critical notion of the "pathologies" and "moral anarchy" of the
"infinity sickness" of the modern world, and Weber's notion of
once visible saints leaving us all in an "iron cage," we must
differ, of course, with Parsons in regard to a number of cru-
cial omissions and distortions in his account. While agreeing
that in Durkheim's second schema egoisme is as much an institu-
tionalized norm as altruisme, nevertheless, we must note that
Parsons generally slights Durkheim's crucial doctrine of human
nature (although occasionally recognizing its centrality, eg.
see 1949:384). This omission creates a potentially disruptive
hiatus in Parsons' own schema which we shall soon explore.
Further, there is little or no mention of Durkheim's notion
of the "infinity of dreams and desires," of the individual path-
ological forms of suicide, insufficient recognition

of moral condemnation involved in Durkheim's discussion, or
the fact that Durkheim considered egoistic suicide the most pre-
valent chronic form of "moral anarchy" afflicting the modern
world. How can Parsons expect us to follow him in his wholly
laudatory valuation of egoisme, in direct contrast to Durkheim's
critique? Isn't it strange that what is "moral anarchy" to
Durkheim is "moral, institutionalized individualism" to Parsons?
Parsons later argued for redress in the balance of attention
given to anomie and egoisme. However, by 1968, Parsons' perspec-
tive   altered somewhat, for in responding to more prevalent

notions than his own, he confused matters further by loosely identifying egoisme and alienation.

b. Parsons on Altruisme

Parsons observes that the key to altruistic suicide is that collective norms so penetrate the individual that his own nascent conscience is so little individuated that he considers self-sacrifice for the group a moral duty. Parsons thus correctly perceives that the key elements distinguishing altruisme from egoisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as simply high and low positions on a continuum of social integration. Rather, the difference is cultural: between collective norms which demand that the collective conscience take precedence over the individual (altruisme) versus collective norms which demand that the individual conscience take precedence over any traditional claims of the collective conscience; in short, between collectivistic and individualistic cultural norms. Parsons observes that altruistic suicide:

> ... involves a group attachment of great strength such that in comparison with claims made upon the individual fulfillment of the obligations laid upon him by the group, his own interests, even in life itself, become secondary. This leads to a generally small valuation of individual life, so that he will part with it on relatively small provocation; on the other hand, it leads to a direct social mandate to suicide (1949:328).

There is, however, besides the cultural differences in dominant rationales concerning the obligation of the individual to society and self, another crucial difference between altruisme and egoisme implicit in Durkheim's schema--namely, the historical differences between primitive, mechanically integrated societies and modern nations prior to the full institutionalization of organic solidarity. By spending most of his analysis on the army, Parsons fails to sufficiently emphasize this crucial historical dimension. The elimination of Durkheim's evolutionary framework from Parsons' account (see Book One) is, however, understandable since Parsons had earlier decreed that Durkheim was most basically concerned with the abstract problem of social order and control, with "social statics" rather than "dy-

namics." Parsons partially perceives Durkheim's underlying time dimension, but characteristically transmutes it into an abstracted theoretical proposition!

> It seems clear that the altruistic factor in suicide is, for Durkheim, on essentially the same theoretical plane as mechanical solidarity. It is a manifestation of the conscience collective by group pressure at the expense of the claims of individuality. But even here there is a slight shift of emphasis. It is no longer similarity which is the central point, but subordination of individuality to the group.... Already Durkheim is moving away from the identification of the problem of "solidarity" with that of the social structure. Altruistic suicide is a manifestation of the collective conscience which is strong in the sense of subordinating individual to group interests, and which has a particular content of low valuation of individual life relative to group values (1949: 330).

Thus, to the cultural dimension involving the differing rationales governing the direction of individual moral obligation, we must add Durkheim's crucial historical dimension by locating these two types in social and cultural structures at the two ends of history.

2. <u>Parsons' Anomie as the "Hobbesian Dilemma"</u>

After discovering egoisme (ala Protestant virtue) as his first anchor, Parsons seizes upon anomie as the key to his search for the resolution of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"-- what he conceives as the generic problem of individual anarchy, social control, and the foundations of lasting social order. Anomie in these terms becomes absolutely central to Parsons' argument. Having discovered with egoisme and altruisme the universal requirement of the internalization of norms (or the solution to the sources of social instability in self-disciplining moral obligation), Parsons next turns to anomie as solving the problem of the source of the breakdown of social order in general, not only in terms of the absence of effective, internalized obligation, but also the sources of normative confusion. Parsons supposes Durkheim's second and decisive breakthrough to have come with the latter's recognition of the central importance of the "contents of motivation with his notion of anomie." Anomie holds the key to social disorder; or more precise-

ly, _anomie_ _is_ _the_ _Hobbesian_ _dilemma_.

In his 1968 encyclopedia essay, Parsons proposes that
"anomie has become ^one^ of the few truly central concepts of con-
temporary social science" (1968a: 316). But whose version of
anomie does this mean? Durkheim's, Halbwach's, Parsons' own,
Merton's, Srole's, countless other installments? If anomie
has become a paradigmatic concept, then I suggest that this
has largely come about through not only Parsons' efforts, but
the intellectual charisma claimed, usurped, and popularized
by Merton and later Srole. Indeed, it is questionable whether
most sociologists really know what Durkheim's notions of ano-
mie imply (or those of Parsons' either, for that matter). Fur-
ther, how close is Parsons' version of anomie to Durkheim's,
and hence, which meaning of anomie should hereafter be consi-
dered "truly central" to sociological theory?

The key to Parsons' own version of anomie rests upon ano-
ther dichotomy--the presence versus the absence of effective,
legitimate, internalized norms. To Parsons, anomie implies the
absence of norms, or more specifically, the absence of _clearly_
defined norms, goals, values, etc. Essentially, Parsons' no-
tion of anomie connotes ambiguity, confusion, or lack of mean-
ingfulness resulting from the breakdown of the intimate rela-
tions between the cultural and psychological components of The
General System of Action. In Parsonian anomie, the "relational
system becomes confused," or in later Parsonian terms, "malin-
tegrated."

As the opposite of clearly perceived and effectively intern-
alized moral obligations, Parsons views anomie as the lack of
clarity leading to a normative breakdown.

> Anomie is best interpreted in terms of Durkheim's Carte-
> sian frame of reference. The observer as actor is natural-
> ly concerned with the definiteness of the reality with
> which he is confronted.... The problem is the definiteness
> of expectations ... (1968a:316).

Having posited internalized moral obligation (ala Protestant
egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability, Parsons
proceeds to explain disorder in terms of the lack of "defini-
teness of expectations." _In_ _a_ _subtle_, _yet_ _absolutely_ _crucial_,

shift in meaning, Parsons switches Durkheim's connotation of anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." In this way Durkheim's profound and critical notion of "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness" plaguing the modern or "Protestant era" becomes transmuted and routinized into mere personal confusion or a feeling of lostness because of changing or unclear cultural mandates.

As always, Parsons presumes that Durkheim was led to the logic of these conclusions and a crucial breakthrough in his own theoretical schema by yet another empirical confrontation with Utilitarian theory.

> Durkheim was led to make his study of suicide by a paradox: according to utilitarian theory, a rising standard of living should bring about a general increase in "happiness;" however, concomitant with the certain rise in the standard of living in Western countries, there was a marked rise in the suicide rate. Why is it that as people become happier, more of them killed themselves (1960a:142)?

> This was clearly an anomaly from the point of view of utilitarian theory, and stimulated Durkheim to a major, if not complete, theoretical reconstruction in Suicide (1968a:315).

> ... the decisive breakthrough in solving the paradox came about with his working out of the concept of anomie (1960a: 143).

Parsons, as always, overestimates the degree to which Durkheim developed his own ideas in polemical opposition to the Anglo Utilitarians; conversely, he overlooks the degree to which Durkheim was engaged in polemics with several opposing cultural traditions. Surely neither statistics nor a purely intellectual squabble with an opposing school suffices to explain Durkheim's intentions in writing Suicide. But, to be sure, any adequate explanation of Durkheim's shifts in his typologies of suicide should rest on a clear conception of both Durkheim's multiple polemical critiques of opposing cultural traditions, and his own core commitments to his own cultural tradition.

Starting with Durkheim's statistics demonstrating that anomic suicides are related both to commercial prosperity and depressions, Parsons begins to add his own series of connotations to Durkheim's description of anomie. Parsons says that the source of these startling facts is "due to the same order

of causes."

> That cause Durkheim finds in the fact that in both cases large numbers of people are thrown with relative sudden-ness out of adjustment with certain important features of their social environment. In depression, expectations re-lative to the standard of living, with all that implies, are disturbed on a large scale. In unusual prosperity, on the other hand, things which had seemed altogether outside the range of possibility become for many people realities. At both extremes the relations between means and ends, be-tween effort and attainment, is upset. The result is a sense of confusion, a loss of orientation. People no long-er have the sense that they are "getting anywhere" (1949: 335).

Parsons exegesis is incomplete, only partially accurate. His off-hand rendering of Durkheim's crucial notion of the Social Schedule--with "all that implies"--leaves out the central in-tervening steps in Durkheim's argument (see Book Two and Three). The reason that people are "thrown out of adjustment" is that the Social Schedule of expectation is upset, chronically in the modern world. And "people no longer feel that they are get-ting anywhere" not because their goals lack clarity or defini-teness, but rather because of the infiniteness of their desires. Parsons is correct in the following passage to note that happi-ness is dependent on "a clear definition of ends," but a clear definition of infinite goals is devastating.

> Durkheim's analysis goes far deeper. The sense of confu-sion and frustration in depression seems not so difficult to understand, but why is the reaction to unusual prosper-ity not increased satisfaction all around, as any utili-tarian point of view would take for granted? Because, Durk-heim says, a sense of security, of progress toward ends depends not only on adequate command over means, but on clear definition of the ends themselves (1949:335).

Parsons series of associations may be summed up thus: normative clarity is to value consensus as normative confusion is to ano-mie and anarchy.

Although Parsons occasionally mentions Durkheim's central concern with anomie and egoisme--namely, insatiability and the "infinity of dreams and desires"--he hardly gives it comparable significance (eg. 1949:335-6). Now, one of the most basic shifts in the grounds of Durkheim's argument concerns the location of the motive force of egoisme and anomie--insatiability. Durkheim

himself began abstractly by anchoring insatiable desires and egotism in the organic half of homo duplex (see Books One and Three); in this he was undoubtedly influenced, as Parsons observes, by the similar, though virtuous, images of man held by the Anglo Utilitarians. But, as Durkheim confronted the specific historical origins of egoisme and anomie, especially in terms of the empirical evidence regarding Protestantism and suicides in commerce, industry, the professions, etc., he was forced to recognize, as Parsons partly did with egoisme, that anomie along with egoisme emerged from modern ethical sanctions pushed to extreme. Since every form of suicide "is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue," anomie and egoisme come from our "virtues becoming vices."

How does Parsons respond to the implications of Durkheim's developing argument as outlined in Books Two and Three of this dissertation? First, he does note that the central tenet of Durkheim's economic sociology--the Social Schedule of the distribution of reward through the occupational system--has another key facet--legitimacy.

> This discipline which is indispensable to the personal sense of attainment, and thus to happiness, is not imposed by the individual himself. It is imposed by society. For it to serve this function, the discipline cannot be mere coercion. Men cannot be happy in the acceptance of limitations simply imposed by force; they must recognize them to be "just," the discipline must carry moral authority. It takes the form, then, of socially given moral norms by which ends of action are defined. If anything happens to break down the discipline of these norms, the result is personal disequilibrium, which results in various forms of personal breakdown, in extreme instances, suicide.... For each class in society there is always a socially approved standard of living--which is relatively definite. To live on such a scale is a normal legitimate expectation. Both depression below it and elevation above it necessitate what Durkheim calls a "moral re-education," which cannot be accomplished quickly and easily, if at all (1949:336).

In breaking through to his second schema, Durkheim, like Parsons with his notion of "institutionalized individualism," began to see that, through the Social Schedule, these religiously sanctioned egoistic and insatiable desires are culturally legitimized and economically expressed.

In structural-functional terms, Parsons considers anomie to represent a pathological state of "malintegration." The cultural and psychological components of The Social System are "out of alignment," inducing "strain" in the individual.

> An individual does not commit suicide primarily because he lacks the "means" to accomplish his goals, but because his goals cannot be meaningfully integrated with the expectations which have been institutionalized in values and norms. The factors responsible for this malintegration may be social, cultural, or psychological in any combination, but the common point of strain concerns the meaningfulness of situations and of alternatives of action.... it is the relational system, not the individual, which needs straightening out *(1960a:27).

> ... "anomie" may be considered that state of a social system which makes a particular class of members consider exertion for success meaningless, not because they lack capacity or opportunity to achieve what is wanted, but because they lack a clear definition of what is desirable. It is a pathology not of the instrumental system but of the collective normative system *(1968a:316).

At root, Parsons' notions of "malintegration" and "strain" rest on mechanistic metaphors (see Smelser, 1971). Here we see Parsons taking pains to distance his idea of anomie from Merton's --for anomie is "a pathology, not of the instrumental system, but of the collective normative system." While Durkheim emphasized egoism and insatiability, and Parsons emphasized normative confusion, Merton saw anomie as the lack of structural access to culturally approved goals. Although linked in certain ways, these fundamental shifts in the nature and origin of anomie from one pioneer sociologist to the next reveals a basic sociocultural process--the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974). Before proposing a detailed critique of Parsons' translation of anomie, let us consider the other anchor of his interpretation--namely, his argument concerning the importance of anomie in Durkheim's methodological breakthrough.

3. Parsons on Durkheim's Methodological Breakthroughs in Relation to His Theories of Social Control and Suicide

If Parsons fundamental thesis on Durkheim is that the latter was centrally concerned with the theoretical problem of social order, then at the heart of this assertion is Parsons' own notion of social control. To Parsons, social order, integration, constraint, obligation, control and so on seemed inextricably interrelated. Beyond the dubiousness of Parsons' "creative" interpretation of Durkheim's core commitments, it is surely misleading to identify Durkheim's central concerns with the shifting historical sources of legitimate moral authority too closely with the abstract heading of social control. The questions of the source and nature of legitimate moral authority, on the one hand, and power and social control are very different, though related, issues.

As always, Parsons asks us to see Durkheim as developing his own central methodological postulates and procedures primarily in polemical response to Utilitarian theory. In the background, of course, lies Parsons' insistence on the centrality of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma," for if men are by nature egoistic and insatiable,

and bound only by passing interests, then how is the "war of all against all" to be moderated? Since Parsons starts from this premise, and then forces Durkheim's theories into the mode of critical response to these dilemmas, one would hardly expect that Durkheim would fail to yield Parsons the very answer for which he so insistently searched.

According to Parsons, since Durkheim's central concern was to clarify the theoretical bases of social order and constraining control over against Hobbesian anarchy, Durkheim logically took up a position opposite to the Utilitarians at almost every point. Durkheim's sociologistic positivism, with its doctrine of "social facts," countered the Utilitarian claims of the subjectivity, spontaneity, and randomness of individual wants with the ideas of externality, constraint, and the notion of the sacred as the foundation of social and moral order

(eg. 1949:461). Parsons assumes that Durkheim's claim that "social facts" should be regarded as "things" represents the first phase, that of "naturalistic causation," in Durkheim's evolving methodological position. This is seen, for example, in Durkheim's theory that the causes of the division of social labor are social morphological (which Parsons and others after him mistakenly termed "biological"). The next factors critical to Durkheim's methodological breakthroughs, Parsons maintains, came with: (a) the synthesis argument, (b) the idea that society is also a "psychic entity," and (c) the specification of the "social factor" in terms of the concepts of the conscience collective and representations collective (see also Pope, 1973).

According to Parsons, Durkheim's next important shift was away from naturalistic causation to concern with legal sanctions (eg. 1949:463). The decisive breakthrough, Parsons informs us, came with Durkheim's analysis of egoisme and anomie in Suicide, and his ideas in Moral Education (eg. 1949:463).

> ... in terms of the great dichotomy of this study, the social factor becomes a normative, value factor, not one of heredity and environment.... Durkheim's sociologism has turned out to be fatal to his positivism (1949:464).

Parsons summarizes his assertions on the phases in Durkheim's developing methodology thus far:

> ... in following out the problem of social control Durkheim has progressed through the conception of control as subjection to naturalistic causation and then avoidance of sanctions, to laying primary emphasis on the "subjective" sense of moral obligation. The element of constraint persists, with a changed meaning, in the sense of obligation (1949:385).

Since Parsons' account of Durkheim's methodological breakthroughs and his supposed developing theory of social control are intimately related, let us note some limitations in Parsons' account. First, Durkheim was not centrally concerned with the "Hobbesian dilemma" (see the works by Giddens); it did not haunt him as it did Parsons. Perhaps Parsons' insistence on this problem is more understandable as a projection of inner difficulties of his own cultural tradition. For Durkheim's own central methodological problem, stemming from the problematics of his own cultural tradition, was to construct a science of

morality to replace the old cultural regime. Second, Durkheim did not develop his own methodology simply in categorical response to the inadequacies of Anglo Utilitarian theory. As he makes clear in The Rules, in the essay "Individual and Collective Representations," in The Elementary Forms and other places, Durkheim opposed key elements of both Utilitarian and Idealistic theory. When we add his critique of metaphysics and the Catholic cultural tradition, it is clear that Durkheim polemicized on three different fronts simultaneously (see Book Three). In these terms, Durkheim's central problem was to resolve the antinomies between these opposing cultural traditions, while still remaining true to his own cultural historical mission (see Chapter One, Book One). Parsons' peculiar definition of positivism ignores the very French flavor of modern positivism; Pope (1973) unfortunately follows Parsons here, when he erroneously concludes that Durkheim was never a positivist. Third, Durkheim simply did not undergo the major revolutionary stages outlined by Parsons. Pope is certainly correct in rejecting this part of Parsons' argument. As we discovered in Book One, Durkheim's emphasis on social morphological differentiation was a life-long concern in his causal model. Parsons' mistaken thesis that Durkheim's central causal anchor of social morphological process represented a theoretical dead-end after The Division of Labor has begun to dissolve. Schnore (1958) was one of the first to point out the centrality of social morphological processes in Durkheim's causal model. Also, Robert Bellah (1959) recognized the importance of social morphological differentiation as a key evolutionary process. By 1960, Parsons had begun to waver from the firmness of his earlier judgment. Thus, while the question of the ratio of continuity to discontinuity in any major thinkers' development is important, Parsons' interpretation was mistakenly predicated on the image of a radical discontinuity in Durkheim's intellectual career. Here Parsons' basic mistake, deriving from his earlier theses, was to split the two halves of Durkheim's causal model by assigning social morphology to the early "radically positivistic" Durkheim, and "collective representations"

to the later "idealistic" Durkheim. Yet, even Parsons himself, as Pope emphasized (1975a), now acknowledges that he "... may have overdone the periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual development" (1975a:106), and agrees instead with Bellah (1973:xiii, xxiii, xix), that there is "an impressive continuity" in Durkheim's intellectual career.

Fourth, Parsons' notion of a third phase where Durkheim broke through to the conception of the internalization of moral obligations is similarly invalidated. On the contrary, as Pope (1973, 1975a) has rightly insisted, Durkheim assumed the internalization of moral obligation from the very beginning. Even Parsons (1975a:107) now agrees. For Durkheim was centrally concerned from the very beginning, as his book reviews (eg. see Giddens, 1970), and many passages in The Division of Labor and its appendices testify, with the internalized contents of the individual conscience in relation to the external contents of the collective conscience. Again, Parsons' basic problem here was the mistaken portrayal of the "early" Durkheim as a crude or radical positivist who acknowledged only "external" enviromental factors such as "population pressure." In sum, Parsons' conjoined theses in this regard must be set aside, namely:

- (a) Durkheim was centrally concerned with "social statics" and not "dynamics" and historical change;

- (b) Durkheim was centrally concerned with the "Hobbesian dilemma"--that is, the search for the generic bases of social order and control (or alternately the "Integration of The Social System");

- (c) Durkheim's rhetorical animus was directed primarily against the Anglo Utilitarians;

- (d) Durkheim's central causal anchor (social morphological processes), which formed the basic theorem of his school, represented a theoretical dead-end and Durkheim never returned to it after The Division of Labor;

- (e) The development of Durkheim's thought passed through at least four distinct phases, in which he broke with positiviism, and moved toward idealism and voluntarism.

- (f) Durkheim moved from originally identifying all non-sociologistic explanations of social action with "individualistic" theories toward a central focus on the subjective point of view.

Parsons' own special intentions are revealed again as he explores the significance of Durkheim's notion of anomie for his methodology, especially as it relates to the problem of social order and control. Parsons proposes that the extreme limit of anomie:

> ... is the state of pure individualism (correlative with "disorganization of personality") which is for Durkheim as for Hobbes--the "war of all against all." Coordinate with and opposite to (as a polar antithesis) the state of anomie is that of "perfect integration" which implies two things--that the body of norms governing conduct in a community forms a consistent system (this aspect of integration significantly enough Durkheim scarcely takes notice of at all) and that its control over the individual is actually effective--it gets itself obeyed (1949: 377).

Here Parsons is faced with a number of difficulties. First, what Parsons refers to as the extreme limit of "pure individualism" is closer to what Durkheim meant by his first notion of egoisme. This notion was influenced by the Utilitarians' image of human nature; Durkheim simply inverted the negative valuation of natural egoism and duty-bound insatiability. But by accepting the image of human nature from his polemical opponents which located the destructive passions of egoism and insatiability in the pre-social or organic ego, Durkheim unwittingly got himself in a most unfortunate bind for a sociologist (see Books One and Three). And Parsons slights Durkheim's derivation of dark forces from the pre-social level, perhaps because Parsons himself shares this darkly negative image of human nature.   Further, Parsons unwittingly identifies the "polar (antithetical) opposite of anomie" as "perfect integration" with fatalisme, which   has always been considered the opposite of anomie.   But Parsons has rightly referred to "suicide fataliste" as "the situation where the pressure of the conscience collective is excessive" (1949:336). Unfortunately, this mis-identification pulls into the same orbit the state of "perfect integration," value consensus, and the "mechanically integrated" collective conscience seen in primitive fatalistic suicides (see Books Two and Three)! Per-

haps Parsons' way out of this Comtean vision is, as later
passages suggest, to view altruisme and fatalisme as possi-
ble cases of "pathological overconformity."

Parsons further fleshes out his assertions concerning
the meaning of anomie and egoisme in the context of Durkheim's
methodological development by simultaneously rooting these
assertions in another parallel theoretical change--namely, the
shift in the connotations of constraint in Durkheim's theory
of moral obligation. At first, Parsons suggests, Durkheim us-
ed almost any external objective factor to counter the indiv-
idual's natural egoism and insatiability. However, Durkheim la-
ter shifted to recognition of the critical importance of moral
rules which, in his final phase, were seen as internalized in
terms of ethical duty.

In regard to the nature and source of socially effective
constraint in Durkheim's early stages, Parsons asks: "What is
their source and what is the nature of the social force which
constrains (1949:381)? Durkheim's next big breakthrough, ac-
cording to Parsons, came with the notion of anomie--represen-
ting the absence of effective internalized moral obligations.
However, as his early reviews and the suppressed introduction
to The Division of Labor, which Simpson reprinted as an appen-
dix, demonstrates, Durkheim was centrally concerned with the
internalization of moral obligation based on respect for tran-
scending moral authority from the very beginning of his career.
This fact, in turn, casts more doubt on Parsons' interpreta-
tion of Durkheim's supposed acceptance of the Utilitarian di-
lemma, his supposed phases, and his supposed "radical break
with positivism" (see also Pope, 1973).

> There [with anomie] he was led to take another great
> step, the implications of which bring him to the next
> great phase of his development. Up to this point he has
> always thought in terms of the utilitarian dilemma--from
> the subjective point of view action must be explained in
> terms of individual ends or wants (which to the utilitar-
> ian are concrete wants).... Durkheim has hitherto accep-
> ted this so that it has simply gone without saying that,
> since he rejects the utilitarian solution, his social
> factor has to fit into the category of conditions.

> Now he makes the far-reaching empirical observation that since individual wants are in principle unlimited, it is an essential condition of both social stability and individual happiness that they should be regulated in terms of norms. But here the norms do not, as the rules of contract, merely regulate "externally," but enter directly into the constitution of the actors ends themselves* (1949: 381).

As is his custom, Parsons portrays Durkheim as a sort of inverted mirror of Utilitarianism--of course, "it simply went without saying" that if the Utilitarians said up, Durkheim said down, the Utilitarians left, Durkheim right, and so on. But this portrait of Durkheim, bordering on caricature, seriously underestimates, as noted earlier, the uniquely French and personal sources of Durkheim's thought. More troublesome is Parsons tacit acceptance of Durkheim's first philosophical doctrine of the dualism of human nature--here expressed as the idea that "individual wants are in principle unlimited." Curiously, Parsons terms this an "empirical observation!" But in what sense? On the contrary, I would suggest that as men are defined in these terms and placed under powerful sanctions to act out these definitions, then and only then will they come to act and see themselves in this way. In this case, the sources of this powerful image is a powerfully situated cultural group; by no means can human nature be blamed (see Book Three). The fact that historically different cultures endow different styles of life with entirely different images of perfection, and hence social sanctions, demonstrates that egoism and insatiability are not accurately projected as generic afflictions on the human species. In sum, Durkheim's key antinomy, to Parsons, was the ahistorical dichotomy: individual anarchy/moral discipline. In turn, we can also recognize how Parsons transmuted Durkheim's dualism into a dichotomy between self-disciplined, Protestant individualism versus the confusion of anomie (or perhaps the lapse from Protestant norms).

However, Parsons' contorted translation of Durkheim's conceptions into his own schema raises another deeper problem for Parsons. If, as he maintains, norms do not merely "regulate externally," but rather enter intimately and "directly

into the constitution of the ends themselves," then Parsons
is faced with two additional difficult problems. If, in his
own terms, norms work primarily in negative fashion by re -
straining the natural passions of the egoistic and insatiable
organic ego, then how do norms also work primarily in a pos-
itive fashion to generate desires and mobilize thought and
action? Further, if norms do enter positively into the con-
stitution of desires and ends in themselves, does not Par-
sons have to consider the possibility, developed in Durkheim's
second schema of suicide (see Book Three), that insatiabili-
ty and egoisme are not natural but socioculturally generated?

Indeed, I now pose the same questions to Parsons as were
directed against Durkheim's first schema and its underlying
image of man as homo duplex: on what grounds do you assume
that the "individual" is naturally "amoral," or that human na-
ture is inherently egoistic and insatiable? Is this a moral
or philosophical doctrine, or an empirical comparative-his-
torical observation? How is this image of the most signifi-
cant drives of human action to be reconciled with the suppo-
sed internalization of cultural images of perfection in mo-
dern socialization processes? Now, Parsons readily admits
that "the normal concrete individual is a morally disciplin-
ed personality." If this is the normal empirical case, then
what abnormal case is Parsons talking about? Where, in point
of fact, can we find one of these naturally "amoral" indivi-
duals? (Historically, it should be remembered that Hobbes re-
ferred to the Puritans and the aftermath of the English Civil
War, whose descendants Parsons tenaciously defends; but this
irony has escaped almost everyone). Isn't this image of egois-
tic and insatiable man a pre-social, philosophical notion of
the pessimistic moral theorists? If so, then isn't egoism and
insatiability, when historically observed, due as much to so-
cialized cultural values, as to human nature? (See Book Three).

As Parsons continues to sort through the different mean-
ings Durkheim bestowed upon anomie, the individual, the histor-
ical emergence of the person, the social morphological necess-
ity of the modern "cult of individualism," and so on, it be-

comes clear that while Durkheim derived, in the main, his central notion of "moral individualism" from the progressive division of labor, Parsons emphatically rejects this and identifies "moral individualism" and the internalization of moral obligations and authority with egoisme and Protestantism. By doing so he mixes up the two senses of egoisme as the egoism of human nature and as the "cult of the individual." But if one does not accept Parsons' theses, Durkheim's first schema, and the Utilitarians' (and Romantics') image of human nature as inherently egoistic and insatiable, but rather follows the more fully sociological and empirical-historical position implied in Durkheim's second schema (see Book Three), and views egoisme and anomie as culturally sanctioned "drives for progress and perfection" and as the "infinity of dreams and desires," and, in turn, acknowledges Parsons' embrace of this second sense of anomie as socially "institutionalized individualism," then isn't it legitimate to similiarly conclude that egoisme may be derived from culturally sanctioned "moral individualism" of an extreme type, chronically gone to excess? And that insatiability, too, may be derived from extreme cultural sanctions? In short, if Parsons wishes to claim "moral individualism" as a Protestant contribution, must he not also assume responsibility thereby for the culturally sanctioned drives for modern egoism and insatiability which Durkheim so profoundly attacked as symptomatic of the "moral anarchy" of the modern world?

Let us look again to Parsons' own testimony on the matter:

On the one hand, there is the element of chaotic, undisciplined impulse and desire--the "individual" element in Durkheim's sense; on the other, the normative rule; in order that the whole conception of normative control may make sense these two elements must be kept radically apart in principle. For unless in "individual desires" there were this inherently chaotic, "centrifugal" quality, the need for control would not be present at all. Moreover, it is important to note that the analysis is couched in terms of the subjective point of view of the actor. It is a question of the relation of his desires, his subjective impulses or ends, to certain disciplining controlling factors. Without the dichotomy of the two sets of factors, Durkheim's whole critique of utilitarianism falls to the ground * (1949:377-8).

In rediscovering Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature (see Books One and Three), Parsons now correctly observes that without this crucial tension, Durkheim's original position becomes less tenable. Indeed, as we have seen, the breakdown of this dichotomy paves the way for the emergence of the second schema of suicide. Parsons thus comes to translate Durkheim's early dichotomy of insatiable appetites/ moral rules (see Lukes, 1973; Book One) into his own terms, first in the Hobbesian sense of anarchy/social order, and then later into the functionalistic jargon of malintegration/ integration and equilibrium.

Durkheim's dichotomy rested, of course, on an extremely negative image of human nature. In contrast to the unprecedented ethical inversion of the relations between egoism and social responsibility in Utilitarian theory, Durkheim rejected the liberal economists' presumption that unbridled individualism, regulated only by the competition of the marketplace, would inevitably lead to the improvement of the commonweal (eg. Mandeville's "private vices, public virtues"). Further, if Durkheim's "whole critique of Utilitarianism" is in danger of "falling to the ground," it can only be because the historical evidence as well socialization process reveals that it is sociologically inadmissible to base social science on biological or moral doctrines of human nature. For all such images are philosophically derived, and are based on the rhetorical fiction of a lone, pre-social individual ego. If Durkheim did indeed make the breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoisme as culturally sanctioned, then, while on a superficial level Durkheim's "whole critique" may fall to the ground, on a deeper cultural-historical level, Durkheim discovered a profound insight into the fundamental rationales of modern society, personality, culture, and historical process. Significantly, Durkheim's breakthrough converges with Weber's historical-cultural investigations into the religio-cultural foundations of the modern world (see Books Three and Four).

4. Critical Summary

Let us briefly review some key points in Durkheim's argument which Parsons misconstrues.

(a) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is incomplete--for it ignores fatalisme.

(b) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is asymmetrical--for it contrasts two categories (egoisme and altruisme) with one (anomie).

(c) By consistently abstracting Durkheim's argument, Parsons misses Durkheim's doctrine of historical-evolutionary process. I submit that Durkheim was always centrally concerned with the broad evolutionary processes of social differentiation and individuation (see Book One). The transition from simple to complex societies, and the individual's changing position within that great historical transformation, formed one of Durkheim's central axes of thought. This neglect means that Parsons, like so many after him, simply failed to sufficiently recognize the historical rootedness of Durkheim's typology of suicide.

(d) As a consequence, while Parsons does note that the difference between egoisme and altruisme is cultural, he fails to emphasize that it is also primarily historical--namely, the distinction between two dominant modes of solidarity at the two ends of history. This same failure of Parsons applies to the distinction between modern anomie and that sort of fatalistic resignation to one's collectively assigned traditional fate in primitive societies.

(e) Further, Parsons ignores Durkheim's processual-historical theory of the emergence of the autonomous individual which accompanies the progressive division of labor (see Book One). Perhaps Parsons ignores this crucial point because he searched for justification that egoisme, positively regarded as "moral or institutionalized individualism," should be viewed not as inevitable or mechanically produced in sociocultural evolution, but rather that this special type of individualism is a praiseworthy product of Protestant values. Such an assertion is opposed, of course, both to "mechanical solidarity" of traditional societies and to hierocratic Catholicism, and to Durkheim's central historical proposition concerning individuation and social morphological differentiation.

(f) As a further consequence of his slighting of Durkheim's processual framework, Parsons neglects to emphasize that the modern world is, in Durkheim's estimate, in a "critical" transitionary stage. Hence, anomie and egoisme are due to the moral disturbances prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity." Egoisme and anomie are not

due to the generic absence of social constraint, as Parsons implies by inserting the "Hobbesian dilemma" everywhere into Durkheim's thought. Rather, they are symptomatic of the abnormal forms of the division of labor in the "critical" contemporary transitional phase of societal evolution (see, for example, Giddens, 1972a:42).

(g) Parsons slights Durkheim's charges that the state of modern "critical" economies and societies, in their transitional stage, are permeated by a "chronic moral anarchy." Parsons generally underplays Durkheim's highly critical account of anomie and egoisme, just as he later underplayed Weber's critical attitude toward the moral foundations of the modern world.

(h) By ignoring Durkheim's historical and critical thrust, Parsons feels little compunction in rendering egoisme as a highly virtuous product of Protestantism. What Durkheim described as "moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness," Parsons transmutes into "moral" or "institutionalized individualism." One can only guess at the influence of Parsons own cultural tradition on this laudatory identification. However, Parsons' reconstruction gets him here into a number of serious binds involving his own interpretation, and in dealing with Durkheim's critique of modern economy and society. Perhaps Parsons became entangled in this double resistance against the main critical thrusts of Durkheim's analysis because Parsons sees the modern "contractual solidarity" not as anomic, but rather that these "non-contractual elements in contract" are themselves underlain by norms. Since egoisme as "institutionalized individualism" may be taken as derived from Protestantism, so perhaps are the normative foundations of "contractual solidarity" and the modern socio-economic order similarly derived from ascetic Protestant norms (eg. see volume two of The Structure of Social Action on Weber). In light of Parsons own background, (some one once called Parsons' doctrines "sublimated ascetic Protestantism"), it is not hard to understand Parsons' underlying rhetorical interest in these issues. Curiously, however, Parsons later charged others with ignoring the significance of the religious background of Durkheim's egoisme: "Largely for ideological reasons, this basic insight is still far from being assimilated into the thinking of social scientists" (1960a:147). But whose ideology is at work here?

While mistaken in underestimating Durkheim's theses concerning differentiation and individuation, Parsons is indeed correct, in my estimate, in detecting certain limitations in Durkheim's overly generalized developmental schemas. Although seemingly abstracted, Parsons here seems to think in terms of specific preconditions for breakthroughs from one fundamental evolutionary level to the next; a helpful premise I believe. Perhaps Parsons was tacitly playing off Weber's methodology and theses on individualism and

Protestantism against Durkheim's ideas. However, again, this puts Parsons in the extremely difficult position of dealing with the implications of Durkheim's (and Weber's) critique of modern society and culture. If egoisme as "institutionalized individualism" and its correlate "contractual solidarity" are both tacitly and historically supported by Protestant religio-cultural norms, then how can Parsons account for the modern egocentricity and insatiability with which Durkheim and Weber were so agonizingly concerned? In terms of his own reconstruction and splitting of Durkheim's schemas, must not Parsons admit that the fundamental sources of modern egoistic insatiability also find their origins and continuing sanctions in Protestant norms? That Protestantism is the proximate source of both the positive aspects of "institutionalized individualism" and the drives for "progress and perfection" which Parsons (and perhaps many of us) hold dear, and the egoism and insatiability seen by Durkheim as underlying the "moral anarchy" of the modern world, would most probably prove an unacceptable admission on Parsons' part. Yet, not only are the historical, cultural, and psychological links there, but the very logic of his own and Durkheim's argument leads inevitably to this conclusion: our virtues, gone to extreme, become our vices!

(i) Further, Parsons ignores much evidence in Suicide that not only egoisme but anomie as well are both supported by dominant modern cultural sanctions. Durkheim repeatedly links egoisme and anomie, and suggests that both are the result of the "entire morality of progress and perfection," and "the longing for the infinite, daily represented as virtue." Yet Parsons conveniently ignores the powerful implications of recognizing that all four suicidal types are, in the last analysis, supported by central cultural sanctions. Although Parsons was in a good position to discover Durkheim's breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoisme as generated by the presence of cultural sanctions, Parsons' own cultural predelications stopped him short.

Indeed, such a recognition of the historical and cultural rootedness of all four types, when coupled with the unforeseen implications of identifying egoisme with Protestant virtue explored above, would prove fatal to Parsons' assertion about the great importance of Durkheim's breakthrough to The Theory of The Integration of The Social System. For Parsons might find it difficult to accept the inevitable conclusion that the very factors for which he so desperately searched in Durkheim's work--namely, the internalization of moral obligation and religious values as the foundation of the "voluntaristic" theory of action-- are also simultaneously the source of the disorder and anomie so relentlessly criticized by Durkheim (eg. see LaCapra, 1972:162,169,178). What would Parsons say to the inevitable conclusion that our modern Central Value System is itself anomic? Or racked by Durkheimian anomie?

(j) By following Durkheim only half-way, Parsons mixes up
    Durkheim's first and second schemas. While Durkheim's
    first schema was predicated on the image of the absence
    of effective social constraint over the passions of the
    pre-social individual in the modern era prior to the full
    institutionalization of organic solidarity (see Book Two),
    and his second schema was based on the image of the pre-
    sence of cultural sanctions for autonomy and drives for
    "progress and perfection," Parsons leads us to mix up
    these separate possibilities by including egoisme (posi-
    tively construed) from Durkheim's second implicit schema
    with a truncated version of anomie from the first schema.

(k) As critical an omission as Parsons' ignoring of Durkheim's
    view of historical process was Parsons' slighting of Durk-
    heim's doctrine of human nature. By abstracting Durkheim's
    concerns as focussed on the theoretical problem of social
    order, Parsons managed to miss both the crucial historical
    dimension to Durkheim's thought (which he only later ack-
    nowledged through his protege Robert Bellah, 1959), and
    Durkheim's image of human nature. Both are critical to any
    adequate interpretation of Durkheim's typology of suicide.

(l) In consequence, Parsons seriously underemphasizes not only
    the source of the disruptive elements in egoisme and anomie,
    but most importantly, the nature of these inordinate pas-
    sions and desires. Durkheim's central concern in analyzing
    the origins and nature of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the
    world was with egoism (in its negative aspects), and with
    ravages of insatiability wrought by these driven and isola-
    ted egos. Given his early dichotomy of moral rules and sen-
    sual appetites, it is clear that Durkheim's central concern
    was with the "infinity of dreams and desires." Parsons ex-
    plains the resulting social instability (or anomie) in terms
    of the "lack of definiteness of expectations." But in an
    absolutely crucial shift in meaning, Parsons changes Durk-
    heim's connotation of anomie from "infiniteness" to "inde-
    finiteness." But lack of normative clarity is simply not
    synonymous with insatiability.

(m) By ignoring Durkheim's crucial doctrine of the inherent
    egoism and passionate insatiability of human nature (in
    the first schema, culture in the second schema), Parsons'
    schematic distinction between the presence (egoisme and
    altruisme) versus the absence of norms (anomie) simply
    falls to the ground. For, in contrast to Parsons, Durk-
    heim's problem was not the generic absence of social con-
    trol. His distinction was rather between that type of cul-
    turally sanctioned social solidarity in which the inher-
    ent passions of human nature are directed solely collect-
    ive ends, and the modern type of "critical" transitional
    period in which no effective social force acts to constrain
    these naturally insatiable and egoistic passions. And if
    one completes the journey started by Parsons and follows
    Durkheim to his second implicit schema by locating egoism

and insatiability in modern culture rather than in human nature, then Parsons' schema becomes not only mistaken and incomplete but historically irrelevant as well.

(n) As always, Parsons mistakenly presumes that Durkheim developed his theories, especially concerning suicide, in exclusive and categorical response to the Anglo Utilitarians. But Durkheim's second typology of suicide cannot adequately be understood apart from either multiple polemics against opposing cultural traditions, or his core cultural commitments to the Franco-Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition (see Book Three).

(o) Parsons' rendering of anomie as simply the confusion resulting from declassification neglects key intervening variables of great general significance in Durkheim's argument. Contrary to Parsons, the deregulation of anomie, to Durkheim, is merely the releasing and sustaining condition of the "diseases of the infinite." An especially critical variable which Parsons ignored, strangely enough in view of his interest in the sociological foundations of economic theory and action, is Durkheim's important notion of The Social Schedule. Further, Parsons ahistorical abstraction of Durkheim's methodological framework leads him to also ignore the crucial historical differences in the content and mode of enforcement of the Social Schedule at the two ends of history.

(p) Accordingly, Parsons fails to sufficiently emphasize the critical fact concerning the Social Schedule governing the distribution of socioeconomic rewards of the two societal types at the two ends of history--namely, legitimacy. If Parsons had linked his correct recognition that both modern egoisme and traditional altruisme were sanctioned as legitimate by dominant cultural values, with Durkheim's notion of the importance of The Social Schedule at both ends of history, then he too might have broken through to recognition of Durkheim's second implicit schema in which all four types of suicide are sanctioned as legitimate, though extreme, expressions of dominant cultural values. In turn, with his Weberian-inspired insights into the origins and development of dominant modern cultural traditions, Parsons might have then profitably explored the legitimizing foundations of egoisme and anomie in the modern world.

(q) Parsons fundamentally misconstrues the importance of anomie and egoisme in Durkheim's methodological development, since the elements Parsons separates out and assigns to different phases do not represent distinct stages. Rather, they were all bound up together from the beginning. In turn, Parsons' caricaturing of the early Durkheim as a crude materialistic positivist, and his equally mistaken interpretation of the later Durkheim as a curiously inconsistent idealist, not only distort Durkheim's thought, but unfortunately directed attention away from some of Durkheim's

really crucial breakthroughs. As we saw in Book Three, these include his growing social realism, his breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and egoisme, his breakthrough to the notion of civilizational process, his historical work on the evolution of education in France which attributed an independent causality to cultural-historical factors, and so on.

(r) Finally, Parsons' solution to the very dilemma which so haunted him that he constantly foisted it off on Durkheim is largely fictitious. For Parsons came to posit the very elements which are lacking in the first place. If, indeed, the absence of a value consensus is the cause of the so-called "Hobbesian problem," then Parsons cannot hope to solve this dilemma simply by postulating the existence, the the generic presence of internalized moral obligation.

Even more damaging, Parsons prescinds from the historical situation which originally generated the "Hobbesian dilemma"--namely, the Puritan Revolution and the English Civil War of the seventeenth century. The same type of ascetic Protestantism which Parsons virtuously identifies with egoisme was also the prime historical cultural source of the anarchy of egoism and anomie in the actual context of the real Hobbesian dilemma! Further, the Utilitarian liberals' economic doctrine was also a later outgrowth of the same Protestantism which Parsons defends, and which Durkheim attacked as anomic!

But, true to his own cultural tradition, Parsons did not trouble himself with the disturbing implications of his doctrines and those which he appropriated for his own purposes.

B.   <u>Dohrenwend</u> <u>and</u> <u>Fatalisme</u>

One of the leading analyses contending that the distinctness of Durkheim's types should be maintained is Bruce Dohrenwend's article "Egoism, Altruism, Anomie, and Fatalism: A Conceptual Analysis of Durkheim's Types" (1959). As widely cited as Barclay Johnson's paper, Dohrenwend takes a position diammetrically opposed to the reductions favored by Johnson. Dohrenwend follows in the Parsonian stream of normative development of Durkheim's theses. Specifically, Dohrenwend accepts Parsons' distinctions between the strength and content of norms. However, Dohrenwend tries to find a set of distinctions for the category which Parsons neglected--fatalisme. Dohrenwend thus distinguishes between fatalisme and the other types in terms of the regulatory source of norms.

Now, we should note again the dangers inherent in setting aside crucial theses in the original works, and translating the remaining portions into one's own special vocabulary, theoretical structure, and one's own special preoccupations. For instance, Dohrenwend contends that Durkheim's image of human nature can be profitably detached from his typology of suicide: "... moralizing about 'the state of human nature' influences Durkheim's descriptions of the norm states at many points; it serves for the most part as an obstacle to the analysis of these states" (1959:468). Although purporting to provide an accurate interpretation of Durkheim's types, Dohrenwend, too, feels little compunction in simply excising, without the detailed exegesis and exploration   we undertook here in Books One and Three, one of the critical anchors of Durkheim's theory. "The focus of this paper, then, is on the norm-states themselves as distinct from their relation to ideas about basic human nature" (1959:469). However, how can one really grasp Durkheim's notions without understanding the central emphasis he placed on the insatiable passions of the organic ego? I must insist: no egoism and no insatiability, and no historical process, no typology of suicide!

Taking his clues from Durkheim's assertion that "egoisme

and altruism are opposites, as are anomie and fatalism" (1959: 470), Dohrenwend sets out, as with so many others, to determine in precisely what sense these types are distinguishable as opposites. "The assumption here is that each type can be differentiated from every other in terms of its polar oppositeness to each of the other types on at least one major dimension" (1959:470).

Now, Dohrenwend takes his lead more from Parsons than Durkheim; this can be seen not only in terms of his abstracted normative emphasis, but also in his initial formulation of the first two dimensions of Durkheim's types.

> ... one is the presence versus the absence of social norms, distinguishing both altruism and egoism from anomie; the other is the collectivistic versus the individualistic content of norms, which distinguishes altruism from egoism (1959:471).

Here we encounter again the asymmetry of Parsons' typology. However, Dohrenwend moves to elaborate an additional comparison allowing us to further distinguish between all four types. Hence, he focusses on the sources of effective legitimate social control or normative regulation--whether it derives primarily from external or internal controls.

> According to this interpretation, there is implicit in Durkheim's types a distinction between two main sources of normative regulation: one stemming from rules which have been internalized by individuals..., the other from rules applied from a source of external authority (1959:472).

Supposedly taking his lead from altruisme, Dohrenwend then attempts to add another dimension to the Parsonian classification which will take care of that "neglected stepchild" --fatalisme. This effort is summed up Dohrenwend this way:

> The four types can be differentiated each from every other, and in terms of oppositeness on at least one of three major dimensions: the existence of norms, their content, and their effective source of regulatory power. Both egoism and altruism are characterized by the existence of effective, internalized rules, but the content of the rules is individualistic in the first case and collectivistic in the second. Fatalism stands in strong contrast to egoism and altruism, for its effective source is an authority external to the social aggregate; nevertheless, all three types involve

> rules which are binding on the overt behavior of in-
> dividuals. Anomie, however, appears to be a type a-
> part, as it is marked by the absence of norms alto-
> gether (1959:472).

Hynes (1975:93) offers a schematic representation of Dohren-
wend's typology.

Now, Dohrenwend's reconstructed typology retains many
of the same flaws as Parsons'--including abstracted ahistor-
icalness, neglect of the insatiability and egoism of human
nature, and in this case, anomie is left floating in socio-
logical space as a purely negative category. While his inclu-
sion of fatalisme in the typology is important, not only is
Dohrenwend's Parsonian classification assymmetrical, but it
might have benefited from the application of the active/pas-
sive dichotomy (one of Parsons' favorites) to the problem of
interpreting fatalisme. In contrast to Dohrenwend, I must in-
sist that fatalisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as
merely the result of external regulation, for Durkheim's no-
tion of archaic society, followed by Parsons' positing of the
generic need for internalized moral obligation, presumes
that individuals are permeated with the dominant norms. No,
fatalisme as well as altruisme in both of Durkheim's schemas
is sanctioned by dominant cultural values, and in Parsons'
schema this includes as well. Surely we can find more viable
alternatives than "jerry-rigging" already inadequate schemas.

C. Neyer, Mawson, Cresswell

Here we shall briefly explore the suggestions of three observers who, while not offering coherent typologies, nonetheless argue for the distinctness of Durkheim's types. In 1960, in a footnote Joseph Neyer sums up Durkheim's general schema of suicide in this way:

> ... altruism=too much self-transcendence; egoism=not enough self-transcendence; fatalism=too much regulation; anomie=not enough regulation. In Durkheim's moral terms, altruism and egoisme are concerned with the good, while fatalism and anomie are concerned with duty. Self-transcendence corresponds to the action of society as immanent; regulation corresponds to the action of society as transcendent (1960:66-7, #48).

While suggestive (eg. Hynes, 1975:100,notes the similarity to his own typology), as expressed Neyer's distinctions are stated in so compressed a form that it is difficult to know exactly what they imply. Are these distinctions classifiable in a graphic schema, or do they designate a series of distinctions? Besides the cumbersome terminology (eg. transcendence/immanence), it is not clear to me to what extent Neyer's rough typology is grounded in the basic structure of Durkheim's thought. While intriguing, I confess I am at a loss to know what to do with this suggestive typology.

In a valuable review and critique of the literature on anomie and social pathology, A.R. Mawson (1970) argues for the importance of retaining the distinction between egoism and anomie. Essentially, as Lukes summarizes, Mawson argues that egoism and anomie represent different kinds of normlessness: "... egoism is the breakdown of social attachments constituting the breakdown of the self; anomie is the breakdown of constraining legal and moral norms" (Lukes, 1973:207, #67). Mawson proposes:

> First, had Durkheim pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to reexamine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite the difficulties in Durkheim's theory in which the concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some of their original meaning. All

> contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the
> distinction between anomie and egoisme with the re-
> sult that social conditions, psychological states,
> and processes which are entirely different from one
> another have been assimilated (1970:298).

Mawson notes also the underlying importance of Durkheim's
negative view of human nature as inherently egoistic and in-
satiable. And Mawson distinguishes between anomie and egoisme
in terms of their externalizing/internalizing, passions/intel-
lect modes of expression.

> ... if a weakening external control over the <u>passions</u>
> is the distinguishing feature of anomie, <u>deregulation</u>
> of the <u>intellect</u> as a result of isolation from group
> activity is the <u>differentia specifica</u> of the second
> pathological state: egoism. Durkheim thus postulates
> a distinction between man's intellect and his passions
> (1970:301-2).

But Mawson proposes that "... analysis of anomie and
egoism leads to a paradox, the solution of which necessitates
the abandonment of his theory and the assumptions on which it
had been based" (1970:301). Specifically, Mawson, like so many
others, is puzzled by Durkheim's distinction between attach-
ment and regulation in regard to egoism and anomie. Noting
(1970:303) several apparent contradictions in Durkheim's de-
velopment of these distinctions, Mawson contends that he has
discovered a paradox: "... which Durkheim assiduously avoid-
ed, for perhaps he realized intuitively that his entire theo-
retical structure would have been called into question if he
had tried to solve it systematically" (1970: 304). Like Marks
and myself, then, Mawson claims to have discovered a basic
hiatus in Durkheim's developing theory of anomie. But Maw-
son's discussion is opaque sometimes, and doesn't appear to
have a clear sense of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's
thought. Like so many others, too, Mawson makes too much of
Durkheim's notion of "externality" as a criterion of social
facts; hence, he claims that the notion of external regula-
tion denied the possibility of social participation and the
internalization of norms. Mawson concludes that:

> The crucial difference between anomie and egoism ...
> is that egoism is defined as the psychological isola-
> tion of individuals from groups, whereas individuals

> in a state of anomie, where legal and moral rules
> have ceased to have sanctioning power, are not iso-
> lated psychologically from each other (1970:306).

But I suggest that Mawson has not fully understood Durkheim's
notion of normative and symbolic process, nor his notion of
the construction and emergence of the person through history.
Thus, when Mawson opposes rules to meanings in Durkheim's
thought, he does something which Durkheim doesn't really do.
Once again, Mawson, like Barclay Johnson and others, is on
to something important here, but it isn't quite what he thinks
it is. I must disagree, therefore, with Mawson's rather opaque
conclusion:

> For in reconciling the notion of regulation with that
> of attachment by juxtaposing an analysis of norms with
> that of psychological isolation we arrived at a social
> psychology in which the intimate relation between norms
> and the self implied a set of presuppositions which
> were fundamentally opposed to those with which Durkheim
> began (1970:307).

Finally, Cresswell (1972), while not having a real grasp
of the underlying structure of Durkheim's thought, nor of the
complexities and ambiguities of his suicide schemas, offers
some observations which have value. First, he raises some in-
teresting questions regarding the meaning of the various no-
tions of social integration (eg. 1972:139). Second, he ob-
ves that Durkheim's sociological theory of suicide rested on
a moral and philosophical position (eg. 1972:137-8). Finally,
in attempting to articulate the relations between Durkheim's
types, Cresswell includes the historical dimension of primi-
tive and modern societies as an integral part of his typology.

D. Anthony Giddens' Work

One of the most perceptive of recent interpreters of
Durkheim, Anthony Giddens, has come closer than many others
to identifying some of the essential elements of an adequate
reinterpretation of Durkheim's first typology of suicide. Not
only has Giddens generated, over the last decade or so, some
of the better work on the sociology of suicide, but he also
enjoys the distinction of having produced some of the finest
exegetical and interpretive work on Durkheim. It is hardly
surprising that Giddens would come closer than others before
him, for he has put close exegesis of texts first, and thus
more often remained faithful to what Durkheim really said and
meant. Unfortunately, Giddens largely stopped at the exegeti-
cal level, and did not proceed to a systematic, in-depth ex-
ploration of Durkheim's paradigmatic or "nuclear structure."
As a result, Giddens' generally excellent insights into Durk-
heim's schema of suicide remain scattered, and are not brought
to bear on a whole scale reconstruction of Durkheim's typology.
Let us now briefly explore some of Giddens' excellent and
thought provoking exegeses, which can often be used as a sum-
mary starting point for understanding Durkheim's first schema.

Giddens stands, for instance, with those who would res-
cue the distinctness of Durkheim's different types of suicide.
Yet he also tries to interrelate them, and in the process
provides some important insight into Durkheim's second notion
of egoisme.

> Durkheim's discussion of the differences between ego-
> istic and anomic suicide is not always unambiguous, and
> this has caused some commentators to suppose that the
> two types in fact, cannot ... be meaningfully disting-
> uished [eg. Barclay Johnson]. Careful reading of Durk-
> heim's account against the broader backdrop of The Di-
> vision of Labor however, makes this position difficult
> to maintain. Egoistic suicide is clearly linked to the
> growth of the "cult of the individual" in contemporary
> societies. Protestantism is the religious forerunner and
> primary source of modern moral individualism, which has
> in other areas of social life become wholly secularized.
> Egoistic suicide is thus an affront to the growth of the
> "cult of the personality." "Where man is a God to mankind
> a certain growth in egoisme is unavoidable." "Individual-

ism is undoubtedly not egoisme, but it comes close to
it; the one cannot be stimulated without further spread-
ing the other. Thus egoistic suicide arises."

Anomic suicide, on the other hand, derives from the lack
of moral regulation particularly characteristic of major
sectors of modern industry. [Footnote: Durkheim holds that
a certain amount of anomie is a necessary element in so-
cieties committed to progressive change. "Every morality
of improvement and progress thus presupposes a certain le-
vel of anomie".]... Egoistic and anomic suicide are never-
theless closely related to one another, especially on the
level of the individual suicide. "It is, indeed, almost in-
evitable that the egoist should have some tendency to de-
regulation; for since he is detached from society, it has
not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him *(1971a:84-5).

In addition, Giddens' account is valuable in that he in-
sists on the historical framework of Durkheim's typology. Ano-
mie and egoisme are specific to the modern socioeconomic order,
while altruisme and fatalisme are rooted in primitive or archa-
ic society.

Suicide in traditional societies takes a different form
than the egoistic and anomic types: this is directly tra-
ceable to the characteristics of social organization, spe-
cified in The Division of Labor, whereby such societies
differ from the modern form. In one category of suicides
found in traditional societies, it is a duty for an indi-
vidual, when placed in certain circumstances, to kill him-
self. A person kills himself because he has an obligation
to do so.... Both kinds of altruistic suicide rest upon
the existence of a strong collective conscience, which so
dominates the actions of an individual that he will sacri-
fice his life in furtherance of a collective value (1971a:
85).

Indeed, Giddens goes on to insist that anomie and egoisme can-
not be understood apart from this macro-evolutionary framework.
Therefore, all those versions of anomie that portray it in ab-
stracted and formal terms are in that measure misleading.

If there is a basic opposition in all of Durkheim's works,
it is not that of social integration (normative control)
versus social disintegration (lack of normative regulation
or anomie), but, as with virtually all leading social think-
ers of his time, that of "traditional" versus "modern" so-
ciety with all the profound transformations which this lat-
ter distinction implies. It does not seem to have been gen-
erally appreciated that there is necessarily an historical
dimension to Durkheim's treatment of anomie: this is inte-
gral to the very conception of "socially generated need,"
but is also important in regard to the second aspect of
anomie, that of provision for wants.

> In the traditional social order, human faculties and
> needs are kept to a low level, and therefore are read-
> ily provided for. The dominance of the <u>conscience col-
> lective</u> plays a role in each of these respects: on the
> one hand, by restricting the development of "individua-
> tion"--the liberation of the individual personality--
> and, on the other hand, by setting strict limits to what
> may legitimately be striven for by an individual in any
> given social position. The process of evolution away from
> traditionalism both increases the level of individuation
> and at the same time undermines the fixed moral boundar-
> ies characteristic of previous ages. It is these <u>twin</u> de-
> velopments which create the important theoretical problem
> which Durkheim seeks to resolve in terms of his analysis
> of the emergence of moral individualism (1971b:216).

Here Giddens clearly recognizes that needs are socially gener-
ated, and the provision for these wants are historically deter-
mined. Giddens implicitly recognizes the importance of Durk-
heim's notion of the crucial historical differences in the So-
cial Schedule at the two ends of history. Hence, Giddens pro-
vides here a valuable <u>entree</u> to Durkheim's second schema which
rests on historical differences in the generation and regula-
tion of desires.

Further, Giddens rightly insists that "anomie is specific
to the modern order." Therefore, anomie, according to Durkheim
and Giddens after him, is not to be viewed primarily as a gen-
eric problem, applicable in equal degree to all societies, but
rather is primarily a problem characteristic of the modern
transitional crisis.

> Anomie, therefore, is a phenomenon specific to the modern
> order (as is indexed by the documentation of the growth
> of anomic suicide in <u>Suicide</u>); it is to be understood in
> relation to individuation and moral individualism. Al-
> though Durkheim concedes that a "certain level of anomie"
> is inevitable in modern society, which is committed to
> rapid and continuous change, anomie as pathology is to
> be traced to the temporarily inadequate development of
> moral individualism. The upsurge of anomie found in the
> contemporary age is mainly centered in economic life,
> which has broken away from the confines of tradition, but
> has not yet been sufficiently penetrated by the new moral-
> ity of individualism (1971b:216).

> It is only through acceptance of the moral regulation
> which makes social life possible that man is able to reap
> the benefits which society offers him. The failure to in-
> ject the historical element into Durkheim's analysis of
> this issue has led many critics to suppose that his views

> represent a thinly veiled rationale for authoritarian
> political doctrine. But it is, in fact, central to Durk-
> heim's thesis that all forms of moral regulation are not
> identical. In other words, "regulation" (society, social
> constraint) cannot simply be juxtaposed in an abstract
> and universal sense with "lack of regulation" (anomie)
> (1971a:117).

All those who would enter the lists in debate over the true
meaning and historical significance of anomie would do well
to heed Giddens' words here; it would save much confusion, and
allow us to progress faster.

> The notions of both egoisme and anomie must be understood
> within the scope of the general conception of the develop-
> ment of society presented in The Division of Labor. Seen
> in this context, egoisme and anomie are not simply func-
> tional problems facing all types of society in equivalent
> degree: they are stimulated by the very moral individual-
> ism which is the outcome of social evolution. The dilem-
> mas facing the modern form of society, Durkheim maintains,
> are not to be resolved through a reversion to the autocra-
> tic discipline found in traditional societies, but only
> through the moral consolidation of the differentiated di-
> vision of labor, which demands quite different forms of
> authority from those characteristic of earlier types of
> society * (1971a:118).

Now, in terms of anomie specifically, Giddens clearly re-
cognizes that Durkheim's concept ambiguously combines both the
notion of goals and the potential for satisfaction. And Gid-
dens rightly pinpoints this ambiguity as a source of confusion
in interpreting what Durkheim "really meant" or "should have
meant."

> ... according to the theory of anomie, moral obligation
> not only sets limits to human action, but also focussses
> it and gives it a defined objective (1971b:219).

> ... In Durkheim's formulation, the concept [of anomie]
> involves two components, which tend to be assimilated in
> his own use of it. One of these refers to the degree to
> which human action is provided with definitive objectives;
> the other concerns how far these ends are realizable. The
> distinction is fundamental, yet Durkheim glosses over it
> .... The fact that Durkheim failed to utilize the distinct-
> ion between the two aspects of anomie is a source of the
> most basic flaws in his sociology. As most recent litera-
> ture employing the concept of anomie demonstrates, the con-
> cept takes on quite divergent theoretical applications ac-
> cording to which aspect is emphasized. If anomie is taken
> to refer mainly to "normlessness"--the first aspect of a-
> nomie--then it tends to support a standpoint emphasizing

the dimensions of "meaning/lack of meaning" in individual conduct. The end result is ... a position which ... treats social conflict as "pathological," ie. which links conflict to "deviance" produced by "imperfect socialization." If the other aspect is emphasized, it tends to lead to a conception of "normative strain" rather than "normlessness." Here the objective of conduct may be quite clear to the actor, and there is not the strong overtone of irrationality which appears to characterize the conduct of the individual where the first aspect is stressed. The importance of this conception is that it allows a much greater scope for conceptualizing conflicts deriving from divisions of interest in society. Durkheim undoubtedly minimizes the significance of this form of conflict in his writings....

There are two respects in which a given objective is not "realizable." One is that there exists barriers in the society which prevents its realization (eg. Mertonian anomie) .... But there is another sense in which an objective has no limits: the insatiable appetite (1971b:225).

Giddens is thus led to the next step in the process of breakthrough to the second schema--namely, that goals are unrealizable because of the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. Giddens then brings up the crucial possibility that anomic suicides may be ultimately generated by sociocultural factors--namely, moral and religious obligations.

He [Durkheim] fails to consider the theoretical possibility that moral obligations themselves may be "factual" elements in the horizon of the acting individual.... While Durkheim accepts that there are varying degrees of attachment to moral norms, he has no place for this in his theoretical analysis of the nature of moral obligation (1971b:226).

But, of course, I disagree with Giddens' conclusion here, for it is precisely my thesis that Durkheim did indeed suggest at many points that moral obligations were not merely "factual" elements in the horizons of individuals, but motivating ones as well. Durkheim did come to perceive egoisme and anomie as the result, not simply of the generic absence of moral discipline, but as the result of the historical presence of a very strong type of internalized moral discipline. Certainly this is the conclusion which Max Weber's work urges upon the reader interested in the relations between Protestant norms and sanctions and the tensions which may issue at their extreme in suicide. But Giddens, perhaps more than anyone else since Parsons and

Merton thirty years earlier, should have recognized these crucial historical sociocultural linkages, and thus broken through to the second schema of suicide. Giddens, after all, is an erudite intellectual historian who wrote, among other things, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory which was specifically devoted to comparing and contrasting the social theories of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, although he cogently criticized the reigning Parsonian orthodoxy, Giddens also failed to breakthrough to the second schema. Even though he was close at many points to discovery of the inner links between these two famous paradigms, the "abductive" reorganization (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958; T. Huff, 1975) never came. We must, therefore, go beyond Giddens' helpful exegeses, and those of Lukes (1973), to an in-depth exploration and reconstruction of Durkheim's basic theses on suicide (see Books Two and Three).

We might also note that Giddens has a keen recognition that Durkheim engaged in multiple polemics against opposing cultural traditions--especially against the Anglo Utilitarians and the German Romantic-Idealists. However, Giddens' insight is incomplete here, too, for he does not sufficiently emphasize that Durkheim's prime historical opponent was--as with all French positivists--the Catholic Hierocratic Metaphysical Cultural Tradition (see Book Four). Nor does Giddens sufficiently refine or emphasize Durkheim's own deep roots and the dilemmas inherent in the Franco Positivist ("laic") Cultural Tradition. Most importantly here, Giddens fails to connect these deeply rooted polemics against opposing cultural traditions to Durkheim's typology of suicide.

In addition, Giddens' account is valuable because it links anomie and egoisme in the modern transitional crisis with Durkheim's structural-social morphological theses, seen in evolutionary perspective. Also, Giddens has good insight into Durkheim's notion of the emergence of "moral individualism" and the person through history (see Book One). However, these insights await reconstruction as in Books Two and Three.

E. Eugene Hynes: Suicide and Homo Duplex

Eugene Hynes's linkage of Durkheim's notion of homo duplex to his typology of suicide must be counted as one of the most important steps forward in the reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide in particular, and his thought in general. Hynes's breakthrough came because he recognized the centrality of the notion of homo duplex in all of Durkheim's thought, and moved to link it to the typology of suicide. He argues: "... the major influence on Durkheim in his formulation of the different causes and types of suicide was his conception of the nature of man and the need for authority..." (1975:88). Indeed, Hynes goes so far as to argue that "... Durkheim's suicide typology derived from his homo duplex concept" (1975:98). Incorporating Durkheim's view of man as double into the suicide typology, Hynes brings us very close to the first adequate reformulation of the Durkheim's initial schema of suicide (see Book Two of the present dissertation). After Hynes explicitly pointed out the intimate and necessary connection between homo duplex and Durkheim's suicide typology, there is no longer any excuse for this crucial factor to be ignored again in the sociological literature.

Focussing on socialization process (instead of the Social Schedules in societies at the two ends of history), Hynes seeks to answer the questions which I have repeatedly posed to the reductionists: Why did Durkheim use the two analytical dimensions of "integration" and "regulation"? Why not others? And why did he keep these dimensions distinct? (See Hynes, 1975:88). Because he includes the notion of man as double, Hynes, for the first time (see also McCloskey, 1974, 1976a) provides an adequate answer. He argues that the need for dual attachment to society and the view of man as double imply one another.

> For the individual to be "socialized"... (1) the insatiable, selfish drives associated with the animal part of his nature must be repressed or checked, and (2) he must be directed to some minimal extent toward social ends, ie. a part of his personality must be made social (1975:89).

Hynes (1975:89) graphically presents these relationships in the following manner (see figure 12):

Socialization of Homo Duplex	Quantity Involved	Suicidal Type
1. Repression of drives (regulation)	(a) too much	Fatalisme
	(b) too little	Anomie
2. Direction towards social ends (integration)	(a) too much	Altruisme
	(b) too little	Egoisme

The major shortcoming of Hynes's valuable typology is that it neglects to include the crucial evolutionary framework of Durkheim's suicide typology. This historical dimension can be factored in, however; the historical type of society and the drives of homo duplex then become the two main classificatory criteria (see figure 13):

	Socialization of Homo Duplex	
	Repression	Integration
	too much--too little	too much--too little
Mechanical Solidarity	Fatalisme	Altruisme
Modern Transitional Crisis	Anomie	Egoisme

However, the resulting schema reveals again how Durkheim tacitly compared and contrasted traditional types of suicide with modern ones, for there are four empty cells here--there are no possibilities suggested where there is too little social control of homo duplex in traditional society, or too much control of the organic ego in modern society.

FOOTNOTES

#1, p. 1099--I originally prepared a much longer version of
   the critical reviews of both Parsons and Merton's
   treatment of Durkheim and anomie, especially as these
   impacted on the development of American sociology.

#1, 1213--The studies specifically cited here by Cole and
   Zuckerman can be found in their appendix to the volume
   edited by Clinard (1964).

#1, 1216--The studies specifically cited in the present regard
   may be found in Cole's (1975) bibliography.

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