DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY:
PAST FAILURES, PRESENT DILEMMAS, AND THE
FUTURE OF EU MILITARY COOPERATION

by

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The European Union (EU) is an alliance of 15 Western European nations that coordinate on economic, social, judicial, and political issues. In 1991, the EU decided to begin collaboration among its members’ foreign and security policies. The goal of a common European military identity had been previously attempted by several EU members, but with little success. The early 1990s Balkan crisis provided the EU with a perfect opportunity to unite on a plan for concerted military action, yet the European countries could not agree on how to address the situation. This failure highlighted the EU’s need to refine its decision-making process and work with an existing security organization in order to accomplish its ambitious goal of military cooperation. By examining past relations, present developments, and future plans between organizations, it became obvious that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the most likely partner for EU military cooperation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the European Union</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Failures</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European Union</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersberg Tasks</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE FUTURE OF EU MILITARY COOPERATION</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Action</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration with the OSCE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with the WEU</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued NATO Dependence</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES | 43 |

ACRONYMS | 44 |

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 45 |
CHAPTER I
Introduction

The European Union (EU) is an alliance of 15 Western European countries that coordinate on economic, political, social, and military issues. Each of these states is a member of the European Union because it realizes the potential benefits of acting together as a unified Europe—international economic and political power and continental stability. However, to achieve this unity, each country must sacrifice some degree of national sovereignty and accept the jurisdiction of EU institutions, which cannot always work in the best interest of all member countries.

One area of interstate coordination that has been particularly challenging for the EU is the development of a common security and defense identity. Military cooperation is such a sensitive issue because the military has traditionally existed for defending domestic territory and ensuring the security of foreign involvements. Today, the EU is trying to move beyond this nationalistic tradition and work together on creating effective military institutions and policies to address common Western European security and foreign policy goals. Ambitions have been high, but results have been disappointing.

Fortunately, the EU has learned a lot from its failures at military collaboration, such as its inaction during the early 1990s Balkan crisis. The European alliance is using
those lessons to build new plans for future cooperation. Failure to deal with these military disappointments, combined with the rapidly changing nature of domestic and international security, poses a serious threat to the credibility and autonomy of the European Union in world affairs.

The post-Cold War era demands new strategies to deal with security threats. Democratic states are no longer preoccupied with the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack and are no longer guaranteed protection by NATO,\(^1\) whose mission was to prevent the spread of Soviet expansionism. Rather, new and more probable security concerns have been given priority, such as unpredictable terrorist attacks and internal conflicts in areas like sub-Saharan Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

Compared to its enormous economic and political leverage,\(^2\) the EU has had little military strength and strategy to deal with these new types of crises. This deficiency has arisen out of a lack of member cooperation, agreement and unity, not a shortage of troops or weapons. If the former obstacles can be overcome, the EU may one day have a formidable military like that of its transatlantic ally, the United States.
CHAPTER II
Evolution of the European Union

After the bloody conflict of World War II, the countries of Western Europe recognized the need for increased European cooperation and interdependence to prevent future wars among the European states. The European leaders of the time maintained the optimistic idea that economic cooperation would eventually bring about political unity, as well as economic prosperity. From this desire to collaborate emerged a number of purely economic predecessors to the present day European Union and the ultimate goal of creating a "United States of Europe."

One of the earliest, and most successful, attempts at regional integration was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was ratified in 1951 to ease trade tariffs and subsidies on these two industrial products between Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy and West Germany. The ECSC "was revolutionary in the sense that France was offering to sacrifice a measure of national sovereignty in the interest of building a new supranational authority that could end an old rivalry [between France and Germany] and help build a new European peace" (McCormick, 1996, 49).
The success of the ECSC in stimulating coal and steel trade encouraged the six member states to agree to further integration. So, in 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were established. The goal of the Euratom Treaty was to create a common market for atomic energy. The purpose of the EEC was to eventually allow unrestricted trade of all goods, not just industrial products, between the six members. It also permitted free movement of people and capital among member states and created common economic policies and institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (McCormick, 1996, 52). These goals are strikingly similar to the current economic functions of the European Union.

Furthermore, the EEC established political bodies that were later adopted by the EC, and the EU, to select and evaluate common procedures. The Council of Ministers held power over decision-making; the Commission implemented and oversaw policies; the Parliamentary Assembly (later renamed as the European Parliament) watched over the Commission; and a European Court of Justice interpreted and enforced treaty requirements. These institutions reinforced the theory that economic collaboration can, and will, lead to political alliances.

The effects of the European Economic Community were impressive. The liberalization of trade spurred industrial growth, and the political bodies fostered steady regional communications. Other Western European countries became very interested in EEC membership because they wanted to enjoy the benefits of free trade, or they feared being excluded from the prosperity that integration was expected to generate. Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark were admitted in 1973, and by 1986, Greece, Spain and Portugal were also members.
The EEC eventually merged with the ECSC and Euratom to form the European Community (EC). Although the EC had grown in membership since its creation in the late 1950s, the economic conditions of Europe had stagnated. The common market had not yet been completely implemented—some trade and travel barriers still existed in Western Europe. Many believed that the common market would never happen without further monetary integration. Therefore, a European Monetary System was enacted to alleviate inflation and unemployment. This system established fixed exchange rates between EC member countries, with the hopes of one day replacing individual currencies with a single European Currency Unit (more commonly known today as the euro). The program would be controlled by a new European Central Bank, which still exists. Today, it is actively monitoring the progress of the euro in its adoptee nations and is closely watching the economies of those nations interested in the new currency.

In addition to striving for monetary union, the EC also took its final step towards the common market by implementing the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The SEA achieved complete openness among EC members by eliminating all barriers between EC countries. The SEA was “widely acclaimed as the single most important and successful step in the process of European integration” (McCormick, 1996, 71) since the creation of the EEC in 1957. People and goods were allowed to move freely because customs and passport regulations were removed. EC states coordinated laws and legal standards to facilitate the free movement of interstate economic investments and exchanges. In addition to unprecedented European assimilation, the SEA gained immense international power for EC members by building the world’s largest trading bloc and single economic market.
Treaty on European Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist threat in 1990 opened up EC membership to the reunified former East Germany. The next major advancement towards complete Western European unity was begun in December of the same year in the Dutch city of Maastricht. There, the countries that made up the EC met at two intergovernmental conferences (IGC), one on political union and one on economic union. At that time, the regional coalition was still comprised of 12 Western European nations: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. These governments drafted the Maastricht Treaty, which was finalized in December of 1991 and eventually signed in February of 1992. This document, more commonly known as the Treaty on European Union, officially created the European Union and its present day structure.

This monumental treaty called for the creation of new political bodies and the official renaming of the European alliance from its previous title, the European Community. The European Union (EU) was divided into three “pillars,” each with a different set of responsibilities and level of authority. Although the pillar organization was a new innovation, the goals of the separate EU branches had previously been attempted by the member nations.

The pillar known as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) was established to facilitate cooperation among EU states on various legal issues. JHA expands upon the legal standardizations accomplished by the SEA. The areas addressed by JHA are considered to be of common interest to all members: border crossing, immigration, combating drug smuggling and addiction, asylum policy, customs collaboration, fighting international fraud,
police cooperation, and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal affairs (Anderson, 1994). JHA is essentially based on intergovernmental cooperation and is not a supranational institution. This means that JHA does not have sovereign decision-making authority. It must obtain the unanimous support of all member countries before creating laws or issuing legal sentences. Reliance on common agreement can make decision-making and policy implementation slow, tedious, and sometimes ineffectual.

The most commonly known pillar of the EU is the European Monetary Union (EMU). The goal of this agreement is to maintain unity between Western Europe's economies and implement a single currency for the EU. The EMU redefined the role of the European Central Bank and created minimum economic requirements for member countries interested in adopting the European Currency Unit (ECU), popularly known as the euro. So far, 12 of the current 15 EU members have adopted the euro. Since 1 January 1999, these countries have been using the common currency for inter-state payments and business-to-business exchanges. The euro will be released for public circulation on 1 January 2002 (European Union, 1998). It is expected to stabilize Western Europe's weaker economies and stimulate cross-border investments.

The idea of European Monetary Union was not new to the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty. Uniting Europe economically has historically been at the forefront of Western European cooperation. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Monetary System, and the Single European Act all attempted economic cooperation and unity. These numerous mechanisms of economic integration helped to establish the many prerequisites for a single currency; a single mar-
ket, institutions to coordinate separate economies, and strong national commitments to economic cooperation and interdependence.

The final pillar of the EU is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This section of the Maastricht Treaty, Title V, was drafted to establish two related, yet separate, objectives-- a single foreign policy for all EU countries and military cooperation among members to protect the future security of Western Europe. Developing the first goal of a single foreign policy means conducting consistent relations with foreign countries. This is central to the international power of the EU because the coalition's economic and political leverage is only powerful when unified. For example, all EU members should ideally come to a consensus on how to conduct economic, as well as diplomatic, relations with the United States. If some countries are not in agreement with others on how to trade and negotiate with the US, the US could get exactly what it wants by playing these differences against disagreeing EU states. Although the EU generally agrees on external economic relations, they have not had similar success in coordinating political relations. An informative pamphlet on the CFSP published by the Council of the European Union clearly expresses the EU's position on foreign policy. "The European Union ... must be able to speak with one voice and show a common political will" (Council, 1999, 10)

The second goal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the creation of a European security and defense identity (ESDI) and is only possible if the first goal has been realized. The ESDI is a dynamic issue that encompasses the possible formation of EU military troops; the need to coordinate with NATO (whose membership includes many, but not all, EU states); and the creation of effective institutions to quickly deploy
troops to appropriate armed conflicts. Of the three EU pillars, the CFSP, and more specifically the ESDI, has been the least successful. Past attempts at military coordination by the European alliance have been unfruitful, and even embarrassing.

**European Defense Community**

The Pleven Plan of 1950 initiated the first European attempt at military coordination. The members of the ECSC (Benelux, France, West Germany, and Italy) negotiated this proposal for 2 years before signing it. The Pleven Plan became the European Defense Community (EDC). According to Winston Churchill, the goal of the EDC was to create a common European defense through “a European Army tied to [the] political institutions of a united Europe [and a] European Minister for Defense” (McCormick, 1996, 51). This effort was designed to strengthen Western Europe’s military potential against the nearby escalation of Soviet power and would hopefully tie Western Germany into a military alliance to detect and prevent Nazi resurgence.

The objectives of the EDC could have been very beneficial to Europe, but there were many faults in how it was implemented. First of all, it was too supranational in nature—the Army held autonomous power to mobilize without direct authorization from all six member countries. The absence of unanimous consent requirements threatened the sovereignty of individual states. They feared that the common military forces, to which they contributed national resources, could be utilized even if the assignment was not in every nation’s best interest. Secondly, World War II suspicions still lingered between affiliates. For instance, the “thought of placing French troops under foreign command or the rearming of Germany faced too much opposition in the French Parliament” (Eliassen,
Furthermore, the EDC also did not devote enough effort to formulating a basic common foreign policy. All six states could never approve a military undertaking against a foreign power unless they first agreed upon their relationship with that country or regime. Finally, the EDC excluded Britain, which had Europe’s most powerful post-WWII military and was essential for European military strength. In the end, the EDC plan was abolished when the French Parliament eventually rejected it in 1954. This ambitious, failed attempt at military coordination taught the EC that common defense depends on many preparatory steps and the trust of all participating governments.

The Maastricht Treaty provision on the CFSP takes into consideration the lessons learned from the deficiencies of the EDC. The treaty created the CFSP as a forum for intergovernmental cooperation, not an institution with supranational powers. The requirement for undivided approval of security affairs is intended to reduce national concerns that a plan of action could be decided and acted upon even if it was detrimental to one or more member states. This safeguard also reduces the likelihood that national troops could be placed under the command of an antagonistic or domineering member.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy was drafted at the 1991 IGC as a two-step process. First, a common foreign policy must be established and followed. Then, from this commonality an ESDI can emerge. The Maastricht Treaty recognized that once a standard foreign policy is unanimously accepted and adopted, defense negotiations could take place. Consensus on how defense should be managed, worded as “a common defense policy” in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, must also precede actual military mobilization, technically termed “common defense.” The EU is in transition between these two stages as it realizes that it needs its own rapid reaction troops to do peacekeep-
ing abroad, but is still years away from having them in operation (Associated Press, 2000A).

Recent Failures

Another, more recent, failed attempt at Western European defense collaboration took place after the break up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (around the same time the EU decided to adopt the CFSP). From 1991 to 1992 the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence, leaving a Yugoslavia that consisted only of the remaining republics of Montenegro and Serbia. Serbia strongly opposed the Croatian and Bosnian secessions, so violence erupted between ethnic Bosnian, Croat, and Serb populations.

As war waged between Croatia and Serbia in 1991, and between Serbs and [Bosnian] Muslims in 1992, the West was compelled to confront a number of issues, including interstate and intrastate war on Europe’s immediate periphery; significant casualties and genocidal murder; brutal human rights violations including systematic rape; vast numbers of refugees; and economic upheaval. (Rupp, 1998A, 159)

The world perceived this as the perfect opportunity for the EU to finally unite on a proposal for reestablishing peace on their home continent and show that it was more than merely an economic power, but the Union failed to do so. It engaged in diplomatic efforts to bring about Balkan peace, such as submitting cease-fires and peace plans, “and then employed the full gamut of negative economic measures [including sanctions] against the former Yugoslavia, yet it could not coerce the parties into reaching an agreement” (Smith, 1998, 78). The EU needed to do more to quell the crisis—deploy military force.
The option of force was not effectively executed for several reasons. Primarily, the members of the EU could not agree upon a single plan of action because national interests still dominated the decision-making process. For example, the British wanted the US to lead any initiative in the Balkans; France supported a purely European military engagement to prove its international strength; Germany opposed using national troops in out-of-area humanitarian efforts; and Denmark was entirely anti-militaristic about the whole situation. All EU members must accept any CFSP action, and this naturally makes crisis response slow moving.

Moreover, the EU had not been involved in serious military operations for decades and was extremely tepid in exercising the use of force out of a fear of causing European casualties, especially because the situation was not viewed as a direct threat to European security. The EU did ask the Western European Union, a European military alliance, to prepare a plan for eventual deployment of peacekeeping troops, with options ranging from limited intervention to full-scale peacemaking. But, two preconditions for intervention were attached to the request—a cease-fire must exist and the security of the troops needed to be guaranteed (Jørgensen, 1993, 83). These were completely unattainable requirements for military involvement because if these conditions could have been secured, there would have been little need for peacekeeping in the first place.

Finally, the military capacity of the EU was not necessarily strong enough to have any real effects without UN or NATO assistance. Although individual member countries controlled formidable militaries, the EU itself possessed "no airlift capacity, no independent intelligence collection or surveillance capability, limited combat air force capa-
bility, command, and control, and no troops trained for rapid intervention" (Dean, 1994, 282).

Overall, the European Union was completely ineffective in dealing with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and the situation was ultimately dealt with by the US and NATO. "In the end, it was NATO that finally brought the warring parties to the bargaining table after unleashing a punishing bombardment upon Serb forces in fall 1995" (Rupp, 1998A, 170). NATO had originally tried to avoid involvement in the Balkans because the United States believed the situation would inevitably entail the use of US troops, but the EU's inaction left no other option. A statement by Oregon Senator Gordon Smith before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations captures the humiliating nature of this incident. He asserts that the experience in the Balkans "highlights the inability of the EU to act together on matters of foreign and security policy" (United States, 1999, 2).

The EU not only failed to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. It failed to establish its military independence from the United States, which is the single largest contributor to NATO operations. Western Europe has relied on US military assistance throughout the twentieth century, and some European states are eager to break that dependency to become a self-sustaining, formidable world power. This entails political and military credibility, as well as economic.

Despite inevitable embarrassment due to their failure, the EU's unsuccessful attempts to moderate the war in the Balkans presented the EU with an opportunity to learn a lot about the CFSP and its shortcomings. It became obvious that the CFSP's reliance on unanimity needed modification because it lengthened the decision-making process so
much that it was nearly impossible to react effectively to any crisis situation. Some countries like Ireland and Sweden favor neutrality, whereas more forceful countries such as France and Britain do not always agree on how to intervene abroad. The EU also realized that it desperately needed to build institutions that specialize in monitoring and addressing crisis situations before they escalate too far. Furthermore, the EU recognized the importance of EU troops that would not hesitate to utilize force when necessary. Such forces must be competent, loyal, and prepared for rapid mobilization. These lessons provided the basis for amendments to Title V of the Treaty on European Union at the 1996 IGC on political union.

Amsterdam Treaty

In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU, finally bringing the alliance to its current membership of 15 states. All 15 nations convened at the 1996 IGC to make amendments to the Maastricht Treaty in an effort to improve the efficiency of EU operations. The final product was the Amsterdam Treaty.

Reforming the CFSP was a top priority, given the recent Yugoslav crisis. Such massive violence had not taken place in Europe for many decades; so naturally, the EU was caught off guard and was unprepared to be of much assistance. Whatever the excuse, the EU was determined to further develop its united military capacity to ensure such humiliation never happened again.

To further improve military coordination, the Amsterdam Treaty created another foreign policy instrument, called the common strategy. This new mechanism for policy
coordination was added to the two foreign policy instruments created by the Treaty on European Union: “common positions” and “joint actions”.

Common positions are the first step towards a common foreign policy. The European Council unanimously defines a common position, and the national policies of every member state must conform to the position. For example, if the Council decides that the EU is going to cut off diplomatic relations with Iraq, each member must take all possible actions to suspend Iraqi political contact. Common positions were designed to make cooperation more systematic and synchronized.

Once common positions are in place, joint actions can be adopted. The European Council issues joint actions to coordinate resources from all member states (human resources, expertise, financing, equipment, etc.) in order to attain specific objectives in areas where action is deemed to be required. Joint actions identify general and specific goals, intended duration, and the anticipated means for achieving those objectives. For example, in 1991 the Council decided to implement a joint action in the Western Balkans to gather and analyze information to facilitate the effective formulation of a European Union foreign policy towards the Balkans. The result was the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM). The ECMM was created with certain objectives in mind, was reviewed and extended in December 2000, and is supported by the resources of all EU states (Council, 2001).

Common strategies, however, are only to be implemented in areas where all member states have strategic interests. Like joint actions, common strategies set out the aims and length of time covered by the plan of action and the means to be made available by the Union and member states to implement and maintain it. The difference, however,
is that common strategies are more specifically intended for strategic military intervention, whereas joint actions are a catch all for any type of coordinated action abroad. The purpose of creating this distinction between joint actions and common strategies is so the EU will more readily realize when an issue is of common strategic importance and, therefore, deserves more serious consideration of military intervention.

The Amsterdam Treaty also revolutionized CFSP decision-making by establishing “constructive abstention.” Members can now merely abstain from, instead of veto, policies they do not agree with. This vote of constructive abstention means that the abstaining state does not need to participate in the policy, but those who support it can contribute to its implementation. This mechanism does not apply, however, when abstentions account for more than one-third of Council votes (i.e. 25 weighted votes).

Decision-making within the security and defense field was also eased by the extension of majority voting in areas where unanimity was previously required. The revised Article J.13 of the Treaty specifies the different CFSP decisions and which type of voting requirements each utilizes.

When the European Council adopts principles, guidelines, and common strategies the rule is unanimity with the possibility of constructive abstention. When the Council adopts joint actions, common positions, or implementing decisions on the basis of previously agreed common strategies, joint actions or common positions, the rule is qualified majority except when a state objects, citing important reasons of national policy. (Gourlay, 1998, 82) The EU hoped that these changes would improve the decision-making process and prevent interstate gridlock, like that which arose when trying to decide on how to deal with the Balkan crisis.
The 1996 IGC established important positions and institutions that would further contribute to a cohesive European security policy. The post of High Representative for the CFSP was created and bestowed upon the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union to give the issue a higher profile and ensure its coherence (European Union, 2000A). The primary responsibility of this position is to assist the Council in foreign and security policy issues by preparing proposals and implementing decisions related to the CFSP. The High Representative is also expected to work with the Council President in conducting political dialogue with third parties. In 1999, this title was given to Mr. Javier Solana Madariaga, former NATO Secretary-General.

A declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty established a "policy planning and early warning unit" as a tool of the CFSP. The High Representative for the CFSP is in charge of the policy planning and early warning unit (PPU) and is supported by the unit's accomplishments. The main duties of the specialists who constitute the PPU are to monitor continuously any world events that are relevant to the security of Western Europe; report on situations that may escalate into political crises and require EU diplomatic or military action; generate policy-option papers to help formulate foreign and security policies; and assess general EU interests and areas for future CFSP involvement.

The creation of the PPU and the CFSP Representative position are pivotal developments in the eventual creation of a European security and defense identity. The drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty were very wise to realize that a policy as difficult as the CFSP can only succeed if it has its own leaders and institutions that specialize in and are dedicated to the ultimate goal of concerted military action. An EU publication assessing
the developments of the Amsterdam Treaty states the centrality of the PPU in another light.

The coherence of common foreign and security policy depends on how Member States react to international developments. Past experience [like the Balkan conflict] has shown that if reactions are uncoordinated, the position of the European Union and its Member States on the international scene is weakened. Joint analysis of international issues and their impact, and pooling of information should help the Union produce effective reactions to international developments. (European Union, 2000A)

The four previously mentioned CFSP reforms—adding common strategies, changing voting requirements, creating the High Representative for the CFSP, and establishing the PPU—all deal with improving the efficiency of foreign and security policy making. The Amsterdam Treaty also redefined how policies should actually be implemented. It accomplished this by strengthening ties to the military alliance known as the Western European Union.

**Western European Union**

When the European Defense Community collapsed in 1954, the Brussels Treaty, which created the initiative, was amended to establish a new alliance for coordinating defense policies—the Western European Union (WEU). At that time, the WEU consisted of the six EDC members (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany, and Italy) and Britain. Whereas the EDC aspired to create a European army, the WEU intended to build military commitments between member countries. The WEU required all members to provide all possible military aid and assistance to any member that came under attack in Europe (Dean, 1994, 266). Furthermore, the WEU "was an at-
tempt to help Germany contribute to the defense of Western Europe without taking part in the kind of European army envisioned by the EDC." (McCormick, 1996, 283).

Several years before the creation of the WEU, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between the US, Canada, and several Western European nations to restore and maintain security in the post-WWII North Atlantic region. Several years later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence as a structure for military cooperation between those countries. Its primary purpose was to deter and counter communist threats to the Western world. NATO soon overshadowed the WEU as the main non-communist security alliance of the Cold War. This is due, in part, to NATO's larger membership, which granted it expanded access to military assets, and strong organizational leadership by the United States.

Therefore, for the next thirty years the WEU lay dormant, referred to by some as a "reserve institution." "As one diplomat put it, the WEU became 'a place where you found jobs for retired Italian admirals'" (McCormick, 1996, 283). In 1984, however, President Ronald Reagan's plan to build a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more popularly known as "Star Wars," revived the European military group. The SDI was supposed to protect the United States physically against nuclear weapons by creating a space-orbiting system to detect and shoot down any long-range missiles fired at US territory. Europeans feared that America would hide behind this defense system and fail to keep its NATO commitments to protect Western Europe in case of a communist attack (Dean, 1994, 267). Although the SDI never successfully materialized, the WEU had been resuscitated. It continued to grow more cohesive and ambitious, despite US and
NATO warnings against any collective defense plans outside of the North Atlantic alliance.

The reinvigorated Western European Union was determined to create a European security and defense identity separate from NATO and the control of the US. France and Germany were at the forefront of this initiative, ultimately seeking greater European autonomy. From this desire emerged the Hague "Platform on European Security Interests," which redefined the WEU’s new purpose and responsibilities. This document, which was written in 1987, outlined two essential roles for the WEU—“to provide Europe’s security identity, and to serve as a bridge between NATO and the European Community” (McKenzie, 1998, 103) [the official EU title was not created until 1991].

Many WEU members believed the organization was finally clearly defined and was, therefore, prepared to play an active role in representing Western Europe in international conflicts. Optimism was high that the European Community had finally established its own defense pillar after decades of failed experiments and dependence on the US military. The WEU’s successful coordination of member states’ forces during a mine-sweeping mission in the Persian Gulf area during the 1987 Iran-Iraq War further reinforced this confidence (McCormick, 1996, 283).

At the time, the memberships of the WEU and the EC (now known as the EU) were very similar. By 1988, the WEU was composed of its original seven members, and Spain and Portugal. The EC included all WEU member states, plus Ireland, Greece and Denmark. The striking similarity in membership caused the EC to consider incorporating the WEU into the economic alliance.
So, at the 1991 IGC the WEU was written into Article J.3 of the Maastricht Treaty as “an integral part of the development of the Union [which would] elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implica-
tions” (European Union, 2000C). The Maastricht Treaty had finally linked the WEU and the EU, and membership between the two groups became even more similar. Greece joined the WEU as its tenth full member, and Denmark and Ireland were admitted to the WEU with observer status. Although the WEU seemed perfectly suited to serve as the EU’s defense pillar, many problems remained.

First of all, the EU did not completely trust the WEU to undertake full-scale military operations. The Balkan crisis provided an excellent opportunity for the EU to finally utilize the WEU for security measures. However, when Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, was in need of protection, the WEU was not called upon to assist. A meeting of the North Atlantic Council was convened instead. “This may be attributable to the com-
plexity and immediacy of the problem, but it did nothing to strengthen the CFSP or the commitment to develop a common defense” (McKenzie, 1998, 104) under the auspices of the WEU.

Also, the WEU’s two roles—as Europe’s security identity and as the link between the EU and NATO—remained unchanged under the CFSP provision of the Treaty on European Union. The WEU was to serve as the defense arm of the EU, yet it was also to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. This duality, often called the “hinge principle,” made the organization “uncertain of its central role and still unclear about its substantive relationship to both the EU and NATO” (Rhodes, 1998, 60).
Neither of the two functions of the WEU could have been eliminated, however, because they represent opposing views over the implementation of a common European defense. As previously mentioned, France and Germany support the WEU as the primary organization for military cooperation in Europe. Britain, on the other hand, is an Atlantacist and has very strong ties to the United States. It will only support NATO as the collective defense organism for Western Europe. Because each of these very powerful nations is also a member of all three organizations, all of their opinions must be respected, even if they make an ESDI impossible.

Furthermore, NATO was still a strong force in 1991, despite the end of the Cold War and the insecurity that surrounded its future role. Some expected NATO to disband with the fall of the Soviet Union and saw the WEU as its replacement; this was not a realistic option.

Reasons for this can be found in the European inability, either through the WEU or CFSP to resolve the Bosnia conflict; disagreements over the strengthening of the WEU in order to take on NATO-like missions; and differences between Britain and France in their assessment of the future of either Russia or Germany, as well as the continued role of the US in Europe. (Kirchner, 1999, 47)

Instead, NATO persevered and began to redefine its role in world politics—it was no longer for containing communism, but instead became a mechanism for quelling conflicts in areas of strategic importance. This new duty came in direct conflict with the evolving role of the WEU, as defined at the 1992 St. Petersburg summit.
Petersberg Tasks

Two weeks after NATO announced that it would make its troops available for peacekeeping under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the WEU Council of defense and foreign ministers assembled in Petersberg, Germany. There, the WEU "declared its own willingness to participate in peacekeeping of the CSCE or the UN" (Dean, 1994, 276). The "Petersberg tasks" are the types of humanitarian activities that the WEU agreed to undertake: peace maintenance, crisis management, and humanitarian aid. Many governments, especially the US, feared that this would create an unnecessary duplication of efforts and create a competitive relationship between NATO and the WEU.

At the Petersberg summit, the WEU also outlined the procedures for appointing member state forces to certain conflicts, both within and outside of Europe. The WEU even created a planning cell, "which would deal with command, control and communications arrangements for operational missions and prepare contingency plans for operations. Under these arrangements the WEU will be activated only for specific purposes" (Kirchner, 1999, 48), rather than act as a standing European army like that originally attempted by the EDC in 1952.

In order to more clearly define its expected role in international security, the EU included the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty's revision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. The governments of the EU incorporated peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention into the developing ESDI because they recognized the decline in the occurrence of large-scale wars, like the world wars of the 20th century. They realized that the majority of European security threats were likely to result from internal wars in nearby
areas, such as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Israel. Therefore, an effective ESDI would not be complete without developing a method to deal with these conflicts.

The 1996 IGC did succeed at outlining EU procedures for out-of-area involvement, but it failed to substantiate several other defense developments that many countries had strongly pushed for to expedite the CFSP process. Most importantly, ties between the WEU and the EU were not redefined, but simply reiterated.

Greece, Germany, Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain favored making the WEU an EU institution (Gourlay, 1998, 63-65). These member states supported an ESDI separate from NATO and saw the integration of the WEU as the most probable means of doing so. They maintained the idea that bringing the WEU under the control of the EU would not only make military action more efficient, but it would also bolster trust between the two entities. Because the seven other members opposed this proposal, no progressive changes were solidified. Article J.7.1 now ambiguously calls for “closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union.” As in the past, the EU was prevented from moving forward in the development of an autonomous security and defense identity because of its members’ reluctance to sever ties to NATO and the US.
Rapid Reaction Force

In December of 1999, the members of the European Union met in Helsinki to discuss putting the Petersberg tasks into action. The result of this summit was a plan to develop a rapid reaction force (RRF) by 2003 with the ability to deploy up to 60,000 troops within 60 days to an area of conflict. Those troops would be sustained for up to a year and then replaced by another force if necessary, therefore requiring a pool of over 180,000 to 230,000 total troops. This decision came soon after Javier Solana’s appointment to the new position of the High Representative for the CFSP.

The push was also accelerated by the European allies’ realization during this year’s NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo that they had nothing like the ability of the United States to move hundreds of fighter-bombers to the theater of operations, use sophisticated satellite technology to guide bombs to their targets, and neutralize Serbian antiaircraft defenses—even though the conflict was less than an hour’s flying time from their own territories. (Whitney, 1999B)

Less than one year later, by November of 2000, the RRF had made impressive advancements. The force was already placed under the command of German Lt. Gen. Klaus Schuwirth (Reuters, 2000A). It had received pledges of over 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 ships from EU states. Many non-EU countries had also expressed interest in being associated with the force and were formulating how many men...
and weapons they would contribute (Associated Press, 2000B). Even Russia supported
the plan and "was ready to cooperate with the European Union's new military
force" (Reuters, 2000B). Finally, the European community had come to an agreement on
the creation of a real security initiative. Its goals were clear, it held continent-wide sup-
port, and its construction was well under way.

Unfortunately, the US and NATO were not as enthusiastic. The purpose of the
RRF is intervention in foreign conflicts that are of particular interest to the force's con-
tributing members. This role is very similar to that of post-Cold War NATO. So natu-
really, NATO began to feel very threatened by this new European effort. "NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson warned ... that any rivalry between the established
trans-Atlantic alliance and a nascent European-only reaction force could be disastrous for
both" (Associated Press, 2000B). This rivalry could develop for several reasons. The
RRF could "waste" valuable European military assets that would otherwise be used for
NATO operations; and, it could create competing military structures that would prevent
both the US and the EU from responding coherently to international crises.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has summed up US concerns about the plan
with what she calls "the three D's": The European defense initiative must not
"decouple" the United States from Europe; it must not "duplicate" NATO struc-
tures and capabilities; and it must not "discriminate" against NATO members that
do not belong to the EU (Drozdiak, 2000).

The first of these concerns, that the RRF will divide the transatlantic partnership,"has stupefied Europeans. After clamoring for Europe to take control of its own security,
the United States suddenly seems fearful that the Helsinki plan could jeopardize NATO
and US leadership of the alliance" (Drozdiak, 2000). In order to prevent irreparable dam-
age, the European Union has been working very diligently to assure the US and other
non-EU NATO members that the RRF is in the best interest of NATO. The Union stands firmly behind the idea that the RRF will strengthen the European pillar of NATO, thereby freeing the US from the heavy burden of supporting Europe militarily. French Defense Minister Alain Richard epitomizes this sentiment by stating that “a strengthening of the Europeans’ own capabilities would modernize, and adjust the balance of, the [North Atlantic] alliance” (Isnard, 2000).

With respect to the concerns over the duplication of NATO, Javier Solana, also known as Mr. CFSP, has repeatedly stated that the RRF “will not in any way undermine the role of NATO” (Madariaga, 1999). The force will only be utilized in situations where NATO as a whole does not want to become involved in crisis management. For example, US President George W. Bush has expressed reservations about continued NATO presence in the former Yugoslavia. If the RRF were already operational, it would be a perfect opportunity for the European force to take over the Balkan peacekeeping mission. This alternative force could give NATO more flexibility over which conflicts to become involved in and could relieve the heavy load that it currently maintains. Furthermore, the EU is only trying to develop its own security forces. It will still primarily rely on national troops, the WEU, and NATO for the defense of Europe.

Albright’s third fear that the RRF will discriminate against non-EU NATO members became obsolete when many non-EU European countries made military contributions to the new military force.

In addition to addressing the US’s three main concerns, the EU has also taken steps to ensure that NATO is an informed and important part of the RRF process. First, key NATO military personnel would be allowed permanent seats or observer status on
the EU’s most important military councils, including the permanent political and security committee and the EU Military Committee (Castle, 2000). Second, NATO and the EU are going to convene at six ambassadorial level meetings a year and at ministerial level meetings at least once per year to ensure the maintenance of stability in the EU-NATO relationship. This frequent meeting schedule makes rational sense given that the EU will have access to some of NATO’s assets for the functioning of the rapid reaction force—most notably warning and control aircraft, communication networks, and intelligence gathering satellites.

The thorough efforts of the European Union to convince the US and NATO that the European security force would not be detrimental to the seasoned alliance did pay off. The United States eventually cooled its opposition to the RRF and now endorses it, but only as long as the EU force is less important than NATO. The following statement by former Defense Secretary William Cohen exemplifies how the US has come full circle on the RRF debate. "'Let me be clear on America’s position," Cohen said. "We agree with this goal—not grudgingly, not with resignation, but with whole hearted conviction’" (Ulbrich, 2000).

**Enlargement**

The European Union addresses a wide variety of issues and consists of 15 members because of the occurrence of deepening and widening. Deepening is the process of developing closer ties between member states by coordinating on additional governmental functions. For example, the predecessors to the EU were primarily mechanisms for
economic integration. However, over time the Western European association deepened to include collaboration on social, judicial and military affairs. Widening is the process of expanding membership to new nations. Nearly half a century ago, the European Coal and Steel Community was created between six countries. The ECSC eventually evolved into the European Union, which was created in 1991 between 12 European nations and currently comprises 15 members.

The debate over deepening versus widening can shed much light on the past failures of the EU and the present dilemmas it faces. An alliance wishing to extend its power can undertake either course of action, but deciding to go forward with both processes simultaneously can be very problematic and stifling. Examination of the EU’s failure to react to the Balkan crisis illuminates the mutually exclusive nature of widening and deepening. If the EU had fewer members and did not have to coordinate the opinions of so many sovereign nations, it could have been more effective at coming to a consensus on how to deal with the nearby war. On the other hand, if the EU had never attempted to take on military coordination in the Balkans, it would have not have been internationally embarrassed when it fell short of its goal.

The difficulties that the EU encountered in formulating a unanimously supported military plan of action provided a valuable lesson about the delicate balance between widening and deepening. Regrettably, the EU did not recognize that lesson and is currently planning a massive stage of membership enlargement. At a summit in December of 2000, EU officials decided to begin the process of allowing 13 more countries into the EU. These applicants will obtain full member status once their economies and legal systems comply with stringent EU entry requirements. One can only help but wonder how
the EU plans to solidify a common security and defense identity with 28 members, when it can hardly do so with only 15, especially since the union is still "struggling with systems that were designed when it had only six member countries" (Daley, 2000).

The enlargement of the EU alone poses substantial obstacles to the effective development of an ESDI. For instance, the challenge of consensus and majority voting requirements will dramatically retard the EU's already slow decision-making process. Furthermore, many of the nations being considered for membership are newly independent states that are struggling economically and have little military power of their own. So, the EU's present members will be forced to provide a disproportional amount of support for any EU security forces. The 1995 average per capita defense budget for 10 of the 13 potential new EU members was only $61, compared with $442 for the EU 15 (Schleidt, 1996, 248-249).

There are, however, several advantages to including new states in the EU and its plans for an ESDI. First of all, the nations of the former Soviet Union could become a productive link between the EU and Russia and could eventually help incorporate Russia into the ESDI. Secondly, several states, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland, all have peacekeeping experience that could prove valuable to the developing rapid reaction force. Thirdly, the combined population of the 13 interested countries is well over 100 million. This could help "reduce to some extent the manpower problems of western countries with respect to peacekeeping" (Jopp, 1996, 80). This situation would be especially constructive if the richer countries of Western Europe funded necessary training programs. As the EU weighs the prospective disadvantages
and benefits of widening the Western European alliance to include non-western countries, it also must consider the concurrent enlargement of NATO.

NATO is also looking into further enlargement of its membership into Central and Eastern Europe in order to adapt to post-Cold War politics. Since the fall of the USSR, NATO has not only shifted its role in international politics to peacemaking, but has also begun to work with countries it was originally created to oppose. In 1994, NATO instituted the Partnership for Peace (PiP) program with countries from Central and Eastern Europe. "The PiP facilitates closer and differentiated military cooperation between NATO and the Partnership member states, in some cases with an eye towards eventual membership" (Sperling, 1999, 11). The goal of the PiP was to establish political and military stability in countries reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union and to create Eastern European alliances that might prevent regional violence. PiP membership grew to 27 (Kay, 1997, 169), and by 1999, three of the PiP members had received full NATO membership: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Others may follow.

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO expanded more rapidly into Eastern Europe than the EU, mainly because of the EU’s strict membership requirements. The EU’s current enlargement endeavor is most likely an effort to catch up with NATO and PiP membership in order to decrease the number of non-EU NATO countries, many of which complain that the WEU and the RRF have access to NATO assets. The EU widening is also intended to ease the transition of newly independent states from communism to democracy and market economies.
CHAPTER IV
Independent Action

There is a strong theoretical argument for the development of an autonomous EU security and defense identity. The EU is a formidable world power that should be able to defend its own territory and ensure security in areas of strategic interest.

In 1992, even before contemplated expansion to include Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Austria, the EC states had a population of 345 million compared with 253 million for the United States, a gross domestic product of $6.9 trillion, $1 trillion more than the United States, exports of $565 billion compared to US exports of $448 billion, and armed forces of 2.2 million compared to 1.9 million for the United States. (Dean, 1994, 277-278)

In reality, however, the EU has been completely ineffectual in creating a military structure comparable to that of the US. This failure is largely attributable to the inherent structure of the European Union—an association of sovereign states with differing national cultures, military loyalties, and attitudes towards out-of-area intervention. The system of EU decision-making has also stifled the effective formulation of security policies. The historical inability of the EU to solidify a CFSP also has to do with the European reliance on NATO and US forces. If NATO had disbanded with the collapse of Soviet communism, Europe would have no longer been able to depend on its protection and would have been forced to create its own means of interstate military cooperation.
It is highly unlikely that the European Union will develop an ESDI in the near future, at least without collaboration with an already-established security and defense organization. Besides the obstacles mentioned above, an independent EU military is hindered by the many other obstacles—the EU’s inexperience in coordinated military action; its lack of effective intelligence gathering and mission command resources; the reluctance of states to contribute to any EU forces when they already supply NATO’s integrated command structure; and the fear that developing a system that resembles NATO will sever longstanding transatlantic ties.

Developing an ESDI in conjunction with another association is very complicated and requires the EU to establish and maintain reliable relations with their partner(s). This entails a system for open communications, regularly scheduled meetings, clearly stated common goals, delegated responsibilities, and a strong sense of mutual trust. Although these prerequisites are tedious and challenging, history has shown that they are all necessary because military cooperation is a delicate, difficult matter. The EU must take what it has learned from its past failures and incorporate those lessons into its new, cooperative undertakings. Only then can the EU achieve its goal, as spelled out by the EU’s Commissioner for External Affairs, Christopher Patten. “What we’re trying to do is make sure the European voice is heard [in security affairs] at the same strong decibel level as when the European Union speaks as the world’s biggest trade bloc and the biggest foreign aid donor” (Whitney, 1999A).
Collaboration with the OSCE

One potential partner for the EU’s development of an ESDI is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE, known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1994, was created in 1975 as a forum for encouraging cooperation among member states on a variety of specific issues, such as technology, human rights and environmental protection (McCormick, 1996, 279).

The UN established the OSCE as a regional security organization to deal with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE presently has 55 members, including the US, Canada, all of Western Europe, the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Russia, a number of other Eastern European nations, and a few countries from Central Asia. OSCE action requires participant consensus on all matters, including preventive diplomacy, arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, and safeguarding human rights.

The OSCE is a large and potentially effectual organization. It has successfully executed several important security functions, most notably the facilitation of military information sharing, conflict mediation, and the generation of ideas for the prosecution of crisis management. Moreover, the OSCE’s large, diverse membership has the potential to bring about stable relations between old rivals. Russia strongly supports the organization’s existence and goals. Therefore, the OSCE theoretically has the power to bring about positive change in Eastern Europe and facilitate military cooperation between the West and the former Soviet Union (Bronstone, 2000, 72). This is an accomplishment that NATO is very far from accomplishing, given Russia’s vehement opposition to the Alliance.
Although the OSCE’s role in crisis management, US-Russia reconciliation, and European military coordination may grow and produce impressive results, the OSCE is not the organization through which the EU will develop its security and defense identity. The most significant reason for this is that the “OSCE has been more a series of conferences than it is a real organization” (Snow, 1998, 155). It has a very small bureaucracy and no military planning units for the EU to utilize. The OSCE was not created to perform military operations, but rather it specializes in “premilitary” or “soft” security efforts. It leaves the function of assembling military contributions from member states to the UN, NATO, and the WEU. In effect, the “the OSCE lacks any security guarantee” (Clemens, 1999, 151) and has no experience in the type of force development and deployment that the EU is seeking to carry out.

Even if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did develop its own military units and engage in peacekeeping missions, several problems would still prevent it from being an effective international tool. First, the consensus-voting requirement would make any military operation nearly impossible. The EU could not come to an agreement over how to deal with the Balkan crisis, and it has only 15 members. Unanimity among 55 countries would be much more complex and paralytic. Secondly, there is a shortage of funds available for OSCE operations. The present need for conflict prevention and mediation is overwhelming, and the missions require financial support that far exceeds the OSCE’s budget (Dean, 1994, 235). Without additional funding from member countries, the organization’s actions may be severely limited and ineffective at stopping the escalation of costly wars.
The European Union should continue to work with the OSCE, doing what the organization does best—engaging in security-building measures and promoting military policy sharing among members. The Union must look elsewhere for a partner to help cultivate a common European security initiative. The OSCE has a positive, productive role to play, as "a neutral agent, facilitating dialogue and negotiations among competing parties" (Rupp, 1998B, 135), not as a coordinator of national armies and strategic interests.

Working with the WEU

Another possible way for the European Union to develop its ESDI is through closer cooperation with the Western European Union. The WEU is a military alliance between 10 of the EU’s 15 member countries; the other five EU members hold WEU Observer status. The two organizations not only share similar membership, but their histories are also closely connected. They are both manifestations of a desire to create European interdependence, prosperity, and protection. Working with the WEU for security and defense purposes would achieve the European goal of freedom from military dependence on the United States.

With regards to future expansion, the WEU is a nearly perfect partner for the EU. Iceland and Norway are the only two WEU associates that are not presently involved in the EU or considering membership. Conversely, there are only two countries in the EU's enlargement list that are not involved with the WEU: Cyprus and Malta. These inconsistencies are relatively small when EU membership is compared to that of NATO/PIPS.
and the OSCE. Therefore, the EU could undergo its intended plan of enlargement and still be closely related to the WEU in terms of membership. Another positive advantage to working with the WEU is Russia’s openness to the possibility of working with the EU and the WEU on security and defense coordination. Collective European security should not continue without the inclusion of Russia, and a EU-WEU affiliation could make that a reality.

Working with the WEU, just like acting alone, makes theoretical sense for the EU’s development of an ESDI. Unfortunately, what should happen does not always materialize. The EU will still depend upon the WEU, as well as NATO, for the defense of Europe. However, the EU will develop its security forces without the help of the Western European Union. There are many reasons why the EU is undergoing the first real step in developing its ESDI separate from the European military alliance.

The WEU was originally created as a pledge between members to contribute to the defense of any member that came under attack, but this role has evolved over time. In the early 1990s, the WEU adopted the Petersberg tasks, which would have allowed military resources from members to be utilized for peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. When the EU decided to develop its rapid reaction force, the WEU abandoned the Petersberg tasks, realizing they were more suited to the goals of the EU. Since then, the WEU has decided to further limit its responsibilities to issues such as armament research and its original role of collective defense, therefore playing a negligible role in the EU’s exciting development of a rapid reaction force.

The EU has decided to carry out the Petersberg tasks with the help of NATO, instead of the WEU, for several reasons. The idea of developing an RRF separate from the
North Atlantic alliance was threatening to NATO and US officials, and a break in trans-atlantic ties could hurt not only diplomatic relations, but trade as well. Plus, NATO has stronger institutions and more military assets than the WEU that the RRF will have access to.

Politically, the British would never have agreed to develop any security forces without the auspices of NATO, and France probably realized that working under NATO temporarily would pay off in the long run when the EU finally controlled its own independent peacekeeping troops. The once popular idea of integrating the WEU into the EU would have made an EU-WEU alliance more feasible for the formation of the RRF, but the “WEU’s integration in the European Union still seems remote and no timetable is being envisaged for it” (Assembly, 1998, 14).

NATO also has much more experience than the WEU at successfully executing out-of-area missions, and will therefore, be a better example for the RRF to emulate. When the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy was originally drafted into the Maastricht Treaty, the governments of the EU agreed to rely on the WEU for security and defense applications. The fighting that erupted in the Balkans, following the fragmentation of the Yugoslavian state, should have been effectively dealt with by the WEU under an EU directive, but this never actualized. The EU could not agree upon a plan of action for the WEU, so the warring continued. One reason for the failure of the EU and the WEU to act effectively, besides a lack of consensus and trust, was that neither alliance had much practice in military coordination and mobilization. The WEU had modest successes in the Gulf War, but that was the limited extent of its experience.
The Western European Union, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has a useful function and should continue to cooperate with the EU to accomplish those important security measures. Although the WEU has relinquished its crisis management responsibilities in favor of the EU, it is taking the lead on European security issues such as weapons trade and development, demining efforts, and maintaining the "WEU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU Satellite Centre ... until the EU [has] provided itself in 2002 with its own institute for security studies and its own satellite centre" (WEU, 2001). The WEU would have been a good RRF partner for the development of an autonomous European force, but cooperation with NATO will make the force more effective and enduring.

Continued NATO Dependence

The European Union has decided to work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the development of its rapid reaction force, the first major phase in the creation of a European security and defense identity. The EU has many incentives for choosing NATO as a partner. Several were specified in the previous section—fear of duplicating NATO structures, NATO's familiarity with peacekeeping, and European political differences.

The Alliance has not always been completely effective in dealing with conflicts it has been involved in, but its track record for efficient decision-making and mobilization is unparalleled. These are two essential functions that the RRF must master in order to work. A rapid reaction force that does not react quickly, or even at all, is a waste of en-
ergy and resources. The EU’s past endeavors in the CFSP field have provided the organization with abundant examples highlighting the importance of efficiency and effectiveness. Under the watch of NATO, the EU will have no excuse for failing again.

There are benefits to working with NATO on this project, but there are also serious drawbacks. The United States would only approve of an EU security force that was “clearly secondary to NATO” (Sanger, 2001). So, the RRF is only permitted to engage in conflicts when the US, or NATO as a whole, does not want to get involved. This severely limits the opportunities that the RRF will have to build experience and contribute to international peace. Current US President Bush is considering the removal of US and NATO troops from many areas, creating openings for the RRF when it becomes functional in 2003. But, the next US president may not be so isolationist. Unfortunately, however, making the new European force a NATO back up was the only way to assuage the concerns of the five non-EU NATO members that are not being considered in the next phase of EU enlargement.

Having access to NATO’s military assets is also undesirable because it alienates Russia from becoming involved in the ESDI. NATO originated as a means of countering Soviet power, and this makes post-Soviet Russia very reluctant to associate with the Alliance on any issue. Russia has expressed interest in working with, and possibly even contributing to, the RRF. It may decide not to do so because of NATO’s control over which activities the force can undertake.

Developing a European security identity with the assistance of NATO is somewhat ironic because the original purpose of an ESDI was to establish the EU as a military power, separate from the United States. Now that the EU will be working so closely with
NATO—coordinating policies and sharing information and resources—the EU will continue to be dependent on non-European actors, and the RRF will merely be a European pillar within the Alliance.

For now, the European Union will have to rely on NATO in the development of the planned peacekeeping force, at least until the EU builds its own integrated command structure. Although working with NATO requires sacrifices in the short-run, such as Russia's involvement and autonomy from the US, maintaining the support of NATO is imperative for the success of any European security initiative. Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama refers to this requirement as an obligation, claiming "it would not be right ... to neglect the structures that have guaranteed our collective security for over half a century" (Gama, 2000). Aside from demonstrating loyalty to the organization that still ensures the defense of many EU nations, the EU's partnership with NATO will contribute to the eventual strength of the RRF.

Conclusion

Given the global proliferation of internal wars and genocidal violence, the European Union's decision to develop a rapid reaction force for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions could not have come at a better time. Although the Balkan crisis provided an excellent example of the EU's past failures at military coordination, it is not the only area in which the RRF could be of assistance. Fighting in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, among other places, weigh heavily on the crisis management capacities
of existing peacekeeping forces. If the RRF is successfully established and managed, many will undoubtedly appreciate its existence.

Unfortunately, the development of a European security and defense identity is a slow process. It involves not only security forces, but also a plan for the defense of Europe. The EU is choosing to remain reliant on NATO and the WEU for defense, and is moving forward with the RRF to be able to maximize security in Europe and abroad. The RRF may be set free from the watchful eye of NATO once the European security force becomes comfortable with crisis management; the EU controls its own extensive military bureaucracy; and NATO is reassured that the RRF does not endanger the Alliance. At this point, assuming the WEU's and NATO's continued defense guarantee, the EU will have finally developed an ESDI.

The Europeans' ambitious goal of an ESDI can become a reality as long as French Defense Minister Alain Richard was correct when he claimed that the EU has "succeeded in analyzing its past shortcomings and hesitations and in learning the lessons from them"(Isnard, 2000). Maintaining faithful relationships with all of the organizations involved in European security and allowing the past to guide the way for the future will lead the EU forward in its mission to fulfill its potential.
NOTES

1 NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is the Cold War military alliance of democratic countries from Western Europe and North America. The Warsaw Pact was the equivalent security organization for Eastern Europe and other communist states. It was abolished at the end of the Cold War, whereas NATO still exists today to deal with violent conflicts in areas that are of concern to NATO members.

2 In 1999, the gross domestic product of the entire EU was $8.5 trillion, compared with $9.3 trillion for the US and $4.4 trillion for Japan (European Union, 2001). The EU also holds 2 of the 5 permanent UN Security Council seats.

3 The Benelux countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

4 The EU-15 are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, and Finland.

5 "Simply defined, European Council is a collective term for the heads of government of EU member states, their foreign ministers, and the President of the [European] Commission. This small group convenes periodically at short summit meetings and provides strategic policy direction for the EU." (McCormick, 1996, 182).

6 Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, the United States, and Canada were the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty.

7 The North Atlantic Council consists of representatives from NATO member nations and serves as the executive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

8 The countries currently negotiating EU membership are Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia.

9 In 1996, NATO agreed to the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). CJTFs permit NATO to opt out of a mission while allowing its technology and resources to be used by the WEU. The purpose of these WEU-led task forces is to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, while avoiding duplication of effort and institutions. Any CJTF mission must be approved by the North Atlantic Council.

10 The Alliance’s integrated command structure coordinates the troops and resources from member states into coherent military operations.

11 The WEU association consists of Member States, Associate Members, Observers, and Associate Partners.

12 The Balkan crisis did not end with the 1995 NATO bombing. It still continues today between opposing ethnic and religious groups, despite another NATO bombing in 1999, the removal of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, and the continued presence of NATO peacekeeping troops.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJTFs</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
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<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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operation in Justice and Home Affairs.” In Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy 
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