FRAMING A WAR AND A PEOPLE: A MIXED METHODS STUDY OF PORTRAYALS OF IRAQI VIOLENCE

by

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A THESIS

Presented to the School of Journalism and Communication and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

June 2009
“Framing a War and a People: A Mixed Methods Study of Portrayals of Iraqi Violence,”
a thesis prepared by Jacob Peter Dittmer in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts degree in the School of Journalism and Communication. This thesis has
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Jacob Peter Dittmer for the degree of Master of Science
in the School of Journalism and Communication to be taken June 2009

Title: FRAMING A WAR AND A PEOPLE: A MIXED METHODS STUDY OF PORTRAYALS OF IRAQI VIOLENCE

Approved: ____________________________

Prof. John Russell

This study examines how the news media and U.S. officials within the Bush administration utilized rhetoric and specific words over others to frame the violence and civil unrest in Iraq following the U.S. invasion. This study incorporates a mixed methods approach to framing analysis. It seeks to advance framing research into the role of the media in presenting dominant frames set forth by powerful political elites. By examining Department of Defense news briefings, this study critiques the officials' framing of the violence and unrest in Iraq. Likewise, through a content analysis of two newspapers' coverage of the Iraq War, it examines the frequency of certain key terms as it attempts to locate the emergence of dominant rhetorical frames, particularly “insurgency.” Results reveal that officials framed Iraq’s insurgency as part of the war on terror and the insurgency frame emerged in print during the periods of study.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work, like so many academic studies, is indebted to the collective intellectual atmosphere of the University of Oregon’s School of Journalism and Communication. A special thanks is in order for Prof. John Russial for his guidance as my academic advisor as well as his assistance in the crafting of this study. Likewise, thanks to Professors Pat Curtin and Carl Bybee for their help in understanding and applying the theoretical and methodological aspects of this study. Thanks to Lauren Bratslavsky for her help with the quantitative coding exercises and for her general support as an intellectual collaborator. Thanks to Arthur Santana, who aided in the coding of the quantitative data. Similarly, thanks to Prof. Scott Maier and the spring 2008 advanced quantitative methods course—a course that proved extremely useful in the creation, fine-tuning, and application of this study’s quantitative method. Lastly, the support of friends and family proved essential in the taxing realities of completing this study. Thanks to everyone who helped make this thesis.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Rarely does one think closely about word selection in an everyday conversation, yet it is through this process that meaning is shaped for the communicator and receiver. In the realm of mass media, words are tailored for a larger audience left to decode and interpret meaning on its own. Even greater emphasis on words is found in the realm of political discourse where (frequently) the objective is to shift public opinion toward a particular ideology or political position. It is at this intersection of political discourse and media that we find the news acting as a gateway to the world of policy debate and issues of importance. Here is where one finds politicians and other invested officials speaking of the Iraq War with calculated rhetoric that promotes particular realities over others.

The nature of political rhetoric or persuasive speech has certainly become more sophisticated over the years (for the sake of this study, “rhetoric” is defined as language intended to persuade an audience through the use of words, figures of speech, etc.). Calling attention to the loaded nature of political rhetoric, Cunningham (2007) suggests a “rhetoric beat,” with journalists specializing in decoding meaning behind the obtuse language of politicians. He writes, “(the rhetoric beat is) to make readers and viewers aware of how the seemingly benign words and phrases they encounter daily are often finely calibrated to influence how they think about ideas” (p. 39).
Similarly, Lakoff (2007), in discussing the rhetoric of the Bush administration, notes that “a common form of propaganda is to keep reality from being described” (p. 1). Keeping with this logic, Lakoff (2006) describes how the Bush administration avoided applying the “occupation frame” to Iraq because the term “occupation” implies the military can’t win and that it’s no longer a war. Avoiding a word is an interesting tactic in political rhetoric that calls attention to the roles the public’s memory and frames of reference play in the selection of words and other rhetorical devices, which are often calculated to avoid negative connotations in the receiver. For example, Safire (2006) notes that the Bush administration made a concerted effort to call Iraqi violence “sectarian” instead of using the weightier terminology of “civil war.” Similarly the violent uprisings in Iraq have been widely labeled an “insurgency,” perhaps in an effort to prevent similar “weightier” terms from arising and gaining prominence in the labeling of Iraqi unrest.

These examples of language’s role in furthering a viewpoint complement critiques of mainstream news media that claim news sources and journalists act as part of a propaganda machine or echoing apparatus for the political elites and their objectives (Altheide & Grimes, 2005; Entman 2004; Herman, 1998). One method of analyzing news coverage for these potential influences is through the examination of rhetoric and words chosen by the authors and their sources who “frame” the news for mass consumption.

The ideological stance of a news source is inextricably tied to how that source frames the issue—in the above examples, the news source is the administration. For the political elite, whose members are central to news construction, ideology is fundamental
in the framing of an issue (Gitlin, 1980). For example, Orientalism states that media representations of Islam and Arab nations contain an ideological bias inherent in the West’s attempt to understand and comment on the East (Said, 1979). Keeping with this thought, the U.S. news media exhibit the ideological perspective of elite sources used in news construction as well as an ideological bias as a member of the West. Therefore it is imperative that dissections of media coverage of the war in Iraq include a realization that these ideological influences shape media frames.

Exploring who sets a media frame and how it is portrayed in the media are important areas of communications research as public policy debates continue to revolve around rhetorical constructions with evident and/or subtle meanings. Through a framing analysis of Pentagon officials’ news briefings, this study explores how these officials choose to frame violence in Iraq and what the underlying ideological components may be. Likewise, this study uses a content analysis to examine the emergence of a rhetorical frame (i.e., a word that evinces a particular framing of the issue), as it becomes the dominant or “chosen” frame by the news media. It examines the U.S. news media’s use of rhetorical frames in describing the Iraqi people during the war in an attempt to locate the emergence of a dominant frame. By situating these two components—the official source’s ideological perspective espoused in news briefings and the media’s applications of rhetorical frames in print—this study illustrates how ideology is inextricably tied to news production as it relates to covering the Iraq War.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Framing in the construction of news

Framing as a theory of news presentation and consumption is not an unusual one to grasp. Much like a photograph, “framing” refers to the objects and their placement within a picture or, in this case, a news story. As a field of research, framing has traversed every aspect of communications studies from visual framing of events to word choice to news story structure. Some framing research found that frames stimulate the audience’s memory (or schema) and affect people’s decision-making (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Another approach focused on how the receiver’s frame of interpretation organizes information (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). This approach draws on cognition and the “individual frame,” which is defined as “organizing principles that hold together and give coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols” (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Gitlin (1980) defines media frames as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (p. 6). Thus, framing’s place in communications and sociological research is one that seeks to understand how frames are utilized in the media and how they function to construct meaning and shape understanding for the individual.
Entman (1993), perhaps the most recognizable authority on news framing research, defined framing as a selective act by a message creator to make a “perceived reality” more salient in the text. This action includes the application of moral evaluations, suggested solutions, problem definitions, and casual interpretations. He further writes that frames reveal themselves in four locations: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Entman recognizes salience as the interaction between text and receiver and, therefore, each individual’s interpretation may differ. Recognizing differing interpretations touches on polysemy (e.g., the various meanings to a word) an important inclusion of the critical-cultural studies paradigm in framing research (Gamson et al., 1992).

More recently, Reese (2001) has defined frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Reese’s definition furthers the social constructivist’s view that frames exist outside of the text and often feature an implanted meaning shared by individuals existing across media and time. Illustrating this point, Reese (2004) writes that U.S.’s military logic (i.e., the logic of military command and justified engagements) during both Iraq Wars extended beyond the front lines to the entire public discourse through the prevalence and selection of certain “militarized” frames in the media.

Reese’s (2007) melding of the sociological and communications paradigms gets at another important point in that framing also occurs before the news is constructed. There has been much literature written on the dynamics of newsrooms and the process of news construction, which are beyond the scope of this study. However, this scholarship has
illustrated that certain news practices and principles emphasize official and elite sources in news gathering and story construction (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Gitlin, 1980; Johnson-Cartee, 2005; Ryfe, 2006; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Thus, the sources highlighted in news coverage impose their own frames, reflected in the news. Johnson-Cartee (2005) writes of news sources as “news promoters” because the latter term accounts for the active role the individuals play in constructing the news. Making the connection back to framing as an act of promoting a perceived reality, Johnson-Cartee states that news promoters have a preferred version of reality they aim to advance over alternatives.

Similarly, Ryfe (2006) analyzed “news rules” or the routines and normalized modes of producing the news as he expands upon the notion of an institutional theory of news. One such “rule” of news production is the emphasis on official sources. Ryfe (2006) writes, “The notion that reporters ought to rely on official sources is a directive about how one ought to write news stories. In this sense, it regulates behavior toward a preexisting object (a news story)” (p. 206). An accompanying “rule” of news production is the reporter’s role as an objective observer and/or information gatherer. In order to properly construct a news story free from the author’s bias, a journalist’s behavior is crafted to cite sources from “both sides” in order to maintain the practice of objectivity and fairness. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) write, “By accepting valueless reporting as the norm, the media accepts the boundaries, values, and ideological rules of the game established and interpreted by elite sources” (p. 244). Similarly, Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model suggested that the political economy of U.S. media institutions ties it
to the dominant ideologies of these political elites, which were once anti-communism during the Cold War, but have shifted towards anti-terrorism and neo-liberal capitalist economics (Herman, 1998).

Beyond news presentation, research on the broader aspect of socially constructed meaning by Gamson et al. (1992) recognizes political economy’s role and argues that framing lacks neutrality and instead “evinces the political and economic elite’s point of view” (p. 374). Purporting hegemony’s influence on framing, Gamson et al. state that the strength of this influence on social construction is its invisibility to the receiver. Gamson et al. write, “Reported events are pre-organized and do not come to us in raw form” (p. 384). Political elites apply their own issue frames, which are often regurgitated through news media’s framing methods. Gitlin’s (1980) framing research saw hegemony as the effort by dominant institutions to define situations for those they rule and if failing to do so, “usurping the whole ideological space” (p. 10). However, placing too much stock in hegemony and political economy presupposes that the public is helpless in setting news frames and affecting political discourse.

Entman (2003) suggests an alternative to the hegemony model of framing with the cascading activation model. This framing model likens political discourse to a waterfall, with the most powerful elites having the greatest strength in framing an issue. As the issue passes down through other actors, such as the media and public, each applies its own frame of interpretation and reframes what has come from above. The model positions the media and public toward the bottom and suggests that it takes a great deal of salience to promote an issue that will “trickle up” from the bottom and influence the
political elite’s frame (Entman, 2003; Entman, 2004). This approach is important for placing some power in the hands of the public and counters the central notion of the hegemony model of framing.

Bennett et al. (2007) used Entman’s model to explore the framing of the Abu Ghraib prison photos in 2004. Their research showed that the framing of this particular incident was directed largely by the political elites after a brief period of debate among the media and public, which featured news frames diverging from the elite. Bennett et al. argued that the U.S. news media recapitulated the administration’s and military officials’ preferred term of “abuse scandal” as opposed to “torture,” which was used far more often by the international news media. In applying the cascading activation model, Bennett et al. argue that a lack of political debate in government leads to a news discourse reflecting the views of the dominant elites exclusively. Bennett et al. invoke institutional theory as an explanation for the news conveying the elites’ frame over others. However, this study failed to examine the micro-level of the words as they appeared in the text and instead coded entire news stories and editorials for an overall thematic frame. Bennett et al.’s study certainly stands as an example of rhetorical frame analysis, but using the whole story as the unit of analysis prevented exploration of the prevalence of key terms over others in a quantifiable manner. Similarly, the study fails to draw a direct correlation between the rhetorical frame and the official generating the frame.

The source-journalist relationship is perhaps the most important intersection of motives in the construction of news. Public relations theory, in examining this relationship, has developed an extension of the press’ role in agenda setting with agenda-
building theory (Cameron, Sallot, & Curtin, 1997; Curtin, 1999). This theory goes a step beyond agenda setting, which posits that public opinion is affected by the news’ emphasis in coverage of events (McCombs & Bell, 1996), in stating that media sources aim to promote their agenda effectively enough that it appears in the news media and in turn influences public perception (Cameron et al., 1997; Curtin, 1999). Public relations practitioners are well aware of the “news hole” and the space limitations on news; agenda building represents the practice of reaching the public by effectively promoting a position to the news media. In this instance the journalist functions as an intermediary for the source who is selective in what information is shared with the goal of seeing this information reflected in the news and thus affecting the public’s view of an issue, event, and/or idea. Research on this topic has found that journalists prefer sources from government agencies and nonprofits because they are thought to possess no economic incentive in furthering their agenda (Cameron et al., 1997). Yet the exchanges between press and government officials on matters of war and national security are perhaps more calculated and worthy of higher scrutiny for the role ideology plays compared with other matters involving economic motivation. These source-press relations are exemplary of agenda building in that government officials have a definite position to promote and the news media is reliant upon them for information that is highly sensitive in regard to military operations and U.S. actions abroad.

These examples illustrate the ideological bias carried in media frames due to the institutional practice of reporting from “official” sources’ perspectives. Entman (1993) writes, “journalists frequently allow the most skillful media manipulators to impose their
dominant frames on the news” (p. 57). Although institutional standards champion accurate and balanced reporting, these examples show that a conflict framed by political and military elites often conveys their ideology as it is echoed through media channels. Furthermore, news coverage of war can rarely circumvent the perspective of the military and is therefore framed through the ideological lens of the political and military powers involved. Another framing analysis by Entman (2004) revealed that the U.S. media framed similar military actions in shooting down civilian aircraft drastically different when it involved the U.S.’s enemy the Soviet Union. This study suggests that a dominant frame emerges unchallenged on sensitive foreign policy issues because the official source realm lacks debate that could spawn a counterframe. In his discussion of these event frames, Entman concluded that the practice of official sourcing results in frames exhibiting the source’s ideological position.

The above studies illustrate the wealth of research examining how the news media frame issues and events through their sources or their own ideological lens. Yet how does one discern ideology in the text? What methods of rhetoric do news sources use in espousing a particular ideology? A discussion of rhetorical criticism and ideology will help answer these queries.

**Discerning ideology in rhetoric**

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) define ideology as, “a symbolic mechanism that serves as a cohesive and integrating force in society” (p. 221). Their hierarchical model of influences on the media features five levels, but the macro-influence encompassing all other levels is the ideological. They reason that ideology functions as a total structure and
not a system of individual attitudes and values. This approach to ideological influence on the media shares much with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Hegemony suggests that dominant powers of politics, business, media, etc. exert influence on such a broad scale that the dominant ideology is shaped by these hegemonic forces (Gamson et al., 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1997). For example, as a nation the United States welcomes all religions and faiths of worship; however, few would question that the dominant ideology presented through the hegemonic influence of politics, media, institutions, and culture is that the country is a Protestant nation. Foss (2004) writes, “Hegemony is the privileging of the ideology of one group over that of other groups” (p. 242).

Hegemony is invisible in practice because it is often the “common sense” ideologies and norms, which are rarely challenged (Gamson et al., 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The media exhibit hegemonic influence when they marginalize outside ideas and instead report on the accepted realm of debate (Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Gamson et al. (1992) write that journalists will report hegemonic ideologies without a counterpoint because “they appear as transparent descriptions of reality, not as interpretations, and are apparently devoid of political content” (p. 382).

Hallin’s model of the sphere of consensus, controversy, and deviance helps explain how the news media maintain ideology and hegemony’s influence in action (in Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This model contends that the news media act as advocates and champions of ideology in the sphere of consensus. Topics in the sphere of legitimate controversy will feature differing viewpoints and the standard “balanced” news approach.
As for the ideologies in the sphere of deviance, a subject like socialism illustrates is rarely covered with the same level of balanced news reporting (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Furthering this point, Gitlin (1980) writes, “The closer an issue is to the core interests of the national political elites, the more likely is a blackout of news that effectively challenges that interest” (p. 5). The sphere of deviance illustrates hegemony in practice because ideas in this sphere are marginalized and discredited by the media.

Similar to hegemony is Hall’s notion of ideology theory that states meaning is socially constructed and debate possesses ideological “logics,” which function to limit understanding of how the world works (in Makus, 1990). Hall posits that three different types of interpretations can occur in the act of decoding signs and their meaning (in Chandler, 1994). The dominant or hegemonic interpretation is when the reader accepts the text’s intended meaning. Negotiated interpretation occurs when the reader largely accepts the preferred reading, but also interjects personal experience in decoding meaning. Oppositional interpretation is when the reader opposes the dominant meaning and does not accept the text’s codes (Chandler, 1994). Elites work within this array of meanings and determine their intended meaning by “framing the competing definitions of reality within their range” (Makus, 1990, p. 502). In other words, the dominant forces often frame an issue so it is decoded within the hegemonic interpretation.

For instance, the post-9/11 political environment enabled President Bush to speak in ideological terms of “evil” and “democracy.” Ivie (2003) writes, “democracy is lost when the agonistic Other is rendered rhetorically into a diabolical enemy” (p. 190). Ivie contends the framing of the war on ideological terms of “good vs. evil” enabled Bush to
squelch any debate calling for a non-military solution. Much has been written and studied in regard to the Bush administration’s efforts at “selling” the Iraq War; in particular, Altheide and Grimes (2005) found a conservative think tank aided in framing the Iraq war in a palatable manner for mainstream media. The study further illustrated how the news media fall back on pre-existing frames of reference in covering recent military conflicts (Altheide & Grimes, 2005). In studying the use of metaphor in the pre-Iraq War coverage, Lučić (2004) found that the news media not only echoed the White House administration’s preferred metaphors but also created their own that conveyed the inevitability of war with titles such as “Showdown with Saddam” and “Target: Iraq” (p. 183). These examples illustrate that the propaganda model functions well when the political climate is right (e.g., post-9/11) and the proper media frames have been employed by the political elites. Much like Entman’s (1993) definition of framing and the role of salience in promoting a “perceived reality,” these examples stand as testaments to the role of metaphor and other rhetorical techniques in framing a military conflict. Similarly, these examples also illustrate how rhetorical persuasion oversimplifies issue for the audience and often carries the dominant ideologies.

Prior to the war, dominant rhetorical frames applied metaphors to Saddam Hussein that likened him to a dictator and renegade leader. Framing research has shown rhetorical metaphors aid in drawing cognitive connections to prior frames (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). For example, the term “dictator” activates schematic nodes, which may find Hussein in the company of Adolph Hitler and Pol Pot (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). These examples illustrate how the dominant ideology is echoed through rhetorical
frames. Yet it is still important to consider the dominant ideologies that have existed for years only to resurface within the language of the “war on terror.”

**Orientalism and the “Other” in Iraq**

Said’s *Orientalism* (1979), illustrated the inherent ideological biases present in the division of the known world into East (the Orient) and West (the Occident). Said’s research revealed that European authors and historians approached the Orient (particularly Islamic nations) as Europeans first and as individuals second (Said, 1979). Said argues that objective truth and knowledge production do not occur free from faction or political influence. Therefore, the socially constructed meanings inherent in news discourse are products of Orientalists—people who attempt to explain the East for those in the West (Said, 1979).

*Covering Islam* (Said, 1981) explored how the U.S. media reported on Islam and the Arab world. A central finding in Said’s critique of news coverage was that the U.S. media often apply the “Islamic” label to topics not at all religious or that the coverage lacked appropriate rationale as to why religious affiliation was designated (Said, 1981). Said’s work does much to reveal that Western media representations of Islam and Arabic countries are void of balanced reporting and lack accurate portrayals.

Because of the deeply politicized nature of attacking Western hegemony, Said’s arguments have been both embraced and rejected, but the ongoing war on terror has made his notion of Orientalism increasingly relevant. Throughout the Cold War the U.S. enemy (or “Other”) was clearly represented as the Soviet Union and its communist allies. Following the Cold War, the United States found itself in limbo for an enemy, but a new
Other presented itself following Sept. 11th (Muscati, 2002). Nayak (2006) writes that in the construction of state identity, “‘knowing’ the Other is integral to protecting and securing what one ‘knows’ to be true about the Self” (p. 45). Therefore, the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11th enabled the United States to latch onto a new ideological enemy, which furthered the reduction of the Arab world to a land of Islamic fundamentalists (Muscati, 2002; Said, 1981). Although vast and existing well beyond the Arab world, Islam is often reduced to this metonymic relationship between religion and fundamentalism, casting an enormous group of people as the ideological enemy of the United States (Nayak, 2006; Said, 1981). Said (1981) points out that Islam is frequently connected to religious fanaticism, while Christian or Jewish fanaticism is rarely mentioned. Said (1981) further argues, in a nod to Herman and Chomsky, that the political economy of U.S. media institutions predisposes the “independent press” to position itself with U.S. foreign policy and the dominant ideology.

These ideological realities and portrayals of the Arab world are important considerations in studying U.S. news media coverage of the Iraq War. The notion of hegemony and the nature of ideological influence on the media show that attempts at balanced news reporting are flawed. During wartime, certain topics and events are reported from within the sphere of consensus, meaning that the media function to advocate and champion certain core ideologies (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The dominant coverage of the war on terror has effectively yielded an Other in Islamic terrorism with little debate or exploration as to what the group is composed of. With Iraq, the U.S. media tread a fine line in casting Iraqi civilians apart from the enemy whom the
U.S. military continues to fight. The ideological need for an Other, coupled with the
U.S.’s Orientalist position, presents a challenge in media coverage of the war in Iraq and
its people.

The debate over purpose in Iraq has certainly shifted in the six years of war, and
yet certain rhetorical frames have emerged and continue to dominate in news discourse.
For instance, the word “insurgency” has become the go-to term to describe unrest and
violence in Iraq. But how did this term come into being? Why not rebellion? Or the
aforementioned civil war? Framing research has shown that events are not transmitted
through an unfiltered channel and instead undergo several stages of interpretation. The
portrayals of Iraq’s violence often travel through the official source and the journalist
newsmaker prior to arriving in printed news form. And the micro-level of word choice
can drastically alter meaning. This study examines the intersection between the officials’
rhetoric and the recurrence of certain rhetorical frames over others in news coverage of
the Iraq War and the violence following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. It
scrutinizes how dominant ideologies have played a part in the officials’ rhetorical
framing of Iraq’s violent unrest and analyzes how those frames are applied in the print
news media.
Research questions

Qualitative question
RQ 1: How have Pentagon and other U.S. officials, in Department of Defense news briefings, framed the violence and unrest in Iraq following the invasion and conclusion of combat operations on May 1, 2003?

Quantitative questions
RQ 2: How frequent were certain rhetorical frames (words) represented in the printed media in the portrayal of the violent unrest in Iraq?

RQ 3: Is “insurgency” the emergent dominant word for Iraq’s unrest between May 2003 and October 2006?

RQ 4: Were certain sources cited for “insurgency” more than others?

RQ 5: How was attribution used in the application of these rhetorical frames?

RQ 6: Are certain rhetorical frames applied to victims more than perpetrators of violence?
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Method of framing analysis

In answering the first research question, this study incorporates Entman’s (1993) notions of framing by examining U.S. Department of Defense archival transcripts of news briefings with Pentagon and military officials in both Iraq and the Washington, D.C. Entman states that frames function to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. This study examines how the communicator (in this case government officials) chooses to frame the situation in Iraq through the application of these four aspects of framing. Entman’s defines framing as an act of giving salience to a perceived reality. Though salience is typically considered an interaction between text and receiver, salience in this analysis is also viewed as the act of promoting one reality over another. Furthermore, the study will account for Reese’s (2007) proposed method of framing analysis when he writes, “It is precisely the way that certain attributes come to be associated with particular issues that should concern framing analysis” (p. 152, emphasis in original). This study will examine how particular words and statements are used in addressing the issue of continued violence in Iraq.

Agenda-building theory (Cameron et al., 1997; Curtin, 1999) will also be instructive in examining the source’s interactions with the news media in these briefings,
as the prevailing issues for U.S. involvement in Iraq will be framed in certain terms. In these interactions with the news media, the information shared by government officials will be examined for emphasis on certain ideological positions. It is in these contexts that the government officials are in a position of power over the journalist as the information shared with the news media is carefully selected and tailored to further one particular view over another. In examining these briefings, the absence of ideas will be accounted for since the exclusion of competing ideas is a function of dominant ideological framing.

The qualitative data collected are transcripts of Department of Defense news briefings on the conditions and military operations in Iraq. Many briefings occurred on a semi-regular basis (e.g., regular monthly briefing) or came after a significant event in Iraq (e.g., elections, military operations) in order to provide information to the news media. Briefings examined all follow the “end of combat operations” on May 1, 2003, with the study’s emphasis on the framing of continued Iraqi violence and unrest. Briefing transcripts were selected from the Department of Defense archives (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/archive.aspx) where all briefings, news interviews and other interactions with the news media can be located. Transcripts were chosen on the basis of their title and dates with an effort to avoid interviews with one news outlet or appearances on a news program. Most briefings analyzed were classified as “monthly news briefing” or “regular briefing”; however, a few were chosen for titles that suggested briefings from Iraq military leaders. Transcripts were collected from briefings between May 2003 and October 2006 with the time span of the quantitative data set (discussed below) included for any potential comparisons. Dates were selected to reflect periods of
increased news coverage due to events in Iraq, as well as pragmatic considerations for vacations/breaks for officials/journalists in Washington D.C. The majority of the transcripts came from the months of May, August, November and February during the three years of study. No specific Pentagon official is chosen over others because this study posits that the Bush administration operated under a common understanding. However, certain officials are more predominant than others (e.g., Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers) and the findings may reflect their role as primary agenda builders.

The framing analysis also incorporates elements of ideological criticism in order to more adequately explore the administration’s use of rhetoric in framing the Iraqi violence and unrest. Foss (2004) defines membership, activities, goals, values/norms, positions and group relations, and resources as components in the “nature of ideology.” This study focuses on the following categories, which are clarified as follows:

- **Membership.** What groups are the speakers part of? How are these groups identified?
- **Goals.** What is the purpose of the rhetoric?
- **Positions and group relations.** What are the power dynamics? Who is in control? Why?
- **Values/norms.** What are the main values? Are there any underlying assumptions?

As the discussion of hegemony above illustrated, ideology is built on certain assumptions incorporated by the rhetor or speaker (Foss, 2004). This study scrutinizes what assumptions are made and what is excluded. Often it is the absence of an alternative ideological perspective that functions to articulate the dominant ideology or, in this case, dominant frame(s) (Gamson et al., 1992; Gitlin, 1980). In addition to understanding the nature of ideology, an ideological criticism requires an examination of the rhetorical
strategies employed to further ideology (Foss, 2004). The analysis will examine word choice (why words are chosen over others) and mode of expression (how words and ideas are conveyed) by administration officials in interacting with the news media. Entman’s approach to framing analysis is the primary qualitative method incorporated into this study, but the role of ideology is also a consideration as the qualitative data is analyzed and discussed below.

Recognizing that a qualitative piece of research such as this involves significant input from the author, here is a discussion of reflexivity. This study is partly borne out of broader questions on the intersections of media, politics, and military. I have a long-standing interest in the media’s role in framing military engagements with curiosity as to how that affects the historical view Americans have of wars, as well as the somewhat forgotten place of civilians in those engagements. In my undergraduate studies, I took a number of courses on Vietnam and have since been interested in what made that conflict different from previous U.S. engagements. Similarly, I think the media played a significant role (through extensive reporting, televised causalities, access, etc.) in the public perception of the Vietnam War as a failure. The social unrest precipitated by the Vietnam War has also been of interest, and I wonder why contemporary U.S. conflicts haven’t created a similar social discord. I believe that the social and political consequences of the Vietnam War coupled with contemporary media forms of coverage have created a political discourse of crafted and carefully chosen rhetoric that functions to avoid complications similar to those of the Vietnam War.
Similarly, as all work is political, this study is influenced by politics and my own view of the Bush administration. It is my belief that the Iraq War was a mistake and that much of the post-invasion period of the war was dedicated towards false justifications resultant from hindsight. Likewise, the news media was negligent in its watchdog function following Sept. 11th as patriotism, nationalism, and enemies of the United States were redefined and used in justify military actions. The news media failed in questioning justifications for war with Iraq, and continued to present the administration’s dominant frame even when found to be based upon shoddy reasoning and rationales. Furthermore, the people most affected by these events, the Iraqi civilian, are often forgotten, misrepresented, and/or characterized as working in conjunction with the U.S.’s enemies. These opinions and beliefs were present as I initiated this study and may have played a part in how the analysis was conducted.

Method of content analysis

In answering the remaining research questions, this study employs a content analysis of two major U.S. newspapers to examine the rhetorical frames (words) used in describing the violence and unrest in post-invasion Iraq. In particular this study focuses on the surfacing of “insurgency” as a dominant term and will therefore incorporate time as an independent variable. Riffe, Aust, & Lacy (1993) compared random, consecutive, and constructed-week sampling methods of daily newspapers and found that constructed-week sampling required only one week for every six months in order to accurately reflect the population mean. This study constructed weeks by randomly selecting two dates for every day of the week within each specified time frames. This study includes a two-week
constructed sample of newspaper coverage for each period between May 2003–April 2004 and Nov. 2005–Oct. 2006 (Riffe, Aust, & Lacy, 1993; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). These time periods have been selected to reflect the ebb and flow of violence in Iraq. Additionally, these differing time periods function to illuminate the appearance, and perhaps fading, of specific terms. This study examines the frequency of certain words as they appear in print and accounts for the predominance of specific terms over other. Examining the frequency of key terms helps to illustrate the emergence of a dominant rhetorical frame. In illustrating this, the variable of time is an important element because a rhetorical frame is not immediately accepted, and instead undergoes a maturation period referred to as “setting the frame” (Bennett et al., 2007).

The newspapers chosen for this study are The New York Times and The Washington Post. These newspapers have been selected for their prominence as national newspapers covering politics and U.S. foreign affairs. Likewise, these two papers had significant resources dedicated to Iraq War coverage during the periods of study. Additionally, these newspapers are considered the flagships of journalism in the United States and are the predominant agenda-setting news organizations. Stories written by the Associated Press and other news wire services have been included if they appeared within the newspapers being analyzed. The Lexis/Nexis database was used to obtain digital copies of the stories from these papers on the specific dates from the constructed week. These dates were then searched with the keyword “Iraq” and a subsequent method of culling stories was then employed. Stories were selected based on the predominance of content focusing and centering on the Iraq War and subsequent efforts at containing
violence. Indicators used in locating these stories include headline, lead paragraph, dateline, etc. For instance, news stories about U.S. government actions regarding Iraq War policy are included; however, commentary and opinion pieces are not analyzed.

Although this study analyzes the content as it appears in print, this study is concerned with the words chosen to describe the people of Iraq. Framing research incorporating content analysis often examines the entire story for an overall framing element. This study differs in that the unit of analysis is the words within the news story with each rhetorical frame and lexical choice being coded (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). One story may contain numerous rhetorical frames (e.g., insurgent, rebel, militia, etc.), and this study codes for all instances fitting the primary criteria (see Appendix for coding criteria and instructions).

Coders were directed to examine the news story for references to violent unrest, non-U.S. /coalition perpetrators of violence, and the casualties of war distinguished as enemy fighters or Iraqi civilians. If these criteria are met, the location within the story is noted (paragraphs are given ascending numeric values in each story) and the words chosen in referring to the violence and/or its perpetrators is given a numeric code. Initial coding exercises found that achieving acceptable intercoder reliability was difficult for several reasons, particularly the ambiguous nature of violent events and the complexity in identifying its perpetrators. Furthermore, it was quite common for a coder to overlook certain key information and miss coding several qualifying instances. To avoid these complications, the stories were opened in Microsoft Word and key words (i.e., the chosen rhetorical frames and their synonyms found on the coding instructions—Appendix) were
then underlined in order to draw the coder’s attention to the word in the text. Coders were still responsible for determining whether the coding criteria had been met (i.e., descriptions of violence in Iraq and/or the implication of violent unrest).

Rhetorical frames chosen for coding were done so based on several criteria. One was the overall predominance of certain terms still used today in news stories on Iraq, in particular, insurgent, insurgency, terrorist, Al Qaeda, sectarian, suicide bomber, civilian, Iraqi, militia, and militant. Then other words were selected because of their synonymous definitions, such as uprising, rebel, rebellion, civil war, and fighter. After a couple of preliminary rounds of examining stories, other terms revealed themselves as rhetorical frames used in connection with the primary variable, such as gunman, attacker, forces, person, and resident. The rhetorical frame is the primary dependent variable in this study; however, three other dependent variables are coded in order to gain further insight into the use and origination of these rhetorical frames.

An “agency” category was created in order to determine whether certain rhetorical frames are more commonly applied to those perceived as perpetrators of violence. This category asked the coder to consider only specific descriptions of violent acts and fighting and code for “victim” “perpetrator” or “both.” Some rhetorical frames didn’t deal specifically with individuals or instances of violence, and in these cases the coders gave a null value to this category.

Considering that production of news content undergoes several stages and points of input, it therefore becomes necessary to consider not only the words chosen, but also who is choosing them and how they are presented in the context of the story. Coders were
directed to code for additional categories whenever the rhetorical frame category is met. The additional codes include the source cited (military official, U.S. government official, Iraqi officials, no source), and the manner of attribution (direct quote, paraphrase, no attribution) (see Appendix). This particular method of framing analysis allows for examining the frequency of certain rhetorical frames within a story and determines whether that use is due to a particular source and if the author is using the source’s exact words. With time as the independent variable, these particular occurrences in news texts may reveal themselves to be linked to specific periods within the Iraq War and the dominant frame. All four dependent variables are coded at the nominal level and a chi-square analysis is used to determine the statistical significance of these variables.

The method chosen for this study was borne out of a methods course with input from a number of classmates affecting the coding technique. A separate study incorporating this method achieved an intercoder composite coefficient of reliability score of 85%. However, due to the complex nature of contextualizing each instance of a word in the text as laid out in the coding criteria, the intercoder test for this particular study was below an acceptable percentage with a composite score of about 63%. The primary culprit of this intercoding discrepancy was related to the category of agency. An acceptable intercoder reliability score of 80% was achieved for the primary coding category (rhetorical frame). Considering that the majority of the findings discussed reflect the frequency of the rhetorical frames, the results are reported below with limited emphasis on the problematic category. Though additional coders were used in the
intercoder reliability checks, the author collected all of the coding data used in the quantitative analysis.
CHAPTER IV

QUALITATIVE FRAMING ANALYSIS

"All of those things that could have gone wrong, for the most part, did not."
–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Department of Defense, 2003, 1, p. 1).

The relatively quick period of combat operations (March-May 2003) in Iraq enabled the administration and political leaders in the United States to assert victory and that Iraq was on its way toward a new government free of the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The news briefings that immediately followed the conclusion of combat operations featured U.S. officials who were quick to pat themselves on the back for a job well done and frame the coming days in Iraq as one of relatively minor violence on the path toward a stable, secure country. However, the conclusion of combat operations did not portend the end of violence and instability in Iraq and many news briefings have followed the triumphant May 2003 briefing.

The news briefings analyzed are typically housed in the Pentagon where a devoted “press corps” or collective of news media journalists, producers and cameramen congregate to hear comments from and ask questions of the Department of Defense officials. Each briefing begins with opening remarks by the official(s) (often more than one) on current events in Iraq and other ongoing issues. Some of the briefings feature a media specialist who fields questions or aids the Pentagon official. Following the opening remarks, the briefing is opened up to questions from the journalists who may follow-up
on the opening statements or start with a new subject. In these briefing transcripts, the journalists are rarely identified, but the official speaking is always designated by name.

In examining 14 Department of Defense news briefings between May 2003 and October 2006, two major frames emerged in the rhetoric of U.S. officials through their interactions with the news media. Both frames are discussed using Entman’s (1993) rubric that frames function to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. These four aspects of framing are examined in the two predominant officials’ frames, which are referred to as “Self-governing and secure Iraq” and “Iraq insurgency and the war on terror.” Naturally, there is some overlap with these frames as the Iraqi resistance and its violent connotations are linked to the security of the nation. These frames are analyzed based on how certain aspects of the frame are made salient while other aspects are relatively lacking in salience, i.e., little to no discussion in the officials’ frames. For much of the analysis and discussion below, salience is discussed in terms of the active promotion and emphasis of a specific idea or reality. Though salience is typically defined as a characteristic of the text or the receiver, this study suggests that salience is part of an active process by framers who advance an idea and make it more salient. (Author’s note: A separate bibliography of briefings cited is located in the works cited section with corresponding numbers given to each briefing in order to allow for abbreviated citation.)
Self-governing and secure Iraq

"The most important take-away is that coalition forces are really making incredible, remarkable strides toward the security and stability of Iraq."


Define problems

The first news briefing (DoD, 2003, 1) features the genesis of countless discussions of Iraq’s stability and security as U.S. officials aim to define these issues as problems requiring continued U.S. involvement in the country. Typically the problems discussed regarding the stability and security frame are infrastructure needs (roads, oil pipelines, etc.), public services (e.g., schools, hospitals, utilities, police, etc.), effective government (elected body of officials, constitution, etc.), and security (well-equipped/trained police or Iraqi military). In later news conferences, much of the same rhetoric in framing emerges with some slight alterations such as Iraq “taking responsibility” and “control.”

Exactly when these conditions will be met and the terminus for the U.S. involvement in Iraq is unknown. Addressing this, both Franks and Rumsfeld discuss the U.S. timetable in the country, and stating that it is not “knowable” (DoD, 2003, 1). As Franks states, “there are a lot of variables,” most of which involve the Iraqis’ taking charge and securing the country (DoD, 2003, 1). Here is the introduction of what is to be a recurring theme throughout these briefings as U.S. officials suggest that U.S. involvement in Iraq is out of its hands, with the Iraqis being in charge of their own fate, i.e., security, government, and stability.

As mentioned, these briefings feature a U.S. official stating that Iraq needs to rebuild and re-establish important services such as hospitals, schools, water treatment,
etc. However, in promoting this particular frame, the officials neglect to mention why or how these services came to be in need of rebuilding. Certainly, some may have crumbled and deteriorated under the weakened/“despotic” Iraqi government, but it is also likely that a large number of these rebuilding projects are due to the U.S.-led invasion and subsequent destruction caused by battles and bombs from coalition forces. Here is an example of salience given to the destitute situation for Iraq’s infrastructure and public services with little to no connection made back to the cause by the framers. In some instances it is implied by the framer that the Iraqi government allowed for such situations to develop (DoD, 2003, 1).

In one briefing, a reporter, citing other authorities, suggests that a problem for the instability in Iraq was a result of poor post-invasion planning. Rumsfeld balks at one reporter’s outlining of this possible problem with Iraq’s instability:

What you’re seeing in the press and on television are slices of truth. You’re seeing that someone is harmed, or in a particular location the water isn’t back on...All of that’s true. A good deal of it, of course, was also true prior to the war...it is a very difficult transition from despotism and repression to a freer system. It’s untidy...there will be fits and starts...There’ll be bumps along the way. (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 2)

Here is an interesting example of Rumsfeld acknowledging that the road ahead for Iraq will be difficult when he states, “there will be fits and starts.” Yet he still frames the problem as part of a “difficult transition from despotism and repression to a freer system,” a statement that carries several value judgments. First, Rumsfeld has framed the previous regime as despotic and repressive, a statement that most in the West and many in the rest of the world would likely agree with, yet still a loaded assessment of Iraq’s previous government. Second, Rumsfeld is asserting that the subsequent system of
governance will be “freer” and therefore better than what preceded it. Again, a statement many may agree with but still carrying assumptions about what is best for the country and what is to come from the next form of government. Another interesting aspect of this statement is Rumsfeld’s tangential acknowledgment of framing in general. He states that the press and television present “slices of truth,” which can’t be refuted, yet don’t speak to the larger picture. In that same vein, the argument could be made that Rumsfeld and his fellow Pentagon officials present “slices of truth” as to the conditions in Iraq as they attempt to promote their frames over competing frames, which may suggest instability and an opposition to U.S. involvement in the country.

Franks (DoD, 2003, 1), in diagnosing problems, framed post-invasion Iraq’s oil fields and infrastructure as in need of improvement, providing salience to the concerns about Iraq’s primary resource and economic engine. He states that the people were working on the fields to replace an infrastructure that had been “disregarded” and allowed to “fall apart under the previous regime.” He concludes, “as time goes forward, we’ll work with the Iraqis and they will be able to bring those oil fields up to the standard that we’re looking for” (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 6). Here, Franks makes no attempt hide that it will be U.S. standards applied to these oil fields, which suggests that it will be U.S. interests benefiting from the renewed infrastructure. Including discussions of Iraq’s oil fields and infrastructure alongside schools and hospitals only functions to provide salience to the frame that U.S. oil interests contributed to the decision for war with Iraq. Iraq’s oil resources are certainly central to the country’s economy, but framing the country’s oil production as an essential part of the rebuilding process is an interesting
frame to present so soon after the initial combat operations. Subsequent briefings
downplay rebuilding the Iraqi oil infrastructure frame and instead focus on the other
infrastructure and public service problems that plagued Iraq for some time.

In later news briefings, officials frame the problems with stability and security as
relatively isolated and contained to four of Iraq’s 14 provinces (DoD, 2006, 13). Rumseld
states, “the currency is fairly stable, the schools are open, the hospitals are open, the
people are functioning” (DoD, 2006, 13, p. 9). Statements like this attempt to frame the
instability problems as remote and contained, suggesting that the country is stable apart
from a few outliers. However, the above statements do little to contextualize what
percentage of Iraq’s population is contained in those four unstable provinces. Similarly,
highlighting these problems as such fails to promote the idea of a stable and unified Iraq.

In another briefing, Gen. Casey makes an interesting case for framing Iraq’s
instability problems:

The new government has been on the job a little less than 150 days. And this is
the third government that I’ve seen now take over in Iraq. And as you can
imagine, it takes everyone a little—a few months there to get their legs under
them. They’re working hard to build unity, security and prosperity for all Iraqis.
(DoD, 2006, 14, p. 2)

Casey diagnoses Iraq’s problems with stability as symptomatic of transitional
woes. He acknowledges that the country has been with three different governments in the
three years since the U.S.-led invasion. Likewise, he asserts that 150 days isn’t an
adequate amount of time to expect government to be fully functional and stable. He
follows it with promises that goals of “unity, security and prosperity” are all in mind for
the governing body. The underlying assumption here is, give them time, they’ll get their
things in order. Yet what's not being said is worth consideration. Hasn't the U.S. been working toward a stable government for Iraq in those three years? Why three governments? What was wrong with the first two? Casey's statement attempts to highlight the problems with Iraq's stability and suggests the relatively short time frame as a probable cause. Further causes of this frame are discussed in the next section.

**Diagnose causes**

Returning to Rumsfeld's (DoD, 2003, 1) remarks, much of the rhetoric framing the causes of Iraq's problems with stability and security stem from the transition from "despotism to democracy." Officials are quick to point out that a dramatic shift in governance doesn't occur overnight. Yet, the rhetoric of triumphalism following the conclusion of combat operations gave the impression that Iraq was much closer to a stable, free government. Rumsfeld further points out that "this country does not have a history of representative or democratic systems" (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 3). Indeed the lack of familiarity with a "representative" government contributes to the problems of immediately establishing such a government. However accurate this sentiment may be, it neglects to provide context to Iraq's history as a British colony prior to its transformation into an independent, yet non-democratic state.

Similarly, these briefings show that U.S. officials never stated that the cause of Iraq's instability and lack of security stemmed from a U.S.-led invasion. Journalists are the sole originators of the poor planning and limited foresight into Iraq's problems with sectarian divisions as the cause for the current situations of instability and insecurity in Iraq. In fact, the lead-off question in the first briefing reads, "journalists in Iraq report that a sense of public order is still lacking...some U.S. officials are quoted as saying that U.S.
planning and execution of the postwar reconstruction were inadequate” (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 2). Here a journalist provides a different cause to the stability and security issues found in Iraq, giving salience to the issue only to have it recede in the wave of oppositional frames promoted by the officials’ perspective. This example speaks to Entman’s (2004) cascading activation model in that the journalists are the source of a frame that was not accepted or promoted by the political elite. However, this is only one example of an otherwise non-salient cause frame.

Another cause for Iraq’s instability that is not explicitly stated in these briefings, yet is implied, is that the Iraqi people are somewhat inept or lacking in the will to secure and stabilize the country. Naturally, these ideas are not directly advanced in the briefings, yet the recurrent utterances of training Iraqi police and army give the implication that the Iraqis need a degree of hand-holding to stabilize the country on their own. Gen. Myers uses indirect rhetoric in describing this cause:

We need to continue to focus on a very serious point, the leadership issue...good leadership is a key ingredient (to performance and loyalty from the security forces) (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 6)

Gen. Myers acknowledges that good leaders are needed from among the Iraqi people in order to train an adequate security force. He fails to explain how or where leadership is cultivated and merely alludes to it as an inherent quality of individuals. Similarly, these briefings rarely discuss the desertion and disbanding of the pre-existing Iraqi army as a cause for instability. The country had a standing army and police force that was disarmed or disbanded following the invasion. Many of these individuals are framed as contributors to the subsequent insurgency, but they’re not included in
discussions of why Iraq's security forces and police need such extensive training and recruitment.

Early news briefings do little to discuss the multicultural nature of Iraq's population and the influence this has on causing problems with stability and the founding of an effective government. However, later briefings during more violent periods of the Iraqi resistance feature recognition of the sectarian divisions and their role as a cause for the instability and stalling of the political process. Iraq's sectarian divides are further discussed below in the insurgency frame as these divisions are viewed as causes to the persistent violence.

The next section discusses moral assertions made by officials as they frame the self-governing and stability issues for post-invasion Iraq.

**Make moral judgments**

Many of these briefings feature an underlying moral assumption that a representative democracy is the best form of governance and the one chosen by Iraq's people. In promoting this aspect of framing, Gen. Franks states, "Iraq's best days are yet to come" (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 2), and Rumsfeld asserts that Iraq has "the most representative body Iraq has ever seen" (DoD, 2003, 2, p. 1). Twice in his opening statements Franks (DoD, 2003, 1) pronounces that the forthcoming Iraqi government will be of the people's own choosing. It is interesting to note that geo-political boundaries are actual a cause for much of the political turmoil in the Middle East region. In Iraq, the Kurds are a nomadic people who don't proclaim allegiance to a specific country or government. Is the Iraqi government, propped up by U.S. forces, the "most representative body Iraq has ever seen"?
Another overriding assumption in much of the briefing is that the U.S. completed its job—ousting Saddam Hussein—and was now going to take a back seat as Iraq took charge of its destiny. Often this point is revealed in rhetoric with phrases like a “new Iraq,” which carries certain moral suggestions where “new” connotes improved (DoD, 2004, 3; DoD, 2004, 5). These statements suggest Iraq’s previous regime was unfit and there is promise with a new government for the people.

Rumsfeld drives home these notions of the “transformative power of freedom” when he compares Iraq’s transition to similar instances for countries in Latin American (DoD, 2004, 6). He discusses how Latin American nations were “traumatized” by dictatorships and civil war, yet today they are stable and working towards prosperity.

Rumsfeld:

History has shown in most every region of the world, when people are given a chance to rule their own lives, they seize it. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 1)

This statement carries significant moral weight as Rumsfeld suggests that humans are predisposed toward democracy and self-governance. What is particularly interesting is the unspoken element of how these people are given the “chance to rule their own lives.” In the instance of Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces ousted the existing government and allowed for the people of Iraq to “choose” their government, which happened to be democratic. In fact Iraqis weren’t given a choice as to whether they rule their own lives, it was chosen for them. Similarly, the notion of Iraq’s choosing a non-democratic government is not even considered because it runs contrary to the ideological imperatives of “freedom” as a tool in the war on terror. In these statements the U.S. officials are framing the “choices” for Iraq in a narrow spectrum that contains a limited array of
choices for a democratic, constitutional government. From the same briefing, Gen. Myers says:

The Iraqi people, from senior government official leaders to the average citizen, recognize the importance of their role and their mission in creating a free Iraq. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 2)

A “free Iraq” is promoted as the moral imperative for the country. Gen. Myers suggests that Iraqis are willing and obligated to participate in the foundation of the democratic government. This statement asserts that all citizens of Iraq are eager and willing to participate in the mission of a democratic Iraqi state. It is worth noting that other democratic states suffer from low voter turnout and a disengaged electorate. Gen. Myers’ statement assumes all parties are passionate and willing to participate in the democratic process when that may not be the case.

The emphasis on Iraq making its own “choice(s)” is a recurring theme through much of the post-invasion news briefings. This moral judgment suggests that Iraqis were incapable of choice prior to U.S. involvement in their political affairs. Furthermore, the officials trumpeting the power of choice for the Iraqis fail to address potential manipulation and restriction of choice, as well as the role of power (economic, political, cultural, etc.) in influencing the political process. Who is allowed to choose the government? What about tribal and regional customs that may prohibit universal choice for all? What about the sectarian divisions, which complicated how those choices (e.g., elections) were made?

The political process and elections of governing officials are given significant weight as remedies for Iraq’s self-governing and stability issues. The next section—
well as the following sections on the insurgency frame—discusses these remedies extensively.

**Suggest remedies**

Rhetorically the most common and prevalent remedy suggested by a litany of U.S. officials is “allowing for the process to move forward,” “making political progress” and achieving “political milestones.” These terms, or some iteration thereof, reveal themselves in the first briefing (DoD, 2003, 1) and continue through to the last (DoD, 2006, 14).

The political milestones rhetorical frame receives significant promotion as the transition of power and governance to the Iraqi people is viewed as the number-one remedy for Iraq’s post-invasion problems with stability. Gareth Bayley, a coalition provisional authority spokesman, promotes this remedy:

> Today ambassador Bremer joined Iraq’s agriculture minister, Dr. Abdul-Ameer Abboud, to mark the official transfer of sovereignty to the Ministry of Agriculture. This is the sixth ministry to be handed over to the control of the Iraqi people. Mr. Bremer said: “Today the Ministry of Agriculture, with all its enormous potential for the people of Iraq, is fully invested in your hands, Mr. Minister, and those of your colleagues. This transfer of authority marks another step on Iraq’s path to sovereignty, elections and constitutional democracy.” Well before 30th of June, when formal sovereignty passes from the coalition authority to an interim government, Iraqis will control most ministries. It is in the ministries that the work of government is done. (DoD, 2004, 4, p. 1)

Bayley places great stock in the power of Iraqis’ controlling their ministries of government for this is where the “work of government is done.” The piecemeal approach to transferring power is highlighted here as Bayley suggests that bit-by-bit, Iraq will be ready for total control of its political affairs in time for the June 30, 2004, transition. This statement suggests that placing control and power into Iraq’s ministries of government is
the best remedy for the country. Yet the notion of corrupt, ineffective leaders/government is not considered in the promotion of this particular remedy. Furthermore, although important, promoting the transfer of power to Iraq’s agriculture ministry is somewhat tangential to the broader problems with Iraq’s stability issues that stem from sectarian divisions, a violent resistance, and ineffective Iraqi security forces.

“Sovereignty” is given salience as it is used here to imply independent control of government affairs free of outside influence. Often this notion of sovereignty and Iraq’s control of its own political affairs is invoked as a remedy for the instability frame. As previously discussed under the “define problems” section, the transition of sovereignty on June 30, 2004, marked only one of several governments to rule over Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Also, this excerpt features the salient topics of a constitutional democracy and elections as the remedies for Iraq’s political woes.

Elections and the political process acting as a remedy to the instability are further promoted in the briefings. Gen Myers says:

I think elections in Iraq are going to be one more step on the path towards a stable and secure and a democratic Iraq. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 6)

Rumsfeld makes this remedy more salient as he refers to the influential power of the ballot box, endowing the act of voting with significant strength for the Iraqis (DoD, 2004, 6). The power of voting and elections is also invoked frequently in conjunction with the insurgency frame, which is discussed further below.

Another remedy officials promote is the need for patience as Iraq attempts to fix its problems with stability and security (DoD, 2003, 1; DoD, 2003, 2; DoD, 2006, 14).
However, patience as a remedy is a rather selective term as these same officials will talk of the need for quick action to establish a governing body or security force.

Another remedy that receives extensive promotion is the training and handing over of power and authority to the Iraqi security forces. Several briefings promote this remedy as essential to the security of Iraq—even the name of the armed Iraqi forces is called the Iraqi security forces. Gen. Mark Kimmit encapsulates this remedy:

We want to see less and less coalition presence and more and more Iraqi presence and Iraqi responsibility for policing, defense, border patrol, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (DoD, 2004, 3, p. 4)

Echoing that same sentiment two and half-years later, Rumsfeld says:

Iraqis will continue to take over responsibility the security of their country and that over time we’ll be able to draw down our forces as conditions permit. (DoD, 2006, 13, p. 4)

Often this remedy is explained in terms of territory under the purview of Iraqi forces and the number of forces equipped and trained. Gen. Thomas Turner says:

This army was grown from the bottom up. And we’ve trained great Iraqi companies and battalions, and they’re still lacking some equipment. (DoD, 2006, 12, p. 3)

The emphasis on this remedy is particularly interesting because of the multitude of benefits for the U.S. military, U.S. contractors, and private security firms. Officials promote training an Iraqi army as a primary solution but neglect to mention the economic benefits U.S. companies receive from such an initiative. Similarly, these efforts also create a “return customer” basis out of Iraq’s military as new and replacement equipment will likely be purchased from those same contractors and firms with whom the Iraqi military has established relations. Furthermore, having U.S. experts train and equip
Iraq’s military is also viewed as an opportunity for a military ally in the tumultuous Middle East region.

The briefings following the invasion of Iraq weren’t all dedicated to discussions of establishing a stable, self-governing Iraq. The violent resistance movement in the months following the U.S./coalition invasion was soon undeniable in its strength and impact on the progress toward such a goal. Therefore, officials found it necessary to frame Iraq’s violence through a familiar lens so that the continued involvement/occupation by the U.S. military was justified. Soon, the Iraq war was no longer a matter of locating Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction and was reframed as part of the war on terror. Though the stability and security frame was still promoted and furthered in later news briefings, the Iraqi resistance was a focus for much of the later briefings. In order to address the resistance and persistent violence, officials began promoting a new frame. This frame was closely related to ongoing policy initiatives of the war on terror.

**Iraq insurgency and the war on terror**

“The soldiers I spoke with understand the mission, they understand why we’re in Iraq and they understand the greater mission in which the war in Iraq is just one part.”


**Define problems**

At first, Iraq’s post-invasion violence and unrest wasn’t framed as part of the grander war on terror as officials suggested that the resistance fighters coalition forces were engaging with daily were merely remnants and hangers-on from the Saddam Hussein era (DoD, 2003, 1; DoD, 2003, 2). Sometimes the Ba’ath-related violence is
defined as political violence with Iraqis lashing out against the former ruling party’s members (DoD, 2004, 3). Rumsfeld applies salience to this problem:

> And the people coming in are providing helpful information as the coalition deals with the remnants of the Ba’ath regime that are seeking to undermine their (Iraqis’) progress. (DoD, 2003, 2, p. 1)

In the same briefing, Gen. Myers promotes the U.S. military’s adroitness:

> It is particularly interesting to note how well our forces are able to switch from tracking down violent Ba’ath regime elements to assisting Iraqis in rebuilding their country. (DoD, 2003, 2, p. 2)

Similarly, the problem of persistent violence is downplayed with the first briefing featuring both Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks discussing “pockets” of violence and resistance (DoD, 2003, 1). Defining the violence as “pockets” suggests it is relatively contained and not sizable enough to warrant concern. In promoting to this subject, the officials are accepting the likelihood for more violence, yet diminishing the scope and strength of that violence. Furthermore the “pockets” metaphor seeks to confirm the notion that problems with continued violence were connected to the Ba’ath loyalists who were small in numbers and confined to remote regions.

By 2004, the Ba’ath loyalists were defined as just one part of a broader insurgency that included foreign terrorist fighters, influential militias, and the somewhat vague, but oft-repeated “anti-coalition forces” (DoD, 2004, 3; DoD, 2004, 4). At this point the violence and the U.S.’s continued involvement in Iraq had shifted to be included in the grander war on terror frame. Rumsfeld frames Iraq’s problems with violence as symptomatic of a long history with extremism when he states:

> No doubt attacks will continue in the weeks and months ahead, and perhaps intensify as the Iraqi election approaches. I suppose this has to be expected. The extremists have a lot to lose, and Iraq was a violent place long before its
liberation. But if the coalition is steadfast, and it will be, eventually we will see the last vestiges of this dying order fade away. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 1)

Here, Rumsfeld makes a number of assumptions about Iraq’s history with extremism and violence as well as the extremists’ view of democracy. The unstated but assumed view of Islamic extremism is prevalent in this statement and frames the problems of violence in Iraq as indicative of the country’s religion and that religion’s acceptance/promotion of extreme views. Rumsfeld further promotes a specific view of extremism:

The struggle that’s taking place within that faith between violent extremists—a small number of them relatively—who are capable of going out and killing a great many people as they’re doing, and the overwhelming majority of that religion that does not believe in violent extremism or terrorism. (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 3)

Even though he couches his ideas in the language of “a small number” compared with “the overwhelming majority,” this statement still carries ideological bias. It is interesting to note the usage of “that religion” here, which places it into a basic definition neglecting to consider the diverse sects and forms of Islam throughout the world. This frame falls in line with much of the grander war on terror framing of the violence being perpetrated by the small number of extremists in the name of Islam. Rumsfeld further illustrates his view of Islamic extremism:

This is a tough business because there are a lot of people out there recruiting young people, putting them in extremist madrassa schools, teaching them to be suicide bombers. And I think the Iraqis are going to have to struggle with this insurgency for some time. (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 7)

This statement is exemplary of the narrow view of how one becomes a suicide bomber and terrorist through religious indoctrination. The problem with Islamic
extremism may well have roots in the schooling and the rearing of youth, but it could also have roots in countless other factors such as socio-economics.

Placing Iraq’s insurgency within the broader war on terror frame leads to highly salient issues such as civilian casualties being framed as part of or due to the war on terror and Iraq’s insurgent terrorists acting as perpetrators of the civilian violence. Gen Casey says:

You asked what do I expect the insurgency to do after the elections. The answer is, on the terrorist and foreign fighter side, I expect them to attempt to resume attacks against civilians and us and Iraqi security forces, and attempt to discredit the process, and attempt to demonstrate that they are still strong and a factor to be reckoned with. (DoD, 2005, 10, p. 3)

There is certainly truth to statements of the role insurgents play in civilian deaths, but this rhetoric suggests that civilian deaths are exclusively the work of enemy forces, distancing the U.S./coalition forces from culpability. Likewise, this statement highlights a recurrent salient topic of the purpose of these attacks being the disruption of the political process. There is an assumption here that the insurgency will cease once the political process has run its course and the governing forces of Iraq have been stabilized. This aligns with the previously mentioned emphasis on rhetoric of process and progress for the self-governance of Iraq.

A problem that receives little promotion in these briefings is the multicultural status of Iraq’s population and the complex/strained relations between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Often discussions of the Iraqi violence would be limited to simplified frames of “terrorists” or “insurgents,” with little to no context for the deeper cultural difference, which bore out the Iraqi violence. Likewise, as in diagnosing Iraq’s post-invasion
problems, U.S. officials did not promote the notion that the United States’ invasion and toppling of the Iraqi government only functioned to destabilized a country already strained by tenuous cultural/religious relations.

However, Gen. Casey does recognize the insurgency as consisting of many parts:

The insurgency is not a homogenous group. We look at it with the terrorists and the foreign fighters, Saddamists and a larger group, the predominant group, Iraqi rejectionists (DoD, 2005, 10, p. 3)

This statement suggests a need for contextualizing the insurgency as made up of various causes and individuals. Yet, in doing so, this subtly frames the insurgency as disorganized and weak. Slicing the insurgency into pieces suggests that the separate pieces can be addressed and curtailed on an individual basis. Furthermore, the usage of “Iraqi rejectionists” is curious for a couple of reasons. First, it suggests that insurgent fighters are resisting their country solely and that the U.S. /coalition’s role as occupying forces (a topic discussed further in the next section) has little to do with the insurgency. Second, the “Iraqi rejectionists” rhetorical frame drives home notions of the insurgency being driven by anti-democratic freedom-haters. This notion is further discussed in the next section.

**Diagnose causes**

The framing of Iraq’s insurgency often includes language about the groups’ determination to prevent the foundation of a democratic government. Numerous instances occur in these briefings in which officials promote the idea that Iraq’s violence is part of a grander plan by a terrorist organization to combat democracy and forces of freedom wherever they may reside (DoD, 2004, 6). Rumsfeld gives this notion salience:
Operations in Fallujah and elsewhere demonstrate anew the extremism of those opposing Iraqi democracy. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 1)

This cause is given further emphasis when officials point out that violence in Iraq spikes around the periods of elections and government transition (DoD, 2006, 11).

Rumsfeld suggest a “rhythm” to the insurgent violence:

It dropped down after January elections, it dropped down after the October referendum, and it’s dropped down after these elections. It’s gone up again on other occasions, and it may very well now. So I don’t attribute it to anything except maybe rhythm. (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 4)

The election cycles are likely to blame for some of the insurgent violence, but this statement suggests that the insurgency can be quelled if the process is concluded. Similarly, this “rhythm” analogy suggests that controlling the violence is out of the hands of the powers that be. Framing the cause of violence in this manner suggests a pattern over which there is little control.

Another cause of the Iraqi insurgency that slowly reveals itself in the briefings is Iraq’s multicultural status and the strained relations between the Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd population. These sectarian divisions are downplayed at first but slowly recognized as a cause for the violent tensions in a country coming out of a period of minority (Sunni) rule. Gen. Kimmitt comments on the sectarian issue:

The last thing they (Kurds) would like to see is an outbreak of sectarian violence. (DoD, 2004, 3, p. 3)

Similarly, later briefings feature proclamations that Iraq’s Sunni population was coming around and rejecting the insurgent movement in favor of establishing stable government (DoD, 2005, 9; DoD, 2005, 10). Gen. Casey provides counter-salience to the sectarian violence:
But I will tell you in general people, particularly the Sunni folks that I talk to, want a government that is seen as broadly representative of all different ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq. (DoD, 2005, 10, p. 6)

However, even as attempts are made to frame the cause of the violence as indicative of strained ethnic/cultural relations, officials still discuss the insurgents in broad strokes, referring to them simply as “the enemy” in some instances (DoD, 2005, 8). Often attempts at contextualizing the cause of unrest include rhetoric about “the nature of the insurgency” (DoD, 2005, 8). This rhetorical frame provides a degree of mystique to the resistance fighters, suggesting that U.S. and coalition forces need to study what motivates these groups. Perhaps taking cues from the war on terror and its emphasis on the figurehead, Osama Bin Laden, a cause for the insurgency that receives significant promotion is the role of Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr’s Shi’a militia is consistently discussed in these briefings as a serious problem for the coalition forces as he exerts political influence over specific towns and region in Iraq, recruiting fighters to combat the U.S./coalition forces (DoD, 2004, 4). Though the role of a charismatic and powerful leader is likely a contributor to the cause of the insurgency, such methods of framing typically function to apply a face as the root cause of a more complex problem.

In discussing “the nature of the insurgency” in one instance, Larry Di Rita, a Department of Defense public affairs secretary, spoke of Iraq’s geographic neighbors and their complicity in the flow of fighters (DoD, 2005, 8). The officials are quick to place blame on Iraq’s neighbors, Syria and Iran, for not being more proactive in policing borders and preventing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Officials often refer to the borders as “porous” (DoD, 2005, 7) and in one instance Rumsfeld calls Syria and Iran...
“unhelpful” (DoD, 2005, 9). Di Rita says, “the general view is that Syria is not doing enough” (DoD, 2005, 8, p. 10). Gen. Kimmitt discusses the flow of foreign fighters and their role as suicide bombers:

When you start to see people strap on suicide bombs and conduct suicide bombings, our first inclination is to sort of look foreign rather than look here within Iraq. (DoD, 2004, 3, p. 7)

However, Gen. Kimmitt doesn’t follow through in explaining his logic as to why one’s first inclination is to look abroad as opposed to domestic sources of suicide bombers. The inflow of foreign “terrorists” and fighters into Iraq suggests that the country became a battleground in the war on terror. But why did these foreigners decide to descend upon Iraq? The U.S. /coalition presence in the country likely serves as a carrot for those “extremists” wishing to act out against outside forces occupying Iraq. Rumsfeld offers his opinion:

Their aim is to seize power in Iraq and use it as a safe haven to launch attacks against America and free people across the globe. (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 1)

This ties in with another cause for the violent unrest that receives no promotion by officials in these briefings—the idea of occupation. The Iraqi people (and the neighbors who join the insurgency) are perhaps acting out against an occupation force making the insurgency more of a rebellion. Framing the violence as symptomatic of an occupation is completely avoided by U.S. officials. Similarly, this notion isn’t given any prominence by the news media, which may act outside of the officials’ frames, according to Entman’s (2004) cascading activation model of framing. Instead, the predominant cause for the Iraq insurgency frame remains that of people determined to combat freedom and democracy wherever it may appear.
Officials also suggest a cause for this flow of foreign fighters and “terrorists” as connected to a broader propaganda campaign by terrorist organizations. Gen. James Conway asserts that there are insurgent Web sites referring to the Iraqi insurgency as the “Jihad Superbowl” (DoD, 2005, 7, p. 8). Gen. Kimmitt says:

Anti-coalition propaganda continues to be broadcast at the mosque—propaganda urging Iraqis to engage coalition forces. (DoD, 2004, 4, p. 1)

Rumsfeld further discusses extremism with his own form of propaganda framing the violence as “Muslims killing Muslims” (DoD, 2006, 14, p. 4). Here, he is attempting to distance the role the U.S. and coalition forces have and continue to play in overturning, then occupying, the country. Rumsfeld’s assertion that the insurgent violence is perpetrated by and upon fellow Muslims is a moral judgment, discussed further in the next section.

**Make moral judgments**

Perhaps one of the most significant moral assessments made in these briefings is the rhetorical constructions of the resistance/enemy fighters as “insurgents,” “rebels,” and “terrorists” with little to no definitional difference given by the officials. In practice, these words do carry significant differences as the “terrorist” rhetorical frame for many Americans carries connotations of the perpetrators of the Sept. 11th hijackings. However, interchanging these words enables the Iraqi insurgency to be framed as part of the broader war on terror frame. This moral judgment denies those Iraqis who may be fighting against a perceived occupation by placing them into the war on terror frame. Rumsfeld says:
I think that the 21st century, and September 11th and certainly. (the) Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have, in fact, changed the circumstances of the world fairly significantly. (DoD, 2003, 1, p. 5)

This statement makes a moral assertion that the world has changed significantly, but he is speaking, of course, from the U.S. perspective. The events he recites as contributing to this “changed” world—though they may have affected global politics, relations, etc.—are all oriented around the United States. Furthermore, in invoking the Sept. 11th attacks as well as the Afghanistan conflict, Rumsfeld is reframing the rationale for war with Iraq as always part of this war on terror.

Similarly, the fighters are also referred to as “anti-coalition forces” in some of the news briefings (DoD, 2004, 3). This terminology carries certain moralistic judgments, particularly that the forces are against all occupying forces, even though a large majority (about 90%) of those forces are from the United States. This rhetorical frame (anti-coalition force/fighter) functions to distance the prominent role the United States may play in influencing the resistance movement. This method of framing applies salience to the grander war on terror narrative of the opposition/“enemy” as undemocratic and freedom hating. Previous sections have already addressed this frequently invoked moral assessment of Iraq’s insurgency as reflective of a broader imperative to combat freedom and the foundation of a democratic nation. Often those Iraqis who vote and participate in the political process are said to be “rejecting” the insurgency’s motives and its leadership (DoD, 2005, 9). This moral judgment is so deterministic in its connecting the political process to the insurgency that the U.S. officials are neglecting their own ideological
underpinnings of freedom being the natural state of man. Rumsfeld addresses this moralistic view:

Free people tend not to make war on each other. (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 3)

As a counter to these moral views of democracy and freedom, the insurgents are often framed as totalitarian and extreme in their disdain for freedom. In one briefing, Rumsfeld compares the war on terror and Iraq’s insurgency with the last days of Hitler’s regime when he describes “the true nature of totalitarianism and its capacity for self-annihilation” (DoD, 2005, 9, p. 1). He further drives home the WWI analogy when he discusses the “cult of death” among the kamikaze and SS fighters in the last days of the war (DoD, 2005, 9). Here a moral assessment is made that the Iraqi insurgency and its terrorist fighters are no different than the fascistic fighters of WWII’s Axis powers.

But WWII isn’t the only war Rumsfeld draws upon to make his moralistic analogies for the war on terror. The Cold War comes up in a few briefings as Rumsfeld attempts to draw connections to the war on terror. He suggests that the two share similar characteristics of occurring without clearly distinguished battle lines and taking place over a prolonged period of time (DoD, 2006, 11). In drawing on these former wars, which are both consequently viewed as victories for the United States, Rumsfeld attempts to justify the prolonged involvement in Iraq’s affairs as the U.S. military attempts to defeat the forces of terror both in Iraq and around the world. Furthermore, there is a subtle suggestion that defeat is not likely, for the United States resides on the appropriate ideological side of the war.
Yet another example of a moralistic and ideologically charged statement comes from Rumsfeld:

If one looks back historically at insurgencies, this insurgency does not have a vision that’s compelling. It doesn’t have a future... It is clear the United States and coalition forces are not occupying forces with any intention of staying there in perpetuity or to seize their land or something else. (DoD, 2005, 9, p. 3)

This statement carries a couple moral judgments. First, the statement carries the assumption that U.S. and coalition forces are not occupying Iraq. Many would disagree with this rhetorical frame when accounting for the role the United States played in establishing Iraq’s government and continuing to remain until democracy took hold.

Likewise, Rumsfeld asserts that this insurgency doesn’t have a “compelling vision.” By what standards? How does he know what is compelling and what is not compelling to the Iraqi people? This statement doesn’t recognize what the insurgency’s roots are or what makes it compelling enough to drive people toward martyrdom.

Finally, the discussions of civil war versus sectarian violence arise in one particular briefing as Rumsfeld attempts to assert that insurgent violence is distinguishable from a civil war (DoD, 2006, 13). He concedes that the insurgent violence is occurring between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a populations, but states that he doesn’t view this as a civil war because it’s not a “classic civil war” like “ours” or other nations (DoD, 2006, 13, p. 8). Rectifying the sectarian violence is another issue discussed in the next section.

Suggest remedies

Many of the remedies for the insurgency/war on terror frame align with the self-governing/stability frame. For example, the officials promote the need for patience in the
transition of power from U.S. forces to Iraq’s own security force and stable government. Similarly, the insurgency is often framed as efforts to defeat and stall the progress of democracy and freedom for Iraqis. Illustrating this remedy, Rumsfeld discusses how the Iraqi constitution, “a piece of paper,” could prove to be the most effective tool in combatting the terrorists (DoD, 2005, 9, p. 1). Echoing this sentiment, Rumsfeld states:

Of course, for democracy to succeed, areas of the country cannot remain under control of insurgents, regime holdovers, extremists and foreign fighters. At the request of the interim government, Iraqi security personnel and coalition forces have been freeing Fallujah and other areas from the murderous enemies of progress. (DoD, 2004, 6, p. 1)

Gen. Casey expresses a similar opinion:

The Iraqi people are fighting to throw off the mantle of terror and intimidation so that they can elect their own government and get on with building a better life for all Iraqis (DoD, 2004, 5, p. 1)

Both these statements present the violence and unrest as being countered by Iraqi forces dedicated to notions of progress and “a better life for all Iraqis.” Naturally, the assumption in this statement is that Iraq’s newly formed government will provide a better life for all Iraqis. The rhetorical frames of “murderous enemies of progress” and their tactics of “terror and intimidation” suggest the only remedy for the insurgency is battling with these forces.

Rhetorically, “political progress and process” are echoed just as much as remedies to the insurgency frame as the self-governing/stability frame. Coalition Provisional Authority Senior Adviser Daniel Senor discusses how Iraq’s Kurd population agrees with the U.S. preferred remedy for defeating the insurgency:

They (Kurds) have been very clear with us that the greatest way to achieve victory is to move forward on the political processes, to move forward on the hand over of authority, which we are doing every single day, culminating in
June 30th when we hand over sovereignty. They understand as well as anybody that there are two simultaneous strategies to defeating foreign fighters and the insurgents. (DoD, 2004, 3, p. 3)

Similarly, the reversal of Iraq’s Sunni population, who initially boycotted some elections, to supporting the political process is a much-lauded remedy to the insurgency problem. Gen. Myers says:

All indications are that the Sunni leadership in Iraq had made a fundamental decision that they want to be part of the process, and that’s been happening now for some time...Eighty-five percent of the Iraqis that are polled say they want to vote, and that’s all ethnic groups. (DoD, 2005, 9, p. 7)

This statement resembles another suggested remedy: the Iraqis will grow weary of the insurgency. Gen. Conway suggests that the influx of tips as to whereabouts of insurgents is indicative of Iraqis reaching a “saturation point” (DoD, 2005, 7). He indicates that a large number of Iraqi casualties has started to affect the broader population’s view of the insurgency’s cause. Similarly, a remedy put forward by Rumsfeld for the sectarian violence is allowing time for a “reconciliation process” (DoD, 2006, 13, p. 8). He fails to elaborate on what entails a “reconciliation process” or what he means exactly. This obtuse language is perhaps just another form of the “patience” remedy, which has been promoted both subtly and not so subtly in these briefings. Part of the “patience” as remedy frame includes the need to train and equip Iraq’s police and security force. Gen. Casey highlights this remedy:

The other part of this transition is a police transition and putting the police in the position and bringing the security situation to the point where the police can take charge of maintaining internal security across Iraq. (DoD, 2005, 10, p. 4)

Giving this remedy salience, Gen. Myers discusses how Iraq’s security forces are “growing in capacity and capability,” saying that 178,000 had been trained and equipped
Rumsfeld discusses this remedy of transition of power to Iraqi security forces when he describes coalition forces having handed over a piece of “real estate the size of Kentucky” to the Iraqis (DoD, 2006, 11, p. 6). The emphasis on Iraq’s own security and police force “taking responsibility” is a recurrent remedy in nearly all briefings as it is given salience to both the insurgency and self-governing frames. Gen. Turner expresses this sentiment as well as other remedies that will lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq:

> It’s an Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally in the war on terror with a representative government that respects human rights of all Iraqis, and an Iraqi security force capable of providing domestic order and denying safe haven to terrorists. (DoD, 2005, 12, p. 1)

The remedy of “denying safe haven to terrorists” is given salience in other briefings as the insurgency is frequently described as isolated territories and regions of Iraq under the influence of insurgents. On more than one occasion, Rumsfeld frames the insurgencies as located in only four or five of Iraq’s 14 provinces, suggesting that the insurgency is not rampant throughout the country (DoD, 2006, 13; DoD, 2006, 14). Gen. Ham discusses a larger campaign against the insurgency as denying them freedom of movement, denying them safe havens, and denying them territory (DoD, 2005, 8).

One particular “safe haven” discussed at length is Fallujah. Gen. Casey:

> The fight in Fallujah will be a tough one and there will be other tough fights in our time here, but nothing worthwhile is ever easy, and the challenge of helping 25 million Iraqis build a better future is one that the Iraqi people and the armed forces of more than 30 freedom-loving nations are clearly up to. (DoD, 2004, 5, p. 1)

Fallujah is referred to as the “center of terrorist and insurgent activity in Iraq” with this safe haven serving as a “staging point for foreign fighters and the Iraqi
insurgents that support them” (DoD, 2004, 5, p. 1). The remedy following the ousting of these insurgents from their safe haven is to ensure that “they don’t come back, as they have tried to do in every one of the cities we have thrown them out of” (DoD, 2005, 5, p. 3). The rhetorical construction of “throwing them out” is a peculiar choice for it suggests that the insurgent forces are still in Iraq and capable of reappearing in the same or another city. As a remedy, “throwing them out” is not as forceful as the literal, and probably more accurate, “killing them” remedy. Use of this rhetorically guarded language distracts from the true nature of war and counter-insurgency actions—killing the enemy force.

Returning to the role of individuals as a cause of the insurgency, salience is given to the remedy of capturing Muqtada al-Sadr because he is viewed to exert significant power with his militia (DoD, 2004, 4). Bayley expresses this remedy, “a solution where Muqtada al-Sadr faces justice and his militia is dissolved” (DoD, 2004, 4, p. 7). Here, Bayley is quick to assume that Sadr’s forces will disband upon his capture and are beholden to his commands. The true nature of his militia and its leadership could be far more decentralized than is implied here. But the capture of a prominent figure is not unfamiliar in the Iraq War (e.g., Saddam Hussein); therefore, promoting this remedy is part of the framing effort to suggest easy remedies and goals that may have no real effect on the difficult situation.

Analysis of these briefings reveals a number of techniques, both rhetorical and unspoken, as officials have strived to frame the post-invasion Iraq quagmire as either manageable or out of U.S. hands—depending on the problem, cause, moral assessment,
and remedy. However, the framing techniques themselves require further discussion as notions of ideology are considered in the next section.

**Discussion of qualitative findings**

Incorporating elements of ideological criticism into these findings and analysis reveals that the membership, values/norms, and goals of U.S. officials are influenced largely by the dominant ideology of the power of freedom and democracy in reshaping Iraq. Frequently, the invasion and subsequent occupation is framed as part of a path to freedom for the Iraqi people. However, this frame is often invoked as a distraction from discussions of the initial justification for war: procuring and prohibiting usage of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. Considering that the ideological allegiance or membership of the officials, newsmakers, and news consumers is with the United States and its construction of democracy and freedom, the war was framed as a mission for bringing freedom to Iraq.

Both the “self-governing and stable Iraq” and “Iraq insurgency and the war on terror” frames featured frequent promotion of Iraq’s elections, constitution, and representative body of politicians as solutions to the problems plaguing the country. As it has been discussed, the emphasis on democracy and the political process was prominent and forceful by U.S. officials. Even with the emphasis on Iraq making its own future and choosing its own government, the underlying assumption is that Iraq can only choose a democratic system of governance. Returning to Hallin’s model of the spheres of consensus, controversy, and deviance (in Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), the data show that discussions about alternative forms of governance for Iraq were in the sphere of deviance,
whereas the “self-governing” and democratic Iraq was promoted as if it were in the sphere of consensus. What if a less-democratic theocracy was the preferred form of governance for Iraqis? What if they chose a socialist government? These questions are unanswerable as the framing (by U.S. officials) of post-invasion Iraq’s political system was exclusively dedicated to notions of freedom and democracy by officials who are political leaders in the world’s most prominent democracy. Furthermore, it seems that U.S. officials sought to establish leaders in ideological alignment with U.S. perspectives as the post-invasion Iraqi leadership was selected.

Though unspoken, the power relations and dynamics between U.S. leaders and the Iraqi leadership are one-sided. Not only did the U.S. play a significant role in ousting the prior regime, but its role as occupier, as well as funder of aid, likely has had a considerable effect on the power dynamics (ideological position/relations). Although it’s frequently suggested that Iraq is autonomous in its decision-making, Iraq’s political decisions were highly influenced by the power dynamics exerted by the U.S. military and government.

The import of Iraq’s democratic government is also linked with broader ideological imperatives to combat the war on terror with freedom. A popular theory viewed as a collateral bonus to the Iraq invasion is that a democratic state in the otherwise undemocratic Middle East region would somehow influence the surrounding states to follow the path to freedom—a sort of reverse to the “domino theory,” which suggested all of southeast Asia would fall to communism in the 1960s. Freedom is consistently invoked as the best medicine to defeating terrorism and extremism. Indeed
there may be some truth to this theory; however, even a cursory examination of U.S. history reveals that democracy can also harbor and spawn a form of violent extremism known to incorporate terroristic tactics (e.g., KKK, neo-Nazi movement, etc.). Similarly, democratic elections in the Middle East have resulted in the election of "Islamic extremists" as evidenced by the 2006 Palestinian elections of Hamas politicians to the ruling majority.

Though Bush officials viewed Saddam Hussein's reign as aiding and abetting Islamic terrorism, the initial framing of the Iraq War did not fall entirely under the war on terror umbrella. However, as illustrated in this analysis, the subsequent post-invasion insurgency was folded into this broad frame. Just as Ivie (2003) found in analyzing Bush's post-Sept. 11th rhetoric calling for a war on terror, so too did the officials analyzed in these briefings frame the Iraq war as a battle between forces of freedom (i.e., "good") vs. forces of terror (i.e., "evil"). Ideologically, framing the insurgency on these terms enabled the conflation of Iraq's resistance fighters into the "terrorist" frame. It is important to note how this conflation is broadening how terrorist has been defined in the post-Sept. 11th environment. The rhetorical frame of terrorists carries many connotations, but in particular it has a strong signifier relationship with the Sept. 11th hijackings. Those attacks were pre-meditated and politically motivated strikes against symbols of the United States and Western hegemony. On the contrary, the resistance fighters in Iraq represent a far more diverse and complex background than the terrorist label suggests. Indeed a significant portion of the fighters have been motivated by political purposes to lash out against the United States and other Western powers. However, some of those
fighters may be farmers who have taken up arms against the occupying military as a retaliatory act. Similarly, remnants of the Ba’ath regime who continued to fight were also lumped into this insurgent/terrorist label. These fighters were not the Islamic extremists reared on terror that Rumsfeld speaks of and were merely continuing the fight that was brought to them by the invasion. The insurgent and terrorist rhetorical frames are ideologically loaded terms given that any enemy fighter was described with this charged rhetoric.

The framing analysis also speaks to Said’s (1979) Orientalism in that much of the Iraq conflict as well as the war on terror have been described in ideological terms of an East/West Manichean division. Rumsfeld doesn’t shy away from the Cold War comparisons as he draws on the Cold War as exemplary of what lies ahead for the war on terror (DoD, 2006, 11). Drawing on such a familiar ideological framework for most Americans enables Rumsfeld and other officials to speak of Iraq’s insurgency and the war on terror as forces against freedom. Frequently, as illustrated in Rumsfeld’s discussion of violent (Islamic) extremism (DoD, 2006, 11), the war on terror is framed in an Orientalist view of Islam as violent and extreme. He paints the terrorist fighters in broad strokes of Otherness as their religion is framed as an ideology that spawns extremism and violence. Again, drawing connections between this ideological view of the war on terror and Iraq’s insurgency suggests a rhetorical framing technique that seeks to legitimize continued U.S. involvement while seeking to ignore other political and ideological motivations Iraqi insurgent fighters may possess.
The term insurgency is defined as "a revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution" (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency retrieved on April 29, 2009). This definition reveals a number of inherent assumptions about the Iraqi insurgency. Although it is defined as a "revolt," this rhetorical frame is not commonplace in the news briefings. Similarly, it suggests such a revolt is "against a government," which is interesting when considering the emphasis in news briefings for the foundation of a stable government in Iraq. Although the briefings hint the lack of a government in Iraq, the insurgency rhetorical frame prevents such a notion from becoming commonplace as the definition suggests that the revolt is against an established government. Furthermore, the definition's use of "less than an organized revolution" carries the delegitimizing rhetoric found in much of the qualitative analysis. To be classified as a "legitimate" revolution would allow comparisons to the American Revolution; therefore, the officials' rhetoric illustrates an effort to delegitimize this revolt by suggesting that it is "less than an organized revolution."

Further exploration of the insurgency rhetorical frame follows a discussion of this study's quantitative results and analysis. These elements of ideology discussed are important considerations as the next section examines the content analysis results, giving quantity to the usage of rhetorical frames over others. The preceding qualitative portion of this study features a more holistic approach to framing analysis where phrases, themes, and overall message meaning is analyzed for evidence of a frame. These findings do account for the language and rhetoric of the government officials as the frames are analyzed; however, the next section addresses framing on a more atomistic and
individualized fashion. Gamson et al. (1992) write of framing occurring at the rhetorical level, as words, catch phrases, and metaphors are all considered influential in the grander social construction of frames and meaning. The next section addresses the idea of words acting frames with rhetorical framing as a notion of words choice and emphasis over others carries a grander framing message. It suggests that those grander frames and their elements discussed in the above qualitative section are influential as to how words (rhetorical frames) are chosen and applied in Iraq War coverage. The next section situates framing on a smaller scale as framing theory is applied to the role of words and the frequency of preferred terms over others.
CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Data analysis of research questions

The second method employed in this study features a slightly different approach to news framing as the thematic and broader frames are put aside for an examination of the role words play in framing. Entman’s (1993) framing theory proved useful in exploring the thematic frames of the Department of Defense, but the specifics of language were not the focus of the analysis. Taking cues from Bennett et al. (2007), Gamson et al. (1992), and Lakoff (2007), this section explores the usage of rhetorical frames (words) in the news media as stories are examined for the frequency of terms used to describe Iraq’s violence and unrest. This section will not only examine the frequency of specific terms, but also account for the sources and attribution methods used by the news media. Following analysis and discussion of the quantitative results, relations and differences between the methodological findings will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The constructed week sample yielded 254 stories of which 147 were from the 2003-04 time period and 107 were from the 2005-06 time period. Of those stories, 71 from the 2003-04 time frame and 64 from the 2005-06 time frame contained instances meeting the primary category’s criteria. Of the stories, 952 instances of rhetorical framing
were coded, of which 265 or 27.8% were the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frames. The next most prevalent frame was the civilian/Iraqi rhetorical frame with 199 instances or 20.9% of the total followed by militia with 115 instances or 12.1% of the total (see Table 1 for rhetorical frame frequency data). The attribution category showed that 550 or 57.8% of the rhetorical frames were without a source or attribution (see Table 3). When a source was cited, the most common source was the U.S. military, which accounted for 148 or 36.8% of the sources followed closely by Iraqi officials/people, who were cited in 146 instances or 36.3%.

**RQ2: How frequent were certain rhetorical frames (words) represented in the printed media in the portrayal of the violent unrest in Iraq?**

As mentioned, out of the 952 total instances meeting category one (descriptions of violence and/or implications of violent unrest), 265 or 27.8% were insurgency or insurgent (see Table 1 for the data frequencies/comparisons discussed hereafter). The second most frequent word(s) fell in civilian/Iraqi category, which accounted for 199 or 20.9% of the coded variables. In terms of the two time periods, the first period (May 2003–April 2004) shows a greater degree of diversity in words, with the dominant rhetorical frame insurgency/insurgent accounting for 23.5% of the total. The civilian/Iraqi rhetorical frame was close behind the insurgency/insurgent terms accounting for 22.3% of the instances. Similarly, the fighter term and militia/militiamen words accounted for 12.5% and 12.1% respectively.

In contrast, the second time frame (Nov. 2005–Oct. 2006) showed a shift in rhetorical frames as the insurgency/insurgent word(s) still dominated in accounting for 31.6% of the total. The civilian/Iraqi word(s) dropped in frequency to 19.7% of the total
as well as the fighter term, which dropped substantially to account for merely 2.9% of the category.

The data show that terms synonymous with insurgency (e.g., uprising) were relatively unused, with uprising occurring only 11 times or 1.2% of the total over the two time frames. Of those 11 instances of uprising, all but one occurred in the earlier 2003-04 time period.

Similarly, the terms rebel and rebellion were applied 16 times or 1.7% of the total during the periods of study. All 41 instances of the sectarian rhetorical frame came from the 2005-06 time period. Those 41 instances accounted for 4.3 of the 952 total rhetorical frames. Likewise, only 3 of the 28 instances of the civil war rhetorical frame were from the 2003-04 time period.

The terrorist term(s) was found to be nearly identical in occurrences between the time periods with 2003-04 registering the rhetorical frame at 7.3% of the total and 2005-06 accounting for the term(s) 7.2% of the total. Similarly, the militia/militiamen rhetorical frame was consistent across both periods with the term(s) accounting for 12.1% of the instances for each time period.

A separate analysis was used to determine the frequency of rhetorical frames in the lead paragraph/headline/caption, which accounted for 122 or 12.8% of the total rhetorical frames. The insurgency/insurgent word(s) was found in one of those three predominant locations 43 of its 265 total occurrences. Compared with the other words situated in those locations, insurgency/insurgent accounted for 35% of all instances. This was nearly double the next most common rhetorical frame of Iraqi/civilian, which
amounted to 18%. Furthermore, the insurgency/insurgent word(s) was found in one of these three locations more than its total average for the data set of 27.8%.

RQ3: Is “insurgency” the emergent dominant word for Iraq’s unrest between May 2003 and October 2006?

The data illustrate a shifting toward the normalization of this rhetorical frame over the two time periods. As previously discussed, the insurgency/insurgent term(s) increased in overall frequency by 8% from the 2003–04 to the 2005–06 period. Though a shift from 23.5% to 31.6% of the total rhetorical frames may not constitute the emergence of a dominant rhetorical frame, the data do reveal that the competing (secondary) rhetorical frame of Iraqi/civilian dropped in frequency from 22.3% to 19.7%. Similarly, other competing terms like fighter went from accounting for 12.5% of the rhetorical frames in the 2003-04 period to 2.9% of the rhetorical frames in 2005-06. Likewise, attacker dropped from 4.1% of the instances in 2003-04 to 1.6% in 2005-06.

RQ4: Were certain sources cited for the “insurgency” more than others?

The data indicate that the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame was attributed to a source nearly 38% of the time, which is shy of the average (42%) of words being attributed to sources. Of the 99 instances when insurgency was sourced, two-thirds (66) of those sources were U.S. military or administrative officials. Although the U.S. military was sourced only 148 (15.5%) of the total 952 instances, of those, 57 (38.5%) were in reference to the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame (see Table 2, for figures).

When comparing the two time periods, the insurgency/insurgent term(s) was attributed to Iraqis more in the latter period (2005-06) with 19 of the 23 instances
occurring during that period. The attribution for the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame will be discussed further below (see RQ5).

Other than the insurgency/insurgent term(s), certain words were sourced to U.S. officials (military/administrative) more frequently than others, particularly the terrorist/suicide bomber rhetorical frames. Though the terrorist word(s) went unsourced 29% (20 of its 69 instances) of the time, which is the lowest percentage unsourced of the rhetorical frames. When it was sourced, U.S. officials accounted for 25 (51%) of the 49 sourced instances.

A chi-square goodness of fit test was calculated comparing the frequency of rhetorical frames and the sources for the rhetorical frames. The results show significant association, $x^2 = 143$ (20 d.f.), $p < .001$.

**RQ5: How was attribution used in the application of these rhetorical frames?**

As previously noted, a majority of the rhetorical frames were unattributed in the text (57.8% of the 952 instances). However, certain terms were far more likely to be attributed by source than others. For instance, the terrorist rhetorical frame was in direct quotes 36 (52%) of its 69 instances (see Table 3 for attribution of rhetorical frames). This rhetorical frame accounted for 36 (34%) of the total 107 words that were located in direct quotes. Similarly, the civil war rhetorical frame was located within direct quotes 8 (29%) of its 28 instances, which, as a percentage, is well above the total average of 11.7% of the instances occurring in direct quotes.

As for those words without sourcing, 10 (90%) of the 11 instances of the uprising rhetorical frame was unattributed. Similarly sectarian was unattributed 33 (80%) of its 41
occurrences. Likewise, the militia/militiamen term(s) went unattributed 86 (75%) of its 115 instances.

The insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame was slightly above the average (58%) of unattributed words with 166 (63%) of its 265 instances coded as lacking attribution. However, the insurgency/insurgent term(s) fell below the average (11%) for direct quotes with only 17 (6.4%) of its 265 instances attributed through direct quotes.

A chi-square goodness of fit test was calculated comparing the rhetorical frames and the attribution method for each frame. The results show significant association, $x^2 = 198$ (26 d.f.), $p < .001$.

**RQ6: Are certain rhetorical frames applied to victims more than perpetrators of violence?**

Of the total codes involving descriptions of people involved in acts of violence (530 or 55.6% of the total codes), 54% were identified as perpetrators of violence while 39% were identified as victims (the remaining 7% was coded as both). Certain rhetorical frames were far more likely to fall into one category or the other with none of the terms having a moderate dispersion between all categories. The civilian/Iraqi rhetorical frame was largely coded under the victim category (92% of the rhetorical frame’s total). In contrast, insurgency/insurgent was coded as a perpetrator of violence 87% of its total.

A chi-square goodness of fit test was calculated comparing rhetorical frames to the agency category. The results show significant association, $x^2 = 497$ (16 d.f.), $p < .001$.

**Quantitative discussion and analysis**

This study approaches quantitative framing analysis through the quantification of words found in the text rather than coding for each story’s overall frame. Through
repetition and frequency of certain rhetorical frames, the issues (Iraqi violence and civil unrest and instability) and the Iraqi people at the heart of this analysis are defined in specific semantic terms. Though this study doesn’t gauge the public’s response to such rhetorical frames, it is important to consider the role of rhetoric and words in shaping meaning and public perception.

This study pinpoints the emergence of certain terms as the situation in Iraq went through a series of redefining moments in the rhetoric of sources and the news. The “sectarian” rhetorical frame was non-existent in the 2003-04 time period (i.e., not one coding instance) (see Table 1), yet it emerged in the 2005-06 data set to account for nearly 8% of that period’s total instances, making it the fourth most common rhetorical frame. This can be explained for a number of reasons. As mentioned in the introduction of this study, the sectarian terminology was promoted over others in an attempt to distinguish Iraq’s violence and unrest as different from a civil war (Safire, 2006). Similarly, as the qualitative framing analysis revealed, the preliminary stages of violence in post-invasion Iraq were not contextualized as symptomatic of the country’s sectarian strife. Furthermore, Iraq’s sects may have been on relatively good terms in the earlier time period only to be pushed toward violence following the much-lauded elections that left some sects without power.

Likewise, Safire’s (2006) notion that civil war was an avoided rhetorical frame is somewhat disproved in this study as all but one instance occurred during the 2005-06 period. This suggests that the civil war term was considered as a descriptor for the Iraqi unrest and violence in the latter period, but not in the 2003-04 period. That said, the civil
war rhetorical frame was less common than sectarian (4.9% compared with 8%). Again, the reasoning behind the emergence of this term is in line with the above-mentioned rationale for the sectarian terminology.

Similarly, a rhetorical frame that received almost no promotion was uprising. This term is relatively synonymous with insurgency, yet it occurs a mere 11 times out of the 952 total coded rhetorical frames. Furthermore, 10 of those 11 instances are during the first period of 2003-04. Only one instance of the uprising rhetorical frame was attributed to a source, all others were unsourced. This suggests that the uprising frame was almost exclusively promoted by the journalists authoring stories about the violence in post-invasion Iraq. The nearly exclusive usage of uprising by journalists also suggests that this rhetorical frame was receiving little to no salience by the official source realm. This is an example of an attempt by journalists to provide a counterframe to the dominant rhetorical frames coming down the cascading activation model (Entman, 2003). However, considering that nearly all instances of uprising occurred in the first time period immediately following the invasion speaks to a moment when the dominant rhetorical frame of insurgency had yet to be fully incorporated into the framing of post-invasion unrest. This example articulates the notion of “setting the frame” as described by Bennett et al. (2007) in that a period of time exists in which the dominant frame is not yet fully realized and incorporated into the rhetoric of sources as well as the news coverage. Once insurgency/insurgent was commonplace in news coverage, the uprising rhetorical frame was edged out. The absence of a word like uprising in the rhetoric chosen to frame Iraq’s post-invasion turmoil helps illustrate an important point in that a word or rhetorical frame
is defined partly by what is not. That is, words are defined in relation to others. The selection of insurgency instead of words such as uprising or rebellion defines insurgency as different from those other forms of organized resistance.

In terms of frequency, the terrorist frame remained consistent during the periods of study accounting for 7% of the total coded instances for both periods. Though this rhetorical frame is fifth in terms of frequency, it carries significant weight when the qualitative analysis is considered. Officials in the briefings analyzed above were somewhat prone to interchange rhetorical frames for enemy fighters between insurgents, terrorists, Ba'ath loyalists, foreign fighters, etc. However, these quantitative data reveal that the terrorist rhetorical frame was not so frequently promoted in news stories. The terrorist rhetorical frame was also sourced more frequently than any other rhetorical frame with only 29% of the total terrorist term(s) occurring without source attribution. This suggests that journalists were reticent in applying this rhetorical frame and typically did so with source attribution. Perhaps the significant moral and ideological assessment that the terrorist rhetorical frame carries was influential in how journalists chose to apply this particular terminology. Or perhaps these news institutions studied have a more rigorous stylistic definition of what constitutes a terrorist and only apply such a rhetorical frame when the criteria have been met. The data suggest the terrorist rhetorical frame was normalized during the periods of study with a significant shift in the appearance of terrorist in direct quotes as opposed to unattributed (see Table 4 for a time comparison of the attribution of the terrorist rhetorical frame). The terrorist rhetorical frame appeared in direct quotes 23 (71.9%) of its 32 instances during the 2003-04 period of study. It was
unattributed 4 (12.5%) of those 32 instances. In contrast, the term was located in direct quotes 13 (35.1%) of its 37 instances during the 2005-06 period of study. The term went unattributed 16 (43.2%) of its 37 instances, which illustrates a significant shift in the acceptance of this rhetorical frame. The first period of study suggest that the terrorist label was less likely to be found without a source. This is perhaps due to more rigorous standards of what constituted a terrorist. However, in a couple of years, the term was found to be without attribution more often that it was in direct quotes or paraphrased.

The frequent promotion of the insurgency/insurgent term(s) alongside terrorist as discussed in the qualitative findings suggests a need to further discuss the insurgency rhetorical frame and its role as the dominant rhetorical frame. Though this study doesn’t pinpoint the exact emergence of the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame, the data reveal a number of important characteristics of post-invasion Iraqi framing. The data reveal that insurgency/insurgent were rhetorical frames in place even in the initial aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. The data suggest that insurgency became normalized or commonplace among the news media and official sources during the time periods studied. Although it was a somewhat slight increase—8% from 2003-04 to 2005-06—the frequency of insurgency/insurgent did in fact increase, which stands as a quantifiable testament to this normalization. The increase in instances can partly be explained by examining what words decreased during the same time periods. The most significant change in frequency was the fighter rhetorical frame, which went from 12.5% to 2.9% during the two periods of study. This statistical shift suggests that many of those individuals who may have fallen under the fighter terminology were now included in the insurgency/insurgent
rhetorical frame. Similarly, the somewhat synonymous terms rebellion/rebel were located in the text a mere 3.6% of the total codes—with no instances coded in the 2005-06 time period.

Time has shown that the violence in Iraq was a partially a product of ethnic and religious division within the country, which had remained otherwise contained under the totalitarian rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. Attempts to accurately portray and explain these divisions and sources of friction were relatively non-existent in the news media for some time. Similarly, as evidenced in the qualitative portion of this study, the U.S. officials often cited as source material for news stories on Iraq also skirted in-depth explanations to Iraq’s complex ethnic and religious strife. Instead “insurgency” was used as a blanket term to describe a situation with conditions far more complicated and complex than the simple rhetorical frame suggests. The next section will draw on both analyses as the insurgency rhetorical frame is further discussed.
CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION OF BOTH FINDINGS

Taken together, the analyses show that U.S. officials and the news media, through the repetition of some frames and the exclusion of others, presented the situation in post-invasion Iraq as characteristic of an unorganized revolt. The strength, purpose, and ideology of Iraq’s resistance fighters are discredited for the sake of framing the violence and unrest as short-lived and capable of defeat. Though the qualitative data showed officials attempting to address Iraq’s strained ethnic divides (DoD, 2005, 10), the quantitative results show the predominance of frames such as insurgent, terrorists, and fighter did little to provide context to these issues.

The qualitative data serve as further evidence for the quantitative data set’s findings that the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame became normalized during the periods of study. In particular, the qualitative data analysis reveals that the two dominant frames (“self-governing and secure Iraq” and “Iraq insurgency and the war on terror”) were also reflective of differing time periods. For instance, much of the framing data for the “Iraq insurgency and the war on terror” frame was located in the later news briefings examined (later 2004 through 2006). By comparison, the “self-governing and secure Iraq” frame was a predominant focus for much of the first briefings analyzed. The role officials play in setting the news agenda (Bennett et al., 2007; Cameron et al, 1997;
Entman, 2003; Gitlin, 1980; Johnson-Cartee, 2005) likely influenced the news stories on Iraq and helped enable for the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical framing to become far more commonplace as revealed in the quantitative data.

It is interesting to note that the qualitative data reveal an effort by officials to paint the resistance fighters as “terrorists,” “insurgents,” “suicide bombers,” and “fighters” in relatively the same brush. Yet the quantitative data reveal that these frames were not as interchangeable and that one (insurgency/insurgent) was chosen far more often than others (terrorist, fighter, etc.). Perhaps this is explained by the stylistic restrictions/choices journalists have in applying such rhetorical frames like terrorist. For example, the criteria for a U.S. official to call an Iraqi resistance fighter a “terrorist” may be far more lax than the criteria for a New York Times journalist to call that same fighter a “terrorist.” Though this shows a lack of a complementary relationship between the two studies’ findings, it does serve to strengthen a central argument to the overall findings.

The term(s) “insurgency/insurgent” up until this Iraq conflict was relatively unused and possessed a certain degree of vagueness. Were this rhetorical frame as loaded and full of as much significance as “terrorist,” then its emergence as the dominant rhetorical frame would have been far more challenged and difficult to establish. The relatively innocuous terms of insurgency and insurgent were given salience and became dominant because they were relatively void of meaning for the American audience and were therefore easier to apply to Iraq’s “difficult to contextualize” violence and unrest.

This returns to Reese’s (2001) notion of frames acting as “socially shared organizing principles,” in that this study suggests certain aspects of social memory and
the lasting effects of previous U.S. wars both played a part in the framing of the Iraq War as well as the war on terror. The framing tactics discussed in the qualitative data as well as the lack of certain rhetorical frames in the quantitative data suggest that dominant frames are chosen in order to advance (or avoid) certain ideological positions steeped in historical military and cultural traditions.

For example, just as Rumsfeld drew comparisons with the Cold War (DoD, 2006, 11), similar comparisons could be made between Iraq’s quagmire and the U.S.’s prolonged involvement in Vietnam. However, the insurgency frame’s connotations for a weak and disorganized resistance is exemplary of a broader attempt to prevent such comparisons to Vietnam—a failed military engagement by most standards. Just as the Vietnam War’s justifications for U.S. involvement were forgotten after years of treading water militarily, so too have the justifications for war with Iraq. In order to prevent the wave of hostility and opposition domestically, U.S. officials quickly reframed the Iraq War with two ideologically loaded frames.

The “war on terror” and “freedom for Iraq’s people” frames were used for they possessed a certain degree of ideological weight in promoting a rationale for continued involvement in the country’s affairs of government and security. As alluded to in the discussion of qualitative findings, the idea of the United States acting as an occupying force was an avoided rhetorical as well as thematic frame. Why? Why is the role of the United States in stabilizing, securing, and rebuilding Iraq downplayed? Interestingly enough, as discussed above in defining “insurgency,” the insurgency rhetorical frame is frequent and dominant as it is used to delegitimize the Iraqi resistance. However, the
insurgency rhetorical frame does carry a connotation of being organized against a government. Through its application to the Iraqi resistance, the frame suggests that the Iraqis are indeed revolting against the U.S. forces (and Iraqi security forces) who are acting directly and indirectly as the occupying government. In the acceptance and promotion of the insurgency rhetorical frame, U.S. officials are inadvertently promoting the occupation frame.

As has been discussed in previous sections, the notion of occupation carries significant weight as it suggests responsibility for the overseeing of government and security. However, the U.S. officials attempt to distance themselves from such an understanding as frequent emphasis is placed upon the need for Iraqis to “take responsibility” and “control” of their affairs. In truth, the United States, and to a small extent coalition allies, did indeed act as occupiers in Iraq with a significant portion of the financing and personnel needed to stabilize and secure the country coming from the United States. Similarly, the interim governments and Iraqi officials allowed to gain political prominence were typically ideological and political allies of the United States with some of the Iraqi leadership returning to the country after the invasion from their exiled homes in the United States. Though the officials make a concerted effort to frame the Iraqi violence and unrest as related to issues outside the U.S. involvement in the country’s political affairs, the role as occupier is a strong, if not the strongest, contributor to the Iraqi insurgency. Avoidance of the ideologically complicated notion of “occupiers” is yet another example of ideology’s role in framing (Gamson et al., 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).
Perhaps the rationale for avoiding the occupation frame is traceable to the U.S. culture’s historical view of such a role being perpetrated upon a country striving for independence. Naturally the American Revolution plays a significant role in the U.S. social memory with ideological narratives about freedom over tyranny and democracy over foreign rule. Were rebellion or revolution incorporated into the rhetorical framing and daily coverage of Iraq, connections may have been drawn back to the American Revolution and the ideological narratives it conveys—connections similar to Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) exploration of cognition and the activation of schema in framing analysis. Therefore, the officials’ framing of Iraq’s insurgency as perpetrated by freedom-haters and terrorists suggests a concerted effort to justify continued involvement as well as distancing the United States from being viewed as an occupation force.

Similarly, the lumping together of insurgents within the broader war on terror may have been an effort by officials to distance the U.S./coalition forces from culpability in Iraqi civilian deaths. By constructing all Iraqi resistance fighters as “terrorists” or the pseudo-synonymous “insurgent” rhetorical frames, the loss of Iraqi civilian life effectively distanced the U.S. military’s involvement because “terrorists” are known to take civilian life to achieve their goals. Though the loss of civilian life was often caused by terrorist acts (suicide bombings, etc.), the framing techniques speak to an effort at suggesting all loss of civilian life was caused by terrorist acts when in fact it could easily have been cause by military error, crossfire from engagements or a number of other unfortunate circumstances that yield civilian causalities.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Limitations of methodologies

The qualitative analysis was largely influenced by a handful of officials, and Rumsfeld in particular revealed himself to be a “data rich” speaker. Therefore, assumptions about how the whole collective of U.S. officials viewed the Iraqi violence and unrest is somewhat flawed for the analysis only focused on those officials found in Department of Defense transcripts. Similarly, the transcripts analyzed represented a small portion of the numerous briefings that occurred during the periods of study not to mention the briefings beyond the periods of study. Similarly, as discussed in the reflexivity portion of the qualitative method, the political inclinations of the author may have influenced the qualitative findings.

A limitation of the quantitative study was the collapsing of certain rhetorical frames into one nominal code. In particular, choosing to include nouns describing the state of violence (e.g., rebellion) in the same code as words that referred to people (e.g., rebel) led to an inability to accurately gauge the agency category, which dealt with rhetorical frames applied to people exclusively. Were this method to be replicated, it is advisable to distinguish these two differing rhetorical framing methods. Similarly, a limitation to the rhetorical frame category was the exclusion of certain rhetorical frames,
which revealed themselves upon initiation of the coding exercise. In particular, the word “guerrilla” wasn’t included in the rhetorical frame category, yet it was located in several articles under the category’s coding criteria. Likewise, the term “revolt,” although used in the definition of “insurgency,” was not coded for in this analysis.

Perhaps the greatest limitation of this study is the attempts to meld methodologies as is apparent in the quantitative methodology. The quantitative method employed in this study shares much with rhetorical criticism in that the coder is asked to locate words and is asked to contextualize how the word appears in print. This process is a qualitative assessment by the coder and created problems with intercoder reliability. The obtuseness of language and rhetorical constructions by journalists made the primary coding criteria of violence perpetrated by or upon Iraqi people far more difficult to replicate consistently. Similarly, each coder possesses inherent biases and views of the rhetorical frames analyzed that may have influenced coding reliability.

Yet another limitation was the underlining method employed to draw the coder’s attention to the rhetorical frame in the text. This was used because certain rhetorical frames examined in this study (particularly, “Iraqi” and “forces”) were often used in contexts that didn’t meet the criteria necessary for coding (i.e., descriptions of security forces or “Iraqi” being used as a modifier of various government agencies, etc.). Therefore it can be said that a preliminary round of coding occurred before the actual coding began. However, an intercoder test of this method was done in order to see if a different person would come up with the same underlined words in a set of articles. This test yielded a coefficient reliability score of 89%. Secondly, this method was a time
saving decision. Were coders asked to read over these stories for the criteria laid out in category one, the time needed to code every story accurately and exhaustively could have easily been five times the amount of time it took to complete the content analysis. Furthermore, the density of a certain story’s usage of rhetorical frames (some stories had more than 40 instances) meant that it was quite likely for a coder to become fatigued and miss several key instances in the text.

Even with these limitations in mind, the data gathered in these analyses provide important evidence on the use of rhetorical frames as they are applied to the Iraq War and the civil unrest precipitated by U.S. involvement. Further studies are warranted on the use of rhetorical framing devices in the news as sources and journalists continue to espouse certain ideological and political positions through the use of “seemingly benign” words.

**Implications for future research**

Approaches to researching this topic could benefit from a method similar to Gamson’s (1992) usage of focus groups to examine how individuals negotiate certain frames. In particular this study is limited in that it lacks evidence of how the public (i.e., U.S. citizens and news consumers) comes to define “insurgency” and the ongoing violence in Iraq. This method of study may help in addressing what Johnson-Cartee (2005) describes as the “individual frame,” i.e., the internal structures of the mind and understanding. Implementing Gamson’s methodology would provide an essential companion to the findings in this study.

Similarly, further study on the role of rhetorical framing in news construction could benefit from ethnographic or interview-driven research on the journalists. The
process of drafting a story may be familiar to researchers, but the selection of rhetorical frames in describing complex situations such as Iraq’s post-invasion unrest is an area of research yet to be fully explored. Examining the process of rhetorical frame selection could also benefit from data collected through surveying newsrooms and news producers. Answering the “how” and “why” behind rhetorical framing needs to be addressed through research involving the producers and the production of news content.

Yet another approach to examining the intersection of words, framing, and audience reception would be the incorporation of semiotics. Though this study briefly hints at the complex nature of words and polysemic meaning, it lacks a full analysis of the signifier/signified relationship that semiotics explores. In particular, the “so what” question of this study’s findings in relation to the frequency of words and the role of rhetoric in framing could be further understood through a thorough semiotic analysis of the words selected in framing complex situations like the violence and unrest in Iraq.

**Conclusion**

Returning to Bennett et al.’s (2007) study of rhetorical frames applied to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (“abuse scandal” opposed to “torture), this study features a furtherance of that study’s emphasis on the importance of rhetorical framing in news stories. However, this study features an atomistic approach to examining rhetorical frames opposed to Bennett et al.’s holistic methodology. Bennett et al.’s methodology may have revealed the emergence of “abuse scandal” as a dominant rhetorical frame, yet it may also have missed the framing debate occurring within the news stories between several terms. By examining the frequency of words in the news story, this study suggests
that rhetorical framing occurs at the level of word choice as well as the broader level of
framing as revealed in the qualitative analysis. Similarly, the qualitative analysis revealed
themes and rhetorical methods that contribute to how certain words are perceived and
promoted in the news media.

A central argument to this study that is unique in framing research is the
suggestion that framing occurs at the level of word choice as the decision to promote one
term over another carries ideological and political importance. The act of promoting a
preferred term is also important because of what it excludes. The frequent and
predominant usage of the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frames is important because
those terms are now connected to notions of the Iraq war and the complicated violence
that has come to define the continued U.S. involvement. Selecting the
insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame also yielded a relation of absence in that other
similar terms (e.g., uprising, rebellion, resistance) have not been associated with how the
situation is framed. As a counter to agenda building theory (Cameron et al., 1997; Curtin,
1999), the absence of words and frames suggests a preferred version be promoted over
those not represented in the officials’ agenda.

The Iraq War and its connections to the war on terror have undoubtedly changed
how the news media cover U.S. foreign affairs. What hasn’t changed is the role officials
play in drafting the first frame of reference for how an issue or topic will be discussed in
the news media. Although this study suggests subtle evidence of counter-framing as
espoused by Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model, much of the results reveal a
propensity toward accepting and furthering the U.S. officials’ dominant, chosen frames.
Though the conditions in Iraq have changed numerous times with the ebb and flow of violence, the frames espoused by U.S. officials of a “self-governing and secure Iraq” as well as “the Iraq insurgency and the war on terror” were rarely dropped or altered as the intended agendas for the news media. It is important to note that the former frame was promoted far more often in the earlier news briefings analyzed compared with the latter frame’s predominance in the later news briefings. Perhaps this speaks to the conditions in Iraq shifting to a more unstable and violent country. Or perhaps the frames were reoriented by U.S. officials who sought to tamp down public criticism and resistance to the continued involvement in the Iraq.

Though insurgency and insurgent were once innocuous terms, their role as dominant rhetorical frames in the news coverage of Iraq’s unrest (not to mention the ongoing uprising in Pakistan and Afghanistan) have given import and meaning to these terms. Future engagements and moments of civil unrest may share or lack characteristics with this Iraq resistance and the application of the insurgency/insurgent rhetorical frame will be done so in the interest of drawing on or avoiding comparisons with Iraq’s uprising. It is interesting to note the role this term has played in the broader war on terror frame and it will be important to pay attention to how this rhetorical frame is appropriated and applied in the coming years as the war on terror has been framed to be the next Cold War. Furthermore, Said’s (1979) notion of Orientalism will be an important consideration as the war on terror has been framed as a contemporary revitalization of old practices of dividing the world into East and West. As the war on terror continues to be waged in the coming years, will “insurgencies” occur outside of the East? Is Orientalist’s
perspective going to determine the application of this rhetorical frame exclusively to the region?

With a new president and a global recession, not to mention tightening budgets in news media, the emphasis on covering the U.S.'s involvement in Iraq has certainly waned in recent months. However, the dominant frames and the accompanying rhetoric remain as stories found in the news media today still discuss the war on terror, suicide bombings in Baghdad, and Iraq's budding democracy. Will new rhetorical frames as the conditions and stated purpose for involvement in Iraq's affairs shift? Will history be drafted with the U.S. forces viewed as occupiers? Or will the dominant frames discussed here become the preferred draft of history?
APPENDIX A
CODING INSTRUMENT TABLE

This study examines the application in news stories of certain “rhetorical frames” or words to violence in Iraq and the local perpetrators of such violence. It is not interested in how the news media refer to U.S. soldiers, coalition forces or Iraqi allied forces perpetrating violence, but seeks to examine how the news media refer to the people of Iraq who are both victims and those perpetrators of violence viewed as enemies. By examining news stories about the Iraq War, the Iraqi people, and attempts at establishing law and order, this study seeks to identify the emergence of certain rhetorical frames as they become commonplace in U.S. news about Iraq. In order to examine how a frame emerges, articles have been collected from two differing year-long time periods (May 2003–April 2004, and Nov. 2005–Oct. 2006).

Prior to starting, please record the following information for each article on the coding grid:

- **Story number** *(each article has a story number at the top-center of the page)*
- **Publication**
  1 = New York Times
  2 = Washington Post
  3 = Wire service (check the byline to see if the story is from a wire service such as AP or Reuters)
- **Date** *(publication date mm/dd/yy)*
- **Story Placement** *(the page number is found under SECTION)*
  1 = Front page A section
  2 = Inside A section
  3 = Other section
- **Location or dateline**
  1 = United States
  2 = Iraq
  3 = Other

This is the coding protocol when reading the selected texts. You are asked to examine the text for criteria described in category one. Once that criterion has been met, code for categories two and three as well. Each paragraph (including the headline and photo/graphic captions when available) is numbered in the article. List the paragraph number when writing down the corresponding codes in order to identify their location within the story.
-Paragraph # (note that headline and caption are the letters ‘H’ and ‘C’, respectively)

**Category one-Rhetorical frame and label**

This category is interested in the appearance and application of certain labels in describing unrest and violence in Iraq. Some words are used more broadly in describing the state of unrest in Iraq, whereas other labels are applied to the non-U.S. perpetrators and casualties of violence. Because of the nature of war victims and perpetrators of war are difficult to distinguish, this category asks you to look at how the news articles present violence and unrest in Iraq. Certain words and labels imply acts of violence without an explicit account of such acts; please code in these instances as well.

The articles provided have underlined the appearance of these words in the text. (Below is an example textual instance with an example code distribution.) Examine the underlined word and its context within the story to determine if it fits the criteria described above. Some words and labels are applied to factions or groups that are not clearly identified as allies or enemies (e.g., Kurdish militia), code for the words when it is unclear if the word is being applied to an enemy or ally. Additionally, some of the below words may be used in describing an individual in particular (e.g., “Rebel cleric Sadr”), please code for the word in this instance. Code the word with the following numerals (Note that a pair of words may occur, e.g. “rebel fighters.” In these instances code the noun “fighter” and not the modifier “rebel”):

0=Civilian, people, resident, person (includes references to the Iraqi people)
1=insurgency/insurgent
2=uprising
3=rebellion/rebel
4=fighter(s)
5=terrorist (including references to al-Qaeda members)
6=suicide bombing/er, suicide car bomb
7=militia/militiamen
8=militant(s)
9=force(s) (only references to Iraqi enemy forces, not U.S., coalition or Iraqi allies)
10=sectarian (note, this word is often used as a modifier, e.g., “sectarian violence,” please code in these instances)
11=attacker(s)
12=gunmen(s)
13=civil war

**Category two-agency**

This category determines how the individual(s) are portrayed in relation to the acts of violence within the text. It is dedicated to exploring how certain terms may correspond with the acts of violence. Code for this category when an act of violence has been clearly described in the story text. Code for ‘both’ when the act of violence
described suggests the perpetrator is a victim as well (e.g., “U.S. forces engaged in a bloody battle with insurgents”).

Code ‘0’ if there are no descriptions of violence pertaining to the conflict in Iraq. Additionally, certain words may carry a connotation of violence being perpetrated (i.e., fighter, terrorist, etc.); however, this category is interested only in violence that has happened and is being recounted in the text of the story. Certain words from category one describe a state of violence and not individuals (e.g., “insurgency,” “civil war,” etc.), in these instances code ‘0’.

0=not clear/not applicable
1=victim
2=perpetrator
3=both

Category three-source cited
This category is interested in the source used in the application of the above-mentioned labels. Standard practice in journalism is to name the source of material if it is in direct quotes or being paraphrased by the journalist. The source citation will typically occur in the same sentence as the label coded for in category one; however, a source can sometimes be implied from a previous sentence in cases of paraphrasing. With this variable, the study is tracking who is applying the label and this may require reading.

0=no source or the author (implies no source is cited in the usage)
1=military source (includes soldiers, commanding officers and generals) and retired military
2=U.S. Executive Branch leadership (the President, Pentagon officials not serving in the military, White House officials, and other members of the Executive branch)
3=Iraqi leadership/civilians (governing officials, Iraqi police and military, and religious leaders)
4=Independent nongovernmental organizations and other designated experts (officials from think tanks, University professors, etc.)
5=Other U.S. and western media outlets (such as references to the Associated Press, Reuters, NBC news, etc.)
6=Iraqi, non-western and Middle Eastern media (e.g., Al-Jazeera)
7=Other foreign leadership and officials (including members of the United Nations)
8=Members of Congress and other U.S. governmental leaders not associated with the Executive branch, includes retired and former officials fitting this description
9=U.S. civilians, private security contractors, other

Category four-attribution method
This category is dedicated to the attribution method and is typically specific to the sentence in which the label occurs. Journalistic standards require some method of citation if the information is coming from a source, otherwise no attribution is necessary if it is considered common knowledge or not attributable. In cases of paraphrasing, it may
appear as though the journalist is applying the label, but if the rhetorical frame occurs in a sentence that has a source listed, code it as paraphrasing.

0 = no attribution (the label appears without any discernable source citation)
1 = direct quote (the label appears in a quotation cited to a specific source, includes instances of quotation marks surrounding the word being coded, i.e., “insurgent”)
2 = paraphrase (the label appears in a sentence not quoted, but attributed to a source)

*Example textual instance:*

> A suicide bomber rammed a truck packed with explosives into a convoy of foreign contractors Monday, killing at least 13 people.

**How it’s coded: 1–6,3,0,0**

The ‘1’ is the paragraph or location of the sentence being coded; the ‘6’ corresponds with category one and the rhetorical frame of “suicide bomber” in describing a non-U.S. or Coalition force perpetrator of violence; the ‘3’ corresponds with agency being both since this act was done by a perpetrator and victim; the first ‘0’ corresponds with category two because the word was selected by the author of the sentence and has no source attached to its use; the second ‘0’ corresponds with category three because the label lacks attribution, i.e., it is the words of the author.
APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS BRIEFINGS ANALYZED


APPENDIX C

TABLE 1-COMPARISON OF RHETORICAL FRAME FREQUENCY

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### TABLE 3-RHETORICAL FRAMES AND ATTRIBUTION METHOD

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TABLE 4-TIME COMPARISON OF TERRORIST ATTRIBUTION METHOD

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<th>Paraphrase</th>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


