Nouweland, Anne van denhttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/109842024-03-28T10:15:43Z2024-03-28T10:15:43ZRock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant ProofNouweland, Anne van denhttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/51362007-10-25T09:51:57Z2007-09-12T00:00:00ZRock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof
Nouweland, Anne van den
I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium
of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition
rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed
strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a
player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to
any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
7 p.
2007-09-12T00:00:00ZThe truncated core for games with limited aspirationsNouweland, Anne van denhttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/51172007-10-23T09:50:28Z2007-10-01T00:00:00ZThe truncated core for games with limited aspirations
Nouweland, Anne van den
We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game
with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs
for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the
definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the
effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called
truncated core.
22 p.
2007-10-01T00:00:00ZInterval values for strategic games in which players cooperateCarpente, LuisaCasas-Mendez, BalbinaGarcía-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)Nouweland, Anne van denhttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/19262011-02-17T18:53:21Z2005-09-22T00:00:00ZInterval values for strategic games in which players cooperate
Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den
In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.
36 p.
2005-09-22T00:00:00ZStatus Equilibrium in Local Public Good EconomiesNouweland, Anne van denWooders, Myrna Holtzhttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/19242011-02-18T20:19:36Z2005-09-19T00:00:00ZStatus Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies
Nouweland, Anne van den; Wooders, Myrna Holtz
We define a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents’ cost shares in any possible jurisdiction. We provide an axiomatic charaterization of status equilibrium using consistency properties.
10 p.
2005-09-19T00:00:00Z