Oregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1 (2011)https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/117532024-03-28T11:10:04Z2024-03-28T11:10:04ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 335-358 : Muddying the Waters of Clean Water Act Permitting: NEDC ReconsideredDahab, Nadiahttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/117612019-03-14T21:19:54Z2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 335-358 : Muddying the Waters of Clean Water Act Permitting: NEDC Reconsidered
Dahab, Nadia
Two related sections of the Clean Water Act have recently received attention in the Oregon courts—and not without considerable confusion. These Clean Water Act sections allow certain pollutant discharges into Oregon’s waterways, and the recent litigation has raised questions about their application to local mining operations.
Gold mining has a long history in the western United States, and Oregon is no exception. Since the Gold Rush in the mid-1800s, prospectors have scoured the West for precious metals, laying claim to their “right to mine” under the General Mining Act of 1872. In recent years, recreational prospectors have begun using modern small suction dredges, a more accessible and lower-impact alternative to large dredging equipment, to search for the precious minerals on federal lands. Yet even small suction dredge mining is known to taint streams with toxins, disrupt wildlife habitats, and, ultimately, impact human health.
Environmentalists have opposed the practice for years. In Oregon, the Northwest Environmental Defense Center has been fighting state regulations that permit small suction dredge mining practices since the state issued the regulations in 1997. Within the past two years, after California passed a statewide moratorium prohibiting the activity, small suction dredge mining on Oregon streams has become particularly popular, and its impacts particularly noteworthy.
24 pages
2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 303-334 : Cyberstalking and Free Speech: Rethinking the Rangel Standard in the Age of the InternetAjmani, Nishahttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/117602015-06-18T01:43:23Z2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 303-334 : Cyberstalking and Free Speech: Rethinking the Rangel Standard in the Age of the Internet
Ajmani, Nisha
Each month, it seems, there are many new technological gadgets, hundreds of new smart phone applications, and Facebook changes that allow for increased information sharing and social contact. While such technological advances can make our lives easier, provide for greater creative expression, and encourage more expansive sharing of ideas and thoughts, such improvements may lead to negative consequences that must be addressed.
Like other forms of cyber-victimization, cyberstalking presents unique problems that make it difficult for existing laws and law enforcement to adequately respond to and prevent criminal activity that is conducted using the Internet and other technological media. For example, cyberstalkers can easily remain anonymous online, and they can also take on the identity of their victims or any other third parties as a means to increase fear in the victims. Furthermore, because of the virtual context of cyberstalking, victims may be completely unaware of the perpetrator’s physical location—thereby potentially causing more fear and uneasiness in the victim.
In addition, along with the numerous law enforcement difficulties that cyberstalking has created, cyberstalking has altered the landscape of free speech litigation as it pertains to the crime. Courts and American society more generally have long regarded the First Amendment as one of the primary hallmarks of the Constitution. There are, however, several forms of expression that the First Amendment and its state constitutional counterparts do not protect because of their potential danger to society—such as threats, child pornography, and incitement to unlawful action. This Comment explores how lawmakers can tailor laws or create new legislation to effectively respond to the dangers of cyberstalking while adhering to the American commitment to free speech; this Comment narrows its analysis of this issue to Oregon law specifically.
32 pages
2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 247-302 : Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar InheritanceSpivack, Carlahttps://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/117592015-06-17T22:45:00Z2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 247-302 : Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance
Spivack, Carla
Pick your statistic: in the United States, every nine seconds a woman is physically abused. The Department of Justice concluded that between 1998 and 2002, of the almost 3.5 million violent crimes committed against family members, forty-nine percent of these were crimes against spouses. In a 1995–1996 study conducted in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, nearly 25% of women and 7.6% of men were raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner, or dating partner/acquaintance at some time in their lifetime (based on a survey of 16,000 participants, equally male and female). Despite a dramatic increase in awareness over the past twenty years, the problem seems intractable.
56 pages
2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 191-246 : An “Outside Limit” for Refund Suits: The Case Against the Tax Exception to the Six-Year Bar on Claims Against the GovernmentGustafson, Adam R. F.https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/117582015-06-17T22:17:41Z2011-01-01T00:00:00ZOregon Law Review : Vol. 90, No. 1, p. 191-246 : An “Outside Limit” for Refund Suits: The Case Against the Tax Exception to the Six-Year Bar on Claims Against the Government
Gustafson, Adam R. F.
Longstanding judicial precedent and the official position of the IRS agree that federal tax refund suits are limited only by the two-year statute of limitations of § 6532(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which is triggered only when the IRS mails the claimant a notice of disallowance. This Article contends that tax refund litigation is also governed by the six-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) on “every civil action commenced against the United States,” which is triggered upon the accrual of a claim. The Supreme Court alluded to this dual-limitation scheme in 2008 in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., stating in dicta that the six-year bar places an “outside limit” on the tax-specific limitation.
56 pages
2011-01-01T00:00:00Z