• Research Support
      • Starting Library Research
      • Research Guides
      • Subject Librarians
      • Digital Scholarship Center
      • Publishing & Copyright
      • Research Data Management
      • Study Skills & Campus Resources
      • Request a Purchase
    • Using the Libraries
      • Rooms & Study Spaces
      • Borrowing & Requesting
      • Connect from Off-campus
      • ILL (Interlibrary Loan)
      • Course Reserves
      • Technology, Printing, & Scanning
      • Tutoring at the UO Libraries
      • Classroom Technology Support
      • Canvas Support
      • Accessibility
    • Collections
      • Databases A-Z
      • Scholars' Bank
      • Videos, Music, Photos
      • Special Collections & University Archives
      • Unique Collections
      • Government Documents
      • Maps & Aerial Photography
      • Oregon Digital
      • Oregon Newspapers
    • Library Accounts
      • LibrarySearch Account
      • ILLiad Account (Interlibrary Loan)
      • Endnote Web (Citation Manager)
    • About
      • Hours & Locations
      • Staff & Department Directory
      • News & Events
      • Calendar
      • Mission, Values, & Strategic Directions
      • Diversity & Inclusion
      • Policies
      • Jobs
      • Comments & Suggestions
    • Chat/Ask Us
      • Email
      • Phone
      • Text
    View Item 
    •   Scholars' Bank Home
    • University Archives
    • University of Oregon Administration
    • The Office of Research, Innovation and Graduate Education
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Scholars' Bank Home
    • University Archives
    • University of Oregon Administration
    • The Office of Research, Innovation and Graduate Education
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Essays in political economy

    View/Open
    Friedrich_Silke_phd2010sp.pdf (1.577Mb)

    Date
    2010-06
    Author
    Friedrich, Silke, 1980-
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Author
    Friedrich, Silke, 1980-
    Abstract
    The following essays address the impact of special interest groups on economic decision making processes. The hypothesis of the first essay is that there exists a dynamic relationship between politicians and lobby groups. Politicians may choose to support "projects" proposed to them by lobbies because they yield clear economic benefits. However, governmental support may continue after these benefits have been exhausted, implying a cost to society and yielding rents to the lobbies. A theoretical framework is developed to model the incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from which all economic rents have been extracted, politicians are rationally reelected. In the second chapter I examine how structural changes in the US steel industry affect the voting behavior of House Representatives on trade related bills. The hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC bailed out the pension plans of major steel firms. Representatives have an incentive to vote less for protectionist policies, because the bailout makes the steel firms more competitive. But the Representatives also have an incentive to yield to the demands of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The data set underlying this study is a panel including votes on trade related bills over 9 years. The results obtained using fixed effects techniques support the hypothesis. In the third chapter, I develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries. I model a society with two different groups of citizens, who have different preferences over public goods, to analyze under which political regime the dissolution of these groups into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions and civil wars allows me to look at the effects of both forms of political violence. I find that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a. country to dissolve peacefully. The model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies, whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
    URI


    Collections
    • Economics Theses and Dissertations [61]
    • Theses and Dissertations [2826]

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Browse

    All of Scholars' BankCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    CAMPUS

    • News
    • Events
    • Maps
    • Directions
    • Class Schedule
    • Academic Calendar

    RESOURCES

    • Webmail
    • Canvas
    • Duckweb
    • Find People
    • A–Z Index
    • UO Libraries

    RELATED INFORMATION

    • Library Accessibility
    • Privacy Policy
    • Giving
    UO Libraries
    1501 Kincaid Street
    1239 University of Oregon
    Eugene, OR 97403-1299

    T: 541-346-3053

    FacebookTwitterYouTubeInstagram

    CareersPrivacy PolicyAboutFind People
    University of Oregon
    ©University of Oregon. All Rights Reserved.

    UO prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national or ethnic origin, age, religion, marital status, disability, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression in all programs, activities and employment practices as required by Title IX, other applicable laws, and policies. Retaliation is prohibited by UO policy. Questions may be referred to the Title IX Coordinator, Office of Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity, or to the Office for Civil Rights. Contact information, related policies, and complaint procedures are listed on the statement of non-discrimination.