Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 785-810 : The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?

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Title: Oregon Law Review : Vol. 89, No. 3, p. 785-810 : The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?
Author: Greaney, Thomas L.
Abstract: In the run-up to its enactment, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) elicited howls of protest from opponents who claimed the federal government was taking over the American healthcare system, micromanaging medicine, and generally exposing the nation to the bête noire of socialized medicine. Hyperbole, misrepresentation, and chauvinism aside, these sound bites suffer from a deeper flaw: they mischaracterize the fundamental thrust of the new law. Though the ACA establishes significant new regulatory authority, this is not a new development (indeed it can be faulted for preserving pre-existing regulatory regimes), nor does it impair market competition. To the contrary, much of the law aims at improving conditions conducive to effective competition. With numerous programs designed to correct perverse incentives in the payment system, to mitigate market imperfections, and to make the delivery system responsive to market signals, the ACA might well be rechristened as the “Accommodation of Competition Act.”
Description: 36 p.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11131
Date: 2011


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