Abstract:
In this dissertation I examine the theoretical underpinnings necessary for a philosophy of liberationaccount of law and suggest an alternative conceptualization of the function of law and political
institutions, following the normative contributions of Enrique Dussel’s political philosophy of
liberation. I argue that, while Dussel has not yet developed a complete account of legality proper
in his political philosophy, his work contains resources for developing a liberatory philosophy of
law. Specifically, this dissertation explores the normative dimensions of this question by offering
a systematization of Dussel´s philosophy of liberation of law through which is possible to conceive
an alternative form of constituent power and institutions that result from this decolonial tradition.
In pursuing this inquiry, I connect concepts from liberation philosophy to questions about the
meaning of legal notions that are understood as the basic framework of our political life. I examine
the notion of constituent power and its potential to redefine political and legal institutions.