Now showing items 9-23 of 23

    • Fixed Costs, Foreign Direct Investment, and Gravity with Zeros 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Kristjánsdóttir, Helga (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-06)
      Fixed costs play a crucial role in current models of foreign direct investment (FDI), yet they are almost entirely ignored in empirical treatments of FDI. We fill this gap by using a 1989-2001 panel of FDI flows into ...
    • Fragmentation of Headquarter Services and FDI 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-09)
      I develop a simple model in which production of skill-intensive headquarter services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities between types of skilled labor. This setting indicates that ...
    • Gradualism in Tax Treaties with Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment 

      Chisik, Richard; Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-06-01)
      Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI). Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties ...
    • Hunting High and Low for Vertical FDI 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-08-01)
      Recently the two dominant models of foreign direct investment (FDI), the horizontal and vertical models, have been synthesized into the knowledge capital (KK) model. Empirical tests, however, have found that the horizontal ...
    • Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, Drug Purity and a Test of Rational Drug Use 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-04-10)
      As of 1987, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) has imposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug traffickers based on the quantity of the drug involved regardless of its purity. Using the STRIDE dataset on drug arrests and a ...
    • The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition and Two-Way Capital 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-01-01)
      Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do call for either credits or exemptions when calculating a multinational’s domestic taxes. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where ...
    • Population Aging, Foreign Direct Investment, and Tax Competition 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Reed, Robert R. (Robert Ray), 1970- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-05-25)
      This paper studies the role of population aging for foreign direct investment and the strategic taxation of capital. Importantly, our theoretical model suggests that the labor market implications of aging differ from the ...
    • Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-11)
      It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight ...
    • Self-Protection: Fragmentation of Headquarter Services and FDI 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-11)
      I develop a simple model in which production of skill-intensive headquarter services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities between types of skilled labor. This setting indicates that ...
    • State Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Winnable War? 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-05-01)
      When a multinational firm invests in a country, potential host states compete for the firm by offering firm-specific tax reductions. Critics blast such incentives as a prisoner’s dilemma that transfers rents to the firm ...
    • Tax Competition and Foreign Capital 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Gresik, Thomas A. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-01-01)
      This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, ...
    • Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-03)
      This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
    • Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry: The Case of Heterogeneous Fixed Costs 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon. Dept of Economics, 2007-02)
      This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
    • Tax Competition for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Egger, Hartmut; Egger, Peter (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-04-10)
      This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through ...
    • Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment 

      Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-10)
      Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign ...