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  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2000-07-01)
    Some firms voluntarily abstain from using child labor, presumably in response to concerns about the welfare of overseas child workers. These firms do not, however, support banning the imports of competitors’ products ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Shea, Paul, 1977- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-07-31)
    This paper develops a simple two-country, two-good model of international trade and borrowing that suppresses all previous sources of current account dynamics. Under rational expectations, international debt follows a ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Ellis, Christopher J. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
    Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Naughton, Helen T. (Helen Tammela), 1976- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-07)
    Inefficient competition in emissions taxes creates benefits from international cooperation. In the presence of cross-border pollution, proximate (neighboring) countries may have greater incentives to cooperate than distant ...
  • Blonigen, Bruce A.; Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
    We explore the impact of bilateral tax treaties on foreign direct investment using data from OECD countries over the period 1982-1992. We find that recent treaty formation does not promote new investment, contrary to the ...
  • Blonigen, Bruce A.; Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-01-01)
    The effects of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity have been unexplored, despite significant ongoing activities by countries to negotiate and ratify these treaties. This paper estimates the impact of bilateral tax ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Ionascu, Delia; Kristjánsdóttir, Helga (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-05)
    This paper applies the panel fixed effects with vector decomposition estimator to three FDI datasets to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables on FDI while including fixed effects. We find that the omission of ...
  • Blonigen, Bruce A.; Davies, Ronald B.; Head, Keith (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-03-01)
    No abstract was submitted.
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Kristjánsdóttir, Helga (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-06)
    Fixed costs play a crucial role in current models of foreign direct investment (FDI), yet they are almost entirely ignored in empirical treatments of FDI. We fill this gap by using a 1989-2001 panel of FDI flows into ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-09)
    I develop a simple model in which production of skill-intensive headquarter services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities between types of skilled labor. This setting indicates that ...
  • Chisik, Richard; Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-06-01)
    Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI). Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-08-01)
    Recently the two dominant models of foreign direct investment (FDI), the horizontal and vertical models, have been synthesized into the knowledge capital (KK) model. Empirical tests, however, have found that the horizontal ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-04-10)
    As of 1987, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) has imposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug traffickers based on the quantity of the drug involved regardless of its purity. Using the STRIDE dataset on drug arrests and a ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-01-01)
    Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do call for either credits or exemptions when calculating a multinational’s domestic taxes. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Reed, Robert R. (Robert Ray), 1970- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-05-25)
    This paper studies the role of population aging for foreign direct investment and the strategic taxation of capital. Importantly, our theoretical model suggests that the labor market implications of aging differ from the ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-11)
    It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-11)
    I develop a simple model in which production of skill-intensive headquarter services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities between types of skilled labor. This setting indicates that ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-05-01)
    When a multinational firm invests in a country, potential host states compete for the firm by offering firm-specific tax reductions. Critics blast such incentives as a prisoner’s dilemma that transfers rents to the firm ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Gresik, Thomas A. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-01-01)
    This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-03)
    This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...

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