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  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-01-01)
    Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do call for either credits or exemptions when calculating a multinational’s domestic taxes. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Reed, Robert R. (Robert Ray), 1970- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-05-25)
    This paper studies the role of population aging for foreign direct investment and the strategic taxation of capital. Importantly, our theoretical model suggests that the labor market implications of aging differ from the ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-11)
    It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-11)
    I develop a simple model in which production of skill-intensive headquarter services are fragmented across borders in order to take advantage of complementarities between types of skilled labor. This setting indicates that ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-05-01)
    When a multinational firm invests in a country, potential host states compete for the firm by offering firm-specific tax reductions. Critics blast such incentives as a prisoner’s dilemma that transfers rents to the firm ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Gresik, Thomas A. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-01-01)
    This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-03)
    This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon. Dept of Economics, 2007-02)
    This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Egger, Hartmut; Egger, Peter (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-04-10)
    This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-10)
    Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign ...

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