dc.contributor.author |
Bush, Darren |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Mayne, Carrie |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2007-07-31T19:05:55Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2007-07-31T19:05:55Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2004 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
83 Or. L. Rev. 207 (2004) |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
0196-2043 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/4641 |
|
dc.description |
80 p. |
en |
dc.format.extent |
425769 bytes |
|
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
|
dc.language.iso |
en_US |
en |
dc.publisher |
University of Oregon School of Law |
en |
dc.subject |
Antitrust law |
|
dc.subject |
California -- Economic conditions |
|
dc.title |
Oregon Law Review : Vol. 83, No. 1, p. 207-286 : In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) |
en |
dc.title.alternative |
In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) |
en |
dc.title.alternative |
Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use) |
en |
dc.type |
Article |
en |