Now showing items 14-33 of 159

    • Can Perpetual Learning Explain the Forward Premium Puzzle? 

      Chakraborty, Avik, 1975-; Evans, George W., 1949- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-08-28)
      Under rational expectations and risk neutrality the linear projection of exchange rate change on the forward premium has a unit coefficient. However, empirical estimates of this coefficient are significantly less than ...
    • Capital Controls: An Evaluation 

      Magud, Nicolas; Reinhart, Carmen M. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-06-02)
      The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious apples-to-oranges problems: (i) There is no unified theoretical framework to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of controls; (ii) there is significant ...
    • Capital Controls: Myth and Reality, A Portfolio Balance Approach to Capital Controls 

      Magud, Nicolas; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-11)
      The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious apples-to-oranges problems: (i) There is no unified theoretical framework to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of controls; (ii) there is significant ...
    • The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation 

      Andreoni, James; Harbaugh, William; Vesterlund, Lise (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-08-20)
      We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the 2×2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing ...
    • CEO Turnover and Foreign Market Participation 

      Blonigen, Bruce A. (Bruce Aloysius); Wooster, Rossitza B. (Rossitza Bouneva), 1971- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-03)
      Anecdotal evidence suggests that new CEOs with foreign backgrounds direct their firms to become more international in their operations. We examine this hypothesis formally using data on U.S. S&P-500 manufacturing firms ...
    • Childbearing, marriage and human capital investment 

      Gray, Jo Anna; Stone, Joe A. (Joe Allan), 1948-; Stockard, Jean (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-02)
      This paper proposes and tests a simple joint explanation for i) increases in marital and nonmarital birth rates in the United States over recent decades, ii) the dramatic rise in the share of nonmarital births, and iii) ...
    • Cohort Effects on Nonmarital Fertility 

      Stockard, Jean; Gray, Jo Anna; O'Brien, Robert; Stone, Joe A. (Joe Allan), 1948- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-05)
      The authors employ a newly developed method to disentangle age, period and cohort effects on nonmarital fertility ratios (NFR) from 1972 to 2002 for U.S. women aged 20-44 – with a focus on three specific cohort factors: ...
    • Comment on "Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy" by Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 

      Evans, George W., 1949- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-03-31)
      Summarizes the Orphanides-Williams argument, locates the paper within the rapidly growing literature on learning and monetary policy, and offers specific comments on natural extensions or alternative approaches.
    • Competition in Taxes and Performance Requirements for Foreign Direct Investment 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Ellis, Christopher J. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
      Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that ...
    • Consumer and competitor reactions: Evidence from a retail-gasoline field experiment 

      Barron, John M.; Umbeck, John R., 1945-; Waddell, Glen R. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-09)
      The standard differentiated-product model with Nash-equilibrium price setting suggests that the density of sellers in a market can affect both a seller’s price elasticity of demand and a competitor’s reaction to a price ...
    • Cooperation in Environmental Policy: A Spatial Approach 

      Davies, Ronald B.; Naughton, Helen T. (Helen Tammela), 1976- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-07)
      Inefficient competition in emissions taxes creates benefits from international cooperation. In the presence of cross-border pollution, proximate (neighboring) countries may have greater incentives to cooperate than distant ...
    • Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts 

      Voorneveld, Mark; Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
      A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an ...
    • Coordination on saddle path solutions: the eductive viewpoint 

      Evans, George W., 1949-; Guesnerie, R. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-05-15)
      We investigate local strong rationality (LSR) in a one step forward looking univariate model with memory one. Eductive arguments are used to determine when common knowledge (CK) that the solution is near some perfect ...
    • Coordination on Saddle-Path Solutions: The Eductive Viewpoint -- Linear Multivariate Models 

      Evans, George W., 1949-; Guesnerie, R. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-10-10)
      We examine local strong rationality (LSR) in multivariate models with both forward-looking expectations and predetermined variables. Given hypothetical common knowledge restrictions that the dynamics will be close to those ...
    • Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model 

      Ellis, Christopher J.; Fender, John (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-10)
      We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the "Engine of Growth" is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use ...
    • Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition 

      Ellis, Christopher J.; Dincer, Oguzhan C., 1969- (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-03-01)
      Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. ...
    • Costly Intermediation and the Poverty of Nations 

      Chakraborty, Shankha; Lahiri, Amartya (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-01-01)
      Distortions in private investment due to credit frictions, and in public investment due to corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, have both been suggested as important factors in accounting for the cross-country per ...
    • Currency Mismatch, Openness and Exchange Rate Regime Choice 

      Magud, Nicolas (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2004-09-01)
      The paper analyzes the choice of an exchange rate regime for a small open economy indebted in foreign currency, incorporating the ¯nancial accelerator. Conventional wisdom suggests that floating regimes should insulate the ...
    • Democratic Errors 

      Fender, John; Ellis, Christopher J. (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2008-04-01)
      In this paper we combine Acemoglu's model of the economic origins of democracy with Lohmann's model of political mass protest. This alllows us to provide an analysis of the economic causes of political regime change ...
    • Demonstrating worker quality through strategic absenteeism 

      Harbaugh, William; Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-06-14)
      Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect ...