ORI Research Bulletin, Volume 13
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Browsing ORI Research Bulletin, Volume 13 by Author "Dawes, Robyn M."
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Item Open Access The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection, No. 2(Oregon Research Institute, 1973-09) Dawes, Robyn M.If individuals were to decide for themselves whether to buy anti-pollution devices for their cars, a commons dilemma would result (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968). The money saved by not buying the device accrues directly to the individual while the harm done by the resulting pollution is shared equally by all. Moreover, the argument for not buying is independent of others' decisions --because if they do buy, the individual who does not makes no appreciable contribution to pollution, and if they don't the individual who does makes no appreciable contribution to reducing pollution . Yet everyone would prefer to have everyone buy . This paper presents an experimental commons dilemma game that has all the properties of the commons dilemma and that reduces to a prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two players.Item Open Access The Decision to Pollute, No. 4(Oregon Research Institute, 1973-12) Dawes, Robyn M.; Delay, Jack; Chaplin, WilliamOne way of studying the pollution problem is to examine the decision making process in situations in which gain accrues directly to an individual while loss is spread out across the group of which the individual is a member. Such a situation has been termed a commons dilemma by Lloyd in 1833; it is a variant of the well known prisoner's dilemma. The mathematical model of rational decision making when facing the commons dilemma implies the dismal conclusion that individuals acting rationally will end up destroying, or nearly destroying, the common wealth. Suggestions are made concerning ways in which people may be persuaded not to pollute our environment.