Lambert, Peter J.

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https://hdl.handle.net/1794/3695

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Browsing Lambert, Peter J. by Subject "Income tax"

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    Base independence in the analysis of tax policy effects: with an application to Norway 1992–2004
    (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-10-27) Lambert, Peter J.; Thoresen, Thor Olav
    The analysis contrasts results of two recently expounded micro-level data approaches to derive robust intertemporal characterizations of redistributional effects of income tax schedules; the fixed-income procedure of Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994) and the transplant-and-compare method of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002). Our study is normative in that the Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) index of tax progressivity is employed. This enables contributions from vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity also to be assessed, using for the latter one classical measure and one no reranking measure. When the competing methodologies are applied to Norwegian data for 1992–2004, their respective strengths and weaknesses are revealed. The transplant-and-compare procedure is found to have a number of advantages.
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    The Equal Sacrifice Principle Revisited
    (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-06-01) Lambert, Peter J.; Naughton, Helen T. (Helen Tammela), 1976-
    What does an equal sacrifice tax look like in the case of a rank-dependent social welfare function? One's tax liability evidently becomes a function of one's income and one's position in the distribution in such a case, but not much else appears to be known. (Menahem Yaari touched upon the issue in his paper "A controversial proposal concerning inequality measurement," Journal of Economic Theory 1988, but focused only on a poll tax.) In this paper, we determine the properties of the equal sacrifice tax for a wide class of rank-dependent social welfare functions, and integrate the theory with that already available for the class of utilitarian social welfare functions. In an additional step, we analyze the equal sacrifice tax for a class of mixed utilitarian and rank-dependent social welfare functions, and finally we review what this synthesis has achieved.