Harbaugh, Bill

Permanent URI for this collection

https://hdl.handle.net/1794/693

The collection highlights some of the research being undertaken by Bill Harbaugh, Associate Professor, UO Economics Department.

A.K.A.
W. T. Harbaugh

William T. Harbaugh

538 PLC
University of Oregon

Economics Department

Eugene, Oregon 97403-1285

email: bill@harbaugh.org

Phone: 541-346-1244
Fax: 541-346-1243

Vitae

For more information, visit his personal web site at: http://harbaugh.org

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Browsing Harbaugh, Bill by Subject "Fairness"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    Bargaining by Children
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-07-20) Liday, Steven G.; Harbaugh, William; Krause, Kate
    We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with age and that most of this change appears to be related to changes in preferences for fairness, rather than bargaining ability. Younger children make and accept smaller ultimatum proposals than do older children, Even young children are quite strategic in their behavior, making much smaller dictator than ultimatum proposals. Boys claim to be more aggressive bargainers than girls do, but they are not. Older girls make larger dictator proposals than older boys, but among younger children the proposals differ much more by height than by sex. We argue that the existence of systematic differences in bargaining behavior across age and sex supports the argument that culture is a determinant of economic behavior, and suggests that people acquire this culture during childhood. We argue that the height differences indicate that forces other than culture, in the usual sense of the word, are also important. Publisher Info
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    The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-08-20) Andreoni, James; Harbaugh, William; Vesterlund, Lise
    We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the 2×2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing the proposer's payoff. We find substantial demands for both punishments and rewards. While rewards alone have little influence on cooperation, punishments have some. When the two are combined the effect on cooperation is dramatic, suggesting that rewards and punishments are complements in producing cooperation. Providing new insights to what motivates these demands is the surprising finding that the demands for rewards depend on the availability of punishments.