Chakraborty, Shankha

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https://hdl.handle.net/1794/3687

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Browsing Chakraborty, Shankha by Subject "Credit frictions"

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    Costly Intermediation and the Poverty of Nations
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-01-01) Chakraborty, Shankha; Lahiri, Amartya
    Distortions in private investment due to credit frictions, and in public investment due to corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, have both been suggested as important factors in accounting for the cross-country per capita income distribution. We introduce two modifications to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model to incorporate these distortions. The model is calibrated using data from 79 countries to examine the quantitative implication of these margins. We find that financial frictions account for less than 2% of the cross-country variation in relative income. Even accounting for mismeasurement, financial frictions can typically explain less than 5% of the income gap between the five richest and the five poorest countries in the world. Distortions in the public investment process, on the other hand, seem more promising. There is both more variation in the measured value of the public capital distortion and it can account for more than 25% of the income gap between the richest and poorest countries in our sample.
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    The Development and Structure of Financial Systems
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-11-01) Chakraborty, Shankha; Ray, Tridip
    We introduce monitored bank loans and non-monitored tradeable securities as sources of external finance for firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Due to frictions arising from moral hazard, access to credit and each type of financial instrument are determined by the wealth distribution. We study the depth of credit markets (financial development) and conditions under which the financial system relies more on either type of external finance (financial structure). We identify initial inequality, investment size and institutional factors as key determinants of financial development, while an economy’s financial structure is shaped by its investment technology and legal and financial institutions. The model’s predictions are consistent with historical and recent development experience.
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    Inequality, Industrialization and Financial Structure
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-01-01) Chakraborty, Shankha; Ray, Tridip
    We introduce monitored bank loans and non-monitored tradeable securities as sources of external finance for firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Due to frictions arising from moral hazard, access to credit and each type of financial instrument are determined by the wealth distribution. We study the depth of credit markets (financial development) and conditions under which the financial system relies more on either type of external finance (financial structure). Initial inequality is shown to determine financial development, with high inequality preventing developed systems from emerging. A more equitable income distribution as well as larger capital requirements of industry tend to promote a bank-based system. Investment risk promotes a greater reliance on non- monitored sources, while institutional parameters affect the financial structure in intuitively plausible ways. The model's predictions are consistent with historical and recent development experience.
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    What do Information Frictions do?
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-02-14) Bhattacharya, Joydeep; Chakraborty, Shankha
    Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby opening up the role for institutions, (ii) inject some realism into their models, and (iii) explain cross country differences in output and employment. We present an overlapping generations model with production in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists along with a credit market friction (costly state verification). The simultaneous presence and interaction of these two frictions is studied. We show that credit frictions have a multiplier effect on economic activity, by directly affecting investment and indirectly through the unemployment rate. The labor market friction, on the other hand, affects unemployment in the short- and long-run but has only a short-run effect on capital accumulation.