Can We Diagnose the Health of Ecosystems?
| dc.contributor.author | Dewberry, Thomas Charles | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-11T21:08:02Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-12-11T21:08:02Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1995-06 | |
| dc.description | 245 pages | |
| dc.description.abstract | This study is a philosophical examination of the question, "Can we diagnose the health of ecosystems?" Two senses of this question are investigated: 1) Are ecosystems the kind of entities to which "health" applies? 2) Assuming that ecosystem health is a coherent concept, how do we diagnose the health of ecosystems? This study begins with a distinction, first made by Michael Polanyi, between machines and holistic inanimate objects, such as thunderstorms. Thunderstorms are reducible to the laws of chemistry and physics, while machines are not Machines have two levels of control, the laws of physics and chemistry, and operational principles, which harness the parts to achieve the purpose of the machine. The importance of this distinction is that the concept of health only applies to objects which have two or more levels of control. This study concludes that the concept of health applies to ecosystems. Ecosystems are not reducible to their parts. The diagnosis of ecosystem health is similar to a medical doctor diagnosing the health of a patient, because ecosystems and humans are both members of the class of objects to which "health" applies. The diagnostician, with each specimen observed, simultaneously modifies the standard of normality for the class of object, at the same time the individual is appraised according to the standard. Diagnosing the health of a patient is a skill which cannot be reduced to an objective measurable standard. However, ecosystem are not individuals, so diagnosing the health of ecosystems is not exactly analogous to diagnosing the health of a human or horse. This study has important implications for resource management and policy. Procedures, such as the federal interagency watershed analysis, which are built on a hierarchical theory based on the rate of processes, make ecosystem health incoherent. The federal strategy appears to hold the implicit assumption that ecosystems are reducible to their parts. Watershed analysis is also an ambiguous procedure at best. It rejects the medical model, and it may destroy the skill of diagnosis, by attempting to replace it with a measurable standard. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/30235 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon | |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0-US | |
| dc.rights | UO theses and dissertations are provided for research and educational purposes and may be under copyright by the author or the author’s heirs. Please contact us <mailto:scholars@uoregon.edu> with any questions or comments. In your email, please be sure to include the URL and title of the specific items of your inquiry. | |
| dc.subject | health of ecosystems, Polanyi, biology, philosophy, ecosystem health, machines, holistic inanimate objects | |
| dc.title | Can We Diagnose the Health of Ecosystems? | |
| dc.type | Thesis / Dissertation |