The Equal Sacrifice Principle Revisited

dc.contributor.authorLambert, Peter J.
dc.contributor.authorNaughton, Helen T. (Helen Tammela), 1976-
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-02T19:45:52Z
dc.date.available2006-10-02T19:45:52Z
dc.date.issued2006-06-01
dc.description21 p.en
dc.description.abstractWhat does an equal sacrifice tax look like in the case of a rank-dependent social welfare function? One's tax liability evidently becomes a function of one's income and one's position in the distribution in such a case, but not much else appears to be known. (Menahem Yaari touched upon the issue in his paper "A controversial proposal concerning inequality measurement," Journal of Economic Theory 1988, but focused only on a poll tax.) In this paper, we determine the properties of the equal sacrifice tax for a wide class of rank-dependent social welfare functions, and integrate the theory with that already available for the class of utilitarian social welfare functions. In an additional step, we analyze the equal sacrifice tax for a class of mixed utilitarian and rank-dependent social welfare functions, and finally we review what this synthesis has achieved.en
dc.format.extent1162904 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/3421
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2006-4en
dc.subjectEqual sacrificeen
dc.subjectIncome taxen
dc.subjectEquityen
dc.titleThe Equal Sacrifice Principle Revisiteden
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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