Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts

dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Mark
dc.contributor.authorNouweland, Anne van den
dc.date.accessioned2003-08-13T18:52:42Z
dc.date.available2003-08-13T18:52:42Z
dc.date.issued2001-06-01
dc.description.abstractA new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors representing the outcomes of each of the criteria depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.en
dc.format.extent0 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/78
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept. of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2001-11
dc.subjectEconomicsen
dc.subjectGamesen
dc.subjectPublicen
dc.subjectPrivateen
dc.titleCooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Conceptsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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