Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof
| dc.contributor.author | Nouweland, Anne van den | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-24T19:36:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-10-24T19:36:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-09-12 | |
| dc.description | 7 p. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 128605 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/5136 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2007-12 | en |
| dc.title | Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |