Response to Livingston's Response: What's Missing?
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Date
2009
Authors
Wheeler, Samuel C.
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Oregon
Abstract
At this point in the discussion, I am beginning to suspect that Livingston and I have different
conceptions of what Davidson’s “framework” is. I take it to be quite a bit more than the idea
that a theory of meaning is a recursive truth-definition. So this response will set out what I take
Davidson’s view and framework to be, and explain why, on that understanding, the inadequacies
Livingston and McDowell ascribe to Davidson’s framework are not genuine inadequacies. Of
course it may well be that I am just not getting something.
I will begin by discussing two peripheral points: First, my understanding of Davidsonian
indeterminacy makes it something more than ambiguity that can be cleared up by determining
the intention of the speaker or author. Second, addressing the remark at the bottom of
footnote 14, I give an explanation of what I take to be the Quinean-Davidsonian approach to
ontology. The main part of this response discusses the central issue of whether a Davidsonian
account of language is adequate as a philosophical account of language.
Description
5 pages
Keywords
Citation
Wheeler III, Samuel. "Response to Livingston's Response: What's Missing?." Konturen [Online], 2.1 (2009): 71-75.