Tax Competition for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry
| dc.contributor.author | Davies, Ronald B. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Egger, Hartmut | |
| dc.contributor.author | Egger, Peter | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-02-21 | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-02-21 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003-04-10 | |
| dc.description | 40 p. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that, in the absence of tax competition, the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can use its tax rate to enforce exporting instead of FDI, thereby leading to a Nash equilibrium in the tax setting game which is associated with higher world welfare than the no-tax situation. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 202073 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/3878 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2006-19 | en |
| dc.subject | Tax competition | en |
| dc.subject | Multinational enterprises | en |
| dc.subject | Profit taxation | en |
| dc.subject | Double taxation relief | en |
| dc.title | Tax Competition for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |