Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI
| dc.contributor.author | Davies, Ronald B. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Liebman, Benjamin H., 1971- | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2004-11-09 | |
| dc.date.available | 2004-11-09 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003-11 | |
| dc.description | 21 p. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight against a new duty, potentially making this threat hollow and collusion less likely. We show that the multinational may therefore choose to submit to a tariff even under collusion since evidence indicates that duties are more difficult to remove than initiate. In this way, it is possible to obtain a greater degree of commitment, although it comes at a cost. Nevertheless, we show that this can be a more profitable strategy than those previously explored. In fact, we find several cases where subsidiaries of multinational firms have indeed filed for protection from their own parents. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 205422 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/261 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2003-36 | |
| dc.subject | Antidumping | en |
| dc.subject | Collusion | en |
| dc.subject | Foreign direct investment | en |
| dc.title | Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |