Regime Security Theory: Why Do States With No Clear Strategic Security Concerns Obtain Nuclear Weapons?

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dc.contributor.authorBeasley, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-23T23:28:13Z
dc.date.available2009-11-23T23:28:13Z
dc.date.issued2009-09
dc.descriptionviii, 151 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.en_US
dc.description.abstractCurrent realist explanations of why states decide to develop nuclear weapons cannot account for the behavior of states that lack a clear strategic threat. An alternative explanation is necessary to explain such behavior. I argue that domestic regimes in states with no clear strategic threat may develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure their survival. Such regimes are internationally isolated, under pressure from major powers in the international system and possess some preexisting nuclear capacity. Under these conditions, increasing domestic instability causes regimes to pursue a course of nuclear development. Nuclear weapons allow a regime to change the preferences of the great powers that would otherwise prefer to see the regime overthrown. If the regime possesses nuclear weapons, because of the costs and risks associated with those weapons, the great power will favor maintenance of the status quo and may even prop up a regime it intensely dislikes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCommittee in Charge: Lars Skalnes, Chair; Jane Cramer; Mikhail Myagkoven_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/9975
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon theses, Dept. of Political Science, M.S., 2009;
dc.subjectNuclear weapons
dc.titleRegime Security Theory: Why Do States With No Clear Strategic Security Concerns Obtain Nuclear Weapons?en_US
dc.title.alternativeWhy Do States With No Clear Strategic Security Concerns Obtain Nuclear Weapons?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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