Does the Criminal Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law Deter Environmental Crime? The Case of The U.S. Clean Air Act
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Date
2023-04-28
Authors
Ozymy, Joshua
Ozymy, Melissa Jarrell
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Oregon School of Law
Abstract
The U.S. EPA and Department of Justice are tasked with the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes occurring under the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA). Criminal sanctions are meant to increase the cost of CAA crimes relative to the economic benefit, with the goal of deterring specific individuals and firms from offending and providing general deterrence indirectly via observation of other potential offenders. Prior research has examined sanctioning under the CAA, but little examines the plausibility of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Through content analysis of all 2,588 criminal prosecutions resulting from the EPA’s criminal investigations between 1983 and 2019, we explore the probability of detection and prosecution for all CAA prosecutions. Results show the probability of detection and prosecution to be very low across the regulated community. We conclude by offering three remedies for improving the plausibility of deterrence, including enhancing resources to impose sanctions, developing greater community involvement in enforcement efforts, and raising the profile and salience of criminal enforcement activities.
Description
36 pages
Keywords
U.S. Clean Air Act, Environmental crime, Environmental Protection Agency
Citation
38 J. Env’t. L. & Litig. 73