Does the Criminal Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law Deter Environmental Crime? The Case of The U.S. Clean Air Act

dc.contributor.authorOzymy, Joshua
dc.contributor.authorOzymy, Melissa Jarrell
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-01T14:52:13Z
dc.date.available2023-05-01T14:52:13Z
dc.date.issued2023-04-28
dc.description36 pagesen_US
dc.description.abstractThe U.S. EPA and Department of Justice are tasked with the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes occurring under the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA). Criminal sanctions are meant to increase the cost of CAA crimes relative to the economic benefit, with the goal of deterring specific individuals and firms from offending and providing general deterrence indirectly via observation of other potential offenders. Prior research has examined sanctioning under the CAA, but little examines the plausibility of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Through content analysis of all 2,588 criminal prosecutions resulting from the EPA’s criminal investigations between 1983 and 2019, we explore the probability of detection and prosecution for all CAA prosecutions. Results show the probability of detection and prosecution to be very low across the regulated community. We conclude by offering three remedies for improving the plausibility of deterrence, including enhancing resources to impose sanctions, developing greater community involvement in enforcement efforts, and raising the profile and salience of criminal enforcement activities.en_US
dc.identifier.citation38 J. Env’t. L. & Litig. 73en_US
dc.identifier.issn1049-0280
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/28215
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon School of Lawen_US
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.en_US
dc.subjectU.S. Clean Air Acten_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental crimeen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental Protection Agencyen_US
dc.titleDoes the Criminal Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law Deter Environmental Crime? The Case of The U.S. Clean Air Acten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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