Democratic Errors
| dc.contributor.author | Fender, John | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ellis, Christopher J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-09T17:24:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-01-09T17:24:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-04-01 | |
| dc.description | 24 p. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper we combine Acemoglu's model of the economic origins of democracy with Lohmann's model of political mass protest. This alllows us to provide an analysis of the economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of rebellion. We are able to derive conditons under which democracy arises peacefully, when it occurs only after a violent rebellion, and when oligarchy persists. We model these posibilities in a world of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible, and where these cascades may involve errors in a paratian sense. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/8265 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2008-2 | |
| dc.subject | Rebellion | en |
| dc.subject | Information cascades | en |
| dc.subject | Democracy | en |
| dc.title | Democratic Errors | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |