Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate
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Date
2005-09-22
Authors
Carpente, Luisa
Casas-Mendez, Balbina
García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)
Nouweland, Anne van den
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Oregon, Dept of Economics
Abstract
In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.
Description
36 p.
Keywords
Strategic games, Coalitional interval games, Superadditive games, Axiomatic characterization