Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

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dc.contributor.authorCarpente, Luisa
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)
dc.contributor.authorCasas-Mendez, Balbina
dc.contributor.authorNouweland, Anne van den
dc.date.accessioned2003-08-18T21:25:56Z
dc.date.available2003-08-18T21:25:56Z
dc.date.issued2003-02-27
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.en
dc.format.extent352256 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/107
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept. of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2003-5
dc.subjectEconomicsen
dc.subjectGamesen
dc.titleValues for strategic games in which players cooperateen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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Economics Working Papers
Nouweland, Anne van den