Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model

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dc.contributor.author Ellis, Christopher J.
dc.contributor.author Fender, John
dc.date.accessioned 2003-08-20T16:35:24Z
dc.date.available 2003-08-20T16:35:24Z
dc.date.issued 2003-06-10
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1794/115
dc.description.abstract We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the "Engine of Growth" is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption. We study both the model’s steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existant empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also does a good job of explaining the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies. en
dc.format.extent 381952 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2003-13
dc.subject Public capital en
dc.subject Growth en
dc.subject Corruption en
dc.subject Economics en
dc.title Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model en
dc.type Working Paper en


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