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dc.contributor.advisorBerk, Geralden_US
dc.contributor.authorChastain, Williamen_US
dc.creatorChastain, Williamen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-26T03:58:37Z
dc.date.available2012-10-26T03:58:37Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1794/12371
dc.description.abstractThe Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture. Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that “proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the army’s philosophy of war.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregonen_US
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved.en_US
dc.subjectIraq Waren_US
dc.subjectMilitary Cultureen_US
dc.subjectOrganizational Changeen_US
dc.titleThe Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. Army, 2005-2007en_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US


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