The Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. Army, 2005-2007

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dc.contributor.advisor Berk, Gerald en_US
dc.contributor.author Chastain, William en_US
dc.creator Chastain, William en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-10-26T03:58:37Z
dc.date.available 2012-10-26T03:58:37Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12371
dc.description.abstract The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture. Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that “proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the army’s philosophy of war. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Oregon en_US
dc.rights All Rights Reserved. en_US
dc.subject Iraq War en_US
dc.subject Military Culture en_US
dc.subject Organizational Change en_US
dc.title The Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. Army, 2005-2007 en_US
dc.type Electronic Thesis or Dissertation en_US


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