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dc.contributor.authorCarpente, Luisa
dc.contributor.authorCasas-Mendez, Balbina
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)
dc.contributor.authorNouweland, Anne van den
dc.date.accessioned2005-12-14T20:04:03Z
dc.date.available2005-12-14T20:04:03Z
dc.date.issued2005-09-22
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1794/1926
dc.description36 p.en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.en
dc.format.extent270306 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2005-16en
dc.subjectStrategic gamesen
dc.subjectCoalitional interval gamesen
dc.subjectSuperadditive gamesen
dc.subjectAxiomatic characterizationen
dc.titleInterval values for strategic games in which players cooperateen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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