dc.contributor.author |
Chopra, Surabhi |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2016-05-04T16:35:54Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2016-05-04T16:35:54Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2016-05-03 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
17 Or. Rev. Int'l. L. 1 (2015) |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
1543-9860 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19846 |
|
dc.description |
70 pages |
en_US |
dc.description.abstract |
In this Article, significant security legislation in India and trace the ways in which it enhances the executive’s powers are examined. I argue that the usual constitutional limits on the executive—electoral democracy, legislative scrutiny, judicial review, and constitutional rights—have failed to restrain the executive’s power and actions under security laws. |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
en_US |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
University of Oregon School of Law |
en_US |
dc.rights |
All Rights Reserved. |
en_US |
dc.subject |
National security laws |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Terrorism |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Organized crime |
en_US |
dc.title |
National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |