Decision Research Faculty Works

Permanent URI for this collection

https://hdl.handle.net/1794/22170

Browse

Now showing 1 - 13 of 13

Open Access
Affect, risk perception and future optimism after the tsunami disaster
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2008-01) Vastfjall, Daniel; Peters, Ellen; Slovic, Paul
Environmental events such as natural disasters may influence the public’s affective reactions and decisions. Shortly after the 2004 Tsunami disaster we assessed how affect elicited by thinking about this disaster influenced risk perceptions and future time perspective in Swedish undergraduates not directly affected by the disaster. An experimental manipulation was used to increase the salience of affect associated with the disaster. In Study 1 we found that participants reminded about the tsunami had a sense that their life was more finite and included fewer opportunities than participants in the control condition (not reminded about the tsunami). In Study 2 we found similar effects for risk perceptions. In addition, we showed that manipulations of ease-of-thought influenced the extent to which affect influenced these risk perceptions, with greater ease of thoughts being associated with greater perceived risks.
Open Access
Affective reactions and context-dependent processing of negations
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2008-12) Rubaltelli, Enrico; Slovic, Paul
Three experiments demonstrate how the processing of negations is contingent on the evaluation context in which the negative information is presented. In addition, the strategy used to process the negations induced different affective reactions toward the stimuli, leading to inconsistency of preference. Participants were presented with stimuli described by either stating the presence of positive features (explicitly positive alternative) or negating the presence of negative features (non-negative alternative). Alternatives were presented for either joint (JE) or separate evaluation (SE). Experiment 1 showed that the non-negative stimuli were judged less attractive than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Experiment 2 revealed that the non-negative stimuli induced a less clear and less positive feeling when they were paired with explicitly positive stimuli rather than evaluated separately. Non-negative options were also found less easy to judge than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that people process negations using two different models depending on the evaluation mode. Through a memory task, we found that in JE people process the non-negative attributes as negations of negative features, whereas in SE they directly process the non-negative attributes as positive features.
Open Access
Cultural Evaluations of Risk: "Values" or "Blunders"?
(Harvard Law School, 2006) Kahan, Dan; Slovic, Paul
What are the respective contributions of culture and rationality to risk perception? Do disagreements between lay persons and experts (and among members of both groups) originate in conflicting values, differing abilities to comprehend technical information, or both? If conflicting values do play a role, should the law be responsive to popular perceptions of risk even when expert regulators believe that popular beliefs are w1'ong? These are the central questions in the debate between Professor Sunstein and us. We take the position that cultural worldviews pervade popular (not to mention expert) risk assessments and that a genuine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such perceptions as products of ''bounded rationality. "1 Sunstein disagrees.1 The critical impo1t of Sunstein 's arguments notwithstanding, we are grateful for his thoughtful reply to our review essay. We now respond to two of Sunstein 's criticisms, one methodological and the other substantive.
Open Access
"If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and Genocide
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2007) Slovic, Paul
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are "one of many" in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity - a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome. One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths represent dry statistics, "human beings with the tears dried off," that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological deficiencies described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other forms of mass murder.
Open Access
"If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and Genocide
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2007-04) Slovic, Paul
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are "one of many" in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our humanity - a deficiency that, once identified, might possibly be overcome. One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths represent dry statistics, "human beings with the tears dried off," that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological deficiencies described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other forms of mass murder.
Open Access
Imagery, Affect, and Decision Making
(Decision Research, 1998-03-11) Slovic, Paul; MacGregor, Donald G.; Peters, Ellen
Traditionally, the principal focus of research on judgment and decision making has been largely cognitive and rationalistic. More recently, however, decision-making researchers have acknowledged the role of non-cognitive factors and have offered limited accounts of how affect and imagery influence processes associated with judgment and choice. The present paper extends this direction by offering evidence from three studies conducted in widely diverse contexts that support the view that the concepts of mental imagery and affect can provide a powerful framework for predicting both intended and actual behavior from relatively simple image elicitation techniques. The implications of this evidence are discussed in terms of their significance for imagery and affect to act as organizing principles in theories of judgment and decision making.
Open Access
The impact and acceptability of Canadian-style cigarette warning labels among U.S. smokers and nonsmokers
(2007) Peters, Ellen; Romer, Daniel; Slovic, Paul; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall; Wharfield, Leisha M.; Mertz, C. K.; Carpenter, Stephanie M.
Open Access
Informing Decisions to Prevent Genocide
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012) Vastfjall, Daniel; Slovic, Paul; Gergory, Robin
This paper describes a psychological phenomenon called psychic numbing that devalues lives when many are at stake and thus enables political leaders to neglect mass suffering, in violation of our professed humanitarian values. The authors argue for the need to use tools such as decision analysis to overcome this moral insensitivity and provide a more thoughtful and consistent framework within which to assess the difficult trade-offs posed by decisions involving mass atrocities.
Open Access
Mental Imagery, Impact, and Affect: A Mediation Model for Charitable Giving
(PLoS ONE, 2016-02-09) Dickert, Stephan; Kleber, Janet; Vastfjall, Daniel; Slovic, Paul
One of the puzzling phenomena in philanthropy is that people can show strong compassion for identified individual victims but remain unmoved by catastrophes that affect large numbers of victims. Two prominent findings in research on charitable giving reflect this idiosyncrasy: The (1) identified victim and (2) victim number effects. The first of these suggests that identifying victims increases donations and the second refers to the finding that people’s willingness to donate often decreases as the number of victims increases. While these effects have been documented in the literature, their underlying psychological processes need further study. We propose a model in which identified victim and victim number effects operate through different cognitive and affective mechanisms. In two experiments we present empirical evidence for such a model and show that different affective motivations (donor-focused vs. victim-focused feelings) are related to the cognitive processes of impact judgments and mental imagery. Moreover, we argue that different mediation pathways exist for identifiability and victim number effects.
Open Access
Numeracy as a precursor to pro-social behavior: The impact of numeracy and presentation format on the cognitive mechanisms underlying donation decisions
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2011-10) Dickert, Stephan; Kleber, Janet; Peters, Ellen; Slovic, Paul
Donation requests often convey numerical information about the people in need. In two studies, we investigated the effects of numeracy and presentation format on the underlying affective and cognitive mechanisms of donation decisions. In Study 1, participants were presented with information about a victim in need, either in a frequency format or in a percentage format. In Study 2, we manipulated the identifiability and number of target victims. Our results demonstrate that donations of individuals lower in numeracy were more susceptible to changes in numeric presentation format than those higher in numeracy. Importantly, the underlying mechanisms for donations differed by numeracy. Whereas the mental image of the victim influenced donation decisions of less numerate people only, the estimated impact of a donation was positively correlated with donation amounts for both more and less numerate individuals.
Open Access
The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power
(1996) Peters, Ellen; Slovic, Paul
Recent research in risk perception has examined the role of affect and worldviews as orienting dispositions that guide people's decisions about complex and risky topics such as nuclear energy. This study tests and supports the hypothesis that worldviews and affect-laden imagery and highly predictive of perceptions of risk from nuclear power and support for the technology. Furthermore, affect and worldviews each contribute independently to the prediction of nuclear support. We find also that a person's affective imagery associated with nuclear power is systematically related to their worldviews. We conclude that affect and worldviews appear to play similar roles as orienting mechanisms, helping people navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world. The implication of this view for the practice of risk communication is briefly discussed.
Open Access
Trust, emotion, sex, politics, and science: Surveying the risk-assessment battlefield
(1999) Slovic, Paul
Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept ‘‘risk’’ and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists’ views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
Open Access
What’s bad is easy: Taboo values, affect, and cognition
(Society for Judgment and Decision Making, 2007-06) Lichtenstein, Sarah; Gregory, Robin; Irwin, Julie
Some decision situations are so objectionable or repugnant that people refuse to make a choice. This paper seeks to better understand taboo responses, and to distinguish choices that are truly taboo from those that are merely difficult or confusing. Using 22 scenarios that describe potentially taboo issues, Experiment 1 explores reasons for disapproval of the scenarios. We measure a large number of possible reasons for disapproval and a variety of preference responses (including willingness to accept), in order to test for subtleties in taboo responses. We also test cognitive and affective responses to the scenarios. Experiment 2 further explores the interaction, found in Experiment 1, between affective and cognitive factors. Taken as a whole, our results show that people are able to indicate their disapproval consistently across a variety of preference elicitation methods, that their disapproval is better understood as an attitude measure than as an economic valuation (even when the measure is in monetary terms), and that taboo responses are driven primarily by affect.

Browse

Browsing Decision Research Faculty Works by Subject "Affect"

Results Per Page

Sort Options