Ellis, Christopher J.
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Item Open Access Privatizing the Commons and Economic Degradation(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-05-01) Ellis, Christopher J.; Birdyshaw, Edward Leon, 1969-We develop a dynamic model of the exploitation of an environmental resource with endogenous property rights. We are able to explain both the evolution of property rights and environmental quality. In some circumstances the time path of environmental quality is U-shaped and resembles an Environmental Kuznets Curve. However this patern derives from changes in the property rights regime, not from changes in income.Item Open Access Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-03-01) Ellis, Christopher J.; Dincer, Oguzhan C., 1969-Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Further, using data on government corruption in US states, we provide some new evidence that supports the theoretical findings.Item Open Access Industrial groupings and foreign direct investment(University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-03) Blonigen, Bruce A.; Ellis, Christopher J.; Fausten, DietrichWe explore worldwide foreign direct investment location decisions by Japanese manufacturing firms from 1985 through 1991. Our conditional logit estimates provide evidence that firms’ location decisions are affected by membership in either vertical or horizontal keiretsu. Consistent with previous studies that stress agglomeration effects on firms’ location decisions, we find that the stock of investment in a region by a firm’s vertical keiretsu partners increases the probability of location. Further, we find that the recent flow of investment into a region by a firm’s horizontal keiretsu partners increases the probability of investment to the region, providing evidence of networking effects.Item Open Access Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-10) Ellis, Christopher J.; Fender, JohnWe develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the "Engine of Growth" is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption. We study both the model’s steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existant empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also does a good job of explaining the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies.Item Open Access Competition in Taxes and Performance Requirements for Foreign Direct Investment(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01) Davies, Ronald B.; Ellis, Christopher J.Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.Item Open Access A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications(University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2000-02-01) Ellis, Christopher J.; Nouweland, Anne van denWe construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".