Monetary policy, expectations and commitment
dc.contributor.author | Evans, George W., 1949- | |
dc.contributor.author | Honkapohja, Seppo, 1951- | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2003-08-15T20:46:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2003-08-15T20:46:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002-05-22 | |
dc.description.abstract | Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approxmiate commitment policy. We assess these optimal reaction functions and instrument rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs well on both counts. | en |
dc.format.extent | 568320 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/95 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2002-11 | |
dc.subject | Determinacy | en |
dc.subject | Stability | en |
dc.subject | Adaptive learning | en |
dc.subject | Interest rate setting | en |
dc.subject | Commitment | en |
dc.subject | Microeconomics | en |
dc.subject | Macroeconomics | en |
dc.subject | Monetary policy (Targets, instruments, and effects) | en |
dc.title | Monetary policy, expectations and commitment | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |