Monetary policy, expectations and commitment

dc.contributor.authorEvans, George W., 1949-
dc.contributor.authorHonkapohja, Seppo, 1951-
dc.date.accessioned2003-08-15T20:46:30Z
dc.date.available2003-08-15T20:46:30Z
dc.date.issued2002-05-22
dc.description.abstractCommitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approxmiate commitment policy. We assess these optimal reaction functions and instrument rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs well on both counts.en
dc.format.extent568320 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/95
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept. of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2002-11
dc.subjectDeterminacyen
dc.subjectStabilityen
dc.subjectAdaptive learningen
dc.subjectInterest rate settingen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectMicroeconomicsen
dc.subjectMacroeconomicsen
dc.subjectMonetary policy (Targets, instruments, and effects)en
dc.titleMonetary policy, expectations and commitmenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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