The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate
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Date
2004-02-19
Authors
Carpente, Luisa
Casas-Mendez, Balbina
García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)
Nouweland, Anne van den
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics
Abstract
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervaluebased method to associate coalitional games with strategic games
that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.
Description
12 p.
Keywords
Valuation functions, Game theory, Strategic games, Shapley valuation function, Coalition games