The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate
| dc.contributor.author | Carpente, Luisa | |
| dc.contributor.author | Casas-Mendez, Balbina | |
| dc.contributor.author | García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Nouweland, Anne van den | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2004-10-20T19:55:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2004-10-20T19:55:23Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004-02-19 | |
| dc.description | 12 p. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervaluebased method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function. | en |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologıa, FEDER and Xunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 167178 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1794/235 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2004-3 | |
| dc.subject | Valuation functions | en |
| dc.subject | Game theory | en |
| dc.subject | Strategic games | en |
| dc.subject | Shapley valuation function | en |
| dc.subject | Coalition games | en |
| dc.title | The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |