Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment

dc.contributor.authorEvans, George W., 1949-
dc.contributor.authorHonkapohja, Seppo, 1951-
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-02T23:14:40Z
dc.date.available2005-09-02T23:14:40Z
dc.date.issued2005-04-06
dc.description22 p. 2002-05-27, Revised 2005-04-06en
dc.description.abstractThis is a revised and shortened version of Working Paper 2002-11. Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs particularly well on both counts.en
dc.format.extent284674 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/1309
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2005-11en
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectInterest rate settingen
dc.subjectAdaptive learningen
dc.subjectStabilityen
dc.subjectDeterminacyen
dc.titleMonetary Policy, Expectations and Commitmenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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