Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

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dc.contributor.authorEllis, Christopher J.
dc.contributor.authorDincer, Oguzhan C., 1969-
dc.date.accessioned2005-03-22T22:28:07Z
dc.date.available2005-03-22T22:28:07Z
dc.date.issued2005-03-01
dc.description16 p.en
dc.description.abstractSeveral empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Further, using data on government corruption in US states, we provide some new evidence that supports the theoretical findings.en
dc.format.extent144785 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1794/656
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers ; 2005-5
dc.subjectCorruptionen
dc.subjectDecentralizationen
dc.subjectYardstick competitionen
dc.titleCorruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competitionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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Ellis, Christopher J.