Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

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dc.contributor.author Carpente, Luisa
dc.contributor.author García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio)
dc.contributor.author Casas-Mendez, Balbina
dc.contributor.author Nouweland, Anne van den
dc.date.accessioned 2003-08-18T21:25:56Z
dc.date.available 2003-08-18T21:25:56Z
dc.date.issued 2003-02-27
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1794/107
dc.description.abstract In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games. en
dc.format.extent 352256 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics en
dc.relation.ispartofseries University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2003-5
dc.subject Economics en
dc.subject Games en
dc.title Values for strategic games in which players cooperate en
dc.type Working Paper en


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