Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI
Datum
2003-11
Autor:innen
Zeitschriftentitel
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Bandtitel
Verlag
University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics
Zusammenfassung
It is well established that the threat of antidumping duties can help sustain collusion between a foreign firm and its domestic counterpart. However, when the foreign firm is a multinational, its subsidiary will fight against a new duty, potentially making this threat hollow and collusion less likely. We show that the multinational may therefore choose to submit to a tariff even under collusion since evidence indicates that duties are more difficult to remove than initiate. In this way, it is possible to obtain a greater degree of commitment, although it comes at a cost. Nevertheless, we show that this can be a more profitable strategy than those previously explored. In fact, we find several cases where subsidiaries of multinational firms have indeed filed for protection from their own parents.
Beschreibung
21 p.
Schlagwörter
Antidumping, Collusion, Foreign direct investment