Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof

Show full item record

Title: Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof
Author: Nouweland, Anne van den
Abstract: I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
Description: 7 p.
Date: 2007-09-12

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
UO-2007-12_Nouweland_Rocks.pdf 125.5Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record