Department of Economics

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Browsing Department of Economics by Author "Casas-Mendez, Balbina"

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    Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate
    (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2005-09-22) Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den
    In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.
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    The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2004-02-19) Carpente, Luisa; Casas-Mendez, Balbina; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Nouweland, Anne van den
    In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervaluebased method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.
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    Values for strategic games in which players cooperate
    (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-02-27) Carpente, Luisa; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Casas-Mendez, Balbina; Nouweland, Anne van den
    In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.