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dc.contributor.authorEvans, George W., 1949-
dc.contributor.authorHonkapohja, Seppo, 1951-
dc.date.accessioned2003-08-15T21:20:11Z
dc.date.available2003-08-15T21:20:11Z
dc.date.issued2002-11-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1794/102
dc.description.abstractWe review the recent work on interest rate setting, which emphasizes the desirability of designing policy to ensure stability under private agent learning. Appropriately designed expectations based rules can yield optimal rational expectations equilibria that are both determinate and stable under learning. Some simple instrument rules and approximate targeting rules also have these desirable properties. We take up various complications in implementing optimal policy, including the observability of key variables and the required knowledge of structural parameters. An additional issue that we take up concerns the implications of expectation shocks not arising from transitional learning effects.en
dc.format.extent450560 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Oregon, Dept. of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers;2002-18
dc.subjectExpectation shocksen
dc.subjectStabilityen
dc.subjectAdaptive learningen
dc.subjectInterest rate settingen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectMicroeconomicsen
dc.subjectMacroeconomicsen
dc.titleAdaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Designen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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