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  • Davies, Ronald B.; Gresik, Thomas A. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-01-01)
    This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-03)
    This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Eckel, Carsten (University of Oregon. Dept of Economics, 2007-02)
    This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium ...
  • Davies, Ronald B.; Egger, Hartmut; Egger, Peter (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-04-10)
    This paper studies non-cooperative tax competition between two countries for an international producer. The international producer chooses where to locate its headquarters and whether to serve the overseas market through ...
  • Davies, Ronald B. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-10)
    Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign ...
  • Bania, Neil; Gray, Jo Anna (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2006-06)
    Barro’s (1990) model of endogenous growth implies that economic growth will initially rise with an increase in taxes directed toward “productive” expenditures (e.g., education, highways, and streets), but will subsequently ...
  • Eberts, Randall W.; Hollenbeck, Kevin; Stone, Joe A. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-02-01)
    No abstract submitted.
  • Blonigen, Bruce A.; Kolpin, Van (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
    The active "courting" of firms by municipalities, regions, and even nations has a long-standing history and the competition for firm location through a wide variety of incentives seems to have escalated to new heights in ...
  • Blonigen, Bruce A.; Kolpin, Van (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2003-09-01)
    The active "courting" of firms by municipalities, regions, and even nations has a long-standing history and the competition for firm location through a wide variety of incentives seems to have escalated to new heights in ...
  • DeShazo, J. R.; Cameron, Trudy Ann; Saenz, Manrique, 1971- (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-11-05)
    We develop and evaluate a test of choice set misspecification for a multinomial logit choice model. This test determines whether the choice set designated by the researcher mistakenly assigns relevant substitutes to the ...
  • Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2007-10)
    We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of ...
  • Liday, Steven G.; Vesterlund, Lise; Harbaugh, William; Krause, Kate (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2002-03-22)
    In this paper we study trust/reciprocity behavior in children ages eight to eighteen using an augmented version of Berg et al.â s (1995) trust game. This study is intended to inspect and reveal when certain aspects of ...
  • Andreoni, James; Harbaugh, William (University of Oregon, Dept of Economics, 2009-12)
    Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over a small number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments often demonstrate contradictions of standard expected ...
  • Cameron, Trudy Ann (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-07-14)
    Willingness to support public programs for risk management often depends on individual subjective risk perceptions in the face of uncertain science. As part of a larger study concerning climate change, we explore individual ...
  • Carpente, Luisa; García-Jurado, I. (Ignacio); Casas-Mendez, Balbina; Nouweland, Anne van den (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-02-27)
    In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method ...
  • Harbaugh, William (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2001-06-01)
    Governments can and do adopt many policies that will improve the health and reduce the mortality risks of children. Given this, estimates of the value of improvements in children’s health and reductions in their mortality ...
  • Bhattacharya, Joydeep; Chakraborty, Shankha (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-02-14)
    Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby opening up the role for institutions, (ii) ...
  • Barron, John M.; Waddell, Glen R. (University of Oregon, Dept. of Economics, 2003-06-01)
    This paper examines the optimal compensation package for executives, in particular the optimal mix of stock options and stock grants, for an agent deciding whether to adopt or reject a plan of uncertain value. The compensation ...

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